Order Code RL33757
U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment
Requirements: Background and Issues
for Congress
December 20, 2006
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States Army and Marine Corps have been at war — first in
Afghanistan and then Iraq — since November 2001. According to the Chief of Staff
of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, “for the last five years, a period longer than
World War II, the Army has had as many as 18 to 20 brigade combat teams deployed
on a rotational basis in combat conditions.” In a similar manner, the Marine Corps
has deployed its forces and equipment in what has been described as “the harsh
operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan” where the heat, sand, and dust as
well as operational rates “well in excess of peacetime rates” has taken a heavy toll
on the Army’s and Marine’s equipment, which, in some cases,was more than 20
years old when the conflicts first began.
At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are contending with war-
related equipment issues, the Army is reconfiguring its forces to a brigade-based
force which could result in requirements for additional equipment. Moreover, both
services have undertaken modernization programs which could generate additional
equipment requirements. Equipping Reserve and National Guard units also presents
challenges to the services. The Army and Marine Corps are also undertaking efforts
to re-equip their pre-positioned stocks which were drawn upon to provide equipment
for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the transfer of large quantities of U.S.
military equipment to Iraqi defense forces and possibly Afghan forces could also be
an element of the overall equipment requirements. Congress, in its appropriation,
authorization, and oversight roles may be faced with some of the following issues:
! Should the Army and Marine Corps reconsider the policy of keeping
large quantities of equipment in theater instead of rotating it home
when units redeploy from Iraq and Afghanistan?;
! How and when will reserve forces will be re-equipped?;
! The impact on the Army and Marines of equipping Iraqi and,
potentially, Afghan security forces?; and
! How the Army can fully equip its Modular units?
This report will not be updated.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Historical Perspective on Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Equipment Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Operational Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Equipment Shortages and Unit Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Equipping Units to Their Authorized Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Equipping Units Above Authorized Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Coping With Equipment Shortfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
War-Related Equipment Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Body Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on
Equipping the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Reset: Replacing Damaged, Destroyed, and Worn-Out Equipment . . . . . . 21
The Army and Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Marines and Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Equipping Iraqi and Afghan Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Better Equipment for the Afghan National Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Army Modularization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Not Fully Equipping Heavy Brigade Combat Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Difficulties in Equipping Brigade Combat Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Revising Marine Equipment Needs to Better Address
Irregular Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Potential Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Keeping Large Quantities of Equipment “In-Theater” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Impact on Readiness of Non-Deployed Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Impact on Training and Domestic Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Equipping Reserve Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Impact of Equipping Iraqi and Afghan Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Can the Army Fully Its Equip Modular Units? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
List of Tables
Table 1: Selected MEF (Forward) Equipment Density Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2: Equipment Items Most Transferred from Nonmobilized Units
to Mobilizing Units from September 2001 to April 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 3: Partial List of U.S. Army Equipment Given to the Iraqi Army as
of June 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table 4: Selected Items for Modular Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 5: Vehicle Comparison: Modular Heavy BCT vs. FCS BCT . . . . . . . . . . 30

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U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment
Requirements: Background and Issues for
Congress
Background
The United States Army and Marine Corps have been at war — first in
Afghanistan and, then Iraq — since November 2001. According to the Chief of
Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, “for the last five years, a period longer
than World War II, the Army has had as many as 18 to 20 brigade1 combat teams
deployed on a rotational basis in combat conditions.”2 Including other supporting
formations, the Army currently has almost 35 brigades’ worth of soldiers and
equipment deployed.3 In a similar manner, the Marine Corps has deployed its forces
and equipment in what has been described as “the harsh operating environments of
Iraq and Afghanistan” where the heat, sand, and dust as well as operational rates
“well in excess of peacetime rates” has taken a heavy toll on the Army’s and
Marine’s equipment, which, in some cases, was more than 20 years old when the
conflicts first began.4
At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are contending with war-
related equipment issues, the Army is reorganizing and the Marine Corps is
adjusting its training, tactics, and equipment to more effectively conduct irregular
warfare and both of these initiatives could result in requirements for additional
equipment. Both services have also undertaken modernization programs, such as the
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) program, which could generate additional
equipment requirements. Equipping Reserve and National Guard units also presents
challenges to the services. Traditionally, the Army National Guard and Reserve have
been characterized as under-equipped and often times equipped with older equipment
than their Active component counterparts. General Schoomaker has reportedly
committed to both man and equip the Army Reserves and National Guard in a similar
manner to the Active component, which could result in additional equipment
1 A brigade consists of between 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers.
2 Statement by General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, “The Army’s Reset
Strategy and Plan for Funding Reset Requirements,” June 27, 2006.
3 Ibid.
4 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T,
Mar. 30, 2006.

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requirements. 5 The Army and Marine Corps are also undertaking efforts to re-equip
their pre-positioned stocks which were drawn upon to provide equipment for use in
Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the possible transfer of significant quantities of
U.S. military equip to Iraqi and possibly Afghan defense forces could also be an
element affecting the overall equipment requirements of the services. The Army and
Marines have a number of equipment-related challenges to rectify which may require
significant funding and management efforts.
Historical Perspective on Equipment
Equipping Army and Marine units has been a long-standing concern of
Congress that has taken on added importance as weapons and equipment have
become exponentially more sophisticated and more expensive. According to Army
leadership:
Historically, the Army has been under resourced - and it is a fact that the decade
preceding the attacks of September 11, 2001 was no exception. Army investment
accounts were underfunded by approximately $ 100 billion and 500,000 soldiers
were reduced from total Army endstrength. There were about $56 billion in
equipment shortages at the opening of the ground campaign in Iraq in the spring
of 2003.6
With few exceptions, almost all Army and Marine Corps units have historically
faced equipment shortages. In these cases, units either “made do” with the equipment
on hand or, if leadership directed, equipment could be transferred from one unit to
another — referred to as “cross leveling” — to increase a unit’s equipment holdings
at the expense of another unit or organization. Reserve forces, which in the past
constituted the nation’s “Strategic Reserve,” usually had less equipment than their
active duty counterparts and much of this equipment tended to be older models.
Protracted conflicts - like Afghanistan and Iraq - serve the purpose of identifying
what equipment works and what equipment does not, as well as identifying
requirements for new equipment. In the later case, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
have generated requirements for new equipment such as improved body armor,
devices to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and coagulant bandages, to
name but a few. Protracted conflicts also dramatically increase equipment operational
usage rates, resulting in reduced useful life and increasing repair and replacement
requirements.
Equipment Readiness
Equipment readiness is a significant factor in determining if a unit can
accomplish its assigned mission. Equipment readiness is a function of how much of
5 Donna Miles, “Army to Ensure Reserve Components Fully Manned, Trained, Equipped,”
American Forces Press Service, Feb. 2, 2006.
6 Statement by General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, “The Army’s Reset
Strategy and Plan for Funding Reset Requirements,” June 27, 2006.

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it is operational and how much equipment a unit has to train with and use on
operations.
Operational Readiness. Having the requisite types and quantities of
equipment on hand for a conflict is important but perhaps equally important is that
the equipment functions as intended over a sustained period of time. This is often
referred to as operational readiness (OR) and is measured as a rate usually as a
percentage reflecting the item’s mission-capable status as a function of time.
According to the Army, its in theater OR rate for ground systems in 2005 was above
90% and above 75% for helicopters. However, the readiness for ground systems not
in theater was less than 80% and for helicopters less than 60%,7 which has caused
concern among some members of Congress that “readiness rates for equipment have
fallen so low that ... it presents a strategic risk to respond to contingencies we may
face beyond our current commitments in Iraq and in Afghanistan.”8
Equipment Shortages and Unit Readiness.9 Recent reports suggest that
Army units that are training at home “are so short on equipment and personnel that
they are unready if needed urgently for Iraq, Afghanistan or potentially any other
crisis that may emerge domestically or abroad” and that the Army has “deployed
units to Iraq and Afghanistan officially rated at the lowest levels of readiness.”10
Reportedly, Army and Marine Corps equipment is being used so heavily overseas to
bring deployed units up to their authorized equipment levels that little equipment is
available for units “back home” to train with prior to their deployment. These reports
maintain that Army readiness is “continuing to decline due to equipment shortages,
particularly in the Army National Guard which allegedly “bears the greatest burden
of equipment shortages in the Army.” Despite these equipment shortages, Army
officials insist that units deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan receive additional
equipment and training once they arrive in theater before they undertake combat
missions.
Equipping the Force
There are a number of dimensions to equipping Army and Marine Corps units
that are examined in the following sections. Equipping units might appear to be a
relatively straight forward exercise, but there are a variety of factors involved.
7 “Resetting the Force: The Equipment Challenge,” Association of the United States Army
(AUSA) Torchbearer National Security Report, Oct. 2005, p. 8.
8 Opening Statement by Rep. Ike Skelton during House Armed Services Committee Hearings
on Army and Marine Corps Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft,
Congressional Transcripts, June 27, 2006, p. 2.
9 Memorandum for the Readiness Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, from
Chairman Joel Hefley, Subject: Closed Subcommittee Briefing to Receive an Update on
Current Military Readiness, June 26, 2006 and Elaine M. Grossman, “House Memo: Army
Unit Readiness for Iraq, Afghanistan is Lagging,” InsideDefense.com, July 6, 2006.
10 Information in this section is from Elaine M. Grossman, “House Memo: Army Unit
Readiness for Iraq, Afghanistan is Lagging,” InsideDefense.com, July 6, 2006.

