Order Code RS22409
Updated December 21, 2006
NATO and Energy Security
Paul Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Energy security is becoming an issue of increasing importance to the United States
and its European allies, as some energy producers are showing a tendency to use oil and
gas for political leverage. Although most European allies believe that a market solution
exists to ensure security of energy supplies, NATO has begun to discuss the issue as an
allied concern. This report1 will be updated periodically. See also CRS Report
RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Vincent Morelli.
Energy as a Security Issue
Over the last several years, the view has grown that the power to ensure access to
international energy resources has shifted away from energy consumers to energy
producers. The growth of China and India as large consumers of energy, coupled with an
inability to develop reliable and affordable alternatives to oil and natural gas, has led to
this development.2 In December 2005-January 2006, when Russia dramatically raised the
price of natural gas that it was supplying to Ukraine, many saw an effort to squeeze
Ukraine politically and economically to secure Kiev within Russia’s orbit. Moscow’s
effort also underscored the shift towards the ability of energy producers to exert pressure
on countries dependent upon them for supplies.3
The United States and its European allies have begun to discuss the appropriate
institutions and policies for ensuring energy security. The Bush Administration introduced
a discussion of energy security at NATO in February 2006, with the support of key allies
such as Britain and Germany. At the same time, EU governments view energy security
in a broad manner, and most believe that political and economic measures are the first
1 This study was originally a memorandum for Senator Richard Lugar and is printed as a CRS
report with his permission.
2 Paolo Scaroni, “Europeans Must Face the Threat to Energy Supplies,” Financial Times, Jan.
18, 2006, p. 15. Scaroni is head of ENI, the large Italian energy firm.
3 See CRS Report RS22378, Russia’s Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine: Context and
Implications, by Bernard Gelb, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel.

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steps to ensure access to energy resources. Most EU members are also members of
NATO, and energy security may emerge as an issue handled in a complementary manner
by the two organizations.
European Views on Energy Security
Most European countries are heavily reliant upon imported energy. Today, EU
countries as a whole import 50% of their energy needs, a figure expected to rise to 70%
by 2030. Russia is a key supplier of oil and natural gas. Germany imports 32% of its
energy from Russia. Poland imports two-thirds of its natural gas needs from Russia, and
97% of its oil. As a whole, EU countries import 25% of their energy needs from Russia.
In one estimate, by 2030 EU countries will import 40% of their gas needs from Russia,
and 45% of their oil from the Middle East.4 In addition, oil in particular is found largely
in unstable areas of the world such as the Middle East, a factor in U.S. and European
concerns over energy security.
European governments view energy security issues primarily in an economic and
political context. The EU floated a proposal meant to build interdependence between EU
members and Russia to secure reliable energy supplies from Russia. The EU has
discussed with Russia a structured arrangement in which Russia would sell energy not
only to its principal customers in central and eastern Europe, but to more distant
customers in France, Italy, and Spain. In return, the EU is asking Moscow to allow
European companies to develop Russian energy reserves.5 But Russia has rejected key
elements of this proposal. Moscow has said that it will not allow foreign ownership of its
pipelines, and has squeezed out some foreign companies that have been developing its
energy reserves. At the same time, it has secured access to some European markets, for
example, through agreements to sell gas to Hungary and France.6
Energy competition in the European Union will be regulated by the EU only from
mid-2007, although the degree of that regulation has not been established. To prevent
impediments to competition and to improve energy security, the EU Commission is
urging new infrastructure, including terminals for receiving liquified natural gas; the
construction of new pipelines from the Caspian region and North Africa; and single
European energy grids for both continental electricity and natural gas markets that would
challenge the grip of national energy firms on their national markets.7
Few observers believe that Moscow’s pricing agreement for its gas exports to
Ukraine indicates that the market process is working successfully. Some EU officials say
4 The United States also relies heavily on imported energy. In 1960, the United States imported
18% of its petroleum; in 2003, that figure reached 58%. “Schroeder and Putin Cementing
Relationship,” International Herald Tribune, Sept. 8, 2005, p. 3; “Gas Crisis a Warning for
Europe,” International Herald Tribune, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 3.
5 “Russia Insists It Is Reliable Gas Supplier,” Financial Times, Mar. 14, 2006, p. 5.
6 “Russia defiant on energy,” International Herald Tribune, Dec. 13, 2006, p. 1; and “Gazprom
gains access to Hungary market,” Financial Times, July 14, 2006, p. 4.
7 “EU To Issue Warning on Foreign Energy Use,” International Herald Tribune, Mar. 7, 2006,
p. 1.

