In March 2006, the Bush Administration proposed legislation to create an exception for India from certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate a future nuclear cooperation agreement. After hearings in April and May, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered bills in late June 2006 to provide an exception for India to certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act related to a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. On July 26, 2006, the House passed its version of the legislation, H.R. 5682, by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate incorporated the text of S. 3709, as amended, into H.R. 5682 and passed that bill by a vote of 85 to 12. The Senate insisted on its amendment, and a conference committee produced a conference report on December 7, 2006. The House agreed to the conference report (H.Rept. 109-721) on December 8 in a 330-59 vote; the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to the conference report on December 9. The President signed the bill into law (P.L. 109-401) on December 18, 2006.
The Senate and House versions of the India bill contained similar provisions, with four differences. The Senate version contained an additional requirement for the President to execute his waiver authority, an amendment introduced by Senator Harkin and adopted by unanimous consent that the President determine that India is "fully and actively participating in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction and contain Iran for its nuclear program." This provision was watered down into a reporting requirement in the conference report. The Senate version also had two unique sections related to the cooperation agreement, Sections 106 and 107, both of which appear in the conference report. Section 106 (now Section 104 (d) (4)) prohibits exports of equipment, material or technology related for uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing or heavy water production unless conducted in a multinational facility participating in a project approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or in a facility participating in a bilateral or multilateral project to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. Section 107 (now Section 104 (d) (5)) would establish a program to monitor that U.S. technology is being used appropriately by Indian recipients. Finally, the Senate version also contained the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol in Title II, which was retained in the conference bill. Minor differences in reporting requirements and statements of policy are compared in Table I of this report.
This report provides a thematic side-by-side comparison of the provisions of the conference report with H.R. 5682 as passed by the House and by the Senate, and compares them with the Administration's initially proposed legislation, H.R. 4974/S. 2429, and the conference report. The report concludes with a list of CRS resources that provide further discussion and more detailed analysis of the issues addressed by the legislation summarized in the table. This report will not be updated.
In July 2005, President Bush announced his intention to conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India. India, which is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered under U.S. law to be a non-nuclear weapon state, yet has tested nuclear weapons and has an ongoing nuclear weapons program. For these reasons, the President would need to make certain waivers and determinations pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) before nuclear cooperation with a state such as India could proceed.
The Administration proposed legislation (introduced as H.R. 4974/ S. 2429) in March 2006 that, in addition to providing waivers of relevant provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129), would have allowed a nuclear cooperation agreement with India to enter into force without a vote from Congress, as though it conformed to AEA requirements. On July 26, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5682 by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate passed H.R. 5682 by a vote of 85 to12, substituting the text of S. 3709 as an engrossed amendment; the Senate insisted on its amendment, necessitating a conference to resolve differences between the bills. On December 7, conferees filed a conference report, and on December 8, the House approved the conference report by a vote of 330 to 59; the Senate approved the conference report by unanimous consent in the early hours of December 9. On December 18, President Bush signed the bill into law, P.L. 109-401. His signing statement is discussed in more detail below.
The House International Relations Committee met on June 27, 2006 to consider H.R. 5682, "United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006," introduced on June 26 by Representative Hyde.1 The Committee voted to adopt 6 of 12 amendments (one was withdrawn):
An amendment by Ms. Berkley to prohibit any Indian spent fuel from being stored in the United States was rejected by a vote of 15-19. The Committee also voted down four other amendments, including two by Representative Berman designed to place limits on U.S. cooperation until India halts production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The first Berman amendment, rejected by a vote of 13-32, sought to condition the President's use of waiver authority (by adding a new determination by the President in Section 4 (b) of the bill) on India's adherence to a unilateral or multilateral moratorium or a multilateral treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The second amendment, rejected by a vote of 12-31, sought to restrict transfers of U.S. nuclear material under a cooperation agreement until such time that India halted fissile material production for weapons, either by adhering to a unilateral or multilateral moratorium, or a multilateral treaty. The Committee also rejected by a vote of 10-32 an amendment by Representative Sherman to condition the President's use of waiver authority on an additional determination, under Section 4 (b) of H.R. 5682, that India's nuclear weapons program was not using more domestic uranium than it had before July 2005. The amendment would have attached an annual certification that required termination of nuclear cooperation if the certification could not be made. Finally, the Committee rejected, by a vote of 4-37, an amendment by Representative Lee that would have required India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) before the President could exercise his waiver authority.
