The aging of the population of the United States, hastened by the impending retirement of the huge baby-boom generation, has caused some policy-makers to question whether the U.S. Social Security system can meet the demands for retirement benefits in the future. The financial health of the system, which is largely financed through payroll taxes paid by current workers in a pay-as-you-go manner, is sensitive to the ratio of dependents to workers—sometimes called the age dependency ratio or support ratio.
Trends and projections of dependency ratios, including the relationship between both older (years 65 and older) and younger (under age 20) dependents to the working-age population in the United States are considered in the first section of this demographic report. If one considers the 130-year period from 1950-2080, the greatest demographic "burden"—when the number of dependents (children plus the elderly) most exceeds persons in the working-age population—is already in the past, having reached its height in 1965 when there were 94.7 dependents per 100 persons of working age. While the dependency ratio has generally been decreasing since that time, two trends are evident. First, the ratio of dependents to workers will again reverse course beginning around year 2013 with the retirement of a large number of baby boomers. Second, the composition of the dependency ratio is changing. The number of children per worker has been falling since 1965; most of the anticipated increase in the dependency ratio in the coming decades reflects a growing proportion of older persons (ages 65 and older). Age-specific trends in the age dependency ratios are not off-setting in terms of their federal budget implications. Programs administered by the federal government (especially Social Security and Medicare) focus much more heavily on assisting the elderly population whereas state and local governments have historically provided substantial support for families with children through spending on elementary and secondary education and other programs.
Next, the United States is compared to nine other nations. Seven of the countries are members of the G8, a consultative grouping of leading industrial democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom. (The United States is the 8th member). In addition, China and India, the two most populous countries globally, are included to highlight that population aging is occurring even in nations that are less industrialized and have "younger" current age structures. Population aging, which largely results from declining fertility rates and increasing survival, is a global phenomenon. Today, the United States is the "youngest" of the industrialized G8 nations. While the proportion of the U.S. population that is aged 65 and older will continue to increase, aging in the United States is still projected to be considerably slower than in any of the other industrialized countries.
In the final section, policy implications of the changing dependent-to-worker ratios are considered in the context of pay-as-you-go (paygo) social security systems.
This report will be updated every two years.
Social Security's financing problems ... are very large and serious. People are living longer, the first baby-boomers are nearing retirement, and the birth rate is low. The result is that the worker-to-beneficiary ratio has fallen from 16.5-to-1 in 1950 to 3.3-to-1 today. Within 40 years it will be 2-to-1. At this ratio there will not be enough workers to pay scheduled benefits at current tax rates.1
As highlighted by the Social Security Administration (SSA), the aging of the (United States) population, hastened by the impending retirement of the huge baby-boom generation,2 has caused policy-makers to question whether the U.S. Social Security system can meet the demands for retirement benefits in the future. Because the current system largely pays benefits through taxes paid by current workers,3 the financial health of the system is sensitive to the ratio of dependents to workers—sometimes called the age dependency ratio or support ratio. Trends and projections of dependency ratios, including the relationship between both older (years 65 and older) and younger (under age 20) dependents to the working-age population in the United States are considered in the first section of this demographic report. Next, the United States is compared to nine other nations, including the seven other members of the G8.4 In the final section, policy implications of the changing dependent-to-worker ratios are considered in the context of pay-as-you-go (paygo) social security systems.
This section summarizes information on trends and projections over time in the ratio of working-age persons to persons in the dependent ages in the United States for the period 1950-2080.
The age-dependency ratio relates the number of persons in "dependent" ages (defined here as persons under the age of 20 and over age 64) to those in "economically productive" ages (20-64 years) in the population. It addresses the question of how many dependents are being supported per 100 persons of working age.5 The age-dependency ratio is divided into old-age dependency (the ratio of persons 65 years and older to those in the working ages 20-64) and child dependency (the ratio of people under age 20 to those ages 20-64).6
Based on data contained in the Annual Report (2006) of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance ("Social Security") Trust Funds,7 Figure 1 shows the estimated and projected trends in age-dependency ratios for the period 1950-2080 in the United States. Ratios for years 1950-2005 are historical estimates based on actual data8; years 2006-2080 are model-based projections that rely upon assumptions about future trends in mortality, fertility, and immigration. A detailed table with the underlying population data and age dependency ratios for years 1950-2080 is provided in Table A-1. Data in this section and in Table A-1 reflect the Social Security actuaries' intermediate assumptions (i.e., their best guess) of future trends in the underlying assumptions. The impact of variability in the assumptions used for the projections is considered later in this report (Figure 2).
As seen in Figure 1, there were 72.5 dependents per 100 persons of working age in 1950; of these, 58.7 dependents were children while 13.8 were older persons. The total dependency ratio reached its height in 1965, just after the last of the Baby Boom generation was born. In 1965, there were 94.7 (of which 76.5 were children and 18.2 were older persons) dependents per 100 persons of working age. There have been divergent trends for the child and old-age dependency ratios in recent decades with the child ratio generally falling and that of older persons increasing. Children continue to out-number older persons in their contribution to the total dependency ratio in 2006 by a sizable margin: there are 45.9 child and 20.3 older dependents per 100 persons of working age.
