Order Code RL33743
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Issues,
Options, and Prospects for Renewal
December 5, 2006
J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper
Specialists in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Issues, Options, and
Prospects for Renewal
Summary
On July 1, 2007, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA — formerly fast track) is set
to expire, and with it a special authority that Congress grants to the President to
negotiate certain trade agreements and to have their implementing bills considered
under expedited legislative procedures, provided the President complies with certain
statutory obligations. The procedures allow Congress to exercise its constitutional
authority over trade, while giving the President added negotiating flexibility by
assuring U.S. trade partners that final agreements are given swift and unamended
consideration. The United States is currently engaged in multiple trade negotiations
that may not be completed before TPA expires, raising the question of its renewal.
TPA reflects years of debate, cooperation, and compromise between Congress
and the Executive Branch. Congress has express constitutional authority to impose
duties and regulate foreign commerce, while the President has the sole authority to
negotiate international agreements and exerts broad power over U.S. foreign policy.
TPA arose from a pragmatic need to accommodate these authorities in the conduct
of U.S. trade policy, as well as address concerns that constituent pressures can often
lead to poor trade policy decisions. The “Smoot-Hawley” Tariff Act of 1930, for
example, raised tariffs significantly, diminishing trade and prolonging the Great
Depression. In response, Congress delegated to the President in 1934 authority to
negotiate pre-approved reductions in tariff rates. TPA evolved in 1974 from this
precedent to allow the President to negotiate non-tariff barriers (NTBs), provided he
comply with various congressional requirements set out in the statute.
The core provisions of the fast track legislative procedures have remained
virtually unchanged since they were first enacted, although Congress has expanded
trade negotiation objectives, oversight, and presidential notification requirements.
While early versions of fast track/TPA received broad bipartisan support, renewal
efforts became increasingly controversial as fears grew over the perceived negative
effects of trade, and as the trade debate became more partisan in nature. Congress
last renewed TPA in the Trade Act of 2002 following a pitched battle and largely
partisan-line vote. Two key issues dominated: labor and environment provisions and
guaranteeing a bipartisan congressional role in trade policy making.
As the debate over TPA renewal heats up, these two issues are still on center
stage, flanked by a handful of other trade policy concerns. Congress faces a difficult
challenge given the number of trade negotiations, including the WTO Doha Round
and bilateral agreements with South Korea, Malaysia, and Panama, among others,
that are close to being concluded before TPA expires. Congress can choose among
various options: no action; temporary extension; revision and renewal; permanent
authority; or some hybrid solution. How this issue plays out depends on a host of
variables including the status of uncompleted negotiations, the economic effects of
pursuing trade liberalization as perceived by various constituents, the political will
to compromise between the Bush Administration and Congress, and the willingness
and ability of the 110th Congress, with its new Members and majority, to craft a truly
bipartisan solution. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
A Brief History of TPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Evolution of the Congressional-Executive Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Creation of Fast Track Trade Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Subsequent Renewals of Fast Track Trade Negotiating Authority . . . . . . . . 5
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA) . . . . . . . . . 6
A Hiatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Elements of TPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Negotiating Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Notification and Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Trade Agreements Authority and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Congressional Procedures Outside TPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Side Agreements and Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Mock Markups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Informal Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Limiting Trade Agreements Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Sunset Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Extension Disapproval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Procedural Disapproval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Withdrawal of Expedited Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Question of the Need for TPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Trade Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Labor Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Trade Remedy Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Temporary Entry of Service Providers (“Mode 4”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Allow TPA to Expire
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Extend TPA Temporarily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Renew TPA Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Grant Permanent TPA Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Prospects for TPA Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B: A Short Guide to the Expedited Legislative Procedures for
Passage of Trade Implementing Bills Under TPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Issues,
Options, and Prospects for Renewal
On July 1, 2007, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA — formerly known as fast
track) is scheduled to expire, and with it the authority that Congress grants to the
President to enter into certain trade agreements, and to have their implementing bills
considered under expedited legislative procedures. Although the President has the
authority to negotiate trade agreements, he may need implementing legislation and
thus congressional action to bring them into force. Currently, the United States is
engaged in multiple trade agreement negotiations that may not be completed before
the current TPA is set to expire. Thus, the issue of TPA renewal is central to the
conduct of trade negotiations during the 110th Congress.
For over 30 years, Congress has granted the President TPA, agreeing to approve
trade implementing legislation expeditiously, provided the President meets certain
negotiating objectives and consultation requirements. This arrangement strikes a
delicate balance by allowing Congress to exercise its constitutional authority over
trade, while giving the President additional negotiating leverage by assuring trade
partners that a final agreement will be given swift and unamended consideration by
Congress. Earlier incarnations of TPA generated relatively little controversy and
were adopted with substantial bipartisan majorities. Over time, however, trade
negotiations have become more complex, involving a broader array of economic
activities and policies. Congress has also insisted on tighter oversight and
consultation guidelines, while the trade debate has become more partisan in nature.
Consequently, congressional renewal of TPA has become increasingly controversial.
Such could be the case again if the 110th Congress takes up TPA renewal, which
would likely focus on many policy and procedural questions over the content,
conduct, and overall direction of U.S. trade policy. This report presents background
on the development of TPA, a summary of the major provisions under the current
authority, and a discussion of the issues that are likely to arise in the debate over TPA
renewal. It also explores the policy options available to Congress and will track the
legislative debate as it develops. The report will be updated as events warrant.

A Brief History of TPA
TPA is the product of many years of debate, cooperation, and compromise
between Congress and the Executive Branch. At its foundation lie the respective
constitutional powers granted to Congress and the President, as well as the pragmatic
realization that a certain cooperative flexibility is needed if the United States is to
negotiate trade agreements credibly. The evolution of TPA to date shows, among
other things, that the Congressional-Executive partnership on trade policymaking can

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be strained as it adjusts to evolving political and economic conditions and shifting
priorities of the two Branches.
The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Trade