The Committee on Rules held a hearing on July 25th to consider amendments to H.R. 5682 and procedures for handling the bill on the floor. H. Res 947 waived all points of order against the bill, specified the allowed amendments and limited floor debate to one hour. The following six amendments were allowed to be offered on the floor:2
Three amendments were not allowed for consideration on the floor.3 These were
The House first considered H. Res 947, which, after several objections to limits on time and the exclusion of certain amendments by Representative Markey and others, passed by a vote of 311 to 112. Of the six amendments considered, three passed by voice vote (the Managers' amendment, Representatives Jackson-Lee/Burton's amendment, and Representative Fortenberry's amendment); Representative Stearn's amendment was recorded as 414-0, and the amendments offered by Representatives Sherman and Berman were defeated (the votes, respectively, were 155 to 268, and 184 to 241).
Representative Markey made a motion to recommit the legislation back to the House International Relations Committee with instructions to include language that would require that nuclear cooperation with India could only commence after the president has determined that the United States has secured India's full support in preventing Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. That motion to recommit was defeated in a vote of 192 to 235.
The House passed H.R. 5682, "Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006," as amended, by 359 to 68 on July 26, 2006.
On June 29, 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered original legislation, S. 3709, to create an exception for India from relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (See S.Rept. 109-288).4 The Committee voted to adopt 2 of 3 amendments:
The Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Feingold requiring an additional presidential determination in Section 105 of the bill by a vote of 5-13. The Feingold amendment would have conditioned the President's use of waiver authority on a determination that U.S. civil nuclear assistance to India would in no way assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture nuclear weapons or nuclear devices. The amendment was identical in text to the Schiff amendment to H.R. 5682, but sought instead to require a determination rather than a report.
An initial attempt to bring S. 3709 to the Senate floor in September failed to gain unanimous consent agreement. Among several issues, two apparently delayed the bill—language in Title II pertaining to implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol, and potential concern about whether the United States would accept U.S.-origin spent fuel back from Indian reactors. In the first case, concerns appeared to be mostly resolved by incorporating language into a manager's amendment, with the exception of two issues raised by Senator Ensign in two amendments he introduced on the floor on November 16th that did not pass. These are described in more detail below. In the second case, the concern about disposition of Indian spent fuel was dropped prior to the bill's reaching the floor.
On November 15, 2006, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to consider S. 3709, at a time to be determined by the Majority Leader, in consultation with the Democratic Leader.5 The unanimous consent agreement specified that a managers' amendment would serve as the original text for the purpose of further amendment; and that the only other amendments to be considered would include the following: Senators Ensign (considered in closed session), Reed, Levin, Obama, Dorgan (two amendments), Feingold, Boxer, Feinstein, Harkin, Bingaman (up to seven amendments), Kennedy, and Dodd. Of these, Senators Reed, Levin, Kennedy, and Dodd did not introduce amendments, and Senator Bingaman introduced three, rather than seven. All but Senator Feingold's amendment were considered to be relevant second-degree amendments and related to the subject matter of the bill. Further, the unanimous consent agreement provided that once the bill was read a third time, the Senate would begin consideration of H.R. 5682, the House-passed companion, striking all text after the enacting clause and inserting the amended text of S. 3709 in its place.
Senator Lugar introduced the bill and offered a section-by-section analysis.6 The following amendments, in brief, were passed either by unanimous consent or voice vote without debate:
Senator Lugar's amendment, S.Amdt. 5168 contained minor changes in Title I of S. 3709 as reported out of Committee. One potentially significant change was the deletion of a Sense of Congress on licensing policy in Section 106. In Title II, however, which contains the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol,10 significant provisions were added. These included Section 202 on findings, Section 251 (3), and Sections 254, 261, 262 and 271-275. In his opening statement, Senator Lugar reported that "a compromise was reached between the Administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and those Senators who expressed concern about the IAEA Additional Protocol implementing legislation."11 These additional provisions appear to make explicit existing U.S. rights to exclude inspectors and certain kinds of inspection activities under the Additional Protocol. Several of the modifications address the use of environmental sampling, both for specific locations and for detecting anomalies in a wide-area mode.
