Order Code RL33692
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
October 18, 2006
Christopher Bolkcom
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
Summary
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) supports Department of Defense (DOD)
airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for airlift exceeds the capability
of the military aircraft fleet. All CRAF participants must be U.S. carriers fully
certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, and meet the stringent standards of
Federal Aviation Regulations pertaining to commercial airlines (Part 121).
The CRAF has three main segments: international, national, and aeromedical
evacuation. The international segment is further divided into the long-range and
short-range sections and the national segment into the domestic and Alaskan sections.
Assignment of aircraft to a segment depends on the nature of the requirement and the
performance characteristics needed.
The commercial airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the various segments
of CRAF, ready for activation when needed. To provide incentives for civil carriers
to commit aircraft to the CRAF program and to assure the United States of adequate
airlift reserves, the government makes peacetime airlift business available to civilian
airlines that obligate aircraft to the CRAF. DOD offers business through the
International Airlift Services.
CRAF presents benefits and opportunities for both DOD and U.S. airlines. By
all accounts it appears to be a symbiotic relationship. Yet, as circumstances change,
pressures and diverging interests may emerge that could bring changes to CRAF. A
number of factors may be considered when examining the future size, character and
role of CRAF. These factors include cost, other potential government / commercial
arrangements, potential change in DOD requirement for CRAF, and industrial base
or financial assistance to U.S. air carriers. This report will be updated as events
warrant.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CRAF Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Contractual Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CRAF Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Analysis - Potential Future of CRAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Cost Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Other Government / Commercial Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Potential Change in DOD Requirement for CRAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Industrial Base / Financial Assistance to Air Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
List of Figures
Figure 1. CRAF Requirements and Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
List of Tables
Table 1. Recent Growth in CRAF Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

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Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
Background
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) supports Department of Defense (DOD)
airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for airlift exceeds the capability
of military aircraft. All CRAF participants must be U.S. carriers fully certified by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and meet the stringent standards of Federal
Aviation Regulations pertaining to commercial airlines (Part 121). To join CRAF,
a carrier must commit at least 30% of its CRAF-capable passenger fleet, and 15% of
its CRAF-capable cargo fleet. Aircraft committed must be U.S. registered and
carriers must also commit and maintain at least four complete crews for each aircraft.
Air Mobility Command (AMC) analysts implement a number of surveillance
initiatives to monitor the carrier’s safety record, operations and maintenance status,
contract performance, financial condition and management initiatives, summarizing
significant trends in a comprehensive review every six months. These initiatives are
supplemented by an open flow of information on all contract carriers between AMC
and the FAA through established liaison officers.
CRAF Structure
The CRAF has three main segments: international, national, and aeromedical
evacuation. The international segment is further divided into the long-range and
short-range sections and the national segment into the domestic and Alaskan sections.
Assignment of aircraft to a segment depends on the nature of the requirement and the
performance characteristics needed.
The long-range international section consists of passenger and cargo aircraft
capable of transoceanic operations. The role of these aircraft is to augment C-5s and
C-17s during periods of increased airlift needs. Medium-sized passenger and cargo
aircraft make up the short-range international section supporting near offshore airlift
requirements.
The aircraft in the Alaskan section provide airlift within U.S. Pacific
Command’s area of responsibility, specific to Alaska needs. The domestic section is
designed to satisfy increased DOD airlift requirements in the United States during an
emergency.
The aeromedical evacuation segment assists in the evacuation of casualties from
operational theaters to hospitals in the continental United States. These aircraft are
also used to return medical supplies and medical crews to the theater of operations.
Kits containing litter stanchions, litters, and other aeromedical equipment are used
to convert civil B-767 passenger aircraft into air ambulances.

