Order Code RL33347
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Pipeline Safety and Security:
Federal Programs
Updated October 11, 2006
Paul W. Parfomak
Specialist in Science and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Pipeline Safety and Security: Federal Programs
Summary
Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the
United States. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many
pipelines carry hazardous materials with the potential to cause public injury and
environmental damage. The nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread, running
alternately through remote and densely populated regions; consequently, these
systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. Congress is examining the
progress of federal efforts to protect pipelines as it considers reauthorization of the
federal Office of Pipeline Safety under the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006
(H.R. 5782) and the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of
2006 (S. 3961). Congress is also considering proposals to expand the pipeline
security activities of the Transportation Security Administration under the
Transportation Security Improvement Act of 2005 (S. 1052).
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), within the Department of Transportation
(DOT), is the lead federal regulator of pipeline safety. The OPS uses a variety of
strategies to promote compliance with its safety regulations, including inspections,
investigation of safety incidents, and maintaining a dialogue with pipeline operators.
The agency clarifies its regulatory expectations through a range of communications
and relies upon a range of enforcement actions to ensure that pipeline operators
correct safety violations and take preventive measures to preclude future problems.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for security in all modes of
transportation — including pipelines. The agency oversees industry’s identification
and protection of pipelines by developing security standards; implementing measures
to mitigate security risk; building stakeholder relations; and monitoring compliance
with security standards, requirements, and regulation. While the OPS and TSA have
distinct missions, pipeline safety and security are intertwined.
Federal activities in pipeline safety and security are evolving. Although pipeline
impacts on the environment remain a concern of some public interest groups, both
federal government and industry representatives suggest that federal pipeline
programs have been on the right track. As oversight of the federal role in pipeline
safety and security continues, questions may be raised concerning the effectiveness
of state pipeline damage prevention programs, the promulgation of low-stress
pipeline regulations, federal pipeline safety enforcement, the relationship between
DHS and the DOT with respect to pipeline security, and particular provisions in
federal pipeline safety regulation. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may
wish to assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity
fit together in the nation’s overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Pipeline Industry Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Pipeline Safety Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Pipeline Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Office of Pipeline Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
OPS Pipeline Security Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Transportation Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
TSA Pipeline Security Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Key Legislative Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Pipeline Damage Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Low-Stress Pipeline Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
OPS Safety Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Federal Pipeline Security Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Pipeline Security Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
TSA Security Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Identifying Critical Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Additional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Distribution integrity management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Mandatory Pipeline Assessment Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
National Pipeline Mapping System Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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Pipeline Safety and Security:
Federal Programs
Introduction1
Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the
United States.2 These pipelines are integral to U.S. energy supply and have vital
links to other critical infrastructure, such as power plants, airports, and military bases.
While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry
volatile or flammable materials with the potential to cause public injury and
environmental damage. The nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread, running
alternately through remote and densely populated regions; consequently, these
systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. The 2006 partial shutdown
of the Prudhoe Bay, Alaska oil field, the largest in the United States, due to pipeline
safety problems was a recent demonstration of this vulnerability.3
The 107th Congress passed legislation to improve pipeline safety and security
practices, and to provide federal oversight of operator security programs (P.L. 107-
355, P.L. 107-71, P.L. 107-296). The 109th Congress is examining the progress of
these efforts as it considers reauthorization of the federal Office of Pipeline Safety
under the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 (H.R. 5782), introduced by
Representative Don Young on July 13, 2006, reported by the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure on July 19, 2006, and reported by the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce on September 27, 2006. In the Senate, the
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006 (S. 3961) was
introduced by Senator Ted Stevens and three cosponsors on September 27, 2006 and
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. The 109th
Congress is also considering proposals to expand the pipeline security activities of
the Transportation Security Administration including provisions in S. 3961 and
provisions in the Transportation Security Improvement Act of 2005 (S. 1052)
introduced by Senator Ted Stevens on May 17, 2005 and reported by the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on February 27, 2006.
1 Parts of this report were previously published in CRS Report RL31990, Pipeline Security:
An Overview of Federal Activities and Current Policy Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak.
2 Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), National Transportation Statistics 2005, Dec.
2005, Table 1-10. In this report “oil” includes petroleum and other hazardous liquids such
as gasoline, jet fuel, diesel fuel, and propane, unless otherwise noted.
3 For specific discussion of BP Alaska’s pipeline problems, see CRS Report RL33629, BP
Alaska North Slope Pipeline Shutdowns: Regulatory Policy Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak.