The U.S. Constitution assigns express authority over foreign trade to Congress.
Article I, section 8, gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign
nations ...” and to “...lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises...” In
contrast, the Constitution assigns no specific responsibility for trade to the President.1
Under Article II, however, the President has exclusive authority to negotiate treaties
and international agreements and exercises broad authority over the conduct of the
nation’s foreign affairs. Both legislative and executive authorities come into play in
the development and execution of U.S. trade agreements and trade policy.
The Evolution of the Congressional-Executive Partnership
For roughly the first 150 years of the United States, the Congress exercised its
authority over foreign trade by setting tariff rates on all imported products. The tariff
was the main trade policy instrument and a primary source of revenue.
Congressional trade debates pitted Members from manufacturing regions, mainly in
the North, wanting high, protectionist tariffs, against Members from raw material
exporting regions, mainly in the South, who wanted low tariffs. During this period,
the President’s primary role in setting trade policy was to use his foreign affairs
authority to negotiate, bring into force, and implement (with the advice and consent
of the Senate) general bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation that
provided most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the goods of the parties to those
treaties with United States.2
Two legislative events occurred in the 1930s that radically changed how U.S.
trade policy would be shaped and conducted. The first was the “Smoot-Hawley”
Tariff Act of 1930 (P.L. 71-361), which set prohibitively high tariff rates in response
to U.S. producers seeking protection during the height of the Great Depression. The
tariffs led to retaliatory tariffs from the major U.S. trading partners, severely
restricting trade, thus deepening and prolonging the effects of the depression.
The damaging effects of Smoot-Hawley inspired the second major trade
legislative event in the 1930s. Congress, with the guidance and encouragement of
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, himself a former Senator, developed and enacted the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (RTAA; P.L. 73-316). The RTAA
authorized the President to negotiate reciprocal agreements that reduced tariffs within
1 Destler, I. M. American Trade Politics. Fourth Edition. Institute for International
Economics. Washington, DC. 2005. p. 14.
2 Shapiro, Hal and Lael Brainard. Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast
Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More than Change. The George
Washington International Law Review. vol 35. no. 1. p. 6. 2003. MFN, also known in
U.S. law as normal trade relations (NTR) status, means that the United States would treat
the imports from that trading partner no less favorably than the imports from other trading
partners.

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pre-approved levels. The tariffs were applied on an MFN basis, that is, reductions
in tariffs on imports from one trade partner would apply to imports from all other
countries with which the United States had such trade agreements. Under the RTAA,
Congress authorized the president to implement the new tariffs by proclamation
without additional legislation. The RTAA is important for several reasons:
! For the first time, Congress expressly delegated to the President
major trade negotiating authority. In so doing, it is argued, Congress
aimed to lessen the protectionist pressure on itself.3
! The Smoot-Hawley tariff was the last general tariff legislation
passed by Congress. While still on the books, the Smoot-Hawley
tariffs are only applied to imports from those few countries, namely
Cuba and North Korea, not receiving MFN status, now called
normal trade relations status (NTR) in U.S. trade laws.
! While delegating some authority, Congress in no way surrendered
its trade authority. Congress subjected the tariff negotiating
authority to periodic review.
Congress renewed presidential trade negotiating authority eleven times until
1962 through trade agreement extension acts. General tariff levels declined and their
significance as a trade barrier lessened.4 In addition, with the establishment of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, the major forum for trade
negotiations shifted from bilateral to multilateral negotiations, and trade negotiations
were eventually expanded beyond tariffs.5
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress granted the President
authority for five years to negotiate the reduction or elimination of tariffs and
increased its role in the process by requiring the President to submit for congressional
review a copy of the concluded agreement and a presidential statement explaining
why the agreement was concluded. It allowed the President to negotiate the GATT
Kennedy Round (1963-1967), the last round in which tariff reduction was the
primary focus of the negotiations.
Along with a number of tariff reduction agreements (which Congress authorized
the President to implement by proclamation), the GATT countries reached
agreements in two areas related to non-tariff barriers (NTBs), that is, laws and rules
3 Destler, American Trade Politics, pp. 14-15; and Pastor, Robert A. Congress and the
Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976. University of California Press.
Berkeley, 1980. pp. 79-80.
4 Shapiro and Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track, p. 11.
5 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) went into effect in 1948 as a set of
rules governing international trade. Over time, the number of GATT signatories grew and
the body of rules were expanded in a series of negotiations called rounds. During the
Uruguay Round, the signatories agreed to establish the World Trade Organization (WTO)
to administer the GATT and other multilateral trade agreements. The WTO now has 149
members.

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other than tariffs that are used to restrict imports. The first was a customs valuation
agreement that would have required the United States to eliminate the American
Selling Price method of pricing goods at the border. The second was an antidumping
agreement that would have required changes in U.S. antidumping practices.6
Because U.S. adherence to these agreements required changes in U.S. law or
regulations beyond tariff modifications, many in Congress concluded that the
President had exceeded his authority. In fact, Congress passed a resolution in 1966
opposing “nontariff commitments” made by the Johnson Administration that had not
been approved by Congress, setting up the debate that would eventually be resolved
with the creation of fast track.7
The Creation of Fast Track Trade Authority

The results of the Kennedy Round made it evident that non-tariff barriers would
increasingly dominate the agenda of future multilateral trade agreements requiring
changes in U.S. law, if the United States were to adhere to them. Congressional
concern over presidential encroachment on its legislative authority prompted
Congress to seek a legislative remedy.
After the expiration of the tariff modification authority in the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, the Administration sought new authority to negotiate the Tokyo Round
in the GATT, which Congress granted in the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618). As
before, the Act provided the President with the authority to negotiate and implement
the reduction and elimination of tariffs within certain parameters. To address the
issue of agreements that require changes in U.S. law, however, the Act stipulated that
non-tariff barrier agreements entered into under the statute could only enter into force
if Congress passed implementing legislation.
It was argued that subjecting implementing legislation to ordinary congressional
debate and amendment procedures would defeat the purpose for delegating trade
negotiating authority to the President in the first place — to reduce the parochial
pressures implicit in trade policymaking. Many Members also recognized that
trading partners would not be willing to negotiate agreements that would be subject
to unlimited congressional debate and amendments. As stated in the Senate Finance
Committee report accompanying the Trade Act of 1974:
The Committee recognizes ... that such agreements negotiated by the Executive
should be given an up-or-down vote by the Congress. Our negotiators cannot be
expected to accomplish the negotiating goals ... if there are no reasonable
assurances that the negotiated agreements would be voted up-or-down on their
merits. Our trading partners have expressed an unwillingness to negotiate
without some assurances that the Congress will consider the agreements within
a definite time-frame.8
6 Destler, I. M. Renewing Fast-Track Legislation. Institute for International Economics.
Washington, DC. September 1997. p. 6.
7 Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics, pp. 71-72.
8 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Trade Reform Act of 1974; report...on
(continued...)