Figure 1. Dependency Ratios: Number of Dependents Per 100 Persons of Working Age, United States: 1950-2080 |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis based on statistical tables in: 2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, May 1, 2006, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf, accessed Oct. 20, 2006. Notes: "Dependents" refers to the population under age 20 and age 65 and older; working age refers to persons ages 20-64 inclusive. Ratios for years 1950-2005 are based on actual data; years 2006-2080 are projections which rely upon assumptions about future trends in mortality, fertility, and immigration. Projections use SSA's intermediate assumptions. |
The old-age dependency ratio has generally been increasing since 1950. The baby-boom generation (persons born between 1946 and 1964) will accelerate the rate at which the old-age dependency ratio changes. Baby boomers will begin to attain age 65 beginning in 2011 (for those born in 1946) and continuing through 2029 (for those born in 1964). As highlighted in Figure 1, the older age dependency ratio will quickly increase as a result of the aging of the baby-boom generation, from about 21.2 to 34.3 older dependents per 100 persons of working age between 2011 and 2029. Population aging,9 however, will continue to be one of the most important defining demographic characteristics of the U.S. population, even after the youngest of the baby-boom generation passes away.10 The number of older dependents per 100 persons of working age will continue to increase, albeit at a slower pace than will be experienced during the years in which the baby boomers retire. Based on the SSA Trustees' current assumptions, there will, for instance, be 42.1 older dependents per 100 workers in 2080.
How Useful Are Dependency Ratios? The standard definition of a support ratio is a simple ratio of the number of persons in broad age groups. The ratios do not reflect whether the people of working age are actually economically productive or whether the older person and children are economically dependent. For instance, many older persons are financially and physically independent whereas there are substantial portions of the working-age population who may not earn incomes because they are unemployed, unable to work, in school, in prison, or have opted out of the labor force. Although it is difficult to include factors such as intra-family financial assistance in an overall measure of social support, it is feasible to consider employment characteristics of the populations in the relevant age groups. Estimates of the "economically active population" can be further adjusted to account for average retirement ages, levels of pension receipt, institutionalization, the prevalence of disabilities, and other factors. This information has been adapted from K. Kinsella, and D. R. Phillips, "Global Aging: The Challenge of Success," Population Bulletin, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2005. |
These trends reflect forecasts of continuing improved survival at the older ages and continuing low fertility rates.11 Increasing rates of survival mean a greater number of older dependents (the numerator of the ratio), which in turn increases the old-age dependency ratio. Fewer (than current) births will mean fewer young dependents in the short-run, but will translate into fewer future workers in about two decades. At that time, the net effect will be that the old-age dependency ratio will be increasing (as the number of dependents will be increasing in the numerator) while the number of working age persons to support them will be falling (in the denominator). From the perspective of the Social Security program, the old-age dependency ratio is the most critical of the dependency measures as it relates the number of potential Social Security beneficiaries ($ outlays) to the number of projected payroll tax payers ($ income). Thus, the lower the old-age dependency ratio, the lower the dollars paid out versus received, and the better the finances of the Social Security program outlook.
Referring again to Figure 1 and Table A-1, the child dependency ratio increased from 58.7 to 76.5 child dependents per 100 working age adults between 1950 and 1965, largely reflecting the birth of the baby-boom generation. Since 1965, the child dependency ratio has experienced a mostly steady decline due to falling fertility rates in the United States. Nonetheless, in 2006, the number of child dependents is more than double the number of older dependents—45.9 and 20.3 per 100 working age adults, respectively.
The SSA Trustees' current projections assume that child dependency ratios will slowly decline through year 2080 but that the rate of decline will be very slow. Child dependency ratios will stay in the narrow range of 43.9 to 45.9 child dependents per 100 working age adults throughout this 75-year time span.
Note that, even with the pending retirement of the baby-boom generation, the number of child dependents has and will continue to be greater than the number of older dependents in each of the years of the time frame considered here.
The ratios reported here are CRS compilations based on estimates and projections from the SSA.15 The information for years 1950 (the earliest available year) to 2005 are estimates that are based on actual data16; the information for years 2004-2080 are projections, which rely upon assumptions about future mortality, fertility, and immigration patterns.
To address the uncertainty that is inherent in all population projections, SSA constructs several sets of projections which are based on different combinations of assumptions. The data represented here uses the intermediate set of projections in the Trustees Report, which represents the Board's best estimate of the future course of the population. The Trustees produce two additional sets of projections, the "high-cost" and "low-cost" scenarios, which use differing assumptions about the future courses of fertility, mortality, and immigration. Figure 2 highlights the possible variation in the total dependency ratio through 2080 under these three different scenarios. While SSA's best guess of the total dependency ratio in year 2080 is 86.1 dependents per 100 persons of working age, the range of possible values varies from 83.1 to 94.5.
Figure 2. Total Projected Dependency Ratio, 2005-2080, Under Three Sets of Assumptions of Future Mortality, Fertility, and Immigration |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis based on statistical tables in: 2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, May 1, 2006, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf, accessed Oct. 20, 2006. |
Figure 3 presents statistics on the number of older persons supported per 100 persons of working age in 2002 in 10 countries.17 Eight of the countries are members of the G8, a consultative grouping of leading industrial democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, China and India, the two most populous countries globally, are included to highlight that population aging is occurring even in nations that are less industrialized and have "younger" current age structures.