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Funding is perhaps the foremost issue, as funding is often limited, requiring the
services often to make trade-offs between equipment needed to sustain operations
and equipment for reorganization or modernization efforts. Another issue is that even
if funds are readily available, the equipment might not be. Army officials maintain
that for some systems, it can take up to three years after receiving funding before they
can be fielded to units.11
Equipping Units to Their Authorized Levels. Prior to units being
deployed on operations, the Army and Marine Corps typically attempt to bring these
units up to their authorized levels of both personnel and equipment. In terms of
equipping forces, there are a number of options available. Perhaps the first option is
to requisition the needed equipment through each service’s respective supply chain
but this option may not be practical if a unit’s equipment needs are significant or if
the unit does not have a great deal of time before it deploys. Other options for
equipping units include cross-leveling and drawing equipment “in-theater” when a
unit deploys. These two options will be discussed in greater detail in following
sections.
Equipping Units Above Authorized Levels. Both the Army and Marines
are providing their units with additional equipment over and above their peacetime
authorized levels, which is placing significant equipment demands on both services.12
The Army maintains that its brigade combat teams (BCTs) are operating over a much
wider geographical area than they were designed for and therefore require additional
equipment to facilitate these dispersed operations. In addition, units such as the 10th
Mountain Division, 101st Airborne, and 82nd Airborne, the Army’s light, largely foot-
mobile infantry units, require extensive equipment augmentation — particularly
vehicles — in order to operate over the large areas assigned to them.
The Marines suggest that:
The Marine Corps is executing a number of operational missions that are
inherently ground equipment intensive. Stability and Support Operations
(SASO), Counter-Insurgency (COIN), Civil Military Operations, and Foreign
Military Training all require a greater quantity of equipment than our
programmed levels for traditional combat operations. In order to adapt to these
new mission requirements, we have revised the Equipment Density List,
increasing the quantity of equipment issued to Marine Units deploying into the
CENTCOM13 ... Our forward operating bases are not in close proximity to each
other; the large distances between forward operational bases require additional
11 From discussions with the Army’s Material Division, G-8 Section of the Army Staff on
Oct. 25, 2006.
12 Information in this section is taken from the Statement of General Michael W. Hagee,
Commandant of the Marine Corps before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on
Army and Marine Corps Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006,
and a discussion with the Army’s Material Division, G-8 Section of the Army Staff on July
12, 2006.
13 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is the Unified Combatant Command responsible for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other geographical locations within their
command jurisdiction.

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CRS-5
vehicles, communications capabilities, and crew-served weapons over and above
the standard unit Equipment Density List ... The increased ground equipment
requirement, when coupled with high utilization rates, results in a Corps-wide
degradation of equipment.14
The following table provides a selective comparison of a Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) (Forward) — an approximately 18,000 Marine force — pre-war and
revised equipment requirements.15
Table 1: Selected MEF (Forward) Equipment Density
Comparison
Equipment
Pre-War Equipment
Revised Equipment
Density List
Density List
PRC-117 Radio
78
205
7-Ton Medium Tactical
Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
540
1015
Armored HMMWV
311
981
M-2 50-Caliber Machine Gun
534
634
Coping With Equipment Shortfalls
Cross-Leveling. Cross-leveling is the practice of transferring equipment to
a unit either from another unit or from some type of equipment pool such as pre-
positioned stocks. In the case of a unit-to-unit transfer, the transferred equipment
often comes from a similar-type unit, usually in a non-deployable status. Both the
Army and Marines have made extensive use of cross-leveling, particularly early on
in the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. According to General Michael W. Hagee,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, “equipment across the Marine Corps is
continuously cross-leveled and redistributed to ensure that units preparing to deploy
have sufficient equipment available.”16
Impact on National Guard and Reserves. Traditionally, Army National
Guard and Reserve forces have not been allotted all of their authorized equipment
instead receiving a percentage of authorized equipment based on their mobilization
sequence in war plans.17 According to a congressionally-mandated report:18
14 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 5.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 3.
17 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional
(continued...)

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CRS-6
Many lower priority Reserve Component units have been resourced
over the years at levels below their mobilization requirements for
equipment on-hand. This difference in past resourcing levels and
current mobilization requirements has resulted in the Army National
Guard and Army Reserve cross-leveling equipment from non-
deploying units, reducing readiness in donor units. The significant
amount of equipment being cross-leveled and the return of many units
from deployments without their equipment is making equipment
available for training and future mobilization a major challenge.
According to a GAO report on the Army Reserves, the equipment items most
transferred from non-mobilized units to mobilizing units from September 2001 to
April 2005 included:
Table 2: Equipment Items Most Transferred from Nonmobilized
Units to Mobilizing Units from September 2001 to April 200519
Equipment Type
Quantity
Individual Equipment (clothing, boots, etc.)
116,107
Unit Equipment (tents, generators, tool kits, etc,) and
54,253
Communications Equipment (radios, switchboards, etc.)
Weapons ( machine guns grenade launchers, rifles, etc.)
39,675
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Items (protective masks,
15,003
decontamination kits, etc.)
Other Miscellaneous Items
10,862
Cross-leveling between Army National Guard units has also resulted in
significant equipment shortages. In order to fully equip its deploying units, as of July
2005, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of
equipment from non-deploying units to deploying units.20 As of May 2005, these
17 (...continued)
Committees, “Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve
Personnel and Equipment Shortages,” GAO-05-660, July 2005, p. 14.
18 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2006, In Accordance with
Title 10, United States Code, Section 10541, prepared by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material
and Facilities), Feb. 2005, p. 1-1.
19 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional
Committees, “Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve
Personnel and Equipment Shortages,” GAO-05-660, July 2005, p. 15.
20 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives, “Reserve Forces:
Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate
(continued...)

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CRS-7
transfers had reportedly exhausted the National Guard’s inventory of more than 220
high demand equipment items, including night vision devices, trucks, armored High-
Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (humvees), and radios.21 Reportedly,
cross-leveling continues to “hamper the ability of non-deployed forces to train for
future missions.”22
The impact of cross-leveling and the war in Iraq has also had an impact on the
state mission of National Guard units, particularly in terms of disaster relief. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, instead of being able to draw on equipment
stores of the units in the affected region, the National Guard in Louisiana and
Mississippi reportedly had to obtain needed equipment from other Guard units
throughout the United States.23 While Guard officials suggested that there had yet
to be an incident where equipment needs could not be met, that the search for
equipment increasingly “ranges further and further afield.”24
Equipment in Theater.25 The Army has kept large quantities of equipment
in theater, primarily to conserve strategic transportation assets and reduce costs but
also to ensure that units are adequately equipped when deployed. This initiative —
called Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) — began in late 2003 when Army units,
including Active, National Guard and Reserve, were directed to leave much of their
equipment in theater when they redeployed back to the United States. This
equipment is then “handed-off” to units deploying to both Operations Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). TPE consists of
a variety of equipment items including armored vehicles, individual soldier body
armor, and equipment used to counter improvised explosive devices. As of
November 2005, Army officials estimated that there were approximately 300,000
TPE items in Iraq - including more than 26,000 vehicles.
The Marines have also directed that equipment needed for OEF and OIF be left
in theater. As previously noted, because mission requirements require additional
equipment beyond a unit’s peacetime equipment allowance, the Marines have
developed expanded equipment packages in theater for deploying units. Marine
officials maintain that they have deployed 35% of its ground equipment and almost
35% of its aviation assets to support ongoing operations.
20 (...continued)
Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives,” GAO-06-111, Oct. 2005, p. 4.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Kristen Scharnberg, “Ill-Equipped Guard Units Alarm States,” Chicago Tribune, Mar. 19,
2006.
24 Ibid.
25 Information in this section is taken from United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics:
Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and
Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T, Mar. 30, 2006, p. 6.

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CRS-8
In-Theater Replacement of Damaged and Destroyed Equipment. Both
Services have also set aside pools of equipment to rapidly replace equipment
damaged and destroyed during operations. The Army refers to this pool of equipment
as Theater Sustainment Stocks (TSS) and as of January 2006, included as many as
400 different types of vehicles and equipment numbering about 174,000 pieces of
equipment including, Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, humvees, and other
support vehicles. The Marines also have developed a similar pool of equipment
known as Forward In-Stores to replace major equipment damaged or destroyed.
Impact of Keeping In-Theater Equipment Stocks.
Army and Marine Corps Rationale for Keeping Equipment In-Theater.
GAO suggests that:
To meet ongoing operational requirements, the Army and Marine Corps have
developed and implemented initiatives to concentrate equipment in theater.
When the Army initially developed its strategy of retaining equipment from
redeploying units in theater, it did not envision this to be a long-term mechanism
for managing equipment needs but rather a short-term measure to conserve
transportation assets, and more importantly, to ensure that units were rapidly
equipped. The Marine Corps, like the Army, developed a similar equipment
management initiative.26
According to Army officials, a major consideration for implementing this policy
was to reduce the costs associated with having to transport unit equipment from both
the United States and Europe to Iraq (by strategic air and sea lift) when units rotated
into country for their year-plus tours of duty and then transporting it back to the unit’s
duty stations when the tours were completed.27
Marine officials28 maintain that the purpose for maintaining in-theater
equipment stocks to insure adequate equipment availability to meet operational
requirements. With almost 30% of the Marine’s ground equipment and 20% of its
aviation assets in theater, the Marines felt that there was insufficient equipment
stocks remaining to establish an equipment rotation plan that would not severely
impact training and readiness for other contingency missions. As additional
equipment is procured, the Marines plan to establish a more extensive equipment
rotation plan.
The Army and Marines have not made public details of purported cost savings
generated by the adoption of this policy and an argument can be made that this short-
term policy, which has become the defacto long term policy for the Marines and
Army, has resulted in maintenance and training issues — the costs of which could
equal or exceed the purported strategic lift cost savings.
26 Ibid., p. 6.
27 From a discussion with the Army’s Material Division, G-8 Section of the Army Staff on
July 12, 2006.
28 From a discussion with the Marine Corps Programs and Resources Office, Oct. 13, 2006.

