Order Code RL31339
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Post-Saddam
Governance and Security
Updated October 18, 2006
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but Iraq remains
unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded
by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. According to its
November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that
U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own
security. President Bush has said he believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will
become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global
war on terrorism. However, mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs — without
clear signs of security progress — have intensified a debate within the United States
over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement
without completely accomplishing U.S. goals.
President Bush, in several series of speeches since 2005, asserts that U.S. policy
is showing important success, demonstrated by two elections (January and December
2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term parliament and government, a
referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in
building Iraq’s security forces, and economic growth. He maintains that U.S. forces
should remain in Iraq until Iraq’s elected government is able to defend itself. While
continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has
worked to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security
institutions; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now
feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds.
However, senior U.S. military leaders have begun to express less optimism
about the situation in Iraq. Some in Congress believe the U.S. mission in Iraq is not
progressing and that major new initiatives are required. Some believe that U.S.
counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop levels.
Others maintain that sectarian violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of an all
out civil war in Iraq and that setting a timetable for withdrawal might force
compromise among Iraqi factions. Others believe that a U.S. move to withdraw
might undercut popular support for the insurgency. Still others maintain that the
U.S. approach should focus not on counter-insurgent combat but on reconstruction
and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents, including neighborhoods of
Baghdad, an approach the Administration has adopted.
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth
Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations,
by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign
Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and
Christopher Blanchard.

---

Contents
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Major Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Kurds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr . . . 4
Smaller Shiite Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-September 11, 2001: Regime Change and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Operation Iraqi Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Occupation Period, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
and Ambassador Paul Bremer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Handover of Sovereignty and Transition Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate . . . . . 14
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
January 30, 2005, Elections/New Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
December 15, 2005, Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Regional and International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Democracy-Building and Local Governance/FY2006 Supplemental . 21
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Oil Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Security Challenges, Responses, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi Faction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Sectarian Violence and Militias/Civil War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Iranian Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams . 32
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Immediate Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Troop Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

---

Reorganize the Power Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Negotiating With Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Internationalization Options/Iraq Study Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
List of Tables
Table 1. Dominant Anti-Saddam Factions/Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 4. Ministry of Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Table 5. Ministry of Interior Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Table 6. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

---

Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958).1 Iraq had been a
province of the Ottoman empire until British forces defeated the Ottomans in World
War I and took control of what is now Iraq in 1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq
from the Ottomans in Iraq earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in
1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis (as did the
Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt
in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941, during World War II. Iraq’s first
Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who,
advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt
against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal
I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939.
Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was only four years old.
A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said,
a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times
during 1930-1958. Faysal II ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim
on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military
alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was
rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam’s rule. The Baath
Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq as
a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was to reduce religious and
sectarian schisms among Arabs.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
1 See Eisenstadt, Michael, and Eric Mathewson, eds, U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq:
Lessons from the British Experience. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003.
Members of the Hashemite family rule neighboring Jordan.

---

CRS-2
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein,
secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam’s home
town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam’s regime
repressed Iraq’s Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring
Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements, emboldened by
Iran, would try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment
Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the
Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided not to militarily
overthrow Saddam Hussein in the 1991 war because the United Nations had
approved only the liberation of Kuwait, because the Arab states in the coalition
opposed an advance to Baghdad, and because the Administration feared becoming
bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.2 Within days of the war’s end (February
28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurds in northern Iraq, emboldened
by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support, rebelled. The Shiite revolt
nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni Muslim Republican Guard forces
were pulled back into Iraq before engaging U.S. forces and were intact to suppress
the rebels. Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States for not intervening to prevent
suppression of the uprisings. Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone”
set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and remained
autonomous thereafter.
About two months after the failure of these uprisings, President George H.W.
Bush reportedly sent Congress an intelligence finding that the United States would
try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein. The Administration
apparently believed that a coup from within the regime could produce a favorable
government without fragmenting Iraq. After a reported July 1992 coup failed, there
was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the Kurdish, Shiite, and other
oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.3
Support for Iraq’s opposition was one facet of broader U.S. policy to pressure
Saddam Hussein. The main elements of U.S. containment policy during the 1990s
consisted of U.N. Security Council-authorized weapons inspections, an international
economic embargo, and U.S.-led enforcement of “no fly zones” over northern and
southern Iraq. The implementation of these policies is discussed in CRS Report
RL32379, Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and
U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
2 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million. Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times,
June 2, 1992.

---

CRS-3
Major Anti-Saddam Factions
Although U.S. policy after the 1991 war emphasized containment, the United
States built ties to and progressively increased support for several of the secular and
religious opposition factions discussed below. Some of these factions have provided
major figures in post-Saddam politics, while also fielding militias that are allegedly
conducting acts of sectarian reprisals in post-Saddam Iraq.
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA). In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist
groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National Congress (INC),” on a platform of human
rights, democracy, pluralism, and “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy). However,
many observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups
have authoritarian leaderships. The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad
Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent banking family, to run the INC
on a daily basis. Chalabi, who is about 67 years old, was educated in the United
States (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. As an Iraqi
governance structure was established, Chalabi was one of the rotating presidents of
the Iraq Governing Council (IGC). Since 2004, Chalabi has allied with and then
fallen out with Shiite Islamist factions; he was one of three deputy prime ministers
in the 2005 transition government, with a focus on economic issues. Chalabi
temporarily served as Oil Minister in December 2005, and he reportedly continues
to play a role in oil decisions. (A table on U.S. appropriations for the Iraqi
opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).4
Another secular group, the Iraq National Accord (INA), was founded after Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but reportedly later
earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).5 It is led by Dr. Iyad
al-Allawi, a Baathist who purportedly helped Saddam Hussein silence Iraqi dissidents
in Europe in the mid-1970s.6 Allawi, who is about 60 years old (born 1946 in
Baghdad), fell out with Saddam in the mid-1970s, became a neurologist and presided
over the Iraqi Student Union in Europe. He survived an alleged Saddam regime
assassination attempt in London in 1978. He is a secular Shiite Muslim, but many
INA members are Sunnis. The INA enjoyed Clinton Administration support in 1996
4 Chalabi’s father was president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the
1958 military coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American
University of Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran
afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly with
some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989. In April 1992, he was convicted
in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and sentenced to 22 years in prison.
The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors a total of $400 million. In a
fallout with his former U.S. backers, U.S.-backed Iraqi police raided INC headquarters in
Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing documents as part of an investigation of various
allegations, including provision of U.S. intelligence to Iran. The case was later dropped.
5 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New
York Times, June 9, 2004.
6 Hersh, Seymour. “Annals of National Security: Plan B,” The New Yorker, June 28, 2004.

---

CRS-4
after squabbling among other opposition groups reduced their viability.7 However,
the INA proved penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services, which arrested or executed
over 100 INA activists in June 1996. In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military
incursion into northern Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from
the PUK. The incursion enabled Baghdad to rout INC and INA agents in the north.
The Kurds.8 The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups. They have a historic fear of
persecution by the Arab majority and want to, at the very least, preserve the
autonomy of the post-1991 Gulf war period. Many younger Kurds want to go
beyond autonomy to outright independence. The Kurds, both through legal
procedures as well as population movements, are trying to secure the city of Kirkuk,
which the Kurds covet as a source of oil, and they have adopted a new oil
development law that some see as an attempt to secure oil resources located in the
Kurdish region for the Kurds alone. The Kurds achieved insertion of language in the
permanent constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on whether Kirkuk might
formally join the Kurdish administered region. For now, both major Kurdish factions
— the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masud Barzani — are participating in Iraqi politics,
the PUK more so than the KDP. Both were on the IGC; Talabani went on to become
Iraq’s president, while Barzani, on June 12, 2005, was named “president of
Kurdistan” by the 111-seat Kurdish regional assembly that was elected on January
30, 2005. In September 2006, the central government criticized the Kurdish regional
government for its decree that the Iraqi national flag, a holdover from the Saddam
era, not be flown in the Kurdish regions. There are also tensions over the Kurds’
deals with some small European oil companies to drill for oil in the Kurdish areas,
revenues from which presumably are not being deposited into the Central Bank or
shared with the rest of Iraq’s communities. The Kurds are building a $300 million
airport in Irbil capable of handling international passenger traffic.
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr.
Shiite Islamist organizations have emerged as the strongest factions in post-Saddam
politics; Shiites constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented
in all pre-2003 governments. Several Shiite factions cooperated with the U.S. regime
change efforts of the 1990s, but others had no contact with the United States.
The undisputed Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
remained in Iraq, albeit with a low profile, during Saddam Hussein’s regime, and he
was not involved in U.S.-backed regime change efforts during the 1990s. As the
“marja-e-taqlid” (source of emulation) and, since 1992, as the most senior of the
four Shiite clerics that lead the Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of
7 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.
8 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.

---

CRS-5
seminaries), he is a major political force in post-Saddam politics.9 He has a network
of agents (wakils) throughout Iraq and among Shiites outside Iraq.
About 84 years old, Sistani was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before
relocating to Najaf at the age of 21. His mentor, the former head of the Hawza, was
Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-Khoi. Like Khoi, Sistani generally opposes a direct
role for clerics in government, but he believes in clerical supervision of political
leaders. He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic culture and favors modest dress for
women, and curbs on sales of alcohol and Western music and entertainment.10 He
was treated for heart trouble in the United Kingdom in August 2004.
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Within
the “United Iraqi Alliance” (UIA) of Shiite political groupings, SCIRI shares power
with the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party and other factions. However, SCIRI has a militia
force (“Badr Brigades”), whereas Da’wa does not. SCIRI founders were in exile in
Iran after a major crackdown in 1980 by Saddam, who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi
Shiite Islamists of trying to overthrow him. During Khomeini’s exile in Najaf (1964-
1978), he was hosted by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, father of the Hakim
brothers that founded SCIRI. The Ayatollah was then head of the Hawza. SCIRI
leaders say they do not seek to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but many
SCIRI members follow Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, and SCIRI reportedly
receives substantial amounts of financial and other aid from Iran. SCIRI also runs
several media outlets. Although it was a member of the INC in the early 1990s,
SCIRI refused to accept U.S. funds, although it did have contacts with the United
States. Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric, is SCIRI’s leader; he
is a member of parliament from the UIA slate but he has taken no government
position. One of his top aides, Bayan Jabr, is now Finance Minister, and another,
Adel Abd al-Mahdi, is a deputy president.
Da’wa Party/Ibrahim al-Jafari and Nuri al-Maliki. The Da’wa (Islamic
Call) Party is both an ally and sometime rival of SCIRI. Da’wa did not directly join
the U.S.-led effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein during the 1990s. Its leader is
Ibrahim al-Jafari, a Da’wa activist since 1966 who fled to Iran in 1980 to escape
Saddam’s crackdown, later going to London. He was Prime Minister during April
2005-April 2006. His successor is the number two Da’wa leader, Nuri Kamal al-
Maliki (see text box below).
Although there is no public evidence that Jafari or Maliki were involved in any
terrorist activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa allegedly committed a May 1985
attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on
the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. Lebanese Hezbollah was founded by
Lebanese clerics loyal to Da’wa founder Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr and
Khomeini, and there continue to be personal and ideological linkages between
9 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
10 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].