Figure 3. Number of Older Dependents per 100 Persons of Working Age in Selected Countries, 2002 and 2025 |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) compilation based on U.S. Census Bureau, International Population Reports WP/02, Global Population Profile, 2002 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004). Notes: Figures for China exclude Taiwan, Hong Kong S.A.R., and Macau S.A.R. Countries are sorted by highest old-age dependent-to-worker ratio in 2002. Estimates relate the number of persons age 65 and older per 100 persons of working age (20-64) regardless of the usual age of retirement or age at entry into the work force in each of these countries. |
Of the 10 countries included in the comparison, Italy ranked first, with Japan close behind, in terms of the number of older persons being supported per 100 workers in 2002—29.6 and 29.5, respectively. Among the G8 countries, Canada and the United States were tied for last place at 20.818 older persons per 100 persons of working age—indicating that the Canadian and American "burdens" are less than those of the other G8 countries.19 Not coincidentally, the proportions of their population aged 65 and older—13% and 12% respectively in 2000—are also the lowest of the G8 nations. In India, with its young age structure, there were only 9.0 older persons per 100 persons of working age. The total age dependency ratio (not shown in graph) is, however, greatest for India among the 10 countries—there are 90.5 dependents (mostly children) per 100 persons of working age.
Figure 3 also highlights that population aging is a global phenomena—the number of older dependents per 100 persons of working age is projected to increase through 2025 in all 10 of the countries considered here. The projected increase in Japan, where the ratio will reach 51.1, is especially notable. Italy and Germany will each have over 40 older dependents per 100 persons of working age. Increases are also expected in both China and India. In fact, the old-age dependency ratio in 2025 in China20 will exceed the level observed in the United States, Canada, and Russia today.
Figure 4 shows the number of child dependents per 100 persons of working ages. India had the highest child dependency ratio in 2002 at 81.5. Of the G8 countries considered, the United States was the leader, largely reflecting the fact that the American fertility rate, while currently hovering around the replacement level,21 has not fallen as far as in the other G8 nations. For instance, the total fertility rate in Italy was 1.2 in 2002 compared to 2.1 in the United States in the same year. The estimates for India and China, and to a lesser extent the Russian Federation, are also affected by differential (higher) rates of infant and childhood mortality.
Figure 4. Number of Child Dependents per 100 Persons of Working Age in Selected Countries, 2002 and 2025 |
Source: The Congressional Research Service (CRS) compilation based on U.S. Census Bureau, International Population Reports WP/02, Global Population Profile, 2002 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004). Notes: Figures for China exclude Taiwan, Hong Kong S.A.R., and Macau S.A.R. Countries are sorted by highest child dependent-to-worker ratio in 2002. Estimates relate the number of children age under 20 years per 100 persons of working age (20-64) regardless of the usual age at entry into the work force in each of these countries. |
Unlike the increasing old-age dependency ratios highlighted in Figure 3, the child dependency ratios are projected to fall through 2025 in most of the countries considered. The notable exception is the United States where it is projected that there will be 47.4 child dependents in 2025, as there had been in 2002.
In summary, population aging, which results primarily from declining fertility rates and increasing survival, is a global phenomenon. Today, the United States is the "youngest" of the industrialized G8 nations. While the proportion of the U.S. population that is aged 65 and older will continue to increase, aging in the United States is still projected to be considerably slower than in any of the other industrialized countries.22 In addition to reflecting the fact that the American fertility rate, which is currently hovering around the replacement level, has not fallen (nor is it projected to) as far as the other G8 nations, the "U.S. is leading the way in adapting to the changing balance ... by encouraging immigration."23 The SSA estimates that net legal immigration and net other immigration were about 675,000 persons and 400,000 persons, respectively, in 2005. For its future projections, SSA assumes the total level of net immigration (legal and other, combined) under the intermediate projection to be 1 million persons annually in the 2010s, 950,000 annually in the 2020s, and 900,000 annually in 2030 and each year thereafter through 2080.24 While these comparatively high levels of immigration differentiate the United States from the other G8 nations, they have a small effect on the median age of U.S. residents and on the total dependency ratio as immigrants are mostly young people who have children (and also higher fertility rates than the U.S.