Order Code RL32686
Afghanistan:
Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Updated December 10, 2006
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Summary
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant negative
factors in Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years.
In 2006, poppy cultivation and opium production reached record highs, in spite of
ongoing efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and their international
partners to combat poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Afghanistan is now the
source of 92% of the world’s illicit opium. U.N. officials estimate that in-country
illicit revenue from the 2006 opium poppy crop will be over $3 billion, sustaining
fears that Afghanistan’s economic recovery continues to be underwritten by drug
profits and that large sums are reaching criminals, corrupt officials, and extremists.
Across Afghanistan, regional militia commanders, criminal organizations, and
corrupt government officials have exploited opium production and drug trafficking
as reliable sources of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these
groups pose to the country’s fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its
embryonic democratic government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears to
provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue
to operate in and around Afghanistan, including the resurgent remnants of the Taliban
and some Al Qaeda operatives. Although coalition forces may be less frequently
relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, many
observers have warned that drug-related corruption among appointed and elected
Afghan officials may create new political obstacles to further progress.
The Bush Administration warned in September 2006 that “failure to act
decisively now” against narcotics and related corruption and security challenges
“could undermine security, compromise democratic legitimacy, and imperil
international support for vital assistance” in Afghanistan. Afghan president Hamid
Karzai has identified the opium economy as “the single greatest challenge to the
long- term security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan.” Afghan,
U.S., and coalition efforts to provide viable economic alternatives to poppy
cultivation and to disrupt corruption and narco-terrorist linkages succeeded in
reducing or eliminating opium poppy cultivation in some areas of the country during
the 2004-2005 season. However, escalating violence in Afghanistan’s southern
provinces, particularly in Helmand, and widespread corruption fueled a surge in
cultivation over the last year, pushing opium output to an all-time high of 6100
metric tons. In response, Members may be asked to consider options for
strengthening counternarcotics efforts during the first session of the 110th Congress.
In addition to describing the structure and development of the Afghan narcotics
trade, this report provides current statistical information, profiles the trade’s various
participants, explores alleged narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. and
international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers current
policy debates regarding the role of the U.S. military in counternarcotics operations,
opium poppy eradication, alternative livelihood development, and funding issues for
Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. For more
information on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Afghanistan’s Opium Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Production Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Historical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Taliban Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-Taliban Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Farmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Land Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Traffickers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Narcotics and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Consumption Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Trafficking to the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Regional Security Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The International Policy Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Institutions and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Public Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Judicial Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Alternative Livelihood Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Defining the Role of the U.S. Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Equipment and Weaponry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

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Redefining Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Manual or Aerial Herbicide-based Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Reauthorization of Defense Counternarcotics Activities . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Counternarcotics Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Cited Field Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
List of Figures
Figure 1. Opium Production in Afghanistan, 1980-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 2. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1986-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan by Province, 2006 . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 4. Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1. Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table 3. Alternative Livelihood Proposed Spending Targets by Province,
FY2005-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 4. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source,
FY2002-FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 5. Planned Use of FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-13 . . 43
Table 6. United Kingdom Counternarcotics Funding 2005-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

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Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Introduction
In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan’s narcotics trade,
U.N. officials estimate that a record opium poppy crop was produced in Afghanistan
during the 2005-2006 season that supplied 92% of the world’s illicit opium.1
Afghan, U.S., and international officials have stated that opium poppy cultivation and
drug trafficking constitute serious strategic threats to the security and stability of
Afghanistan and jeopardize the success of post-9/11 counterterrorism and
reconstruction efforts. In light of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the
United States make a long-term commitment to the security and stability of
Afghanistan, counternarcotics policy has emerged as a focal point of recurring debate
in the Bush Administration and in Congress concerning the United States’ strategic
objectives in Afghanistan and the global war against terrorism.
Concerns include the role of U.S. military personnel in counternarcotics
activities and strategies for continuing the simultaneous pursuit of counterterrorism
and counternarcotics goals, which may be complicated by practical necessities and
emerging political realities. Coalition forces pursuing regional security and
counterterrorism objectives may rely on the cooperation of commanders, tribal
leaders, and local officials who may be involved in the narcotics trade. Similarly,
U.S. officials and many observers believe that the introduction of a democratic
system of government to Afghanistan has been accompanied by the election and
appointment of narcotics-associated individuals to positions of public office.
Efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of ending
a highly-profitable enterprise that has become deeply interwoven with the economic,
political, and social fabric of a war-torn country. Afghan, U.S., and international
authorities are engaged in a campaign to reverse an unprecedented upsurge of opium
poppy cultivation and heroin production: they continue to implement a multifaceted
counternarcotics initiative that includes public awareness campaigns, judicial reform
measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, drug interdiction
operations, and more robust poppy eradication. The Bush Administration and
Congress continue to consider options for upgrading U.S. support for
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in order to meet the challenges posed by the
Afghan opium economy to the security of Afghanistan and the international
community. Questions regarding the likely effectiveness, resource requirements, and
implications of new counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan are likely to arise
during the first session of the 110th Congress as such options continue to be debated.
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/Government of Afghanistan
Counternarcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, November 2004.

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Afghanistan’s Opium Economy
Opium production has become an entrenched negative element of Afghanistan’s
fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years in spite of ongoing local,
regional, and international efforts to reverse its growth. At the time of Afghanistan’s
pro-Communist coup in 1978, narcotics experts estimated that Afghan farmers
produced 300 metric tons (MT) of opium annually, enough to satisfy most local and
regional demand and to supply a handful of heroin production facilities whose
products were bound for Western Europe.2 Since the early 1980s, a trend of
increasing opium poppy cultivation and opium production has unfolded during
successive periods of insurgency, civil war, fundamentalist government, and recently,
international engagement (Figures 1 and 2). During the 2005-2006 poppy growing
season, Afghanistan produced a world record opium poppy crop that yielded 6,100
MT of illicit opium — an estimated 92% of the world’s supply. This significantly
reversed a slight downward trend in national poppy cultivation and opium output that
occurred from 2004 to 2005.
Narcotics experts describe Afghanistan’s opium economy as the backbone of
a multibillion dollar drug trade that stretches throughout Central and Southwest Asia
and supplies heroin to consumption markets in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and
the United States. Millions of Afghans remain involved with various aspects of the
opium trade, including farmers, laborers, traffickers, warlords, and government
officials. Some experts have warned that the consolidation of existing relationships
between these groups supports negative trends such as warlordism and corruption and
threatens to transform Afghanistan into a failed narco-state.
Current Production Statistics
According to the 2006 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Ministry of
Counternarcotics (MCN):
! Opium poppy cultivation took place in 28 Afghan provinces in
2005-2006 (see Figure 3). Overall, the decrease in opium poppy
cultivation that occurred during the 2004-2005 growing season was
reversed: the land area under poppy cultivation rose by 59% to
165,000 hectares in 2005-2006 (equal to 3.65% of Afghanistan’s
arable land). The increase was concentrated in conflict-ridden
Helmand province, which produced over 69,000 hectares of poppy
— 42% of the national total.
! The 2005-2006 opium poppy crop produced 6,100 MT of illicit
opium, a 49% increase from the prior season. A range of accepted
2 See Jonathan C. Randal, “Afghanistan’s Promised War on Opium,” Washington Post, Nov.
2, 1978, and Stuart Auerbach, “New Heroin Connection: Afghanistan and Pakistan Supply
West With Opium,” Washington Post, Oct. 11, 1979.

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opium to heroin conversion rates indicate that this year’s opium
yield of 6,100 MT could produce 610 to 870 MT of refined heroin.3
! Approximately 448,000 Afghan families cultivated opium poppy in
2005-2006, a 45% increase from the previous season and equal to
roughly 2.9 million people or 12.6% of the Afghan population. Over
500,000 laborers and an unknown number of traffickers, warlords,
and officials also participate.
! The estimated over $3 billion value of Afghanistan’s 2006 illicit
opium harvest is equivalent in value to approximately 45% of the
country’s licit GDP. Many licit and emerging industries are financed
or supported by profits from narcotics trafficking.4
The 2006 UNODC report identifies insecurity and poor governance as the major
factors that fueled the large growth in poppy cultivation and opium production during
the 2005-2006 season. The report echoes previous assessments that significant
sustainable declines in opium poppy cultivation occurred in provinces and districts
that were economically integrated and politically stable and in those that received
alternative livelihood assistance and where effective eradication took place. Other
observers have pointed to the steady increase in opium production volume that has
occurred since late 2001 and argued that excess opium supply has reduced raw opium
price levels (Table 1) and may undercut price incentives for farmers to cultivate
poppy. Price levels have increased in eastern and northern provinces where poppy
cultivation and opium production were reduced from 2004 to 2006.5
Experts have identified two factors that may affect Afghanistan’s future opium
output regardless of reported declines in cultivation. Intensified interdiction and
eradication efforts by Afghan authorities may fuel a renewed increase in opium prices
that could enrich traffickers who control large existing stocks of opium and
encourage farmers to resume cultivation in the future. In addition, drought and crop
disease problems that limited the output of the 2004 poppy crop may not affect the
output of future crops.
Note: The following figures display trends in poppy cultivation and opium
production in Afghanistan over the last 25 years. The sharp decline in cultivation and
production in the 2000-2001 growing season is related to the Taliban regime’s
decision to ban opium poppy cultivation. According to U.S. officials, opium
trafficking continued unabated during this period, and the Taliban and their allies
collected higher taxes and profits from the sale of opium and heroin stockpiles.6
3 UNODC/Afghan Gov., Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, Nov. 2004, pp. 105-7.
4 See Barnett Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Center for
International Cooperation, Oct. 7, 2004, and the World Bank Country Economic Report -
Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty, Sept. 9, 2004.
5 UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 Executive Summary, Sept. 2006.
6 Author interviews with U.S., U.N., and coalition officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, Jan. 2005.

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Figure 1. Opium Production in Afghanistan, 1980-2006
Source: Graphic from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006. One hectare is equal to 10,000 square
meters. U.S. government estimates placed 2005 opium cultivation at 107,400 hectares. The Taliban banned
opium poppy cultivation in areas under their control in 2001, but allowed opium trafficking to continue and
profited from the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks. Limited cultivation continued in areas under
Northern Alliance control.

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Figure 2. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1986-2006
Source: UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006. One metric ton is equal to 2,200 pounds. U.S.
government estimates placed 2005 opium production at 3375 metric tons. The Taliban banned opium poppy
cultivation in areas under their control in 2001 but allowed opium trafficking to continue and profited from
the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks. Limited cultivation continued in areas under Northern Alliance
control.

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Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan by Province, 2006
Source: Map from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006.

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Table 1. Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan
(regionally weighted fresh opium farmgatea price US$/kilogram)
1999
2000
2001b
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Opium Price
$40
$28
$301
$350
$283
$92
$102
$94
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Surveys 2004-2006.
a. Farmgate price for fresh opium is the price paid to farmers for non-dried opium.
b. Dry opium prices skyrocketed to nearly $700/kg immediately following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and fell to $93/kg after U.S. airstrikes began.
Historical Development
During the more than two decades of occupation, foreign interference, and civil
war that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion, opium poppy cultivation and drug
trafficking served as central parts of Afghanistan’s war economy, providing revenue
to individuals and groups competing for power and an economic survival mechanism
to a growing segment of the impoverished population. In December 2001, Afghan
leaders participating in the Bonn conference that formed Afghanistan’s interim post-
Taliban government echoed pleas issued by their pro-Communist predecessors
decades earlier:7 They strongly urged that “the United Nations, the international
community, and regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority to
combat international terrorism, cultivation, and trafficking of illicit drugs and provide
Afghan farmers with financial, material and technical resources for alternative crop
production.”8 In spite of renewed efforts on the part of Afghan and international
authorities to combat opium poppy cultivation since the fall of the Taliban,
Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium.
Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy. Following the Soviet invasion
of 1979 and during the civil war that ensued in the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal, opium poppy cultivation expanded in parallel with the gradual collapse
of state authority across Afghanistan. As the country’s formal economy succumbed
to violence and disorder, opium became one of the few available commodities
capable of both storing economic value and generating revenue for local
administration and military supplies. Some anti-Soviet mujahideen commanders
encouraged and taxed opium poppy cultivation and drug shipments, and, in some
instances, participated in the narcotics trade directly as a means of both economic
survival and military financing.9 Elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
7 In 1978, pro-Communist Afghan officials reportedly requested “a lot of assistance from
abroad, especially economic help, to help replace farmers’ incomes derived from opium
poppy cultivation.” Randal, Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1978.
8 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions [The Bonn Agreement], Dec. 5, 2001.
9 See Arthur Bonner, “Afghan Rebel’s Victory Garden: Opium,” New York Times, June 18,
(continued...)