---

CRS-6
Lebanese Hezbollah and Da’wa (as well as with SCIRI). Hezbollah attempted to link
release of the Americans they held hostage in Lebanon in the 1980s to the release of
17 Da’wa prisoners held by Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s.
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction. Moqtada Al Sadr is emerging as a major figure
in Iraq. He is the lone surviving son of the revered Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-
Sadr (the Ayatollah was killed, along with his other two sons, by regime security
forces in 1999 after he began agitating against Saddam). He has been viewed as a
young firebrand who lacks religious and political weight. However, the established
Shiite factions, as well as Iranian diplomats, are building ties to him because of his
large following, particularly among poorer Shiites.
By participating fully in the December 15, 2005, elections, Sadr appeared to
distance himself from his uprisings in 2003 and 2004, although tensions between
Sadr’s militia forces and international (particulary British) forces in Iraq — as well
as against rival Shiite factions and Iraqi security forces — are flaring again in 2006.
During 2003-2004, he used Friday prayer sermons in Kufa (near Najaf) to agitate for
a U.S. withdrawal, and he did not join any Iraqi governments. Pro-Sadr candidates
also won pluralities in several southern Iraqi provincial council elections and hold 6
seats on Basra’s 41-seat provincial council.
Smaller Shiite Factions. One other Shiite grouping, called Fadilah
(Virtue), holds about 15 seats in the 2006-2010 parliament as part of the UIA
coalition. Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, it is a splinter group of Moqtada
al-Sadr’s faction and is perceived as somewhat anti-U.S. It also holds seats on
several provincial councils in the Shiite provinces and controls the protection force
(Facilities Protection Service) for the oil installations in Basra. The governor of
Basra is a Fadilah member. This has made the party a major force in that city,
helping it, with Sadr’s help, to try to dominate the provincial government there.
Other Shiite parties operating in southern Iraq include fighters who challenged
Saddam Hussein’s forces in the southern marsh areas, around the town of Amara,
north of Basra. One goes by the name Hezbollah-Iraq and is headed by guerrilla
leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the IGC. Hezbollah-Iraq
apparently plays a major role in policing the relatively peaceful Amara (Maysan
province). Another pro-Iranian grouping that wields a militia is called Thar Allah
(Vengeance of God). A smaller Shiite Islamist organization, the Islamic Amal
(Action) Organization, is headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a
moderate cleric. Its power base is in Karbala, and it conducted attacks there against
regime organs in the 1980s. Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s
regime in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamic Amal won two seats in the January 30
election and has a member in the new cabinet (Minister of Civil Society Affairs).
Another Karbala-based faction is that of Ayatollah Mahmoud al-Hassani. His
armed followers clashed with local Iraqi security forces in Karbala in mid-August
2006. Hassani, along with Fadilah, are considered opponents of Iran because of
Iran’s support for the larger Shiite factions SCIRI and the Da’wa Party.

---

CRS-7
Table 1. Dominant Anti-Saddam Factions/Leaders
Iraq National
Consists of many ex-Baathists and ex-military officers. Allawi was
Accord
interim Prime Minister (June 2004-April 2005). Won 40 seats in
(INA)/Iyad al-
January 2005 election but only 25 in December 2005.
Allawi
Kurds/KDP
Two main Kurdish factions. Talabani became president of Iraq after
and PUK
January 2005 and remains so. Barzani has tried to secure his clan’s
base in the Kurdish north. Together, field up to 100,000 peshmerga
militia. Their joint slate won 75 seats in January election but only 53
in December.
Grand
Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq. No formal position in
Ayatollah Ali
government but has used his broad Shiite popularity to become
al-Sistani
instrumental in major questions facing it and in U.S. decisions on
Iraq. Helped forge UIA and brokered compromise over the selection
of a Prime Minister nominee in April 2006. Strongly criticized
Israel’s July 2006 offensive against Lebanese Hezbollah. However,
acknowledges that his influence is waning and that calls for Shiite
restraint are unheeded as Shiites look to armed parties and militias
for defense in sectarian warfare.
Supreme
Best-organized and most pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist party. It was
Council for
established in 1982 by Tehran to centralize Shiite Islamist
the Islamic
movements in Iraq. First leader, Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, killed
Revolution in
by bomb in Najaf in August 2003. Controls 5,000 fighter “Badr
Iraq (SCIRI)
Brigades” militia. As part of United Iraqi Alliance (UIA- 128 total
seats in December election), it has about 30 of its members in
parliament. Supports formation of large Shiite “region” composed of
nine southern provinces.
Da’wa
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957), active against
(Islamic Call)
Saddam Hussein in early 1980s. Founder, Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr,
Party
was ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and was hung by Saddam
regime in 1980. Da’wa supporters tend to follow senior Lebanese Shiite
cleric Mohammad Hossein Fadlallah rather than Iranian clerics. Has no
organized militia and a lower proportion of clerics than does SCIRI.
Part of UIA, controls about 28 seats in parliament.
Moqtada Al-
Young (about 31) relative of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr
Sadr Faction
and son of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq Al Sadr, was in Iraq during
Saddam’s rule. Inherited father’s political base in “Sadr City,” a
large (2 million population) Shiite district of Baghdad. Mercurial,
has both challenged and worked with U.S. in Iraq. Still clouded by
allegations of involvement in the April 10, 2003, killing in Iraq of
Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi and
head of his London-based Khoi Foundation. Formed “Mahdi Army”
militia in 2003, although some militia elements now believed beyond
Sadr’s control. Now part of UIA, controls 32 seats in new
parliament and ministries of health, transportation, and agriculture,
and has several seats on provincial councils of the Shiite-majority
provinces. Opposes formation of a large Shiite “region” in the south.

---

CRS-8
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act
During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) inspections led to growing congressional calls to overthrow Saddam,
beginning with an FY1998 supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 105-174). The
sentiment was reflected even more strongly in the “Iraq Liberation Act” (ILA, P.L.
105-338, October 31, 1998). This law, signed by President Clinton despite doubts
about opposition capabilities, was viewed as an expression of congressional support
for the concept of promoting an Iraqi insurgency with U.S. air power. The Bush
Administration has cited the ILA as evidence of a bipartisan consensus that Saddam
should be toppled.
The ILA stated that it should be the policy of the United States to “support
efforts” to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-November 1998,
President Clinton publicly articulated that regime change was a component of U.S.
policy toward Iraq. Section 8 states that the act should not be construed as
authorizing the use of U.S. military force to achieve regime change. The ILA did
not specifically terminate after Saddam Hussein was removed from power. Section
7 provides for post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi groups with “democratic
goals.” The law also gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million worth
of defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting funds, to
opposition groups designated by the Administration.
The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5,
1999, President Clinton made seven opposition groups eligible to receive U.S.
military assistance under the ILA (P.D. 99-13): INC; INA; SCIRI; KDP; PUK; the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);11 and the small Movement for
Constitutional Monarchy (MCM). In May 1999, the Clinton Administration
provided $5 million worth of training and “non-lethal” defense articles under the
ILA. During 1999-2000, about 150 oppositionists underwent civil administration
training at Hurlburt air base in Florida, including Defense Department-run civil
affairs training to administer a post-Saddam government. The Hurlburt trainees were
not brought into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed
to Iraq. However, the Clinton Administration decided that the opposition was not
sufficiently capable to merit weapons or combat training.
11 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally de-listed.

---

CRS-9
Post-September 11, 2001:
Regime Change and War
Several senior Bush Administration officials had long been advocates of a
regime change policy toward Iraq, but the difficulty of that strategy led the Bush
Administration initially to continue its predecessor’s emphasis on containment.12
Some accounts say that the Administration was planning, prior to September 11, to
confront Iraq militarily, but President Bush has denied this. During its first year,
Administration policy tried to strengthen containment of Iraq, which the
Administration said was rapidly eroding, by achieving U.N. Security Council
adoption (Resolution 1409, May 14, 2002) of a “smart sanctions” plan. The plan
relaxed U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to Iraq of purely civilian equipment13
in exchange for renewed international commitment to enforce the U.N. ban on
exports to Iraq of militarily-useful goods.
Bush Administration policy on Iraq changed to an active regime change effort
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In President Bush’s State of the
Union message on January 29, 2002, given as major combat in the U.S.-led war on
the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down, he characterized Iraq
as part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North Korea). Some U.S. officials,
particularly deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States
needed to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks by “ending states,” such as Iraq,
that support terrorist groups. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in
March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the possibility of
confronting Iraq militarily, although the leaders visited reportedly urged greater U.S.
attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed war with Iraq. Some accounts,
including the books Plan of Attack and State of Denial by Bob Woodward (published
in April 2004 and September 2006, respectively), say that then Secretary of State
Powell and others were concerned about the potential consequences of an invasion
of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building a democracy after major hostilities
ended. Other accounts include reported memoranda (the “Downing Street Memo”)
by British intelligence officials, based on conversations with U.S. officials. That
memo reportedly said that by mid-2002 the Administration had already decided to
go to war against Iraq and that it sought to develop information about Iraq to support
that judgment. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this. (On
December 20, 2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s
refusal to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.)
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate.
12 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, Mar. 11, 2002.
13 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.

---

CRS-10
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials, including President
Bush, particularly in an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, asserted
the following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to
rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
previous resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of
Iraq’s WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons
against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors
(Iran), implying that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from
using WMD against the United States; and (3) that Iraq could
transfer its WMD to terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in
potentially catastrophic attacks in the United States. Critics noted
that, under the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD
against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war. A “comprehensive”
September 2004 report of the Iraq Survey Group, known as the
“Duelfer report,”14 found no WMD stockpiles or production but said
that there was evidence that the regime retained the intention to
reconstitute WMD programs in the future. The formal U.S.-led
WMD search ended December 2004,15 although U.S. forces have
found some chemical weapons caches left over from the Iran-Iraq
war.16 The UNMOVIC work remains formally active.17
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-1982 and was again so designated after its 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam
Hussein’s regime had a direct connection to the September 11
attacks, senior U.S. officials asserted that Saddam’s regime was
linked to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-Al Qaeda
militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq. Although
this issue is still debated, the report of the 9/11 Commission found
no evidence of a “collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq
and Al Qaeda.18
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Although it is not certain when the Administration decided on an invasion, in
mid-2002 the Administration began ordering a force to the region that, by early 2003,
gave the President an active option to take that step. In concert, the Administration
tried to build up and broaden the Iraqi opposition and, according to the Washington
14 The full text of the Duelfer report is available at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
15 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
16 Pincus, Walter. Munitions Found in Iraq Renew Debate. Washington Post, July 1, 2006.
17 For information on UNMOVIC’s ongoing activities, see [http://www.unmovic.org/].
18 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.

---

CRS-11
Post (June 16, 2002), authorizing stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special
operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein. In August 2002, the State and
Defense Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups to Washington,
D.C. At the same time, the Administration expanded its ties to several groups,
particularly those composed of ex-military officers. The Administration also began
training about 5,000 oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,19 although reportedly only
about 70 completed training at an air base (Taszar) in Hungary, eventually serving
as translators during the war. At the same time, the Administration opposed a move
by the major factions to declare a provisional government, believing that doing so
would prevent the emergence of secular, pro-democracy groups after Saddam’s fall.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly (September 12, 2002) that the U.N. Security
Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq. The
Administration subsequently agreed to give Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with
all applicable Council resolutions by supporting Security Council Resolution 1441
(November 8, 2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection.
Iraq reluctantly accepted it. In January and February 2003, UNMOVIC Director
Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-
Baradei briefed the Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November
27, 2002. Although they were not denied access to suspect sites, they criticized Iraq
for failing to actively cooperate to clear up outstanding questions, but also noted
progress and said that Iraq might not have retained any WMD. The Bush
Administration asserted that Iraq was not complying with Resolution 1441 because
it was not pro-actively revealing information.
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion. It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if
he determines that doing so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N.
Security Council resolutions. It passed the House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and
the Senate the following day (77-23). It was signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely. The United States, along with Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria, maintained that Iraq had not fundamentally decided to disarm.
At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain, Spain, and
Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted that diplomatic options to disarm
Iraq had failed. The following evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and
his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
19 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,”
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 2002.

