Order Code RL33561
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side
Comparison of Current Legislation
Updated November 22, 2006
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Jill Marie Parillo
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side
Comparison of Current Legislation
Summary
In March 2006, the Bush Administration proposed legislation to create an
exception for India from certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate a
future nuclear cooperation agreement. After hearings in April and May, the House
International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
considered bills in late June 2006 to provide an exception for India to certain
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act related to a peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement. On July 26, 2006, the House passed its version of the legislation, H.R.
5682, by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate incorporated the
text of S. 3709, as amended, into H.R. 5682 and passed that bill by a vote of 85 to 12.
The Senate insisted on its amendment, and a conference committee will likely be
selected during the week of December 4, 2006.
The Senate and House versions of the India bill contain similar provisions, with
four major differences. The Senate version contains an additional requirement for
the President to execute his waiver authority, an amendment introduced by Senator
Harkin and adopted by unanimous consent that the President determine that India is
“fully and actively participating in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction
and contain Iran for its nuclear program.” The Senate version also has two unique
sections related to the cooperation agreement, Sections 106 and 107. Section 106
prohibits exports of equipment, material or technology related for uranium
enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing or heavy water production unless conducted in
a multinational facility participating in a project approved by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or in a facility participating in a bilateral or
multilateral project to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. Section 107 would
establish a program to monitor that U.S. technology is being used appropriately by
Indian recipients. Finally, the Senate version also contains the implementing
legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol in Title II. Minor differences in
reporting requirements and statements of policy are compared in Table I of this
report.
This report provides a thematic side-by-side comparison of the provisions of the
two bills, H.R. 5682 as passed by the House and H.R. 5682 as passed by the Senate,
and compares them with the Administration’s initially proposed legislation, H.R.
4974/S. 2429. The report concludes with a list of CRS resources that provide further
discussion and more detailed analysis of the issues addressed by the legislation
summarized in the table. This reported will be updated as necessary.

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Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
H.R. 5682 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Committee Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Floor Debate and Votes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
S. 3709/H.R. 5682 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Committee Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Floor Debate and Votes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Additional Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
List of Tables
Table 1: Comparison of Current Legislation on Waivers for U.S.-India
Nuclear Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-
Side Comparison of Current Legislation
Overview
In July 2005, President Bush announced his intention to conclude a peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement with India. India, which is not a party to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered under U.S. law to be a non-nuclear
weapon state, yet has tested nuclear weapons and has an ongoing nuclear weapons
program. For these reasons, the President would need to make certain waivers and
determinations pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) before nuclear cooperation
with a state such as India could proceed.
The Administration proposed legislation (introduced as H.R. 4974/ S. 2429) in
March 2006 that, in addition to providing waivers of relevant provisions of the AEA
(Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129), would have allowed a nuclear cooperation
agreement with India to enter into force without a vote from Congress, as though it
conformed to AEA requirements. In late June, the House International Relations
Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported their versions of
legislation (H.R. 5682 and S. 3709), both of which provide the requisite waivers,
retain the requirement for a joint resolution of Congress for such an agreement to
enter into force, and contain some restrictions. On July 26, 2006, the House passed
H.R. 5682 by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate passed H.R.
5682 by a vote of 85 to12, substituting the text of S. 3709 as an engrossed
amendment; the Senate insisted on its amendment, necessitating a conference to
resolve differences between the bills. Neither chamber has voted on conferees, but
this will likely occur the week of December 4, 2006. Given the bill’s apparent high
priority for the Bush Administration, there will likely be significant pressure to
complete the process in this Congress.

H.R. 5682
Committee Actions. The House International Relations Committee met on
June 27, 2006 to consider H.R. 5682, “United States and India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act of 2006,” introduced on June 26 by Representative Hyde.1 The
Committee voted to adopt 6 of 12 amendments (one was withdrawn):
1 The National Journal and Congressional Quarterly wrote reports of the HIRC mark-up,
available at [http://nationaljournal.com/members/markups/2006/06/mr_20060627_5.htm]
and [http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/committees/
109/committe e s 1 0 9 -2 0 0 6 0 6 2 7 0 0 2 2 8 0 5 5 . h t ml @ commi t t ees&met apub=CQ-
COMMITTEEMARKUPS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=1].