Other amendments were introduced, debated, and defeated. These included the following:
Most of these amendments were characterized by Senators Lugar and Biden as "killer amendments." Senator Bingaman described his amendment as implementing a proposal by former Senator Nunn.18 Senator Dorgan's amendment supporting U.S. implementation of U.N. Security Council 1172 sought to reaffirm U.S. support for the steps endorsed by the U.N. Security Council following the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, including limits on those nuclear programs such as a ban on deployments, and fissile material production for weapons, as well as a commitment on all states' parts not to sell nuclear technology to India and Pakistan. Senator Dorgan's other amendment, S.Amdt. 5182, was similar to Representative Barbara Lee's amendment to the House bill that was rejected by the House Rules Committee. That amendment attempted to commit India to undertake the same obligations as other nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Senator Feingold's amendment was similar to the one he introduced in Committee that was rejected. Although modified to address objections voiced in the mark-up, the amendment was described by Senator Lugar on the floor as requiring a certification that would have been "impossible to make."19 Senator Ensign's amendment was debated in closed session, apparently because of the potential need to discuss classified information relating to the protection of national security information during IAEA inspections under an Additional Protocol in the United States.
On December 7, 2006, conferees on H.R. 5682 filed Conference Report H.Rept. 109-721. The bill essentially combines many of the provisions of both the House and Senate versions. Specific differences are highlighted in Table 1, below. Of note, the Senate provisions to ban enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production cooperation with India (now Section 104. (d) (4)) and create an end-use monitoring program (now Section 104.(d) (5)) prevailed in the conference bill, as did Title II, which includes the implementing legislation of the U.S. Additional Protocol. The so-called Harkin amendment, which added a determination that India was fully and actively supporting U.S. and international efforts to contain, dissuade, and sanction Iran for its nuclear weapons program, did not remain as a determination, but became two reporting requirements: first, as a one-time report when the Section 123 agreement is submitted to Congress (now Section 104.(c)(2)(H)) and as an annual reporting requirement (now Section 104.(g)(2)(E)).
On December 18, 2006, President Bush signed the "Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006" into law (P.L. 109-401). President Bush noted that the act "will strengthen the strategic relationship between the United States and India."20 In particular, President Bush stated that the executive branch would construe two sections of the bill as "advisory" only: policy statements in Section 103 and the restriction contained in Section 104 (d) (2) on transferring items to India that would not meet NSG guidelines. On the first, the President cited the Constitution's "commitment to the presidency of the authority to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs;" on the second, the President raised the question of whether the provision "unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to an international body." In other words, the President was questioning whether Congress were ceding authority to approve U.S. exports to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. However, U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Rice, have formally told Congress multiple times that the United States government would abide by NSG guidelines. The President's signing statement also noted that the executive branch would construe "provisions of the Act that mandate, regulate, or prohibit submission of information to the Congress, an international organization, or the public, such as sections 104, 109, 261, 271, 272, 273, 274, and 275, in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to protect and control information that could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties." This could suggest that the executive branch might limit the scope of reporting required by Congress in those sections.
Table 1. Comparison of Current Legislation on Waivers for U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation
|
Issue |
Description/Purpose |
H.R. 5682 |
H.R. 5682 |
H.R. 5682 |
|
|
Waiver authority |
Provides authority for President to waive Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requirements. |
Section 1 (a): President may waive sections of AEA (see below) if he makes a determination. |
Section 4 (a): |
Section 104 (a): |
Section 104 (a): |
|
Section 123 a. (2) of Atomic Energy Act (AEA) |
Full-scope safeguards. |
Section 1 (a) (1): Waived AND the future cooperation agreement enters into force as though it met all Section 123 a. requirements (does not require a Joint Resolution of Approval). |
Section 4 (a) (1): |
Section 104 (a) (1): |
Section 104 (a) (1): |
|
Section 128 of AEA |
