Order Code RS21774
Updated December 5, 2006
Bosnia and the European Union Military Force
(EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping
Julie Kim
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
On December 2, 2004, NATO formally concluded its Stabilization Force (SFOR)
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and handed over peace stabilization duties to a
European Union force (EUFOR). The mission of the EU’s Operation Althea has been
to ensure continued compliance with the 1995 Dayton peace agreement and contribute
to a secure environment and Bosnia’s efforts towards European integration. The EU
recently postponed a decision to significantly reduce the 6,500-strong force until early
2007. NATO retains a small headquarters presence in Sarajevo to provide advice on
defense reforms and to support counterterrorism efforts and the apprehension of wanted
war crimes suspects believed to be hiding in or transiting through Bosnia. Eleven years
after Dayton, many Members of Congress remain engaged and interested in Bosnia’s
prospects for sustainable peace and efforts to integrate into NATO and the EU; the 110th
Congress is likely to maintain this interest. This report may be updated as events
warrant. See also CRS Report RS22324, Bosnia: Overview of Current Issues, by Julie
Kim.
SFOR Background and U.S. Policy
The 1995 Dayton peace agreement ended a 3 ½-year war that pitted Bosnia’s
Muslim, Croat, and Serb communities against one another. NATO first deployed an
Implementation Force (IFOR) of nearly 60,000 troops to Bosnia to enforce compliance
with the military aspects of the Dayton accords. Although IFOR successfully carried out
the military tasks outlined in the Dayton agreement, the continued need for an external
military presence to provide a secure environment in Bosnia led NATO to replace IFOR
with a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR, initially with about 32,000 troops) in December
1996. NATO extended SFOR a second time in June 1998, this time without a specified
end-date. Instead, NATO outlined a number of benchmarks to measure progress toward
a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. Periodic mission reviews by NATO of SFOR operations
assessed an increasingly stable security situation and prompted gradual reductions in
SFOR’s force strength over time. The U.N. Security Council authorized NATO’s original

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IFOR mission in December 1995, the follow-on SFOR mission one year later, and
subsequently renewed its authorization for SFOR’s operations on an annual basis.1
The United States initially contributed close to 20,000 troops to IFOR, or about one-
third of the total force. In 1995, President Clinton justified the U.S. contribution as an
appropriate response to the suffering and instability caused by the Bosnian war and as a
demonstration of U.S. leadership in NATO, although he pledged at the time that the
commitment would not exceed one year. The Bush Administration frequently invoked
the “in together, out together” policy with the European allies on maintaining an
international security presence in the Balkans. As the smaller SFOR drew down over the
years, so did the U.S. contingent, and its share averaged about 15% of the total force in
the final years (for example, the U.S. contribution was about 1,000 out of a total of 7,000-
8,000 troops in SFOR in late 2004). Throughout, the United States retained command
over the NATO force in Bosnia; NATO’s residual headquarters presence has likewise
come under U.S. command and includes a small number of U.S. forces. About 1,700 U.S.
troops serve in the NATO peacekeeping force in nearby Kosovo.
Transition to EUFOR in Bosnia
Concept Evolution. EU heads of state expressed their willingness and readiness
to lead a military operation to follow SFOR as early as 2002.2 EU officials viewed the
initiative to lead a follow-on peacekeeping force in Bosnia as an outgrowth of the EU’s
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as well as a logical extension of the EU’s
growing involvement in the western Balkans. Bosnia is in negotiations with the EU on
a Stabilization and Association Agreement and aspires to eventual EU membership. The
EU also has experience in fielding a police training and advisory mission in Bosnia in the
ESDP framework — the EU Police Mission in Bosnia currently comprises just over 150
international police personnel, and its mandate runs through the end of 2007. Moreover,
the Dayton-mandated Office of the High Representative is “double-hatted” as the EU’s
Special Representative in Bosnia and is scheduled to evolve into an EU-only office by
mid-2007. By assuming peacekeeping duties in Bosnia, EU members aimed to further
develop ESDP on an operational level, as well as complement the broader EU integration
strategy for Bosnia.
By the December 2003 NATO ministerial meetings, some apparent differences
between NATO and the EU had been worked out, and NATO members reached
consensus on the concept, if not yet the details, of a follow-on EU military mission in
Bosnia. A fundamental principle agreed to early on was that any EU military mission in
Bosnia should fall within the so-called Berlin Plus framework. Berlin Plus refers to
arrangements finalized in late 2002-early 2003 on institutional and operational links
between NATO and the EU that grant the EU access to NATO planning and assets for
operations in which NATO is not engaged. The first test case for Berlin Plus occurred in
early 2003 with the EU’s takeover of the small NATO mission in Macedonia. NATO’s
1 The last U.N. resolution authorizing SFOR operations was Resolution 1551, passed
unanimously on July 9, 2004, which extended authorization for SFOR for a further six months
and welcomed the EU’s intention to launch an EU military mission in December 2004.
2 See Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13, 2002. European
Council Press Release No. 15917/02, January 29, 2003.