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As a solution, Congress agreed that each Chamber would suspend its ordinary
legislative procedures and give trade agreements expedited treatment, which became
known as “fast track.” The relevant committees would be given limited time to
consider implementing bills. Once they reached the floor, the implementing bills
would be subject to time-limited debate and no amendments. In exchange, Congress
required the Executive Branch to consult with relevant committees during the
negotiations and to notify Congress 90 calendar days before signing an agreement.
The Act also provided for the accreditation of 10 Members of Congress as advisers
to the U.S. delegation of negotiators. (The Trade Act of 1962 had provided for five
such advisers.) Thus, fast track was born!
With the trade negotiating authority and the “fast-track” provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974, the United States participated in the Tokyo Round (1973-1979).
As expected, this round resulted in a number of agreements on NTBs, such as
government procurement practices, product standards, customs regulations, and rules
for administering antidumping and countervailing duty procedures. The Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-39) was the first trade agreement bill implemented
by Congress under fast-track procedures.
Subsequent Renewals of Fast Track Trade Negotiating
Authority
The core provisions of the fast track procedures have remained virtually
unchanged since they were first enacted. They are ensconced in sections 151-154 of
the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and are not subject to sunset provisions. The
ability to use them, however, is subject to time limits, and Congress has revised them
over the years. (This report examines fast-track procedures and the trade negotiating
authority in more detail in the following section.) The trade negotiating authority and
the authority to enact tariff modifications by proclamation under the Trade Act of
1974 were in effect for 5 years ending on January 2, 1980. A residual presidential
authority to enact tariff modifications expired January 2, 1982.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Along with implementing the Tokyo
Round agreements, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 extended for eight years, until
January 2, 1988, the presidential authority to negotiate agreements on non-tariff
barriers without any other changes to the original authority. The Act did not extend
presidential tariff modification authority.
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. This act amended the Trade Act of 1974
to provide for the negotiation and implementation of bilateral free trade agreements
that both reduce or eliminate tariffs and address non-tariff barriers. Congress was
taking into account the U.S.-Israel and U.S.-Canada FTAs being considered. The
legislation waived for the U.S.-Israel FTA the requirement of 90-day notification to
Congress prior to entering the agreement. However, for negotiations with other
8 (...continued)
H.R. 10710...(S.Rept. 93-1298) Nov. 26, 1974. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. p. 107. As
cited in CRS Report 97-41, Fast-Track Implementation of Trade Agreements: History,
Procedure, and Other Options, by Vladimir N. Pregelj.

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countries, it required the President to notify the House Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee of his intention to begin FTA negotiations 60 days
prior to entering the negotiations and provided for disapproval of the negotiations by
either the House Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee. The
Act also required that agreements that lead to tariff modifications beyond a certain
threshold be subject to congressional approval via implementing legislation.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA). The
OTCA extended the president’s authority to enter into trade agreements before June
1, 1993, but extended fast-track procedures only for agreements entered into before
June 1, 1991. Legislation for agreements entered into after that date, but before June
1, 1993, could be approved under fast-track procedures, if the President requested an
extension of such authority and it was not disapproved by either the House or the
Senate. (The President requested the extension which survived proposed House and
Senate resolutions of disapproval.) The OTCA also provided that Congress could
withhold a trade agreement from fast track consideration, by passing resolutions of
disapproval, if it determined that the USTR had failed to consult with Congress
adequately during the trade negotiations. Under the OTCA provisions, Congress
passed implementing legislation for the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1993 (P.L. 103-82).

However, negotiations under the Uruguay Round of the GATT were not going
to finish in time to meet the June 1, 1993 deadline. Congress, therefore, passed H.R.
1876, signed by the President on July 2, 1993 (P.L. 103-49), extending the authority
and implementing procedures until April 16, 1994, for the Uruguay Round
agreements. The votes reflected strong congressional support for extending the
authority in the House (295-126) and in the Senate (76-16). The law did not change
any other aspects of the fast-track authority.
A Hiatus. After the fast-track authority expired on April 16,1994, Congress
did not approve new authority until the Trade Act of 2002 (H.R. 3009; P.L. 107-210).
The eight-year period was the longest since January 1975 during which the “fast-
track” was unavailable to President. In 1997, both the Senate Finance and House
Ways and Means Committees reported out legislation to renew fast track. House
Republican leaders pulled it before a floor vote at the request of the Clinton
Administration because it lacked sufficient support in the House. In September 1998,
the House voted on fast track authority legislation, but the bill failed to pass (180-
243).
Several reasons may explain the failure of the Clinton Administration and
Congress to get fast track procedures re-authorized. For one, both the Republican
congressional leadership and the Clinton Administration wanted fast-track authority;
however, the two sides could not agree on how labor and environmental issues
should be addressed in trade agreements negotiated under a new negotiating
authority. Republicans wanted limited coverage while the Clinton Administration
and many Democrats in Congress preferred broader coverage. In addition, the WTO
failed to launch a new round of negotiations at the 1999 Ministerial meeting in
Seattle, and therefore, no major trade negotiations were underway that might have
made the adoption of a fast-track statute a political priority.

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The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. In 2001,
President Bush requested new trade agreements (fast-track) authority, which was
renamed “trade promotion authority (TPA),” in part to counter a negative connotation
associated with the fast track name. The new authority is contained in the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act (BTPAA) of 2002, which itself is contained in a
larger bill, as Title XXI of The Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210).
The structure of TPA is consistent with previous negotiating authority. It also
includes environmental and labor provisions as “principal negotiating objectives, “
but does not mandate the inclusion of minimal enforceable labor standards in trade
agreements.9 The lack of a mandate to include such standards was the source of
much of the opposition from labor groups and many Members of Congress. The Act
also created a new mechanism for congressional oversight, the Congressional
Oversight Group (COG), to operate in addition to the congressional trade advisors
that have been appointed under previous versions.
The original House version of the BTPAA (H.R. 3005) passed by one vote (215-
214) largely along party lines, with Republicans largely supporting the bill and
Democrats largely opposing it. The legislation was combined in the Senate with the
renewal of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), Andean Trade Preference Act
(ATPA), and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and passed (66-30). The
conference report on the final bill, H.R. 3009, the Trade Act of 2002, was adopted
by House (215-212) and by the Senate (64-34).10
Under the current version of TPA, Congress has approved implementing
legislation for FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, the Dominican
Republic, Central American countries, Bahrain, and Oman. In addition, the United
States has signed FTAs with Colombia and Peru.
Because the President must notify Congress 90 calendar days before he intends
to sign or enter into a prospective agreement, an agreement would have to be
completed before April 2, 2007, if it is to meet the July 1, 2007 expiration date. This
time constraint could affect many agreements currently under negotiation. The
negotiations with Panama are nearly completed and could meet the deadline under
the current TPA. The United States is also aiming to complete and sign agreements
with South Korea and Malaysia before TPA expires. The United States is also
interested in FTA negotiations with Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the
members of the South African Customs Union (SACU), which are currently
suspended and not expected to be completed before TPA expires.
The United States and more than 140 other members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are engaged in a round of multilateral negotiations, the Doha
9 Devereaux, Charan, Robert Z. Lawrence, and Michael D. Watkins. Case Studies in US
Trade Negotiation, Volume 1: Making the Rules. Institute for International Economics.
Washington, DC. September 2006. p. 229.
10 For details on votes on this legislation, see CRS Report RS21004, Trade Promotion
Authority and Fast Track Negotiating Authority for Trade Agreements: Major Votes, by
Carolyn C. Smith.