Annual review by Congress of export license for an agreement exempted from full-scope safeguards requirement. |
Section 1 (a) (2): Application of Section 128 waived without conditions. |
Section 4 (a) (2): |
Section 104 (a) (2): |
Section 104 (a) (2): |
|
Section 129 of AEA |
a. Terminate U.S. nuclear exports if President determines that a (1) non-nuclear weapon state: |
Section 1 (a) (3): |
Section 4 (a) (3): |
Section 104 (a) (3): |
Section 104 (a) (3): |
|
Determination |
Establishes threshold for President to use waiver authority. |
Section 1b: |
Section 4 (b): |
Section 105: |
Section 104 (b): |
|
Separation plan |
Identification of Indian civilian nuclear facilities to US and IAEA. |
(1) India has provided to US and IAEA a credible plan to separate civil and military facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities with the IAEA. |
Section 4 (b) (1): |
Section 105 (1) and (2) |
Section 104 (b) (1): |
|
Safeguards plan |
India committed to placing additional civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards under the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement. |
(2) Entry into force of safeguards agreement in accordance with IAEA practices for India's civil nuclear facilities as declared in the plan. |
Section 4 (b) (2): |
Section 105 (3) |
Section 104 (b) (2) |
|
Additional Protocol |
An agreement with IAEA to enhance inspections, access, and declarations relevant to safeguards. |
(3) Making satisfactory progress toward implementation. |
Section 4 (b) (3) |
Section 105 (4) |
Section 104 (b) (3) |
|
FMCT |
Future negotiations to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. |
(4) Working with the United States for conclusion of a multilateral FMCT. |
Section 4 (b) (4) |
Section 105 (5) |
Section 104 (b) (4) |
|
Halting enrichment/ reprocessing transfers |
July 18, 2005, commitment by India to support U.S. policy to restrict access to enrichment and reprocessing. |
(5) Supporting international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. |
Section 4 (b) (5) |
Section 105 (6) |
Section 104 (b) (5) |
|
Export controls |
July 18, 2005 commitment by India to strengthen export controls and adhere to international norms, including Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines. |
(6) Ensuring that necessary steps are taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and regulations; and harmonization and adherence to MTCR and NSG guidelines. |
Section 4 (b) (6) |
Section 105 (7) |
Section 104 (b) (6) |
|
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) |
NSG guidelines currently prohibit nuclear transfers to India; a decision must be taken to allow cooperation. NSG operates by consensus. |
(7) Supply to India is consistent with US participation in NSG. This assumes that the NSG will agree to an exception for exports to India. |
Section 4 (b) (7) |
Section 105 (9) |
Section 104 (b) (7) |
|
Iran |
Ensure that India is supporting U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and contain Iran's nuclear program |
NONE |
NONE |
Section 105 (8) |
Senate provision (Harkin amendment) removed and placed in reporting requirements (see Section 104.(c)(2) (H)) and Section 104.(g)(2) (E)). |
|
Report on Determination |
Notify Congress that 7 actions have occurred to allow waiver. |
Section 1 c. |
Section 4 (c) (2): |
Section 105: |
Section 104 (c) (1) and (2) |
|
Termination |
Establish a threshold for halting U.S. exports to India (now contained in Section 129 of the AEA and in the proposed peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement itself, which is not yet drafted). |
Section 1d. |
Section 4 (a) (3): |
Section 104 (a) (3): |
Section 104 (d) (3): |
|
ALSO |
No equivalent provision to H.R. 5682 but Section 108 (b) (3) (A) contains a reporting reqt if India does not comply with NSG guidelines and Section 108 (b) (4) (A) requires an annual certification that India is in full compliance with all July 18, 2005 commitments. |
Section 104 (d) (3): |
|||
|
Sense of Congress |
To describe Congress's policy objectives with respect to nuclear cooperation with India. |
NONE |
Section 2 |
Section 102 |
Section 102 |
|
Statements of Policy (I)* |
To describe U.S. policy objectives, with respect to nonproliferation. |
NONE |
Section 3 (a) General |
Section 103 |
Section 103 (a) |
|
(2) Support peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but only with full NPT compliance. |
No equivalent |
Section 103 (a)(2) |
|||
|
(3) Strengthen NSG implementation, including cutoff of exports for violations. |
Similar to Section 103 (6) on support for NSG. |
Section 103 (a)(3) and Section 103(a) (4). |
|||
|
Statements of Policy (II) |
To describe U.S. policy objectives, with respect to South Asia, U.S.-India bilateral relations, and South Asian proliferation. |
NONE |
Section 3 (b) South Asia |
Section 103 (1), but moratorium does not include China. |
Section 103(b)(1) |
|
(2) FMCT |
No equivalent |
Section 103(b)(2) |
|||
|
(3) Other nonproliferation activities, like PSI, Australia Group, Wassenaar, Convention on Supplementary Compensation. |
Section 103 (2), but no mention of Convention on Supplementary Compensation. |
Section 103(b)(3) |
|||
|
(4) Support for U.S. policies to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. |