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that the agreement lacks transparency, and may mask involvement by criminal enterprises.
They contend that Russia needs European (and other) firms’ good will and continued
investment in its decaying energy infrastructure to maintain existing production and
develop its oil and gas reserves to sell energy products abroad.8
Some EU governments believe that close cooperation with Russia in energy
commerce will not lead to energy security. Poland has raised the possibility of an EU
energy treaty. The treaty would presuppose a continental energy grid able to offer supply
flexibility in the region in the event of an energy shortfall, and would urge larger storage
facilities. The treaty would have a provision similar to NATO’s Article V mutual security
clause, in which a signatory could invoke the aid of its treaty partners, this time to obtain
part of their energy reserves in a period of significant shortage. Germany has opposed
such an arrangement, in part because it excludes Russia, which Berlin believes would
hinder efforts to build greater interdependence between the EU and Russia.9
Some European and U.S. officials draw conclusions from Russia’s behavior that
differ with the German view. From their perspective, Germany’s post-war policy to
develop a working relationship with Russia could weaken U.S. and European efforts to
develop secure and reliable energy supplies from Russia and elsewhere. These officials
believe Germany may become too reliant on Russian energy supplies and move away
from its EU partners and the United States. East European states in particular, once in
Moscow’s sphere, believe that they could find themselves unable to ensure reliable and
affordable energy supplies from Gazprom, the powerful state-controlled Russian energy
company. They point to the former Schroeder government’s deal with Gazprom to
involve German companies in the development of a Russian-German gas pipeline under
the Baltic Sea as a special arrangement that appears to promise a supply to Germany that
other states might not enjoy.10
Some governments believe that Russia has little interest in market forces in the
energy sector. In this view, Russia seeks high energy prices to maximize profits. These
governments note that the Russian government has a prevailing control over Gazprom,
hardly a model of capitalist entrepreneurship, and that Gazprom was behaving like a
monopoly in ratcheting up the price of natural gas to Ukraine. Knowing that Ukraine had
no reliable alternatives for gas supply, Gazprom raised prices threefold and threatened a
sixfold rise. Gazprom also controls the transit of non-Russian energy supplies to Ukraine,
and threatened rapid rises in transit fees as well. Political motives seem apparent in such
policies. In 2003, Putin himself said that Gazprom is a “powerful political and economic
lever of influence over the rest of the world.”11
8 Interviews with European officials, Dec. 2006; see also CRS Report RL33212, Russian Oil and
Gas Challenges, by Bernard A. Gelb.
9 “Gazprom: La Reconversion de M. Schröder scandalise la Pologne,” Le Monde, Dec. 14, 2005;
“EU Urges an Energy Pact with the Russians,” International Herald Tribune, Mar. 9, 2006.
10 Interviews with U.S. and east European officials, Dec. 2006.
11 Jamestown Eurasian Daily Monitor, Jan. 19, 2006; Putin cited in “EU’s Barroso Demands
Natural Gas Supply Assurances from Russia,” Bloomberg News, Mar. 16, 2006.

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NATO and Energy Security
Some U.S. officials believe that NATO could play a role in building international
political solidarity in the event of a deliberate disruption of energy flows. In this view,
NATO might coordinate policies among member states and with non-member partner
governments to share resources and to bring an end to an energy disruption. NATO might
also provide security for infrastructure in energy-producing states facing unrest.
Iran has threatened to use its energy reserves to attain political objectives. In
response to possible sanctions due to its refusal to comply with requirements by the
International Atomic Energy Agency on its nuclear program, Iran has threatened to cut off
or limit its energy supplies to buyers. Beyond deliberate policies affecting energy
security, there are many countries in Central Asia and the Middle East that are unstable,
have a need for new energy infrastructure investment, and have insecure transportation
systems due to political unrest. Some of these countries are in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace program, or desire a closer association with NATO.
NATO is moving into a period in which member states believe that the alliance must
be a global player with global partners. This trend is evident in Afghanistan, for example,
where Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are expending resources to bring stability
through NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, even though the three countries
are not NATO members. NATO’s role in energy security could be complementary to the
EU’s effort to strengthen market forces and interdependence in the international energy
sector. U.S. officials agree with their EU counterparts that market forces can lead to
greater energy security. Diversification of supply, for example, through building more
pipelines that are secure, is one course of action. Joint investment efforts to build such
pipelines in and with energy producers such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan could be an
important step in this direction. Both countries are members of NATO’s Partnership for
Peace program, and are seeking closer relations with the United States and its allies.
Development of more liquified natural gas (LNG) transport and reception facilities
from distant suppliers, such as Nigeria, into Europe could be another course of action.
Coupled with the development of new oil and gas pipelines could be an offer from NATO
(and/or EU) members to provide security for energy infrastructure in periods of unrest or
conflict in supplier and transit countries.12
The Military Option. NATO governments (although not NATO as a whole) have
already been involved in military efforts to secure energy resources. The first Gulf War,
while not a NATO operation, involved key member states such as the United States,
France, Britain, and Italy that sought not only to liberate Kuwait but also to ensure that
Iraq did not control Kuwaiti oil and threaten Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers.
NATO governments also took part in a military operation in the 1980s explicitly
designed to secure the supply of oil. Operation Earnest Will was an effort, primarily by
NATO states, to protect tanker traffic in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).
Beginning in 1984, Iran first, and then Iraq, attacked neutral oil tankers to cut off the
other’s means of financial support. Iran attacked Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers in those two
12 Discussions at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Feb. 2006.