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CRS-2
! Representative Royce offered an amendment to ensure that nothing
in the Act shall be interpreted as permitting any civil nuclear
cooperation with India that would in any way assist, encourage, or
induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
(Section 4 (d) (1));
! Representative Sherman offered an amendment to strengthen one of
the determinations the President must make to implement the
waivers pertaining to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
stipulating that the required NSG decision would not permit nuclear
commerce with any other non-nuclear weapon state that does not
have full-scope International Atomic Energy Act (IAEA) safeguards
(Section 4 (b) (7)).
! Representative Schiff offered an amendment with three components:
to add a provision to U.S. policy with respect to South Asia (Section
3 (b)(7)) encouraging India not to increase its production of fissile
material at military facilities pending a multilateral moratorium on
production of such material for nuclear weapons; to add a reporting
requirement for the Presidential submission to implement the
waivers (Section 4 (c) (2) (I)) on steps taken to ensure the U.S.
transfers will not be replicated by India or used in its military
facilities and that U.S. nuclear fuel supply does not facilitate military
production of high-enriched uranium or plutonium; and to add a
reporting requirement for an annual report on the same (Section 4 (o)
(2) (C)).
! Representative Crowley offered an amendment to add a requirement
(Section 4 (o)(3)) for an annual report on new Indian nuclear
facilities.
! Representative Berkley offered two amendments related to India’s
spent fuel disposal: an annual report describing the disposal of spent
nuclear fuel from India’s civil nuclear program (Section 4 (o) (4), and
a statement of policy that any spent civilian nuclear fuel in India that
might be stored in the United States is considered by Congress under
existing procedures of the Atomic Energy Act (Section 3 (b) (7)).
An amendment by Ms. Berkley to prohibit any Indian spent fuel from being
stored in the United States was rejected by a vote of 15-19. The Committee also
voted down four other amendments, including two by Representative Berman
designed to place limits on U.S. cooperation until India halts production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons. The first Berman amendment, rejected by a vote of 13-
32, sought to condition the President’s use of waiver authority (by adding a new
determination by the President in Section 4 (b) of the bill) on India’s adherence to a
unilateral or multilateral moratorium or a multilateral treaty prohibiting the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The second amendment, rejected
by a vote of 12-31, sought to restrict transfers of U.S. nuclear material under a
cooperation agreement until such time that India halted fissile material production
for weapons, either by adhering to a unilateral or multilateral moratorium, or a
multilateral treaty. The Committee also rejected by a vote of 10-32 an amendment
by Representative Sherman to condition the President’s use of waiver authority on
an additional determination, under Section 4 (b) of H.R. 5682, that India’s nuclear
weapons program was not using more domestic uranium than it had before July 2005.

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CRS-3
The amendment would have attached an annual certification that required termination
of nuclear cooperation if the certification could not be made. Finally, the Committee
rejected, by a vote of 4-37, an amendment by Representative Lee that would have
required India to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) before the President
could exercise his waiver authority.
The Committee on Rules held a hearing on July 25th to consider amendments
to H.R. 5682 and procedures for handling the bill on the floor. H. Res 947 waived
all points of order against the bill, specified the allowed amendments and limited
floor debate to one hour. The following six amendments were allowed to be offered
on the floor:2
! Representatives Hyde (IL)/Lantos (CA): Manager’s amendment,
containing technical and conforming changes to the text, as well as
one substantive change: removing an amendment proposed by
Representative Sherman and adopted during the full committee
markup relating to subsection 4(b)(7).
! Representative Stearns (FL): Reinforces the intent of Congress that
the nuclear cooperation into which the governments of the United
States and India would enter is for peaceful, productive purposes,
not military.
! Representatives Jackson-Lee (TX)/Burton (IN): Sense of Congress
declaring the importance of the South Asia region and urging the
continuation of the United States’ policy of engagement,
collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan.
! Representative Sherman (CA): Requires that, before any nuclear
cooperation with India can go forward, and every year thereafter, the
President must certify that during the preceding year India has not
increased the level of domestic uranium it sends through its weapons
program. Baseline for the determination under the amendment is the
365 day period preceding the July 18, 2005, Bush-Singh declaration
on nuclear cooperation.
! Representative Berman (CA): Restricts exports of uranium and other
types of nuclear reactor fuel (defined as ‘source material’ and
‘special nuclear material’ in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) to
India until the President determines that India has halted the
production of fissile material (i.e., plutonium and highly enriched
uranium) for use in nuclear weapons.
! Representative Fortenberry (NE): Provides Congress with the ability
to assess, to the extent possible, whether annual levels of India’s
nuclear fissile production may imply a possible violation of Article
I of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
2 See description in H.Rept. 109-599, “Providing for Consideration of H.R. 5682, United
States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006,” Congressional Record, July
25, 2006, p. H5820.