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CRS-2
Pipeline Industry Characteristics
Roughly 160,000 miles of oil pipeline in the United States carry over 75% of the
nation’s crude oil and around 60% of its refined petroleum products.4 Some 180
companies operate the interstate lines, which account for roughly 80% of total
pipeline mileage and transported volume.5 The U.S. natural gas pipeline network
consists of around 210,000 miles of interstate transmission, 85,000 miles of
intrastate transmission, and 40,000 miles of field and gathering pipeline, which
connect gas extraction wells to processing facilities. Around 100 systems make up
the interstate network. Another 90 or so systems operate strictly within individual
states.6 These interstate and intrastate gas transmission pipelines feed around 1.1
million miles of regional lines in some 1,300 local distribution networks.7 Natural
gas pipelines also connect to 113 liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage sites, which
augment pipeline gas supplies during peak demand periods.8
Pipeline Safety Record. Taken as a whole, releases from pipelines cause
few annual fatalities compared to other product transportation modes. Oil pipelines
reported an average of 1.4 deaths per year from 2000 to 2004; gas pipelines reported
an average of 17.0 deaths per year during the same period.9 Accidental pipeline
releases result from a variety of causes, including third-party excavation, corrosion,
mechanical failure, control system failure, and operator error. Natural forces, such
as floods and earthquakes, can also damage pipelines. According to the Department
of Transportation (DOT), there were 124 oil pipeline accidents and 172 gas
transmission pipeline accidents in 2005.10 Although pipeline releases have caused
relatively few fatalities in absolute numbers, a single pipeline accident can be
catastrophic. For example, a 1999 gasoline pipeline explosion in Bellingham,
Washington, killed two children and an 18-year-old man, and caused $45 million in
damage to a city water plant and other property. In 2000, a natural gas pipeline
explosion near Carlsbad, New Mexico, killed 12 campers, including four children.11
In 2006, damaged pipelines on the North Slope of Alaska leaked over 200,000
gallons of crude oil in an environmentally sensitive area. These accidents have
4 BTS, Dec. 2005, Table 1-10.
5 C. J. Trench, How Pipelines Make the Oil Market Work — Their Networks, Operation and
Regulation. For Assoc. of Oil Pipelines, Allegro Energy Group, New York, Dec. 2001.
6 James Tobin, Changes in U.S. Natural Gas Transportation Infrastructure in 2004, Energy
Information Administration (EIA), June 2005, p. 4.
7 BTS, Dec. 2005, Tables 1-2 and 1-10.
8 Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. LNG Markets and Uses, Jan. 2003, p. 1.
9 BTS, Dec. 2005, Table 2-46.
10 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Liquid Pipeline Accident Summary by Cause and Natural
Gas Transmission Incident Summary by Cause, Feb. 11, 2006.
11 National Transportation Safety Board, Pipeline Accident Report PAR-03-01, Feb. 2003.

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CRS-3
generated substantial scrutiny of pipeline regulation and increased state and
community activity related to pipeline safety.12
Pipeline Security Risks. Pipelines are vulnerable to vandalism and terrorist
attack with firearms, with explosives, or by other physical means. Some pipelines
may also be vulnerable to “cyber-attacks” on computer control systems or attacks on
electricity grids or telecommunications networks.13 Oil and gas pipelines have been
a target of terrorists outside and within the United States. In Colombia, for example,
rebels have bombed the Caño Limón oil pipeline over 600 times since 1995.14 In
1996, London police foiled a plot by the Irish Republican Army to bomb gas
pipelines and other utilities across the city.15 In 1997, Texas police prevented the
bombing of natural gas storage tanks at a processing plant by Ku Klux Klan members
seeking to create a diversion for a robbery (to finance other terrorist actions).16
Since September 11, 2001, federal warnings about Al Qaeda have mentioned
pipelines specifically as potential terror targets in the United States.17 One U.S.
pipeline of particular concern and with a history of terrorist and vandal activity is the
Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s
North Slope oil fields to the marine terminal in Valdez. TAPS runs some 800 miles
and delivers nearly 17% of United States domestic oil production.18 In 1999,
Vancouver police arrested a man planning to blow up TAPS for personal profit in oil
futures.19 In 2001, a vandal’s attack on TAPS with a high-powered rifle forced a
two-day shutdown and caused extensive economic and ecological damage.20 In
January 2006, federal authorities acknowledged the discovery of a detailed posting
on a website purportedly linked to Al Qaeda that reportedly encouraged attacks on
12 W. Loy, “Slope Mayor Questions Leak Detection,” Anchorage Daily News, Mar. 14,
2006; J. Nesmith and R. K. M. Haurwitz, “Pipelines: The Invisible Danger,” Austin
American-Statesman (Austin, TX), July 22, 2001.
13 J.L. Shreeve. “Science&Technology: The Enemy Within.” The Independent. London. May
31, 2006. p. 8.
14 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure
Colombia’s Caño Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges
Remain, GAO-05-971, Sept. 2005, p. 15.
15 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations:
Protecting America’s Infrastructures, Washington, DC, Oct. 1997.
16 S. A. Pressley, “Group Planned Massacre and Big Robbery, FBI Says,” Washington Post,
April 25, 1997, p. A02.
17 “Already Hard at Work on Security, Pipelines Told of Terrorist Threat,” Inside FERC,
McGraw-Hill Companies, Jan. 3, 2002.
18 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., Internet page, Anchorage, AK, March 2006, at [http://www.
alyeska-pipe.com/about.html].