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CRS-8
(ISI) agency and Afghan rebel commanders to which the ISI channeled U.S. funding
and weaponry are also alleged to have participated in the Afghan narcotics trade
during the Soviet occupation and its aftermath, including in the production and
trafficking of refined heroin to U.S. and European markets.10 After the withdrawal
of Soviet troops and a drop in U.S. and Soviet funding, opium poppy cultivation,
drug trafficking, and other criminal activities increasingly provided local leaders and
military commanders with a means of supporting their operations and establishing
political influence in the areas they controlled.
Taliban Era. The centralization of authority under the Taliban movement
during the mid-to-late 1990s further fueled Afghan opium poppy cultivation and
narcotic production, as Taliban officials coopted their military opponents with
promises of permissive cultivation policies and mirrored the practices of their
warlord predecessors by collecting tax revenue and profits on the growing output.11
In 1999, Afghanistan produced a peak of over 4500 MT of raw opium, which led to
growing international pressure from states whose populations were consuming the
end products of a seemingly endless supply of Afghan drugs. In response, the
Taliban announced a ban on opium poppy cultivation in late 2000, but allowed the
opiate trade to continue, fueling speculation that the decision was designed to
contribute to their marginalized government’s campaign for international legitimacy.
Under the ban, opium poppy cultivation was reduced dramatically and overall opium
output fell to 185 MT, mainly because of continued cultivation and production in
areas under the control of Northern Alliance forces. Individual Northern Alliance
commanders also taxed opium production and transportation within their zones of
control and continued producing opium and trafficking heroin following the Taliban
prohibition.12 Although U.S. and international officials initially applauded the
Taliban policy shift, many experts now believe that the ban was designed to increase
the market price for and potential revenue from stocks of Afghan opium maintained
by the Taliban and its powerful trafficking allies within the country.13
9 (...continued)
1986, and Mary Thornton, “Sales of Opium Reportedly Fund Afghan Rebels,” Washington
Post, Dec. 17, 1983.
10 See James Rupert and Steve Coll, “U.S. Declines to Probe Afghan Drug Trade: Rebels,
Pakistani Officers Implicated,” Washington Post, May 13, 1990; Jim Lobe, “Drugs: U.S.
Looks Other Way In Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Inter Press Service, May 18, 1990; John
F. Burns, “U.S. Cuts Off Arms to Afghan Faction,” New York Times, Nov. 19, 1989; Kathy
Evans, “Money is the Drug,” The Guardian (UK), Nov. 11, 1989; and Lawrence Lifschultz,
“Bush, Drugs and Pakistan: Inside the Kingdom of Heroin,” The Nation, Nov. 14, 1988.
11 The Taliban government collected an agricultural tax (approximately 10%, paid in kind),
known as ushr, and a traditional Islamic tithe known as zakat (variable percentages). The
Taliban also taxed opium traders and transport syndicates involved in the transportation of
opiates. UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 92, 127-8.
12 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 92.
13 In December 2001, then Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs Rand Beers stated that the Taliban had not banned opium cultivation
“out of kindness, but because they wanted to regulate the market: They simply produced too
much opium.” Marc Kaufman, “Surge in Afghan Poppy Crop Is Forecast,” Washington Post,
(continued...)

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Post-Taliban Resurgence. Following 9/11, Afghan farmers anticipated the
fall of the Taliban government and resumed cultivating opium poppy as U.S.-led
military operations began in October 2001. International efforts to rebuild
Afghanistan’s devastated society began with the organization of an interim
administration at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, and Afghan leaders
committed their new government to combat the resurgence of opium poppy
cultivation and requested international counternarcotics assistance from the United
States, the United Kingdom and others.14 The United Kingdom was designated the
lead nation for international counternarcotics assistance and policy in Afghanistan.
On January 17, 2002, the Afghan Interim Administration issued a ban on opium
poppy cultivation that was enforced with a limited eradication campaign in April
2002. In spite of these efforts, the 2001-2002 opium poppy crop produced over 3400
MT of opium, reestablishing Afghanistan as the world’s leading producer of illicit
opium. Since 2002, further government bans and stronger interdiction and eradication
efforts failed to reverse an overall trend of increasing opium poppy cultivation and
opium output, although year-on-year reductions occurred from 2004 to 2005.
Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy
Farmers, laborers, landowners, and traffickers each play roles in Afghanistan’s
opium economy. Ongoing field research indicates that the motives and methods of
each group vary considerably based on their geographic location, their respective
economic circumstances, their relationships with ethnic groups and external parties,
and prevailing political conditions.15 Studies suggest that profit is not the universal
motivating factor fueling opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan: opium trade field
researcher David Mansfield argues that the “great diversity in the socio-economic
groups involved in opium poppy in Afghanistan and the assets at their disposal”
ensures that “there is great disparity in the revenues that they can accrue from its
cultivation.”16 Household debt and land access needs also motivate opium poppy
cultivation. Cultivation patterns and motives vary from district to district.
Farmers. Field studies have identified several structural barriers that limit the
profitability of opium poppy cultivation for the average Afghan farmer. Many
Afghan farming households cultivate opium poppy in order to improve their access
to land, water, agricultural supplies, and credit — inputs that remain in short supply
13 (...continued)
Dec. 25, 2001. See Table 1 and UNODC, Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 57.
14 The Bonn Agreement, Dec. 5, 2001.
15 Analysis in this report relating to the motives and methods of Afghan farmers, land
owners, and traffickers is based on the findings of the UNODC’s “Strategic Studies” series
on Afghanistan’s opium economy and a series of commissioned development reports by
David Mansfield, the Aga Khan Foundation, Frank Kenefick and Larry Morgan, Adam Pain,
and others. UNODC Strategic Studies reports are available at [http://www.unodc.org/
pakistan/en/publications.html]. Complete citations are provided in Appendix A.
16 David Mansfield, “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and
Reality,” International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and
Cooperation, Aug. 2001.

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in many of the rural areas where opium poppy is grown. Experts have identified high
levels of household debt as a powerful structural determinant of the continuation of
opium poppy cultivation among some Afghan farmers. An opium-for-credit system,
known as salaam, allows farmers to secure loans to buy necessary supplies and
provisions if they agree in advance to sell future opium harvests at rates as low as
half their expected market value. Crop failures that occurred as a result of a severe
four-year nationwide drought (1998-2001) reportedly caused many farming
households to accumulate large amounts of debt in the form of salaam loans based
on future cultivation of opium poppy. In some cases, the introduction of strict poppy
cultivation bans and crop eradication policies by the Taliban in 2001 and the Afghan
Interim Authority in 2002 and 2003 increased the debt levels of many Afghan
farmers by destroying opium crops that served as collateral for salaam arrangements.
Although the Afghan government issued a decree banning opium-based loans
and credit in April 2002, the 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey reported that salaam
lending had continued. Increased debt has led some farmers to mortgage land and
to agree to cultivate opium poppy in the future through sharecropping arrangements.
Other landless farmers have reportedly been forced to accept the crop selection
choices of landowners who control their access to land and water and who favor
opium poppy over other traditional crops. According to experts, this combination of
drought-induced debt, predatory traditional lending systems, and the unintended side-
effects from government cultivation bans and eradication programs has fueled opium
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey warned
that in areas where farmers carry high salaam and other loan debt, significant
decreases in opium poppy cultivation and associated revenue may be “potentially
problematic” and could have created “severe financial pressure on to farmers to
resume opium production [in 2006] in order not to default.”
Land Owners. Afghan land owners are better positioned to profit from opium
poppy cultivation because of the labor intensive nature of the opium production
process. Land owners who control vital opium cultivation inputs like land, water, and
fertilizers enjoy an economic advantage in the opium production cycle, which places
heavy demands on Afghanistan’s rural agricultural labor market during annual opium
poppy planting, maintenance, and harvesting seasons. Wealthy land owners secure
the services of skilled itinerant laborers to assist in the complex opium harvesting
process, which improves their crop yields and profits. Itinerant laborers, in turn,
contribute to the spread of opium cultivation expertise around Afghanistan.17
Although opium prices have fallen since reaching a peak of $350/kg in 2002, farmers
have experienced greater profit loss than land owners.18 Land owners also have
benefitted from consolidation of property related to rising debt levels among Afghan
farmers. Land valuation based on potential opium yields also benefits land owners.
Traffickers. International market prices for heroin and intermediate opiates
such as morphine ensure that individuals and groups engaged in the shipment and
distribution of refined opium products earn substantially higher profits than those
17 See UNODC, “An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Poppy Cultivation to
New Districts in Afghanistan,” June 1998.
18 UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003,” p. 8.

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CRS-11
involved with cultivating and producing raw opium gum.19 Although opium refining
facilities that produce morphine base and heroin traditionally have been located in
tribal areas along the Afghan border with Pakistan, the growth and spread of opium
cultivation in recent years has led to a corresponding proliferation of opiate
processing facilities, particularly into northeastern Badakhshan province.20 The large
proportion of heroin in the composition of drugs seized in countries neighboring
Afghanistan reflects this proliferation and suggests that the profitability of opiate
trafficking for Afghan groups has increased significantly in recent years.
Although Afghan individuals and groups play a significant role in trafficking
opiates within Afghanistan and into surrounding countries, relatively few Afghans
have been identified as participants in the international narcotics trafficking
operations that bring finished opiate products such as heroin to Middle Eastern,
European, or North American consumer markets.21 Ethnic and tribal relationships
facilitate the opium trade within Afghanistan, while relationships between ethnic
Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, and Baluchi Afghans and their counterparts in Central Asia,
Pakistan, and Iran provide a basis for the organization and networking needed to
deliver Aghan opiates to regional markets and into the hands of international
trafficking organizations.22 Some observers argue that trafficking profits are a source
of economic and political instability and that interdiction and prosecution should
precede eradication efforts so that increased post-eradication opium prices do not
enrich trafficking groups further. Multilateral intelligence gathering and interdiction
operations have been initiated since 2001 and are described in further detail below.
Narcotics and Security
Experts and officials have identified three areas of concern about the potential
impact of the Afghan narcotics trade on the security of Afghanistan, the United
States, and the international community. Each is first summarized, and then more
fully developed below.
! Prospects for State Failure. Afghan, U.S., and international
officials have identified several correlations between the narcotics
trade and negative political and economic trends that undermine
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, establish the rule of law, and restore
a functioning and licit economy. These trends include corruption
and the existence of independent armed groups opposed to the
Afghan government’s reform and counternarcotics agendas. Similar
19 See UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 129-40, 165-8.
20 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 139, 158.
21 “The involvement of Afghan groups/individuals is basically limited to the opium
production, the trade of opium within Afghanistan, the transformation of some of the opium
into morphine and heroin, and to some extent, the trafficking of opiates to neighboring
countries.” UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 64.
22 See Tamara Makarenko, “Bumper Afghan Narcotics Crop Indicates Resilience of
Networks,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1, 2002.

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drug-related trends threaten countries neighboring Afghanistan.
Political observers have warned that figures involved with the drug
trade have been elected or appointed to public office and may
oppose or undermine current and future counternarcotics initiatives.
! “Narco-Terrorism.” Afghan and U.S. officials believe that Taliban
insurgents and regional groups associated with Al Qaeda continue
to profit from Afghanistan’s burgeoning narcotics trade. Officials
also suspect that drug profits provide some Al Qaeda operatives with
financial and logistical support. U.S. officials believe that financial
and logistical relationships between narcotics traffickers, terrorists,
and criminal groups pose threats to the security of Afghanistan and
the wider international community.
! Consumption and Public Health. World health officials believe
that Afghan narcotics pose social and public health risks for
populations in Afghanistan, its neighbors, Russia, Western Europe,
and, to a limited extent, the United States. Increased use of Afghan
opiates has been closely associated with increased addiction and
HIV infection levels in heroin consumption markets.
Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan
Afghan authorities and international observers have identified negative trends
associated with the narcotics trade as barriers to the reestablishment of security, the
rule of law, and a legitimate economy throughout Afghanistan — goals that U.S. and
Afghan authorities have characterized as essential for the country’s long term
stability. In a September 2004 report on Afghanistan’s economic development, the
World Bank described these related trends as “a vicious circle” (Figure 4) that
constitute “a grave danger” to the “entire state-building and reconstruction agenda.”23
Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence. Anecdotal reporting
suggests that armed and well-financed trafficking groups may be encouraging Afghan
farmers to violently resist expanded drug interdiction and crop eradication efforts.
Opium production remains a source of revenue and patronage for some armed groups
and militia leaders seeking to maintain their power and influence over areas of the
country at the expense of the extension of national government authority.24 Although
much of the outright conflict between regional and factional militias that motivated
opium cultivation in the past has ended, long-established political and commercial
networks linking armed groups, landowning elites, transportation guilds, and drug
syndicates continue to constitute the foundation of the opium economy.
23 Testimony of Robert B. Charles, then-Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, House International Relations Committee, Sept.
23, 2004.
24 See UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 69, and Report of the
Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International
Peace and Security, Aug. 12, 2004.