---

CRS-12
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British-led 30-country20 “coalition of the
willing” force assembled, a substantial proportion of which remained afloat or in
supporting roles. Of the invasion force, Britain contributed 45,000, and U.S. troops
constituted the bulk of the remaining 335,000 forces. Some Iraqi units and irregulars
(“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional tactics.
Some post-major combat evaluation (“Cobra Two,” by Michael Gordon and Bernard
Trainor, published in 2006) suggest the U.S. military should have focused more on
combating the irregulars rather than bypassing them to take on armored forces. No
WMD was used by Iraq, although it did fire some ballistic missiles into Kuwait; it
is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than 150 km).
The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein appeared
with supporters that day in Baghdad’s mostly Sunni Adhamiya district.
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition
According to the Bush Administration’s November 30, 2005, “Strategy for
Victory,” the U.S. long-term goal is to enable Iraq to be stable, unified, and
democratic, able to provide for its own security, a partner in the global war on
terrorism, and a model for reform in Middle East. The political transition in post-
Saddam Iraq has advanced, but insurgent violence is still widespread, and sectarian
violence has increased to the point that senior U.S. officials say that it is now the
pre-eminent security threat in Iraq, with “potential” for full fledged civil war. Some
experts say Iraq is already in a state of civil war, by most definitions of the term.
Occupation Period, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and
Ambassador Paul Bremer. After the fall of the regime, the United States set up
an occupation structure, reportedly grounded in concerns that immediate sovereignty
would favor major factions and not produce democracy. The Administration initially
tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction with a staff of U.S.
government personnel to administer Iraq’s ministries; they deployed in April 2003.
He headed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),
within the Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order.
The Administration’s immediate post-war policy did not make use of an extensive
State Department initiative, called the “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent at least a
year before the war drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam.
The State Department project, which cost $5 million, had 15 working groups on
major issues.21
Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi regime. He and
White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (now Ambassador to Iraq) organized a
20 Many of the thirty countries listed in the coalition did not contribute forces to the combat.
A subsequent State Department list released on March 27, 2003 listed 49 countries in the
coalition of the willing. The 49 country list can be found in the Washington Post, Mar. 27,
2003, p. A19.
21 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/].

---

CRS-13
meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying views and
ethnicities. A subsequent meeting of over 250 notables was held in Baghdad
(April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to
name an interim administration. However, senior U.S. officials reportedly disliked
Garner’s toleration of Iraqis naming themselves as local leaders, among other
measures. In May 2003, the Administration named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to
replace Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which
subsumed ORHA. The CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003).
Bremer discontinued Garner’s political transition process and instead appointed
a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body. On July 13, 2003, he named this 25-member
“Iraq Governing Council” (IGC), and in September 2003, the IGC selected a 25-
member “cabinet” to run the ministries, with roughly the same factional and ethnic
balance of the IGC itself (a slight majority of Shiite Muslims). The IGC was widely
perceived in Iraq as an arm of U.S. decision-making. Although there were some
Sunni figures in the CPA-led political structure, such as pro-Western Sunni elder
(Shammar tribe) Ghazi al-Yawar, many Sunnis resented the U.S. invasion and
opposed the Iraqi bodies. Adding to Sunni resentment were some of the CPA’s most
controversial decisions, including the decision not to recall members of the armed
forces to serve in a new Iraqi security force, and to pursue “de-Baathification” — a
purge from government of about 30,000 persons who held any of the four top ranks
of the Baath Party. The IGC also authorized a war crimes tribunal for Saddam and
his associates, still ongoing.
Handover of Sovereignty and Transition Roadmap
The Bush Administration initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections for a
new government, tasks expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah
Sistani and others agitated for early Iraqi sovereignty and direct elections. In
November 2003, the United States announced it would return sovereignty to Iraq by
June 30, 2004, and that national elections would be held by the end of 2005.
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The CPA decisions were
incorporated into an interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL), which was drafted mostly by the major anti-Saddam factions (signed on
March 8, 2004).22 It provided a roadmap for political transition, as follows.
! Elections by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly. A permanent constitution would be drafted by August
15, 2005, and put to a national referendum by October 15, 2005.
National elections for a permanent government, under the new
constitution (if it passed), would be held by December 15, 2005.
The new government would take office by December 31, 2005.
22 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website at [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].

---

CRS-14
! Any three provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds
majority. If that happened, a new draft was to be developed and
voted on by October 15, 2006. In that case, the December 15, 2005,
elections would have been for another interim National Assembly.
! The Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government.” They were given powers to contradict or alter the
application of Iraqi law in their provinces, and their peshmerga
militia were allowed to operate.
! Islam was designated “a source,” but not the primary source, of law,
and no law could be passed that contradicts such rights as peaceful
assembly; free expression; and the right to strike and demonstrate.
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover. The TAL did not
directly address the formation of the interim government that would assume
sovereignty. Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan to select a national
assembly through nationwide “caucuses.” After considering several other options,
the United States tapped U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to select that government.23
Dominated by senior faction leaders, it was named and began work on June 1, 2004.
The formal handover ceremony occurred on June 28, 2004, two days before the
advertised June 30 date, partly to confuse insurgents. There was a ceremonial
president (Ghazi al-Yawar), and Iyad al-Allawi was Prime Minister, with executive
power, heading a cabinet of 26 ministers. Six ministers were women, and the
ethnicity mix was roughly the same as in the IGC. The defense and interior
ministries were headed by Sunni Arabs.
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate. The
Administration asserts that it has consistently sought U.N. and partner country
involvement in Iraq efforts. Resolution 1483 (cited above) provided for a U.N.
special representative to Iraq, and “called on” governments to contribute forces for
stabilization. Resolution 1500 (August 14, 2003) established U.N. Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).24 The size of UNAMI in Iraq has increased to a few
hundred, headed by former Pakistani diplomat Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, primarily
focused on promoting political reconciliation, election assistance, and monitoring
human rights practices and humanitarian affairs. In an attempt to satisfy the
requirements of several nations for greater U.N. backing of the coalition force
presence, the United States achieved adoption of Resolution 1511 (October 16,
2003), authorizing a “multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.] command.”
Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further by
endorsing the handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim
government, and spelling out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq,
23 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,” Washington Post,
Apr. 15, 2004.
24 Its mandate has been renewed each year since, most recently by Resolution 1700 (Aug.
10, 2006).

---

CRS-15
as well as authorizing a coalition component force to protect U.N. personnel and
facilities. The Resolution contained the following provisions.
! It “authorize[d]” the U.S.-led coalition to secure Iraq, a provision
interpreted as giving the coalition responsibility for security. Iraqi
forces are “a principal partner” in the U.S.-led coalition, and the
relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is spelled out in an
annexed exchange of letters between the United States and Iraq. The
U.S.-led coalition retained the ability to take prisoners.
! It stipulated that the coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the
request of the government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of
this resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire
when a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and
that the mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so
requests.” On November 11, 2005, in advance of the termination of
the mandate, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1637
extending the coalition military mandate to December 31, 2006,
unless earlier requested by the Iraqi government. The Resolution
also required review of the mandate on June 15, 2006; no changes
were made to the mandate at that time.
! It deferred the issue of the status of foreign forces (Status of Forces
Agreement, SOFA) to an elected Iraqi government. No SOFA has
been signed to date, and U.S. forces operate in Iraq and use its
facilities under temporary memoranda of understanding. Major
facilities include Balad, Tallil, and Al Asad air bases, as well as the
arms depot at Taji; all are being built up with U.S. military
construction funds in various appropriations. However, Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld told journalists in July 2005 that U.S. military
lawyers are working with the Iraqis on a SOFA or other
arrangements that would cover U.S. operations in Iraq for the
duration of U.S. involvement there. (The conference report on P.L.
109-234, an FY2006 supplemental appropriation, deleted Senate
provisions prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to construct
permanent basing facilities in Iraq. However, the Defense
Appropriation for FY2007, P.L. 109-289, contains a provision, first
passed in the House version of the measure, prohibiting use of U.S.
funds to establish permanent military installations or bases in Iraq.)
! It established a 100-seat “Interim National Council” to serve as an
interim parliament. The body, selected in August,25 did not have
legislative power but was able to veto government decisions with a
two-thirds majority. The council held some televised “hearings;”
it disbanded after the January 2005 elections for a parliament.
25 Tavernise, Sabrina. “In Climax To a Tumultuous 4-Day Debate, Iraq Chooses An
Assembly,” New York Times, Aug. 19, 2004.

---

CRS-16
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq. The following were additional
consequences of the sovereignty handover, designed in part to lower the profile of
U.S. influence over post-handover Iraq.
! As of the June 28, 2004, handover, the state of occupation ceased.
Subsequently, a U.S. Ambassador (John Negroponte) established
U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first time since January 1991.
A U.S. embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with
about 1,100 U.S. personnel.26 Negroponte was succeeded in July
2005 by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was previously
Ambassador to Afghanistan and who takes an activist approach. An
FY2005 supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provided $592
million of $658 million requested to construct a new embassy in
Baghdad and to fund embassy operations. The large new embassy
complex, with 21 buildings on 104 acres, is under construction. The
FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $1.327
billion for U.S. embassy operations and security.
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB). Iraq also was given responsibility for close-out of
the “oil-for-food program.”27 Resolution 1483 ended that program
as of November 21, 2003.
! Reconstruction management and advising of Iraq’s ministries were
taken over by the State Department through the U.S. Embassy and
a unit called the “Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office
(IRMO).” IRMO, headed since June 2006 by Ambassador Joseph
Saloom, has about 150 U.S. civilian personnel working outside
Baghdad at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs,
discussed further below. A separate “Project Contracting Office
(PCO),” headed by Brig. Gen. William McCoy (now under the
Persian Gulf division of the Army Corps of Engineers), funds
infrastructure projects such as roads, power plants, and school
renovations.
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005
After the handover of sovereignty, the United States and Iraq began focusing
on the three national votes that would be held in 2005. These votes and resulting
governments are discussed in CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government,
and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman.
26 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.
27 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.

---

CRS-17
January 30, 2005, Elections/New Government. On January 30, 2005,
elections were held for a transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and
the Kurdish regional assembly. Sunnis, still resentful of the U.S. invasion, mostly
boycotted, and no major Sunni slates were offered. This enabled the UIA to win a
slim majority (140 of the 275 seats) and to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to dominate
the government formed subsequently. PUK leader Jalal Talabani was named
president; Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister. U.S. officials said publicly this
government was not sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority, even though it had
a Sunni Arab as Assembly speaker; deputy president; deputy prime minister;
Defense Minister; and five other ministers.
Permanent Constitution. Despite Sunni opposition, the constitution was
approved on October 15, 2005. Sunni opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in
two provinces but not the three needed to defeat the constitution. The crux of Sunni
opposition to it was its provision for a weak central government (“federalism”): it
allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous “regions” with
their own regional governments, internal security forces, and a large role in
controlling revenues from any new energy discoveries. The Sunnis oppose this
concept because their region, unlike those dominated by the Kurds and the Shiites,
lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues.
December 15, 2005, Election. In this election, some anti-U.S. Sunnis
moved further into the political arena, including the “Concord Front” and the Iraqi
Front for National Dialogue, put forward major slates. The results were court-
certified on February 10, formally beginning the formation of a government, but the
convening of the “Council of Representatives” (COR) was delayed until March 16
by wrangling over the post of Prime Minister. With the UIA alone well short of the
two-thirds majority needed to unilaterally form a government, Sunnis, the secular
groupings, and the Kurds succeeded in ousting Jafari as Prime Minister and
engineering selection instead of his top Da’wa aide, Nuri al-Maliki (April 22).
Talabani was selected to continue as president, with two deputies Adel Abd al-Mahdi
of SCIRI and Tariq al-Hashimi of the Concord Front. (The former has lost one and
the latter has lost three siblings to sectarian violence in 2006.) A COR leadership
team was selected as well, with hardline U.S. critic Mahmoud Mashadani as speaker,
although the broader sectarian disputes caused Mashadani to openly talk in August
2006 of resigning.
Maliki had until May 21 to name a cabinet and achieve its confirmation. Amid
U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki named and won approval of a 39-member
cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Among his permanent
selections were Kurdish official Barham Salih and Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie as
deputy prime ministers. Four ministers (environment, human rights, housing, and
women’s affairs) are women. Of the 34 permanent ministerial posts named, a total
of seven are Sunnis; seven are Kurds; nineteen are Shiites; and one is Christian
(minister of human rights, Ms. Wijdan Mikha’il). Ayatollah Sistani loyalist Hussein
Shahristani was named Oil Minister, even though he has no evident oil background;
controversial SCIRI official Bayan Jabr moved to Finance Minister (from Interior);
and KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari remained Foreign Minister. Sadr loyalists were
named to the ministries of agriculture, health, and transportation.