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CRS-2
Contractual Relationship
The airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the various segments of CRAF,
ready for activation when needed. To provide incentives for civil carriers to commit
aircraft to the CRAF program and to assure the United States of adequate airlift
reserves, the government makes peacetime airlift business available to civilian
airlines that obligate aircraft to the CRAF. DOD offers business through the
International Airlift Services.
For FY2005, the guaranteed portion of the CRAF contract was $418 million.
AMC estimates that throughout fiscal 2005 it would also award more than $1.5
billion in additional business that is not guaranteed.1 In September 2005 the Air
Force announced $2.2 billion in CRAF contracts had been let FY2005.2 For FY2003
the guaranteed portion of the CRAF contract was $394 million with more than $224
million in potential, additional business. DOD let contracts worth $3.8 billion to
commercial airlines to transport personnel and cargo from FY1998 to FY2002;3 1998
— $646 million, 1999 — $710 million, 2000 — $629 million, 2001 — $572 million,
and 2002 — $1,280 million. The use of chartered commercial aircraft in 2002 was
more than double that of the previous year. This may be due to an unanticipated
increase in mobility requirements in support of the Bush Administration’s war on
terrorism.
Activation
Three stages of incremental activation allow for tailoring an airlift force suitable
for the contingency at hand. Stage I is for minor regional crises, Stage II would be
used for major theater war, and Stage III for periods of national mobilization.
The commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), with approval
of the Secretary of Defense, is the activation authority for all three stages of CRAF.
During a crisis, if the Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC) has a need for
additional aircraft, it would request the TRANSCOM commander to take steps to
activate the appropriate CRAF stage.
Each stage of the CRAF activation is only used to the extent necessary to
provide the amount of civil augmentation airlift needed by DOD. When notified of
call-up, the carrier response time to have its aircraft ready for a CRAF mission is 24
to 48 hours after the mission is assigned by AMC. The air carriers continue to operate
and maintain the aircraft with their resources; however, AMC controls the aircraft
missions.
1 Civil Reserve Air Fleet (Fact Sheet). U.S. Air Force. October 2005.
[http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=173]
2 “Air Force announces CRAF contracts valued at $2.2 billion.” (Release Number: 570905)
Air Force Print News Today. Sept. 13, 2005.
3 Military Readiness. Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, but Incentives May
Need Revamping. General Accounting Office (GAO-03-278) December 2002. p.15.

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CRS-3
CRAF has been formally activated on two separate occasions over the
program’s 54 year history. The first activation was during Operations Desert
Shield/Storm from August 18, 1990 through May 24, 1991. The level of activation
included long range international passenger and cargo up to Stage II. The second
activation was during Operation Iraqi Freedom from February 8, 2003 through June
18, 2003. The level of activation included long range international passenger up to
Stage 1; long range cargo was not required.
CRAF Membership
As of April 2005, 40 carriers and 1,126 aircraft were enrolled in the CRAF. This
includes 1,003 aircraft in the international segment (785 in the long-range
international section and 218 in the short-range international section), and 36 and 83
aircraft, respectively, in the national and aeromedical evacuation segments. These
numbers are subject to change on a quarterly basis. The following air carriers are
members of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet:
Long-Range International Section:
Express.net
ABX Air
Falcon Air
Air Transport International
Lynden Air Cargo
American Airlines
Miami Air International
ATA Airlines
Planet Airways
Arrow Air
Spirit Airlines
Astar Air Cargo
Sun Country
Atlas Air
Continental Airlines
Aeromedical Evacuation Segment:
Delta Air Lines
Delta Air Lines
Evergreen International
United Airlines
FEDEX Express Airlines
US Airways
Gemini Air Cargo
Hawaiian Airlines
Domestic Section:
Kalitta Air
Air Trans Airways
North American Airlines
America West
Northwest Airlines
Frontier Airlines
Omni International
Midwest Airlines
Polar Air Cargo
Southwest Airlines
Ryan International
Southern Air
Alaskan Section:
United Airlines
Northern Air Cargo
United Parcel Service Airlines
Lynden Air Cargo
US Airways
World Airways
Short-Range International Section:
Alaska Airlines
Astar Air Cargo
Champion
Continental Airlines
Delta Airlines
Evergreen International