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Figure 4. Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan
Source: World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing
Poverty, Country Economic Report No. 29551-AF September 9, 2004, p. 87.
Fears of widespread violence are based in large part on patterns of clashes
between Afghan farmers and counternarcotics authorities seeking to eradicate crops.
In May 2006, fighting between the security detail for a government eradication force
and farmers during the destruction of opium crops in the northern province of Sar-e
Pol led to the death of two farmers and the wounding of nine Afghan police. Afghan
soldiers and police also were killed during 2005 by attackers firing on government
eradication forces in Uruzgan and Kandahar. These clashes and attacks follow a
pattern evident in previous years, in which eradication teams employed by provincial
authorities faced demonstrations, small arms fire, and mined poppy fields.25 At the
outset of the Afghan government’s first eradication campaign in April 2002, for
example, Pashtun farmers barricaded the major highway linking Pakistan and
Afghanistan, and clashes between opium farmers and Afghan eradication teams
killed 16 people.26
Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy. According to the
U.S. State Department’s 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) on Afghanistan, “drug-related corruption is a problem at all levels of
government and remains pervasive at the provincial and district levels.” In turn, the
25 The Afghan government’s Central Eradication Force reportedly was “rocketed by furious
villagers” during a 2004 eradication mission in Wardak province outside of Kabul. Reuters,
Pressure on Karzai as Afghan Drug Problem Worsens, Oct. 5, 2004.
26 See “Afghanistan Deploys 67 Million Dollars in War on Drugs,” Agence France Presse,
Apr. 11, 2002, and Anwar Iqbal, “War on Dug Begins in Afghanistan,” United Press
International, Apr. 10, 2002.

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report states that President Karzai’s “ability to move vigorously against corruption...
is severely constrained by the practical political considerations of a nascent central
government.” Afghan counternarcotics officials have stated that “high government
officials, police commanders, governors are involved” in the drug trade and have
identified “former commanders and warlords who are still in power” serving as
“district chiefs and local police” as the main problem with regard to corruption.27
Government authorities and security forces in Afghanistan have accused each other
of involvement in opium production and trafficking, and militia commanders have
clashed over opium production and profits in various regions of the country,
threatening the country’s stability and the lives of civilians.28 Although most of
Afghanistan’s prominent political figures have publicly condemned the country’s
opium economy, some political figures and their powerful supporters are alleged to
have links with the trade or hold responsibility for areas of Afghanistan where opium
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking take place. Commanders under the control of
former cabinet members, former presidential candidates, and members of parliament
are alleged to participate in the opium trade.29
As the Afghan government develops stronger counternarcotics policies and
capabilities, groups that are involved with the opium trade may join others in seeking
to corrupt or subvert Afghanistan’s democratic process. With regard to the Afghan
parliament, some experts have argued that drug money may have financed the
campaigns of candidates, and at least one expert warned that “drug lords” were
candidates.30 High-level appointees also have been alleged to be involved in
narcotics trafficking. One frequently cited example is the former governor of
Helmand province, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, who was removed from office
after 9 metric tons of opium were found at his offices in June 2005.31 When asked
about the case later that year, President Karzai said, “We don’t need to have an
investigation on [Sher Mohammed]. We will remove him from his place and bring
him to do some other government work. Maybe he should become a senator or
something.”32 President Karzai appointed Akhundzada to Afghanistan’s House of
Elders (Senate equivalent) in December 2005. In June 2006, Akhundzada claimed
27 “Curbing Rampant Afghan Opium Trade Will Take Karzai Years,” Agence France
Presse, Dec. 5, 2004; and Pamela Constable, “A Poor Yield For Afghans’ War on Drugs,”
Washington Post, Sept. 19, 2006.
28 See “7 Are Killed in a Clash of Afghan Militias,” New York Times, Feb. 9, 2004.
29 See Victoria Burnett, “Outlook Uncertain: Can Afghanistan Take the Next Step to
Building a State?” Financial Times, Aug. 19, 2004; Carol Harrington, “Ruthless Dostum a
Rival for Karzai,” Toronto Star, Sept. 20, 2004; and Jurgen Dahlkamp, Susanne Koelbl, and
Georg Mascolo, (tr. Margot Bettauer Dembo), “Bundeswehr: Poppies, Rocks, Shards of
Trouble,” Der Spiegel [Germany], Nov. 10, 2003.
30 Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan,”
Boston Globe, Oct. 20, 2004.
31 John Jennings, “Opium Crops Flourish in Afghanistan after U.S. Breaks Aid Promise,”
Reuters, July 4, 1991; Paul Watson, “Where Taliban Rules Again,” Los Angeles Times, June
24, 2006; and, DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy Statement Before the House Committee
on Armed Services, June 28, 2006.
32 Steve Kroft, “Afghanistan: Addicted to Heroin,” 60 Minutes (CBS), Oct. 16, 2005.

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CRS-15
to have recruited several hundred armed tribesmen to combat the Taliban in Helmand
with financial support from the national government.33
Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery. Reports
continue to indicate that profits from Afghanistan’s opium trade may be
overwhelming efforts to reestablish a functioning, licit economy. According to the
UNODC/MCN 2006 opium survey, the value of the 2006 opium harvest, an
estimated $3 billion, was equal in value to 45% of the country’s licit GDP. The
World Bank reports that the opium economy has produced significant increases in
rural wages and income and remains a significant source of credit for low income
rural households. Opium profits fuel consumption of domestic products and support
imports of high value goods such as automobiles and appliances from abroad. Funds
from the drug trade are also a major source of investment for infrastructure
development projects, including major projects in “building construction, trade, and
transport.”34 In February 2005, the IMF warned that new counternarcotics efforts, if
successful, “could adversely affect GDP growth, the balance of payments, and
government revenue” by lowering drug income and weakening its support for
domestic consumption and taxed imports.35
Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism
Afghan, coalition, and U.S. officials believe that linkages between insurgents,
terrorists, and narcotics traffickers threaten the security of Afghanistan and the
international community. In addition to moving opiates, sophisticated drug
transportation and money laundering networks may also facilitate the movement of
wanted individuals and terrorist funds and support illicit trafficking in persons and
weapons. Most U.S. officials address the issue of narco-terrorist linkages in general
terms and indicate that intelligence agencies are continually developing more
complete pictures of these relationships. In late 2005 and early 2006, Afghan
president Hamid Karzai made several statements indicating that drug profits were
providing financial support to the Taliban. Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives and local
tribal and criminal networks in the southern border region that may support them are
thought to have some involvement with the regional narcotics trade. British officials
refer to these relationships as “alliances of convenience” based on the use of drug
money to recruit tribal “foot soldiers.”36 Table 2 describes linkages between groups
involved in terrorism and the drug trade as presented by State Department officials
to Members of Congress in 2004 and 2005. Unconfirmed press reports continue to
suggest that the Taliban relationship to the narcotics trade has evolved and may now
include exchanges of arms, transportation, protection, and funds with traffickers.
33 Akhundzada: “I have raised 500 people and am working on their registration. The Finance
Ministry pays them $200 a month.” Simon Cameron-Moore, “Afghanistan Mulls Enlisting
Tribesmen Against Taliban,” Reuters, June 11, 2006.
34 World Bank, State Building..., p. 87.
35 International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 05/33 - Islamic State of
Afghanistan: 2004 Article IV Consultation and Second Review, February 2005.
36 United Kingdom Defense Secretary Des Browne, “Speech to the Royal United Services
Institute,” London, Sept. 19, 2006.

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Table 2. Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade
Afghan Extremists
Are they receiving money from the trade?
Do traffickers provide them with logistical support?
Are they telling farmers to grow
opium poppy?
Hizb-i Islami/ Gulbuddin
Almost Definitely: HIG commanders
Most Likely: HIG commanders involved in the drug
Probably: Afghan government
(HIG)a
involved in trafficking have led attacks on
trade may use those ties to facilitate weapons smuggling
officials say the Taliban encourage and
Coalition forces, and U.S. troops have raided
and money laundering.
in some instances force poppy
labs linked to the HIG.
cultivation. Existing State Department
estimates suggest other groups
Taliban
Almost Definitely: U.N. and Afghan
Most Likely: Major drug barons who supported the
interested in weakening the
officials report the group earns money from
Taliban when it was in power remain at large, and may
government in Kabul — like the HIG
trafficking and gets donations form drug
be moving people, equipment, and money on the
— may have followed suit.
lords.
group’s behalf.
Islamic Movement of
Probably: Uzbek officials have accused the
Probably: Members with drug ties may turn to
Possibly: No reports, and these groups
Uzbekistan (IMU)
group of involvement in the drug trade, and
traffickers for help crossing borders.
— as foreigners in Afghanistan —
its remnants in Afghanistan may turn to
may lack the moral and political
trafficking to raise funds.
authority needed to influence farmers’
planting decisions.
Al Qaedab
Possibly: Only scattered reports, but fighters
Probably: Traffickers stopped during December 2003
in Afghanistan may be engaged in low-level
in the Arabian Sea were linked to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda
— but still lucrative — drug deals.
may hire criminals in South Asia to transfer weapons,
explosives, money, and people through the region.
Source: Robert Charles, then-Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, April 1, 2004.
a. Hizb-i Islami’s leader — former anti-Soviet mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — is alleged to have been involved in the Afghan narcotics trade since the 1980s.
b. According to U.S. officials, senior Al Qaeda leaders considered and subsequently rejected the idea of becoming directly involved in managing and profiting from Afghan narcotics.
Ideological considerations and fear of increased vulnerability to intelligence and law enforcement reportedly were the predominant factors in their decision. Author interviews with
U.S. officials in Kabul, Afghanistan, January 2005.

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Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers. Afghan individuals serve as middlemen
between the groups described in Table 2 and narcotics producers and traffickers.
Press reports and U.S. officials have identified three prominent figures involved in
Afghanistan’s drug trade that reportedly have financed Taliban insurgents and some
low-level Al Qaeda operatives:
! Haji Bashir Noorzai is a former confidant of ousted Taliban leader
Mullah Omar who served as a military commander during the
Taliban era and was reportedly a “major financial supporter of the
Taliban.”37 In June 2004, the Bush Administration added Haji
Bashir Noorzai to the U.S. government’s drug kingpin list. In April
2005, Noorzai was arrested by DEA officials and charged with
conspiracy to import heroin into the United States over a 15-year
period. The indictment charges that Noorzai and his organization
“provided demolitions, weaponry, and manpower to the Taliban” in
return for “protection for its opium crops, heroin laboratories,
drug-transportation routes, and members and associates.”38
! Haji Baz Mohammed is an alleged drug organization leader from
the eastern province of Nangarhar who was extradited to the United
States in October 2005 to face charges of importing Afghan heroin
into the United States. According to his indictment, Mohammed’s
organization was “closely aligned with the Taliban” and “provided
financial support to the Taliban and other associated Islamic-
extremist organizations in Afghanistan” in return for protection.39
! Haji Juma Khan has been identified as an alleged drug lord and Al
Qaeda financier. In August 2004, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Robert
Charles told Time Magazine that Haji Juma Khan is “obviously very
tightly tied to the Taliban.” Afghan Counter Narcotics Directorate
chief Mirwais Yasini added that “there are central linkages among
Khan, Mullah Omar and [Osama] Bin Laden.”40
U.S. forces reportedly detained and released both Haji Juma Khan and Haji
Bashir Noorzai in late 2001 and early 2002. Press accounts state that Noorzai
voluntarily provided intelligence about his Taliban and Al Qaeda colleagues during
questioning at Kandahar’s airport prior to his release.41 DEA officials reportedly
37 Liz Sly, “Opium Cash Fuels Terror, Experts Say,” Chicago Tribune, Feb. 9, 2004; John
Fullerton, “Live and Let Live for Afghan Warlords, Drug Barons,” Reuters, Feb. 5, 2002.
38 See U.S. v. Bashir Noorzai, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S1 05 Cr.
19, Apr. 25, 2005.
39 See U.S. v. Baz Mohammed, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S14 03
Cr. 486 [DC], Oct. 25, 2005.
40 Tim McGirk, “Terrorism’s Harvest,” Time Magazine [Asia], Aug. 2, 2004.
41 Haji Bashir reportedly described his time with U.S. forces in the following terms: “I spent
(continued...)