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Development Agenda (DDA), to revise and expand rules for conducting trade in
agriculture, manufactured goods, and services. In July 2006, WTO Director-General
Pascal Lamy suspended the negotiations, making it highly unlikely that the WTO
members can successfully conclude the DDA under the current TPA.11 Nonetheless,
the fate of DDA may be critical for any justification of the renewal or extension of
TPA.
The Elements of TPA
Through TPA, in its various iterations, Congress has sought, in the context of
supporting trade negotiations, to achieve four major goals: 1) to define its trade
policy priorities and to have those priorities reflected in trade agreement negotiating
objectives; 2) to ensure that the Executive Branch adheres to these objectives by
requiring periodic notification and consultation; 3) to define the terms, conditions,
and procedures under which trade agreement implementing bills will be approved;
and 4) to reaffirm Congress’s overall Constitutional authority over trade by placing
limitations on the trade agreements authority. These four goals, and some important
procedural precedents that fall outside the formal TPA process, are discussed below.
Negotiating Objectives
Congress exercises its trade policy role, in part, by defining trade negotiation
objectives in TPA legislation. In the 2002 TPA, Congress made clear that trade is
an important aspect of U.S. foreign economic and security policy because it generates
broad benefits for the United States and the global economy. To take the fullest
advantage of these benefits, Congress, drawing on its constitutional authority and
historical precedent, defined the objectives that the President is to pursue in trade
negotiations. Although the Executive Branch has some discretion over implementing
these goals, they are definitive statements of U.S. trade policy that the Administration
is expected to honor, if it expects the trade legislation to be considered under
expedited rules. Given their importance, trade negotiating objectives stand at the
center of the congressional debate on TPA.
Congress conveys both general and specific trade negotiating objectives in three
categories: 1) overall objectives; 2) principal objectives; and 3) other priorities.
These begin with broadly focused goals that encapsulate the “overall” direction trade
negotiations are expected to take, such as the need to enhance U.S. and global
economies. Principal objectives are far more precise and provide detailed goals that
Congress expects to be integrated into trade agreements like reducing barriers to
various types of trade (goods, services, agriculture, electronic commerce); protecting
foreign investment and intellectual property rights; encouraging transparency, fair
regulatory practices, and anti-corruption; ensuring countries protect environment and
labor conditions and rights; providing for an effective dispute settlement process; and
protecting the U.S. right to enforce its trade remedy laws. Objectives also include an
important obligation to consult Congress, discussed in detail below.
11 For more information on current U.S. trade negotiations, see CRS Report RL33463,
Trade Negotiations During the 109th Congress, by Ian F. Fergusson.

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In the past, congressional debate over language defining trade negotiating
objectives has been highly contested, contributing to the 2002 renewal controversy
in which TPA passed virtually along partisan lines and by only the narrowest of
margins.12 This controversy reflects the importance of TPA negotiating objectives,
which serve effectively as a template for future trade agreements negotiated under
these guidelines. Therefore, if a debate over the language of a TPA objective is
highly contentious, it stands to reason that the same issue may prove even more
acerbic when a specific trade agreement is brought before Congress for approval.
The labor provisions provide the best example, which are emphasized repeatedly in
all three groups of negotiating objectives. The decision not to include minimal
enforceable standards anywhere in TPA, however, caused acrimonious debate over
both TPA and the FTAs that later adopted the TPA language on labor. This was
perhaps most evident in the debate on the Dominican Republic-Central America-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).
Because the structure of trade agreements mirrors TPA objectives, and highly
disputed agreements based on those objectives brought before Congress under TPA
have so far survived, often narrowly, all challenges from dissenters, the vote on
TPA/fast track renewal is among the most critical trade votes Congress takes. The
110th Congress, therefore, is likely to proceed carefully in defining trade negotiation
objectives in any new TPA authority.
Notification and Consultation
The trade agreements authority is extended to the President provided he consults
regularly with Congress, including the Congressional Oversight Group (COG)
created in the 2002 trade act, whose members are to be accredited as official advisors
to the U.S. trade negotiation delegations. Notification and consultation requirements
have been expanded over time in their own section within the TPA statute (the
exception is the 90-day notification of intention to enter into an agreement found in
the original “trade agreements authority” section). See Appendix A for a time line.
First, the President must conduct certain consultations before negotiations begin
that include:
1)
notifying Congress in writing of his intention to enter into negotiations at
least 90 calendar days prior to commencing negotiations;
2)
consulting with the House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, other
relevant committees, and the COG on the nature of the negotiations; and
3)
providing special consultations on agriculture, import sensitive agricultural
products, fishing and textile industry tariffs, and other issues.
The president must also conduct specific consultations before agreements are
entered into (signed), to include:
12 For a summary of bills authorizing TPA and trade agreements approved under its
provisions, see CRS Report RS21004, Trade Promotion Authority and Fast-Track
Negotiating Authority for Trade Agreements: Major Votes, by Carolyn C. Smith.