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CRS-9
Maintenance Issues.29 Both the Army and Marines have made “risk based
decisions” to keep significant amounts of equipment in theater and to forego depot-
level maintenance, relying instead on in-theater maintenance This decision means
that in many cases, equipment has not undergone higher level depot maintenance
since March 2003 and because some of this equipment is being used at rates from
two to nine times the normal peacetime rate, “some equipment may have added as
much as 27 years of use in the past three years.” Sustained usage at this rate without
extensive depot-level maintenance could result in equipment wearing out sooner than
expected thereby requiring replacement. The Army and Marines have undertaken
initiatives to develop additional maintenance capacity in theater. The Army has set
up a Humvee refurbishment facility in Kuwait and a Stryker maintenance facility in
Qatar and the Marines have established an aircraft maintenance depot in theater. In
the Army’s case, much of this in-theater maintenance is being done by contractors
and some contractor maintenance is falling short of the Army’s expectations.
Equipment Availability for Training and National Guard Domestic
Missions. Reports suggest that non-deployed unit’s lack of equipment is having
adverse impact on their ability to train as well as to respond to domestic missions.
According to GAO:30
When the North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from its
deployment to Iraq in 2005, it left behind 229 humvees, about 73 percent of its
pre-deployment inventory of those vehicles for other units to use. Similarly,
according to Guard officials, three Illinois Army National Guard Units were
required to leave almost all of their humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they
returned from deployment. As a result, the units could not conduct training to
maintain the proficiency that they acquired while overseas or train new recruits.
In all, the Guard reports that 14 military police companies left over 600 humvees
and other armed trucks, which are expected to remain in theater for the duration
of operations.
Of particular concern is that National Guard units may not be adequately
equipped to deal with their domestic responsibilities such as consequence
management in the event of natural disasters or terrorist attacks. Reportedly, the
Florida National Guard headed into the most critical months of the 2006 hurricane
season short almost $50 million worth of equipment.31 As of mid-June 2006, the
Florida Guard reported almost 400 vehicles left overseas including 230 cargo trucks
29 Information in this section is taken from United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics:
Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and
Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T, Mar. 30, 2006.
30 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T,
Mar. 30, 2006, p 17.
31 Mark K. Matthews, “War Saps Guard’s Storm-Response Gear,” Orlando Sentinel, July
11, 2006.

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CRS-10
and 13 ambulances.32 In units elsewhere that might be expected to respond to
chemical or biological terrorist incidents, some reportedly have only 14% of their
authorized chemical decontamination equipment and virtually none of their chemical
agent monitors.33
Requirement to Replace Reserve and National Guard Equipment
Left in Theater. In late 2003, the Army directed National Guard and Reserve units
to leave selected items of equipment in theater when redeploying to the United
States.34 DOD Policy35 requires that the Army replace equipment transferred to it by
reserve components and if that equipment is left in theater, the Army must provide
“plans to replace equipment for units returning home to ensure training readiness.”36
According to GAO, as of March 2006, only three Army replacement plans had been
endorsed by the Secretary of Defense to replace National Guard equipment, with
another 33 plans in various phases of approval.37 It is not known if this equipment
will be new or of a older variety or if it will be provided in sufficient time and in
sufficient quantities to permit Reserve component units to maintain their readiness
and to execute domestic missions if required. Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum,
Chief of the National Guard Bureau, has reportedly stated that as of August 1, 2006,
more than two thirds of the National Guard’s brigade combat teams were not combat
ready due to what the Guard estimates to be almost $21 billion in equipment
shortages, owing in large part to equipment left in Iraq that has not been replaced.38
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T,
Mar. 30, 2006, p 16.
35 Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, Apr. 7, 2005.
36 Ibid., p. 3.
37 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T,
Mar. 30, 2006, p 17.
38 “Army Guard in “Dire Situation,” CNN.com, Aug. 1, 2006, and “General: Most Army
Guard Units Unprepared,” MSNBC.com, Aug. 1, 2006.

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Equipment from Prepositioned Stocks.39 Another source for equipping
Army and Marine Corps units is equipment from prepositioned stocks either ashore
or afloat. Reports maintain that both the Army and Marines have drawn extensively
on prepositioned stocks to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.40 While
drawing on these stocks has facilitated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, by
depleting these stocks, DOD has assumed near-term operational risks if another large
scale conflict break out. While the remnants of these prepositioned stocks provide a
degree of residual capability, there are supposedly some significant inventory and
maintenance shortfalls.
To support operations, the Army reportedly used almost all of its prepositioned
ship stocks and its stocks ashore in Kuwait and Qatar as well as some stocks in
Europe.41 This included more than 10,000 pieces of rolling stock, 670,000 repair
parts, 3,000 containers and thousands of other items of equipment.42 According to
General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Marines drew
equipment and supplies from the Marine Corp’s two prepositioning programs — the
Maritime Prepositioning Force and the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program
(Norway) — to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.43
Reconstituting Prepositioned Stocks. The Army and Marines are currently
reconstituting their prepositioned stocks. The Army is reportedly focusing on
39 Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) consists of prepositioned unit sets of equipment,
operational projects and sustainment stocks. It also includes War Reserve Stocks for Korea
and Israel. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the core of the program was five brigade
sets -- one afloat on ships stationed at Diego Garcia (designated as APS-3) and one set
ashore in Europe (APS-2), one set in Korea (APS-4) and two sets in South West Asia
(SWA) (APS-5). As of 2004 there were six brigade sets in APS. Five are on land (one in
Europe, three in SWA, and one in Korea) and the sixth is afloat at Guam/Saipan.Fourteen
APS Operational Projects provide specialized capabilities over and above normal unit
authorizations, such as petroleum distribution, Force Provider housing modules and
mortuary affairs. These are located across the globe to support regional Combatant
Commander requirements. Sustainment stocks support APS unit sets and deploying units
in SWA and Korea until re-supply is initiated from the industrial and sustaining base in the
Continental United States (CONUS).
40 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset
Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T, Mar. 30, 2006, pp.
15-16.
41 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, GAO-04-562T, Mar. 24, 2006, p. 11.
42 Ibid.
43 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 6.

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building two brigade-sized equipment sets in Kuwait and battalion sized sets in Qatar
and Afghanistan.44 Equipment that is being used to form these sets is coming from
a combination of equipment left in theater, equipment being transferred from U.S.
depots and from units around the world. Much of this equipment is described as
needing “substantial repair.”45 The Marines report that they plan to reconstitute
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two — which was downloaded to support
Operation Iraqi Freedom — by February 2009 and that the Marine Preposition
Program - Norway should be replenished by FY2010.46
War-Related Equipment Needs
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have generated a variety of additional
equipment requirements. These requirements range from developing new equipment,
providing commercially-available equipment to service members and units, and
modifying existing equipment. The following sections provide an overview of
selected equipment requirements resulting from experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI). The Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) is an
Army effort to modernize soldier’s individual equipment and small unit equipment
for active and reserve components, often times using commercial “off the shelf”
items. This initiative is the result of soldiers reporting equipment shortages and
inadequacies in 2002 in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In many instances, soldiers and
their families used personal funds to purchase such items as body armor and scopes
for weapons, because these items were not provided by the Army to deployed
soldiers.47
In response to this requirement, as well as criticism from the press and
Congress,48 the Army initiated the RFI program which provides soldiers a “kit”
which includes:
About 50 items ranging from mission-essential equipment such as improved
boots, socks and “wick-away” T-shirts, to key force protection items such as the
advanced combat helmet and knee and elbow pads. Also included are key
44 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T,
Mar. 30, 2006, pp. 15-16.
45 Ibid.
46 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 6.
47 Association of the United States Army, “The Rapid Fielding Initiative: Equipping Soldiers
to Succeed,” Aug. 2004.
48 Richard Lardner, “Army Learns Lessons on Equipping Troops,” Tampa Tribune Mar. 16,
2004; Thomas E. Ricks, “General Reported Shortages in Iraq,” Washington Post, Oct. 18,
2004; Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich et al., Letter to President Bush Urging the Administration to
Better Support the Troops, Dec. 2, 2003.

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lethality items such as improved ammunition packs, team radios and advanced
weapon optics.49
The Army maintains that it costs $19.7 million per brigade combat team (BCT)
to equip soldiers with RFI kits.50 According to Army officials, since the start of the
RFI program in October 2002, the Army has equipped over 520,000 soldiers in 54
BCTs and supporting units.51 In FY2004, the Army equipped over 184,000 active and
reserve soldiers with over three million pieces of equipment and in FY2005, the
number of soldiers increased to over 260,000.52 The Army plans another 36,000
soldiers with RFI kit in FY2006, with plans to equip the entire operating Army by the
end of September 2007.
Body Armor. The current standard body armor for Army and Marine forces
is Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). The basic IBA53 is a modular configuration of an
outer tactical vest (OTV) that can protect against explosive fragmentation and 9-
millimeter bullets and a series of small arms protective insert (SAPI) plates that can
be inserted into the OTV to provide additional protection against small arms hits.
There are also attachable throat, groin, and collar protectors to provide additional
protection. P.L. 109-289, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007,
appropriated $700 million for the Army and $25 million for the Marines for the
procurement of Interceptor Body Armor.54
Not Enough Body Armor for All Troops? The Army had insufficient
quantities of IBA (both OTV and SAPI plates) to outfit all soldiers serving in Iraq
in March 2003.55 On April 17, 2003, the Army Strategic Planning Board agreed to
a requirement for 278,000 OTVs and 175,000 SAPI sets (meaning that not every
soldier who was issued an OTV would receive SAPI plates) and that “no additional
funding for acceleration of production of OTV or SAPI,” would be needed and that
49 Ibid.
50 Army Briefing, “Task Force Soldier,” Army Fellows Mid Course Review, Jan. 29, 2004,
p. 3.
51 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
Aviation Safety Programs, Feb. 1, 2006.
52 Ibid.
53 Information on Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) is taken from an information paper
provided by the Army’s Program Manager - Soldier Equipment.
54 House Conference Report 109-676, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007
(P.L. 109-289) Sept. 25, 2006, pp. 362-363.
55 Department of the Army, The Inspector General, “Special Inspection of the Processes
Used to Provide Body Armor to U.S. and Coalition Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom - December 2003 - February 2004,” Apr. 20, 2004; and
Michael Moss, “Many Actions Tied to Delay in Armor for Troops in Iraq,” New York Times,
Mar. 7, 2005.