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were unable to question him at the time.42 Noorzai’s forces later surrendered a large
number of weapons to coalition and Afghan authorities and provided security for the
then-governor of Qandahar province Gul Agha Sherzai.43 Juma Khan remains at
large, and Defense Department officials indicate that U.S. military forces are not
directly pursuing major figures in the Afghan opium trade, although U.S., Afghan,
and coalition authorities continue to monitor and collect intelligence on their
activities and support Afghan authorities and their operations.44
Consumption Markets
Afghan opium presents significant public health and internal security challenges
to downstream markets where refined heroin and other opiates are consumed,
including the United States. Russia and Europe have been the main consumption
markets for Afghan opiates since the early 1990s, and estimates place Afghan opium
as the source of over 90% of the heroin that enters the United Kingdom and Western
Europe annually. Russian and European leaders have expressed concern over the
growth of Afghanistan’s opium trade as both a national security threat as well as a
threat to public health and safety.
Trafficking to the United States. Heroin originating in southwest Asia
(Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) “was the predominant form of heroin
available in the United States” from 1980 to 1987,45 and the DEA’s Heroin Signature
Program has indicated that southwest Asia-derived heroin currently constitutes up to
10% of the heroin available in the United States.46 Since the 1980s, several figures
involved in the Afghan drug trade have been convicted of trafficking illegal drugs,
including heroin, into the United States.47 Afghan and Pakistani nationals have been
indicted and convicted on heroin trafficking and money laundering charges in U.S.
courts as recently as April 2005. Since 2001, DEA and FBI investigators have
prosecuted several Afghan and Pakistani nationals in connection with heroin
trafficking and money laundering charges, including members of Pakistan’s Afridi
41 (...continued)
my days and nights comfortably... I was like a guest, not a prisoner.” CBS Evening News,
“Newly Arrived US Army Soldiers Find it Difficult to Adjust...,” Feb. 7, 2002.
42 Steve Inskeep, “Afghanistan’s Opium Trade,” National Public Radio, Apr. 26, 2002.
43 See Mark Corcoran, “America’s Blind Eye,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
Foreign Correspondent, Apr. 10, 2002.
44 Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.
45 Drug Enforcement Agency, “The Availability of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United
States,” May 1996.
46 Drug Enforcement Agency, “Heroin Signature Program: 2002,” March 2004.
47 In 1985, the DEA developed evidence against a wealthy Afghan national alleged to have
been “involved in supplying Afghan rebels with weapons in exchange for heroin and
hashish, portions of which were eventually distributed in Western Europe and the United
States.” See Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control - Annual Report 1985, Dec.
19, 1986, p. 58; See U.S. v. Roeffen, et al. [U.S. District Court of New Jersey (Trenton),
86-00013-01] and U.S. v. Wali [860 F.2d 588 (3d Cir.1988)].

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clan.48 Officials have indicated that some of the individuals involved in these recent
cases may have relationships with Taliban insurgents and members of Al Qaeda.49
Al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers have been captured trafficking large quantities
of heroin and hashish and attempting to trade drugs for Stinger missiles.50
Russia. Afghan opiates have been a concern for Russian leaders since the
1980s, when Afghan drug dealers targeted Soviet troops and many Russian soldiers
returned from service in Afghanistan addicted to heroin.51 More recently, the Russian
government has expressed deep concern about “narco-terrorist” linkages that are
alleged to exist between Chechen rebel groups, their Islamist extremist allies, and
Caucasian criminal groups that traffic and distribute heroin in Russia. Since 1993,
HIV infection and heroin addiction rates have skyrocketed in Russia, and these trends
have been linked to the influx and growing use of Afghan opiates. These concerns
make the Afghan narcotics trade an issue of priority interest to Russian decision
makers, and motivate attention and initiative on the part of Russian security services
in the region. The head of Russia’s counternarcotics service has announced plans to
open a counternarcotics field office in Kabul.52
Western Europe. In Europe, press outlets and public officials in several
countries have devoted significant attention to Afghanistan’s opium trade since the
1990s. In the United Kingdom, where British officials estimate that 90-95% of the
heroin that enters the country annually is derived from Afghan opium, the public
places a high priority on combating the Afghan opiate trade. In October 2001, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair cited the Taliban regime’s tolerance for opium cultivation
and heroin production as one justification for the United Kingdom’s involvement in
the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. Some British citizens and officials
have criticized the Blair Administration’s counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and
argued that more should be done to stem the flow of Afghan opiates in the future.53
The United Kingdom has served as the lead nation for international counternarcotics
efforts in Afghanistan, and British government officials assist Afghan
counternarcotics authorities in intelligence gathering and targeting operations for
interdiction and eradication. British defense officials have deployed 3,600 British
troops to the key opium-producing province of Helmand province in southern
Afghanistan, where their mission includes efforts to support counternarcotics
operations. Roughly 850 more troops will deploy to Helmand by the end of 2006.
48 U.S. v. Afridi, et. al., [U.S. District Court of Maryland, (Baltimore), AW-03-0211].
49 Testimony of DEA Administrator Karen Tandy before the House International Relations
Committee, Feb. 12, 2004.
50 James W. Crawley, “U.S. Warships Pinching Persian Gulf Drug Trade,” San Diego
Union-Tribune, February 9, 2004, and Tony Perry, “2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for Al
Qaeda Ally,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 4, 2004.
51 Defense Department officials report that steps are taken to educate U.S. troops serving in
Afghanistan about the dangers of narcotics use and to monitor and prevent drug use.
Testimony of Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director of Strategic Plans (J-5), Before the House
International Relations Committee, Sept. 23, 2004.
52 Agence France Presse, “Russia plans anti-drug centre in Kabul,” Mar. 29, 2005.
53 House of Commons (UK) - Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report, July 21, 2004.

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Regional Security Implications
Afghanistan’s opiate trade presents a range of policy challenges for
Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly for the Central Asian republics of the former
Soviet Union. As a security issue, regional governments face the challenge of
securing their borders and populations against the inflow of Afghan narcotics and
infiltration by armed trafficking and terrorist groups. Regional terrorist organizations
and international criminal syndicates that move Afghan opiates throughout the region
have been linked to insecurity, corruption, and violence in several countries.54 As a
public health issue, Afghan narcotics have contributed to a dramatic upsurge in opiate
use and addiction rates in countries neighboring Afghanistan, a factor that also has
been linked to dramatic increases in HIV infection rates in many of Afghanistan’s
neighbors. According to the UNODC, by 2001, “Afghan opiates represented: almost
100% of the illicit opiates consumed in ... Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the Russian
Federation.”55 With the exception of Turkey, intravenous use of Afghan opiates is
the dominant driver of growing HIV infection rates in each of these countries.56
These destabilizing factors could provide a powerful pretext for increased attention
to and possible intervention in Afghan affairs on the part of regional powers such as
Iran and Pakistan.
Central Asia.57 The emergence of the so-called “Northern Route” of opiate
trafficking through Central Asia and the Caucasus in the mid-1990s transformed the
region’s previously small and relatively self-contained opiate market into the center
of global opium and heroin trafficking. Ineffective border control, civil war, and
corruption facilitated this trend, and opiate trafficking and use in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan now pose significant security and public
health threats to those countries. U.S. officials have implicated the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan in the regional drug trade, as well as well-organized and heavily armed
criminal syndicates that threaten U.S. interests.
Tajikistan has emerged as the primary transit point for Afghan opiates entering
Central Asia and being trafficked beyond. From 1998 to 2003, Tajikistan’s Drug
Control Agency seized 30 MT of drugs and narcotics, including 16 MT of heroin.
54 See Tamara Makarenko, “Crime, Terror and the Central Asian Drug Trade,” Harvard Asia
Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 3 (Summer 2002); and, Integrated Regional Information Networks
(IRIN) Report, “Central Asia: Regional Impact of the Afghan Heroin Trade,” U.N. Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), August 2004.
55 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 33, 35.
56 For more information, see the World Health Organization’s Epidemiological Fact Sheets
on HIV/AIDS at [http://www.who.int/GlobalAtlas/PDFFactory/HIV/index.asp], and Julie
Stachowiak and Chris Beyrer, “HIV Follows Heroin Trafficking Routes,” Open Society
Institute - Central Eurasia Project.
57 For more on Central Asian security and public health, including information on narcotics
trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism see CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s
Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol and CRS Report
RL30970, Health in Russia and Other Soviet Successor States: Context and Issues for
Congress, also by Jim Nichol.

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CRS-21
U.N. authorities estimate that the European street value of the 5,600 kg of heroin
seized by Tajik authorities in 2003 was over $3 billion.58 The 201st Russian Army
Division stationed troops along the Afghan-Tajik border to disrupt the activities of
criminals, narcotics traffickers, and terrorist groups from 1993 through late 2004.
Tajik and Russian authorities completed efforts to replace these Russian military
forces with Tajik border security guards in August 2005. Russian counternarcotics
officials have reported increases in narcotics smuggling via the Tajik-Afghan border
following the replacement of the Russian border guards. Tajik officials deny the
claims and have announced large-scale seizures since the handover.59 In January
2005, Russian press sources reported that Russian border guards seized 2.5 MT of
heroin on the Tajik-Afghan border in 2004. A Russian-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization interdiction effort known as Channel-2005 seized close to 9 MT of
drugs in 2005, including over 200 kg of heroin.60
Pakistan. According to the State Department’s 2006 INCSR, Pakistan is “a
major transit country for opiates and hashish from neighboring Afghanistan” and
Pakistani narcotics traffickers “play a very prominent role in all aspects of the drug
trade” in regions of Afghanistan that border Pakistan. Trafficking groups routinely
use western areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as staging areas for the movement of
opiates into and through Iran. Efforts to control the narcotics trade in Pakistan have
historically been complicated by the government’s limited ability to assert authority
over autonomous tribal zones, although recent cooperative border security efforts
with the United States have increased the presence of government authorities in these
regions and improved opium seizures by 61% in 2005. The Pakistani government’s
efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation and heroin production since 2001 have
been moderately successful; however, drug usage remains relatively high among
some elements of Pakistani society. In March 2003, former U.S. Ambassador to
Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain told a House International Relations Committee panel
that the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency in the heroin trade
from 1997-2003 had been “substantial.”61 The 2006 INCSR stated that “as a matter
of policy, neither the GOP nor any of its senior officials encourages or facilitates”
narcotics trafficking, although the report also stated that corruption “is likely to be
associated with the movement of large quantities of narcotics and pre-cursor
chemicals.”
58 IRIN Report, “Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide,” OCHA, Sept. 13, 2004. Available
at [http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/opium/regTaj.asp].
59 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006, “Russia,”
March 2006.
60 Moscow Interfax, “Russia Says Around 9 Tonnes of Afghan Drugs Seized in International
Operation,” Nov. 13, 2005. FBIS Document CEP20051113029009.
61 Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain, “Transcript: Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific of the House International Relations Committee,” Federal News Service, Mar.
20, 2003. See also, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 120-2, and
Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 197-8.
See also Rubin, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and
the Middle East and Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mar. 7, 1990.

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CRS-22
Iran. Narcotics trafficking and use continue to present serious security and
public health risks to Iran, which, according to the State Department, serves as the
transit route for 60% of the opiates smuggled from Afghanistan. According to the
2003 INCSR, over 3200 Iranian security personnel have been killed in clashes with
heavily-armed narcotics trafficking groups over the last twenty years, and 67% of
HIV infections in Iran are related to intravenous drug use by some of the country’s
more than 3 million estimated opiate users. Iran’s interdiction efforts along its
eastern borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan are widely credited with forcing opiate
traffickers to establish and maintain the “Northern Route” through Central Asia.
According to the State Department, Iranian officials seized 199 MT of opiates in the
first seven months of 2005.
The 2006 INCSR cites “overwhelming evidence of Iran’s strong commitment”
to counternarcotics programs, including interdiction and demand reduction.
Although the absence of bilateral diplomatic relations prevents the United States
from directly supporting counternarcotics initiatives in Iran, the 2005 INSCR
indicated that the United States and Iran “have worked together productively” in the
U.N.’s multilateral “Six Plus Two” group. Shared interest in interdiction has led the
United Kingdom to support the Iranian government’s counternarcotics efforts since
1999 by providing millions of dollars in grants for security equipment purchases,
including bullet-proof vests for Iran’s border patrol guards.62
The International Policy Response
The Bonn Agreement that established the Afghan Interim Authority committed
Afghanistan’s new government to cooperation with the international community “in
the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime.”63 After taking office in early
2002, Hamid Karzai’s transitional administration took a series of steps to combat the
growth of the Afghan narcotics trade, including issuing a formal ban on opium
cultivation, outlining a national counternarcotics strategy, and establishing
institutions and forces tasked with eradicating poppy crops and interdicting drug
traffic. Karzai’s government places a high priority on creating alternative livelihoods
and sources of income for opium growing farmers. Many countries have contributed
funding, equipment, forces, and training to various counternarcotics programs in
Afghanistan, including crop eradication and judicial reform. The United States and
others work closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors in an effort to contain the flow of
narcotics and strengthen interdiction efforts.
The United Kingdom serves as the lead coalition nation for international
counternarcotics policy and assistance in Afghanistan and has announced plans to
spend $510 (£270 million) on counternarcotics from 2005 through 2008 (Table 6).64
62 Jason Barnes, “The Desert Village that Feeds UK’s Heroin Habit,” The Observer (UK),
Dec. 12, 1999.
63 The Bonn Agreement, Dec. 5, 2001.
64 Dr. Kim Howells, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister for the Middle East,
(continued...)