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CRS-10
1)
consulting with House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, other relevant
committees, and the COG with respect to the nature of the agreement, how
it achieves the purposes defined in TPA, and any potential effects it may
have on existing laws;
2)
notifying the revenue committees at least 180 calendar days prior to
entering into the agreement of any potential changes to U.S. trade remedy
laws that may be required;
3)
submitting private sector advisory committee reports to Congress, the
President, and the USTR no later than 30 calendar days after notifying
Congress of the President’s intention to enter into an agreement;13
4)
providing the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) with trade
agreement details at least 90 days before entering into an agreement; and
5)
presenting the USITC report on the impact of the agreement on the U.S.
economy to Congress no later than 90 calendar days after the President
enters into the agreement.
Trade Agreements Authority and Implementation
As noted above, when the statutory authority to negotiate trade agreements was
limited to reducing tariffs, the trade agreement was implemented by presidential
proclamation and without further congressional action, provided the tariff rate
reductions were within legislatively pre-approved limits. This process changed when
trade negotiations were expanded to include non-tariff barriers (NTBs). These more
complex agreements led Congress to tighten its control over trade policy by
establishing fast track trade negotiating authority. As set out in the Trade Act of
1974, NTB agreements could enter into force for the United States only if certain
conditions were met, including the President’s notifying Congress before entering
into an agreement and enactment of an implementing bill, as defined in the
legislation. The implementing bill, however, would be eligible for expedited
legislative treatment.14
13 The private sector advisory system was established by Congress in 1974 to ensure that
U.S. trade policy and negotiations benefit from, and reflect, a broad array of private sector
U.S. interests. It consists of 27 committees and over 700 advisors, coordinated by the Office
of the United States Trade Representative. USTR. 2006 Trade Policy Agenda and 2005
Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program.
Washington, DC. March 2006. pp. 252-255.
14 Under TPA, reciprocal FTAs and multilateral NTB agreements that go beyond tariff
reductions are treated as congressional-executive agreements, which require the approval
of both Houses of Congress. Such approval expresses Congress’ consent to bind the United
States to the commitments of the agreement under international law. This type of agreement
is distinguished from both the executive agreement, requiring only presidential action, and
the treaty, requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Because reciprocal trade agreements
typically result in tariff rate (revenue) changes, the House of Representatives is necessarily
involved. For a more detailed legal discussion, see CRS Report 97-896, Why Certain Trade
(continued...)

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CRS-11
At the heart of TPA/fast track are the expedited rules for moving trade
implementing legislation through Congress, which have been used for nearly all
reciprocal trade agreements.15 Congress makes these expedited procedures available
for a trade implementing bill provided the President uses the trade agreements
authority granted him to the satisfaction of Congress, first by entering into
agreements that meet TPA’s overall and principal negotiating objectives, and second
by satisfying the consultation requirements. In addition, under the “trade agreements
authority,” the President must:
1)
at least calendar 90 days prior to signing the agreement, notify
Congress of his intention to do so (to provide opportunity for
revision before the agreement is signed, at which point it can no
longer be changed);
2)
within 60 calendar days of signing the agreement, provide
Congress with a list of required changes to U.S. law needed for
the United States to be in compliance with the agreement; and
3)
on a day Congress is in session, send a copy of the final legal
text of the trade agreement, a draft implementing bill, statement
of administrative action proposed to implement the agreement,
and supporting statements on how the agreement meets
congressional objectives, changes existing agreements, and
serves the purpose of U.S. commercial interests.
As an important caveat, these expedited procedures are extended only to
implementing bills containing provisions that are “necessary or appropriate” to
implement the trade agreements, either repealing or amending existing laws, or
providing new statutory authority. This presumably limits the implementing bill to
provisions related to the pending trade agreement, although the meaning of
“necessary or appropriate” has been subject to debate.
Should these requirements be fulfilled to the satisfaction of Congress, it has
agreed to follow certain expedited legislative procedures. In effect, these rules
require that Congress must act on the bill, and in other ways represent a significant
departure from ordinary legislative procedures. The rules are defined below (see
Appendix B for greater detail):
1)
mandatory introduction of the implementing bill in both Houses of
Congress and immediate referral to the appropriate committees (House
Ways and Means, Senate Finance, and possibly others);16
14 (...continued)
Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than as Treaties,
by Jeanne J. Grimmett; and Shapiro, Hal S. Fast Track: A Legal, Historical, and Political
Analysis. Ardsley, NY, Transnational Publishers. 2006. p. 22.
15 The U.S.-Jordan FTA is the exception.
16 This depends on whether there are provisions in the agreement that would change laws
(continued...)

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CRS-12
2)
automatic discharge from House and Senate Committees after a limited
period of time (see Appendix B);
3)
limited floor debate; and
4)
no amendment, meaning that Congress must vote either up or down on the
bill, which passes with a simple majority.
Congressional Procedures Outside TPA
In addition to the expedited rules procedures defined in TPA, Congress, with the
effective consent of the Executive Branch, has followed certain procedures during
the consideration of trade agreement implementing bills, that although not formally
defined in TPA, have been integrated into the process of congressional approval of
trade agreements. Three in particular stand out:
Side Agreements and Letters. Outside of formal TPA statutory
requirements, Congress has insisted on additions or clarifications to trade
agreements. This has resulted, at times, in side agreements and letters. Side
agreements add to the agreement, such as the environment and labor side agreements
of NAFTA.17 Side letters serve as clarifying devices that can be used to attempt to
assuage congressional concerns. Side agreements and letters accompany the
agreement, but neither changes its text and both require official signatures of all the
negotiating parties to come into force.
Mock Markups. Congress has insisted on reviewing the negotiated trade
agreement prior to the implementing bill being introduced. This is done in an
informal or “mock” markup, whereby hearings are held before the House Ways and
Means and Senate Finance Committees on a draft of the final text of the agreement
and an informal draft version of the implementing bill, which are sent over by the
White House. This is, in effect, a test run of congressional response to the trade bill.
Because it is only an informal draft bill, there is no real legislation to “mark up,” but
the hearings afford Committee Members an opportunity to comment on the draft
trade agreement, as well as the informal draft implementing legislation, and offer
amendments that serve as important signposts for changes to the implementing bill
they would like to see made. Congress may also decide to hold a mock conference.
Although the agreement at this point has already been concluded, a clarification
or “translation” of key points that do not alter the basic agreement can be made in the
final implementing bill.18 These accommodations, however, need not be done.
Although many were made during consideration of the CAFTA-DR agreement, the
16 (...continued)
under the jurisdiction of other committees.
17 Interestingly, while Congress authorized funding for U.S. contributions and for
participation in the administrative bodies created by the NAFTA side agreements, it did not
expressly approve the agreements themselves. See 19 U.S.C. sections 3471-3472.
18 This idea is elaborated in: VanGrasster, Craig. Is the Fast Track Really Necessary?
Journal of World Trade. Vol. 31, No. 2. April 1997. p. 106.