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CRS-4
Three amendments were not allowed for consideration on the floor.3 These
were:
! An amendment by Representative Woolsey that would have
prohibited the export of any nuclear-related item to India until the
President has implemented and observed all NPT obligations and
commitments of the United States and has revised United States’
policies relating to nuclear weapons accordingly;
! An amendment by Representative Barbara Lee that would have
required India to place all electricity-producing reactors under
safeguards, undertake a binding obligation not to transfer any
nuclear-weapon-related information or technology (per Article I of
the NPT) and take concrete steps toward disarmament;
! An amendment by Representatives Markey and Upton that would
have prohibited nuclear cooperation with India from commencing
until the President has determined that the United States has secured
India’s full and active support in preventing Iran from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction.
Floor Debate and Votes. The House first considered H. Res 947, which,
after several objections to limits on time and the exclusion of certain amendments by
Representative Markey and others, passed by a vote of 311 to 112. Of the six
amendments considered, three passed by voice vote (the Managers’ amendment,
Representatives Jackson-Lee/Burton’s amendment, and Representative Fortenberry’s
amendment); Representative Stearn’s amendment was recorded as 414-0, and the
amendments offered by Representatives Sherman and Berman were defeated (the
votes, respectively, were 155 to 268, and 184 to 241).
Representative Markey made a motion to recommit the legislation back to the
House International Relations Committee with instructions to include language that
would require that nuclear cooperation with India could only commence after the
president has determined that the United States has secured India’s full support in
preventing Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. That motion to
recommit was defeated in a vote of 192 to 235.
The House passed H.R. 5682, “Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006,” as amended, by 359 to 68.
S. 3709/H.R. 5682
Committee Actions. On June 29, 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee considered original legislation, S. 3709, to create an exception for India
3 A fourth amendment, proposed by Mr. Hyde, would have implemented a Congressional
review process for arms sales and exports under the Arms Export Control Act, but this
amendment was withdrawn.

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CRS-5
from relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (See S.Rept. 109-288).4 The
Committee voted to adopt 2 of 3 amendments:
! Senator Chafee offered an amendment making it U.S. policy to
ensure that exports of nuclear fuel to India did not encourage India
to increase its production of fissile material (Section 103 (9));
! Senator Obama offered an amendment to ensure that the United
States did not encourage other states to continue nuclear exports to
India, if the United States exports to India terminated under U.S. law
(Section 102 (6)).
The Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Feingold requiring an additional
presidential determination in Section 105 of the bill by a vote of 5-13. The Feingold
amendment would have conditioned the President’s use of waiver authority on a
determination that U.S. civil nuclear assistance to India would in no way assist,
encourage, or induce India to manufacture nuclear weapons or nuclear devices. The
amendment was identical in text to the Schiff amendment to H.R. 5682, but sought
instead to require a determination rather than a report.
Floor Debate and Votes. An initial attempt to bring S. 3709 to the Senate
floor in September failed to gain unanimous consent agreement. Among several
issues, two apparently delayed the bill — language in Title II pertaining to
implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol, and potential concern
about whether the United States would accept U.S.-origin spent fuel back from
Indian reactors. In the first case, concerns appeared to be mostly resolved by
incorporating language into a manager’s amendment, with the exception of two
issues raised by Senator Ensign in two amendments he introduced on the floor on
November 16th that did not pass. These are described in more detail below. In the
second case, the concern about disposition of Indian spent fuel was dropped prior to
the bill’s reaching the floor.
On November 15, 2006, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to consider
S. 3709, at a time to be determined by the Majority Leader, in consultation with the
Democratic Leader.5 The unanimous consent agreement specified that a managers’
amendment would serve as the original text for the purpose of further amendment;
and that the only other amendments to be considered would include the following:
Senators Ensign (considered in closed session), Reed, Levin, Obama, Dorgan (two
amendments), Feingold, Boxer, Feinstein, Harkin, Bingaman (up to seven
amendments), Kennedy, and Dodd. Of these, Senators Reed, Levin, Kennedy, and
Dodd did not introduce amendments, and Senator Bingaman introduced three, rather
than seven. All but Senator Feingold’s amendment were considered to be relevant
second-degree amendments and related to the subject matter of the bill. Further, the
4 Details on the mark-up are available at Congressional Quarterly,
[http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/committees/109/c
o m m i t t e e s 1 0 9 - 2 0 0 6 0 6 2 9 0 0 2 2 8 0 9 0 . h t m l @ c o m m i t t e e s & m e t a p u b = C Q -
COMMITTEEMARKUPS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=1] for report of the mark-up.
5 Congressional Record, November 15, 2006, p. S. 10941-42, daily edition.