---

CRS-18
Maliki did not immediately name permanent figures for the major posts of
Interior, Defense, and Ministry of State for National Security because major factions
could not agree on nominees. After several weeks of negotiation, on June 8, 2006
he achieved COR confirmation of three compromise candidates. The Defense
Minister is Gen. Abdul Qadir Mohammad Jasim al-Mifarji, a Sunni who had been
expelled from the Iraqi military and the Baath Party for criticizing Saddam’s decision
to invade Kuwait in 1990. More recently, he commanded operations of the post-
Saddam Iraqi Army in western Iraq. The Interior Minister is Jawad al-Bulani. He
is a Shiite from the UIA bloc but is an engineer by training and not closely affiliated
with any of the major UIA component factions and is the subject of reported
maneuvers by some major Shiite factions to oust him. The choice for Minister for
National Security was Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite who is from a faction of the Da’wa
Party. He has served in post-Saddam Iraq as head of the provincial council in the city
of Nassiriyah, as well as an adviser in the national security ministry.
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki
Born in 1950 in Karbala, has belonged to Da’wa Party since 1968. Fled Iraq in 1980
after Saddam banned the party, initially to Iran. Fled to Syria when he refused Iran’s
orders that he join pro-Iranian Shiite militia groups fighting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq
war. Headed Da’wa offices in Syria and Lebanon and edited Da’wa Party newspaper.
Elected to National Assembly in January 2005 and chaired its “security committee.”
Believed to support Kurds’ efforts to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdish region. Has
tense relations with SCIRI, whose activists accuse Maliki of surrounding himself with
Da’wa members and shutting SCIRI out of his inner circle.
The actions and performance to date of the Maliki government are mixed, and
some reports say the Bush Administration might be losing confidence in his ability
to reconcile major factions and disband partisan militias. In June 2006, Maliki
launched a National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project designed to broker a
resolution of sectarian differences, but that program was plagued by debate over who
would be eligible to receive any amnesty (whether one had killed Iraqi or American
soldiers, for example). The program has failed to date to persuade major insurgent
groups to end their activities. Maliki tried to inject momentum into the process in
August 2006 by re-hiring 10,000 Ba’th Party members fired from government jobs
after Saddam fell. Later in the month, about 100 tribal leaders agreed to a “Pact of
Honor,” a pledge to try to halt sectarian violence.
Despite some of the positive steps, factional polarization erupted as the National
Assembly reconvened in September 2006, primarily between Sunni and Shiite
members but also within the Shiite camp. As the new session began, SCIRI leader
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim created inflamed tensions by pressing for legislation to
implement the constitutional authorization for forming new regions. Creating a large
Shiite region in the south has been a major SCIRI goal, but Sunni members teamed
up with the Sadr faction — which fears SCIRI dominance of a Shiite autonomous
region — to oppose Hakim. The broad goal of reducing acrimony led to a tentative
September 24 agreement by all Assembly factions to (1) debate the Hakim-proposed
legislation; (2) delay the actual formation of any new region for 18 months; and (3)

---

CRS-19
constitute the long-delayed constitutional review commission that was promised by
the adopted constitution. However, the committee is to complete its work within one
year, not the four months stipulated in the constitution. The committee will have 12
UIA (Shiite) representatives, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 2 Allawi bloc representatives, and
3 members from other blocs. Despite the agreement, Sunnis and some secularists
and Shiites boycotted the October 11, 2006, parliament vote on the Hakim proposals
for formation of regions. The legislation nonetheless passed 140-1, paving the way
for potential formation of a large Shiite region as early as 2008.
Regional and International Relations. The Iraqi government has received
diplomatic support, even though most of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite
and Kurdish domination of the regime. As of September 2006, there are 46 foreign
missions in Iraq, including most European and Arab countries. Jordan has appointed
an ambassador and Kuwait has pledged to do so. Iran upgraded its representation to
Ambassador in May 2006. At an Arab League meeting in late March 2006, Arab
states pledged to increase their diplomatic representation in Iraq, and to consider
other help (aid, debt relief) to bolster the Iraqi government, although movement on
appointments has been slow because of attacks on diplomats from Bahrain, Egypt,
Algeria, Morocco, and Russia in 2005 and 2006.

Although too bogged down with domestic issues to play a major role in the
region, Iraqi leaders, including Maliki, generally criticized Israel for “aggression”
against Lebanon during the July 2006 Israel-Hezbollah crisis. Maliki’s expression
of support for Hezbollah (which, as noted above, shares a background with his
Da’wa Party) caused congressional criticism of him during his July 2006 visit to
Washington DC. His outlook was shared by other major Iraqi Shiite figures
including Sadr, who threatened to send Mahdi forces to help Hezbollah, and
Ayatollah Sistani, who issued a pronouncement strongly criticizing Israel for attacks
that killed Lebanese civilians.
At the same time, Turkey is complaining that Iraq’s Kurds are harboring the
anti-Turkey PKK guerrilla group in northern Iraq, and Turkey has been threatening
to send in forces if the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi Kurdish factions do not arrest
members of that group who are in Iraq. The threat prompted the U.S. naming of an
envoy to Turkey on this issue in August 2006 (Gen. Joseph Ralston, ret, former Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

---

CRS-20
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq
Ghazi al-Yawar
Yawar has cooperated with the U.S. since the invasion.
(Iraqis Party)
Served as President in the Allawi government and deputy
president in the post-January 2005 government, but he is
not in the post-2005 permanent government.
Iraqi Concord Front
The Front is led by Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), headed by
(Tariq al-Hashimi and
Tariq al-Hashimi. IIP withdrew from the in January 2005
Adnan al-Dulaymi)
election but led this Sunni coalition to compete in
December 2005 elections. Critical of but accepts U.S.
presence. Includes Iraqi General People’s Council of
Adnan al-Dulaymi, and the Sunni Endowment. The Front
holds 44 seats in new parliament. Hashimi a deputy
president.
Iraqi Front for National
Mutlak, an ex-Baathist, was chief negotiator for Sunnis on
Dialogue
the new constitution, but was dissatisfied with the outcome
(Saleh al-Mutlak)
and now advocates major revisions to the new constitution.
Holds 11 seats in the new parliament. Parliament Speaker
Mahmoud Mashadani, a hardliner, is a senior member; in
July 2006, he called the U.S. invasion “the work of
butchers.”
Muslim Scholars
Hardline Sunni Islamist group, has boycotted all post-
Association
Saddam elections. Believed to have ties to and influence
(MSA, Harith al-Dhari
over insurgent factions. Wants timetable for U.S.
and
withdrawal from Iraq.
Abd al-Salam al-
Qubaysi)
Iraqi Insurgents
Numerous factions and no unified leadership, although an
eight group “Mujahedin Shura” was formed in early 2006,
led by an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi). Some
groups led by ex-Saddam regime leaders, others by Islamic
extremists. Major factions include Islamic Army of Iraq,
Muhammad’s Army, and the 1920 Revolution Brigades.
Foreign Fighters/
Estimated 3,000 in Iraq. Have been led by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi Faction
Zarqawi, a Jordanian national, killed in a U.S. airstrike on
June 7, 2006. Succeeded by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. His
faction is part of Mujahedin Shura. Advocates attacks on
Iraqi Shiite civilians to spark civil war. Related foreign
fighter faction, which includes some Iraqis, is Ansar al-
Sunna, but this group is not in the Mujahedin Shura.

---

CRS-21
Democracy-Building and Local Governance/FY2006 Supplemental.
The United States and its coalition partners have tried to build civil society and
democracy at the local level. U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the
past 30 years, with a free press and the ability to organize politically. A State
Department report to Congress in July 2006 detailed how the FY2004 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund” (IRRF) is being
spent (“2207 Report”):
! About $1.014 billion is allocated for “Democracy Building.”
! About $71 million is allocated for related “Rule of Law” programs.
! About $159 million is allocated to build and secure courts and train
legal personnel.
! About $128 million is allocated for “Investigations of Crimes
Against Humanity,” primarily former regime abuses.
! $10 million is for U.S. Institute of Peace democracy/civil society/
conflict resolution activities.
! $10 million is for the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (which is
evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds, mainly in
Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime).
! $15 million is to promote human rights and human rights education
centers.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), some of the democracy and rule of
law building activities conducted with these funds, aside from assistance for the
various elections in Iraq in 2005, include the following:
! Several projects that attempt to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
! Activities to empower local governments, policies that are receiving
increasing U.S. attention and additional funding allocations from the
IRRF. These programs include (1) the “Community Action
Program” (CAP) through which local reconstruction projects are
voted on by village and town representatives. About 1,800
community associations have been established thus far; (2)
Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs) to
empower local governments to decide on reconstruction priorities;
and (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), local enclaves to
provide secure conditions for reconstruction, as discussed in the
section on security, below. The conference report on an FY2006
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) designated $50 million
in ESF for Iraq to be used to keep the CAP operating. The House-
passed and the Senate version of an FY2007 foreign aid
appropriation, H.R. 5522, earmarks another $50 million in ESF for
the CAP.

---

CRS-22
! Programs to empower women and promote their involvement in
Iraqi politics, as well as programs to promote independent media.
! Some funds have been used for easing tensions in cities that have
seen substantial U.S.-led anti-insurgency combat, including Fallujah,
Ramadi, Sadr City district of Baghdad, and Mosul. In August 2006,
another $130 million in U.S. funds (and $500 million in Iraqi funds)
were allocated to assist Baghdad neighborhoods swept by U.S. and
Iraqi forces in “Operation Together Forward.”
In addition to what is already allocated, the FY2006 regular foreign aid
appropriations (conference report on P.L. 109-102) incorporated a Senate
amendment (S.Amdt. 1299, Kennedy) to that legislation providing $28 million each
to the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for
democracy promotion in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-
234) provided another $50 million in ESF for Iraq democracy promotion, allocated
to various organizations performing democracy work there (U.S. Institute of Peace,
National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, National
Endowment for Democracy, and others).
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, although some aspects of that effort appear to be faltering. As discussed
in recent reports (most recently the one issued in July 2006) by the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the difficult security environment has
slowed reconstruction.28 For more detailed information on U.S. spending and
economic reconstruction, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in
Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
A total of about $34 billion has been appropriated for reconstruction funding,
of which $20.917 billion has been appropriated for the “Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund” (IRRF) in two supplemental appropriations: FY2003
supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the FY2004
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 108-106, which provided about $18.42 billion. Of
the IRRF funds, about $20.156 billion has been obligated, and, of that, about $15.764
billion has been disbursed. According to State Department weekly reports, the sector
allocations for the IRRF are as follows:
! $5.036 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.315 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society;
! $1.013 billion for Democracy;
! $4.22 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.724 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
28 The defense authorization bill for FY2007 (H.R. 5122) sets October 1, 2007, for
termination of oversight by the SIGIR.