No equivalent, but language similar to Section 105 (8) determination |
Section 103(b)(4) |
|||
|
(5) Cap, roll back and eliminate South Asian nuclear arsenals. |
No equivalent |
Section 103(b)(5) |
|||
|
(6) No spent fuel transfer without Congressional approval. |
No equivalent |
Section 103(b)(6) |
|||
|
(7) Encourage cap on production of fissile material for weapons, pending moratorium. |
No equivalent provision |
Section 103(b)(7) |
|||
|
Statements of Policy (III) |
NONE |
No equivalent provision |
Section 103 (3): Full compliance with all nonproliferation obligations. |
Removed. |
|
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 103 (4): Ensure reliability of safeguards and Additional Protocol. |
Section 103(b)(8) |
|||
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 103 (5): Agreement must meet all other Section 123 a. requirements. |
Section 103(b)(9) |
|||
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 103 (6): Consistency with NSG guidelines. |
Section 103(a)(3) |
|||
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 103 (7): Work with NSG members to restrict transfers of enrichment and reprocessing, also to India. |
Section 103 (a)(5) |
|||
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 103 (8): Maintain support for adherence & compliance with NPT. |
Akin to Section 102 (2). |
|||
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 103 (9): Exports of nuclear fuel to India should not contribute to or encourage India to increase production of fissile material for military uses. |
Removed (see reporting requirements). |
|||
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 114: Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to India should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements |
Section 103 (b)(10) |
|||
|
Expedited procedures |
To provide procedures for expedited consideration of Joint Resolution of Approval. |
None, except as provided already in Section 130 of AEA. |
Section 4 (f) and (g): track with existing law (Section 130 of AEA). |
None, except as provided already in Section 130 of AEA. |
None, except as provided already in Section 130 of AEA. |
|
End-Use Monitoring |
To provide reasonable assurances that the recipient is complying with relevant requirements, terms and conditions of U.S. export licenses. |
NONE |
NONE |
Section 107 requires following measures: (1) Obtain and implement assurances and conditions regarding end-use monitoring; (2) a detailed system of reporting on technology transfers, including those authorized by Section 57 b of AEA. (3) Fall-back safeguards, should IAEA be unable to implement safeguards in India. |
Section 104 (d)(5) |
|
Restrictions on cooperation |
NONE |
Section 4 (d) |
No equivalent but similar concept behind Section 106, Section 103 (9) |
Section 104 (d) |
|
|
(2) No transfers if they would violate NSG guidelines. |
Similar to Section 103 (6): to act in a manner fully consistent with NSG guidelines (but this is only a Statement of Policy). |
Section 104 (d)(2)* |
|||
|
(4) President should seek to prevent cooperation by other states with India if United States terminates exports. |
Section 102 (6): United States should not seek to facilitate cooperation by other states with India if United States terminates exports. |
Similar to Section 102 (13). |
|||
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 106 |
Section 104 (d)(4) |
|||
|
Other reporting |
NONE |
Section 4 (j) (1): annual report on U.S. policy objectives for South Asia (i.e., steps taken by the United States and India, extent of success, and cooperation by other countries). |
No equivalent provision |
Removed |
|
|
Section 4 (j) (2) |
Section 108 (b) (6) Section 108 (b) (7) |
Section 104 (g) (2) (H) and Section 104 (g) (2) (J) |
|||
|
Other reporting, continued |
NONE |
Section 4 (j) (3): annual report on new Indian nuclear facilities. |
Section 108 (b) (2): list of licenses approved by NRC, DOE, Commerce or any other U.S. authorizations of exports and reexports of nuclear materials and equipment. |
Section 104 (g) (2) (B) |
|
|
Section 4 (j) (4): annual report on India's spent fuel disposal. |
No equivalent provision |
Section 104 (g) (2) (L) |
|||
|
Section 4 (j) (5): annual report on growth in India's military fissile material production, to include information on Indian uranium mining, electricity production, domestic uranium used in civilian electricity production, & military fissile material production, etc. |
Section 108 (b) (1): description of additional nuclear facilities/materials India places under IAEA safeguards. Section 108 (a) (3): Implementation & Compliance Report; Information on Nuclear Activities of India; "significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced." See also Section 108 (b) (6). |
Section 104 (g) (2) (A) |
|||
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 108 (b) (3): Any significant nuclear commerce between India and other countries that does not comply with NSG guidelines, or would not meet standards applied to U.S.-origin material. |
Section 104 (g) (2) (C) |
|||
|
Other Presidential certifications |
NONE |
NONE |