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CRS-6
unanimous consent agreement provided that once the bill was read a third time, the
Senate would begin consideration of H.R. 5682, the House-passed companion,
striking all text after the enacting clause and inserting the amended text of S. 3709
in its place.
Senator Lugar introduced the bill and offered a section-by-section analysis.6
The following amendments, in brief, were passed either by unanimous consent or
voice vote without debate:
! Senator Lugar introduced a manager’s amendment, which contained
new language in Title II related to the Additional Protocol (S.A.
5168; unanimous consent);
! Senator Obama introduced an amendment containing a statement of
U.S. policy (which became Section 114) that any nuclear power
reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in
safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with
reasonable reactor operating requirements (S.A. 5169; voice vote);7
! Senator Harkin introduced an amendment requiring the President to
determine, before executing his waiver authority, that India was
supporting U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and
contain Iran’s nuclear program (S.A. 5173; unanimous consent);8
! Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment to add a reporting
requirement to Section 108 (b) on the amount of uranium mined in
India during the previous year; the amount of such uranium that has
likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive
devices; and the rate of production in India of fissile material for
nuclear explosive devices and of nuclear explosive devices as well
as an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate
of production in India of nuclear explosive devices (S.A. 5179;
unanimous consent);9
! Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment to add a new Section
in Title I (which became Section 115) requiring the Secretary of
Energy to create a Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with India
(S.A. 5180; unanimous consent).
Senator Lugar’s amendment, S.A. 5168 contained minor changes in Title I of
S. 3709 as reported out of Committee. One potentially significant change was the
deletion of a Sense of Congress on licensing policy in Section 106. In Title II,
however, which contains the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional
6 See Senator Lugar’s opening statement in the Congressional Record, November 16, 2006,
S10982-84, daily edition.
7 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11021, daily edition, for the colloquy
between Senator Obama and the managers of the bill on the subject of limiting nuclear fuel
reserves to provide a disincentive for India to conduct future nuclear tests.
8 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10996, daily edition, for Senator
Harkin’s description of the amendment.
9 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S. 11003, daily edition for the text of
Senator Bingaman’s amendments, S.A. 5179 and 5180.

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CRS-7
Protocol,10 significant provisions were added. These included Section 202 on
findings, Section 251 (3), and Sections 254, 261, 262 and 271-275. In his opening
statement, Senator Lugar reported that “a compromise was reached between the
Administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and those Senators who
expressed concern about the IAEA Additional Protocol implementing legislation.”11
These additional provisions appear to make explicit existing U.S. rights to exclude
inspectors and certain kinds of inspection activities under the Additional Protocol.
Several of the modifications address the use of environmental sampling, both for
specific locations and for detecting anomalies in a wide-area mode.

Other amendments were introduced, debated, and defeated. These included the
following:
! Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment requiring a Presidential
determination that the United States and India are taking specific
steps to conclude a multilateral treaty on the cessation of fissile
material for weapons before U.S. nuclear equipment or technology
could be exported under the future agreement for cooperation and
that no nuclear materials may be exported to India unless the
President has determined that India has stopped producing fissile
materials for weapons (S.A. 5174; Vote 26-74);12
! Senator Dorgan introduced an amendment to add a declaration of
U.S. policy to continue to support implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1172 (S.A. 5178; Vote 27-71);13
! Senator Ensign introduced an amendment to Title II of the bill
related to the Additional Protocol that would have required any
inspection equipment, materials and resources to have been
purchased, owned, inspected, and controlled by the United States
(S.A. 5181; Vote 27-71);14
! Senator Dorgan introduced an amendment that would have required
the President to determine, before executing his waiver authority,
that India has committed to putting all electricity-producing nuclear
reactors under safeguards, has undertaken an obligation not to
proliferate nuclear weapons technology, has joined a legally-binding
nuclear test moratorium; is verifiably reducing its nuclear weapons
10 The Additional Protocol is a protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements under the Nuclear
Nonproliferaton Treaty (NPT) which enhances the IAEA’s inspection rights, methods, and
information. The model agreement is INFCIRC/540. Nuclear weapon states have modified
the model to include provisions for national security exclusions, because of their weapons
status. The United States signed its additional protocol in 1998, and the Senate gave its
consent for ratification in 2004, but the additional protocol requires implementing
legislation to enter into force. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out such
implementing legislation, S. 2489, in April 2006.
11 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S10984, daily edition.
12 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S. 10998-11001, daily edition, for Senator
Bingaman’s explanation of his amendments and responses by Senators Lugar and Biden..
13 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11001, daily edition.
14 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11009, daily edition, for text of Ensign
amendment. The debate was held in closed session.