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CRS-23
Under British leadership, basic eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood
development measures began in the spring of 2002. The U.S. Department of State’s
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau administers U.S.
counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance programs in Afghanistan and
coordinates with the Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the
Government of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). To date, U.S. forces in Afghanistan
have engaged in some counternarcotics activities based on limited rules of
engagement. The role of the U.S. military in counternarcotics expanded in 2005 to
include police training and limited interdiction mission support. British military
units carry out interdiction missions in cooperation with Afghan authorities that
target drug production laboratories and trafficking infrastructure. The United States
also provides counternarcotics assistance to other countries in the region.
The Bush Administration continues to implement a “five-pillar” inter-agency
initiative to reinvigorate U.S. support for the implementation of Afghanistan’s
national counternarcotics strategy. The initiative has been accompanied by a
substantial increase in spending on counternarcotics programs, with particular
emphasis on alternative livelihood development and greater U.S. support for crop
eradication efforts. Training of and equipment for Afghan counternarcotics forces
and prosecution teams also have figured prominently in the new strategy. Most
observers and officials expect that a long-term, sustained international effort will be
necessary to reduce the threat posed by the opium trade to the security and stability
of Afghanistan and the international community.
Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces
Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements. Among the first acts of the
newly established Afghan Interim Authority created by the Bonn Agreement was the
issuance of a decree that banned the opium poppy cultivation, heroin production,
opiate trafficking, and drug use on January 17, 2002. On April 3, 2002, Afghan
authorities released a second decree that described the scope and goals of an
eradication program designed to destroy a portion of the opium poppy crop that had
been planted during late 2001. In order to prevent further cultivation during the
autumn 2002 planting season, the government issued a third, more specific decree in
September 2002 that spelled out plans for the enforcement of bans on opium
cultivation, production, trafficking, and abuse.
Religious and political leaders have also spoken out adamantly against
involvement in the drug trade. Islamic leaders from Afghanistan’s General Council
of Ulema issued a fatwa or religious ruling in August 2004 that declared poppy
cultivation to be contrary to Islamic sharia law.65 Following his election in October
64 (...continued)
“Afghanistan: Counter Narcotics,” House of Commons Hansard Ministerial Statements for
July 13, 2006, (Pt. 0134).
65 “Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy,” Associated Press, Aug. 3,
(continued...)

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CRS-24
2004, President Hamid Karzai has made a number of public statements characterizing
involvement in opium cultivation and trafficking as shameful and stating that
provincial and district leaders would be held accountable by the central government
for failure to combat drug activity in areas under their control.
Afghan authorities developed a national drug control strategy (NDCS) in 2003
in consultation with experts and officials from the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the UNODC.66 The strategy declared the Afghan government’s
commitment to reducing opium poppy cultivation by 70% by 2008 and to completely
eliminating poppy cultivation and drug trafficking by 2013. In 2005, the Afghan
government released an implementation plan for the strategy that outlines specific
initiatives planned in five policy areas, as well as for regional cooperation,
eradication, and public information campaigns.67 New implementation plans to
replace those outlined in the 2005 document remain under consideration. The
government also issued a new counternarcotics law to clarify administrative
authorities for counternarcotics policy and establishes clear procedures for
investigating and prosecuting major drug offenses.
In January 2006, the Afghan government released an update of the NDCS to
incorporate changes in the structure of the government and lessons learned from
previous counternarcotics efforts and interagency and inter-governmental initiatives.
68 Unlike the original NDCS, the latest version refrains from setting firm elimination
targets or deadlines and identifies more general, overarching goals. The fundamental
objective, as outlined in the updated strategy, is “to secure a sustainable decrease in
cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs with a view to
complete and sustainable elimination.” Four priority areas outlined in the report
focus on the disruption of the drug trade (including high-level traffickers), the
strengthening and diversification of legal rural livelihoods, the reduction of the
demand for and consumption of illegal drugs, and the development of central and
provincial level counternarcotics institutions. Afghan authorities plan to complete
a full review of the NDCS in 2007 and release a new strategy sometime in 2008.
Institutions and Forces. In October 2002, then-Interim President Hamid
Karzai announced that the Afghan National Security Council would take
responsibility for counternarcotics policy and would oversee the creation and
activities of a new Counternarcotics Directorate (CND). The CND subsequently
established functional units to analyze data and coordinate action in five areas:
judicial reform, law enforcement, alternative livelihood development, demand
reduction, and public awareness. Following its establishment in late 2002, the CND
65 (...continued)
2004.
66 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, National Drug Control Strategy, May 18, 2003.
67 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation
Plan, Feb. 16, 2005.
68 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - Ministry of Counternarcotics, National Drug Control
Strategy: An Updated Five-Year Strategy for Tackling the Illicit Drug Problem, January
2006.

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CRS-25
worked with other Afghan ministries, local leaders, and international authorities to
develop counternarcotics policies and coordinate the creation of counternarcotics
institutions and the training of effective personnel. The CND was transformed into
a new Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) in December 2004. Habibullah Qaderi
currently serves as Afghanistan’s Minister for Counternarcotics. According to the
updated NDCS, the MCN will prepare quarterly and annual reports summarizing
interagency progress on implementing the strategy.
Counternarcotics enforcement activities have been directed from within the
Ministry of Interior since 2002. General Mohammed Daud was named Deputy
Ministry of Interior for Counternarcotics in December 2004. General Daud and his
staff work with U.S. and British officials in implementing the Afghan government’s
expanded counternarcotics enforcement plan. In November 2006, the World Bank
and UNODC warned that a lack of progress in reforming the Ministry of Interior in
relation to other ministries such as the Ministry of Defense has left Afghan police and
counternarcotics officials more vulnerable to corruption.69 Other relevant ministries
include the Ministries of Agriculture, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Justice,
National Defense, Education, Foreign Affairs, Provincial Administrations, Finance,
and Information.
The Ministry of Interior supervises of the following Afghan counternarcotics
and law enforcement entities:
! Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A). The CNP-A
consists of investigative and enforcement divisions whose officers
work closely with U.S. and British counternarcotics authorities.
CNP-A officers continue to receive U.S. training to support their
ability to plan and execute counternarcotics activities independently.
! National Interdiction Unit (NIU). The NIU was established as an
elite element of the CNP-A in October 2004 and continues to
conduct significant raids across Afghanistan. Approximately five
25-member NIU teams (140 total personnel) have received U.S.
training and now operate in cooperation with DEA Foreign Advisory
Support Teams (FAST teams, for more see below).
! Central Eradication Planning Cell (CPEC). The CPEC is a U.K.-
supported targeting and intelligence center that uses sophisticated
technology and surveying to target poppy crops and monitor the
success of eradication operations. The CPEC provides target data
for the Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF).
! Afghan Eradication Force (AEF). The U.S.-supported AEF
conducts ground-based eradication of poppy crops based on
targeting data provided by the Central Eradication Planning Cell
69 Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd (eds.), Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure,
Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy, World
Bank/UNODC, November 2006.

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(CPEC). The force is made up of approximately 800 trained
eradicators and is supported by security personnel. Afghan and U.S.
officials prioritized so-called “governor led” eradication efforts
supported by Poppy Elimination Program supervision teams for
2006, after the AEF failed to meet its targets for 2005.
! Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF). The elite ASNF, or
“Force 333,” has received special training from the British military
and carries out interdiction missions against high value targets and
in remote areas. The U.S. military provides some intelligence and
airlift support for the ASNF. According to the Ministry of
Counternarcotics, the ASNF destroys approximately 150 MT of
opium annually and has raided over 190 drug laboratories.
! Border Police, National Police, and Highway Police.
Approximately 62,000 Afghan police have graduated from U.S.-
sponsored training facilities, including over 7,000 border police.
Elements of all three forces have received training, equipment, and
communications support from British, German, and U.S. authorities
to improve their counternarcotics enforcement capabilities. The
number of fully trained and equipped police cited by U.S. officials
in September 2006 was 42,000, including border police.
U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan
In spite of limited efforts on the part of Afghan, U.S., and international
authorities, the land area used for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and
Afghanistan’s corresponding opiate output has increased substantially from late 2001
through 2006. Although public awareness of government opium poppy cultivation
bans and laws outlawing participation in the narcotics trade is widespread, until
recently, counternarcotics enforcement activities have been hindered by the Afghan
government’s tactical inability to carry out nationwide, effective eradication and
interdiction campaigns as well as a lack of adequate legal infrastructure to support
drug-related prosecutions. International development agencies have made positive,
but limited, efforts to address structural economic issues associated with rural
livelihoods and drug production, such as household debt and the destruction of local
agricultural market infrastructure. Such efforts were not centrally coordinated or
linked directly to counternarcotics goals and initiatives until late 2004: they remain
highly dependent on regional security conditions.
Substantial growth in opium poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking from
2001 through 2004 led U.S. officials, in consultation with their Afghan and coalition
partners, to develop a more comprehensive, complementary plan to support the
implementation of Afghanistan’s national counternarcotics strategy. The evolving
policy initiative currently being implemented by U.S. agencies consists of five key
elements, or pillars, that mirror Afghan initiatives and call for increased interagency

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CRS-27
and international cooperation.70 The five pillars of the U.S. initiative are (1) public
information, (2) judicial reform, (3) alternative livelihood development, (4)
interdiction, and (5) eradication.
Public Information. Afghan and U.S. authorities have initiated public
information campaigns to reach out to ordinary Afghans and raise public awareness
about the threat of narcotics and the danger of participation in the illegal drug trade.71
The efforts build on the Afghan government’s public awareness strategy, which
enlists local community and religious leaders to support the government’s
counternarcotics policies and encourages them to speak out in their communities
against drug use and involvement the opium trade. As noted above, Islamic leaders
from Afghanistan’s General Council of Ulema have supported this effort by publicly
condemning poppy cultivation and involvement in the drug trade.72
The U.S. campaigns supplement existing public information efforts designed to
reduce demand for illegal drugs within Afghan society and spread awareness of the
Afghan government’s opium poppy cultivation bans and drug laws. The
UNODC/MCN 2005 Opium Survey found that farmers across Afghanistan were well
aware of the government’s ban on opium poppy cultivation and that many farmers
who declined to cultivate opium poppy did so because they feared eradication or
incarceration. An earlier survey also reported that farmers in provinces where opium
poppy cultivation was found to have increased believed that the government could
not or would not enforce the ban. The UNODC/MCN’s 2006 survey reported that
Islamic prohibitions on involvement with narcotics also was influential among
Afghans, particularly those that had not yet been involved with cultivation or
trafficking.
Judicial Reform. State Department (INL office) and Justice Department
personnel are undertaking judicial reform efforts to further enable Afghan authorities
to enforce counternarcotics laws and prosecute prominent individuals involved in
narcotics trafficking. A Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) has been developed and
granted jurisdiction over significant narcotics cases under presidential decree. The
CJTF features integrated teams of prosecutors and investigators that are being
specially trained to handle complex, high-profile cases. U.S. federal prosecutors
participate in CJTF training activities in Afghanistan. The CJTF prepares cases for
the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) under the jurisdiction of fourteen specially
trained judges. According to the State Department, the CNT currently is processing
over 100 cases against narcotics suspects and detainees and has convicted over 20
individuals. The Department of Defense is supporting construction activities for a
secure Counternarcotics Judicial Center and a maximum-security wing at the Pol-e
Charki prison near Kabul to hold offenders prosecuted by the Task Force.
70 David Shelby, “United States to Help Afghanistan Attack Narcotics Industry,”
Washington File, U.S. Department of State, Nov. 17, 2004.
71 Ibid.
72 “Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy,” Associated Press, Aug. 3,
2004.

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CRS-28
Afghan and coalition officials are currently working to identify targets for
prosecution, although, according to U.S. officials, political concerns and security
considerations will play a role in the targeting of individuals. The April 2005 arrest
of Haji Bashir Noorzai by U.S. officials and the extradition of Haji Baz Mohammed
raised concern about the readiness and ability of Afghan authorities to investigate,
prosecute, and incarcerate drug suspects independently. According to an Afghan
Interior Ministry official, “Afghan police had no role in [Noorzai’s] arrest,” and
Afghan authorities were constrained because of “a lack of concrete evidence against
him.”73
With U.S. and coalition support, the government of Afghanistan drafted and
issued a new counternarcotics law in December 2005 that clarifies administrative
authorities for counternarcotics policy and establishes clear procedures for
investigating and prosecuting major drug offenses. U.S. officials have called on the
Afghan authorities “to start prosecuting corrupt officials” and “to start building cases
that will stand up in court” under the new law.74 Counternarcotics Minister
Habibullah Qaderi conceded in September 2006 that to date Afghan authorities were
“not going after the people who matter,” although some observers expect that corrupt
officials and higher level narcotics traffickers may be prosecuted under the new law
as planned anti-corruption initiatives move forward over the next year.
Alternative Livelihood Development.75 In order to provide viable
economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation and drug production, U.S. officials
have developed a three-phased plan that directly links development initiatives to
overall counternarcotics efforts through a comprehensive program targeted to opium
producing areas. The first phase of the alternative livelihoods plan accelerated
existing agricultural development initiatives, including improvements to agricultural
market infrastructure, farmer education programs, and micro-credit lending systems
to support rural families. The new efforts build on existing USAID programs to
develop integrated systems of crop processing facilities, storage areas, roads, and
markets, and to restore wheat and other cereal crop production levels. Work began
on phase one projects in early 2005 and has continued through 2006.
The second phase of the plan consists of an “immediate needs”/ “cash-for-work”
program that continues to sponsor labor-intensive work projects to provide non-
opium incomes to rural laborers and to rehabilitate agricultural infrastructure. The
program began in December 2004 and continued through 2006. USAID personnel
design “immediate needs” projects in consultation with local councils and tribal
leaders in districts where crop eradication has been planned or where farmers have
73 Interior Ministry spokesman Lutfullah Mashal. “Afghan Drugs Kingpin Seized by US
was Untouchable in Afghanistan: Experts,” Agence France Presse, Apr. 27, 2005.
74 Thomas A. Schweich, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, quoted in Pamela Constable, “A Poor Yield For
Afghans’ War on Drugs,” Washington Post, Sept. 19, 2006.
75 USAID information available online at [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/
countries/afghanistan/alt_live.html].