-born population). Immigration nudges the worker-elderly ratio a little higher, meaning that there are more people of working age per person age 65 or older. The more dramatic effect, however, is at the younger ages. Immigration after 2000 is projected to add about 15 million more children under age 18 than there would be without any post-2000 immigration. Continued immigration will lower the worker-child ratio and increase the child component of the dependency ratio.25
Most Western industrialized nations, including the United States, have systems in place providing significant social security benefits, and virtually all of these plans originated with pay-as-you-go (paygo) or quasi-paygo funding schemes.26 In the United States, payroll or self-employment tax contributions by current workers (and their employers) are transferred to current beneficiaries. The majority of Social Security taxes paid by today's workers are not put into a special account to pay for their future benefits. Rather, they are used to pay benefits for persons receiving benefits today, just as the future benefits for today's workers will be paid by future generations of workers. In general, a low ratio of retirees to workers (the system's old age dependency ratio) and a high rate of productivity and real wages would permit a paygo social security system with high benefits or low contributions.27
Advantages of government-sponsored paygo schemes relative to fully funded systems include the following:28
Given these advantages, paygo systems looked very attractive in the immediate post-World War II years. Projections of labor force growth, coupled with forecasts of real wage growth, implied a potential total annual return near 5% for a fully mature paygo system. In contrast, the common view of a funded system involved investing contributions in government securities with a return of 1% or less. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the market for equities seemed far too risky, and many countries lacked private bond markets. Furthermore, most countries instituting a new pension system were unwilling to delay initial benefit payments for several decades, as would have been required under a funded system. There was a desire to address the immediate problem of high poverty among the elderly, and most countries provided benefits to an older generation of workers which had not contributed fully to the system.29 Also, to many at that time, a high rate of population growth (and subsequent work force growth) seemed inevitable, in which case pay-as-you-go seemed a good way to finance an old age pension program.30
The current outlook is much different. Birth rates have fallen considerably while the life expectancy at the older ages has increased significantly, resulting in less favorable old-age dependency ratios (as shown in Figures 1 and 2). While the old-age dependency ratio had already been increasing since 1950, the upcoming retirement of the baby-boom generation will accelerate the rate at which it grows. However, even after the youngest of the baby-boom generation has passed away, the number of older dependents per 100 persons of working age will still continue to increase, albeit at a slower pace than will be experienced during the years in which the baby boomers retire.
Concurrent with these demographic trends, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that federal spending for Social Security, adjusted for inflation, will rise substantially—from $483 billion in 2003 to $2.5 trillion in 2075.31 The projected rise in Social Security spending is due, in part, to the demographics of an aging society; CBO estimates that approximately 55% of the higher spending is due to the expected increase in the number of beneficiaries, as the number of new claimants grows and as life expectancy rises. The remaining 45% of the rise is due to a projected increase in the real value of Social Security benefit checks. Specifically, they note that, under rules put into effect in 1979, benefits of newly eligible recipients are based on a formula and earnings records that are adjusted for wage growth. Those adjustments, referred to as wage indexing, are designed to keep the ratio of initial benefits to pre-retirement earnings—that is, replacement rates—approximately the same from one generation of new recipients to the next. Wages tend to rise along with productivity in the economy, at a faster pace than prices and, over the long run, a system pegged to wage growth will gradually afford greater purchasing power.32