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CRS-8
stockpile, and has undertaken an obligation to agree to ultimate
disarmament (S.A. 5182; voice vote);15
! Senator Feingold introduced an amendment that would have
required the President to determine, before executing his waiver
authority, that the scope and content of the cooperation agreement
would not allow India to use U.S. technology, equipment or material
in unsafe guarded facilities, would not result in India replicating U.S.
technology nuclear fuel and would not facilitate the increased
production by India of fissile material in unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities (S.A. 5183; Vote 25-71);16
! Senator Boxer introduced an amendment that would have required
the President to determine, before he could execute his waiver
authority, that India had halted military-to-military contacts with Iran
(S.A. 5187; Vote 38-59).17
Most of these amendments were characterized by Senators Lugar and Biden as
“killer amendments.” Senator Bingaman described his amendment as implementing
a proposal by former Senator Nunn.18 Senator Dorgan’s amendment supporting U.S.
implementation of U.N. Security Council 1172 sought to reaffirm U.S. support for
the steps endorsed by the U.N. Security Council following the 1998 Indian and
Pakistani nuclear tests, including limits on those nuclear programs such as a ban on
deployments, and fissile material production for weapons, as well as a commitment
on all states’ parts not to sell nuclear technology to India and Pakistan. Senator
Dorgan’s other amendment, S.A. 5182, was similar to Representative Barbara Lee’s
amendment to the House bill that was rejected by the House Rules Committee. That
amendment attempted to commit India to undertake the same obligations as other
nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Senator Feingold’s amendment was similar
to the one he introduced in Committee that was rejected. Although modified to
address objections voiced in the mark-up, the amendment was described by Senator
Lugar on the floor as requiring a certification that would have been “impossible to
make.”19 Senator Ensign’s amendment was debated in closed session, apparently
because of the potential need to discuss classified information relating to the
protection of national security information during IAEA inspections under an
Additional Protocol in the United States.
15 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11006, daily edition, for Senator
Dorgan’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
16 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11011-15, daily edition, for Senator
Feingold’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
17 See Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11016-11019, daily edition, for Senator
Boxer’s introduction of the amendment and debate.
18 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S109998-11000, daily edition.
19 Congressional Record, November 16, 2006, S11014, daily edition.

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CRS-9
Table 1: Comparison of Current Legislation on Waivers for U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Waiver authority Provides authority for
Section 1 (a):
Section 4 (a):
Section 104 (a):
President to waive
President may waive
Same as H.R. 4974.
Same as H.R. 4974.
Atomic Energy Act
sections of AEA (see

(AEA) requirements.
below) if he makes a
determination.
Section 123 a.
Full-scope safeguards.
Section 1 (a) (1):
Section 4 (a) (1):
Section 104 (a) (1): Equivalent
(2) of Atomic
Waived AND the
Waived BUT entry
to H.R. 5682. See Section 104
Energy Act
future cooperation
into force requires
(b).
(AEA)
agreement enters into Joint Resolution of
force as though it met Approval as all other
all Section 123 a.
exempted agreements
requirements (does
(See also Section 4
not require a Joint
(e)).
Resolution of
Approval).
Section 128 of
Annual review by
Section 1 (a) (2):
Section 4 (a) (2):
Section 104 (a) (2):
AEA
Congress of export
Application of
Waiver ends if India
Section 128 waived without
license for an agreement Section 128 waived
engages in any Section conditions.
exempted from full-
without conditions.
129 actions (see
scope safeguards
description below for
requirement.
Section 129), except
for its ongoing
weapons program [129
a. (1) (D)] and future
reprocessing transfers
to a non-nuclear
weapon state [129 a.
(2) (C)].

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CRS-10
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Section 129 of
a. Terminate U.S.
Section 1 (a) (3):
Section 4 (a) (3):
Section 104 (a) (3):
AEA
nuclear exports if
“Sanctions” under
Waiver of Section 129 Equivalent to H.R. 5682 but
President determines
Section 129 waived.
limited to: Indian
worded differently. The
that a (1) non-nuclear
nuclear tests before
language specifies waiver for
weapon state:
2005 [Section 129 a.
sanctions under Section 129 a.
(A) Has tested a nuclear
(1) (A)] and ongoing
(1) (D), but covers the 1998
device
nuclear weapons
Indian nuclear test by waiving
(B) terminates or
activities [Section 129 any Section 129 sanctions
abrogates IAEA
a. (1) (D)].
regarding any actions that
safeguards
occurred before July 18, 2005.
(C) materially violates
(There has only been one
IAEA safeguards
Presidential determination for
(D) Has ongoing nuclear
India prior to 2005 that is
weapons program
relevant to Section 129 — for
OR if President
the Indian nuclear test in
determines (2) any state
1998).

(A) materially violates a
cooperation agreement
(B) assists non-nuclear
weapon state in nw-
related activities
(C) Has agreement or
transfers reprocessing
material, technology, or
equipment to a non-
nuclear weapon state.