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IBA procurement began to slow down.56 In the ensuing weeks, however, Iraqi
suicide and sniper attacks directed against support soldiers operating “behind the
lines” led the Army to reverse its position57 and on May 15, 2003 the Army reversed
its decision and ordered that all soldiers operating in the Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility would receive the complete IBA set and ordered
that the Army Budget office was “to procure every OTV and SAPI plate available.”58
It took the Department of Defense (DOD) 167 days to start getting IBA to soldiers
in Iraq59 and some deploying soldiers reportedly purchased their own IBA from the
manufacturer or had family members purchase body armor for them.60 The Army has
testified to Congress that “by April 2004, Central Command reported that it had
enough body armor for every soldier and DOD civilian deployed in Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF in Afghanistan),” and “to
date, the Army has fielded over 700,000 sets of body armor worldwide.”61
The Army and Marines are continuing to upgrade their body armor. One report
suggests the Marine forces will begin receiving the new Modular Tactical Vests
(MTV) body armor in February 2007.62 The MTV body armor incorporates additional
protection to the side of the torso, the lower back and kidney area. The report
maintains that the Army will not begin receiving its’ MTVs until FY2010 or FY2012,
although the Army is examining the possibility of fielding the body armor component
of its Future Force Warrior system earlier than FY2010.
The Impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on Equipping
the Force. Some maintain that the most significant equipment challenge facing the
Army and Marine Corps is protecting soldiers and marines from improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) which have been characterized as “ the most lethal weapon
56 Department of the Army, The Inspector General, “Special Inspection of the Processes
Used to Provide Body Armor to U.S. and Coalition Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom - December 2003 - February 2004,” Apr. 20, 2004, p. 10.
57 Michael Moss, “Many Actions Tied to Delay in Armor for Troops in Iraq,” New York
Times, Mar. 7, 2005.
58 Department of the Army The Inspector General “Special Inspection of the Processes Used
to Provide Body Armor to U.S. and Coalition Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom - December 2003 - February 2004,” Apr. 20, 2004, p. 10.
59 Michael Moss.
60 Richard Lardner, “Army Learns Lessons on Equipping Troops,” Tampa Tribune Mar. 16,
2004 and Ryan Lenz, “Unwilling to Wait, Some Buy Body Armor Before Deploying,” Army
Times, Mar. 26, 2004. Despite opposition from the Department of Defense, Congress
legislated that DOD would reimburse members of the armed forces who purchased
protective equipment such as body armor (P.L. 108-375, Sec. 333).
61 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
Aviation Safety Programs, Feb. 1, 2006, p. 2.
62 Information in this section is taken from Jeff Schogol, “Marines Downrange to Get New
Body Armor in ‘07,” Mideast Stars and Stripes, Oct. 22, 2006.

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of the insurgency.”63 The IED threat, which some suggest was not anticipated by
military planners,64 has resulted in a number of equipment-related initiatives which
are described in the following sections.

Uparmoring Wheeled Vehicles. Tactical wheeled vehicles ranging from
the High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (Humvee) to heavy equipment
transporters were intended to operate in combat support and service support roles in
“rear areas” where the threat of attack in past conflicts was considered minimal. The
nature of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan however, has been termed a “360
degree” conflict by some where there are no “safe rear areas.” These circumstances,
as well as the use of pervasive use of Humvees, in particular, to transport combat
troops during operations, has subjected these unarmored vehicles to insurgent attacks
— IED attacks in particular. P.L. 109-289, Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2007, appropriated $1.074 billion for the Army and $557 million for the
Marines for the procurement of uparmored Humvees.65
Uparmoring Humvees. Recognizing the vulnerability of unarmored humvees,
66 DOD and the services initiated efforts to increase the numbers of uparmored
Humvees in theater. The first request from the theater for additional uparmored
Humvees (235) was received in May 2003 and by August 14, 2004 the Army had
approved requirements to increase the level of uparmored Humvees in theater to
18,005.67 This uparmoring has been accomplished through a variety of means
including uparmoring Humvees in factories, developing uparmor kits for Humvees
for installation in theater, and, in some instances, soldiers and marines adding
improvised armor.68
Efforts to uparmor Humvees and to produce uparmored kits reportedly have
met with a number of difficulties, drawing considerable congressional attention.69
63 Mark Mazzetti, “Pentagon Sets its Sights on Roadside Bombs,” Los Angeles Times, Nov.
3, 2005.
64 John Barry, Michael Hastings, and Evan Thomas, “Iraq’s Real WMD,” Newsweek, Mar.
27, 2006.
65 House Conference Report 109-676, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007
(P.L. 109-289) Sept. 25, 2006, pp.366-367.
66 Not all humvees in service in Iraq and Afghanistan were unarmored. There are numerous
humvee versions in each service and versions that are classified as armament carriers and
those for use in specialized units - such as Military Police (MP) - are armored variants
(uparmored).
67 Army Staff (DAPR-FDL), “ Protection for High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWV),” Sept. 17, 2004.
68 Ryan Lenz and Jason Straizuso, “Troops Do Their Own Humvee Upgrades,” Houston
Chronicle, Jan. 14, 2006.
69 For a representative view of congressional concerns see John Donnelly, “Battlefield
Armor a Hot Issue for the 109th Congress,” CQ Today, Oct. 20, 2005; Anne Plummer,
“Hunter Wants to Know Why Troop Vehicles Slated for Iraq are Idling in Texas,” CQ
Today, Oct. 20, 2005; and Eric Rosenberg, “Lawmakers Criticize Shortage of Humvees,”
(continued...)

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In August 2003, manufacturers were producing 51 uparmored Humvees per month.70
In February 2004, the Army reached an agreement with manufacturers to increase
production to 460 vehicles per month by October 2004, although the manufactures
indicated that the maximum production could have been increased to 500 vehicles
per month. The Army maintained that it did not have the funds available to fund the
maximum production rate of 500 vehicles per month and the manufacturer required
an assurance of consistent funding at least three months in advance of delivery.
Armor kit production in the Army depot system also experienced difficulties. The
Army did not reach its maximum production until April 2004 and there was reported
unused capacity at the depots, in one instance a contractor operated Army facility
reported that it could produce an additional 800 kits per month, but the Army
reportedly had issues with the pricing and contract timing.
While some unarmored Humvees remain in Iraq, the Army and Marines have
restricted them to operate within the confines of forward operating bases (FOBs)
where the chances of being subject to an IED attack or ambush are considered
unlikely.71 One report suggests, however, that this is not the policy in Afghanistan
and that unarmored Humvees are used throughout the country despite the recent
surge in IED attacks attributed to Taliban insurgents.72 The Army reports that
CENTCOM now has over 11,000 uparmored humvees in the region, with 4,299
belonging to Marine forces.73
Humvee Replacement. Efforts to develop a replacement for Humvees have
been accelerated, due in part to the vehicle’s demonstrated vulnerability to IED’s.74
Prior to the war in Iraq, the Army reportedly had not planned to introduce a successor
69 (...continued)
Contra Costa (CA) Times, Dec. 12, 2005.
70 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional Committees, “Defense
Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical items During Current and
Future Operations,” GAO-05-275, Apr. 2005.
71 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
Aviation Safety Programs, Feb. 1, 2006, p. 5, and Statement of General Michael W. Hagee,
Commandant of the Marine Corps before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on
Army and Marine Corps Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006,
p. 4.
72 Leo Shane III, “Troops in Afghanistan Told to Wait for Armored Vehicles,” Mideast Stars
and Stripes, Aug. 8, 2006.
73 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
Aviation Safety Programs, Feb. 1, 2006, p. 5; and Statement of General Michael W. Hagee,
Commandant of the Marine Corps before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on
Army and Marine Corps Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006,
p. 4.
74 Steven Komarow, “Effort to Replace Humvee Sped Up,” USA Today, Aug. 24, 2005.

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to the Humvee earlier than 2015, but the need to develop a vehicle with better troop
protection features and a sturdier suspension to handle the weight of additional
armor, has accelerated developmental efforts and a replacement could enter service
as early as 2008.75 The Army, Marines, and U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) are said to be working together to develop the Future Tactical Truck
System Utility Vehicle (FTTSUV) and the Army has awarded contracts to
International Truck and Engine and Lochkheed Martin to build demonstrator vehicles
that could eventually lead to replacement vehicles for the Army’s and Marine’s
Humvees.76
Uparmoring Other Wheeled Vehicles. The Army and Marines have also
conducted extensive uparmoring efforts for their respective fleets of medium and
heavy wheeled vehicles. Uparmoring efforts for these heavier logistics vehicles also
reportedly experienced a number of difficulties. In December 2004, the House Armed
Services Committee was reportedly told by DOD that only 10% of the 4,814
medium weight transport trucks were armored and only 15% of the 4,314 heavy
transport vehicles were armored.77 According to a GAO report,78 the Army first
identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in
November 2003 but did not produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not
install all of these kits until May 2005 - 18 months after the initial requirement was
identified.79 A number of factors contributed to this situation, including the Army
missing the opportunity to have a sizeable number of truck armor kits available for
Operation Iraqi Freedom by “not fully capitalizing on approved operational
requirements established in 1996.”80 Additional requirements for uparmored trucks
have exacerbated these shortages and the effort to uparmor trucks continues with fuel
tankers not scheduled to be completed until early 2007.81
The Army reports that as of January 18, 2006, 12,188 medium and heavy trucks
have been equipped with armor kits.82 The Marines report that funding to date has
enabled them to provide armor protection for 1,110 Medium Tactical Vehicle
75 Ibid.
76 “US Army Moves on Joint Humvee Replacement,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Feb. 22, 2006,
p. 8.
77 Thomas Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Armor Scarce for Big Trucks Serving in Iraq,” New
York Times, Dec. 10, 2004.
78 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional
Committees, “Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation
of Army Truck Armor During Current Wartime Operations,” GAO-06-160, Mar. 2006.
79 Ibid., p. 1.
80 Ibid.
81 Joseph Tanfani, “Report: Military Errors Held Up Armor in Iraq,” Philadelphia Inquirer,
Mar. 24, 2006.
82 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
Aviation Safety Programs, Feb. 1, 2006, p. 5.

