Order Code RS21922
Updated November 2, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution,
and Government
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
In 2004 and 2005, Afghanistan adopted a permanent constitution and elected a
president and a parliament. The parliament is emerging as a significant force in Afghan
politics, as shown in debates to approve cabinet and Supreme Court appointments, and
the 2006 budget. However, the Afghan government’s inability to extend its authority
throughout the country has caused some disillusionment and contributed to renewed
Taliban violence in 2006. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
, by Kenneth Katzman.
Post-Conflict Political Transition
For the first time ever, Afghanistan has a fully elected government, although there
were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in 1969).
Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were
part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored
agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001,
after the Taliban had fled Kabul (“Bonn Agreement”).1 The Bonn meeting formed an
interim administration, led by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun. A new constitution was
approved at a “constitutional loya jirga” (traditional Afghan assembly) in January 2004.
It set up a strong elected presidency, but, at the urging of the minority-dominated
“Northern Alliance” faction, it gave substantial powers to an elected parliament, such as
veto power over cabinet selections. It also provided for2
! Presidential elections (held by June 2004). Two vice presidents run on
the same election ticket as the president, and one succeeds him in the
event of the president’s death. They serve a five-year term, and
presidents are limited to two terms.
1 For text, see [http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm].
2 Text of constitution, see [http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/currentconstitutionenglish.pdf].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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! A parliament consisting of a 249-seat lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House
of People) and a 102-seat selected upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House
of Elders) elected simultaneously, if possible, with presidential elections.
In the lower house, ten seats are reserved for Afghanistan’s Kuchis
(nomads), and at least 68 of those elected (two per province, with 34
provinces) “should” be women, giving women about 25% of the seats.
The top two women in each province earn seats.
! For the upper house, 34 seats are selected by provincial councils (one
from each of 34 provinces); another 34 are to be selected by nearly 400
elected district councils; and the final 34 are appointed by the President.
(Half of the president’s 34 appointees are to be women.) The provincial
and district councils were to be elected, simultaneously, if possible, with
the other elections. No major roles are stipulated for the provincial or
district councils, although they are likely to gain powers to impose local
taxes and provide local services.
! The constitution states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and
provisions of the sacred religion of Islam,” and says that men and women
have “equal rights and duties before the law.” Political parties can be
established so long as their charters “do not contradict the principles of
Islam,” and they do not have affiliations with other countries.
! The constitution does not impose Islamic law but provides for court
rulings “in accord with [the Hanafi school of] Islamic law,” when there
is no specific provision in the Constitution or other laws on that issue.
The October 2004 Presidential Election
Karzai sought to hold presidential elections by the June 2004 deadline to
demonstrate that he did not seek to monopolize power. However, there was an early
recognition that parliamentary, provincial, and district elections would be complicated to
organize and might be delayed. In July 2003, a joint Afghan-U.N. (U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA) elections management body, the Joint Election
Management Body (JEMB), was set up. Even though a population census had never been
taken, it was estimated that 10.5 million would be eligible to vote. The voting age is 18.
Registration was slowed by violence in early 2004, and holding to the June 2004 schedule
was judged not feasible, but a firm presidential election date was set for October 9, 2004.
The parliamentary, provincial, and district elections were postponed (initially to April-
May 2005). A total of 10.5 million voters registered,3 of which about 42% were women.
On May 25, 2004, Karzai signed an election law 4 providing for district-based (voting for
candidates) rather than proportional representation (voting for party slates).
3 The International Organization of Migration, on behalf of the JEMB, conducted registration of
Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, who were eligible to vote.
4 “New Afghan Election Law Endorsed.” Kabul Radio in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
May 27, 2004.

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In advance of the vote, Karzai engaged in substantial political bargaining to try to
blunt opposition. Northern Alliance leaders, including former President Burhannuddin
Rabbani (the Alliance political leader) and Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim, sought
but did not reach agreement with Karzai to exchange support for him for a role in a
coalition cabinet. Instead, Karzai chose as his running mate Ahmad Zia Masud, brother
of legendary slain Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Masud, hoping to attract Tajik
support. His second running mate was Hazara (Shiite Muslims) leader Karim Khalili.