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CRS-11
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Determination
Establishes threshold for Section 1b:
Section 4 (b):
Section 105:
President to use waiver
President must make
Same requirements
Same requirements with minor
authority.
1 determination that 7 with minor changes
changes that strengthen
actions have occurred that strengthen
measures. Specifies
(see below).
measures. Specifies
safeguards in perpetuity.
safeguards in
perpetuity.
Separation plan
Identification of Indian
(1) India has provided Section 4 (b) (1):
Section 105 (1) and (2) Same
civilian nuclear facilities to US and IAEA a
Same language as
language as H.R. 4974 but
to US and IAEA.
credible plan to
H.R. 4974.
separates the declaration
separate civil and
provision into Section 105 (2).
military facilities,
materials, and
programs, and has
filed a declaration
regarding its civil
facilities with the
IAEA.
Safeguards plan
India committed to
(2) Entry into force of Section 4 (b) (2):
Section 105 (3)
placing additional
safeguards agreement Specifies safeguards in Specifies safeguards in
civilian nuclear facilities in accordance with
perpetuity in
perpetuity in accordance with
under IAEA safeguards
IAEA practices for
accordance with IAEA IAEA standards, principles and
under the July 18, 2005, India’s civil nuclear
standards, principles
practices. Also mentions
Joint Statement.
facilities as declared
and practices. Also
safeguards on materials and
in the plan.
mentions safeguards
programs.
on materials and
programs, including
materials used in or
produced through use
of civil nuclear
facilities.

---

CRS-12
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Additional
An agreement with
(3) Making
Section 4 (b) (3)
Section 105 (4)
Protocol
IAEA to enhance
satisfactory
Specifies “substantial
Specifies “substantial
inspections, access, and
progress toward
progress” consistent
progress.”
declarations relevant to
implementation.
with IAEA principles,
safeguards.
practices and policies.
FMCT
Future negotiations to
(4) Working with the
Section 4 (b) (4)
Section 105 (5)
(Fissile Material
end production of fissile United States for
Specifies working
Equivalent to H.R. 4974.
Production
material for nuclear
conclusion of a
“actively” for the
Cutoff Treaty)
weapons.
multilateral FMCT.
“early” conclusion.
Halting
July 18, 2005,
(5) Supporting
Section 4 (b) (5)
Section 105 (6)
enrichment/
commitment by India to
international efforts
Specifies “working
Specifies preventing spread “to
reprocessing
support U.S. policy to
to prevent the spread
with and supporting
any state that does not already
transfers
restrict access to
of enrichment and
US and international
possess full-scale, functioning
enrichment and
reprocessing
efforts.”
enrichment and reprocessing
reprocessing.
technology.
plants.”
Export controls
July 18, 2005
(6) Ensuring that
Section 4 (b) (6)
Section 105 (7)
commitment by India to
necessary steps
Specifies enactment
Specifies effective enforcement
strengthen export
are taken to secure
and enforcement of
actions.
controls and adhere to
nuclear materials and export control laws;
international norms,
technology through
specifies
including Missile
comprehensive
harmonization of laws,
Technology Control
export control
regulations, policies
Regime (MTCR) and
legislation and
and practices with the
Nuclear Suppliers Group regulations; and
policies and practices
(NSG) guidelines.
harmonization and
of MTCR and NSG.
adherence to MTCR
and NSG guidelines.

---

CRS-13
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Nuclear
NSG guidelines
(7) Supply to India is
Section 4 (b) (7)
Section 105 (9)
Suppliers Group
currently prohibit
consistent with US
Specifies NSG
Specifies NSG consensus
(NSG)
nuclear transfers to
participation in NSG. consensus decision.
decision that does not permit
India; a decision must be This assumes that the
an exception for another non-
taken to allow
NSG will agree to an
nuclear weapon state.
cooperation. NSG
exception for exports
operates by consensus.
to India.
Iran
Ensure that India is
NONE
NONE
Section 105 (8)
supporting U.S. and
But see Section 3 (b)
Requires India’s full & active
international efforts to
(4) statement of policy participation in U.S. and
dissuade, sanction, and
on India’s support for
international efforts to
contain Iran’s nuclear
U.S. efforts vis-a-vis
dissuade, sanction, and contain
program
Iran.
Iran for its nuclear program
consistent with U.N. Security
Council resolutions

---

CRS-14
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Report on
Notify Congress that 7
Section 1 c.
Section 4 (c) (2):
Section 105:
Determination
actions have occurred to Report to HIRC,
Provides details about
Determination must be made in
allow waiver.
SFRC that 7 actions
what reports to HIRC, writing to appropriate
have occurred,
SFRC should contain,
Committees.
including basis for
specifically on the 7
determination.
actions. Also, two
Similar reports are required in
other reports are
Section 108 (a) (1), but are not
required for the
tied to President’s
determination: a
determination.
description of the
scope of the 123
agreement with the US
and the steps taken to
ensure that U.S.
assistance will not aid
India’s nuclear
weapons program
(Schiff amendment).