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Replacements (MTVRs) and over 260 Logistics Vehicle Systems trucks and 180
five-ton trucks.83
M1117 Armored Security Vehicle. The M1117 Armored Security Vehicle
(ASV) is an armored wheeled vehicle originally designed for Army Military Police
units. The first contract for these vehicles was awarded in 1999 and by March 2003,
there were 53 of these vehicles in the Army’s inventory.84 In addition to being well
armed, ASVs earned high marks from soldiers in Iraq in terms of protection and
survivability - due to not only angled armor which deflected insurgent’s rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs) but also because of its V-shaped hull which helps to
reduce the blast effects of IEDs and mines.85 The Army, recognizing the value of
ASVs for patrolling and for protecting road convoys, have funded a total of 1,118
ASVs at $700,000 per vehicle.86 The ASV is produced by a single supplier - Textron
- and the company’s production lines in New Orleans were severely damaged in last
year’s Hurricane Katrina. Production has increased from 6 per month in September
2005 to 48 a month in August 2006.87 The Iraqi government has reportedly ordered
50 ASVs for its 8th Mechanized Police Brigade.88 P.L. 109-289, Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, appropriates $83 million for the Army for the
procurement of M117 ASVs.89
Specialized Counter-IED Vehicles. The Army and Marines have acquired
commercially-available armored vehicles designed for route clearance and removal
of IEDs. Both vehicles are wheeled and incorporate a V-shaped hull design to
mitigate blast effects. DOD reportedly has a $91 million dollar contract with Force
Protection, Inc. of Ladson, SC to build these vehicles for the Army and Marine
Corps.90 According to the vehicle’s manufacturer, both vehicles have been deployed
83 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p.5.
84 “M1117 Guardian Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) ASV-150,” GlobalSecurity.org,
[http://www.global]security.org/military/systems/ground/asv.htm], accessed Aug. 8, 2006.
85 Jeff Schogol, “More “Mean-Looking” ASVs Planned for Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, Apr.
14, 2006 and Elliot Blair Smith, “Textron Fought Storm to Deliver for Army,” USA Today,
May 5, 2006.
86 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
Aviation Safety Programs, Feb. 1, 2006, p. 6 and Elliot Blair Smith, “Textron Fought Storm
to Deliver for Army,” USA Today, May 5, 2006.
87 Elliot Blair Smith, “Textron Fought Storm to Deliver for Army,” USA Today, May 5,
2006.
88 “Iraqi Police Brigade Gets New Armored Security Vehicles,” PortalIraq, Feb. 28, 2005.
89 House Conference Report 109-676, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007
(P.L. 109-289) Sept. 25, 2006, p. 366.
90 W. Thomas Smith, “Buffalo Roams the Battlefield to Protect Soldiers from Mines,”
(continued...)

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to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 and not a single crew fatality has occurred,
despite over 1,000 mine detonations and IED attacks.91

Buffalo.92 The Buffalo is a 23 ton, mine- protected vehicle currently used by the
Army for route clearance and to examine suspected IEDs and mines. The Buffalo
employs a 30 foot robotic arm with a camera controlled from inside the vehicle to
examine suspicious objects or areas. This robotic arm allows the vehicle’s crew to
examine suspected IEDs without having to dismount the vehicle. According to Army
officials, as of February 1, 2006, “several hundred” Buffalo vehicles had been
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and starting in FY2007, the Army plans to stand
up three Route Clearance Companies per year, for a total of twelve companies.93
Cougar.94 The Cougar is a 12 ton, mine- protected armored patrol vehicle used
by the Marines for route clearance, to examine suspected IEDs and mines, and to
provide armored protection to mounted patrols. The Cougar can accommodate from
10 to 16 passengers, depending on vehicle configuration. Unlike the Buffalo, the
Cougar does not have a robotic arm to use on suspected IEDs.
IED Detectors and Jammers. Army and Marine efforts to develop
technological countermeasures currently fall under the Department of Defense’s Joint
IED Defeat (JIEDD) Organization - a joint service organization established in 2004
with the charter to identify and develop “innovative, cutting-edge technology and
training.”95 The FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 109-
364) Title XV Emergency Authorization authorizes $2.1 billion for the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund.96 According to reports, the Army had
90 (...continued)
Washington Times, Aug. 29, 2005.
91 “Force Protection Exceeds June Production Objectives, Fulfills DOD Cougar Contract,”
Force Protection Inc., July 3, 2006.
92 Information in this section is from Erin Robicheaux, “Buffalo Joins Brigade Combat Team
Arsenal,” DefendAmerica News (DOD News Service), Mar. 24, 2005 and W. Thomas Smith,
“Buffalo Roams the Battlefield to Protect Soldiers from Mines,” Washington Times, Aug.
29, 2005.
93 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
Aviation Safety Programs, Feb. 1, 2006, p. 6.
94 Information in this section is from William Skelton, “Cougar Roars Through Iraq,”
Marine Corps News, Apr. 8, 2006; Gerry J. Gilmore, “Heavyweight “Cougars” Protect
Marines in Iraq,” American Forces Press Service, June 19, 2006; “Cougar: Mine Protected
Armor Patrol Vehicle,” Defense Update, Year 2004, Issue 3.
95 Statement by Major General Stephen M. Speakes, Major General Jeffrey A. Sorenson, and
Brigadier General Stephen D. Mundt, Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Army Force Protection and
Aviation Safety Programs, Feb. 1, 2006, p. 3.
96 Conference Report 109-702, John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
(continued...)

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fielded more than 4,200 vehicle-mounted IED jammers as of October 2005 and that
DOD had ordered the Army to bypass standard acquisition processes to acquire
10,000 hand-held “Scorpion” jammers to counter remote-controlled explosive
devices.97
Although there is extensive involvement with industry, academia, and other
government agencies to identify and develop counter-IED technologies, little is
publically know about specific technologies and how many devices has been
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. This is in part due to DOD concerns that public
information on how counter-IED devices work has been used by insurgents to
develop countermeasures. One report cites how an article that appeared in a U.S.
newspaper about how a particular counter-IED device worked was used by insurgents
in Iraq to develop countermeasures and techniques to defeat the counter-IED
device.98
Coagulant Bandages. DOD reportedly maintains that about 50% of troop
fatalities are due to blood loss and that coagulant or blood clot bandages play a
significant roll in reducing these deaths.99 According to reports, the Army has had
significant difficulties getting these bandages to soldiers while these bandages have
reportedly been “standard issue” to Marines since 2004.100 Reports also suggest that
soldiers have requested that friends and relatives purchase these bandages for soldiers
and their units serving in Iraq. The Army has reportedly admitted that there have been
production problems as well as “supply chain” problems — the bandages were in
theater but had not been distributed to troops — and as of June 13, 2006 the Army
had informed Congress that the “Army has sent over 200,000 blood clotting bandages
to theater — reportedly exceeding the requirement for one bandage per soldier.”101
96 (...continued)
Year 2007, (P.L. 109-364) Sept. 29, 2006, p. 848.
97 Tony Capaccio, “More U.S. Troops Die in Iraq Bombings Even as Armoring Improves,”
Bloomberg.com, Oct. 13, 2005.
98 Jason Sherman, “DOD Wants Lid on IED Leaks,” InsideDefense.com, Mar. 15, 2006.
99 Congressional Transcripts, House Armed Services Committee, House Armed Services
Committee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Holds Hearing on Update on Troop Protective
Equipment, June 15, 2006, p 44.
100 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from David Goldstein,
“Scrounging to Stanch Bleeding,” Kansas City Star, June 8, 2006; Martin C. Evans,
“Lifesaving Kits in Short Supply, Long Island Newsday, June 8, 2006; and J. Jioni Palmer,
“Army Admits a Shortage,” Long Island Newsday, June 16, 2006.
101 Congressional Transcripts, House Armed Services Committee, House Armed Services
Committee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Holds Hearing on Update on Troop Protective
Equipment, June 15, 2006, p. 45.

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CRS-21
Reset: Replacing Damaged, Destroyed, and Worn-Out
Equipment
Replacing damaged, destroyed, and worn-out equipment arguably constitutes
the most significant equipment issue - both in terms of cost and magnitude - facing
the Army and Marine Corps. The process of replacing this equipment is generally
referred to as “reset” by the Army and the Marines and is further defined as
follows:102
! Reset is defined as “a series of actions taken to restore unit
equipment to a desired level of combat capability after returning
from contingency operations”;
! Reset includes the functions of repairing equipment and replacing
equipment that has either been lost in combat or worn to the point of
being uneconomically repairable; and
! Reset also includes the function of recapitalization which is the
rebuilding or systemic upgrading of currently fielded systems to a
“zero time/zero miles” status which is intended to extend service
life, reduce operations and support costs, and improve reliability and
enhance capability - often based on lessons learned in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The Army and Reset. In June 2006, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Schoomaker testified to Congress:103
Since 9-11, we have reset and returned over 1,920 aircraft; 14,160 tracked
vehicles; and 110,800 wheeled vehicles, as well as thousands of other items to
our operational units. By the end of this year (FY2006) we will have placed
approximately 290,000 major items of equipment in reset. Approximately
280,000 major items will remain in theater and will not redeploy to be reset until
a drawdown [troop reduction] is implemented.
Army leadership maintains that reset will be a long-term effort, dependent on the
intensity and duration of the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army
expects that the current wartime reset program will need to continue for “a minimum
of two to three years beyond” the current conflict but it is possible that it could
extend for a much longer period depending on the amount of equipment damaged,
102 Statement by General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, “The Army’s Reset
Strategy and Plan for Funding Reset Requirements,” June 27, 2006 and “Resetting the
Force: The Equipment Challenge,” Association of the United States Army (AUSA)
Torchbearer National Security Report, Oct. 2005.
103 Statement by General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, “The Army’s Reset
Strategy and Plan for Funding Reset Requirements,” June 27, 2006, p. 3.