The Northern Alliance fielded Education Minister Yunis Qanooni, who instantly became
the most serious challenger. Also running was Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who
has been part of the Northern Alliance, and 15 other candidates, including Hazara leader
Mohammad Mohaqiq and Dr. Masooda Jalal, the only woman who ran.
Results. Partly due to fewer security incidents than predicted, voter turnout was
heavy at about 80% (8 million votes cast). The vote was observed by about 400
international monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and other groups, who mostly rebuffed allegations by 15 challenging candidates
that there had been widespread fraud, including alleged failure of indelible ink to prevent
multiple voting. Karzai was declared the winner on November 3, 2004, with about 4.4
million votes (55.4%), more than the 50% needed to avoid a runoff. Qanooni was second
with 1.3 million (16.3%); Mohaqiq, 935,000 (11.7%); Dostam, 800,000 (10%); and
Masooda Jalal, 91,000 (1.1%). Karzai was sworn into a five-year term on December 7,
2004, with Vice President Cheney in attendance. In December 2004, he named a 27-seat
cabinet that tilted more heavily toward Pashtuns, particularly in the key security
ministries. Fahim was replaced as Defense Minister by his Pashtun deputy, Abdul Rahim
Wardak. Qanooni was not given a cabinet seat. Karzai also create a new Ministry of
Counter-Narcotics, headed by Habibullah Qaderi. International donors provided more
than $90 million in aid for the presidential elections, of which about $40 million came
from the United States (P.L. 108-106, FY2004 supplemental appropriation).
Parliamentary and Provincial Elections/New Parliament
On March 21, 2005, the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
announced that parliamentary and provincial elections would be held on September 18,
2005. District elections were postponed until at least 2006 (no date is yet scheduled)
because of the complexities of drawing district boundaries. The postponement meant that
these councils would not select their representatives to the upper house (Meshrano Jirga).
In the interim, the 34 provincial councils would select two representatives — one
permanent (full four-year term) and one interim. Each interim member is to be replaced
by a district council selectee when the district councils are elected.
The election system was the “Single Non-Transferable Vote System” (SNTV) in
which candidates stand as individuals, not as members of a party list. Each voter cast
a ballot for only one candidate for the lower house, even though there were multiple
representatives per province — the number varying from 2 (Panjsher province) to 33
(Kabul province). Herat province has 17 representatives; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh,
and Ghazni, 11 seats each. Each of the 34 provincial councils consists of between 9 and
29 seats (Kabul province is largest with 29). Some experts had urged that the
parliamentary election be conducted by proportional representation because there would
be less potential for local manipulation. That system was not adopted because of the fears
of empowering political parties, which are unpopular in Afghanistan because of the

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mujahedin parties’ links to foreign governments during the anti-Soviet war. Even though
the vote was not party-based, 70 parties are registered with the Ministry of Justice.
There were a total of 2,815 candidates (including 347 women) for the lower house
and 3,185 candidates (including 279 women) for the provincial councils. Out of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, three (Nangahar, Uruzgan, and Zabol) did not have enough
female candidates for the provincial elections to ensure at least 25% female
representation; these seats remain vacant until the next election. During June 25-July 21,
over 2 million additional voters registered (those who came of age since the presidential
election or were not originally counted), bringing the total to about 12.5 million. An
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) initially disqualified 208 candidates for alleged
ties to illegal militias; some disarmed, others withdrew their candidacies. A final list of
candidates was published on July 12, with only 11 disqualified, although another 28 were
later disqualified, mostly for alleged links to armed groups. The OSCE and the European
Union sent observer missions.
Turnout was lower than expected — about 57% (about 6.8 million voters), which
was widely attributed to voter confusion over the large numbers of candidates on each
ballot and high voter illiteracy. Candidates were identified on the ballot with symbols and
photographs. No major attacks on polling centers were reported during the vote, although
about 15 people were killed in election day violence (including a French soldier).