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CRS-29
agreed to cease poppy cultivation.76 According to USAID, in main opium producing
provinces, USAID-sponsored alternative livelihood cash-for-work programs have
paid $19.6 million in salaries to 214,000 farmers who otherwise may have engaged
in or supported opium poppy cultivation. Over 6,200 km of irrigation canals,
drainage ditches, and traditional water transportation systems have been repaired and
cleaned in a number of provinces, improving irrigation and supporting high value
agriculture on an estimated 290,000 hectares of land. More than 650,000 farmers
have received seeds or fertilizer (or both) in conjunction with counternarcotics
information across Afghanistan since late 2005.77
The third, “comprehensive development” phase of the plan began in six key
poppy-producing provinces during 2005 and is scheduled to be implemented through
2009. Current and planned projects include long-term infrastructure development for
urban and rural areas, credit and financial services expansion, agricultural
diversification, and private investment support. The Afghan government requested
that USAID expand alternative livelihood programs into the provinces of Ghor, Dai
Kundi, Konar, Farah, and Uruzgan, and USAID personnel have consulted with
contractors and security officials and initiated preliminary projects in some of those
provinces.
Accountability standards have been built into the USAID alternative livelihood
programs, including seed and fertilizer distributions and cash-for-work programs.
Seed and fertilizer recipients, including government officials, are required to agree
in writing not to grow poppy in exchange for program support. Cash-for-work
program participants must make similar commitments, and program staff monitor
participant activities outside of the program to ensure compliance. According to
USAID, all alternative livelihood program assistance is 100% conditional on the
reduction of poppy cultivation within one year of the receipt of assistance.78 Positive
incentives also are provided via a multi-million dollar “Good Performers Fund.” The
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID plans to
contribute over $245 million (£130 million) to development and alternative
livelihood programs as part of the UK’s wider spending counternarcotics program
from 2005 through 2008.79
76 USAID has established a “Good Performer’s Fund” to reward districts that end cultivation
with high visibility infrastructure development projects.
77 Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, Sept. 12, 2006; USAID,
Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 13, August 2006; and, author consultation with
USAID Afghanistan Desk Office, January 2006.
78 Author consultation with USAID Afghanistan Desk Office, January 2006.
79 Dr. Kim Howells, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister for the Middle East,
“Afghanistan: Counter Narcotics,” House of Commons Hansard Ministerial Statements for
July 13, 2006, (Pt. 0134).

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CRS-30
Table 3. Alternative Livelihood Proposed Spending Targets
by Province, FY2005-2007
($ millions)
2004 Province Share
Immediate
Comprehensive
Province
of Nationwide Poppy
Needs
Development
Cultivated Area
Nangarhar and Laghman
$18
$110
21.1%
Helmand and Kandahar
$19
$120
34.2%
Badakhshan and Takhar
$1.5
$60
8.6%
Source: USAID, Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 2, March 16 — 31, 2005.
Interdiction. Reflecting on the absence of effective counternarcotics
institutions and authorities in post-Taliban Afghanistan, international authorities led
by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) established a series
of cooperative interdiction initiatives in countries neighboring Afghanistan beginning
in early 2002. The primary U.S.-led effort, known as “Operation Containment,” is
designed to “implement a joint strategy to deprive drug trafficking organizations of
their market access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs,
precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency.”80 Operation Containment
has continued since early 2002 and currently involves “nineteen countries from
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Europe and Russia.”81 According to the DEA, Operation
Containment activities in FY2005 were responsible for the seizure of “11.5 metric
tons of heroin, 1.3 metric tons of morphine base, 43.9 metric tons of opium gum, 248
drug labs, and 146 investigations including efforts that led to the arrest of alleged
drug lords Haji Bashir Noorzai and Haji Baz Mohammed.82 A similar multinational
DEA-led effort named Operation Topaz has focused on interdicting acetic anhydride
— a primary heroin production precursor chemical — to Afghanistan.
In addition to ongoing international narcotics and precursor interdiction
initiatives, U.S. officials provide support to Afghan government interdiction efforts
through intelligence cooperation, training programs, equipment transfers, and joint
operations. The DEA has significantly expanded its presence in Afghanistan since
January 2003, although in the past DEA officials have cited restrictions on the
capabilities and freedom of movement of their staff in Afghanistan due to a general
lack of security outside of Kabul and difficulty in securing air mobility assets (see
discussion of security and mobility issues below). DEA Foreign Advisory and
Support Teams (FAST) have been deployed to Afghanistan “to provide guidance and
conduct bilateral investigations that will identify, target, and disrupt illicit drug
80 DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy, House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Feb. 26, 2004.
81 Ibid.
82 DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy Statement Before the House Committee on Armed
Services, June 28, 2006.

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CRS-31
trafficking organizations.” The FAST teams receive Defense Department
transportation and construction support and are currently conducting operations and
serving as mentors to officers of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit. The DEA
received new FY2006 funding to expand its operational presence in Afghanistan and
Central Asia, including support for FAST teams, Operation Containment activities,
and new field officers. In December 2006, House International Relations Committee
Chairman Henry Hyde announced a reported change in policy that will allow DEA
agents to accompany U.S. military forces on operational raids of narcotics-related
sites in Afghanistan.83
Current Defense Department directives state that U.S. military forces in
Afghanistan do not and will not directly target drug production facilities or pursue
drug traffickers as a distinct component of ongoing U.S. counternarcotics
initiatives.84 Current rules of engagement allow U.S. forces to seize and destroy
drugs and drug infrastructure discovered during the course of routine military
operations carried out in pursuit of conventional counterterrorism and stability
missions.85 U.S. forces continue to provide limited intelligence and air support to
Afghan and British forces during interdiction missions, including the destruction of
heroin laboratories and opiate storage warehouses. U.S. initiatives that supply
Afghan police with tents, boots, communication equipment, mobility support,
infrastructure improvements, and training are expected to continue. Defense
Department and military personnel plan to focus future efforts on further improving
Afghanistan’s border security and providing greater intelligence support to Afghan
law enforcement officials through joint military/DEA/Afghan “intelligence fusion
centers” located at U.S. facilities in Kabul and the Afghan Ministry of Interior.86
British forces currently contribute to a central targeting operation that identifies
opiate warehouses and processing facilities for destruction. British Customs and
Excise authorities also work with Afghan officials through mobile heroin detection
units in Kabul. British and other troops in the key opium-producing province of
Helmand province in southern Afghanistan are under the NATO-led support security
and counternarcotics operations but do not have a role in directly targeting high-level
narcotic traffickers.87
83 The Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration did not comment
publicly. “Hyde Praises Department of Defense Support for Drug Enforcement
Administration Efforts in Afghanistan,” House Committee on International Relations News
Advisory, Thursday, December 07, 2006.
84 Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.
85 Testimony of Thomas W. O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Before House International Relations Committee,
Feb. 12, 2004; and Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.
86 Statement of Lennard J. Wolfson, Assistant Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office
of National Drug Control Policy, Committee on House Government Reform Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, May 10, 2005.
87 “Troops deployed as part of the NATO-led International security assistance force (ISAF)
— including British forces deployed as part of the Helmand Task Force — are authorized
(continued...)

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Eradication. Some critics have cited growth in opium poppy cultivation
figures as evidence that manual eradication campaigns have failed thus far to serve
as a credible deterrent for Afghan farmers. Plans developed by the State Department,
in consultation with Afghan authorities, called for early and more robust opium
poppy eradication measures for the 2004-2005 growing season to provide a strong
deterrent to future cultivation. The Afghan Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF)
carried out limited operations with support from U.K. intelligence officers, U.S.
advisors, and international contractors in early 2005. Field reports indicated that
CPEF personnel met violent resistance from farmers in some instances and largely
failed to meet their eradication targets for the 2004-2005 season.88 State Department
officials have identified the failure of 2004-2005 eradication activities as one factor
behind the surge in poppy cultivation that occurred during the 2005-2006 season.89
The centrally organized and executed eradication plan in 2004-2005 marked a
departure from previous eradication campaign strategies, which largely relied upon
governors and local authorities to target and destroy crops. Most governors pledged
to support President Karzai’s eradication initiatives in 2005, and U.S. officials report
that areas where governors and local leaders embraced and enforced the central
government’s eradication demands saw significant reductions in poppy cultivation.
In response to these trends, “poppy elimination programs” (PEPs) have been
established in select Afghan provinces as part of a change toward “governor-led” and
centrally monitored eradication. When complete, the PEPs will consist of 7-member
U.S. interagency and international teams that will direct and monitor locally led and
administered counternarcotics activities, including eradication, and will advise the
central government on any needed intervention. Central government and governor-
led eradication efforts during the 2005-2006 season tripled the amount of eradicated
poppy (15,713 hectares, roughly 10% of the total national poppy crop). U.S. officials
have stressed the importance of early season, locally executed eradication in order to
minimize violent farmer resistance and give Afghan farmers time to plant licit
replacement cash crops. New methods and technologies for future eradication
activities also are under consideration, including the introduction of manual herbicide
spraying to improve eradication teams’ efficiency.
87 (...continued)
to provide support to Afghan counter-narcotics forces, including training, and they will help
the Afghans create a secure environment in which economic development and institutional
reform — both essential to the elimination of the opium industry — can take place.” Des
Browne, UK Secretary of State for Defense, House of Commons Hansard Record, Written
Answers to Questions, July 24, 2006.
88 Author conversation with DEA official, Washington, D.C., May 2005.
89 “This year’s increase in cultivation represents planting decisions made by farmers last fall
following disappointing eradication efforts in the spring and summer of 2005 that failed to
introduce sufficient threat to deter planting for the new season. We have had more success
in eradication efforts this year, both in Helmand province and nationwide, although it is too
early to tell how much impact this will have on this coming fall’s planting decisions.” Anne
W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, Sept. 12, 2006

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Issues for Congress
Experts and government officials have warned that narcotics trafficking may
jeopardize the success of international efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.
U.S. officials believe that efforts to reverse the related trends of opium cultivation,
drug trafficking, corruption, and insecurity must expand if broader strategic
objectives are to be achieved. A broad interagency initiative to assist Afghan
authorities in combating the narcotics trade has been developed, but officials argue
that the full effectiveness of new U.S. efforts will not be apparent until capacity
building efforts are complete and all elements of the strategy are advanced
simultaneously. Regional insecurity and corruption also present formidable
challenges.
Primary issues of interest to the Congress include program funding, the role of
the U.S. military, and the scope and nature of eradication and development assistance
initiatives. The 108th Congress addressed the issue of counternarcotics in
Afghanistan in intelligence reform proposals, and the 109th Congress has considered
new counternarcotics policy proposals in relation to FY2006 and FY2007
appropriation and authorization requests. During the term of the 110th Congress, the
full effectiveness of the U.S. five-pillar plan should become apparent —
Administration officials have argued that, to date, insecurity in key opium poppy
producing areas, delays in building and reforming Afghan institutions, and
widespread local Afghan corruption have prevented its full implementation.
Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle
As noted above, narcotics trafficking and political instability remain intimately
linked across Afghanistan. U.S. officials have identified narcotics trafficking as a
primary barrier to the establishment of security and consider insecurity to be a
primary barrier to successful counternarcotics operations. Critics of existing
counternarcotics efforts have argued that Afghan authorities and their international
partners remain reluctant to directly confront prominent individuals and groups
involved in the opium trade because of their fear that confrontation will lead to
internal security disruptions or armed conflict with drug-related groups. Afghan
authorities have expressed their belief that “the beneficiaries of the drugs trade will
resist attempts to destroy it,” and have argued that “the political risk of internal
instability caused by counternarcotics measures” must be balanced “with the
requirement to project central authority nationally” for counternarcotics purposes.90
Conflict and regional security disruptions have accompanied recent efforts to expand
crop eradication programs and previous efforts to implement central government
counternarcotics policies.
U.S. officials have identified rural security and national rule of law as
prerequisites for effective counternarcotics policy implementation, while
90 National Drug Control Strategy, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, May 18, 2003.

