Order Code RL33561
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side
Comparison of Current Legislation
Updated December 8, 2006
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Jill Marie Parillo
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

---

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side
Comparison of Current Legislation
Summary
In March 2006, the Bush Administration proposed legislation to create an
exception for India from certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate a
future nuclear cooperation agreement. After hearings in April and May, the House
International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
considered bills in late June 2006 to provide an exception for India to certain
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act related to a peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement. On July 26, 2006, the House passed its version of the legislation, H.R.
5682, by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate incorporated the
text of S. 3709, as amended, into H.R. 5682 and passed that bill by a vote of 85 to 12.
The Senate insisted on its amendment, and a conference committee produced a
conference report on December 7, 2006.
The Senate and House versions of the India bill contained similar provisions,
with four major differences. The Senate version contained an additional requirement
for the President to execute his waiver authority, an amendment introduced by
Senator Harkin and adopted by unanimous consent that the President determine that
India is “fully and actively participating in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade,
sanction and contain Iran for its nuclear program.” This provision was watered down
into a reporting requirement in the conference report. The Senate version also had
two unique sections related to the cooperation agreement, Sections 106 and 107, both
of which appear in the conference report. Section 106 prohibits exports of
equipment, material or technology related for uranium enrichment, spent fuel
reprocessing or heavy water production unless conducted in a multinational facility
participating in a project approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) or in a facility participating in a bilateral or multilateral project to develop
a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. Section 107 would establish a program to monitor
that U.S. technology is being used appropriately by Indian recipients. Finally, the
Senate version also contained the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional
Protocol in Title II, which was retained in the conference bill. Minor differences in
reporting requirements and statements of policy are compared in Table I of this
report.
This report provides a thematic side-by-side comparison of the provisions of the
conference report with H.R. 5682 as passed by the House and by the Senate, and
compares them with the Administration’s initially proposed legislation, H.R. 4974/S.
2429. The report concludes with a list of CRS resources that provide further
discussion and more detailed analysis of the issues addressed by the legislation
summarized in the table. This report will be updated as necessary.

---

Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
H.R. 5682 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Committee Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Floor Debate and Votes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
S. 3709/H.R. 5682 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Committee Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Floor Debate and Votes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
H.R. 5682 Conference Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Additional Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
List of Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Current Legislation on Waivers
for U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

---

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation:
A Side-By-Side Comparison
of Current Legislation
Overview
In July 2005, President Bush announced his intention to conclude a peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement with India. India, which is not a party to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered under U.S. law to be a non-nuclear
weapon state, yet has tested nuclear weapons and has an ongoing nuclear weapons
program. For these reasons, the President would need to make certain waivers and
determinations pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) before nuclear cooperation
with a state such as India could proceed.
The Administration proposed legislation (introduced as H.R. 4974/ S. 2429) in
March 2006 that, in addition to providing waivers of relevant provisions of the AEA
(Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129), would have allowed a nuclear cooperation
agreement with India to enter into force without a vote from Congress, as though it
conformed to AEA requirements. In late June, the House International Relations
Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported their versions of
legislation (H.R. 5682 and S. 3709), both of which provide the requisite waivers,
retain the requirement for a joint resolution of Congress for such an agreement to
enter into force, and contain some restrictions. On July 26, 2006, the House passed
H.R. 5682 by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate passed H.R.
5682 by a vote of 85 to12, substituting the text of S. 3709 as an engrossed
amendment; the Senate insisted on its amendment, necessitating a conference to
resolve differences between the bills. Conferees were appointed in the week of
December 4, and a conference report was issued on December 7. Voting is expected
on December 8.

H.R. 5682
Committee Actions. The House International Relations Committee met on
June 27, 2006 to consider H.R. 5682, “United States and India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act of 2006,” introduced on June 26 by Representative Hyde.1 The
Committee voted to adopt 6 of 12 amendments (one was withdrawn):
1 The National Journal and Congressional Quarterly wrote reports of the HIRC markup,
available at [http://nationaljournal.com/members/markups/2006/06/mr_20060627_5.htm]
and [http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/committees/
109/committe e s 1 0 9 -2 0 0 6 0 6 2 7 0 0 2 2 8 0 5 5 . h t ml @ commi t t ees&met apub=CQ-
COMMITTEEMARKUPS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=1].