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CRS-4
Analysis - Potential Future of CRAF
CRAF presents benefits and opportunities for both DOD and U.S. airlines. By
all accounts it appears to be a symbiotic relationship. Yet, as circumstances change,
pressures and diverging interests may emerge that could bring changes to CRAF. For
example, DOD plans appear to increasingly emphasize expeditionary warfare and
long-range power projection. Increasing the size, capacity, and use of CRAF is one
potential approach to satisfying DOD’s growing appetite for long range airlift.4 Also,
the Department of Transportation has proposed changes to Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulations that might potentially lead to increased foreign
investment in U.S. airlines, including those that participate in CRAF.5 In light of
these factors, an examination of the potential future of CRAF appears useful.
Cost Factors
The primary benefit that CRAF imparts is low cost. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) notes that CRAF provides up to half of the nation’s
long range airlift capability without the government having to buy additional aircraft,
pay personnel costs, or maintain the aircraft during peacetime. GAO references the
use of CRAF during Operation Desert Storm to illustrate its point:
The use of CRAF aircraft during an activation is not free — DOD pays rates
based on weighted average carrier costs — but the cost is minimal in comparison
to the costs of acquiring and supporting aircraft, paying and training aircrew, and
other expenses of maintaining standby military airlift capability. AMC paid the
carriers about $1.5 billion for using their aircraft during the operation.
Purchasing additional military aircraft to provide similar capability would cost
from $15 to $50 billion, according to Air Force officials, depending on
assumptions used for aircraft replacement cost.6
A RAND study (Finding the Right Mix of Military and Civil Airlift, Issues and
Implications) also includes a discussion of the cost-effectiveness of CRAF:
For a very small cost, the DOD has had on call a very substantial airlift capacity.
Replacing CRAF’s 1992 Stage II capability with military-style transports would
have cost the DOD about $1 billion annually (1992 dollars) over the past several
decades. Replacing the Stage III capability would have cost about $3 billion
annually.7
4 See CRS Report RS20915, Strategic Airlift Modernization, by Christopher Bolkcom for
more information.
5 See 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389 (Nov. 7, 2005), a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
seeking comments on a proposal to clarify the policy of requiring “actual control” of a U.S.
air carrier to be by a citizen of the United States.
6 Ibid., p.7.
7 Jean Gebman, et al. Finding the Right Mix of Military and Civil Airlift, Issues and
Implications. Volume 1. Executive Summary. RAND. Santa Monica, CA.1994. P.21.

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CRS-5
The RAND analysis points out that to have adequate airlift for a major crisis,
DOD maintains a military airlift fleet with a total capacity four to five times greater
than the average daily use. Costs associated with acquiring and maintaining this
excess airlift capability must be routinely incurred, even if the full capacity is rarely
used.
As DOD’s procurement and operations and maintenance accounts come under
increasing pressure, it may appear attractive to increase the size of CRAF in lieu of
procuring and operating a certain fraction of the Air Force strategic airlift fleet.
Recent events may suggest that a growing use of commercial aircraft for every-day
DOD needs is already in evidence. In January 2005, for example, it was reported that
commercial airlines moved twice as many U.S. troops overseas as they moved in
January 2004.8
Contracting with air carriers to commit their aircraft to wartime needs is
cheaper, in a sense, than purchasing and operating additional Air Force cargo aircraft.
However, CRAF is not free, and it costs more once activated. RAND points out that:
Although holding reserve capacity in the CRAF is far more cost effective than
holding the reserve in the military airlift fleet, the government has a financial
incentive to use its own resources (for which it has already committed funds) in
a crisis to the extent that they are conveniently available, rather than give
additional business to CRAF carriers.9
Other Government / Commercial Arrangements
CRAF is not the only means by which DOD transports troops by civil aircraft.
Through the General Services Administration (GSA), the U.S. government negotiates
and lets contracts to commercial airlines to fly government employees on official
U.S. government business. Federal employees, including DOD civilian and military
personnel, traveling on government business are obliged to fly with these contracted
airlines at the official government rate. DOD also charters commercial aircraft to
satisfy peacetime mobility needs.
In July 2006 the U.S. Central Command had initiated a pilot program —
“Commercial and Government Air Program” — to enlist commercial air cargo
carriers to deliver military supplies into Afghanistan and Iraq. The pilot program is
hoped to deliver up to 20% of DOD cargo to the region and to save DOD
approximately $9 million per month.10 DOD hopes to dramatically reduce its flight
costs by creating competition among carriers for the work, and by leveraging excess
cargo capacity on regularly scheduled commercial flights. This trial program could
be viewed as something of an alternative to CRAF, or an indication that more CRAF
would be welcome.
8 Micheline Maynard. “Airlines Moving More Troops This Month.” New York Times. Jan.
25, 2005.
9 RAND op cit. p.22.
10 Jason Sherman. “CENTCOM Taps Commercial Air Carriers to Cut Iraq Cargo Costs.”
Inside the Air Force. July 21, 2006.