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countries’ own waters to ensure that all Gulf states understood that none was secure. The
Soviet Union, followed shortly thereafter by the United States, made offers to the
Kuwaitis, who lost the most tankers, to reflag their vessels under the USSR and the U.S.
flags, an offer that was accepted. After Iraqi aircraft attacked the USS Stark in 1987,
killing 37 sailors, the Reagan Administration formed a coalition of like-minded states,
above all from NATO, to protect tanker traffic in the Gulf. Britain, France, and the
Netherlands were important participants in Operation Earnest Will. The allies captured
Iranian vessels mining shipping lanes in the Gulf, and engaged in firefights with Iranian
troops using oil platforms to fire on ships.
In February 2006, NATO governments discussed a range of potential actions in the
event of future disruption of oil supplies caused by military action. Some member states
reportedly raised the possibility of protecting tanker traffic and oil platforms in periods
of conflict, and using satellites to monitor developments in areas where energy resources
come under threat.13
Congressional Action
There was increasing congressional interest in energy security during the 109th
Congress. The Senate passed S.Res. 456, which urged the Administration to raise the
issue of energy security in the North Atlantic Council, and to report the results of such a
meeting to Congress. Senator Lugar gave a speech during the NATO Riga summit in
November 2006 in which he urged that energy security be raised to an Article V, or
mutual security, issue. Several House and Senate committees held hearings on the issue
of energy security, with attention to NATO’s possible role. Similar hearings and possible
legislation are expected in the 110th Congress.
Conclusion
NATO is attempting to become a global security organization, still concentrating on
protection of the interests of the United States and its Canadian and European partners,
but engaging non-member states as global partners. Discussions on energy security have
already occurred at NATO. NATO’s role in energy security remains uncertain, however,
as some individual members may prefer a greater role for the EU.
A political role in energy security for NATO seems most likely in the near future.
Under NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004, the allies have begun discussions
with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates to build practical cooperation
in the security field, including the fight against terrorism.14 Some Middle Eastern
governments are concerned about terrorist attacks on their oil facilities, but it is not
publicly known whether NATO has discussed this issue with the four governments.
Partnership for Peace countries, such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, that are
important energy producers often seek ways to associate themselves more closely with
NATO, in part to diminish Russian influence on their soil, in part to develop reliable
13 Discussions with officials from several NATO governments, Feb. 2006.
14 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO, Brussels, Jan. 2006.

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partners in an unstable region. It is possible that NATO will seek ways to provide
security for the energy infrastructure of such countries. At the same time, the EU may
encourage its member states to invest more heavily in that infrastructure.
There is division in the EU over management of the Union’s growing dependence
on Russian oil and gas. Several states, led by Poland, wish to engage NATO more fully
in ensuring energy security in this relationship. While in the early stages of discussion,
Poland is exploring a role for NATO and the United States, perhaps only diplomatically,
in which U.S. leverage on Moscow could be an element for encouraging responsible
Russian behavior and deflecting any Russian attempt to divide the Europeans.
A NATO role in energy security could prove to be premature. Most EU
governments clearly prefer that market forces secure access to energy. A well-structured
commercial partnership with Russia might be one mark of such a policy. Another would
be the effort of the EU3 (Germany, France, and Britain) and the United States to curtail
Iran’s nuclear program. The EU3 desire completion of that effort in the UN before there
is any discussion of a military organization like NATO assuming responsibility for a
broader policy of energy security.
Some EU governments also believe that discussion of energy security at NATO
sends the wrong signal to other governments, which might assume that the allies are
contemplating military action to ensure the flow of oil and gas. Some of these
governments propose instead that there first be a high-level “seminar” that include the
United States, representatives of key EU countries, Russia, and such countries as
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. There, some participants would reiterate the
importance of market forces and the interdependence of producers and suppliers, and the
need to protect and maintain energy infrastructure.
In addition, some NATO partner governments in Central Asia and the Middle East
might be reluctant to accept allied assistance in securing the resource that is central to
their survival. The belief is widespread in the Middle East that the United States invaded
Iraq in part to secure access to its oil. There might be popular opposition to any NATO
effort to secure energy infrastructure in some of these countries. Moreover, the United
States has been unable to provide full security to pipelines in Iraq, and NATO might have
similar difficulties in partnership countries. Russia is also a factor. Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan depend upon Russia as a transit country for their pipeline shipments to the
west, and could be subject to Moscow’s pressure to spurn NATO proposals of assistance.

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