Order Code RL33701
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Uganda: Current Conditions
and the Crisis in North Uganda
October 20, 2006
Ted Dagne
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Uganda: Current Conditions
and the Crisis in Northern Uganda
Summary
In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26
years. President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Revolutionary Movement
(NRM) parliamentary candidates won a decisive victory over opposition candidate
Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democracy Coalition. Nevertheless, poll results
showed a notable decline in support for President Museveni from previous elections.
International election observers did not condemn the election results, nor did they
fully endorse the electoral process. Critics charged the government with intimidating
the opposition during the pre-election period, and Besigye spent much of the
campaign period in jail. The election followed a controversial move by the Ugandan
parliament in July 2005 to remove the constitutional two-term limit on the
presidency.
In the north, the government of Uganda fought the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA), an armed rebel group backed by the government of Sudan. Through over 20
years of civil war, the brutal insurgency has created a humanitarian crisis that has
displaced over 1.5 million and resulted in the abduction of over 20,000 children. In
recent months, the government and the LRA have entered into peace negotiations
mediated by the government of Southern Sudan. The negotiations have had some
limited success in halting the fighting through a negotiated ceasefire, but observers
suggest criminal indictments by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the
LRA’s leadership may limit the rebels’ willingness to reach a final settlement.
This report will be updated as significant changes occur in Uganda.

Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Uganda: Political Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The 2001 Presidential Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Third-Term Debate and Adoption of a Multi-Party System . . . . . . . . . . 2
Multi-Party Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Situation in Northern Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Regional Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Attempts to End the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Current Peace Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Social and Economic Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
HIV/AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Regional Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
U.S.-Uganda Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis
in Northern Uganda
Background
Uganda, a country slightly smaller than Oregon, gained its independence from
Britain in 1962. Until the mid-1980s, the east African country was mired in civil war
and ethnic strife, and suffered under a brutal dictatorship. By the time President
Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) took power in
early 1986, the country’s economy was in ruins, with an inflation rate of over 240%
and an almost non-existent economic infrastructure. President Museveni is credited
with bringing relative political and economic stability to Uganda, although he has not
been able to end the
conflict in northern
Uganda. His strategy in
Uganda at a Glance
the late 1980s and 1990s
Population: 28.2 Million
was to co-opt his political
Population Growth: 3.37 % (2006)
opponents and, when
Comparative Area: Slightly smaller than Oregon
necessary, to use military
Infant Mortality Rate: 66.5 deaths/1,000 live
means to neutralize rebel
births(2006)
groups. Museveni’s first
Life Expectancy at Birth: 52.67 years
government included
HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rate: 6.7 % (2005)
opposition figures who
HIV/AIDS Deaths: 78,000 (2003)
had served in previous
Religions: Roman Catholic 33%, Protestant 33%,
governments and arch
Muslim 16%, Indigenous beliefs 18%.
critics of the NRM.
Language: English (official)
Despite efforts aimed at
GDP (purchasing power parity — PPP): $46 billion
(2005)
a c h i e v i n g n a t i o n a l
GDP per capita (PPP): $1,700 (2005)
reconciliation, armed
o p p o s i t i o n t o h i s
Source: CIA — The World Factbook, 2006.
government continued for
much of the 1980s and
1990s.
Uganda: Political Profile
In May 1996, after a long transition period, President Museveni was elected to
a five year term in direct presidential elections in what was known until last year as
a “no-party” system. Museveni won 74.2% of the votes, while his opponent, Paul
Ssmogerere, former deputy prime minister and longtime rival of the president,
received 23.7%. The elections were declared by international observers to be free
and fair. A national referendum on multiparty politics was held in June of 2000.