Observers did express concerns about apparent fraud (mostly proxy voting in some
districts), and JEMB investigations of balloting complaints delayed publication of final
results until November 12, 2005.5 The election cost about $159 million, all of which
came from international donors; the U.S. contribution was $44.9 million (P.L. 109-13,
FY2005 supplemental appropriation).
Results and Parliament Composition.6 The results confirmed expectations
that many seats would go to prominent personalities and factional groupings. However,
a prevailing view in Kabul is that all faction leaders are now committed to peaceful debate
in parliament rather than violence. Although Karzai himself has not formed a party,
observers say that Karzai supporters are about 60% of the parliament. Among the pro-
Karzai parliamentarians is his elder brother, Qayyum (Qandahar Province). About 40
parliamentarians are from the Hizb-e-Islam party of anti-U.S. former mujahedin leader
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but they have renounced violence and are said to support Karzai.
An “opposition” bloc is the 14-party, pro-Northern Alliance “National
Understanding Front,” led by Yunus Qanooni, who purportedly wants to run again for
president, and former president Rabbani. More to bolster their faction than because of
any major policy disputes with Karzai, these leaders engineered Qanooni’s selection as
speaker in December 2005, beating back a challenge from Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf
(Kabul Province), a prominent mujahedin party leader and Islamic conservative who was
backed by Karzai for the speakership. Two deputy lower house speakers were selected
on December 22: the first deputy is Aref Nurzai (a relative by marriage to the Karzai
5 Results are available at [http://www.jemb.org/].
6 Some of the information in this section is taken from author participation in a House Democracy
Assistance Commission assessment visit to Afghanistan during February 26-March 2, 2006.

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clan); the other is Kawzia Kofi, a Tajik woman from Rabbani’s home province
(Badakhshan).
Introducing further texture to the lower house is the presence of reputed militia
leaders, former officials of the Soviet occupation-era Communist regime, and six-eight
Taliban era figures who renounced membership in that movement. The feared Soviet-era
Interior Minister, Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi, won a seat from Khost Province. Of the
former Taliban candidates, Abdul Salam Rocketi (“Mullah Rocketi”), won from Zabol
province, and Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, who ran Bamiyan Province during the
Taliban rule and who cooperated with the Taliban’s destruction of the large Buddha
statues in Bamiyan in early 2001, won from Samangan province. The Taliban-era
Foreign Minister Wakil Mutawwakil lost, as did the former enforcer of the Taliban’s
puritanical restrictions, Maulvi Qalamuddin. A reputed militia leader who won a seat is
Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who had gained fame for directing the Afghan
component of the assault on the Al Qaeda redoubt in the Tora Bora mountains during the
U.S.-led war. Another winner was Pacha Khan Zadran, a local leader from Paktia
Province who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora during
the U.S. offensive there.
A number of unaffiliated, well-educated Afghans were elected. They include 27-
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), an outspoken women’s rights advocate who is
emerging as a leading critic of the major faction leaders and who, because of that, has
endured several physical threats. Another female winner was Fauzia Gailani, who came
in first in conservative Herat Province, and Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman Mirror
magazine. One of the intellectuals elected was Ramazan Bashardost, a male former
Karzai government minister who is emerging as a major champion of constitutional
procedure and parliamentary prerogatives. The U.S.-based International Republican
Institute (IRI) is working to organize and train the estimated 93 lower house
“independents; “ the National Democratic Institute (NDI) is assisting the major factions.
Karzai has fewer critics in the upper house because of his bloc of appointments. The
upper house lacks the appointment and budgetary review powers of the lower house.
After making his 34 appointments to that body (including the mandated 17 women), he
supported an ally, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (who heads a reconciliation commission) as
its Speaker, helping him narrowly defeat university chancellor Bakhtar Aminzay for that
post. Karzai also appointed Fahim, representing a further effort to coopt the Northern
Alliance leaders; as well as reputed drug trafficker and former Helmand Province
governor Sher Mohammad Akhund, and former Taliban religious affairs deputy minister
Arsala Rahmani. The deputy speaker is Hamid Gaylani, member of a pro-Karzai family
with five members in the parliament (both houses). One member is a Hindu.
