Order Code RS22097
Updated December 18, 2006
Balkan Cooperation on War Crimes Issues
Julie Kim
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
By the end of 2006, six individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remained at large, including wartime Bosnian Serb
leaders Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic. From late 2004 through early 2005,
a combination of intensified international pressure and deadlines associated with Euro-
Atlantic integration processes prompted a spate of transfers of indicted persons to The
Hague. The Tribunal has also referred several lower-level cases to domestic Balkan
courts. Full cooperation with ICTY has been a key prerequisite to further progress
toward a shared long-term goal for the western Balkan countries: closer association
with and eventual membership in the European Union and NATO. However, in
November 2006, NATO invited Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia to join Partnership for
Peace despite the ongoing failure to capture Mladic and Karadzic. The 110th Congress
may consider legislation to encourage full compliance with ICTY obligations. This
report will be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Report RS21686, Conditions
on U.S. Aid to Serbia, by Steven Woehrel.
Introduction and U.S. Concerns
The European Union (EU) and NATO have long explicitly conditioned closer
association with the western Balkan states (mainly Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and also Croatia) on their respective levels of cooperation with ICTY. To
varying degrees, conditionality policy has held up Euro-integration processes in the
western Balkans that would otherwise likely have gone forward but has also provided a
key incentive for the Balkan states to meet their obligations with respect to ICTY.
From late 2004 to early 2005, a steady stream of individuals charged with Balkan
war crimes turned up at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague. Most of the transfers of indicted persons came from Serbia or the
Republika Srpska (RS) entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, both parties that had the
greatest number of suspects and the weakest cumulative record of cooperation with ICTY.
Other prominent surrenders included the former Prime Minister of Kosovo’s governing
institutions and the former Bosnian Muslim (or Bosniak) Army chief. However, top-

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ranking war crimes suspects Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic have eluded
capture for over a decade.
Meanwhile, ICTY operations are beginning to wind down after over a dozen years
in operation. ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte prepared the Tribunal’s final
indictments in late 2004 and the last war crimes indictments were unsealed in March
2005. Under its “completion strategy,” ICTY had planned to conclude all initial trials
by 2008 and all court proceedings by 2010. However, ICTY officials have extended their
estimate for a completion date by at least one year. The ICTY President has confirmed
that trials will run into 2009 or beyond, depending on many factors, including how soon
Karadzic and Mladic are captured.1 Tribunal officials stress that all of the remaining
fugitives, especially Karadzic and Mladic, must be brought to justice before the Tribunal
closes its doors for good. The extended trial against Slobodan Milosevic ended without
a verdict after Milosevic’s death on March 11, 2006, by a heart attack while in custody.
In November, Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj engaged in a hunger strike
while in the detention unit, causing his case proceedings to be suspended. Seselj ended
his strike in early December. The Hague opened a major trial concerning the 1995
Srebrenica massacre against multiple suspects in mid-2006, without the presence of
Mladic. Overall, the Tribunal has closed about two-thirds of its cases.
U.S. Administration and congressional interest in Balkan cooperation with the
Tribunal stems from longstanding U.S. support for ICTY and insistence that the top-
ranking indictees be turned over to The Hague. The United States supports the region’s
Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including closer ties to and possible membership in NATO.
U.S. officials have long viewed full ICTY cooperation to be a pre-condition to further
Euro-Atlantic integration but altered this policy at the November 2006 NATO summit in
Riga, which invited three Balkan states to join Partnership for Peace. In annual
appropriations bills, Congress has conditioned some bilateral U.S. assistance to Serbia on
ICTY cooperation. Under an FY2006 foreign aid law (P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057), funding
for Serbia was conditional on the President’s certification that Serbia was cooperating
with ICTY, including the surrender and transfer of indictees Mladic and Karadzic. Unable
to make this certification, the Secretary of State suspended $7 million in FY2006 funds
for Serbia on May 31, 2006. The Bush Administration has also supported the Tribunal’s
completion strategy.