---

CRS-2
! Representative Royce offered an amendment to ensure that nothing
in the Act shall be interpreted as permitting any civil nuclear
cooperation with India that would in any way assist, encourage, or
induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
(Section 4 (d) (1));
! Representative Sherman offered an amendment to strengthen one of
the determinations the President must make to implement the
waivers pertaining to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
stipulating that the required NSG decision would not permit nuclear
commerce with any other non-nuclear weapon state that does not
have full-scope International Atomic Energy Act (IAEA) safeguards
(Section 4 (b) (7)).
! Representative Schiff offered an amendment with three components:
to add a provision to U.S. policy with respect to South Asia (Section
3 (b)(7)) encouraging India not to increase its production of fissile
material at military facilities pending a multilateral moratorium on
production of such material for nuclear weapons; to add a reporting
requirement for the Presidential submission to implement the
waivers (Section 4 (c) (2) (I)) on steps taken to ensure the U.S.
transfers will not be replicated by India or used in its military
facilities and that U.S. nuclear fuel supply does not facilitate military
production of high-enriched uranium or plutonium; and to add a
reporting requirement for an annual report on the same (Section 4 (o)
(2) (C)).
! Representative Crowley offered an amendment to add a requirement
(Section 4 (o)(3)) for an annual report on new Indian nuclear
facilities.
! Representative Berkley offered two amendments related to India’s
spent fuel disposal: an annual report describing the disposal of spent
nuclear fuel from India’s civil nuclear program (Section 4 (o) (4), and
a statement of policy that any spent civilian nuclear fuel in India that
might be stored in the United States is considered by Congress under
existing procedures of the Atomic Energy Act (Section 3 (b) (7)).
An amendment by Ms. Berkley to prohibit any Indian spent fuel from being
stored in the United States was rejected by a vote of 15-19. The Committee also
voted down four other amendments, including two by Representative Berman
designed to place limits on U.S. cooperation until India halts production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons. The first Berman amendment, rejected by a vote of 13-
32, sought to condition the President’s use of waiver authority (by adding a new
determination by the President in Section 4 (b) of the bill) on India’s adherence to a
unilateral or multilateral moratorium or a multilateral treaty prohibiting the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The second amendment, rejected
by a vote of 12-31, sought to restrict transfers of U.S. nuclear material under a
cooperation agreement until such time that India halted fissile material production
for weapons, either by adhering to a unilateral or multilateral moratorium, or a
multilateral treaty. The Committee also rejected by a vote of 10-32 an amendment
by Representative Sherman to condition the President’s use of waiver authority on
an additional determination, under Section 4 (b) of H.R. 5682, that India’s nuclear

---

CRS-3
weapons program was not using more domestic uranium than it had before July 2005.
The amendment would have attached an annual certification that required termination
of nuclear cooperation if the certification could not be made. Finally, the Committee
rejected, by a vote of 4-37, an amendment by Representative Lee that would have
required India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) before the President
could exercise his waiver authority.
The Committee on Rules held a hearing on July 25th to consider amendments
to H.R. 5682 and procedures for handling the bill on the floor. H. Res 947 waived
all points of order against the bill, specified the allowed amendments and limited
floor debate to one hour. The following six amendments were allowed to be offered
on the floor:2
! Representatives Hyde (IL)/Lantos (CA): Manager’s amendment,
containing technical and conforming changes to the text, as well as
one substantive change: removing an amendment proposed by
Representative Sherman and adopted during the full committee
markup relating to subsection 4(b)(7).
! Representative Stearns (FL): Reinforces the intent of Congress that
the nuclear cooperation into which the governments of the United
States and India would enter is for peaceful, productive purposes,
not military.
! Representatives Jackson-Lee (TX)/Burton (IN): Sense of Congress
declaring the importance of the South Asia region and urging the
continuation of the United States’ policy of engagement,
collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan.
! Representative Sherman (CA): Requires that, before any nuclear
cooperation with India can go forward, and every year thereafter, the
President must certify that during the preceding year India has not
increased the level of domestic uranium it sends through its weapons
program. Baseline for the determination under the amendment is the
365 day period preceding the July 18, 2005, Bush-Singh declaration
on nuclear cooperation.
! Representative Berman (CA): Restricts exports of uranium and other
types of nuclear reactor fuel (defined as ‘source material’ and
‘special nuclear material’ in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) to
India until the President determines that India has halted the
production of fissile material (i.e., plutonium and highly enriched
uranium) for use in nuclear weapons.
! Representative Fortenberry (NE): Provides Congress with the ability
to assess, to the extent possible, whether annual levels of India’s
nuclear fissile production may imply a possible violation of Article
I of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
2 See description in H.Rept. 109-599, “Providing for Consideration of H.R. 5682, United
States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006,” Congressional Record, July
25, 2006, p. H5820.

---

CRS-4
Three amendments were not allowed for consideration on the floor.3 These
were
! an amendment by Representative Woolsey that would have
prohibited the export of any nuclear-related item to India until the
President has implemented and observed all NPT obligations and
commitments of the United States and has revised United States’
policies relating to nuclear weapons accordingly;
! an amendment by Representative Barbara Lee that would have
required India to place all electricity-producing reactors under
safeguards, undertake a binding obligation not to transfer any
nuclear-weapon-related information or technology (per Article I of
the NPT) and take concrete steps toward disarmament; and
! an amendment by Representatives Markey and Upton that would
have prohibited nuclear cooperation with India from commencing
until the President has determined that the United States has secured
India’s full and active support in preventing Iran from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction.
Floor Debate and Votes. The House first considered H. Res 947, which,
after several objections to limits on time and the exclusion of certain amendments by
Representative Markey and others, passed by a vote of 311 to 112. Of the six
amendments considered, three passed by voice vote (the Managers’ amendment,
Representatives Jackson-Lee/Burton’s amendment, and Representative Fortenberry’s
amendment); Representative Stearn’s amendment was recorded as 414-0, and the
amendments offered by Representatives Sherman and Berman were defeated (the
votes, respectively, were 155 to 268, and 184 to 241).
Representative Markey made a motion to recommit the legislation back to the
House International Relations Committee with instructions to include language that
would require that nuclear cooperation with India could only commence after the
president has determined that the United States has secured India’s full support in
preventing Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. That motion to
recommit was defeated in a vote of 192 to 235.
The House passed H.R. 5682, “Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006,” as amended, by 359 to 68.
3 A fourth amendment, proposed by Mr. Hyde, would have implemented a Congressional
review process for arms sales and exports under the Arms Export Control Act, but this
amendment was withdrawn.