After a one-week training session, both houses were inaugurated on December 19,
2005, with Vice President Cheney attending. Assisting the members is a staff of about
275 Afghans, reporting to a parliament “secretariat.” Staff was hired a year before
parliament convened, and they and the members are receiving assistance and training
from the U.N. Development Program and the State University of New York (SUNY)
under an $8 million contract with USAID. It has formed 18 committees to oversee
governmental functions; each committee has two staff members. The parliament has a
small research group and a relatively small library. The parliament’s budget is controlled
by the government (Ministry of Finance).

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Parliament-Executive Relations and Governance. The completion of the
series of elections (with the exception of the district councils) was considered a major
milestone that has given the Afghan government additional legitimacy. The new
parliament has challenged Karzai on several issues, in some cases blocking his perceived
attempts to appease Islamic conservatives, but at other times favoring Islamic
conservative positions. Signaling some criticism of the international military presence
in Afghanistan, immediately after it was seated, parliament called for the dismantling of
(mostly U.S.-run) “security barriers” in Kabul. In March 2006, the parliament began to
review the hundreds of decrees issued by Karzai during 2001-2005, when there was no
parliament. In May 2006, the parliament voted down Karzai’s March 2006-March 2007
budget because the proposed spending plan did not raise civil service salaries. The budget
was subsequently revised and approved by parliament. Parliament did not block Karzai’s
July 2006 revival of a “Ministry of Supporting Virtue and Discouraging Vice,” a ministry
that was used by the Taliban to commit major human rights abuses, particularly against
women. Karzai says the ministry will focus purely on advice and public relations to
encourage Islamic behavior and not enforce laws.
Karzai has had mixed success achieving approval of his official appointments. In
February 2006, the Qanooni/Rabbani faction achieved a lower house vote to review
Karzai’s cabinet individually, rather than en bloc, increasing their leverage over the
nominations. However, Karzai, despite lacking a formal party structure, rallied his
followers in the confirmation process; only five of his 25 cabinet nominees (announced
March 22, 2006) were rejected, fewer than expected. (Three ministers were declared
confirmed after receiving plurality votes.) Among those confirmed was Dr. Rangeen
Dadfar Spanta, a Pashtun who replaced the well known Northern Alliance figure Dr.
Abdullah. Those rejected were voted down because of opposition from parliament
conservatives or on the grounds of purported poor performance. All five of Karzai’s
nominees to fill those five empty seats were approved on August 7, 2006, including his
nominee for Minister of Women’s Affairs Husn Banu Ghazanfar, dean of literature at
Kabul University. In May 2006, the lower house voted down six of Karzai’s
appointments to the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest judicial body, including his
reappointment of the 73-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice.
Parliament approved his new choices in July 2006, all of whom are trained in modern
jurisprudence. The new chief justice is 69-year-old U.S.-educated Abdul Salam Azimi.
The building of elected institutions has not been sufficient to shield Karzai from
criticism for indulging local faction leaders with appointments and control over various
companies rather than insisting on reform and high performance standards, for tolerating
corruption, and for failing to extend Kabul’s authority. In August 2006, 60
parliamentarians signed a letter criticizing the poor performance of the government, which
many experts believe at least partly responsible for the upsurge of Taliban violence in
2006. According to this view, the government’s failure to extend infrastructure and
services to citizens, particularly in the south, has led some Afghans to tolerate or
cooperate with Taliban insurgents. On the other hand, U.S. reports, such as the report on
International Religious Freedom (September 15, 2006) credit Afghanistan with dramatic
progress on human rights and democracy since the Taliban’s fall. Moreover, Karzai has
tried to counter the criticism by forming an anti-corruption commission and appointing
an attorney general who has made anti-corruption efforts his focus. He has blamed the
slow pace of reconstruction for causing public disillusionment.