Chronology of Transfers Since Early 20052
06/10/06 — Former Bosnian Serb military police officer Dragan Zelenovic was transferred to
The Hague. He had been captured in Siberia by Russian authorities in August 2005 but only
extradited to Bosnia in June 2006.
02/21/06 — Milan Lukic was transferred to The Hague. He had been arrested in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, in August 2005. He is under the same indictment from 1998 as Sredoje Lukic (see
below).
1 Statement by Judge Fausto Pocar, ICTY President, to the U.N. Security Council, Dec. 15, 2006,
available at [http://www.un.org/icty/].
2 Details of the indictments can be found at the ICTY home page [http://www.un.org/icty/].

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12/10/05 — Croatian Gen. Ante Gotovina was transferred to The Hague. Spanish authorities
arrested Gotovina in the Canary Islands on December 7. Gotovina’s indictment charges him with
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war in relation to the 1995
Croatian “Storm” offensive against Croatian Serb-held territory in the Krajina region.
09/16/05 — Former Bosnian Serb paramilitary leader Sredoje Lukic was transferred to The
Hague from the RS. His indictment from 1998 charges him, his cousin Milan Lukic, and Mitar
Vasiljevic (already in custody) with war crimes committed in the Visegrad area, 1992 to 1994.
04/25/05 — General Nebojsa Pavkovic, former Serbian Army chief of staff, arrived at The
Hague. He is charged with alleged crimes relating to Serbian military and police operations in
Kosovo in 1998-1999. ICTY’s provisional release of Pavkovic in September was held up in
appeal; he was eventually released pending trial on November 21.
04/14/05 — Former Bosnian Serb officer Vujadin Popovic surrendered to The Hague. He is
charged with genocide and war crimes related to the 1995 Bosnian Serb attacks on Srebrenica.
04/07/05 — Former Bosnian Serb commander Milorad Trbic arrived at The Hague and is charged
in the same indictment as Vinko Pandurevic (see 03/23).
04/04/05 — Former Serbian special police General Sreten Lukic was transferred to The Hague
from a Belgrade hospital where he had undergone vascular surgery. Lukic is charged with crimes
allegedly committed by forces under his command in Kosovo in 1999. Lukic was granted
provisional release on October 3.
04/01/05 — Former Bosnian Serb special police commander Ljubomir Borovcanin arrived at The
Hague from Belgrade. His indictment from 2002 charges him with individual and command
responsibility for crimes relating to the 1995 Bosnian Serb offensive in eastern Bosnia.
03/24/05 — Former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski was transferred to The Hague
from Croatia, where he had been incarcerated on charges unrelated to the ICTY indictment. His
ICTY indictment cites charges relating to the unlawful killing of ethnic Albanian civilians in
northern Macedonia during the 2001 conflict.
03/23/05 — Former Bosnian Serb General Vinko Pandurevic was transferred to The Hague. Gen.
Pandurevic served as a brigade commander of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and is charged with
genocide and crimes against humanity related to the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica.
03/17/05 — Former Bosnian Serb Chief of Security Drago Nikolic arrived at The Hague. Nikolic
is charged with genocide and crimes against humanity for his alleged individual criminal role in
the 1995 Srebrenica assault.
03/16/05 — Former Macedonian police officer Johan Tarculovski arrived at The Hague. Along
with former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski, Tarculovski is charged with
unlawful attacks on civilians during the 2001 conflict.
03/14/05 — Former Bosnian Serb Chief of Police Gojko Jankovic was transferred to The Hague
from Banja Luka.3 He is charged with war crimes allegedly committed in the 1992 attack on the
Bosnian town of Foca.
3 Jankovic was reportedly one of several Serbian indictees who had sought and received refuge
in Russia for years. See Ed Vulliamy, “Russians Accused of Sheltering War Crimes Suspects,”
The Guardian (U.K.), Mar. 15, 2005.

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03/11/05 — Former Bosnian Serb Interior Minister (MUP) Mico Stanisic was transferred to The
Hague. He is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity relating to his role in
commanding Bosnian Serb police in Bosnia during 1992. ICTY provisionally released Stanisic
on July 22.