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Bush Administration, by contrast, declined to include the language of an amendment
unanimously supported by the Senate Finance Committee with respect to the U.S.-
Oman FTA implementing legislation, citing TPA’s own requirement that only
legislation “necessary or appropriate” to implement the agreement be included. The
Oman bill passed, but there arose a new bipartisan call for better consultation prior
to the President entering into a trade agreement.19
Informal Agreements. Some Members of Congress have also relied on
promises from the Administration to address issues raised in mock markups. These
often relate to special interests and concerns, and their fulfillment relies on a measure
of good will between Congress and the Administration. In the case of the CAFTA-
DR implementing bill, for example, the Bush Administration made accommodations
to sugar, textile, and labor interests to secure congressional support.20
Limiting Trade Agreements Authority
Congress adopted TPA rules on pragmatic grounds as self-limiting conditions
to prevent trade implementing bills from being delayed or obstructed by
congressional procedures that can either keep a bill from moving out of committee,
or delay it on the floor of the House or Senate with extended debate. Trade
agreements can also be the product of a fragile consensus between trade partners, and
TPA procedures were designed to protect such a consensus from unraveling due to
congressional amendments. In crafting TPA, however, Congress did not agree to
surrender its constitutional authority over trade matters and wrote into TPA a number
of provisions that can limit the use of the expedited procedures.
Sunset Provision. The expedited procedures in TPA are provided for a
limited time, currently available for trade agreements that are entered into before July
1, 2007. Importantly, there is no deadline for submitting implementing legislation
for an agreement that has been entered into before the July 1 deadline.
Extension Disapproval. TPA legislation requires that the President request
an extension of the TPA authority after a certain period of time. The extension is
granted unless a disapproval resolution is adopted in either House of Congress. Such
a resolution of disapproval may not be considered unless it is reported out of either
House Ways and Means or Senate Finance Committee. Although such resolutions
have been reported out of committee in the past, none has been passed in either
House of Congress. This process is a reminder to the Executive Branch that the
availability of expedited legislative procedures is a congressional prerogative that can
be denied if Congress becomes unhappy with how the President has conducted trade
agreement negotiations.
Procedural Disapproval. The President must fulfill consultation and
reporting requirements to give Congress the opportunity to influence the agreement
before it is finalized. Should Congress determine that the President has failed to
19 Inside Trade. Grassley Presses USTR To Improve Consultations on FTAs. July 7, 2006.
20 For details, see: CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central America-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by J. F. Hornbeck.

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CRS-14
meet these requirements, it may decide that the implementing bill is not eligible to
be considered under TPA rules, which it can enforce if it adopts a joint “procedural
disapproval” resolution in both Houses of Congress.
Withdrawal of Expedited Procedures. TPA, first and foremost, provides
rules of procedure enacted by Congress, “with the full recognition of the
constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the
procedure of the House) at any time.”21 That is, Congress reserves its constitutional
right to withdraw the fast track rule, which can take effect with a vote by either
House of Congress.22
This summary suggests that in addition to binding rules, the long-term success
of TPA rests on a cooperative spirit and partnership between the Legislative and
Executive Branches of government, and by extension, between the two major
political parties.23 Many note that the sense of such cooperation has been absent
under the current TPA, placing a strain on the trade legislative process in recent
years. In fact, a bipartisan agreement on TPA has been absent since at least 1993, as
evident in the eight-year lapse during the Clinton Administration and the highly
partisan passage of the 2002 TPA renewal. The current dissatisfaction with TPA
results from philosophical differences that have developed, in part, along partisan
lines and raises the distinct possibility that TPA may lapse once again for an
indeterminable period of time.
Issues for Congress
TPA is set to expire and, if it does, will be unavailable for trade agreements not
entered into before July 1, 2007. Before TPA’s scheduled expiration, a debate in the
110th Congress may be influenced by several sets of factors.
One set of factors reflects economic and trade policy concerns. Some Members
of Congress have raised a concern over the role of globalization and trade
liberalization in lost jobs and lower wages and in the growing income gap in the
United States, issues that are the subject of debate among economists. Many
Members have also expressed concern about the record-breaking trade deficits the
United States continues to run and their possible impact on the U.S. economy.
Many Members have also called for greater enforcement by China and other
trading partners of their obligations under trade agreements with the United States
and for U.S. use of trade policy tools to encourage enforcement. In addition, some
Members have argued that the United States needs to re-order its trade partner
21 Section 151(a)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974.
22 See Shapiro, Fast Track: A Legal, Historical, and Political Analysis, p. 28.
23 See Carrier, Michael A. All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to
Beyond. George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics. Washington,
DC. 1996.

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priorities and forge closer economic ties with Japan, the European Union, and other
large economies through FTAs or other mechanisms.
A second set of factors that would likely underlie a debate on the future of TPA
is the political environment in Congress on trade. Recent votes on trade agreements
have pointed to a political environment that is highly contentious and partisan,
following a trend that began with the vote on the TPA in the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Act of 2002, if not earlier. Added to this trend is the unknown impact on
trade policy of the change in the composition of the Congress as a result of the 2006
congressional elections.

The ensuing debate on TPA renewal, shaped by these and other factors, will
likely focus on a number of specific issues. These issues point to concerns over the
TPA process and particular trade policy issues that have yet to find a consensus
resolution.
The Question of the Need for TPA
Given the many complexities with the TPA process, one recurring question is
whether it is necessary at all? One way to explore this issue is to consider the
alternatives. First, given the breadth and scope of modern trade accords, executive
agreements are an insufficient means for fully implementing trade agreements where
the amendment, repeal, or enactment of new laws is required. Second, the treaty
approach presents two problems: the high hurdle of a two-thirds vote of approval in
the U.S. Senate and lack of House approval for an agreement involving revenue.24
Further, Congress has long considered U.S. trade agreements to be non-self-
executing, that is, requiring implementing legislation if existing law is insufficient
to carry out agreement obligations.25
Because legislative action involving both Houses of Congress is needed, the
options appear limited to a TPA approach, or relying on ordinary rules of procedure
to consider trade implementing legislation. To date, the complexity of representing
the diverse interests of numerous economic stakeholders has several times led
Congress back to the idea of using a carefully structured, time-limited grant of trade
agreements authority, subject to implementing legislation being considered under
streamlined legislative rules. Still, implementing legislation for some trade
agreements, like the U.S.-Jordan FTA, have been approved without the use of TPA,
demonstrating that under certain circumstances, TPA may be unnecessary for
expeditious legislative action.
The Role of Congress
If the success of TPA were to be measured simply by the number of trade
agreements that have been approved and implemented under its authority, then it may
24 See: Article 1, section 7, of the U.S. Constitution, which requires that all bills for raising
revenue originate in the House.
25 See: U.S. Congress. 103d Congress. 2d Session. House. Uruguay Round Agreements
Act. (H.Rept. 103-826) October 3, 1994. p. 25.