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Allied Harmony mission in Macedonia was concluded in March 2003 and replaced by the
EU’s Operation Concordia, a small and limited mission of 350 troops that ended in
December 2003.3
Planning, Decisions, and Handover in 2004. Conceptual details of the
transition evolved as NATO and EU planners worked to develop plans for mid-2004
summit meetings. Early agreed concepts included formally concluding SFOR and putting
in place a new and distinct EU mission in a seamless transition. The EU mission was to
emphasize broader reform objectives in Bosnia, including closer association with the EU.4
An issue of greater contention centered on the form and function of the residual NATO
“headquarters presence.” Early on, NATO officials called for a small military presence
to carry out defense reform functions, such as training and inter-operability exercises in
conjunction with Bosnia’s expected future membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace
(PFP), as well as intelligence collection, counterterrorism, and apprehension of persons
indicted for war crimes. This proposed multifaceted set of tasks for the residual NATO
presence suggested to some a more robust operational capability than just an advisory or
support presence. Some European officials reportedly resisted plans that could have led
the NATO presence to parallel functions of the EU force. They also emphasized the need
for the EU to maintain full operational control of, and autonomous decision-making
authority over, the military mission.5 In the final arrangement, EUFOR took over the
primary military stabilization role, while the NATO headquarters presence was to focus
primarily on defense reform. However, both share some operational tasks.
The war criminals issue clouded the transition and the legacy of SFOR, especially
with respect to former Bosnian Serb leader and wanted war crimes suspect Radovan
Karadzic. In 2004, SFOR and the Office of the High Representative embarked on
numerous joint measures to increase pressure on Karadzic, including detaining his close
associates and sanctioning or dismissing his alleged supporters. SFOR and local police
also launched some unsuccessful raids against Karadzic in Republika Srpska. Despite
ongoing efforts by NATO, EUFOR, and local authorities to apprehend Karadzic and
increase pressure on his support network, he and former Bosnian Serb General Ratko
Mladic have eluded capture for many years. Although local authorities bear the primary
responsibility for apprehending war crimes suspects, some observers believe that the lack
of resolution of this issue marred SFOR’s cumulative record of achievement in Bosnia
and threatens to do the same for EUFOR.
3 The EU initially planned to deploy an EU force to Macedonia in 2002 but had to postpone
because of delays in finalizing the Berlin Plus agreements. See also CRS Report RL32342,
NATO and the European Union, by Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis. For more information on
the EU force in Macedonia, see CRS Report RL32172, Macedonia (FYROM): Post-Conflict
Situation and U.S. Policy, by Julie Kim. In 2003, the EU also launched a peacekeeping mission
in Congo that did not utilize the Berlin Plus framework.
4 Summary of the Report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on a Possible EU
Deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, February 23, 2004, available at [http://www.ohr.int/print/
?content_id=31930].
5 Judy Dempsey, “US and EU in Dispute on Control of Bosnia Force,” Financial Times, March
9, 2004.

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Prior to the December 2004 handover, the United States appeared to send somewhat
contradictory signals at times on the desired level of U.S. engagement in the Balkans. On
the one hand, some U.S. officials, especially in the military, expressed an interest in
concluding the U.S. military role in the Balkans in view of greater or more pressing U.S.
priorities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. For them, handing over operational
security matters to the EU in Bosnia represented another opportunity, in a relatively
secure environment in Europe, for global security burden-sharing. The larger EU role is
also seen to be consistent with U.S. goals for the western Balkan region to eventually
achieve full integration into the EU. On the other hand, some U.S. officials may be wary
of French and other European long-term aspirations to build up European military
structures separate from NATO. Those with this perspective might be concerned that a
successful EU mission in Bosnia could work to diminish NATO’s primacy — and
possibly U.S. influence — on European security matters. Others also see a continued U.S.
role in enhancing stability in the Balkans with a U.S. military presence.
After the handover, about 200 U.S. forces remained in Bosnia as part of the NATO
headquarters presence in Camp Butmir in Sarajevo and at the U.S. Eagle Base in Tuzla
(on the basis of a bilateral military agreement). The U.S. presence has been used for
providing a staging area for military exercises, supporting the EU mission, and
demonstrating the enduring U.S. commitment to Bosnia’s security.6 The residual U.S.
presence at both bases has been involved in providing intelligence support, engaging in
efforts to detain war crimes suspects, and working to deny safe havens for Islamist
extremists and their supporters in Bosnia. In 2006, the United States announced the
withdrawal by the end of the year of its forces at Eagle Base; a small number of U.S.
intelligence officers continue to serve with the NATO Headquarters presence.
Key Dates.
! On April 26, 2004, EU members endorsed a “General Concept” for an
EU-led mission, including a military component of about 7,000 troops,
in Bosnia. The concept established the broad strategy for the EU’s
engagement in Bosnia. It called for the EU military operation to fulfill
the military tasks of the Dayton peace agreement, have a mandate
authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, and come under the political authority of the EU Council’s
Political and Security Committee (PSC).
! At its June 28-29 Istanbul summit, NATO nations confirmed the decision
to conclude SFOR by the end of the year and welcomed the EU’s
readiness to deploy a new and distinct mission. NATO members agreed
that NATO’s residual military presence would have the “principal task”
of providing advice on defense reforms and would also “undertake
certain operational supporting tasks, such as counter-terrorism...;
supporting the ICTY...with regard to the detention of persons indicted for
war crimes; and intelligence sharing with the EU.”
6 Statement by Maj. Gen. James W. Darden, U.S. European Command, at a hearing before the
House Armed Services Committee, July 12, 2004.