03/09/05 — Ramush Haradinaj arrived at The Hague after resigning from his position as Kosovo
Prime Minister. The indictment against the former Kosovo Liberation Army commander and two
of his subordinates (Lahi Brahimaj and Idriz Balaj, who turned themselves in with Haradinaj)
cites charges of war crimes perpetrated against Serbs and others in Kosovo in 1998. Haradinaj
was granted provisional release, with conditions, including permissions to engage in some
political activities.
03/07/05 — General Momcilo Perisic, former Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army,
surrendered to The Hague. He is charged with 13 counts of crimes allegedly committed in
Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Srebrenica. The tribunal granted Perisic provisional release on June 9.
02/28/05 — General Radivoj Miletic, former Bosnian Serb army chief of operations, arrived at
The Hague after surrendering to Serbian government authorities. His indictment, shared with
Milan Gvero (below), relates to war crimes allegedly committed in Srebrenica in 1995. Miletic
was provisionally released on July 22.
02/28/05 — General Rasim Delic, former Chief of the General Staff of the Bosnian Army,
departed Sarajevo for The Hague, and is charged with command authority over four counts of
violating customs of war in 1993 and 1995. Delic was granted provisional release on May 6.
02/24/05 — Milan Gvero, a former VRS commander, arrived at The Hague from Belgrade. He
is charged with individual criminal responsibility for crimes allegedly committed in the
Srebrenica region in 1995. Gvero was provisionally released on July 22.
02/03/05 — General Vladimir Lazarevic, former commander of the Yugoslav Army Pristina
Corps, arrived at The Hague. Lazarevic is one of the four Yugoslav Army generals indicted by
ICTY in October 2003 for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo. ICTY provisionally released
Lazarevic and three other suspects on April 15.
Remaining Suspects at Large
By the end of 2006, six known indicted suspects remained at large. The short list for
most concerned parties comprises the top two remaining suspects: former Bosnian Serb
leaders Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic. The indictments against Karadzic and
Mladic charge them with genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws
or customs of war as part of the Bosnian Serb campaign in 1991 to 1995 to control
territory and drive out non-Serb populations from Srebrenica and other areas.
ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte has frequently charged that five of the
remaining suspects, including Mladic and Karadzic, remain “within reach” of authorities
in Serbia and the RS, with the sixth believed to be in Russia. In particular, she has
charged that Belgrade could “easily arrest” Mladic.4 Throughout much of 2005 and early
4 See address by ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte to the U.N. Security Council, December 15,
2006. Serbian government officials dispute this claim. However, Belgrade authorities have
revealed that Mladic had occasionally received shelter from the Serbian military until mid-2002.
(continued...)

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2006, several news stories reported sightings of Karadzic and Mladic and unconfirmed
surrender negotiations with local authorities. However, Serbian and international officials
immediately discounted these reports, and Mladic remains at large. Other reports have
suggested that Mladic has become seriously ill.
Policy Implications
The United States and the European Union, often in conjunction with ICTY’s Office
of the Prosecutor, have frequently wielded conditionality policies in order to foster
improved Balkan cooperation with ICTY. On the incentive side, western officials have
expressed support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the western Balkan states and for
moving forward in these integration processes, some of which have lagged primarily over
limited ICTY cooperation. All of the western Balkan states have made closer ties to
NATO and especially the EU a key strategic priority. At the same time, western officials
also emphasize that the Balkan states must adhere to standards on international
commitments and the rule of law, especially with regard to meeting obligations on ICTY
cooperation and overcoming the legacy of the wartime years. In this regard, NATO’s
invitation in November 2006 to Serbia and Bosnia (in addition to Montenegro) to join PfP
was seen as a significant shift in long-standing conditionality policy.