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CRS-6
Potential Change in DOD Requirement for CRAF
It appears that the increased scope and pace of military operations following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have increased the Air Force’s mobility needs
and made CRAF a more prominent component of this capability.11 This increased
role, along with fear of bankruptcy or other major fluctuations in the U.S.
commercial air carrier market has led DOD to seek access to foreign air carriers.12
DOD’s most recent mobility requirements study (Mobility Requirements Study 05,
or MRS-05), however, calls for the same level of CRAF contribution to total airlift
capabilities (20.5 million ton miles per day of the overall 54.5 million ton miles per
day objective).13 DOD projected a growing discrepancy, however, between its actual
and desired airlift capabilities.
The Air Force would prefer to increase its airlift capabilities with additional
purchases of C-17 Globemasters because of that aircraft’s unique capabilities in
terms of range, types of payload that can be carried, and the ability to land on very
austere runways.14 Because Air Force budget limitations make additional large-scale
procurement of C-17s appear unlikely, DOD also proposes the design of a
commercial version of the aircraft (the BC-17) that might become part of the CRAF
fleet.
Some industry studies suggest that a commercial market for up to 10
commercial BC-17s may exist, for use in heavy industry, mining, or similar
endeavors. Under the proposed Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft
(CAMAA), private companies would purchase BC-17s and make them available to
the military in an emergency. The Air Force has proposed several options to
encourage participation, such as helping companies find customers who need
outsized cargo delivery, and monthly military business paid for at commercial rates.
In addition to having access to these aircraft, it has been asserted, the Air Force and
industry would benefit because building BC-17s for industry would use up excess
production capacity and help lower the per-unit cost of those aircraft bought by
DOD.15
11 See for example, Cynthia Di Pasquale. “Pentagon Studies CRAF Sustainability and
Incentives to Industry.”Inside the Air Force. Oct. 8, 2004.
12 See for example, Cynthia Di Pasquale. “Airline Bankruptcies, Move to Smaller Planes
Concern AMC Officials.” Inside the Air Force. Oct. 1, 2004.
13 Unlike previous mobility studies, DOD’s 2006 Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) did not
provide a specific quantitative estimate of airlift requirements. Some have asserted that this
omission reduces the value of the MCS and have called for another, requirements-driven
study.
14 See CRS Report RL30685, Military Airlift: C-17 Aircraft Program, by Christopher
Bolkcom for more information about the C-17.
15 Amy Butler. “Commercial C-17 Buys Would Stabilize Cost, Enhance Reserve Air Fleet.”
Inside the Air Force. December 22, 2000. Christian Lowe. “Air Force Issues Draft
Solicitation for Civilian C-17s” Defense Week. July 9, 2001.

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CRS-7
The figure above also indicates that DOD’s projected use of CRAF to fulfill
total airlift needs has increased from roughly 12 million ton miles per day (MTM/D)
in the late 1980s to roughly 20 MTM/D today. However, this increase in capacity has
occurred gradually, and the DOD’s requirement for CRAF can be viewed as being
stable over this 19 year span.
Another factor suggests that DOD’s need for CRAF may not change, even if
airlift requirements change. As the figure below indicates, commercial aircraft
committed to CRAF exceed DOD requirements. Thus, any foreseeable increase in
requirement appears likely not to cause any additional commitment in commercial
aircraft.
Figure 1. CRAF Requirements and Commitments
Source: Air Force Magazine. February 2003. p.28.