---

CRS-23
! $469 million for Transportation and Communications;
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $746 million for Health Care;
! $805 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $410 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
FY2006 Supplemental/FY2007. To continue reconstruction, the
Administration requested FY2006 supplemental funds of $1.6 billion and $479
million for FY2007, mainly to help sustain infrastructure already built with U.S.
funds. The FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $1.485
billion. The House passed FY2007 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 5522) provides
$305.8 million in ESF for Iraq reconstruction, about $175 million less than requested.
It also provides requested funds for counter-narcotics ($254 million) and anti-
terrorism ($18 million). The Senate version of that bill provides the total requested
($752.785 million), but it allocates the funds as $453.77 million in ESF; $108 million
in democracy funds (DF); $171.6 in INCLE (international narcotics and law
enforcement funds); and $18.23 million in anti-terrorism funds (NADR, non-
proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs).
Iraq provides some additional funds for reconstruction. In 2006, and again in
2007, the Iraqi government has allocated $2 billion in Iraqi revenues for development
activities. U.S. officials are hoping that Iraq will take over the U.S. role as funding
source for new reconstruction projects as U.S. funds transition in 2007 to sustainment
operations for projects already built.
Oil Revenues. The oil industry is the driver of Iraq’s economy, and
rebuilding this industry has received substantial U.S. attention. (The United States
imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude oil from Iraq.) Before the war, it was
widely asserted by Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed
second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction
costs. The oil industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led
invasion (only about nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of
insurgents and smugglers. Insurgents have focused their attacks on pipelines in
northern Iraq that feed the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that is loaded at Turkey’s
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. (Iraq’s total pipeline system is over 4,300 miles
long.) The attacks, coupled with corruption, smuggling, and other deterioration, has
kept production and exports below expected levels, although high world oil prices
have more than compensating for the output shortfall. The northern export route was
shut in early 2006 but is now in operation. The Iraqi government needs to import
refined gasoline because it lacks sufficient refining capacity. The alleged smuggling
of oil, particularly by the Fadila party that has many members in the oil industry, has
been a source of intra-Shiite rivalry and clashes in Basra.
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other

---

CRS-24
countries. Iraq’s interim government has contracted for a study of the extent of Iraq’s
oil reserves, and it has contracted with Royal Dutch/Shell to formulate a blueprint to
develop the gas sector. Poland reportedly is negotiating with Iraq for possible
investments in Iraq’s energy sector. As referenced above, in December 2005, it was
reported that a Norwegian company, DNO, had contracted with the Kurdish
administrative region to explore for oil near the northern city of Zakho, raising the
concerns of Iraq’s Arabs who view this as a move by the Kurds to control their own
oil revenues. The field might eventually produce about 100,000 barrels per day.
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Exports
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Oil Production
Production
Exports
(pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(2006 (to
(weekly avg.)
(pre-war)
war)
(2004)
(2005)
date)
2.27 million
$17
$23.5
$25.3
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
1.57 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
billion
(mbd)
Electricity
Baghdad
Pre-War Load
Current
(hrs. per
Served (MWh)
Load Served
day)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
95,000
6.3
11.6
Other Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate (2006 anticipated by IMF)
10.6%
GDP
$18.9 billion (2002)
$33.1 billion (2005)
New Businesses Begun Since 2003 30,000
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
October 11, 2006. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the
1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. In an effort to encourage private U.S. investment in
Iraq, the Bush Administration has lifted most U.S. sanctions on Iraq, beginning with
Presidential Determinations issued under authorities provided by P.L. 108-7
(appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11 (FY2003 supplemental):
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.) The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.

---

CRS-25
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services.
Exports of dual use items (items that can have military applications)
are no longer subject to strict licensing procedures.29
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt, built up during Saddam’s regime, and
estimated of Saddam Hussein. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not
including reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war. In 2004, the “Paris Club”
of 19 industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes
them. However, with the exception of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf states that supported
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have not to date firmly agreed to write-off Iraq’s
approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar). On December 17, 2004, the United States signed an
agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1 billion debt to the United States;
that debt consisted of principal and interest from about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi
agricultural credits from the 1980s.30 On December 13, 2004, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession talks with Iraq.
29 A May 7, 2003, executive order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
30 For more information, see CRS Report RL33376, Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and
Potential Implications for International Debt Relief, by Martin A. Weiss.

---

CRS-26
Security Challenges,
Responses, and Options
In several series of speeches since 2005, President Bush has cited successful
elections and the growth of the Iraqi security forces to assert that the U.S. “National
Strategy for Victory” will, in time, stabilize Iraq. However, at a news conference on
October 11, 2006, he said that U.S. strategy in Iraq might not be producing stability
as expected and might need to be adjusted. As he has in several recent press
conferences, he has asserted that Iraq’s security would deteriorate dramatically and
U.S. security would be directly threatened if the United States were to withdraw now
or set a timetable to withdraw.
Congress has mandated two major periodic Administration reports on progress
in stabilizing Iraq. A Defense Department quarterly report, which DOD has titled
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” was required by an FY2005 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-13). The latest version was issued in August 2006 and
provides some of the information below. Another report, first issued April 6, 2006
(“1227 Report”), is required by Section 1227 of the Defense Authorization Act for
FY2006 (P.L. 109-163).
Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency
The Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. forces and the Iraqi government
has defied official U.S. expectations in intensity and duration. Although hesitant
to assess the size of the insurgency, U.S. commanders say that insurgents probably
number approximately 12,000-20,000. Some Iraqi officials have publicly advanced
higher estimates of about 40,000 active insurgents, helped by another 150,000
supporters. Insurgent attacks — characterized mostly by roadside bombs, mortar and
other indirect fire, and direct weapons fire as well as larger suicide bombings —
numbered about 100 per day during most of 2005, and DOD officials in August 2006
put that number at about 120 attacks per day.
The Administration’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” (November 30,
2005) said that many insurgents are motivated by opposition to perceived U.S. rule
in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite political dominance. Others want to return the
Baath Party to power, although, according to many experts, some would accept a
larger Sunni political role without the Baath. Still others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters,
either foreign or Iraqi, that want to defeat the United States and spread radical Islam
throughout the region. The insurgent groups are believed to be loosely coordinated
within cities and wider provinces. However, in early 2006, a group of insurgent
factions announced the formation of a national “Mujahedin Shura (Council)”
purportedly consisting mostly of Iraqi factions but including foreign fighters.
Despite their growing coordination, the insurgents have failed to derail the
political transition,31 although they have succeeded, to some extent, in painting the
31 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?” U.S. Institute
(continued...)

---

CRS-27
Iraqi government as ineffective and in stimulating a debate in the United States over
the continuing U.S. commitment in Iraq. Sunni insurgent groups have conducted
several large-scale (50 insurgents fighters or more) attacks on police stations and
other fixed positions during 2006, in a few cases overrunning Iraqi positions. Other
targets include not only U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security forces but also
Iraqi civilians working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors and aid workers, oil
export and gasoline distribution facilities, and water, power, and other infrastructure
facilities. Whole neighborhoods of Baghdad, including Amiriya, Jihad, Amal, and
Doura, not to mention the Anbar Province city of Ramadi, have increasingly served
as insurgent bases. Iraqis say that the upscale and previously quiet Baghdad district
of Mansour is now penetrated by insurgents.
The U.N. Security Council has adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency
in Resolution 1618 (August 4, 2005), condemning the “terrorist attacks that have
taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on Iraqi election workers, constitution drafters,
and foreign diplomats in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provides
$1.3 million in Treasury Department funds to disrupt insurgent financing.
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi Faction.32 A numerically small but
politically significant component of the insurgency is non-Iraqi, constituted as an
organization called Al Qaeda-Iraq. A study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies released in September 2005 said that about 3,500 foreign
fighters are in Iraq. According to the study, the foreign fighters come mostly from
Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, with Saudis constituting
only about 350 of the 3,000 estimated foreign fighters.
A major portion of the foreign fighters were commanded by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, a 40-year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in Afghanistan during
the 1980s alongside other Arab volunteers against the Soviet Union.33 He was killed
in a June 7, 2006, U.S. airstrike and has been succeeded by the little known Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir (also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri), an Egyptian national. The
organization remains active, and some U.S. commanders say it is increasingly
31 (...continued)
of Peace, Special Report 134, April 2005; and Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White.
“Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus No. 50, December 2005.
32 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?, by Kenneth Katzman.
33 Zarqawi himself came to Iraq in late 2001, along with several hundred associates, after
escaping the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. He made his way to northern Iraq, after
transiting Iran and Saddam-controlled Iraq, eventually taking refuge with a Kurdish Islamist
faction called Ansar al-Islam near the town of Khurmal. After the Ansar enclave was
destroyed in OIF, Zarqawi went to the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, naming his faction the
Association of Unity and Jihad. He then formally affiliated with Al Qaeda (through a
reputed exchange of letters) and changed his faction’s name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in
Mesopotamia (Iraq).” It is named as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), assuming that
designation from the earlier Unity and Jihad title, which was designated as an FTO in
October 2004.

---

CRS-28
gaining political influence among Iraqi Sunnis in Fallujah and other parts of Sunni-
inhabited Anbar Province. Al Muhajir appeared in a video in September 2006
inciting insurgents to attack American soldiers, and some Iraqi sources predicted in
October 2006 that he would be caught soon.
The foreign fighters have been a U.S. focus because of their alleged perpetration
of large scale suicide and other bombings against both combatant and civilian targets.
This trend began with major suicide bombings in 2003, beginning with one against
U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad (August 19, 2003),34 followed by
the August 29, 2003 bombing in Najaf that killed SCIRI leader Mohammad Baqr Al
Hakim. The foreign fighters, and related factions, have also kidnapped a total of
over 250 foreigner workers, and killed about 40 of those. Zarqawi’s strategy was to
spark Sunni-Shiite civil war, an outcome that appears to be developing. In actions
intended to spread their activities outside Iraq, Zarqawi’s faction reputedly
committed the August 19, 2005, failed rocket attack in the Jordanian port of Aqaba
against two U.S. warships docked there, as well as the November 10, 2005, bombing
of Western-owned hotels in Amman, Jordan.
Outside Support for Sunni Insurgents. Numerous accounts have said
that Sunni insurgents are receiving help from neighboring states (money and
weapons),35 although others believe that outside support for the insurgency is not
decisive. In September 2005, U.S. ambassador Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of
allowing training camps in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to gather and train before going
into Iraq. These reports led to U.S. warnings to and imposition of additional U.S.
sanctions against Syria and to the U.S. Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of
some suspected financiers of the insurgency. Syria tried to deflect the criticism by
moves such as the February 2005 turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi
to Iraqi authorities. Since January 2006, senior U.S. commanders in Iraq have said
they have been receiving increased cooperation from Syria to prevent insurgent flows
across those borders.
Other assessments say the Sunni insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,36 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
Some reports say that some influential Saudis want the Saudi government to provide
direct support to Sunni insurgents in Iraq as a means of protecting the Sunni minority,
although the government apparently is resisting doing so on the grounds that
militants might return to Saudi Arabia to commit violence.
34 Among the dead in the latter bombing was the U.N. representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, and it prompted an evacuation of U.N. personnel from Iraq.
35 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
21, 2004.
36 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.” Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates
By U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,” New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.