---

CRS-15
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Termination
Establish a threshold for Section 1d.
Section 4 (a) (3):
Section 104 (a) (3): All
halting U.S. exports to
All waiver authorities All termination
termination provisions of
India (now contained in
(for Section 123 a.
provisions of Section
Section 129 of the AEA
Section 129 of the AEA
(2), Section 128, and
129 of the AEA
(except 129 a.(1) (D)) would
and in the proposed
Section 129)
(except 129 a.(1) (D))
be in effect (see description of
peaceful nuclear
terminate if India
would be in effect (see sec.129 waiver above).
cooperation agreement
tests a nuclear
description of sec.129
itself, which is not yet
explosive device.
waiver above).
drafted).
ALSO
No equivalent provision to
Section 4 (d) (3):
H.R. 5682 but Section 108 (b)
Exports would
(3) (A) contains a reporting
terminate if India
reqt if India does not comply
makes a materially
with NSG guidelines and
significant transfer of
Section 108 (b) (4) (A) requires
items in violation of
an annual certification that
NSG guidelines, or of
India is in full compliance with
items in violation of
all July 18, 2005 commitments.
MTCR guidelines.

---

CRS-16
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Sense of
To describe Congress’s
NONE
Section 2
Section 102
Congress
policy objectives with
Notes importance of
Notes that engaging India is in
respect to nuclear
nonproliferation and
the national security interest of
cooperation with India.
NPT and focuses on
the United States, but need to
how the United States
minimize proliferation risk.
could strengthen its
United States should not
nonproliferation policy facilitate trade by other nations
by engaging NPT
if U.S. exports terminated.
outliers like India. Sets
up criteria
(nonproliferation
record, democratic
government, support
for U.S.
nonproliferation aims)
for engagement and
states India meets
criteria.

---

CRS-17
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Statements of
To describe U.S. policy
NONE
Section 3 (a) General
Section 103
Policy (I)
objectives, with respect
(1) Oppose nuclear
Section 103 (8): maintain
to nonproliferation.
weapons development. support for NPT.
(2) Support peaceful
No equivalent
uses of nuclear energy,
but only with full NPT
compliance.
(3) Strengthen NSG
Similar to Section 103 (6) on
implementation,
support for NSG.
including cutoff of
exports for violations.
Statements of
To describe U.S. policy
NONE
Section 3 (b) South
Section 103 (1), but
Policy (II)
objectives, with respect
Asia
moratorium does not include
to South Asia, U.S.-
(1) Fissile material
China.
India bilateral relations,
production
and South Asian
moratorium for India,
proliferation.
Pakistan, China.
(2) FMCT
No equivalent
(3) Other
Section 103 (2), but no
nonproliferation
mention of Convention on
activities, like PSI,
Supplementary Compensation.
Australia Group,
Wassenaar,
Convention on
Supplementary
Compensation.

---

CRS-18
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
(4) Support for U.S.
No equivalent, but language
policies to prevent Iran similar to Section 105 (8)
from acquiring nuclear determination
weapons.
(5) Cap, roll back and
No equivalent
eliminate South Asian
nuclear arsenals.
(6) No spent fuel
No equivalent
transfer without
Congressional
approval.
(7) Encourage cap on
No equivalent provision
production of fissile
material for weapons,
pending moratorium.
Statements of
NONE
No equivalent
Section 103 (3): Full
Policy (III)
provision
compliance with all
nonproliferation obligations.
No equivalent
Section 103 (4): Ensure
provision
reliability of safeguards and
Additional Protocol.
No equivalent
Section 103 (5): Agreement
provision
must meet all other Section
123 a. requirements.
No equivalent
Section 103 (6): Consistency
provision
with NSG guidelines.

---

CRS-19
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
No equivalent
Section 103 (7): Work with
provision
NSG members to restrict
transfers of enrichment and
reprocessing, also to India.
No equivalent
Section 103 (8): Maintain
provision
support for adherence &
compliance with NPT.
No equivalent
Section 103 (9): Exports of
provision
nuclear fuel to India should not
contribute to or encourage
India to increase production of
fissile material for military
uses.
No equivalent
Section 114: Any nuclear
provision
power reactor fuel reserve
provided to India should be
commensurate with reasonable
reactor operating requirements

---

CRS-20
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Expedited
To provide procedures
None, except as
Section 4 (f) and (g):
None, except as provided
procedures
for expedited
provided already in
track with existing law already in Section 130 of AEA.
consideration of Joint
Section 130 of AEA
(Section 130 of AEA).
Resolution of Approval
End-Use
To provide reasonable
NONE
NONE
Section 107 requires following
Monitoring
assurances that the
measures: (1) Obtain and
recipient is complying
implement assurances and
with relevant
conditions regarding end-use
requirements, terms and
monitoring; (2) a detailed
conditions of U.S.
system of reporting on
export licenses.
technology transfers, including
those authorized by Section 57
b of AEA.
(3) Fall-back safeguards,
should IAEA be unable to
implement safeguards in India.