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Museveni prevailed with 90.7% of Ugandans favoring a no-party government system.
The President stated that multiparty politics could only be introduced once a no-
party system had succeeded in eliminating the threat of a return to sectarian politics.
The 2001 Presidential Elections
On March 12, 2001, Uganda again held national elections, and President
Museveni won 69.3% of the votes cast,1 while his closest challenger, Kizza Besigye,
received 27.8%. Besigye, a doctor and Museveni’s one-time ally, was a member of
the NRM and Museveni’s personal physician during the insurgency in the early
1980s. He ran on an anti-corruption platform, vowing to rid the government of its
excesses. He also raised questions about Uganda’s military involvement in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Election observers, both local and
international, declared the elections to be free and fair, although they acknowledged
that the electoral process and management had many weaknesses. The results of the
elections were rejected, however, by Besigye on the grounds that there were
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the electoral process. He filed a petition at the
Supreme Court challenging the declaration of Museveni as president-elect and sought
to annul the elections. Besigye subsequently lost the petition and said he would
respect the Supreme Court verdict. In August 2001, Besigye fled Uganda and later
surfaced in South Africa.2
The Third-Term Debate and Adoption of a Multi-Party System
Uganda was ruled under a “no-party” system after Museveni took power in
1986. In March 2003, President Museveni suggested to his National Executive
Committee, the leadership organ of the NRM, that the Movement should consider
lifting the ban on a multi-party system. He and his supporters also urged a review of
the two-term limit for a president. According to the Ugandan constitution at the time,
“A person shall not be elected under this Constitution to hold office as President for
more than two terms as prescribed by this article.”3 Under this provision, President
Museveni’s term would have expired in 2006, but many of his supporters argued that
without Museveni, Uganda might plunge into another civil war. Critics of the
President contended that Museveni did not wish to relinquish power. The President
holds most executive powers. In January 2003, President Museveni told a British
reporter “We will follow the Constitution because that is what I fought for. The
present Constitution says not more than two consecutive terms.”4 Those ruling party
members who criticized the President’s third term proposal were removed from
power, including Eriya Katagaya, the then-First Deputy Prime Minister and a
1 Ugandan Elections 2001, online at [http://www.uganda-elections.com].
2 Besigye fled into exile a day after he met with visiting U.S. congressional delegation
members.
3 The Constitution of Uganda can be found online at [http://www.government.go.ug/
constitution/detail].
4 John Kakande. “Museveni Speaks on 3rd Term.” The New Vision, January 3, 2003.

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longtime ally of President Museveni.5 The Vice President also resigned, reportedly
to pursue her academic studies in the United States. In May 2005, the Ugandan
parliament voted to approve a referendum on multi-party politics. On July 28, 2005,
Ugandans voted overwhelmingly in favor of a multi-party system, after almost 19
years of a “no party” system. Reportedly, more than 92% of the registered voters said
yes to a multi-party system, although the polls were boycotted by the Forum for
Democratic Change, an opposition group. In July 2005, the Ugandan parliament
voted to remove the two-term limit on the presidency.
Multi-Party Elections
In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26
years. President Museveni won 59% of the votes, while the leading opposition
candidate, Kizza Besigye, won 37% of the votes. The ruling NRM won 202 seats in
parliamentary elections, while the opposition Forum for Democracy Coalition won
40 seats. The election results show a consistent decline for President Museveni from
his 74% and 69% victories in the 1996 and 2001 elections, respectively. Meanwhile,
Besigye’s 37% share represented a 10% gain over his 2001 vote share. International
election observers did not condemn the election results nor did they fully endorse the
electoral process. According to the European Union election monitoring group
report, “Uganda’s first multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections since
1980 have demonstrated significant improvements in comparison to previous
elections.” According to the same report, “Despite a number of problems
experienced by voters on election day, EU Chief Observer Max van den Berg, who
spent the day traveling between Kampala, Gulu and Soroti, noted that voters came
out in large numbers, knew that they had a choice between change or continuity, and
made this choice with calm and dignity.” But the elections were marred by
intimidation, counting irregularities, voter name deletions, and show of force by the
government. Harassment and the trial of the opposition candidate, Besigye, by
authorities, were seen as part of the overall strategy to secure victory. Kizza Besigye
was charged and imprisoned soon after his return to Uganda to run as a candidate for
president. He was charged with rape, terrorism, and treason. The rape charge was
dropped, but he still faces other charges.
The Situation in Northern Uganda
While much of the country has remained stable since the NRM took power in
1986, civil war has ravaged northern Uganda for over 20 years. The situation has
been characterized as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, where civilians,
particularly children, are the most affected, according to the United Nations and
numerous reports by non-governmental organizations. The conflict and the
humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda have killed tens of thousands of civilians due
to deliberate targeting of children by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (see below),
although the actual number of those killed is unknown.
5 “President Should Listen to Old Friends, Avoid Disaster (Editorial).” The Monitor, May
3, 2002.