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CRS-34
simultaneously identifying narcotics as a primary threat to security and stability.91
Although an increasing number of Afghan police, security forces, and
counternarcotics authorities are being trained by U.S. and coalition officials, the size
and capability of Afghan forces may limit their power to effectively challenge
entrenched drug trafficking groups and regional militia in the short term. Specifically,
questions remain as to whether Afghan security and counternarcotics forces alone
will be able to establish the security conditions necessary for the more robust
eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood programs planned by U.S. and
Afghan officials.
From a political perspective, U.S. officials maintain that parliamentary and
provincial elections contributed to the political legitimacy of the central government
and, by extension, its counternarcotics initiatives. However, the creation of sufficient
political and military stability for effective counternarcotics operations is likely to
remain a significant challenge. Local police and officials are considered to be the
best positioned to create conditions of security necessary for “full spectrum”
counternarcotics activity. They also are considered to be the most susceptible to
narcotics related corruption. The death of several local contractor employees working
on USAID alternative livelihood projects in May 2005 brought renewed urgency to
concerns about the provision of security as a prerequisite for non-enforcement related
counternarcotics programs.
Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics
In pursuing counterterrorism objectives, Afghan and coalition authorities also
must consider difficult political choices when confronting corrupt officials, militia
leaders, and narcotics traffickers. Regional and local militia commanders with
alleged links to the opium trade played significant roles in coalition efforts to
undermine the Taliban regime and capture Al Qaeda operatives, particularly in
southeastern Afghanistan. Since late 2001, some of these figures have been
incorporated into government and security structures, including positions of
responsibility for enforcing counternarcotics policies.92 According to Afghanistan
scholar Barnett Rubin, “the empowerment and enrichment of the warlords who allied
with the United States in the anti-Taliban efforts, and whose weapons and authority
91 “Poppy cultivation is likely to continue until responsible governmental authority is
established throughout the country and until rural poverty levels can be reduced via
provision of alternative livelihoods and increased rural incomes.... Drug processing and
trafficking can be expected to continue until security is established and drug law
enforcement capabilities can be increased. “ Department of State, INCSR, March 2005.
92 See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “U.S. Turns to Drug Baron to Rally Support,” Asia Times,
Dec. 4, 2001; Charles Clover and Peronet Despeignes, “Murder Undermines Karzai
Government,” Financial Times, July 8, 2002; Susan B. Glasser, “U.S. Backing Helps
Warlord Solidify Power,” Washington Post, Feb. 18, 2002; Ron Moreau and Sami
Yousafzai, with Donatella Lorch, “Flowers of Destruction,” Newsweek, July 14, 2003;
Andrew North, “Warlord Tells Police Chief to Go,” BBC News, July 12, 2004; Steven
Graham, “Group: Warlords to Hinder Afghan Election,” Associated Press, Sept. 28, 2004;
and Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan,”
Boston Globe, Oct. 20, 2004.

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CRS-35
now enabled them to tax and protect opium traffickers,” have provided the opium
trade “with powerful new protectors.”93
Pragmatic decisions taken since 2001 to prioritize counterterrorism operations
and current plans to enforce counternarcotics policies more strictly may conflict with
each other, forcing Afghan and coalition authorities to address seemingly difficult
contradictions. “Tactical” coalition allies in militia and other irregular forces with
ties to the drug trade may inhibit the ability of the central government to extend its
authority and enforce its counternarcotics policies. A number of reports suggest that
the Taliban resurgence that has unfolded since early 2006 has been supported in part
by narcotics proceeds. These issues may weigh strongly in decision concerning the
feasibility and prospects for success of continuing counterterrorism and
counternarcotics operations. One senior Defense Department official has argued that
U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan must recognize “the impact the drug
trade has on our other policy objectives, while complementing (and not competing
with) our other efforts in furtherance of those objectives.”94 Striking such a balance
may continue to create challenges for the United States and its allies.
Defining the Role of the U.S. Military
Some observers have argued that U.S., coalition, and NATO military forces
should play an active, direct role in targeting the leaders and infrastructure of the
opiate trade. Following the announcement of record poppy cultivation and opium
production in 2005-2006, UNODC Director Antonio Maria Costa has called for
direct NATO military involvement in counternarcotics enforcement operations in
Afghanistan. Although U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials have
indicated that “the DoD counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan is a key element
of our campaign against terrorism,”95 military officials have resisted the
establishment of a direct counternarcotics enforcement role for U.S. forces. NATO
Commander U.S. General James Jones has supported the idea that counternarcotics
enforcement is “not a military mission,” stating that “having NATO troops out there
burning crops, for example, is not going to significantly contribute to the war on
drugs.”96
Other opponents of a direct enforcement role for U.S., coalition, or NATO
forces claim that such a role may alienate forces from the Afghan population,
93 Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Oct. 7, 2004.
94 Testimony of Mary-Beth Long, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics before the House Committee on International Relations, Mar. 17, 2005.
95 “U.S. CENTCOM views narcotrafficking as a significant obstacle to the political and
economic reconstruction of Afghanistan... Local terrorist and criminal leaders have a vested
interest in using the profits from narcotics to oppose the central government and undermine
the security and stability of Afghanistan.” Major Gen. John Sattler, USMC, Dir. of
Operations-US CENTCOM before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Apr. 21, 2004.
96 Lolita C. Baldor, “NATO to Provide More Afghanistan Troops,” Associated Press, Sept.
20, 2006.

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CRS-36
jeopardize ongoing counterterrorism missions that require Afghan intelligence
support, and divert military resources from direct counter-insurgent and
counterterrorism operations. The House report on the FY2007 Defense authorization
bill argued that the Department of Defense “must not take on roles in which other
countries or other agencies of the U.S. Government have core capabilities” with
regard to counternarcotics in Afghanistan. According to the Department of Defense,
U.S. military forces currently are authorized to seize narcotics and related supplies
encountered during the course of normal stability and counterterrorism operations.
Similarly, at present, NATO forces provide support for Afghan and coalition
counternarcotics initiatives but refrain from direct involvement with enforcement.
Equipment and Weaponry. Current U.S. policy calls for an expanded role
for U.S. military forces in training, equipping, and providing intelligence and airlift
support for Afghan counternarcotics teams, but stops short of elevating narcotics
targets to a direct priority for U.S. combat teams. Section 1021 of the Defense
Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-136) added Afghanistan to the list of
countries eligible for transfers of non-lethal Defense Department counternarcotics
equipment authorized under Section 1033 of the Defense Authorization Act for
FY1998 (P.L. 105-85). The FY2005 and FY2006 supplemental appropriations acts
(P.L. 109-13 and P.L. 109-234) further authorized the provision of individual and
crew-served weapons, ammunition, vehicles, aircraft, and detection, interception,
monitoring and testing equipment to Afghan counternarcotics forces. To date,
.50-caliber machine guns have been provided along with night vision equipment and
a range of other supplies. Afghan counternarcotics forces have requested further
weaponry in response to attacks by well armed and supplied trafficking groups. The
FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364) reauthorized provision of .50-
caliber and lighter crew-served weaponry and ammunition through FY2008.
The conference report (H.Rept. 109-360) on the Defense Authorization Act for
FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) did not include a provision that was included in the Senate
version of the bill (S. 1042, Section 1033) that would have authorized the Defense
Department to provide a range of technical and operational support to Afghan
counternarcotics authorities under Section 1004 of the Defense Authorization Act for
FY1991 (P.L. 101- 510). The Senate version would have authorized “the use of U.S.
bases of operation or training facilities to facilitate the conduct of counterdrug
activities in Afghanistan” in response to the Defense Department’s request “to
provide assistance in all aspects of counterdrug activities in Afghanistan, including
detection, interdiction, and related criminal justice activities.”97 This would have
included transportation of personnel and supplies, maintenance and repair of
equipment, the establishment and operation of bases and training facilities, and
training for Afghan law enforcement personnel.
Mobility. Options for improving the mobility and reach of Afghan forces and
U.S. advisors also have been considered and addressed since 2004. In response to
calls for greater airlift support, Defense Department officials agreed in March 2005
to provide limited airlift assistance (four operations per month) to U.S. and Afghan
interdiction teams using U.S. Blackhawk and Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters.
97 S.Rept. 109-69.

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CRS-37
Successful interdiction operations in remote areas have been carried out on this basis
since mid-March 2005, and further helicopter leasing and pilot training arrangements
have been made that will supply a total of 8 MI-17 helicopters to Afghan forces by
the end of 2006. Training efforts for MI-17 pilots and crew are ongoing at Ft. Bliss
in Texas. The Department of Defense prioritizes counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations when considering requests for U.S. military airlift
assistance by other entities.98 The State Department operates ten Huey-II helicopters
that provide medical evacuation, re-supply, transportation, reconnaissance, command
and control, and security for Afghan counternarcotics operations. A fixed-wing
aircraft and two further helicopters also provide higher altitude and higher capacity
airlift support. For other FY2007 equipment, weaponry, and mobility considerations,
see below.
Redefining Eradication
Proponents of swift, widespread eradication argued that destroying a large
portion of the 2004-2005 opium poppy crop was necessary in order to establish a
credible deterrent before opium production in Afghanistan reaches an irreversible
level. Critics of widespread, near-term eradication argued that eradication in the
absence of existing alternative livelihood options for Afghan farmers would
contribute to the likelihood that farmers would continue to cultivate opium poppy in
the future by deepening opium based debt and driving up opium prices.99 U.S. and
Afghan authorities maintain that the Central Poppy Eradication Force and governor-
led eradication programs were effective in deterring and reducing some opium poppy
cultivation in 2005. However, given recurrent clashes between eradication forces and
farmers and accounts of selective, politicized eradication efforts by local authorities,
some observers and officials have expressed concern about the safety and
effectiveness of current ground-based eradication efforts. During the 2006 season,
“poppy elimination program” teams were partially introduced to key opium poppy
growing provinces to monitor and direct early season, locally-executed eradication
activities. This strategy was designed to minimize violent farmer resistance to central
government forces and give farming families time to plant replacement cash crops.
Eradication increased three-fold from 2004-2005 to 2005-2006, but results varied
drastically based on location and local political and security conditions.
Manual or Aerial Herbicide-based Eradication. Policy makers are likely
to engage in further debate concerning options for using herbicides for manual or
98 Prior to 2006, Defense Department airlift support to DEA and Afghan authorities was
minimal. From January to June 2006, the Defense Department supported 12 of 17 airlift
missions requested by DEA. As mentioned above, in December 2006, the Department of
Defense reportedly agreed to allow DEA agents to ride along on select missions to narcotics
relevant locations. Sources: Author consultation with Defense Department officials,
September 2006; and, House Committee on International Relations.
99 A September 2004 British government report argues that “if not targeted properly,
eradication can have the reverse effect and encourage farmers to cultivate more poppy to pay
off increased debts.” Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs (UK) to the Seventh Report from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee, September 2004.

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CRS-38
aerial poppy eradication and their possible risks and rewards. Afghan and U.S.
authorities discussed the introduction of aerial herbicide-based eradication to
Afghanistan in late 2004, but decided against initiating a program in early 2005 due
to financial, logistical, and political considerations. Afghan President Hamid Karzai
has expressed his categorical opposition to the use of aerial eradication, citing public
health and environmental safety concerns.100 The updated 2006 Afghan national drug
control strategy also states that “The Government has also decided that eradication
must only be delivered by manual or mechanical ground based means.”101
Proponents of aerial eradication argue that the large amount of rural land under
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and poor road infrastructure makes ground-based
eradication inefficient, subjects eradication teams to unnecessary security threats, and
raises associated costs. Critics of aerial eradication argue that the mixed-crop
cultivation patterns common throughout Afghanistan will expose legitimate food
crops to damage and warn that aerial spraying may produce widespread, possibly
violent resistance by villagers with vivid memories of centrally directed Soviet
military campaigns to destroy food crops and agricultural infrastructure. The Senate
report on the FY2005 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 1268) specified that
“none of the funds recommended by the Committee may be available for aerial
eradication programs within Afghanistan absent a formal request by the President of
Afghanistan seeking such support.” Manual herbicide spraying by Afghan eradication
teams may be under consideration for future introduction as a means of improving
efficiency.
Herbicide-based eradication, whether aerial or manual, remains politically
sensitive. Reports of unauthorized aerial spraying in eastern Nangarhar province in
mid-November 2004 angered Afghan officials and led to an investigation by the
Afghan Ministries of Agriculture and Health of claims that crops had been sprayed
with herbicides by unidentified aircraft. The government investigation reportedly
revealed that unidentified chemicals were present in soil samples, that non-narcotic
crops had been destroyed, and that an increase in related illnesses in local villages
had occurred. Afghan officials cited U.S. control of Afghan airspace in their
subsequent demands for an explanation. U.S. and British officials have denied
involvement in the spraying and assured Afghan authorities that they support
President Karzai’s position.102 In early December 2004, then-U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad suggested that “some drug-associated people” may
have sprayed the crops “in order to create the sort of distrust and problem between
Afghanistan and some of its allies.”103 Observers noted that the vocal negative
100 Office of the Spokesperson to the President — Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan,
“About the Commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to the Fight Against Narcotics
and Concerns About the Aerial Spraying of Poppy Fields.”
101 Afghanistan Ministry of Counternarcotics, Updated NDCS, January 2006, p. 21.
102 See David Brunnstrom, “Afghans Committed to Drug War But Against Spraying,”
Reuters, Nov. 19, 2004; and Stephen Graham, “Afghan Government Concerned at Spraying
of Opium Crops by Mystery Aircraft,” Associated Press, Nov. 30, 2004.
103 Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Poppy Farmers Say Mystery Spraying Killed Crops,” New York
(continued...)