---

CRS-5
S. 3709/H.R. 5682
Committee Actions. On June 29, 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee considered original legislation, S. 3709, to create an exception for India
from relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (See S.Rept. 109-288).4 The
Committee voted to adopt 2 of 3 amendments:
! Senator Chafee offered an amendment making it U.S. policy to
ensure that exports of nuclear fuel to India did not encourage India
to increase its production of fissile material (Section 103 (9));
! Senator Obama offered an amendment to ensure that the United
States did not encourage other states to continue nuclear exports to
India, if the United States exports to India terminated under U.S. law
(Section 102 (6)).
The Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Feingold requiring an additional
presidential determination in Section 105 of the bill by a vote of 5-13. The Feingold
amendment would have conditioned the President’s use of waiver authority on a
determination that U.S. civil nuclear assistance to India would in no way assist,
encourage, or induce India to manufacture nuclear weapons or nuclear devices. The
amendment was identical in text to the Schiff amendment to H.R. 5682, but sought
instead to require a determination rather than a report.
Floor Debate and Votes. An initial attempt to bring S. 3709 to the Senate
floor in September failed to gain unanimous consent agreement. Among several
issues, two apparently delayed the bill — language in Title II pertaining to
implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol, and potential concern
about whether the United States would accept U.S.-origin spent fuel back from
Indian reactors. In the first case, concerns appeared to be mostly resolved by
incorporating language into a manager’s amendment, with the exception of two
issues raised by Senator Ensign in two amendments he introduced on the floor on
November 16th that did not pass. These are described in more detail below. In the
second case, the concern about disposition of Indian spent fuel was dropped prior to
the bill’s reaching the floor.
On November 15, 2006, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to consider
S. 3709, at a time to be determined by the Majority Leader, in consultation with the
Democratic Leader.5 The unanimous consent agreement specified that a managers’
amendment would serve as the original text for the purpose of further amendment;
and that the only other amendments to be considered would include the following:
Senators Ensign (considered in closed session), Reed, Levin, Obama, Dorgan (two
amendments), Feingold, Boxer, Feinstein, Harkin, Bingaman (up to seven
4 Details on the mark-up are available at Congressional Quarterly,
[http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/committees/109/c
o m m i t t e e s 1 0 9 - 2 0 0 6 0 6 2 9 0 0 2 2 8 0 9 0 . h t m l @ c o m m i t t e e s & m e t a p u b = C Q -
COMMITTEEMARKUPS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=1] for report of the mark-up.
5 Congressional Record, November 15, 2006, p. S. 10941-42, daily edition.

---

CRS-6
amendments), Kennedy, and Dodd. Of these, Senators Reed, Levin, Kennedy, and
Dodd did not introduce amendments, and Senator Bingaman introduced three, rather
than seven. All but Senator Feingold’s amendment were considered to be relevant
second-degree amendments and related to the subject matter of the bill. Further, the
unanimous consent agreement provided that once the bill was read a third time, the
Senate would begin consideration of H.R. 5682, the House-passed companion,
striking all text after the enacting clause and inserting the amended text of S. 3709
in its place.
Senator Lugar introduced the bill and offered a section-by-section analysis.6
The following amendments, in brief, were passed either by unanimous consent or
voice vote without debate:
! Senator Lugar introduced a manager’s amendment, which contained
new language in Title II related to the Additional Protocol (S.A.
5168; unanimous consent);
! Senator Obama introduced an amendment containing a statement of
U.S. policy (which became Section 114) that any nuclear power
reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in
safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with
reasonable reactor operating requirements (S.A. 5169; voice vote);7
! Senator Harkin introduced an amendment requiring the President to
determine, before executing his waiver authority, that India was
supporting U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and
contain Iran’s nuclear program (S.A. 5173; unanimous consent);8
! Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment to add a reporting
requirement to Section 108 (b) on the amount of uranium mined in
India during the previous year; the amount of such uranium that has
likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive
devices; and the rate of production in India of fissile material for
nuclear explosive devices and of nuclear explosive devices as well
as an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate
of production in India of nuclear explosive devices (S.A. 5179;
unanimous consent);9
! Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment to add a new Section
in Title I (which became Section 115) requiring the Secretary of
Energy to create a Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with India
(S.A. 5180; unanimous consent).
6 See Senator Lugar’s opening statement in the Congressional Record, November 16, 2006,
S10982-84, daily edition.
7 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11021, daily edition, for the colloquy
between Senator Obama and the managers of the bill on the subject of limiting nuclear fuel
reserves to provide a disincentive for India to conduct future nuclear tests.
8 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10996, daily edition, for Senator
Harkin’s description of the amendment.
9 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S. 11003, daily edition for the text of
Senator Bingaman’s amendments, S.A. 5179 and 5180.