As both CBO and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) are warning, current spending policies are likely to be unsustainable.33 The policy implication is that, unless there are large offsetting productivity gains in the U.S. economy, contribution rates by current workers (e.g., tax rates) must markedly rise or benefit levels must fall under Social Security's paygo system. Alternatively, the structure of the underlying paygo system could be modified such that part or all of the scheme is fully funded. This, however, raises the same issues that caused most countries to originally select paygo systems: reduction of (investment) risk and the need to pay benefits for the current generation of beneficiaries.
Table A-1. Age Dependency Ratios, United States, 1950-2080
(Number of dependents per 100 persons of working age)
Year |
Population |
Dependency Ratio |
|||||
Total |
Children (0-19) |
Working Age |
Older Persons (65-65+) |
All Dependents |
Children (0-19) |
Older Persons (65-65+) |
|
1950 |
160,118 |
54,466 |
92,841 |
12,811 |
72.5 |
58.7 |
13.8 |
1951 |
163,808 |
56,419 |
94,102 |
13,287 |
74.1 |
60.0 |
14.1 |
1952 |
166,369 |
57,923 |
94,727 |
13,719 |
75.6 |
61.1 |
14.5 |
1953 |
168,977 |
59,600 |
95,209 |
14,168 |
77.5 |
62.6 |
14.9 |
1954 |
171,686 |
61,398 |
95,656 |
14,632 |
79.5 |
64.2 |
15.3 |
1955 |
174,510 |
63,261 |
96,176 |
15,073 |
81.4 |
65.8 |
15.7 |
1956 |
177,878 |
65,313 |
97,075 |
15,490 |
83.2 |
67.3 |
16.0 |
1957 |
181,324 |
67,401 |
97,992 |
15,931 |
85.0 |
68.8 |
16.3 |
1958 |
184,305 |
69,374 |
98,538 |
16,393 |
87.0 |
70.4 |
16.6 |
1959 |
187,236 |
71,256 |
99,129 |
16,851 |
88.9 |
71.9 |
17.0 |
1960 |
190,172 |
73,076 |
99,818 |
17,278 |
90.5 |
73.2 |
17.3 |
1961 |
193,151 |
74,858 |
100,614 |
17,679 |
92.0 |
74.4 |
17.6 |
1962 |
196,082 |
76,444 |
101,576 |
18,062 |
93.0 |
75.3 |
17.8 |
1963 |
198,876 |
77,766 |
102,703 |
18,407 |
93.6 |
75.7 |
17.9 |
1964 |
201,539 |
78,997 |
103,796 |
18,746 |
94.2 |
76.1 |
18.1 |
1965 |
204,018 |
80,132 |
104,795 |
19,091 |
94.7 |
76.5 |
18.2 |
1966 |
206,281 |
80,743 |
106,116 |
19,422 |
94.4 |
76.1 |
18.3 |
1967 |
208,421 |
80,723 |
107,932 |
19,766 |
93.1 |
74.8 |
18.3 |
1968 |
210,494 |
80,616 |
109,755 |
20,123 |
91.8 |
73.5 |
18.3 |
1969 |
212,547 |
80,571 |
111,477 |
20,499 |
90.7 |
72.3 |
18.4 |
1970 |
214,765 |
80,684 |
113,158 |
20,923 |
89.8 |
71.3 |
18.5 |
1971 |
217,039 |
80,755 |
114,913 |
21,371 |
88.9 |
70.3 |
18.6 |
1972 |
219,105 |
80,502 |
116,784 |
21,819 |
87.6 |
68.9 |
18.7 |
1973 |
220,955 |
79,961 |
118,718 |
22,276 |
86.1 |
67.4 |
18.8 |
1974 |
222,756 |
79,247 |
120,742 |
22,767 |
84.5 |
65.6 |
18.9 |
1975 |
224,599 |
78,437 |
122,857 |
23,305 |
82.8 |
63.8 |
19.0 |
1976 |
226,501 |
77,576 |
125,054 |
23,871 |
81.1 |
62.0 |
19.1 |
1977 |
228,523 |
76,700 |
127,366 |
24,457 |
79.4 |
60.2 |
19.2 |
1978 |
230,687 |
75,884 |
129,750 |
25,053 |
77.8 |
58.5 |
19.3 |
1979 |
232,931 |
75,161 |
132,117 |
25,653 |
76.3 |
56.9 |
19.4 |
1980 |
235,233 |
74,568 |
134,428 |
26,237 |
75.0 |
55.5 |
19.5 |
1981 |
237,627 |
74,126 |
136,693 |
26,808 |
73.8 |
54.2 |
19.6 |
1982 |
240,104 |
73,788 |
138,891 |
27,425 |
72.9 |
53.1 |
19.7 |
1983 |
242,541 |
73,493 |
141,028 |
28,020 |
72.0 |
52.1 |
19.9 |
1984 |
244,923 |
73,249 |
143,096 |
28,578 |
71.2 |
51.2 |
20.0 |
1985 |
247,335 |
73,211 |
144,957 |
29,167 |
70.6 |
50.5 |
20.1 |
1986 |
249,801 |
73,393 |
146,603 |
29,805 |
70.4 |
50.1 |
20.3 |
1987 |
252,313 |
73,703 |
148,197 |
30,413 |
70.3 |
49.7 |
20.5 |
1988 |
254,893 |
74,099 |
149,840 |
30,954 |
70.1 |
49.5 |
20.7 |
1989 |
257,609 |
74,545 |
151,581 |
31,483 |
69.9 |
49.2 |
20.8 |
1990 |
260,457 |
75,060 |
153,368 |
32,029 |
69.8 |
48.9 |
20.9 |
1991 |
263,372 |
75,749 |
155,036 |
32,587 |
69.9 |
48.9 |
21.0 |
1992 |
266,342 |
76,690 |
156,522 |
33,130 |
70.2 |
49.0 |
21.2 |
1993 |
269,273 |
77,751 |
157,931 |
33,591 |
70.5 |
49.2 |
21.3 |
1994 |
272,081 |
78,740 |
159,370 |
33,971 |
70.7 |
49.4 |
21.3 |
1995 |