---

CRS-29
Sectarian Violence and Militias/Civil War?
The security environment in Iraq has become more complex over the past year
as Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence has increased. Top U.S. officials now say that
sectarian-motivated violence — manifestations of an all-out struggle for political and
economic power in Iraq — has now displaced the Sunni-led insurgency as the
primary security challenge in Iraq. Senior U.S. officials, most notably the leaders of
the Iraq war effort (Gen. John Abizaid and George Casey) at a Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing on August 3, 2006, have said the sectarian violence
risks becoming all-out civil war, but that they do not consider Iraq in a civil war now.
Several experts, on the other hand, say that Iraq is now clearly in at least a low-level
civil war. Most trace the escalation of sectarian violence to the February 22, 2006,
Al Qaeda-Iraq bombing of the Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra. The destruction
of its dome set off a wave of purported Shiite militia attacks on about 60 Sunni
mosques and the killing of about 400 persons in the first days after the sectarian
attacks. Since then, the violence has taken the form of weapons fire, abductions, and
attacks on mosques, markets, and apartment buildings frequented or inhabited by
members of the rival sect. Many of those abducted turn up bound and gagged,
dumped in rivers, facilities, vehicles, or fields. UNAMI, as well as Iraqi morgue and
other officials, say that this type of violence is now claiming more than 100 Iraqi
lives per day: approximately 6,600 were killed in sectarian and other violence in July
and August 2006. Officials from the International Organization of Migration (IOM)
said in October 2006 that there are now over 300,000 internally displaced persons in
Iraq — mostly Iraqis who are fleeing their homes in mixed Baghdad neighborhoods
or provinces because of threats from one sect or the other.37
The sectarian violence is difficult to curb because the Sunnis are accusing the
Shiites of using their preponderant presence in the emerging security forces — as
well as their party-based militias — to commit atrocities against Sunnis. Sunnis
report that Shiite militiamen who have joined the security forces are raiding Sunni
homes or using their arrest powers to abduct Sunnis, some of whom later show up
killed. Many Shiites, for their part, are blaming Sunni insurgents for attacking Shiite
civilians.
The sectarian violence has caused U.S. officials to assert that the new
government must dismantle 23 known militias. In the absence of clear actions by
the Maliki government, U.S. forces are now conducting some operations to curb
them, particularly the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr. During July 17-24, 2006,
for example, U.S. and Iraqi forces conducted 19 operations against purported
sectarian “death squads.” In late 2005, U.S. forces uncovered militia-run detention
facilities and arrested those running them. U.S. officials — as well as the new
Interior Minister Jawad Bolani — are also moving to prevent militiamen from joining
the security forces. On the other hand, Sunnis in the city of Balad accused U.S.
forces of failing to act when Shiite militias killed several dozen Sunnis in sectarian
violence in the city on October 14, 2006.
37 Knickermeyer, Ellen. “Thousands of Iraqis Flee to Avoid Spread of Violence.”
Washington Post, Mar. 29, 2006.

---

CRS-30
In an effort to curb both sectarian and insurgent violence in Baghdad itself, the
Administration announced on July 25, 2006, during the visit of Prime Minister
Maliki, that about 4,000 additional U.S. troops would deploy in Baghdad
(supplementing the 9,000 U.S. forces there already) as part of “Operation Together
Forward” to patrol neighborhoods and prevent insurgent and militia activities. The
operation, still ongoing, has focused on such violent districts as Doura, Amiriyah,
Rashid, Ghaziliyah, and Mansour. U.S. commanders said, early on in the operation,
that violence in these districts had dropped substantially, over 50% in some cases, as
a result of the operation, and that shops have reopened because of increased sense of
security. However, since mid-September, the U.S. military has been less optimistic
about the results of the operation as sectarian violence in the city has continued at
levels widely described by U.S. officials as unacceptably high.
Iraqi Christians and their churches have become major targets of Shiite and
Sunni armed factions, viewing them as allies of the United States. Since the fall of
Saddam Hussein, as many as 100,000 Christians might have left Iraq, leaving the
current size of the community in Iraq at about 600,000 - 800,000. The two most
prominent Christian sects in Iraq are the Chaldean Catholics and the Assyrian
Christians.
The three major militias in Iraq are discussed below, although it is primarily the
Shiite militias that are believed responsible for sectarian violence.
! Kurdish Peshmerga. Together, the KDP and PUK may have as
many as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of which are
providing security in the Kurdish regional area (Dahuk,
Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil Provinces). Some are in the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and deployed in such cities as Mosul, Tal Affar, and
Baghdad. Peshmerga units have sometimes fought each other; in
May 1994, the KDP and the PUK clashed with each other over
territory, customs revenues, and control over the Kurdish regional
government in Irbil.
! Badr Brigades. The militia of SCIRI numbers about 5,000 and is
led by Hadi al-Amiri (a member of parliament). The Badr
Brigades were recruited, trained, and equipped by Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard, aligned with Iran’s hardliners, during the
Iran-Iraq war, during which Badr guerrillas conducted forays from
Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials. Most Badr
fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners of war held
in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed SCIRI as an Iranian
puppet and Badr operations in southern Iraq during the 1980s and
1990s did not shake Saddam’s grip on power. The Badr
“Organization” registered as a separate political entity, in addition
to its SCIRI parent, during elections in 2005.
! Badr militiamen play unofficial policing roles in Basra, Najaf, and
elsewhere in southern Iraq. Many Badr members also reputedly are
in the ISF, particularly the police, which is led by the SCIRI-

---

CRS-31
dominated Interior Ministry, and Badr forces reputedly operated
unofficial detention facilities discovered by U.S. forces in late 2005.
! Mahdi Army. U.S. officials say Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia has now
grown to about 20,000 fighters, representing a gaining of strength
since U.S. military operations suppressed Mahdi uprisings in April
and August of 2004. That fighting was ended with compromises
under which Mahdi forces stopped fighting (and in some cases
traded in some of their weapons for money) in exchange for lenient
treatment or releases of prisoners, amnesty for Sadr himself, and
reconstruction aid. The Mahdi Army subsequently, with tacit U.S.
and coalition approval, patrolled Sadr City and parts of other Shiite
cities, particularly Basra. However, Mahdi assertiveness since 2005
has accounted for a sharp deterioration of relations between the
Mahdi Army and British and U.S. forces, and between Sadr and
other Iraqi leaders more generally. At least 30 British soldiers have
died in suspected Mahdi attacks in southern Iraq since late 2005,
including a British helicopter shot down in May 2006. Since mid-
2006, U.S. casualties have been occurring in areas where Sadr is
strong, including Sadr City, Diwaniyah, and Kut, and U.S. and Iraqi
forces fought a major engagement with Mahdi forces in Diwaniyah
in October 2006. That followed a major clash between the Mahdi
Army and Iraqi forces in Diwaniyah in August 2006, resulting in
more than 20 Iraqi troops killed. Mahdi forces also shelled a British
base near Amarah in August 2006, contributing to a British decision
to leave the base. However, some experts believe Sadr himself has
tried to rein in Mahdi violence but no longer has full control of his
armed following.
Iranian Support. U.S. officials, and some Sunni Iraq political leaders, have
repeatedly accused Iran of aiding Shiite militias. On June 22, 2006, General Casey
reiterated past assertions by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Peter Pace that the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard is providing armed Iraqi Shiite factions (most likely Sadr’s Mahdi forces)
with explosives and weapons. The most likely recipient is the Shiite faction of
Moqtada al-Sadr. Because of Iran’s support for Shiite militias, the United States and
Iran announced in March 2006 that they would conduct direct talks on the issue of
stabilizing Iraq, but Iran subsequently said the talks were not needed because Iraq
had a new government, and no talks have been held. For more information, see CRS
Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman.
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security
At times, such as after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 and
after all three elections in 2005, U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the
violence would subside. As outlined in the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,”
the Administration continues to try to refine its stabilization strategy, with increasing
focus on preventing sectarian violence from escalating.

---

CRS-32
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Since November 2005, the Administration has publicly articulated a strategy called
“clear, hold, and build,” intended to create and expand stable enclaves by positioning
Iraqi forces and U.S. civilian reconstruction experts in areas cleared of insurgents.
The strategy, based partly on an idea advanced by Andrew Krepinevich in the
September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,38 says that the United States
should devote substantial resources to preventing insurgent re-infiltration and
promoting reconstruction in selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that
could eventually expand throughout Iraq. The strategy formed the basis of
“Operation Together Forward” designed to pacify restive areas of Baghdad.
In conjunction with the new U.S. strategy, the Administration has formed
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a concept used extensively in
Afghanistan. Each PRT is civilian led, composed of about 100 U.S. State
Department and USAID officials and contract personnel, to assist local Iraqi
governing institutions, such as the provincial councils (elected in the January 2005
elections), representatives of the Iraqi provincial governors, and local ministry
representatives. The concept ran into some U.S. military objections to taking on
expanded missions, but the debate was resolved with an agreement by DOD to
provide security to the U.S.-run PRTs.
Thus far, nine PRTs have been inaugurated, of which the following seven are
run by the United States: Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Baghdad, Anbar Province, Salah ad-
Din Province, and Baquba. Of the two partner-run PRTs, Britain has formed a PRT
in Basra, and Italy has formed one in Dhi Qar province. South Korea is expected to
open one in the near future.
PRT Funding. The FY2006 supplemental request asked for $400 million for
operational costs for the PRTs, of which the enacted version, P.L. 109-234, provides
$229 million. The requested $675 million for development grants to be distributed
by the PRTs is fully funded through the ESF appropriation for Iraq in this law.
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations. The Administration
position is that continued combat operations against the insurgency — and
increasingly against sectarian militias — are required. About 141,000 U.S. troops
are in Iraq (down from 160,000 there during the December 2005 election period and
consistent with 2005 baseline troop levels), with about another 50,000 troops in
Kuwait and the Persian Gulf region supporting OIF. Centcom commander Gen.
Abizaid said on September 19, 2006, that this force level is likely to persist into
spring 2007 due to the high levels of violence, and Army Chief of Staff Peter
Schoomaker said on October 12 that the Army is developing plans to maintain
current troop levels through 2010, if needed. U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad
(Combined Joint Task Force-7, CJTF-7) is a multi-national headquarters
“Multinational Force-Iraq, MNF-I,” headed by four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey.
Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli is operational commander of U.S. forces as head of the
“Multinational Corps-Iraq.”
38 Krepinevich, Andrew. “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2005.

---

CRS-33
A major focus of U.S. counter-insurgent combat has been Anbar Province,
which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, the latter of which is the most
restive of all Iraqi cities and which is assessed to have virtually no functioning
governance. However, a reported assessment by a U.S. intelligence officer in August
2006 said that U.S. efforts in Anbar were failing and that the province is “lost”
politically. Other reports say that U.S. forces are essentially conceding some areas
of Anbar (the cities of Hit and Haditha, for example) because intense combat in these
areas might cost significant U.S. lives without yielding permanent results. Still, there
are about 40,000 U.S. troops in Anbar conducting combat primarily in and around
the provincial capital of Ramadi. In the run-up to the December 15 elections, U.S.
(and Iraqi) forces conducted several major operations (for example Operations
Matador, Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and Ram) to clear
contingents of foreign fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities along the
Euphrates River.
Casualties. As of October 17, 2006, 2,767 U.S. forces and about 240
coalition partner soldiers have died in OIF, as well as over 125 U.S. civilians working
on contract to U.S. institutions in Iraq. Of U.S. deaths, 2,620 have occurred since
President Bush declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003,
and about 2,210 of the U.S. deaths were by hostile action. There are no firm
estimates of numbers of Iraqi civilians killed in hostilities, but one estimate in
October 2006 published in the Lancet, dismissed by President Bush as inconsistent
with other estimates, said over 650,000 Iraqis had died, far above the estimate used
by Iraq Body Count, for example, which puts that figure at about 45,000 Iraqi civilian
deaths. As of October 2006, about 650 U.S. civilian contractors have been killed in
Iraq. (See CRS Report RS22441, Iraqi Civilian, Police, and Security Force Casualty
Estimates, by Hannah Fischer.)
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)39
A major pillar of U.S. policy is to equip and train Iraqi security forces (ISF)
that could secure Iraq by themselves. President Bush stated in a June 28, 2005
speech, “Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will
stand down.”40 The most recent DOD “Measuring Stability” report, released August
2006, reiterates U.S. official statements of progress in building the ISF, while
assessing that growing sectarian violence is hindering U.S. stabilization efforts.
The tables below detail the composition of the ISF and provide Administration
assessments of force readiness. As of October 11, there are 307,800 total ISF:
131,600 “operational” military forces under the Ministry of Defense and 176,200
police and police commando forces “trained and equipped” under the Ministry of
Interior. The commander of the ISF training mission, the Multinational Transition
Security Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I), Gen. Martin Dempsey, said in late June 2006
that the total force goal of 325,000 ISF would be reached by the end of 2006.
39 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy Sharp.
40 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/
2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].