---

CRS-7
Senator Lugar’s amendment, S.A. 5168 contained minor changes in Title I of
S. 3709 as reported out of Committee. One potentially significant change was the
deletion of a Sense of Congress on licensing policy in Section 106. In Title II,
however, which contains the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional
Protocol,10 significant provisions were added. These included Section 202 on
findings, Section 251 (3), and Sections 254, 261, 262 and 271-275. In his opening
statement, Senator Lugar reported that “a compromise was reached between the
Administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and those Senators who
expressed concern about the IAEA Additional Protocol implementing legislation.”11
These additional provisions appear to make explicit existing U.S. rights to exclude
inspectors and certain kinds of inspection activities under the Additional Protocol.
Several of the modifications address the use of environmental sampling, both for
specific locations and for detecting anomalies in a wide-area mode.

Other amendments were introduced, debated, and defeated. These included the
following:
! Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment requiring a Presidential
determination that the United States and India are taking specific
steps to conclude a multilateral treaty on the cessation of fissile
material for weapons before U.S. nuclear equipment or technology
could be exported under the future agreement for cooperation and
that no nuclear materials may be exported to India unless the
President has determined that India has stopped producing fissile
materials for weapons (S.A. 5174; Vote 26-74);12
! Senator Dorgan introduced an amendment to add a declaration of
U.S. policy to continue to support implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1172 (S.A. 5178; Vote 27-71);13
! Senator Ensign introduced an amendment to Title II of the bill
related to the Additional Protocol that would have required any
inspection equipment, materials and resources to have been
purchased, owned, inspected, and controlled by the United States
(S.A. 5181; Vote 27-71);14
! Senator Dorgan introduced an amendment that would have required
the President to determine, before executing his waiver authority,
10 The Additional Protocol is a protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements under the Nuclear
Nonproliferaton Treaty (NPT) which enhances the IAEA’s inspection rights, methods, and
information. The model agreement is INFCIRC/540. Nuclear weapon states have modified
the model to include provisions for national security exclusions, because of their weapons
status. The United States signed its additional protocol in 1998, and the Senate gave its
consent for ratification in 2004, but the additional protocol requires implementing
legislation to enter into force. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out such
implementing legislation, S. 2489, in April 2006.
11 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10984, daily edition.
12 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S. 10998-11001, daily edition, for Senator
Bingaman’s explanation of his amendments and responses by Senators Lugar and Biden..
13 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11001, daily edition.
14 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11009, daily edition, for text of Ensign
amendment. The debate was held in closed session.

---

CRS-8
that India has committed to putting all electricity-producing nuclear
reactors under safeguards, has undertaken an obligation not to
proliferate nuclear weapons technology, has joined a legally-binding
nuclear test moratorium; is verifiably reducing its nuclear weapons
stockpile, and has undertaken an obligation to agree to ultimate
disarmament (S.A. 5182; voice vote);15
! Senator Feingold introduced an amendment that would have
required the President to determine, before executing his waiver
authority, that the scope and content of the cooperation agreement
would not allow India to use U.S. technology, equipment or material
in unsafe guarded facilities, would not result in India replicating U.S.
technology nuclear fuel and would not facilitate the increased
production by India of fissile material in unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities (S.A. 5183; Vote 25-71);16
! Senator Boxer introduced an amendment that would have required
the President to determine, before he could execute his waiver
authority, that India had halted military-to-military contacts with Iran
(S.A. 5187; Vote 38-59).17
Most of these amendments were characterized by Senators Lugar and Biden as
“killer amendments.” Senator Bingaman described his amendment as implementing
a proposal by former Senator Nunn.18 Senator Dorgan’s amendment supporting U.S.
implementation of U.N. Security Council 1172 sought to reaffirm U.S. support for
the steps endorsed by the U.N. Security Council following the 1998 Indian and
Pakistani nuclear tests, including limits on those nuclear programs such as a ban on
deployments, and fissile material production for weapons, as well as a commitment
on all states’ parts not to sell nuclear technology to India and Pakistan. Senator
Dorgan’s other amendment, S.A. 5182, was similar to Representative Barbara Lee’s
amendment to the House bill that was rejected by the House Rules Committee. That
amendment attempted to commit India to undertake the same obligations as other
nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Senator Feingold’s amendment was similar
to the one he introduced in Committee that was rejected. Although modified to
address objections voiced in the mark-up, the amendment was described by Senator
Lugar on the floor as requiring a certification that would have been “impossible to
make.”19 Senator Ensign’s amendment was debated in closed session, apparently
because of the potential need to discuss classified information relating to the
protection of national security information during IAEA inspections under an
Additional Protocol in the United States.
15 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11006, daily edition, for Senator
Dorgan’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
16 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11011-15, daily edition, for Senator
Feingold’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
17 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11016-11019, daily edition, for Senator
Boxer’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
18 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S109998-11000, daily edition.
19 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11014, daily edition.

---

CRS-9
H.R. 5682 Conference Report
On December 7, 2006, conferees on H.R. 5682 filed Conference Report H. Rept.
109-721. The bill essentially combines many of the provisions of both the House and
Senate versions. Specific differences are highlighted in Table 1, below. Of note, the
Senate provisions to ban on enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production
cooperation with India (now Section 104. (d) (4)) and create an end-use monitoring
program (now Section 104.(d) (5)) prevailed in the conference bill, as did Title II,
which includes the implementing legislation of the U.S. Additional Protocol. The so-
called Harkin amendment, which added a determination that India was fully and
actively supporting U.S. and international efforts to contain, dissuade, and sanction
Iran for its nuclear weapons program, did not remain as a determination, but became
two reporting requirements: first, as a one-time report when the Section 123
agreement is submitted to Congress (now Section 104.(c)(2)(H)) and as an annual
reporting requirement (now Section 104.(g)(2)(E)).