274,787 |
79,621 |
160,844 |
34,322 |
70.8 |
49.5 |
21.3 |
1996 |
277,511 |
80,433 |
162,458 |
34,620 |
70.8 |
49.5 |
21.3 |
1997 |
280,248 |
81,123 |
164,267 |
34,858 |
70.6 |
49.4 |
21.2 |
1998 |
282,898 |
81,710 |
166,161 |
35,027 |
70.3 |
49.2 |
21.1 |
1999 |
285,517 |
82,192 |
168,149 |
35,176 |
69.8 |
48.9 |
20.9 |
2000 |
288,279 |
82,581 |
170,275 |
35,423 |
69.3 |
48.5 |
20.8 |
2001 |
291,250 |
82,906 |
172,613 |
35,731 |
68.7 |
48.0 |
20.7 |
2002 |
294,223 |
83,172 |
175,034 |
36,017 |
68.1 |
47.5 |
20.6 |
2003 |
297,001 |
83,432 |
177,319 |
36,250 |
67.5 |
47.1 |
20.4 |
2004 |
299,645 |
83,705 |
179,447 |
36,493 |
67.0 |
46.6 |
20.3 |
2005 |
302,322 |
83,963 |
181,457 |
36,902 |
66.6 |
46.3 |
20.3 |
2006 |
304,849 |
84,218 |
183,364 |
37,267 |
66.3 |
45.9 |
20.3 |
2007 |
307,340 |
84,472 |
185,082 |
37,786 |
66.1 |
45.6 |
20.4 |
2008 |
309,798 |
84,697 |
186,659 |
38,442 |
66.0 |
45.4 |
20.6 |
2009 |
312,264 |
84,838 |
188,316 |
39,110 |
65.8 |
45.1 |
20.8 |
2010 |
314,740 |
84,895 |
190,083 |
39,762 |
65.6 |
44.7 |
20.9 |
2011 |
317,226 |
84,959 |
191,627 |
40,640 |
65.5 |
44.3 |
21.2 |
2012 |
319,718 |
85,087 |
192,733 |
41,898 |
65.9 |
44.1 |
21.7 |
2013 |
322,215 |
85,283 |
193,681 |
43,251 |
66.4 |
44.0 |
22.3 |
2014 |
324,710 |
85,525 |
194,629 |
44,556 |
66.8 |
43.9 |
22.9 |
2015 |
327,202 |
85,796 |
195,496 |
45,910 |
67.4 |
43.9 |
23.5 |
2016 |
329,662 |
86,106 |
196,245 |
47,311 |
68.0 |
43.9 |
24.1 |
2017 |
332,086 |
86,466 |
196,874 |
48,746 |
68.7 |
43.9 |
24.8 |
2018 |
334,497 |
86,859 |
197,405 |
50,233 |
69.4 |
44.0 |
25.4 |
2019 |
336,892 |
87,247 |
197,826 |
51,819 |
70.3 |
44.1 |
26.2 |
2020 |
339,270 |
87,547 |
198,213 |
53,510 |
71.2 |
44.2 |
27.0 |
2021 |
341,626 |
87,736 |
198,642 |
55,248 |
72.0 |
44.2 |
27.8 |
2022 |
343,958 |
87,883 |
199,059 |
57,016 |
72.8 |
44.1 |
28.6 |
2023 |
346,255 |
88,003 |
199,475 |
58,777 |
73.6 |
44.1 |
29.5 |
2024 |
348,514 |
88,233 |
199,736 |
60,545 |
74.5 |
44.2 |
30.3 |
2025 |
350,729 |
88,597 |
199,789 |
62,343 |
75.5 |
44.3 |
31.2 |
2026 |
352,871 |
88,942 |
199,847 |
64,082 |
76.6 |
44.5 |
32.1 |
2027 |
354,936 |
89,266 |
199,965 |
65,705 |
77.5 |
44.6 |
32.9 |
2028 |
356,946 |
89,574 |
200,139 |
67,233 |
78.3 |
44.8 |
33.6 |
2029 |
358,898 |
89,863 |
200,347 |
68,688 |
79.1 |
44.9 |
34.3 |
2030 |
360,794 |
90,133 |
200,644 |
70,017 |
79.8 |
44.9 |
34.9 |
2031 |
362,633 |
90,385 |
201,120 |
71,128 |
80.3 |
44.9 |
35.4 |
2032 |
364,418 |
90,625 |
201,748 |
72,045 |
80.6 |
44.9 |
35.7 |
2033 |
366,150 |
90,855 |
202,431 |
72,864 |
80.9 |
44.9 |
36.0 |
2034 |
367,828 |
91,076 |
203,037 |
73,715 |
81.2 |
44.9 |
36.3 |
2035 |
369,451 |
91,288 |
203,518 |
74,645 |
81.5 |
44.9 |
36.7 |
2036 |
371,024 |
91,494 |
204,028 |
75,502 |
81.8 |
44.8 |
37.0 |
2037 |
372,547 |
91,694 |
204,721 |
76,132 |
82.0 |
44.8 |
37.2 |
2038 |
374,025 |
91,890 |
205,594 |
76,541 |
81.9 |
44.7 |
37.2 |
2039 |
375,461 |
92,082 |
206,520 |
76,859 |
81.8 |
44.6 |
37.2 |
2040 |
376,856 |
92,268 |
207,416 |
77,172 |
81.7 |
44.5 |
37.2 |
2041 |
378,215 |
92,449 |
208,311 |
77,455 |
81.6 |
44.4 |
37.2 |
2042 |
379,543 |
92,629 |
209,180 |
77,734 |
81.4 |
44.3 |
37.2 |
2043 |
380,845 |
92,813 |
209,977 |
78,055 |
81.4 |
44.2 |
37.2 |
2044 |
382,121 |
93,002 |
210,647 |
78,472 |
81.4 |
44.2 |
37.3 |
2045 |
383,379 |
93,199 |
211,166 |
79,014 |
81.6 |
44.1 |
37.4 |
2046 |
384,621 |
93,404 |
211,628 |
79,589 |
81.7 |
44.1 |
37.6 |
2047 |
385,852 |
93,619 |
212,130 |
80,103 |
81.9 |
44.1 |
37.8 |
2048 |
387,074 |
93,843 |
212,709 |
80,522 |
82.0 |
44.1 |
37.9 |
2049 |
388,293 |
94,077 |
213,334 |
80,882 |
82.0 |
44.1 |
37.9 |
2050 |
389,510 |
94,318 |
213,935 |
81,257 |
82.1 |
44.1 |
38.0 |
2051 |
390,730 |
94,563 |
214,511 |
81,656 |
82.1 |
44.1 |
38.1 |
2052 |
391,954 |
94,810 |
215,085 |
82,059 |
82.2 |
44.1 |
38.2 |
2053 |
393,186 |
95,057 |
215,634 |
82,495 |
82.3 |
44.1 |
38.3 |
2054 |
394,425 |
95,303 |
216,097 |
83,025 |
82.5 |
44.1 |
38.4 |
2055 |
395,675 |
95,550 |
216,474 |
83,651 |
82.8 |
44.1 |
38.6 |
2056 |
396,934 |
95,796 |
216,845 |
84,293 |
83.0 |
44.2 |
38.9 |
2057 |
398,204 |
96,040 |
217,265 |
84,899 |
83.3 |
44.2 |
39.1 |
2058 |
399,485 |
96,283 |
217,737 |
85,465 |
83.5 |
44.2 |
39.3 |
2059 |
400,777 |
96,522 |
218,247 |
86,008 |
83.6 |
44.2 |
39.4 |
2060 |
402,080 |
96,760 |
218,777 |
86,543 |
83.8 |
44.2 |
39.6 |
2061 |
403,391 |
96,994 |
219,348 |
87,049 |
83.9 |
44.2 |
39.7 |
2062 |
404,710 |
97,225 |
219,969 |
87,516 |
84.0 |
44.2 |
39.8 |
2063 |
406,034 |
97,452 |
220,617 |
87,965 |
84.0 |
44.2 |
39.9 |
2064 |
407,362 |
97,676 |
221,257 |
88,429 |