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According to a report by the Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern
Uganda (CSOPNU), a coalition of 50 Ugandan and international groups, more than
two million civilians have been affected. An estimated 90% of the population in the
northern region of Acholiland, particularly in the districts of Gulu, Kitigum, and
Pader, have been displaced; and some estimate that 80% of the forces in the LRA are
the abducted children from these areas. For the past two decades, the victims in this
conflict have largely been civilians, although the conflict began in an effort to
overthrow the Museveni regime. The victims reportedly are abused routinely by
security forces and the government has failed to provide adequate protection to
civilians, particularly children in northern Uganda, according to several reports.
The LRA has abducted more than 20,000 children over the past decade for
forced conscription and sexual exploitation.6 According to the United Nations “the
most disturbing aspect of this humanitarian crisis is the fact that this is a war fought
by children on children - minors make up almost 90% of the LRA’s soldiers. Some
recruits are as young as eight and are inducted through raids on villages. They are
brutalized and forced to commit atrocities on fellow abductees and even siblings.
Those who attempt to escape are killed. For those living in a state of constant fear,
violence becomes a way of life and the psychological trauma is incalculable.”
Approximately half of all U.S. non-food aid in Uganda is directed at
ameliorating the crisis in the north. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) continues its support for the displaced children and orphans in Uganda.
The program, Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF), “assist[s] war-affected
children in northern and western Uganda by rebuilding traditional community and
family structures and working to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS.” The DCOF funded
programs such as the Community Resilience and Dialogue (CRD), which focused on
aiding abducted children between 2002-2005. The CRD rehabilitated 7,000
abducted children and reunified and resettled 5,700 with their families. Other donor
governments are also doing similar projects in support of former abducted children
and internally displaced persons in northern Uganda.
6 Uganda Complex Emergency. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), July
2003.

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The LRA: Early Years
In 1985, the Milton Obote regime was ousted in a military coup by General Tito Lutwa Okello
and other military officers from northern Uganda. The coup came at a time when the NRM
attacks against the Obote regime threatened Obote’s hold on power. In 1986, the NRA defeated
the Okello regime, forcing the military and their supporters to flee to northern Uganda. Shortly
afterward a rebel alliance was formed, the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA). The
UPDA began attacks against government military installations primarily in northern Uganda.
The same year, Alice Lakwena, an Acholi spiritual healer, emerged as the dominant leader of
the rebel alliance. Lakwena’s faction, the Holy Spirit Movement, initially dominated the
alliance and also began to make its move in Southern Sudan. After a devastating battle with the
Ugandan military in Jinja, 60 miles from the capital of Kampala, in which a large number of the
rebel alliance members were killed or captured, Lakwena fled to Kenya. By the late 1980s and
early 1990s, UPDA was no longer active. One of Lakwena’s key members and reportedly a
relative, Joseph Kony, then in his early 20s, emerged as the leader of the remaining forces and
emerged as the LRA leader. A major military strategy shift took place in the early 1990s with
the emergence of Kony. Kony’s group began to primarily target civilians in northern Uganda
and forged a strong alliance with the government of Sudan.
The overall impact of the crisis in northern Uganda is not clear, although day to
day life for many in this region has changed significantly. The economy in northern
Uganda has been devastated, especially in light of the fact that much of the
population is displaced internally and some have left the region. According to
various sources, there are an estimated 1.5-1.7 million internally displaced people in
northern Uganda. Large numbers of children who are not in internally displaced
persons camps often leave their homes at night to sleep in hospitals or churches.
They are known as “Night Commuters.” Education for many of these children seems
out of reach, since many are unable to stay in one place to attend school. According
to a World Vision report, Pawns of Politics, “the north has suffered insecurity,
manifested by violence against civilians, abductions and displacement. This
insecurity has resulted in death, loss of property, and disruption of development
activities. For example, more than 20,000 children and adolescents have been
abducted between 1986 and 2003, of whom only 11,000 have returned to their
homes. The insecurity of war has created an uncertain future for children. Children
are losing vital educational opportunities; they are at greater risk for contracting
HIV/AIDS and other STDs; and they are forced into child prostitution, child
soldiering, and other forms of bondage.”7 As a result of the war and perceived ethnic
bias, the NRM government remains unpopular in northern Uganda. In the 2006
elections, opposition candidate Besigye reportedly won 80% of the votes in Gulu.
Regional Implications
Under the leadership of Joseph Kony, the LRA has conducted military
operations in northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and
Southern Sudan. The regional impact of the northern Uganda crisis has been
7 The Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda. World Vision,
2004.