---

CRS-10
Table 1. Comparison of Current Legislation on Waivers for U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Waiver
Provides authority for
Section 1 (a):
Section 4 (a):
Section 104 (a):
Section 104
authority
President to waive
President may
Same as H.R.
Same as H.R. 4974. (a):
Atomic Energy Act
waive sections of
4974.
Same as H.R.
(AEA) requirements.
AEA (see below) if
4974.

he makes a
determination.
Section 123 a. Full-scope safeguards. Section 1 (a) (1):
Section 4 (a) (1):
Section 104 (a) (1): Section 104
(2) of Atomic
Waived AND the
Waived BUT entry Equivalent to H.R.
(a) (1):
Energy Act
future cooperation
into force requires
5682. See Section
Senate
(AEA)
agreement enters
Joint Resolution of 104 (b).
version.
into force as though Approval as all
it met all Section
other exempted
123 a. requirements agreements (See
(does not require a
also Section 4 (e)).
Joint Resolution of
Approval).

---

CRS-11
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Section 128 of Annual review by
Section 1 (a) (2):
Section 4 (a) (2):
Section 104 (a) (2): Section 104
AEA
Congress of export
Application of
Waiver ends if
Section 128 waived (a) (2):
license for an
Section 128 waived India engages in
without conditions. Same as
agreement exempted
without conditions.
any Section 129
Senate
from full-scope
actions (see
version.
safeguards
description below
requirement.
for Section 129),
except for its
ongoing weapons
program [129 a.
(1) (D)] and future
reprocessing
transfers to a non-
nuclear weapon
state [129 a. (2)
(C)].

---

CRS-12
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Section 129 of a. Terminate U.S.
Section 1 (a) (3):
Section 4 (a) (3):
Section 104 (a) (3): Section 104
AEA
nuclear exports if
“Sanctions” under
Waiver of Section
Equivalent to H.R.
(a) (3):
President determines
Section 129 waived. 129 limited to:
5682 but worded
Same as
that a (1) non-nuclear
Indian nuclear tests differently. The
Senate
weapon state:
before 2005
language specifies
version.
(A) Has tested a
[Section 129 a. (1) waiver for sanctions
nuclear device
(A)] and ongoing
under Section 129
(B) terminates or
nuclear weapons
a. (1) (D), but
abrogates IAEA
activities [Section
covers the 1998
safeguards
129 a. (1) (D)].
Indian nuclear test
(C) materially violates
by waiving any
IAEA safeguards
Section 129
(D) Has ongoing
sanctions regarding
nuclear weapons
any actions that
program
occurred before
OR if President
July 18, 2005.
determines (2) any
(There has only
state
been one
(A) materially violates
Presidential
a cooperation
determination for
agreement
India prior to 2005
(B) assists non-nuclear
that is relevant to
weapon state in nw-
Section 129 — for
related activities
the Indian nuclear
(C) Has agreement or
test in 1998).
transfers reprocessing
material, technology,
or equipment to a non-
nuclear weapon state.

---

CRS-13
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Determination Establishes threshold
Section 1b:
Section 4 (b):
Section 105:
Section 104
for President to use
President must
Same requirements Same requirements
(b):
waiver authority.
make 1
with minor
with minor changes Closer to
determination that 7 changes that
Specifies
House-
actions have
strengthen
safeguards in
passed
occurred (see
measures.
perpetuity. Added
version.
below).
Specifies
determination on
safeguards in
India and Iran
perpetuity.
(Harkin
amendment)
Separation
Identification of Indian (1) India has
Section 4 (b) (1):
Section 105 (1) and Section 104
plan
civilian nuclear
provided to US and Same language as
(2) Same language
(b) (1):
facilities to US and
IAEA a credible
H.R. 4974.
as H.R. 4974 but
Closer to
IAEA.
plan to separate
separates the
House-
civil and military
declaration
passed
facilities, materials,
provision into
version.
and programs, and
Section 105 (2).
has filed a
declaration
regarding its civil
facilities with the
IAEA.

---

CRS-14
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Safeguards
India committed to
(2) Entry into force
Section 4 (b) (2):
Section 105 (3)
Section 104
plan
placing additional
of safeguards
Specifies
Specifies
(b) (2)
civilian nuclear
agreement in
safeguards in
safeguards in
Change:
facilities under IAEA
accordance with
perpetuity in
perpetuity in
Requires
safeguards under the
IAEA practices for
accordance with
accordance with
concluding
July 18, 2005, Joint
India’s civil nuclear IAEA standards,
IAEA standards,
“all legal
Statement.
facilities as
principles and
principles and
steps prior to
declared in the plan. practices. Also
practices. Also
signature”
mentions
mentions
(meaning
safeguards on
safeguards on
Board of
materials and
materials and
Governors
programs,
programs.
approval of
including materials
the
used in or
safeguards
produced through
agreement).
use of civil
Specifies
nuclear facilities.
safeguards in
perpetuity
with IAEA
standards,
etc.
Additional
An agreement with
(3) Making
Section 4 (b) (3)
Section 105 (4)
Section 104
Protocol
IAEA to enhance
satisfactory
Specifies
Specifies
(b) (3)
inspections, access,
progress toward
“substantial
“substantial
“Substantial
and declarations
implementation.
progress”
progress.”
progress
relevant to safeguards.
consistent with
toward
IAEA principles,
concluding
practices and
and
policies.
Additional
Protocol.”