84.1 |
44.1 |
40.0 |
2065 |
408,693 |
97,897 |
221,816 |
88,980 |
84.2 |
44.1 |
40.1 |
2066 |
410,022 |
98,115 |
222,274 |
89,633 |
84.5 |
44.1 |
40.3 |
2067 |
411,350 |
98,330 |
222,696 |
90,324 |
84.7 |
44.2 |
40.6 |
2068 |
412,675 |
98,544 |
223,098 |
91,033 |
85.0 |
44.2 |
40.8 |
2069 |
413,997 |
98,756 |
223,608 |
91,633 |
85.1 |
44.2 |
41.0 |
2070 |
415,315 |
98,968 |
224,244 |
92,103 |
85.2 |
44.1 |
41.1 |
2071 |
416,629 |
99,180 |
224,879 |
92,570 |
85.3 |
44.1 |
41.2 |
2072 |
417,937 |
99,392 |
225,509 |
93,036 |
85.3 |
44.1 |
41.3 |
2073 |
419,239 |
99,606 |
226,130 |
93,503 |
85.4 |
44.0 |
41.3 |
2074 |
420,535 |
99,821 |
226,740 |
93,974 |
85.5 |
44.0 |
41.4 |
2075 |
421,827 |
100,039 |
227,337 |
94,451 |
85.6 |
44.0 |
41.5 |
2076 |
423,113 |
100,258 |
227,920 |
94,935 |
85.6 |
44.0 |
41.7 |
2077 |
424,394 |
100,480 |
228,490 |
95,424 |
85.7 |
44.0 |
41.8 |
2078 |
425,669 |
100,704 |
229,048 |
95,917 |
85.8 |
44.0 |
41.9 |
2079 |
426,942 |
100,930 |
229,597 |
96,415 |
86.0 |
44.0 |
42.0 |
2080 |
428,214 |
101,159 |
230,137 |
96,918 |
86.1 |
44.0 |
42.1 |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis based on statistical tables in: 2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, May 1, 2006, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf, accessed Oct. 20, 2006.
Figure A-1. Number of Working Age Persons Per 100 Dependents, United States, 1950-2080 |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis based on statistical tables in: 2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, May 1, 2006, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf, accessed Oct. 20, 2006. Notes: This figure relates the number of workers (numerator) to the number of dependents (denominator). For example, in 1950, there were 725 workers to support every 100 persons age 65 and older. Figure 1 in the main body of the text showed dependency ratios which relate the number of dependents (numerator) to the number of workers (denominator). In 1950, there were 13.8 older dependents per 100 workers. |
1. |
Social Security Administration, Social Security's Future—FAQs, Frequently Asked Questions About Social Security's Future; Question: I hear that Social Security has a big financial problem. Why? at http://www.ssa.gov/qa.htm, accessed Oct. 20, 2006. |
2. |
Americans born in years 1946 to 1964. |
3. |
This is often referred to as a pay-as-you-go (or "paygo") system. |
4. |
The G8 is a consultative grouping of leading industrial democracies—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. |
5. |
Alternatively, one could ask how many workers there are to support each dependent. A graph of these trends, which is not analyzed in the text of this report, is provided in Figure A-1. |
6. |
These age breaks are arbitrary. These are the age breaks used by the SSA in its reporting of the status of the Social Security trust funds. The age at which a worker could receive full Social Security benefits (the full retirement age, FRA) was, until recently, age 65. The FRA will gradually rise from 65 to 67 years beginning with people who attained age 62 in 2000 (those born in 1938). See CRS Report 94-622, Social Security: Raising the Retirement Age Background and Issues, by Geoffrey C. Kollmann. |
7. |
2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, May 1, 2006, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR05/tr06.pdf, accessed Oct. 20, 2006. (Hereafter cited as Trustees Report, 2006.) |
8. |
Note that data for 2003, 2004, and 2005 are preliminary. |
9. |
As measured by increases in the median age of the population and increases in the proportion of the population aged 65 and older. |
10. |
See CRS Report RL32701, The Changing Demographic Profile of the United States, by [author name scrubbed]. (Hereafter cited as CRS Report RL32701). |
11. |
Note that improved population survival and decreased fertility are the root causes of the aging boom though immigration also contributes to trends in dependency ratios over time. Immigration is currently and is projected to remain over-shadowed by the trends in mortality and fertility in the dependency ratios. See CRS Report RL32701, The Changing Demographic Profile of the United States, by [author name scrubbed]. |
12. |
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Federal Spending on the Elderly and Children, July 2000, at http://www.cbo.gov, accessed June 17, 2005. (Hereafter cited as CBO, Federal Spending on the Elderly and Children.) See also: (1) CRS Report RS22008, Federal Spending for Older Americans, by [author name scrubbed] and William Klunk (pdf) (hereafter cited as CRS Report RS22008); and (2) C. Eugene Steuerle, "The Incredible Shrinking Budget for Working Families and Children," National Budget Issues, no. 1, Dec. 2003. |