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particularly hard for Southern Sudan, in part because of its geographic proximity and
also due to the government of Sudan’s support for the LRA rebels. In Southern Sudan
the LRA joined the government of Sudan to attack the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA), the liberation movement fighting then successive Sudanese
governments, according to U.S. and regional officials. Southern Sudanese civilians
have been and continue to be victims of LRA attacks. The LRA was given protection,
facilities for training, and supplies by the government of Sudan to wage war in
northern Uganda and Southern Sudan. 8 The LRA targeted civilians in Eastern and
Western Equatoria and in the Juba region, the regional capital. The LRA leadership
and its troops had a permanent presence in Southern Sudan under the protection of
the government of Sudan. In the Juba region, LRA forces used schools and other
government facilities to train and house their troops.9 In late 2005, the LRA
intensified its attacks targeting civilians in Southern Sudan, especially in Yei and
Juba areas. However, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in
2005 between the government of Sudan and the SPLM has threatened the survival
of the LRA as a force in Southern Sudan. The SPLA has been fighting the LRA and
the takeover of the government in Southern Sudan by the SPLM has made LRA
activities very difficult. The CPA has a provision in the Security Agreement that all
foreign groups must be forced out of Sudan. The late leader of Southern Sudan, Dr.
John Garang, had the LRA and foreign terrorist groups in mind when he insisted on
this provision.10 In 2005, some LRA units went into DRC, reportedly looking for a
new home after the SPLM took power. Military clashes in DRC reportedly led to the
killing of 8 Guatemalan United Nations peacekeepers in the DRC.
Attempts to End the Conflict
A number of attempts in the past at a negotiated settlement with the LRA failed,
in large part due to LRA intransigence and due to the government of Uganda’s
inconsistent positions. The first serious effort was launched by former Ugandan
government minister Betty Bigombe in the early 1990s with the full support of
President Museveni. In 1993, Bigombe made contact with the LRA leadership and
the LRA initially expressed interest in a negotiated settlement. Prior to this effort,
the government of Uganda launched what was known as the Operation North
campaign. Operation North campaign was designed to deny the LRA support in the
North and to arm the civilian population with bows and arrows, known then as the
Arrow Group. The operation failed and created strong animosity between the
government and elements in northern Uganda. The Bigombe initiative ended when
President Museveni threatened to use force against the LRA and demanded its
surrender. Other initiatives, both local and regional, failed to produce tangible results.
Bigombe is once again engaged in an effort to bring an end the conflict in northern
8 The International Crisis Group. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Resolving the
Conflict, April 2004.
9 The author visited Juba last year and other towns in Southern Sudan over the past decade
where LRA has been active.
10 Ted Dagne interviewed Dr. John Garang on a number of occasions during the Security
Arrangement negotiations.