---

CRS-15
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
FMCT
Future negotiations to
(4) Working with
Section 4 (b) (4)
Section 105 (5)
Section 104
(Fissile
end production of
the United States
Specifies working
Equivalent to H.R.
(b) (4)
Material
fissile material for
for conclusion of a
“actively” for the
4974.
House
Production
nuclear weapons.
multilateral FMCT. “early” conclusion.
version.
Cutoff Treaty)
Halting
July 18, 2005,
(5) Supporting
Section 4 (b) (5)
Section 105 (6)
Section 104
enrichment/
commitment by India
international efforts Specifies “working Specifies
(b) (5)
reprocessing
to support U.S. policy
to prevent the
with and
preventing spread
Combines
transfers
to restrict access to
spread of
supporting US and “to any state that
both texts.
enrichment and
enrichment and
international
does not already
reprocessing.
reprocessing
efforts.”
possess full-scale,
technology.
functioning
enrichment and
reprocessing
plants.”
Export
July 18, 2005
(6) Ensuring that
Section 4 (b) (6)
Section 105 (7)
Section 104
controls
commitment by India
necessary steps
Specifies
Specifies effective
(b) (6)
to strengthen export
are taken to secure
enactment and
enforcement
Closer to
controls and adhere to
nuclear materials
enforcement of
actions.
House
international norms,
and technology
export control
version.
including Missile
through
laws; specifies
Technology Control
comprehensive
harmonization of
Regime (MTCR) and
export control
laws, regulations,
Nuclear Suppliers
legislation and
policies and
Group (NSG)
regulations; and
practices with the
guidelines.
harmonization and
policies and
adherence to
practices of MTCR
MTCR and NSG
and NSG.
guidelines.

---

CRS-16
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Nuclear
NSG guidelines
(7) Supply to India
Section 4 (b) (7)
Section 105 (9)
Section 104
Suppliers
currently prohibit
is consistent with
Specifies NSG
Specifies NSG
(b) (7)
Group (NSG)
nuclear transfers to
US participation in
consensus
consensus decision
House
India; a decision must
NSG. This assumes decision.
that does not permit version.
be taken to allow
that the NSG will
an exception for
cooperation. NSG
agree to an
another non-nuclear
operates by consensus. exception for
weapon state.
exports to India.
Iran
Ensure that India is
NONE
NONE
Section 105 (8)
Senate
supporting U.S. and
But see Section 3
Requires India’s
provision
international efforts to
(b) (4) statement of full & active
(Harkin
dissuade, sanction, and
policy on India’s
participation in U.S. amendment)
contain Iran’s nuclear
support for U.S.
and international
removed and
program
efforts vis-a-vis
efforts to dissuade,
placed in
Iran.
sanction, and
reporting
contain Iran for its
requirements
nuclear program
(see Section 104.(c)(2)
consistent with
(H)) and
U.N. Security
Section
Council resolutions 104.(g)(2)
(E)).

---

CRS-17
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Report on
Notify Congress that 7 Section 1 c.
Section 4 (c) (2):
Section 105:
Section 104
Determination actions have occurred
Report to HIRC,
Provides details
Determination must (c) (1) and
to allow waiver.
SFRC that 7 actions about what reports be made in writing
(2)
have occurred,
to HIRC, SFRC
to appropriate
Includes ten
including basis for
should contain,
Committees.
requirements
determination.
specifically on the
in the report
7 actions. Also,
Similar reports are
to be
two other reports
required in Section
submitted
are required for the 108 (a) (1), but are
with the 123
determination: a
not tied to
agreement.
description of the
President’s
scope of the 123
determination.
agreement with the
US and the steps
taken to ensure
that U.S. assistance
will not aid India’s
nuclear weapons
program (Schiff
amendment).

---

CRS-18
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Termination
Establish a threshold
Section 1d.
Section 4 (a) (3):
Section 104 (a) (3): Section 104
for halting U.S.
All waiver
All termination
All termination
(d) (3):
exports to India (now
authorities (for
provisions of
provisions of
All
contained in Section
Section 123 a. (2),
Section 129 of the
Section 129 of the
termination
129 of the AEA and in Section 128, and
AEA (except 129
AEA (except 129
provisions of
the proposed peaceful
Section 129)
a.(1) (D)) would be a.(1) (D)) would be Section 129
nuclear cooperation
terminate if India
in effect (see
in effect (see
of the AEA
agreement itself,
tests a nuclear
description of
description of
(except 129
which is not yet
explosive device.
sec.129 waiver
sec.129 waiver
a.(1) (D))
drafted).
above).
above).
would be in
effect (see
description of
sec.129
waiver
above).

---

CRS-19
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
ALSO
No equivalent
Section 104
Section 4 (d) (3):
provision to H.R.
(d) (3):
Exports would
5682 but Section
Incorporated
terminate if India
108 (b) (3) (A)
House
makes a materially contains a reporting version
significant transfer reqt if India does
Section 4 (d)
of items in
not comply with
(3) (Berman
violation of NSG
NSG guidelines and amendment)
guidelines, or of
Section 108 (b) (4)
items in violation
(A) requires an
of MTCR
annual certification
guidelines.
that India is in full
compliance with all
July 18, 2005
commitments.