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CRS-8
Recapitalization of the Air Force’s strategic aerial refueling fleet may also have
an impact on future DOD CRAF needs and use. This is because both the KC-135
and the KC-10 are dual mission aircraft and carry cargo (primarily pallets) as well as
fuel. Currently, DOD is most in need of the cargo portion of the CRAF fleet. If
DOD were to recapitalize its aging tanker fleet with a larger number of KC-10-size
aircraft (it is considering both large tankers like the KC-30 and medium tankers like
the KC-767), it could appreciably increase the amount of organic cargo capability,
and thus require less CRAF. Today, the 59 KC-10s in the Air Force inventory
represent 12% of the Air Force’s organic airlift capabilities. A purchase, for
example, of 50 KC-30s, or similar aircraft, in tandem with the existing KC-10 fleet
might take an appreciable bite out of DOD’s CRAF needs.
Industrial Base / Financial Assistance to Air Carriers
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many U.S. commercial
air carriers have struggled due to a lack of business and other factors. As economic
and financial conditions for commercial air carriers have worsened, the potential
benefit of CRAF for the commercial sector has been increasingly discussed. It may
be that if economic conditions remain difficult, or worsen again, pressure may build
on DOD to use more CRAF, not necessarily to satisfy DOD’s needs, but to support
the private sector.16
Table 1. Recent Growth in CRAF Participation
1998
2002
2005
Carriers
35
33
40
Aircraft
657
927
1,126
Source: DOD data
All major passenger and cargo carriers participate in CRAF.17 This strong
participation can be inferred to reflect broad support for CRAF. The program is
voluntary, and it appears logical that if the airlines didn’t find participation to be in
their interest, they would not participate. Every indication suggests that U.S. air
carriers value CRAF and want to participate. Many airline complaints about CRAF
tend to address perceived impediments to increased access to the program and
DOD’s regular cargo business. A number of airline complaints or proposed
modifications are summarized below. As an alternative to increasing the
participation in, and use of CRAF, policy makers could, for example, aid
commercial air carriers by addressing some of the following complaints:
16 See for example Scott McCartney. “Flying Troops for the Pentagon Gives Airlines a
Financial Boost.” Wall Street Journal. May 14, 2003. Micheline Maynard. “Pentagon’s
War Needs Are a Lifeline for Airlines.” New York Times. Dec. 26, 2003. Micheline
Maynard. “Pentagon’s Needs Offer Airlines a Lift.” New York Times. Jan. 22, 2005.
17 United, American, Delta, Northwest, US Airways, Southwest, UPS, and FEDEX
respectively.

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CRS-9
! Many carriers are dissatisfied with their share of peacetime business
with DOD. They claim that DOD’s preference for 747 aircraft, over
smaller aircraft, unfairly rewards carriers that operate wide-body
aircraft with a disproportionate amount of peacetime business. As
a result, they argue that CRAF’s reward system should be revamped.
! Some carriers have expressed an interest in more DOD business, but
there are no incentives in CRAF to pursue it. One solution might be
to allow carriers to bid for additional DOD contracts to transport
small packages if these carriers commit more than the minimum
number of aircraft required for the CRAF program.
! CRAF carriers must rely on supplemental insurance when operating
in war zones. The FAA’s Aviation War Risk Insurance Program is
designed to provide CRAF carriers with wartime insurance, but it is
seen as underfunded, and the bureaucratic procedures are unwieldy.
The program could be streamlined and provided with additional
funds.
! Commercial carriers can lose business to foreign competition or
non-CRAF competitors when CRAF is activated. Although access
to DOD business during peacetime makes up for this loss, some
companies believe they should be compensated for lost business.
! Many of the airlines that operated during Operation Desert Storm
said that DOD’s compensation rates did not cover all the costs that
they incurred. The Air Force pays airlines normal peacetime rates
when they are activated. Airlines claim that costs for hazardous duty
pay, routing delays and establishing en route bases were higher
during activation than during peacetime. Airlines have filed claims
with the Air Force for these costs, but complain that these claims
took too long to settle and required onerous documentation.
! Some airlines complained that when they were activated to
participate in Operation Desert Storm DOD did not fully use their
aircraft. If the aircraft weren’t used, the airline couldn’t charge the
government. Further, airlines complained about perceived delays in
loading and unloading cargo when the aircraft were being used,
which reduced the number of sorties they could fly, which in turn
reduced the amount of money they could charge the government.
! The Air Force’s greatest CRAF need is for cargo aircraft. Thus,
DOD provides greater rights to peacetime business to airlines that
commit cargo aircraft to the program. As a result, a small number of
cargo carriers have the rights to a large portion of DOD’s peacetime
business. DOD’s peacetime needs, however, are primarily for
passenger aircraft. To address this imbalance of needs and interests,
the airline industry developed a system of “joint ventures” where
cargo and passenger carriers team up. Cargo carriers sell their rights
to peacetime business to their passenger carrying partners. These

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CRS-10
joint ventures work well in peacetime, but can become cumbersome
when trying to settle extraordinary expense claims for CRAF
activation and operations.

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