13. |
CBO, Federal Spending on the Elderly and Children. Note, however, that the increase in the ratio of older persons to people under 65 also has important implications for state budgets because of the growth in Medicaid spending as a share of total state government expenditures. Medicaid is the largest public source of spending on long-term care (LTC), and this will strain state budgets because a substantial contributor to the rise in the old-age dependency ratio will be due to increases in the number of people 85 and older who are disproportionately large consumers of LTC services. |
14. |
Robert B. Friedland and Laura Summer, Demography Is Not Destiny, Revisited, Commonwealth Fund Publication 789 (New York, Mar. 2005), p. v. (Hereafter cited as Friedland and Summer, Demography is Not Destiny.) |
15. |
Trustees Report, 2006. |
16. |
Note that the data for years 2003, 2004, and 2005 are preliminary. |
17. |
CRS compilation based on U.S. Census Bureau, International Population Reports WP/02, Global Population Profile, 2002 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004). |
18. |
Note that the Census Bureau's estimate of the old-age dependency ratio for the United States in 2002 was 20.8, which is slightly higher than Social Security's estimate of 20.6 for the same year (as seen in Figure 1 and Table A-1). |
19. |
Note, however, that the total dependency ratio is greater in the United States than in Canada since Americans are supporting a higher number of children. |
20. |
China's age structure is quickly transforming from that of a "young" population to that of an older one, as measured by the mean age of the population and proportions in the relevant young and old age groups. The speed of population aging in China is also significantly faster than had been observed in the G8 countries. In China, it is expected that 26 years (from 2000-2026) will be required for the percent of the population age 65 or older to rise from 7% to 14%. In comparison, 115 years (from 1855-1980) were required in France; 69 years in the United States (1944-2013); and 65 years (1944-2009) in Canada. See Kevin Kinsella and David R. Phillips, "Global Aging: The Challenge of Success," Population Bulletin, vol. 60, no. 1, Mar. 2005. |
21. |
The level of fertility and mortality in a population at which women will replace themselves in a generation, in the absence of migration. It corresponds to a total fertility rate (the average number of children a cohort of women would have by the end of their childbearing years) in the range of 2.04 to 2.10. |
22. |
Friedland and Summer, Demography is Not Destiny. |
23. |
David E. Bloom, A. K. Nandakumar, and Manjiri Bhawalkar, The Demography of Aging in Japan and in the United States, in Gail B. Hedges, ed., "Aging and Health: Environment, Work and Behavior", Harvard Printing and Publications, 2003. |
24. |
Trustees Report, 2006. |
25. |
Philip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, "Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America," Population Bulletin, vol. 58, no. 2, June 2003. |
26. |
Robert L. Brown, "Paygo Funding Stability and Intergenerational Equity," Transactions of Society of Actuaries, vol. 47, 1995. (Hereafter cited as Brown, Paygo Funding Stability.) Note that significant modifications have been made to the original designs of the systems over time. |
27. |
Estelle James, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth, World Bank Policy Research Report, 1994. (Hereafter cited as James, Averting the Old Age Crisis.) |
28. |
See, for instance, Brown, Paygo Funding Stability. |
29. |
Barry Bosworth and Gary Burtless, "Pension Reform and Saving" (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution). Paper prepared for a conference of the International Forum of the Collaboration Projects, held in Tokyo, Japan, Feb. 17-19, 2003. (Hereafter cited as Bosworth, Pension Reform and Saving.). |
30. |
James, Averting the Old Age Crisis. |
31. |
Congressional Budget Office, The Future Growth of Social Security: It's Not Just Society's Aging, An Issue Summary from CBO, no. 9, July 2003, at http://www.cbo.gov. |
32. |
Ibid. See also CRS Report RL32900, Indexing Social Security Benefits: The Effects of Price and Wage Indexes, by [author name scrubbed], Laura Haltzel, and Neela K. Ranade. |
33. |
See CRS Report RS22008, Federal Spending for Older Americans (pdf). |