---

CRS-20
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Sense of
To describe
NONE
Section 2
Section 102
Section 102
Congress
Congress’s policy
Notes importance
Notes that engaging Combines
objectives with respect
of nonproliferation India is in the
both texts
to nuclear cooperation
and NPT and
national security
with India.
focuses on how the interest of the
United States
United States, but
could strengthen
need to minimize
its nonproliferation proliferation risk.
policy by engaging United States
NPT outliers like
should not facilitate
India. Sets up
trade by other
criteria
nations if U.S.
(nonproliferation
exports terminated.
record, democratic
government,
support for U.S.
nonproliferation
aims) for
engagement and
states India meets
criteria.

---

CRS-21
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Statements of To describe U.S.
NONE
Section 3 (a)
Section 103
Section 103
Policy (I)
policy objectives, with
General
Section 103 (8):
(a)
respect to
(1) Oppose nuclear maintain support
Section 103
nonproliferation.
weapons
for NPT.
(a)(1)
development.
Combines
both
(2) Support
No equivalent
Section 103
peaceful uses of
(a)(2)
nuclear energy, but
House
only with full NPT
version
compliance.
(3) Strengthen
Similar to Section
Section 103
NSG
103 (6) on support
(a)(3) and
implementation,
for NSG.
Section
including cutoff of
103(a) (4)
exports for
violations.
Statements of To describe U.S.
NONE
Section 3 (b) South Section 103 (1), but Section
Policy (II)
policy objectives, with
Asia
moratorium does
103(b)(1)
respect to South Asia,
(1) Fissile material not include China.
House
U.S.-India bilateral
production
version
relations, and South
moratorium for
Asian proliferation.
India, Pakistan,
China.
(2) FMCT
No equivalent
Section
103(b)(2)
House
version

---

CRS-22
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
(3) Other
Section 103 (2), but Section
nonproliferation
no mention of
103(b)(3)
activities, like PSI, Convention on
House
Australia Group,
Supplementary
version
Wassenaar,
Compensation.
Convention on
Supplementary
Compensation.
(4) Support for
No equivalent, but
Section
U.S. policies to
language similar to
103(b)(4)
prevent Iran from
Section 105 (8)
Modified
acquiring nuclear
determination
House
weapons.
(5) Cap, roll back
No equivalent
Section
and eliminate
103(b)(5)
South Asian
nuclear arsenals.
(6) No spent fuel
No equivalent
Section
transfer without
103(b)(6)
Congressional
approval.
(7) Encourage cap
No equivalent
Section
on production of
provision
103(b)(7)
fissile material for
weapons, pending
moratorium.
Statements of
NONE
No equivalent
Section 103 (3):
Removed
Policy (III)
provision
Full compliance
with all
nonproliferation
obligations.

---

CRS-23
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
No equivalent
Section 103 (4):
Section
provision
Ensure reliability of 103(b)(8)
safeguards and
Additional
Protocol.
No equivalent
Section 103 (5):
Section
provision
Agreement must
103(b)(9)
meet all other
Section 123 a.
requirements.
No equivalent
Section 103 (6):
Section
provision
Consistency with
103(a)(3)
NSG guidelines.
No equivalent
Section 103 (7):
Section 103
provision
Work with NSG
(a) (5)
members to restrict
transfers of
enrichment and
reprocessing, also
to India.
No equivalent
Section 103 (8):
Akin to
provision
Maintain support
Section 102
for adherence &
(2)
compliance with
NPT.

---

CRS-24
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
No equivalent
Section 103 (9):
Removed
provision
Exports of nuclear
(see reporting
fuel to India should requirements
not contribute to or
)
encourage India to
increase production
of fissile material
for military uses.
No equivalent
Section 114: Any
Section 103
provision
nuclear power
(b) (10)
reactor fuel reserve
provided to India
should be
commensurate with
reasonable reactor
operating
requirements

---

CRS-25
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Expedited
To provide procedures None, except as
Section 4 (f) and
None, except as
None, except
procedures
for expedited
provided already in (g): track with
provided already in as provided
consideration of Joint
Section 130 of AEA existing law
Section 130 of
already in
Resolution of
(Section 130 of
AEA.
Section 130
Approval
AEA).
of AEA.
End-Use
To provide reasonable NONE
NONE
Section 107
Section 104
Monitoring
assurances that the
requires following
(d)(5)
recipient is complying
measures: (1)
with relevant
Obtain and
requirements, terms
implement
and conditions of U.S.
assurances and
export licenses.
conditions
regarding end-use
monitoring; (2) a
detailed system of
reporting on
technology
transfers, including
those authorized by
Section 57 b of
AEA.
(3) Fall-back
safeguards, should
IAEA be unable to
implement
safeguards in India.

---

CRS-26
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Restrictions
NONE
Section 4 (d)
Section 104
on
(1) No assistance
No equivalent but
(d)
cooperation
that would aid
similar concept
Section 104
India’s nuclear
behind Section 106, (d) (1)
weapons program. Section 103 (9)
(2) No transfers if
Similar to Section
Section 104
they would violate 103 (6): to act in a
(d) (2)
NSG guidelines.
manner fully
House
consistent with
version
NSG guidelines
(but this is only a
Statement of
Policy).
(4) President
Section 102 (6):
Similar to
should seek to
United States
Section 102
prevent
should not seek to
(13)
cooperation by
facilitate
other states with
cooperation by
India if United
other states with
States terminates
India if United
exports.
States terminates
exports.