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Uganda. Contacts were made in late 2004-2005 with the leadership of the LRA and
the LRA also had appointed two senior commanders, Vincent Otti and Sam Kolo,
as negotiators in this new initiative. The peace initiative stalled in 2005 when Kolo
defected to the government side and the government of Uganda began its military
campaign. Resolution of the conflict through military means has not been successful,
in part due to ineffective operations against the LRA and an apparent lack of will by
the government to end the conflict through a negotiated settlement.
In October 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants
for five top LRA leaders, including Kony. Some observers, while supportive of the
ICC prosecution of these leaders, maintain that the ICC action could make peace
efforts very difficult. In April 2006, Bigombe stated that “it is now extremely
difficult for me to talk meaningfully to the LRA leadership when they know they are
being hunted down to be locked up behind bars in Europe.” 11
Current Peace Initiative
After a series of failed peace efforts, the government of South Sudan appears to
have made some significant strides in brokering the conflict. Following months of
talks in Juba, Sudan, the two parties signed a formal cessation of hostilities
agreement on August 26, 2006. Under the agreement, LRA insurgents were expected
to gather at assembly points in southern Sudan. The deadline for assembly was
extended after ceasefire observers reported that both sides violated the agreement in
October. The Ugandan army has admitted to approaching a rebel safe haven in
Sudan, claiming it was escorting journalists and diplomats on a fact-finding mission.
Meanwhile, LRA soldiers, claiming they feared attack by the Ugandan forces,
violated the agreement by leaving a designated assembly point in southern Sudan.
Many observers remain skeptical that all of the remaining LRA insurgents will
comply with the terms of the agreement.
President Museveni has offered amnesty if the rebels accept a peace agreement.
According to media reports and U.S. officials, there is support among many civilians
in northern Uganda for reconciliation rather than revenge against the LRA leaders.
To date, Kony has rejected Museveni’s offer, pronouncing that amnesty “presupposes
surrender”.12 Nevertheless, unless the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, accepts a local judicial solution, the indicted insurgents would have to
accept asylum in a country not bound by the Rome Treaty. The ICC has announced
that it will not consider any amnesty proposal until after the successful completion
of a peace agreement.
11 Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Uganda: Mediator Critical of ICC Indictments,
April 15, 2006.
12 Jaime Jansen. “Uganda Rebels Reject Amnesty Offer.” Jurist, July 7, 2006.

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Social and Economic Profile
Economic Conditions
Uganda is blessed with fertile soils, regular rainfall, and sizable deposits of
copper and cobalt. Its largest sector is agriculture, which employs 78% of the
workforce, and accounted for about 90% of export earnings and 23.4% of Uganda’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2003/2004. Coffee exports make up half its export
earnings and Uganda is Africa’s largest coffee producer. Other major exports include
cotton, tea, and to a lesser extent, maize. Crop production has been hampered by
security concerns in the northern and western regions of Uganda. To stabilize the
economy, Museveni adopted a policy of reducing inflation while simultaneously
increasing production and export earnings. Uganda raised producer prices on export
crops, increased the prices of imported petroleum products, and boosted civil service
wages.

The industrial sector has also expanded, with real output growth approaching
10% a year, and contributed 24.2% of GDP in 2003/2004. The main industries
include the processing of coffee, cotton, tea, sugar, tobacco, edible oils, dairy
products, and grain milling as well as brewing. Other ventures include vehicle
assembly and the manufacture of textiles and metal products. According to the
Economic Intelligence Unit (3/2006), “real GDP growth is forecast to improve to
5.8% in 2006 and 6% in 2007, supported by continued expansion in manufacturing,
construction, transport and telecommunications. Food production will remain
vulnerable to disruptions such as drought and disease, and prices will fall back
slowly, with inflation set to average 7% in 2006 and 6% in 2007. Declining coffee
prices, high fuel prices and growth in investment-led imports are expected to result
in a widening of the current-account deficit from an estimated 4% of GDP in 2005
to 4.8% of GDP in 2006 and 5.5% of GDP in 2007.”
Obstacles to economic growth remain. Uganda’s heavy reliance on coffee
exports makes it vulnerable to international commodity price fluctuations and poor
weather conditions. Privatization initiatives pose a problem as they are seen by many
to be a scramble for the fruits of state-owned property. Another problem plaguing
Uganda’s economy is corruption. Uganda relies upon international donors for 41%
of its national budget. Those donors, in particular Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, have become increasingly critical of governance issues and a rise
in defense spending.
Uganda is eligible for trade benefits, including textile and apparel benefits, with
the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). In 2005,
Uganda’s exports to the United States under AGOA provisions were valued at $4.9
million, composing 19% of the country’s total exports to the United States.
HIV/AIDS
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Uganda was one of the African countries most
devastated by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Over the past decade, however, Uganda has
made significant progress in the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the Museveni