Section 108 (b) (4): That India is in full compliance with following obligations (listed in Section 108 (a) (1)): Joint Statement commitments, separation plan, safeguards agreement, Additional Protocol, 123 agreement, terms and conditions of approved export licenses. If certification is not possible, report on steps, responses and implications. |
Section 104 (g) (2) |
|
|
Consultation with Congress |
NONE |
Section 4 (e (2): Requires monthly consultations with Congress on progress in 123 agreement negotiations and IAEA safeguards agreement negotiations. |
No equivalent provision |
Removed |
|
|
No equivalent provision |
Section 108 (a): keep Congress fully informed on India's: |
Section 104 (g) (1)) |
|||
|
Program for cooperative threat reduction |
To further common nonproliferation goals, including scientific research and development efforts related to nuclear nonproliferation, with emphasis on nuclear safeguards. |
NONE |
NONE |
Section 115 |
Section 109 |
|
TITLE II |
Implementing Legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol. |
NONE |
NONE |
Entire Title II |
Title II |
CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
CRS Report RL33292, India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, by [author name scrubbed].
CRS Report RL33072, U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements and "Global Partnership", by [author name scrubbed].
CRS Report RS22474, Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons: Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT), by [author name scrubbed].
| 1. |
The National Journal and Congressional Quarterly wrote reports of the HIRC markup, available at http://nationaljournal.com/members/markups/2006/06/mr_20060627_5.htm and http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/committees/109/committees109-2006062700228055.html@committees&metapub=CQ-COMMITTEEMARKUPS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=1. |
| 2. |
See the description in H.Rept. 109-599, "Providing for Consideration of H.R. 5682, United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006," Congressional Record, July 25, 2006, p. H5820. |
| 3. |
A fourth amendment, proposed by Mr. Hyde, would have implemented a Congressional review process for arms sales and exports under the Arms Export Control Act, but this amendment was withdrawn. |
| 4. |
Details on the mark-up are available at Congressional Quarterly, http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/committees/109/committees109-2006062900228090.html@committees&metapub=CQ-COMMITTEEMARKUPS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=1 for report of the markup. |
| 5. |
Congressional Record, November 15, 2006, p. S. 10941-42, daily edition. |
| 6. |
See Senator Lugar's opening statement in the Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10982-84, daily edition. |
| 7. |
See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11021, daily edition, for the colloquy between Senator Obama and the managers of the bill on the subject of limiting nuclear fuel reserves to provide a disincentive for India to conduct future nuclear tests. |
| 8. |
See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10996, daily edition, for Senator Harkin's description of the amendment. |
| 9. |
See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S. 11003, daily edition for the text of Senator Bingaman's amendments, S.Amdt. 5179 and S.Amdt. 5180. |
| 10. |
The Additional Protocol is a protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements under the Nuclear Nonproliferaton Treaty (NPT) which enhances the IAEA's inspection rights, methods, and information. The model agreement is INFCIRC/540. Nuclear weapon states have modified the model to include provisions for national security exclusions, because of their weapons status. The United States signed its additional protocol in 1998, and the Senate gave its consent for ratification in 2004, but the additional protocol requires implementing legislation to enter into force. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out such implementing legislation, S. 2489, in April 2006. |
| 11. |
Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10984, daily edition. |
| 12. |
Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S. 10998-11001, daily edition, for Senator Bingaman's explanation of his amendments and responses by Senators Lugar and Biden.. |
| 13. |
Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11001, daily edition. |
| 14. |
Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11009, daily edition, for text of Ensign amendment. The debate was held in closed session. |
| 15. |
See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11006, daily edition, for Senator Dorgan's introduction of the amendment and debate. |
| 16. |
See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11011-15, daily edition, for Senator Feingold's introduction of the amendment and debate. |
| 17. |
See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11016-11019, daily edition, for Senator Boxer's introduction of the amendment and debate. |
| 18. |
Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S109998-11000, daily edition. |
| 19. |
Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11014, daily edition. |
| 20. |
See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061218-12.html. |