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! On July 9, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution
1551 which welcomed “the EU’s intention to launch an EU mission to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a military component, from
December 2004.”
! On July 12, EU members adopted a “Joint Action” on the EU military
operation in Bosnia, named Althea. It designated the EU Operation
Commander and EU Force Commander. It reaffirmed the EU’s
comprehensive approach toward Bosnia and support for its progress
toward EU integration.
! On October 11, the EU Council approved the Operational Plan for the
EUFOR Operation Althea.
! By a unanimous vote, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1575
on November 22. Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, it
authorized EUFOR to be the legal successor to SFOR and to carry out a
peace stabilization role for an initial period of one year. EU officials
have estimated that EUFOR’s mandate in Bosnia could extend to three
years.
! At a ceremony in Sarajevo on December 2, NATO formally concluded
the SFOR mission and the EU launched Operation Althea. Althea
operates out of three military areas in Bosnia (Tuzla, Mostar, and Banja
Luka), each comprising a multinational task force, and also has an
integrated police unit and theater troops. 33 countries led by Germany,
Italy, and the United Kingdom contributed the initial forces to EUFOR.
! On November 21, 2005, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
1639, which authorized EUFOR and the NATO Headquarters in Bosnia
for a further twelve months.
! On November 21-22, the EU Council took several decisions on the EU’s
relationship with Bosnia including opening Stabilization and Association
Agreement negotiations, continuing an EU police mission in Bosnia, and
keeping an EU military presence in Bosnia at basically unchanged force
levels for the coming year.
! On the date of its first anniversary on December 4, EUFOR held a change
of command ceremony, with Italian General Gian Marco Chiarini taking
over as EU Force Commander.
! On November 13, 2006, EU foreign and defense ministers considered a
proposal to reduce EUFOR’s troop strength based on a positive
evaluation of the security situation. However, ministers postponed a
decision to cut EUFOR reportedly in consideration of Kosovo’s status

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process and potential for regional unrest.7 EUFOR reductions could be
implemented beginning in February 2007, and the entire force could be
withdrawn by 2008.
! On November 21, the U.N. Security Council further extended EUFOR’s
and NATO’s mandates in Bosnia until November 2007 in Resolution
1722.
! On December 5, German Rear Admiral Hans-Jochen Witthauer replaced
General Marco Chiarini as EU Force Commander for EUFOR-Althea.
EUFOR Outlook
The December 2004 handover ceremony marked an historic end to NATO’s
longstanding mission in Bosnia and the beginning of a new EU military undertaking.
Many U.S. and European officials believe that success in handing over the stabilization
mission in Bosnia from NATO to the EU has been important not just for Bosnia’s future
but also for EU aspirations to assume greater security responsibilities. EUFOR is seen
as an important precedent for future potential mission handovers from NATO to the EU,
for example possibly in Kosovo. European support for EUFOR’s continuation appears
strong, although some EU members are likely eager to reduce their troop commitments
in Bosnia as the country makes progress in its efforts to integrate with the EU.
EUFOR has conducted several exercises and operations aimed at collecting illegal
weapons, improving coordination with NATO, and disrupting organized criminal activity.
EUFOR has worked closely with Bosnian law enforcement agencies on combating
organized crime, including conducting joint anti-crime operations and arrests. Small units
of Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT) have been stationed to increase EUFOR
visibility in local communities. Both EUFOR and the NATO presence remain engaged
in the pursuit of war crimes fugitives and in pressuring their support networks.
The transition from NATO to the EU force incurred no discernible political impact
in Bosnia. During the EUFOR planning stage, Bosnian government officials accepted the
concept of a European follow-on force, although they emphasized the need for a
continued NATO and U.S. presence. Bosnian officials often cite the critical role of U.S.
leadership in eventually bringing an end to the Bosnian war in 1995, especially in the
wake of failed U.N. peacekeeping missions (comprised largely of European forces) during
the Bosnian war. The ongoing NATO presence in Bosnia can serve to reinforce the
transatlantic dimension and Bosnia’s aspirations to join NATO; Bosnia’s recent
admittance into NATO’s Partnership for Peace program is likely to expand activities with
NATO. On the other hand, European integration today represents the ultimate strategic
perspective of all of the western Balkan states, including Bosnia, and the EU is expected
to lead the international presence on the ground in Bosnia, especially as the Office of the
High Representative winds down in 2007.
7 Paul Ames, “Concern over Kosovo Delays EU Decision on Cutting Bosnia Force,” Associated
Press, November 13, 2006.

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