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be argued that TPA has proven its merit. Many Members of Congress, however,
have complained that the TPA process has failed, demonstrating that binding
congressional rules of procedure are not sufficient to guarantee a consensus position
or a cooperative working arrangement on trade.26 Such criticism is largely, but not
exclusively, made along partisan lines.
Complaints point to multiple problems: 1) trade negotiation objectives that do
not include all key concerns of Congress (e.g., enforceable labor standards) and are
open to interpretation by the Executive Branch; 2) an Executive Branch consultation
process, including the COG, denounced as superficial and unresponsive to
congressional input; 3) the passage of widely unpopular FTAs negotiated under TPA
authority; and 4) ineffective procedures for deterring the use of TPA (e.g., the
extension disapproval resolution and repeal of fast track rules) because power is held
closely through partisan control of committee chairs.27 In short, there have already
been calls for rekindling trust between the Administration and Congress, as well as
ensuring greater bipartisan cooperation within Congress.
Trade Policy Issues
Many specific trade issues are likely to emerge in the course of congressional
debate over TPA renewal. Given congressional debates over recent trade
agreements, three issues stand out: labor standards; trade remedy laws; and the
temporary entry of service providers or “mode-4.”

Labor Standards. Perhaps the single most contentious specific trade issue
in TPA renewal, particularly in the House, is the treatment of labor standards. They
have been included as negotiating objectives in fast-track/TPA authority since the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The partisan differences were
evident in two competing bills offered during the 2001-2002 debate, and they are still
reflected today.28 H.R. 3009, introduced by House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Thomas, was eventually enacted as the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2002. It established principal negotiating objectives for labor
standards that include the following: to ensure that a party does not fail to effectively
enforce its own labor laws; to recognize that parties retain the right to exercise
discretion in the allocation of enforcement resources for those laws; to strengthen the
capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards; and to
ensure that labor protections do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against
U.S. exports or serve as disguised trade barriers.
H.R. 3019, as introduced by House Ways and Means Committee Ranking
Member Rangel, would have gone further, requiring that each country’s labor laws
include ILO core labor standards that would be enforceable with sanctions, as are
26 Yerkey, Gary G. Renewal of TPA Seen as Highly Unlikely Next Year, Particularly if
Democrats Triumph. International Trade Reporter. October 26, 2006. p. 1528.
27 Reuters. Bush’s Trade Authority Renewal: Dead on Arrival? October 19, 2006 and
Vaughn, Martin, What If: Trade. The Congressional Daily. October 17, 2006.
28 House and Senate Democrats Urge USTR to Renegotiate Labor Provisions in Peru FTA.
International Trade Daily. November 22, 2006.

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commercial disputes, under a trade agreement. The possible use of sanctions to
enforce a trade agreement party’s adherence to mandatory labor standards has been
the core difference to be resolved. Some Members contend that labor standards are
an important human rights consideration and also a policy to ensure that U.S. workers
do not have to compete against low cost products made by mistreated workers.
Others view labor standards as an issue that can be misused for protectionist purposes
and, in any case, should be covered in fora other than trade agreements.
Trade Remedy Laws. Another principal negotiating objective in the 2002
TPA that is of considerable interest to Congress requires trade agreements:
... to preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws,
including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and avoid
agreements that lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines
on unfair trade ...
A rather strong bipartisan consensus supports this principle. It can be understood by
the institutional predilection Congress has toward safeguarding the interests of
constituents.29 Despite such a clear congressional message, the Bush Administration
included a discussion of trade remedy laws in the Doha Development Agenda,
arguing that it was necessary in order to get developing countries to launch the
negotiations. Many Members of Congress criticized this step. Individual U.S.
trading partners have also demanded that trade remedy laws be part of U.S. FTA
negotiations, most recently with South Korea.
Temporary Entry of Service Providers (“Mode 4”). The temporary
movement of service providers (to the home country of the buyer of the services),
known in the WTO as “mode-4,” has been a contentious issue in various trade
negotiations. It has been a major issue in the Doha Development Agenda
negotiations on services. Several developing countries, especially India, have
criticized the United States for not providing greater latitude in the temporary
movement of professional services providers to the United States.

Mode-4 is also an issue of congressional jurisdiction. In July 2003, during
congressional consideration of the implementing bills for the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-
Singapore free trade agreements, some Members of the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees objected to the inclusion of changes in U.S. visa policies to allow
increases in the quotas of workers entering the United States. They argued that
changes in visa rules must be separate from trade legislation that is considered by
Congress under expedited (fast-track) procedures. Compromises were reached to
allow the two bills to be voted on, but not without bipartisan warnings from both
Committees that changes in visa policy should no longer be part of bilateral or
multilateral trade agreements.30
29 Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976, pp. 56-58.
30 For more information on immigration issues and trade agreements, see CRS Report
RL32982, Immigration Issues in Trade Agreements, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.

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Options for Congress
As the expiration date for the current TPA approaches, Congress may be
considering a number of options; four that span the spectrum are discussed below.
Allow TPA to Expire
Should Congress not agree to extend or renew TPA, it may allow the authority
to expire. Many sector-specific and other narrowly targeted agreements have been
concluded in the past without TPA. Negotiations have also been launched prior to
having TPA authority in place, suggesting that the conduct of U.S. trade negotiations
can continue in some form without TPA. Others assert, however, that the absence
of TPA may seriously constrain some U.S. trade negotiations, particularly those
involving reciprocal bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements. Trading
partners may be reluctant to negotiate with the United States without TPA given that
an agreement would be subject to ordinary legislative procedures and amendment by
Congress. Therefore, one issue that Congress faces is whether there are compelling
agreements outstanding that may warrant consideration of TPA extension or renewal.
Extend TPA Temporarily
Under this option Congress would extend the current TPA with few if any
revisions long enough to allow the United States to complete specific negotiations.
This approach might be favored by those who are reluctant to renew the authority but
do not want to hinder the completion of any agreements that they view potentially
beneficial to the United States. This option was adopted in 1993 when the
negotiating authority was due to expire before the completion of the Uruguay Round
agreements. Congress extended the authority for 10 months and only for the Uruguay
Round negotiations.31 A possible consequence of this approach might be the adverse
impact on negotiations that are not covered by the temporary TPA extension, with
trading partners interpreting the move as lack of U.S. support for those negotiations.
Renew TPA Authority
Under this option, Congress could grant the President new authority with or
without major changes in its structure, and without restricting it to specific agreement
negotiations. This approach would give more time to complete pending trade
negotiations and allow for the opportunity to launch new negotiations. In so doing,
this option would provide the President with the flexibility to implement a complex
trade negotiating agenda. This approach would imply, however, that a political
consensus exists among most Members of Congress and between Congress and the
President on trade objectives and strategy.
31 Some have argued that the circumstances at that time were different from what they are
now because the trade authority had more support in Congress.