---

CRS-21
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Restrictions on
NONE
Section 4 (d)
cooperation
(1) No assistance that
No equivalent but similar
would aid India’s
concept behind Section 106,
nuclear weapons
Section 103 (9)
program.
(2) No transfers if they Similar to Section 103 (6): to
would violate NSG
act in a manner fully consistent
guidelines.
with NSG guidelines (but this
is only a Statement of Policy).
(4) President should
Section 102 (6): United States
seek to prevent
should not seek to facilitate
cooperation by other
cooperation by other states
states with India if
with India if United States
United States
terminates exports.
terminates exports.
No equivalent
Section 106
provision
Bans cooperation on
enrichment, reprocessing, and
heavy water materials,
equipment, and technology
with exception for multilateral
and bilateral fuel cycle
cooperation, if President
determines that the export will
not improve India’s ability to
produce nuclear weapons.
ability to produce fissile
material for weapons.

---

CRS-22
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Other reporting
NONE
Section 4 (j) (1):
No equivalent provision
annual report on U.S.
policy objectives for
South Asia (i.e., steps
taken by the United
States and India,
extent of success, and
cooperation by other
countries).
Section 4 (j) (2)
Section 108 (b) (6)
Annual report on U.S.
Annual report on estimated
nuclear exports to
amount of uranium mined in
India, including
India during the previous
estimates of Indian
year(A); amount of such
uranium mining, fissile uranium that has likely been
material and nuclear
used or allocated for the
weapons production
production of nuclear
rates; as well as impact explosive devices (B); and the
of imported uranium on rate of production in India of
such rates. Report also fissile material for nuclear
to describe India’s use
explosive devices(C)(I); and of
of any U.S. nuclear
nuclear explosive
equipment, material or
devices(C)(ii)
technology in an

uninspected facility;
Section 108 (b) (7)
replication of anything
Analysis on whether imported
transferred and whether uranium has affected the rate
imported nuclear fuel
of production in India of
has helped to increase
nuclear explosive devices.
fissile material
production for
weapons.

---

CRS-23
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Other reporting,
NONE
Section 4 (j) (3):
Section 108 (b) (2): list of
continued
annual report on new
licenses approved by NRC,
Indian nuclear
DOE, Commerce or any other
facilities.
U.S. authorizations of exports
and reexports of nuclear
materials and equipment.
Section 4 (j) (4):
No equivalent provision
annual report on
India’s spent fuel
disposal.
Section 4 (j) (5):
Section 108 (b) (1): description
annual report on
of additional nuclear
growth in India’s
facilities/materials India places
military fissile
under IAEA safeguards.
material production, to Section 108 (a) (3):
include information on Implementation & Compliance
Indian uranium
Report; Information on
mining, electricity
Nuclear Activities of India;
production, domestic
“significant changes in the
uranium used in
production by India of nuclear
civilian electricity
weapons or in the types or
production, & military amounts of fissile material
fissile material
produced.” See also Section
production, etc.
108 (b) (6).
No equivalent
Section 108 (b) (3): Any
provision
significant nuclear commerce
between India and other
countries that does not comply
with NSG guidelines, or would
not meet standards applied to
U.S.-origin material.

---

CRS-24
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Other
NONE
NONE
Section 108 (b) (4): That India
Presidential
is in full compliance with
certifications
following obligations (listed in
Section 108 (a) (1)): Joint
Statement commitments,
separation plan, safeguards
agreement, Additional
Protocol, 123 agreement,
terms and conditions of
approved export licenses. If
certification is not possible,
report on steps, responses and
implications.
Consultation
NONE
Section 4 (e (2):
No equivalent provision
with Congress
Requires monthly
consultations with
Congress on progress
in 123 agreement
negotiations and IAEA
safeguards agreement
negotiations.
No equivalent
Section 108 (a): keep Congress
provision
fully informed on India’s:
(1) non-compliance
(2) nuclear facility construction
(3) fissile material production
(4) changes in operational
status of nuclear facilities.

---

CRS-25
Issue/Provision
Description/Purpose
H.R. 4974/S. 2429 as H.R. 5682
H.R. 5682 as passed by the
introduced
as passed by House
Senate (with text of S. 3709
as engrossed amendment)
Program for
To further common
NONE
NONE
Section 115
cooperative
nonproliferation goals,
Requires Secretary of Energy
threat reduction
including scientific
to establish a United
research and
States-India Scientific
development efforts
Cooperative Threat Reduction
related to nuclear
Program.
nonproliferation, with
emphasis on nuclear
safeguards
TITLE II
Implementing
NONE
NONE
Entire Title II
Legislation for the U.S.
See. S. 2489 for comparison
Additional Protocol
and S. 3709 as reported out of
committee for differences
between those and the version
voted on by the Senate.

---

CRS-26
Additional Resources
CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress,
by Sharon Squassoni.
CRS Report RL33292, India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views, by
Sharon Squassoni.
CRS Report RL33072, U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements in 2005, by K. Alan
Kronstadt.
CRS Report RS22474, Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons:
Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT) by Sharon Squassoni, Andrew Demkee, and Jill
Marie Parillo.

---