---

CRS-34
However, police figures include possibly tens of thousands (according to the GAO
on March 15, 2005) who are absent-without-leave or might have deserted. The
police live in their areas of operation, and attendance is hard to account for.
U.S. commanders say they are progressively turning over greater formal
responsibility to the ISF, although areas under ISF control or leadership are not
necessarily pacified or stable. Indicators include the following:
! In September 2006, the Ministry of Defense began assuming
operational control of Iraqi military forces from the U.S.-led
coalition. By the end of October 2006, it is estimated that one-third
of the ISF will be under Iraqi operational control.
! As of May 2006, U.S. and partner forces have now turned over to
the ISF 40 out of 111 forward operation bases.
! 87 battalions of ISF (about 63,000 personnel) — 85 Army battalions
and 2 battalions of National Policy — are “in the lead” on security
in their areas of operations.
! Almost half the territory of Iraq is formally under ISF security
control, including the entire province of Muthanna (turned over to
ISF control on July 13, 2006, in conjunction with the pullout of
Japanese ground forces from the province) and the province of Dhi
Qar (turned over to ISF control by Italy on September 21, 2006).
! Nearly the entire provinces of Wasit, Qadissiyah, Najaf, Babil, and
Sulaymaniyah are under ISF control.
! Areas south and west of Mosul are under the control of the 2nd and
3rd IAD, respectively.
! Areas west of Baghdad, including Abu Ghraib and the area around
Habbaniyah (the first part of Anbar Province turned over to the ISF)
are under control of the 1st and 6th IAD.
! A large swath of northern Iraq, encompassing much of Salahuddin,
Nineveh, and Tamim provinces, was turned over to 4th IAD control
on August 9, 2006.
! Most of Diyala province was handed to the 5th IAD on July 3, 2006.
However, some U.S. commanders and outside observers say that the ISF
continue to lack an effective command structure, independent initiative, or
commitment to the mission, and that it could fragment if U.S. troops draw down.41
U.S. commanders have told journalists recently that it is common for half of an entire
41 Fallows, James. “Why Iraq Has No Army.” Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2005.

---

CRS-35
ISF unit to desert or refuse to undertake a specified mission.42 ISF were unable to
secure Baghdad under Maliki’s security plan for the city, necessitating the infusion
of U.S. forces in July-August 2006. Iraqi forces also were unable to prevent looting
of the British base, cited above, abandoned by British forces in August 2006 in
Amarah. A report on the Iraqi police by the offices of the Inspector General of the
State and Defense Departments, released July 15, 2005, said that many recruits are
only marginally literate and that some recruits are insurgent infiltrators (p.3).43
A major issue is ethnic balance and involvement in sectarian violence. U.S.
commanders have consistently acknowledged difficulty recruiting Sunni Arabs into
the ISF and have said this is a deficiency they are trying to correct. Most of the ISF,
particularly the police, are Shiites, with Kurdish units mainly deployed in the north.
There are few units of mixed ethnicity, and, as discussed above, many Sunnis see the
ISF as mostly Shiite and Kurdish instruments of repression and responsible for
sectarian killings. U.S. officials are reportedly pressing Maliki to purge the ISF of
commanders and members who are loyal to militia organizations, and in October
2006, Interior Minister Bolani fired 3,000 Ministry employees for alleged sectarian
links. He also fired two major commanders of National Police components. On
October 3, an entire brigade of National Police were taken out of duty status for
retraining for alleged toleration of sectarian killings in Baghdad.
There are growing allegations that some of the 145,000 members of the
Facilities Protection Force, which is not formally under any ministry, may be
involved in sectarian violence. The U.S. and Iraq began trying to rein in the force in
May 2006 by placing it under some Ministry of Interior guidance, including issuing
badges and supervising what types of weapons it uses.
ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy. The Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this
training and equipping mission. According to the State Department, a total of $5.036
billion in IRRF funds has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for,
and in some cases provide pay for) the ISF. Of those funds, as of September 20,
2006, about $4.938 billion has been obligated and $4.621 billion of that has been
disbursed. An FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an
additional $5.7 billion to equip and train the ISF, funds to be controlled by the
Department of Defense and provided to MNSTC-I. Of that amount, about $4.7
billion has been obligated. Therefore, the total obligated (spent) for the ISF to date
is about $9.6 billion. The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provides another $3
billion for the ISF but withholds the remaining ISF facilities construction funding.
42 Castaneda, Antonio. “Iraqi Desertions Complicate U.S. Mission.” Associated Press,
January 31, 2006.
43 Inspectors General. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense.
Interagency Assessment of Iraqi Police Training. July 15, 2005.

---

CRS-36
Table 4. Ministry of Defense Forces
(As of October 11, 2006)
IRRF Funds
Force
Size/Strength
Allocated
Iraqi Army
120,700 total; goal is 131,000. Forces in units are
$1.097 billion
in 104 battalions (about 70,000 personnel), with
for facilities;
85 battalions (about 60,000) “in the lead” on
$707 million
operations. At least 57 battalions (about 40,000)
for equipment;
control their own “battle space.” Trained for eight
$656 million
weeks, paid $60/month. Has mostly East bloc
for training,
equipment, including 77 T-72 tanks donated by
personnel, and
Poland.
operations
Iraqi
About 3,000 personnel, included in Army total
Intervention
above. Trained for 13 weeks.
Force
Special
About 1,600 divided between Iraqi Counter-
Operations
Terrorist Force (ICTF) and a Commando
Forces
Battalion. Trained for 12 weeks, mostly in Jordan.
Strategic
About 2,900 personnel in seven battalions to
Infrastructure
protect oil pipelines, electricity infrastructure. The
Battalions
goal is 11 battalions.
Mechanized
About 1,500. Recently transferred from Ministry
Police
of Interior control.
Brigade
Air Force
About 800, its target size. Has 9 helicopters, 3 C-
$28 million
130s; 14 observation aircraft. Trained for six
allocated for
months. UAE and Jordan to provide other aircraft
air fields (from
and helos.
funds for Iraqi
Army, above)
Navy
About 1,100, about the target size. Has a Patrol
Boat Squadron and a Coastal Defense Regiment.
Fields about 35 patrol boats for anti-smuggling
and anti-infiltration. Controls naval base at Umm
Qasra, Basra port, and Khor al-Amaya oil
terminals. Some training by Australian Navy.
Totals
131,600
U.S./Other
U.S. training, including embedding with Iraqi units, involves about
Trainers
3,500 U.S. forces, run by Multinational Security Transition
Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I). Training at Taji, north of Baghdad;
Kirkush, near Iranian border; and Numaniya, south of Baghdad. All
26 NATO nations at NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) at
Rustamiyah (300 trainers). Others trained at NATO bases in Norway
and Italy. Jordan, Germany, and Egypt also have done training.

---

CRS-37
Table 5. Ministry of Interior Forces
(As of October 11, 2006)
Force/Entity
Size/Strength
IRRF Funds Allocated
Ministry of
Total size unknown. 3,000
Interior/Minister
employees dismissed in October
Jawad al-Bolani
for corruption/sectarianism.
Iraqi Police Service
123,500, including 1,300 person
$ 1.806 billion allocated
(IPS)
Highway Patrol. (About the target
for training and
size.) Gets eight weeks of
technical assistance.
training, paid $60 per month. Not
organized as battalions.
Center for Dignitary
About 500 personnel
Protection
National Police
About 24,400. Comprises “Police
Commandos,” Public Order
Police,” and “Mechanized Police.”
Organized into 28 battalions, 2 of
which (about 1,500) are “in the
lead” in counter-insurgency
operations. Six battalions (about
4,000) control security in their
areas. Overwhelmingly Shiite.
Two leading commanders fired in
October 2006 for alleged militia
ties. Gets four weeks of counter-
insurgency training.
Emergency Response
About 300, able to lead
Unit
operations. Hostage rescue.
Border Enforcement
27,500. Controls 258 border forts
$437 million, $3 million
Department
built or under construction. Has
of which is allocated to
Riverine Police component to
pay stipends to 150
secure water crossings.
former regime WMD
personnel.
Totals (all forces)
176,200. Goal is 195,000
Training
Training by 2,000 U.S. personnel as embeds and partners.
Pre-operational training mostly at Jordan International Police
Training Center; Baghdad Police College and seven
academies around Iraq; and in UAE. Countries doing training
aside from U.S.: Canada, Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland,
UAE, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Germany
(now suspended), Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore,
Belgium, and Egypt.
Facilities Protection
Technically outside MOI. About
$53 million allocated
Service
145,000 security guards protecting
for this service thus far.
economic infrastructure.

---

CRS-38
Coalition-Building and Maintenance44
Some believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient efforts to
enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that the U.S.
mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military personnel
contributions. As of October 17, 27 other countries are contributing about 17,000
forces, down from about 28,000 in 2005, and the total is expected to fall further.
Poland and Britain lead multinational divisions in central and southern Iraq,
respectively. The UK-led force (UK forces alone number about 7,500) is based in
Basra, but Britain said it will likely halve its force by mid-2007. The Poland-led
force (Polish forces number 1,700, down 800 from 2005 levels ) is based in Hilla
and include forces from the following foreign countries: Armenia, Slovakia,
Denmark, El Salvador, Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Mongolia, and
Kazakhstan. However, Poland says it might withdraw its remaining forces by the end
of 2006. Italy is in the process of reducing its 1,600 troops now that it has turned Dhi
Qar Province over to ISF control.

The coalition force has shrunk since Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of its 1,300
troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombings
and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had supported the war
effort. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua followed Spain’s
withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in July 2004 after
one of its citizens was taken hostage. On the other hand, many nations are replacing
their contingents with trainers for the ISF or financial contributions or other
assistance to Iraq. Among other changes are the following.
! Ukraine, which lost eight soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent
attack, withdrew most of its 1,500 forces after the December 2005
elections.
! Bulgaria pulled out its 360-member unit after the December 15 Iraqi
elections. However, in March 2006 it said it had sent in a 150-
person force to take over guard duties of Camp Ashraf, a base in
eastern Iraq where Iranian oppositionists are located.
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and, in line with a November 2005 decision, withdrew another 1,000
in May 2006, bringing its troop level to about 2,200 (based in Irbil
in Kurdish-controlled Iraq). The remainder will stay through 2006.
! Japan completed its withdrawal of its 600-person military
reconstruction contingent in Samawah on July 17, 2006. The
Australian forces protecting the Japanese contingent (450 out of the
total Australian deployment in Iraq of 1,350) moved to other areas.
44 For additional information on international contributions to Iraq peacekeeping and
reconstruction, see CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.