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CRS-22
destroyed, or worn out.104 Of concern to some is that there maybe no discernable end
to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and that significant amounts of equipment
will remain in use in theater and not available for reset, thereby further decreasing the
useful life of Army equipment.
Funds for Reset.105 The Army relies on supplemental funding for reset —
reportedly based on directives from the Office of Management and Budget and DOD
policy — as these costs “are directly tied to damage and wear resulting from
contingency operations,”although an argument can be made that some reset costs —
particularly recapitalization costs — existed as part of the Army’s base budget
requirements prior to 2001. Prior to the current Iraq war, the Army reset costs were
approximately $3 billion per year, funded within the Army’s base budget.106 The
Army estimates its FY2007 reset requirement to be $17.1 billion, which includes
$4.9 billion deferred from FY2006. If the operations continue at the current rate, the
Army predicts that reset requirements beyond FY2007 will be $12 to $13 billion a
year throughout the duration of the conflict and for two to three years beyond the end
of the conflict. The Army’s “two to three years beyond the end of the conflict”
estimate for reset may not be a realistic estimate as it reportedly took the Army two
years after the 1991 Gulf War to reset the force after a six-month deployment and
approximately 100-hour ground war.107
The Army maintains that it has not received all the reset funds that it has
requested from the Secretary of Defense. In FY2006, the Army requested $13.5
billion for reset in its internal DOD budget plan, but the Administration approved
only $8.6 billion in reset funding for the Army in the FY2006 supplemental. As a
result of this shortfall, the Army has included $4.9 billion in their FY2007
supplemental request as previously noted.108 The Army received $17.1 billion in the
FY2007 Supplemental for reset requirements.109
Congressional Concern. Congress has expressed a number of concerns about
reset. One concern is that “billions of dollars in equipment costs are not requested in
annual defense budgets but are funded through emergency supplemental spending
104 Ibid.
105 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is taken from Statement by General
Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Before the Committee on Armed Services,
United States House of Representatives, “The Army’s Reset Strategy and Plan for Funding
Reset Requirements,” June 27, 2006.
106 Congressional transcripts, House Armed Services Committee Hearing on “Army and
Marine Corps Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft,” June 27, 2006, pp.
37-38.
107 Ryan Lenz, “Battered Gear Shipped Home,” ArmyTimes.com, June 22, 2006.
108 Ibid.
109 Conferees Approve FY2007 Defense Spending Bill, House Committee on
Appropriations, Sept. 21, 2006.

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CRS-23
bills.”110 Members are reportedly concerned that the Army only requested 64% of its
funding in the FY2006 budget and the Marines have sought only 44% of their
funding over the past five years.111 Another concern is that some Members believe
that the Army and Marines have not given adequate attention to National Guard and
Reserve equipment reset and that the Services have not coordinated with depots and
industry on the increased workload that would be generated by reset.112
Congress has reportedly expressed concern that the Army has not fully revealed
the extent of reset costs.113 In a series of briefings to congressional staff in late July -
early August 2006, the Army reportedly revealed that nearly two thirds of Army
brigades have low readiness ratings attributed in large measure to a lack of equipment
or equipment in less than satisfactory operating condition. Some Members have
reportedly voiced concern over the Army’s revelations of equipment funding
shortfalls so late in budgeting process. It is possible that the Army’s readiness
briefings were an attempt to gain additional budgetary resources from Congress or
perhaps an indication that the Army has not successfully managed its equipment
resources, and has only recently realized the readiness implications resulting from
equipment deficiencies.
The Marines and Reset. In June 2006, the Commandant of the Marines
Corps, General Michael W. Hagee, told Congress approximately 35% of all Marines
Corps ground equipment and almost 35% of active duty aviation squadrons were
deployed overseas.114 The majority of the Marine’s equipment is remaining in theater
after forces rotate home and is subject to almost continuous use.115 The Marines
reportedly have almost “ a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and a half worth of
gear” in Iraq and senior Marine leaders suggest that it may not make “economic
sense” to bring back significant amounts of equipment for reconstitution because
excessive use under stressful environmental conditions has significantly decreased
the useful life of these items.116
According to one report, Marine equipment losses over time from combat and
heavy use has been significant.117 As of August 2006, approximately 5,500 major
110 George Cahlink, “Lawmakers Will Outline Worries About Army, Marine Corps Reset,”
Defense Daily, June 27, 2006.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Information in this section is from John M. Donnelly, “Senators Steamed Over Army
Funding Reports,” CQ Today, Aug. 3, 2006.
114 Statement of General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps before the
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Strategies for
Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p. 3.
115 Ibid.
116 Geoff Fein, “Reconstituting Equipment From Iraq May Not Make Much Sense,” Defense
Daily, Aug. 1, 2006.
117 Information in this section is taken from Lawrence J. Korb, Max A. Bergman, and Loren
(continued...)

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CRS-24
pieces of Marine Corps equipment have been destroyed or degraded to the extent that
they must be either rebuilt or replaced. Another factor contributing to equipment
wearing out is deferring depot level maintenance. This “ultimately leads to higher
reset and procurement costs to repair or replace equipment than previously
estimated.”118
Funds for Rest. The Marines have requested $11.9 billion from Congress for
both operations and reset in FY2007.119 Prior to the Iraq War, the Marines spent from
$1.5 billion to $2 billion annually to procure ground equipment.120 Marine leadership
maintains that even if this funding is received for FY2007 that it will take “two to
three years” after these FY2007 funds are obligated before the equipment arrives at
the units, suggesting that it could take two to three years to improve the equipment-
related readiness of Marine units.121 The Marines received $5.8 billion in the FY2007
Supplemental for reset requirements.122
Equipping Iraqi and Afghan Forces
One of the Administration’s criteria for reducing the level of U.S. forces in Iraq
is to train and equip an Iraqi army capable of providing security and controlling that
country’s insurgency, and the U.S. Army is a “bill payer” in terms of providing some
of the equipment for the new Iraqi army. The Chief of Staff of the Army testified to
Congress on June 27, 2006 that the following equipment items had been provided
from the U.S. Army to the Iraqi Army:123
117 (...continued)
B. Thompson, “Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq,” Lexington Institute, Aug. 2006, p. 8.
118 Ibid.
119 From a discussion with the Marine Corps Programs and Resources Office, Oct. 13, 2006.
120 From a discussion with the Marine Corps Programs and Resources Office, Oct. 13, 2006.
121 Congressional Transcripts, House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and
Marine Corps Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p 8.
122 Conferees Approve FY2007 Defense Spending Bill, House Committee on
Appropriations, Sept. 21, 2006.
123 Congressional Transcripts, House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Army and
Marine Corps Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotor Craft, June 27, 2006, p 8.

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CRS-25
Table 3: Partial List of U.S. Army Equipment Given to the Iraqi Army
as of June 2006124
Item
Quantity
Tracked Vehicles
251
Wheeled Vehicles
2,600
Small Arms
153,000
Night Vision Devices
16,000
Uniforms
601,000
Body Armor Sets
242,000
Kevlar Helmets
170,000
Engineer Equipment
56
Generators
195
Material Handling Equipment
17

While General Schoomaker did not provide specific details about this
equipment provided to the Iraqi Army, he did remark to members that “equipment
that we give up, we have to replace,”125 which suggests that the Army intends to
replace this equipment at some point. It is possible that a substantial amount of the
equipment given to the Iraqi Army was from Army National Guard and Reserve units
and stocks, which could further complicate the Army’s requirement to replace
equipment taken from the Army National Guard and Reserve.
Better Equipment for the Afghan National Army. According to Army
Lieutenant General (LTG) Karl Eikenberry, commander of Combined Forces
Command Afghanistan (CFC-A), the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization need to begin to equip the Afghan National Army (ANA) with better
and more advanced weapons and vehicles.126 According to retired U.S. Army General
Barry R. McCaffrey who conducted an assessment of the situation in Afghanistan in
May 2006:127
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ashley Roque, “Eikenberry: Time to Start Equipping Afghan Army With Better
Material,” InsideDefense.com, July 3, 2006.
127 Academic Report to COL. Mike Meese, Department Head of Social Sciences, United
States Military Academy from GEN. Batty R. McCaffrey (retired), Subject: Academic
Report - Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan Friday, 19 May through Friday, 26 May, June 3,
2006, pp. 6-7.

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CRS-26
The Afghan Army has shoddy small arms. ANA units do not have mortars, few
machine guns, no MK19 grenade machine guns, and no artillery. They have
almost no fixed wing transport or attack aviation now or planned. They have no
body armor or blast glasses. They have no Kevlar helmets. They have no up-
armored Humvees or light armor tracked vehicles.
While LTG Eikenberry maintains that both the United States and NATO should
take responsibility for equipping the ANA, it is not unreasonable to assume that the
United States will play a leading role in equipping the 50,000 to 70,000 soldier force.
Given this, the U.S. Army and possibly Marines might be required to provide a
variety of equipment to the ANA, along the lines of what has been provided to the
Iraqi Army. Specific information on the types and quantities of equipment that might
be provided to the ANA is unknown, as well as the potential impact that providing
this equipment might have on Army and Marine readiness. One report suggests that
the United States will provide an additional $2 billion dollars worth of equipment to
the ANA, although details regarding types and quantities of equipment and a time
frame for providing this equipment was not provided. 128
Army Modularization129
The Government Accountability Office suggests that “ the Army’s and Marine
Corp’s equipment reset programs will also have to compete with ongoing force
structure changes designed to provide more flexibility in deploying forces for
ongoing and future operations.” 130 According to GAO, the equipment costs for
modularity will be about $41 billion.131 The Army currently plans to acquire the
following items to equip its modular forces:
128 Associated Press, “U.S. to Give Afghans $ 2 Billion in Additional Military Equipment,”
Washington Post, July 5, 2006.
129 For additional information on Army Modularization see CRS Report RL32476, U.S.
Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
130 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
Equipment Reset Challenges and Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO-06-604T,
Mar. 30, 2006, p. 14.
131 Ibid.