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CRS-39
reaction of the Afghan population and government to an alleged isolated spraying
incident illustrates the type of popular opposition that may accompany any future
herbicide spraying eradication program.
Afghan government officials would have to approve any future herbicide
spraying operations undertaken by U.S. or Afghan personnel in Afghanistan. Any
future aerial eradication in Afghanistan also would require significant funding and
the introduction of airframes and military support aircraft that exceed current U.S.
capabilities in the region. Herbicide-based eradication programs, if employed in the
future, could feature the use of the glyphosate compound currently approved for use
in Colombia. The use of mycoherbicides, or fungal herbicides, also has been
discussed. Opium poppy-specific mycoherbicide has been developed with U.N.,
U.K., and U.S. support at the Institute of Genetics and Experimental Biology, a
former Soviet biological warfare facility in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.104 Mycoherbicide
tests continue, including efforts by USDA’s Agricultural Research Service , although
USDA officials and others have expressed various concerns about the use of
mycoherbicides for counternarcotics purposes.105
Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding
Several legislative initiatives in the 108th and 109th Congresses sought to address
the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation on expanding the U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan’s security and stability, including U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Section
7104 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458) stated the sense of Congress that “the President should make the substantial
reduction of illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a priority in the
Global War on Terrorism” and called on the Administration to provide a secure
environment for counternarcotics personnel and to specifically target narcotics
operations that support terrorism. The act also required the submission of an
interagency report that described current progress toward the reduction of poppy
cultivation and heroin production in Afghanistan and provided detail on the extent
to which drug profits support terrorist groups and anti-government elements in and
around Afghanistan. The report was completed in October 2005.106
103 (...continued)
Times, Dec. 5, 2004, and “U.S. Says Drug Lords May Have Sprayed Afghan Opium,”
Reuters, Dec. 2, 2004.
104 See Nicholas Rufford, “Secret Bio-weapon Can Wipe Out Afghan Heroin,” Sunday Times
(London), May 26, 2002; Antony Barnett, “UK in Secret Biological War on Drugs,”
Observer (London), Sept. 17, 2000; Juanita Darling, “Fungi May Be the Newest Recruits
in War on Drugs Colombia,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 30, 2000.
105 According to a USDA official, “The Department of Agriculture, as an agency, is opposed
to the idea [of using mycoherbicides in Afghanistan]: The science is far from complete;
There are real environmental and possible human health negative implications; There are
very real image problems ... the use of any agent like this would be portrayed as biological
warfare.” USDA response to CRS inquiry, Oct. 19, 2004.
106 Report on Counter Drug Efforts in Afghanistan — October 18, 2005, as required by Sec.
7104, Section 207 (b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 (P.L.
(continued...)

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CRS-40
Reauthorization of Defense Counternarcotics Activities. To date,
Department of Defense authorizations for counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan
have been provided via reference to Section 1033 of the Defense Authorization Act
for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85, as amended) and Section 1004 of the Defense
Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510, as amended). Both acts have been
amended on a semi-annual basis to extend existing authorizations into subsequent
fiscal years, and, as written, require reauthorization to extend beyond the end of
FY2006. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act(P.L. 109-364) restated the existing
authorizations and reauthorized the Secretary of Defense to provide non-lethal
counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan and a number of its neighbors (and other
countries) through FY2008. The act also allows the transfer of crew-served weapons
of .50-caliber or less to Afghan counternarcotics forces. The act also requires annual
reporting on overseas counterdrug activities, and Section 1025 requires the Secretary
of Defense to submit an interagency-coordinated report by December 31, 2006,
updating “the interagency counter-narcotics implementation plan for Afghanistan and
the South and Central Asian regions, including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, India, and China.”
Counternarcotics Funding. Funding for U.S. counternarcotics operations
in Afghanistan consists of program administration costs and financial and material
assistance to Afghan counternarcotics authorities. On September 7, 2006, the Senate
adopted an amendment to the Defense appropriations bill for FY2007 (S.Amdt. 4897
to H.R. 5631), which would make available up to an additional $700 million for
Defense Department interdiction and counter-narcotics activities “to combat the
growth of poppies in Afghanistan, to eliminate the production and trade of opium and
heroin, and to prevent terrorists from using the proceeds for terrorist activities in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.” The conference report on H.R. 5631 (H.Rept.109-
676) did not contain this provision but provides $100 million to “expedite” the
Defense Department’s non-construction related counternarcotics efforts in FY2007.
The conference report requires the Department of Defense to submit “a detailed
execution plan” on the use of the $100 million to the congressional defense
committees prior to obligating any of the funds. The conference report also requires
the Department of Defense to submit an interagency report on the Administration’s
plan to address drug production, drug smuggling, and narco-terrorism financing in
the Central Asian region to the congressional appropriations committees no later than
March 1, 2007.
The House version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R.
5522) would limit the obligation of Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance to
Afghanistan to $225 million until the Secretary of State certifies to the
Appropriations committees that the Afghan government “at both the national and
local level” is fully cooperating with U.S.-funded poppy eradication and drug
interdiction efforts. The Senate version of the FY2007 foreign operations bill does
not contain this provision. An identical certification condition was included in the
2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) that provided waiver
authority to the President if he deems it necessary to preserve the vital national
106 (...continued)
108-458); House Committee on International Relations, Ex. Comm. 4575.

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CRS-41
security interests of the United States. The Administration waived its certification
requirement for FY2006 ESF appropriations for Afghanistan on May 22, 2006.107
Table 4 displays the funding appropriated for U.S. counternarcotics activities
in Afghanistan and related regional programs from FY2002 through FY2006, and
includes requests for FY2007.
Table 5 describes the Administration’s planned use for the counternarcotics
funding included in the FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13), which
provided $758.15 million of the $773.15 million in supplemental FY2005
counternarcotics funding originally requested by the Administration. Under the terms
of P.L. 109-13, the Comptroller General must conduct an audit of the use of all
Economic Support Fund and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
funds for bilateral counternarcotics and alternative livelihood programs in
Afghanistan obligated and expended during FY2005. The General Accounting
Office is currently conducting this audit.
Table 6 describes the United Kingdom’s spending on counternarcotics
programs in Afghanistan for 2005-2006.
107 U.S. Department of State Public Notice 5486, “Determination To Waive the Certification
Requirement that the Government of Afghanistan Is Cooperating Fully with U.S.-Funded
Poppy Eradication and Interdiction Efforts in Afghanistan,” May 22, 2006. Federal
Register, Volume 71, Number 153, Aug. 9, 2006.

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CRS-42
Table 4. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source, FY2002-FY2006
($ million)
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Approp.
P.L.
Approp.
P.L.
Approp.
P.L.
P.L.
Approp.
P.L.
Approp.
P.L.
Request
Funds
107-206
Funds
108-11
Funds
108-106
107-38
Funds
109-13
Funds
109-234
Department of State
$3.00a
$60.00
$3.00a
$25.00 -
$170.00b
$50.00c
$89.28
$260.00
$232.65
-
$297.39
Department of Defense
-
-
-
-
-
$73.00
-
$15.40
$242.00
$27.80h
$141.87g
$18.00h
DEAd
($0.58)
-
($2.92)
-
-
($3.96)
-
($7.67)
$7.65
$17.60e $9.20
$4.00
USAIDf -
$9.99
$14.29
-
$53.55
-
-
$95.69
$248.50
$90.50
-
$109.00
Annual Total
$73.57
$45.21
$350.51
$966.19
$519.62
$428.39
Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development - Budget Justifications to the Congress, Department of State - Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Office
of the Secretary of Defense - Defense Budget Materials, Office of Management and Budget, and Legislative Information System.
a $3 million funding for Southwest Asia Initiative counternarcotics programs in Pakistan partially designed to restrict the flow of Afghan opiates.
b Of the $170 million in supplemental funds, $110 million was channeled toward police training and judicial reform programs.
c Reprogrammed funds appropriated as part of $40 billion Emergency Response Fund established in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.
d On May 8, 2002, Congress approved a reprogramming of 17 positions and $15,125,000 in Violent Crime Reduction Program prior year funds to support the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s ‘Operation Containment,’ which targets heroin trafficking in Southwest Asia. The figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect annual expenditure of the reprogrammed
obligated funds. (DEA response to CRS request, October 2004.)
e FY2006 funds include $7.72 million for Operation Containment, $4.3 million to support Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) teams, and $5.58 million for DEA offices in Kabul
and Dushanbe, Tajikistan. New funds were not appropriated for the creation of a DEA office in Dubai, United Arab Emirates authorized in H.Rept. 109-272.
f USAID figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect funds applied to USAID’s “Agriculture” and “Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods” programs (Program #306-001).
g Reflects supplemental funds earmarked for use in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, and Tajikistan.
h Author consultations with Defense Department officials and appropriations committee staff, June 2005 and September 2006. Appropriated fund totals reflect funds requested and
obligated to continue programs in the entire U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, including countries along the Arabian Sea littoral, the Horn of Africa,
and Central Asia.

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CRS-43
Table 5. Planned Use of FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-13
($ million)
Agency
Amount
Proposed Purpose
Funds for training, equipment, intelligence, infrastructure, and information operations related to the campaign
against narcotics trafficking and narcotics-related terrorist activities in Afghanistan and the Central Asia area.
Department of Defense
Of this amount, $70 million restored funding to other DoD counternarcotics activities from which funds were
(Drug Interdiction and
$242
used to finance counter-drug assistance to Afghanistan. P.L. 109-13 limited the provision of assistance to $34
Counter-Drug Activities)
million for the Afghan government and authorized the delivery of individual and crew-served weapons to
counter-drug security forces. (Note: The Administration’s original request was for $257 million.)
Funds to continue the expanded counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan begun in FY2005. Of the total amount
Department of State
requested, $95 million replenished funding advanced to start expanded crop eradication, establishment of a
(International Narcotics Control
$260
National Interdiction Unit, prosecution of drug traffickers, and public information programs. The remaining
and Law Enforcement Account)
$165 million supported the Department of State’s contribution to expanded efforts in eradication ($89 million),
interdiction ($51 million), law enforcement ($22 million), and public information ($3 million).
Funds to support alternative livelihoods programs. A portion ($138.5 million) of the amount replenished
United States Agency for
reconstruction and development aid accounts that had been drawn on previously to create alternative livelihood
International Development
$248.5
programs in late 2004 and early 2005. The balance ($110 million) is being used to expand alternative livelihood
(Economic Support Fund)
programs beyond pilot provinces.
Funds to support and equip DEA’s Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) and to provide operational
Drug Enforcement Agency
$7.65
support for the Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU).
Total FY2005
$758.15
Supplemental Appropriation
Source: P.L. 109-13 and Office of Management and Budget, Estimate #1: Emergency Supplemental — Ongoing Military Operations in the War on Terror;
Reconstruction Activities in Afghanistan; Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction; and Other Purposes, February 14, 2005.

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CRS-44
Table 6. United Kingdom Counternarcotics Funding 2005-2006
Pillar/Program Area
$ million
£ million
Public Awareness
$1.225
£0.649
Demand Reduction
$2.100
£1.112
Law Enforcement
$39.251
£20.787
Criminal Justice
$2.100
£1.112
Institution Building
$9.775
£5.177
Alternative Livelihoods
$70.847
£37.520
International and Regional Cooperation
$3.788
£2.006
Counternarcotics Trust Fund Contribution
$16.994
£9.000
Law and Order Trust Fund Contribution
$2.832
£1.500
Strategy, Research, and Reviews
$5.608
£2.970
Total
$154.520
£81.833
Source: Dr. Kim Howells, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister for the Middle East,
“Afghanistan: Counter Narcotics,” House of Commons Hansard Ministerial Statements for July 13,
2006 (Pt. 0134).

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CRS-45
Appendix A
Cited Field Surveys
Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd (eds.), Afghanistan’s Drug Industry:
Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics
Policy, World Bank/UNODC, November 2006.
Jonathan Goodhand, “From Holy War to Opium War: A Case Study of the Opium
Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan,” Peacebuilding and Complex
Emergencies Working Paper Series, No. 5, University of Manchester, 1999.
Frank Kenefick, and Larry Morgan, “Opium in Afghanistan: People and Poppies —
The Good Evil,” Chemonics International Inc. for USAID, February 5, 2004.
David Mansfield, “Coping Strategies, Accumulated Wealth and Shifting Markets:
The Story of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Badakhshan 2000-2003,” Agha Khan
Development Network, January 2004.
——, “Alternative Development in Afghanistan: The Failure of Quid Pro Quo,”
International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug
Control and Development Cooperation, January 2002.
——, “Exploring the ‘Shades of Grey’: An Assessment of the Factors. Influencing
Decisions to Cultivate Opium Poppy in 2005/06, Report for the Afghan Drugs
Inter-Departmental Unit of the Government of the United Kingdom, December
2005.
David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Opium Poppy Eradication: How to Raise Risk
When There is Nothing to Lose?” Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit,
August 2006.
Adam Pain, “The Impact of the Opium Poppy Economy on Household Livelihoods:
Evidence from the Wakhan Corridor and Khustak Valley in Badakhshan,” Aga
Kahn Development Network, Badakhshan Programme, January 2004.
UNODC, Strategic Study Series #1-6, June 1998 - June 2000.

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