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government is widely credited for implementing a sweeping reform to address the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. According to USAID, the prevalence of HIV has dropped over
50% in the last fifteen years. Today the overall prevalence rate is 6.7%. Moreover,
prevalence among pregnant women declined significantly. Despite these impressive
declines, HIV/AIDS is still a serious problem in Uganda. An estimated 91,000
Ugandans died in 2005, and there are over 1 million orphans from the AIDS crisis.
Uganda HIV/AIDS prevention program known as ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful, or
Use Condoms) is credited for the reduction in HIV infections, and has been viewed
by the U.S. Administration as a model for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. In 2007,
the United States is expected to provide $188 million to support Uganda’s fight
against HIV/AID (see table below for a summary of U.S. assistance to Uganda).
Regional Relations
Uganda is a member of the East African Community and has enjoyed favorable
relations with its fellow members, Kenya and Tanzania. Uganda has at times had
tense relations with two of its other neighbors, namely Rwanda and, more recently,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), resulting from its 1998 troop deployment
into eastern Congo. While the government claimed the troop presence was aimed at
discouraging attacks from Ugandan rebels based in the region, there were widespread
allegations of natural resource exploitation, and Uganda eventually removed its
troops under international pressure in 2003. In 2005 Museveni threatened to send
troops back to the region when LRA forces moved from Sudan to the DRC if Congo
failed to deny them sanctuary, although the current peace talks may avert further
contention.
U.S.-Uganda Relations
Relations between Washington and Kampala are warm. Over the years,
successive American administrations have supported the Museveni government as
a reformist regime and a staunch ally of the United States. The Clinton
Administration championed the Museveni regime, and President Clinton visited
Uganda during his 1998 tour of Africa. Relations cooled when Ugandan troops
intervened in the Congo in 1998. Clinton Administration officials were also critical
of Uganda and Rwanda when the two former allies clashed in eastern Congo in 1999
and 2000.
The Bush Administration appears to have restored good relations with Kampala.
Former Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Uganda during his four-nation trip to
Africa in late May 2001. Secretary Powell met with President Museveni and
opposition leaders to discuss a wide range of issues, including Sudan and DRC. He
praised Museveni for lowering Uganda’s HIV-AIDS infection rate. In 2001, Uganda
withdrew several battalions from Congo and by May 2003, almost all of Uganda’s
troops had been withdrawn from Congo. President Museveni has also been a leading
ally of the United States in the fight against international terrorism, and was one of
the first African leaders to pledge support in the war against Iraq.

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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Uganda
($ in thousands)
Account
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Actual
Estimate
Request
CSH
15,160
19,948
18,512
DA
27,967
21,614
23,845
FMF
1,984
— —
GHAI
122,741
145,000
188,000
IMET
293
238
295
NADR-TIP
— — 150
P.L. 480 Title II
64,410
16,193
19,000
Peace Corps
1,768
1,848
1,868
Source: Department of State.
Acronyms. CSH: Child Survival and Health; DA: Development Assistance;
FMF: Foreign Military Financing; GHAI: Global Aids Initiative; IMET:
International Military Education and Training; NADR-TIP:
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related programs.