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina has sought membership in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and completion of a Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. Limited cooperation with ICTY,
especially by the Republika Srpska (RS), contributed to a slowdown in both efforts. Until
January 2005, RS authorities had not turned over a single indicted suspect, and ICTY
officials have since reported little effort by the RS to locate or arrest Radovan Karadzic.
The ICTY issue also provided former High Representative Ashdown justification for
removing obstructionist officials, freezing assets, and even re-shaping governing
institutions especially in the defense and security sectors. The EU opened SAA
negotiations with Bosnia in November 2005 after Bosnia’s leaders came to a preliminary
agreement on police reforms; stalled reforms in the police and other sectors have
presented obstacles to concluding the SAA, although incomplete ICTY cooperation may
also present an unfulfilled requirement. As noted earlier, Bosnia gained entry into
NATO’s PfP program in late 2006.
Croatia. Croatia had a largely positive record of cooperation with ICTY since 2001
except for one high-profile case involving indicted Gen. Ante Gotovina. In March 2005,
EU members indefinitely postponed the opening of membership talks with Croatia and
created a special task force to assess Croatia’s ICTY cooperation. The Croatian
government adopted an Action Plan to increase efforts to track down Gotovina. ICTY
Prosecutor del Ponte reported “full” cooperation with Zagreb on October 3, paving the
4 (...continued)
Financial Times, Feb. 3, 2006. More recent news accounts speculate that Mladic may have been
hiding in Belgrade as late as January 2006

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way for the EU to formally open accession negotiations with Croatia.5 Gotovina’s
subsequent capture resolved the matter of ICTY cooperation for Croatia.
Serbia and Montenegro. Despite Serbia’s notable achievement of extraditing
wartime Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague in 2001, Serbia’s level of
cooperation with ICTY has been limited, according to most assessments. Beginning in
late 2004, the Kostunica government substantially increased efforts to encourage the
voluntary surrender of indicted persons, even while it did not abandon its reluctance to
make arrests. Politically, the Kostunica government is constrained to some extent because
it is supported in parliament by Milosevic’s Socialist Party (SPS) and because the SPS
and the much larger nationalist Radical Party (SRS) vehemently oppose forced indictee
transfers to The Hague. With Serbia now set to hold new elections in January 2007, few
observers expect further action to arrest indicted suspects. Generally, however, some
analysts believe that strong domestic support for EU integration and signs of diminishing
public opposition to Serbian cooperation with ICTY favor eventually meeting EU
requirements. Many analysts also cite the manner in which Croatia secured Gen.
Gotovina’s arrest as a model example for Serbia to follow. In July 2006, the Serbian
government adopted in own Action Plan but has not yet achieved similar success. Serbian
authorities have brought charges against associates of Mladic for helping him avoid arrest.
Serbia’s cooperation with ICTY has been an intermittent sore spot in its foreign
relations. In accordance with annual foreign aid legislation, the United States suspended
portions of bilateral assistance to Serbia over war crimes issues in FY2004, FY2005, and
most recently in May 2006, affecting some FY2006 funds. Serbia and Montenegro had
long been denied entry into Partnership for Peace, despite having made some significant
progress in defense reforms, until the 2006 NATO summit. In recent years, Serbia and
Montenegro lagged behind other western Balkan states in the EU’s Stabilization and
Association process.6 The EU opened SAA negotiations with Serbia in October 2005 but
suspended the talks in May 2006, explicitly over the issue of cooperation with ICTY.
Brussels has expressed readiness to resume talks once full ICTY cooperation is achieved
and is likely to review the status of the SAA talks after Serbia’s January 2007 elections.
5 EU officials denied that the positive decision on Croatia was made in exchange for Austria’s
acceptance of opening accession talks with Turkey, but several media commentators questioned
the “suspiciously expedient” circumstances. Del Ponte later reported that her assessment of
Croatia’s “full cooperation” came after she was given information that Croatian authorities had
located Gotovina in Spain.
6 Complications arising from the state of the Serbia and Montenegro union had also presented
some obstacles to EU integration. With the separation of Montenegro from the union in May
2006, both countries have pursued independent paths toward EU integration.

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