---

CRS-27
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
No equivalent
Section 106
Section 104
provision
Bans cooperation
(d) (4)
on enrichment,
Minor
reprocessing, and
editing
heavy water
changes
materials,
equipment, and
technology with
exception for
multilateral and
bilateral fuel cycle
cooperation, if
President
determines that the
export will not
improve India’s
ability to produce
nuclear weapons.
ability to produce
fissile material for
weapons.

---

CRS-28
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Other
NONE
Section 4 (j) (1):
No equivalent
Removed
reporting
annual report on
provision
U.S. policy
objectives for
South Asia (i.e.,
steps taken by the
United States and
India, extent of
success, and
cooperation by
other countries).

---

CRS-29
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Section 4 (j) (2)
Section 108 (b) (6)
Section 104
Annual report on
Annual report on
(g) (2) (H)
U.S. nuclear
estimated amount
and Section
exports to India,
of uranium mined
104 (g) (2)
including estimates in India during the
(J)
of Indian uranium
previous year(A);
mining, fissile
amount of such
material and
uranium that has
nuclear weapons
likely been used or
production rates; as allocated for the
well as impact of
production of
imported uranium
nuclear explosive
on such rates.
devices (B); and the
Report also to
rate of production
describe India’s use in India of fissile
of any U.S. nuclear material for nuclear
equipment, material explosive
or technology in an devices(C)(I); and
uninspected facility; of nuclear explosive
replication of
devices(C)(ii)
anything transferred
and whether
Section 108 (b) (7)
imported nuclear
Analysis on
fuel has helped to
whether imported
increase fissile
uranium has
material production affected the rate of
for weapons.
production in India
of nuclear explosive
devices.

---

CRS-30
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Other
NONE
Section 4 (j) (3):
Section 108 (b) (2): Section 104
reporting,
annual report on
list of licenses
(g) (2) (B)
continued
new Indian nuclear approved by NRC,
facilities.
DOE, Commerce or
any other U.S.
authorizations of
exports and
reexports of nuclear
materials and
equipment.
Section 4 (j) (4):
No equivalent
Section 104
annual report on
provision
(g) (2) (L)
India’s spent fuel
disposal.

---

CRS-31
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Section 4 (j) (5):
Section 108 (b) (1): Section 104
annual report on
description of
(g) (2) (A)
growth in India’s
additional nuclear
military fissile
facilities/materials
material
India places under
production, to
IAEA safeguards.
include
Section 108 (a) (3):
information on
Implementation &
Indian uranium
Compliance Report;
mining, electricity
Information on
production,
Nuclear Activities
domestic uranium
of India;
used in civilian
“significant changes
electricity
in the production by
production, &
India of nuclear
military fissile
weapons or in the
material
types or amounts of
production, etc.
fissile material
produced.” See
also Section 108 (b)
(6).
No equivalent
Section 108 (b) (3): Section 104
provision
Any significant
(g) (2) (C)
nuclear commerce
between India and
other countries that
does not comply
with NSG
guidelines, or
would not meet
standards applied to
U.S.-origin
material.

---

CRS-32
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
Other
NONE
NONE
Section 108 (b) (4): Section 104
Presidential
That India is in full
(g) (2)
certifications
compliance with
following
obligations (listed
in Section 108 (a)
(1)): Joint
Statement
commitments,
separation plan,
safeguards
agreement,
Additional
Protocol, 123
agreement, terms
and conditions of
approved export
licenses. If
certification is not
possible, report on
steps, responses and
implications.
Consultation
NONE
Section 4 (e (2):
No equivalent
Removed
with Congress
Requires monthly
provision
consultations with
Congress on
progress in 123
agreement
negotiations and
IAEA safeguards
agreement
negotiations.

---

CRS-33
Issue
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429
H.R. 5682 (House H.R. 5682 (Senate
H.R. 5682
as introduced
version)
version)
Conference
Report
No equivalent
Section 108 (a):
Section 104
provision
keep Congress fully (g) (1))
informed on
India’s:
(1) non-compliance
(2) nuclear facility
construction
(3) fissile material
production
(4) changes in
operational status of
nuclear facilities.
Program for
To further common
NONE
NONE
Section 115
Section 109
cooperative
nonproliferation goals,
Requires Secretary
threat
including scientific
of Energy to
reduction
research and
establish a United
development efforts
States-India
related to nuclear
Scientific
nonproliferation, with
Cooperative Threat
emphasis on nuclear
Reduction Program.
safeguards
TITLE II
Implementing
NONE
NONE
Entire Title II
Title II
Legislation for the
See. S. 2489 for
U.S. Additional
comparison and S.
Protocol
3709 as reported
out of committee
for differences
between those and
the version voted on
by the Senate.

---

CRS-34
Additional Resources
CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress,
by Sharon Squassoni.
CRS Report RL33292, India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, by
Sharon Squassoni.
CRS Report RL33072, U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements in 2005, by K. Alan
Kronstadt.
CRS Report RS22474, Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons:
Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT) by Sharon Squassoni, Andrew Demkee, and Jill
Marie Parillo.

---