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CRS-27
Table 4: Selected Items for Modular Units132
Trucks and Support Equipment
Quantity
Humvees
9,196
Medium Trucks
3,180
Heavy Trucks
1,148
Trailers for All Classes of Wheeled Vehicles
17,430
Forward Area Refueling Systems
4,630
Medical Systems
1,059
Generators
18,817
Assault Kitchens
646
Armored Vehicles (a)
M-1 Abrams Tanks
512
M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles
1,260
M-113 Variant Vehicles
1,345
M-88 Recovery Vehicles
170
Communications, Navigation, and Other Equipment
Global Positioning System Receivers
21,215
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems Radios
22,436
Joint Tactical Radio System Cluster 5 Radios
20,250
Future Battle Command Brigade and Below Radio Systems
8,683
Night Vision Goggles
98,053
Note: a. These purchases will be either upgrades to or capitalization of existing equipment.
Not Fully Equipping Heavy Brigade Combat Teams. A report suggests
that the Army may not fully equip some of its modular brigade combat teams
(BCTs).133 Currently, the Army plans to establish 35 “heavy” brigade combat
132 This table is taken from a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Study, “The Army’s
Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives,” Aug. 2006, Table 3-3, p. 31.
133 Information in this section, unless otherwise noted, is from Jen DiMascio, “Army May
Rotate Equipment Among Its Heavy Brigade Combat Teams,” InsideDefense.com, Dec. 26,
2005.

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CRS-28
teams134 (HBCTs) in the Active Army and National Guard, but might only fully equip
33 of these 35 brigade combat teams. The Army reportedly plans to “share” these 33
sets of equipment with the 35 brigade combat teams as part of the Army’s recently-
enacted Army Force Generation Model (ARFOGEN) readiness program - a cyclical
program which will replace the Army’s former “tiered” readiness program.135 While
the Army asserts that only partially equipping the HBCTs will provide units with the
“best available equipment to train on and then go into combat with,”136 it may be
argued that by not fully equipping these two HBCTs, that in the event of an
unforeseen conflict requiring the commitment of all available combat units, these
two HBCTSs will not be available for combat operations.
Difficulties in Equipping Brigade Combat Teams.137 A GAO report
maintains that the Army is not meeting its equipping goals for BCTs and has not
completed a strategy on how to equip the rest of the Army. It suggests that the
National Guard will “likely face even greater challenges fully equipping 28 planned
National Guard modular combat brigades since National Guard units have
historically been underequipped and have transferred large quantities of equipment
to deploying units.”138
GAO reports that several of the active duty brigades that they audited had
significant equipment shortages 180 days after the date that units had been formally
reorganized into the new modular brigade structure. According to GAO “the Army
is having difficulty providing equipment to units undergoing their modular
conversion in time for training prior to operational deployment and deploying units
often do not receive some of their equipment until after arriving in theater.”139 GAO
believes that the Army National Guard will face even more significant equipment
issues in equipping its 28 planned BCTs than the Active Army. Although the Army
has said that it will dedicate $21 billion to equipping and modernizing the National
Guard through 2007, GAO contends that Guard units will start their modular
conversions with much older and much less equipment than their Active
134 Heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) will be equipped with M-1 Abrams tanks and M-
2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
135 The ARFORGEN model is a cyclic readiness model whereby active and reserve units will
be resourced with personnel and equipment as they proceed through a predetermined cycle
as they train for eventual deployment. The previous tiered readiness model assigned units
“C-ratings” [with C-1 being fully combat ready and C-4 being not combat ready] and
manned and equipped these units based on this rating.
136 Jen DiMascio, “Army May Rotate Equipment Among Its Heavy Brigade Combat
Teams,” InsideDefense.com, Dec. 26, 2005.
137 Information in this section is taken from United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Report to Congressional Committees, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD
and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation
Plans, GAO-06-745, Sept. 2006.
138 Ibid., p. 4.
139 Ibid., p. 11.

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CRS-29
counterparts, which could make equipping these units at comparable levels to active
units an extremely difficult undertaking.140
Revising Marine Equipment Needs to Better Address Irregular
Warfare. Reports suggest that the Marines are revising their equipment
modernization program to better address the challenges of “irregular warfare” such
as the challenges faced in Iraq and Afghanistan.141 The Marines plan to reduce the
number of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles (EFV)142 from 1,013 to 578 - an almost
43% reduction.143 Marine officials note, however, that the reductions in the EFV
program were driven by several factors, including strategic guidance, affordability,
and developmental problems.144 The Marines plan to use some of the funds “saved”
from the EFV reduction to fund the Light Armored Vehicle-Personnel (LAV-P)
variant, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle [proposed joint replacement for the humvee],
and the Internally Transported Vehicle (ITV) which the Marines describe as systems
that are versatile and optimized for irregular warfare.145
The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS)146 The Future Combat System
(FCS) is the U.S. Army’s multiyear, multibillion-dollar program at the heart of the
Army’s transformation efforts. It is to be the Army’s major research, development,
and acquisition program consisting of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied
together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS is intended
to replace such current systems as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry
fighting vehicle with advanced, networked combat systems. The Army envisions
equipping and fielding 15 FCS brigades by 2025.
140 Ibid., p. 11.
141 Jason Sherman, “Marines Cut, Kill Programs to Improve Irregular Warfare Capabilities,”
Inside the Pentagon, Aug. 24, 2006.
142 “The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is a keystone for both the Marine Corps
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM)
warfighting concepts. It represents the Marine Corps primary means of tactical mobility for
the Marine Rifle Squad during the conduct of amphibious operations and subsequent ground
combat operations ashore. The EFV is an armored amphibious vehicle capable of seamlessly
transporting Marines from Naval ships located beyond the visual horizon to inland
objectives. While providing the speed and maneuvering capabilities to operate with the main
battle tank on land, current obstacles to the landing force such as oceans, lakes and rivers,
can be used by the EFV as high speed avenues of approach and maneuver.”
[http://www.efv.usmc.mil/]
143 Jason Sherman, “Marines Cut, Kill Programs to Improve Irregular Warfare Capabilities,”
Inside the Pentagon, Aug. 24, 2006 and United States Marine Corps Program Objective
Memorandum 08 (POM08) Executive Summary, p. 6.
144 From a discussion with the Marine Corps Programs and Resources Office, Oct. 13, 2006
and Christopher J. Castelli, “Poor Reliability Puts Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle in
Jeopardy,” Inside the Navy, Oct. 2, 2006.
145 United States Marine Corps Program Objective Memorandum 08 (POM08) Executive
Summary, p. 6.
146 For additional information on FCS see CRS Report RL32888, The Army’s Future
Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, May 5, 2006.

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CRS-30
According to current plans, the Army plans to field 500 FCS vehicles per year
starting in FY2018. The proposed FCS brigade combat team (FCS BCT) will have
500 fewer soldiers than the current modular heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) and
fewer vehicles as depicted in the following table:
Table 5: Vehicle Comparison: Modular Heavy BCT vs. FCS BCT147
Modular
Vehicle Type
Heavy BCTa
FCS BCTa
Tracked
370
320
Trucks
880
550
Towed
410
180
Other
20
180b
Total Vehicles
1,680
1,230
Notes:
a. Numbers rounded to the nearest 10.
b. This total includes 150 unmanned ground vehicles and 20 armed reconnaissance
helicopters in addition to wheeled vehicles that are not designed for long-distance road
travel.
While only 15 BCTs are intended to be fully FCS equipped, the remaining 55
Active and Reserve BCTs (consisting of Infantry BCTs and Stryker BCTs) will also
be provided with a variety of systems developed under the FCS program and support
units may also receive selected items of equipment developed for FCS. With many
units besides heavy brigade combat teams receiving FCS equipment, the Army’s total
FCS equipment requirements could prove to be substantial.
Another consideration in equipping the Army’s FCS force is the cost of the
manned ground vehicles (MGVs) that are intended to replace legacy systems such
as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. FCS program
officials currently estimate the cost per FCS manned ground vehicle at between $6.7
million to $10 million apiece — depending on the vehicle variant.148 While the Army
maintains that these per vehicle costs are comparable to the costs of current fully-
equipped combat systems, GAO notes that from May 2003 to September 2005,
projected FCS procurement costs increased over 50%.149 If procurement costs
continue to grow, it is possible that the per unit procurement costs for FCS MGVs
could be significantly higher than the current $6.7 to $10 million estimate by the time
that the FCS production decision is made in FY2012.
147 Information from this table is taken from a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Study,
“The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives,” Aug. 2006, Table 3-3,
p35.
148 From discussion with the Army’s G-8 Office, Sept. 15, 2006.
149 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional
Committees, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-06-391, Mar. 2006, p. 62.

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CRS-31
Potential Issues for Congress
Keeping Large Quantities of Equipment “In-Theater”
Congress might act to review the Army’s and Marine’s current policies which
maintain significant quantities of equipment in theater instead of returning a unit’s
organic equipment home when the unit departs Iraq and Afghanistan. While soldiers
and marines are afforded a break between operational deployments, much of their
equipment remains in almost continuous use, resulting in as much as two to nine
times the normal wear. Of additional concern is that equipment might not receiving
adequate depot-level maintenance and repairs which could further decrease the
equipment’s useful life.
From a pure cost perspective, it is possible that cost of repairing and replacing
equipment that is almost continual use and not receiving prescribed maintenance
might exceed the costs of rotating equipment to and from the theater in conjunction
with troop deployments. According to the Chief of Staff of the Army, by rotating one
division’s worth of troops (about four BCTs, plus headquarters and support troops)
onto another division’s equipment left in theater, the Army avoids almost $1 billion
in transportation costs.150 Aside from monetary costs, there are other costs that might
be worth considering when examining this policy — costs in terms of readiness and
ability to train.
Impact on Readiness of Non-Deployed Units. Congress has expressed
its concern that a lack of equipment has had a significant impact on readiness.
According to the House Armed Service Committee’s Readiness Subcommittee, “Due
to operational needs and the positioning of equipment in theater (“stay behind
equipment”), equipment shortages exist across the Army and Marine Corps ... the
equipment shortages noted above affect not only equipment readiness, but training
readiness as well.”151 In a letter to President Bush requesting that the Administration
fully fund Army reset requirements, Representative Ike Skelton, the Ranking
Member of the House Armed Service Committee wrote:152
Today, unclassified Army briefing charts show two-thirds of the brigade combat
teams in our operating force are unready. Nearly every non-deployed combat
brigade in the active Army is reporting that they are not ready to complete their
assigned wartime missions. When I asked General Schoomaker in recent
testimony if he was comfortable with the readiness level for non-deployed units
located within the continental United States, he simply answered no.
150 “Ground Truth,” Government Executive Magazine, Sept. 15, 2006, p. 40.
151 Memorandum for the Readiness Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, from
Chairman Joel Hefley, Subject: Closed Subcommittee Briefing to Receive an Update on
Current Military Readiness, June 26, 2006.
152 Letter from Representative Ike Skelton to President Bush dated July 25, 2006.