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Grant Permanent TPA Authority
Some trade policy experts have suggested that Congress grant the President a
form of permanent fast-track/TPA.32 The proponents of this option envision a two-
tier procedure: (1) Congress would enact into law permanent fast track procedures;
and (2) before specific negotiations can begin, both Houses of Congress would have
to pass a resolution approving the negotiations and objectives designed for the
specific set of negotiations.
Supporters argue that the permanent authority would signal to trading partners
that the United States is committed to trade liberalization over the long term. The
prior approval procedure for specific negotiations would avoid the concern of some
Members of Congress of giving the President a “blank check” to negotiate FTAs with
any country he chooses. One criticism of this approach is that Congress might not
be willing to give “permanent” authority even with the required pre-approval process.
Prospects for TPA Renewal
When the 110th Congress convenes in January 2007, one issue that it will face
early is the expiration of TPA. Congress has multiple options including: no action,
temporary and/or limited extension, multi-year renewal, permanent authority, or
some hybrid solution. The TPA decision will have significant implications for the
shape and conduct of U.S. trade policy in the near term, as well as how the
congressional-executive relationship may be redefined for the rest of the Bush
Administration. The outlook is far from clear, however, given the controversy that
surrounds TPA and the numerous factors that may influence Congress’s decision of
how or even whether to act.
First, for TPA support to grow, at a minimum, there must be a clear and
compelling trade agenda. The fate of both the Doha round and major bilateral trade
negotiations such as those with South Korea, Malaysia, and Panama, will be key
indicators. If they are not concluded by the time TPA expires, Congress could extend
a limited TPA if there is some promise that they can be concluded in the near term.
In the absence of such promise, congressional interest in TPA extension may
dissipate.
Second, the political will to find a compromise over TPA extension would have
to emerge. President Bush faces the decision of whether trade is of sufficient
importance for the final two years of his term to request, lobby, and make the
necessary tradeoffs to obtain TPA extension or renewal. In the past, this has included
consideration of trade adjustment assistance (TAA) programs and may be expanded
to non-trade issues such as health care, among others. Stakeholders in favor of TPA
would also have to be involved, including big business, agriculture exporters, and
consumers. They likely face a formidable challenge from those who have opposed
32 See for example, Destler, I. M. Renewing Fast-Track Legislation. Institute for
International Economics. Washington. September 1997. pp. 41-43, and Mastel, Greg and
Hal Shapiro. Fast Track Forever? The International Economy. Summer 2006. pp. 54-55.

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TPA, including labor unions, environmental groups, import-sensitive industries, and
non-exporting agriculture producers. TPA may also become tied up in other
legislative issues and tradeoffs, such as the extension of the Farm Bill, which could
further complicate renewal efforts. Congress faces the determination of whether
there is a solution that can garner sufficiently broad support.
Third, the many new members and leadership positions in the 110th Congress
indicates that a true bipartisan approach to TPA would be required if there is to be
sufficient support for its extension, much less renewal. This is a factor that only
Congress can decide and it is not yet clear how this will play out.

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Appendix B: A Short Guide to the Expedited
Legislative Procedures for Passage of Trade
Implementing Bills Under TPA33
I.
Before the formal TPA expedited procedures come into play, the House Ways
and Means and Senate Finance Committees typically hold “mock markups” on
informal drafts of the implementing legislation, voting to approve or
disapprove. The vote and any amendments to the draft legislation, however, are
non-binding on the Administration. These hearings provide the last opportunity
to make recommendations to the Administration before it sends final
implementing legislation to Congress, initiating the expedited rules procedures.
II.
The President sends a final legal draft text of the trade agreement and a draft
implementing bill (with supporting materials) to Congress. Identical bills are
subject to mandatory introduction in each House of Congress the day received.
The bills may, or may not, reflect some or all of any non-binding amendments
passed by committees in the mock markup.
III. The bills are jointly referred to the “appropriate committees”: House Ways and
Means, Senate Finance, and others if jurisdiction warrants.34
IV. Each committee has 45 legislative (in session) days to report the bill or it is
automatically discharged and placed on the appropriate calendar.35 Under the
U.S. Constitution, as a revenue bill, the Senate must pass the House bill, in
which case to report the bill, the Senate Finance Committee would have the
longer of either 45 legislative days from the time the bill was introduced in the
Senate, or 15 days from the time the bill was sent over from the House.36
V.
Each house has 15 days to complete floor action from the time the committees
report, after which any member may request a vote. The implementing bill is
privileged so:
33 Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) and section 151 of the Trade Act of
1974, as amended. A detailed summary, including committee consideration and floor
procedures, may be found in CRS Report RL32011, Trade Agreements: Procedure for
Congressional Approval and Implementation, by Vladimir N. Pregelj.
34 For example, the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement implementing bill contained a
provision affecting immigration law, requiring the bill to be referred to the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees.
35 Cumulatively, the whole process can take as long as 90 legislative days, potentially lasting
many months.
36 In fact, the Senate can and has acted before the House. In the case of the Chile FTA
implementing bill, the Senate Finance Committee reported out first. When the House bill
came over, it was held at the desk and put on the Senate calendar directly, given it was
identical to the Senate version. For the CAFTA-DR bill, the whole Senate actually voted
first, necessitating a second (procedural) vote to substitute the language of the later-passed
House bill for the Senate-passed bill.

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CRS-23
! consideration is limited to 20 hours of debate evenly divided
between those for and against, and
! it cannot be amended, and a motion to suspend the no-amendment
rule or request to suspend it by unanimous consent, is not in order.
VI. A bill passes by simple majority. Because the House and Senate bills are
identical, no conference is needed so the final votes clear the measure to be
presented to the President. Once the implementing bill is signed, under its
terms, the agreement enters into force for the United States by Presidential
proclamation.

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