---

CRS-39
! Denmark said in May 2006 it will keep its forces in Iraq (Basra),
although it withdrew 80 of its 530-person force in May 2006.
! In July 2006, Romanian leaders began debating whether to withdraw
or reduce its 890 forces in Iraq.
NATO/EU/Other Offers of Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO
countries have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to
contribute funds or equipment. Several NATO countries and others are offering to
also train civilian personnel. In addition to the security training offers discussed
above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help train Iraqi police,
administrators, and judges outside Iraq. At the June 22, 2005 Brussels conference
discussed above, the EU pledged a $130 million package to help Iraq write its
permanent constitution and reform government ministries. The FY2005
supplemental appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $99 million to set up a regional
counter-terrorism center in Jordan to train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy”
Although there are no public indications that the Administration might soon end
or dramatically alter the U.S. effort in Iraq, some Members say that major new
initiatives need to be considered to stabilize Iraq or to shift the burden of securing
Iraq to Iraqi political leaders. As U.S. public support for the U.S. effort in Iraq has
declined, debates have emerged over several congressional resolutions proposing an
“exit strategy.” On the other hand, there does not appear to be major public support
for an immediate end to the Iraq effort. Some of the ideas widely circulated among
Members and other policy experts are discussed below.
Troop Increase. Some have said that the United States should increase
troops levels in Iraq significantly to tamp down sectarian violence and prevent Sunni
insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by U.S. operations. Some experts believe
the extra troops needed for such an effort might number about 100,000,45 although
other estimates say that 40,000 additional U.S. forces could make a significant
difference in reducing violence. The Administration asserts that U.S. commanders
feel that current and planned force levels are sufficient, and that U.S. commanders
are able to request additional forces, if needed. Some experts believe that troop level
increases would aggravate Sunni Arabs already resentful of the U.S. intervention in
Iraq and that even many more U.S. troops would not necessarily produce stability and
would appear to deepen the U.S. commitment without a clear exit strategy. Others
believe that increasing U.S. force levels would further the impression that the Iraqi
government depends on the United States for its survival.
Immediate Withdrawal. Some Members argue that the United States should
begin to withdraw immediately, maintaining that the decision to invade Iraq was a
mistake in light of the failure thus far to locate WMD, that the large U.S. presence
in Iraq is inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional
45 Bersia, John. “The Courage Needed to Win the War,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 9,
2005.

---

CRS-40
U.S. casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Those who take this position
include the approximately 50 Members of the “Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus,”
formed in June 2005. In November 2005, Representative John Murtha, a ranking
member and former chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, publicly
called for an “immediate” pullout (over six months). His resolution (H.J.Res. 73)
called for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable date” and the maintenance of
an “over the horizon” U.S. presence. A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written by
Representative Duncan Hunter, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee),
expressed the sense “that the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be terminated
immediately;” it failed 403-3 on November 18, 2005. Other bills, such as H.R. 3142
and H.Con.Res. 197, state that it [should be] U.S. policy not to maintain a permanent
or long-term presence in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) omitted a
provision to this effect that was in the Senate version.
Withdrawal Timetable. Another alternative is the setting of a timetable for
a U.S. withdrawal or the beginning of a withdrawal. This position is typified by
H.J.Res. 55, introduced by Representative Neil Abercrombie, which calls on the
Administration to begin a withdrawal by October 2006. H.Con.Res. 348, introduced
by Representative Mike Thompson, calls for a redeployment of U.S. forces no later
than September 30, 2006, although that date has now passed. In November 2005,
Senator Levin, who takes the view that the United States needs to force internal
compromise in Iraq by threatening to withdraw, introduced an amendment to S. 1042
(FY2006 defense authorization bill) to compel the Administration to work on a
timetable for withdrawal during 2006. Reportedly, on November 10, 2005, Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee John Warner reworked the Levin proposal
into an amendment that stopped short of setting a timetable for withdrawal but
requires an Administration report on a “schedule for meeting conditions” that could
permit a U.S. withdrawal. That measure, which also states in its preamble that “2006
should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty,” achieved bi-
partisan support, passing 79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications
by House conferees, in the conference report on the bill (H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-
163).
On June 22, 2006, the Senate debated two Iraq-related amendments to an
FY2007 defense authorization bill (S. 2766). One, offered by Senator Kerry, setting
a July 1, 2007, deadline for U.S. redeployment from Iraq, was defeated 86-13.
Another amendment, sponsored by Senator Levin, called on the Administration to
begin redeployment out of Iraq by the end of 2006, but with no deadline for full
withdrawal. It was defeated 60-39. On July 31, 2006, 12 Democrats, including
House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid,
reportedly wrote to President Bush calling for the beginning of a U.S. withdrawal by
the end of 2006, although without a suggested deadline for completing that pullback,
along with a “transition to a more limited mission.”46 In October 2006, following a
trip to Iraq, Senator Warner stated that events in Iraq are “moving sideways” and that
46 Babington, Charles and Jim VendeHei. Hill Democrats Unite to Urge Bush to Begin Iraq
Pullout. Washington Post, August 1, 2006.

---

CRS-41
the Administration might consider a “change of course” if, in “two or three months”
the Iraqi government has not gotten sectarian and other violence under control.47
Responding to the congressional action, President Bush has remained opposed
to the setting of any timetable for troop pullouts, let alone an immediate pullout.
During his June 13, 2006, visit to Baghdad and since, President Bush has ruled out
a pullout by stating that the United States would uphold its “commitment” to the
Iraqi government, although he has suggested that Iraqi officials need to plan their
own future. He reportedly reiterated these views in a phone conversation with Prime
Minister Maliki on October 16, 2006, in response to reported Maliki fears that the
United States might withdraw support for his government.
Supporters of the President’s position maintain that the Iraqi government would
collapse upon an immediate pullout, representing a victory for terrorists, and that the
loss of the Iraq effort could cause terrorists to attempt attacks in the United States
itself. H.Res. 861, stating that “... it is not in the national security interest of the
United States to set an arbitrary date for the withdrawal or redeployment” of U.S.
forces from Iraq passed the House on June 16 by a vote of 256-153, with 5 voting
“present.”
Troop Reduction. Perhaps in response to the growing U.S. debate over U.S.
involvement in Iraq, General Casey, during a visit to Washington in late June 2006,
presented to President Bush options for a substantial drawdown of U.S. forces in
Iraq, beginning as early as September 2006. According to reports of the Casey plan,
which the Administration said was one option dependent on security progress, U.S.
force levels would drop to about 120,000 by September 2006, with a more
pronounced reduction to about 100,000 by the end of 2007. These reported plans
were similar to some previous reports of plans for reduction. All previous such
reported plans have tended to fade as the security situation has not calmed
significantly, as is the case currently, and Gen. Abizaid indicated in September 19,
2006, press comments that a troop reduction is unlikely at least until spring 2007.
Reorganize the Power Structure. Some experts believe that adjusting
U.S. troop levels would not address the underlying causes of violence in Iraq. Both
the Administration and its critics have identified the need to bring more Sunni Arabs
into the political process, and the Administration has done so, although without
complete success to date. There is little agreement on what package of incentives,
if any, would persuade most Sunnis leaders — and their constituents — to fully
support the government. Some believe that Sunnis might be satisfied by a wholesale
cabinet reshuffle that gives several leading positions, such as that of President, to a
Sunni Arab.
Some commentators believe in a more substantial re-distribution of power.
They maintain that Iraq cannot be stabilized as one country and should be broken up
into three separate countries: one Kurdish, one Sunni Arab, and one Shiite Arab.
Another version of this idea, propounded by Senator Biden and Council on Foreign
Relations expert Leslie Gelb (May 1, 2006, New York Times op-ed) is to form three
47 White, Josh. “Warner Downbeat After Iraq Trip.” Washington Post, October 6, 2006.

---

CRS-42
autonomous regions, dominated by each of the major communities. According to the
authors of this latter piece, doing so would ensure that Iraq’s territorial integrity is
preserved while ensuring that these communities do not enter all-out civil war with
each other. Some believe that, to alleviate Iraqi concerns about equitable distribution
of oil revenues, an international organization should be tapped to distribute Iraq’s oil
revenues.
Critics of both forms of this idea believe that any segregation of Iraq, legal or
de-facto, would cause parts of Iraq to fall firmly under the sway of Iraq’s powerful
neighbors. Others believe that the act of dividing Iraq’s communities in any way
would cause widespread violence, particularly in areas of mixed ethnicity, as each
community struggles to maximize its territory and its financial prospects.
Negotiating With Insurgents. A related idea is to negotiate with
insurgents or insurgent commanders. The Administration — and the Iraqi
government — appears to have adopted this recommendation to some extent. As
noted, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad and various Iraqi leaders, such as President
Talabani, have reached out to Sunni politicians known to have ties to the insurgency.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld confirmed to journalists in June 2005 that such
discussions had taken place between insurgent representatives and some U.S.
military commanders in the field. The U.S. talks reportedly have been intended to
help U.S. forces defeat Zarqawi’s foreign insurgent faction. However, no major
insurgent faction has lain down arms in response to any talks with U.S. personnel or
Iraqi officials, although Iraqi leaders say some insurgent groups have expressed
tentative interest in the amnesty plan. The insurgents who have attended such talks
reportedly want an increased role for Sunnis in government, a timetable for U.S.
withdrawal, and a withdrawal of the Shiite-dominated ISF from Sunni regions. Some
are also said to want Saddam Hussein’s release from jail and an end to his trial.
Some U.S. officials appear to believe that talking directly with insurgents increases
insurgent leverage and emboldens them to continue attacks.

Accelerating Economic Reconstruction. Some believe that the key to
calming Iraq is to accelerate economic reconstruction. According to this view,
accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment,
improving public services, and creating confidence in the government. This idea
appears to have been incorporated into the President’s “National Strategy for
Victory” document and is exemplified by the formation of the PRTs, as discussed
above. Others doubt that economic improvement alone will produce major political
results because the differences among Iraq’s major communities are fundamental and
resistant to economic solutions. In addition, the U.S. plan to transfer most
reconstruction management to Iraqis by the end of 2007 might indicate that the
Administration has not found this idea persuasive.
Internationalization Options/Iraq Study Group. Some observers believe
that the United States needs to recruit more international help in stabilizing Iraq. One
idea is to form a “contact group” of major countries and Iraqi neighbors to prevail
on Iraq’s factions to compromise. These ideas are included in several resolutions
introduced by Senator Kerry, including S.J.Res. 36, S.Res. 470, S.J.Res. 33, and S.
1993, although several of these bills also include provisions for timetables for a U.S.
withdrawal. Other ideas involve recruitment of new force donors. In July 2004, then

---

CRS-43
Secretary of State Powell said the United States would consider a Saudi proposal for
a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to perform peacekeeping in Iraq,
reportedly under separate command. However, the idea floundered because of
opposition from potential contributing countries. Another idea is to identify a high-
level international mediator to negotiate with Iraq’s major factions.
In a possible move toward some versions of these options, in March 2006
President Bush appointed former Secretary of State James Baker to head a
congressionally recruited “Iraq Study Group” to formulate options for U.S. policy in
Iraq. (The conference report on P.L. 109-234, FY2006 supplemental, provides $1
million for operations of the group.) The Group is to submit its report to President
Bush some time in late 2006, after the November 7, 2006, mid-term elections. In
press interviews in October 2006, former Secretary Baker has indicated that there
might be need for major new initiatives on Iraq policy, and some believe the Group
might represent a means for President Bush to eventually back a change in policy,
possibly included beginning of a U.S. troop withdrawal. There is no public
discussion, to date, that Baker himself or any other member of the Study Group might
become an international mediator on Iraq, and most experts believe that a mediator,
if selected, would likely need to come from a country that is viewed by all Iraqis as
neutral on internal political outcomes in Iraq.

---

CRS-44
Table 6. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
War
INC
Broadcasting
opposition
Total
crimes
activities
FY1998
—
2.0 5.0 (RFE/RL for
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
“Radio Free
Iraq)
FY1999
3.0
3.0
—
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000
—
2.0
—
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in Iraq)
(INC radio)
FY2002
—
—
—
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1
—
—
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-FY2003
(about 14.5
million of this
went to INC
FY2004
—
—
—
0
0
(request)
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war
crimes” funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation, Apr. 2004.

---

CRS-45
Figure 1. Map of Iraq

---