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CRS-32
Given that these non-deployed units constitute the United State’s strategic reserve
that could be called on to respond to a military threat elsewhere or a catastrophic
terrorist event or natural disaster, it can be argued that the currently policy that keeps
significant equipment stocks in the CENTCOM region — Iraq in particular — calls
into question the United States’ ability to muster properly equipped and ready forces
to respond to unforseen contingencies.
Impact on Training and Domestic Missions. Congress may examine
how equipment shortages in non-deployed units may affect the ability to conduct
training and respond to domestic missions if required. Although under the Army’s
new Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cyclical readiness model, units at the lowest
readiness level — often times units just returning from Iraq and Afghanistan that are
undergoing significant personnel rotations — will supposedly have enough
equipment to train with, reports suggest that equipment levels are insufficient in
many units to conduct even small unit training.153 One aspect of the ARFORGEN
cyclical readiness model that Congress might examine are the costs associated with
managing, transporting, transferring and maintaining significant amounts of
equipment on a continuous basis as units increase their readiness posture.
One report maintains that even Active Army units are experiencing significant
equipment shortages which are a having a detrimental impact on unit’s ability to
train.154 For example, the commander of the Fourth Brigade of the Third Infantry
Division, stationed at Ft. Stewart, GA, reportedly acknowledged that “his unit’s
equipment levels had fallen so low that it now had no tanks or other armored vehicles
to use in training and that his soldiers were rated as largely untrained in attack and
defense.”155 Many of the brigade’s soldiers are new to the unit and some have come
directly from basic training and Fourth Brigade may have as few as 11 months to
train and prepare for redeployment to Iraq — a significantly shorter time than the two
years between rotations for Active units envisioned by the Army Force Generation
Model. According to this report “other than the 17 brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan,
only two or three combat brigades in the entire Army — perhaps 7,000 to 10,000
troops — are fully trained and sufficiently equipped to respond quickly to crises.”156
153 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the
Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and
Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, GAO-06-1109T, Sept. 21, 2006;
David S. Cloud, “Unit Makes Do As Army Strives to Plug Gaps,” New York Times, Sept.
25, 2006; Lisa Burgess, “Army Reserve Chief says Two-Thirds of Units Aren’t Ready to
Deploy,” Mideast Stars and Stripes, Aug. 5, 2006; and Elaine M. Grossman, “House
Memo: Army Unit Readiness for Iraq, Afghanistan is Lagging,” InsideDefense.com, July
6, 2006.
154 Information in this section is taken from David S. Cloud, “Unit Makes Do As Army
Strives to Plug Gaps,” New York Times, Sept. 25, 2006.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.

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Both Active and Reserve forces have domestic missions in addition combat
missions. According to GAO testimony:157
The Army National Guard reports that its units have less than one-third of their
required equipment, and the Army Reserve reports that its units have about half
of the modern equipment that they need to deploy. These shortages could also
adversely affect reserve units’ ability to perform homeland defense missions and
provide support to civil authorities in the event of natural disasters or terrorist
attacks ... Until recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard could
perform its typical state missions such as storm relief and firefighting, with the
equipment that it had on hand for federal missions. However, with the heavy use
of the Army National Guard in the new security environment, this assumption
may not be a sound one, especially in the event of non-traditional threats such as
chemical or biological attacks, or pandemic disease.
Given the aforementioned equipment shortages for both active and reserve units,
some maintain a detailed examination of equipment shortages for non-deployed
Army and Marine units would provide additional insight to Congress. From their
perspective, the inability to train due to a lack of equipment not only carries
implications for these units when they deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan, but also if they
are called upon to conduct combat operations in response to an act of aggression in
another theater of operations. Also of importance is the ability to respond to
domestic missions, which often times occur with virtually no warning, thereby
requiring responding units to have the appropriate equipment on-hand as opposed to
having equipment transferred from outside sources.
Recent Congressional Action. Section 345 of P.L. 109-364, the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, requires that the DOD
Comptroller General submit a report to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees no later than June 1, 2007 on the readiness of Army and Marine Corps
Ground Forces. Amongst other elements of this report, DOD is to:
! Conduct an analysis of the availability for training by units of the
Army and Marine Corps in the United States in configurations
comparable to equipment being used by units of the Army and
Marines Corps, as applicable, in ongoing operations;
! Conduct an analysis of the current and projected requirements for
repair or replacement of equipment of the Army and Marine Corps
due to ongoing operations and the effect of such required repair or
replacement of equipment on the availability of equipment for
training; and
! Conduct an assessment of the efforts of the Army and Marine Corps
to mitigate the impact of cross-leveling equipment.
157 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the
Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and
Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, GAO-06-1109T, Sept. 21, 2006, pp.
I - 11.

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Equipping Reserve Forces
Congress might review the Department of Defense’s and the Service’s plans to
equip reserve forces. As previously discussed, reserve forces typically have had less
equipment than their active duty counterparts and much of this equipment tended to
be older models of equipment in the Active components. Compounding this is the
fact that reserve units “have left significant quantities of equipment overseas and the
Department of Defense has not yet developed plans to replace it.”158 Recent reports
suggesting that additional troops might be required for Iraq and that the National
Guard might be called on to fill this requirement159 could highlight the reserve’s
equipment shortages as an issue for further examination by Congress.
The Army reportedly has budgeted $21 billion to improve the Army National
Guard’s equipment holdings and $3.8 billion for the Army Reserve over the next 5
years.160 GAO notes, however that the Army, has not yet provided detailed
information about the types and quantities of equipment to be purchased, and it has
been suggested that in addition to details on types of quantities of equipment to be
procured, that the Army should also provide an assessment of how readiness will be
impacted by these procurements. While almost $25 billion will likely purchase
significant quantities of equipment, when this equipment is distributed amongst
numerous National Guard and Reserve units, it may, in fact, do little to improve the
overall equipment situation for individual units that might be called upon to deploy
to Iraq or Afghanistan. This could result in extensive cross leveling of equipment as
in the past. GAO maintains that despite the Army’s pledge to fund National Guard
and Reserve equipment shortages “the need to equip units deploying overseas [and]
is likely to continue to take priority over nondeployed units for equipment funds,
reserve units are likely to have shortfalls of some key equipment items well into the
future.”161
Recent Congressional Actions. Section 349 of P.L. 109-364, the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, requires that the Defense
Department to report to Congress every 90 days when equipment is withdrawn or
diverted from any reserve component unit to another reserve component unit that has
been ordered to active duty. Included in this report will be plans to repair,
recapitalize, or replace equipment that has been withdrawn or diverted; in cases
where a unit is required to leave its equipment in theater when it departs, a plan to
provide the departing unit with equipment needed for training to ensure readiness;
158 Ibid., p. I.
159 Rowan Scarborough, “Army Considers More Combat Units for Iraq,” Washington Times,
Sept. 25, 2006 and Will Dunham, “Army Shows Signs of Strain in Iraq, Afghan Wars,”
WashingtonPost.com, Sept. 26, 2006.
160 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the
Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and
Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, GAO-06-1109T, Sept. 21, 2006, pp.
3-4.
161 Ibid., p. 4.

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and a memorandum between units on how transferred equipment will be accounted
for and when the equipment will be returned to the owning unit.
Impact of Equipping Iraqi and Afghan Forces
Congress may decide to review how ongoing and future equipment transfers
from the Army to the Iraqi Security Forces will affect readiness. While General
Schoomaker provided details to Congress in June 2006 about types and amounts of
equipment that had been transferred to Iraq as of that date, it is not widely known if
the total equipment requirements have been established by the Administration for
equipment transfers to Iraqi security forces. It is also not known if the Marines will
be required to provide equipment to Iraqi forces and, if so, what will be the impact
on Marine readiness? Congress might also examine Department of Defense plans to
replace this equipment and how the Administration intends to fund replacement
equipment for the Army and Marines. In a similar manner, Congress might also
consider the implications of potential equipment transfers to the Afghan National
Army.
Can the Army Fully Its Equip Modular Units?
Given the concerns over the Army’s equipment posture, Congress might choose
to examine whether or not the Army can fully equip it’s modular units given
proposed funding. In a report, GAO asserts that:162
While the Army is well underway in creating active component modular combat
brigades, it is not meeting the equipping goals for these brigades and has not yet
completed its equipping strategy which raises considerable uncertainty about the
levels to which the modular brigades will be equipped both in the near and longer
term and the ultimate cost. Moreover, the Army will likely face even greater
challenges fully equipping 28 planned national Guard combat brigades since
National Guard units have been historically underequipped and have transferred
large quantities of equipment to deploying units.
These shortages include equipment described as necessary for the modular brigades
to be as lethal as the previous division-based brigades that they are replacing -
including battle command systems, advanced digital communications systems, and
advanced sensors needed for intelligence-gathering, reconnaissance, and target-
acquisition.163 GAO reports that these equipment shortages are due to a number of
reasons but primarily because the Army’s modular conversion schedule is outpacing
funding as well as planned acquisitions.164
162 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional
Committees, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility
Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans, GAO-06-745, Sept. 2006,
p. 4.
163 Ibid., p. 13.
164 Ibid.

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Another issue of concern are reports that the Army may not equip two of its
heavy brigade combat teams.165 While the Army contends that under a cyclical
readiness model, it is not necessary for these two brigades to have equipment, others
see this proposal as indicative of the Army’s difficulty in equipping its units.
Congress might explore the Army’s proposed modular equipping strategy in detail
with the Army and DOD. If equipment shortages prove to be insurmountable and the
only choice is to field under-equipped and less-capable modular brigade combat
teams and support brigades, significant force structure changes which incorporate the
Army’s equipment on hand and equipment that will be fielded in the near term, might
be warranted.
165 Jen DiMascio, “Army May Rotate Equipment Among Its Heavy Brigade Combat
Teams,” InsideDefense.com, Dec. 26, 2005.

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