19 D. S. Cloud, “A Former Green Beret’s Plot to Make Millions Through Terrorism,”
Ottawa Citizen, Dec. 24, 1999, p. E15.
20 Y. Rosen, “Alaska Critics Take Potshots at Line Security,” Houston Chronicle, Feb. 17,
2002.

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CRS-4
U.S. pipelines, especially TAPS, using weapons or hidden explosives.21 In February
2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested a U.S. citizen for trying to
conspire with Al Qaeda to attack TAPS and a major natural gas pipeline in the
eastern United States.22 To date, there have been no known Al Qaeda attacks on
TAPS or other U.S. pipelines, but operators remain alert.
Office of Pipeline Safety
The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-481) and the Hazardous
Liquid Pipeline Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-129) are two of the key early acts establishing
the federal role in pipeline safety. Under both statutes, the Transportation Secretary
is given primary authority to regulate key aspects of interstate pipeline safety: design,
construction, operation and maintenance, and spill response planning. Pipeline safety
regulations are covered in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.23 The DOT
administers pipeline regulations through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) within
the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).24 The OPS
has approximately 250 staff, including inspectors, based in Washington, D.C.,
Atlanta, Kansas City, Houston, and Denver.25 In addition to its own staff, the OPS’s
enabling legislation allows the agency to delegate authority to intrastate pipeline
safety offices, and allows state offices to act as “agents” administering interstate
pipeline safety programs (excluding enforcement) for those sections of interstate
pipelines within their boundaries.26 Over 400 state pipeline safety inspectors are
available in 2006. The OPS safety program is funded primarily by user fees assessed
on a per-mile basis on each regulated pipeline operator (49 U.S.C. § 60107). The
President’s FY2007 budget request for the OPS seeks $75.7 million, an increase from
$73.0 million in FY2006.27 H.R. 5782 would authorize OPS expenditures at this
level (Sec. 6). S. 3961 would authorize $79.0 million in FY2007.
The OPS uses a variety of strategies to promote compliance with its safety
standards. The agency conducts physical inspections of facilities and construction
projects; conducts programmatic inspections of management systems, procedures,
and processes; investigates safety incidents; and maintains a dialogue with pipeline
operators. The agency clarifies its regulatory expectations through a range of
21 W. Loy, “Web Post Urges Jihadists to Attack Alaska Pipeline,” Anchorage Daily News,
Jan. 19, 2006.
22 A. Lubrano and J. Shiffman, “Pa. Man Accused of Terrorist Plot,” Philadelphia Inquirer,
Feb. 12, 2006, p. A1.
23 Safety and security of liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities used in gas pipeline
transportation is regulated under CFR Title 49, Part 193.
24 PHMSA succeeds the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA),
reorganized under P.L. 108-246, which was signed by the President on Nov. 30, 2004.
25 OPS phone directory, updated Aug. 30, 2006. [http://ops.dot.gov/contact/phonelist.htm].
26 49 U.S.C. 601. States may recover up to 50% of their costs for these programs from the
federal government.
27 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2007 — Appendix, Washington, DC, Feb. 2006, p. 894.

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CRS-5
communications tools including published protocols and regulatory orders, guidance
manuals, and public meetings. The OPS also relies upon a range of enforcement
actions, including administrative actions and civil penalties, to ensure that pipeline
operators correct safety violations and take preventive measures to preclude future
safety problems.28 According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
analysis, between 1994 and 2004, the OPS took 1,430 enforcement actions against
pipeline operators.29 Civil penalties proposed by the OPS for pipeline safety
violations in 2005 exceeded $4 million.30 The OPS also conducts accident
investigations and systemwide reviews designed to focus on high-risk operational or
procedural problems and areas of the pipeline near sensitive environmental areas or
high-density populations. To improve its regulations and activities, the agency
conducts a research program funded at $13 million in FY2006.
Since 1997, the OPS has increasingly encouraged industry’s implementation of
“integrity management” programs on pipeline segments near “high consequence”
areas. Integrity management provides for continual evaluation of pipeline condition;
assessment of risks to the pipeline; inspection or testing; data analysis; and followup
repair, as well as preventive or mitigative actions. High-consequence areas include
population centers, commercially navigable waters, and environmentally sensitive
areas, such as drinking water supplies or ecological reserves. The integrity
management approach directs priority resources to locations of highest consequence
rather than applying uniform treatment to the entire pipeline network.31 The OPS
made integrity management programs mandatory for most operators with 500 or
more miles of regulated oil pipeline as of March 31, 2001 (49 C.F.R. § 195).
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. On December 12, 2002,
President Bush signed into law the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (P.L.
107-355). The act reauthorizes funding for the OPS through FY2006. It also
strengthens federal pipeline safety programs, state oversight of pipeline operators,
and public education regarding pipeline safety.32 Among other provisions, P.L. 107-
355 requires operators of regulated gas pipelines in high-consequence areas to
28 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), “Enforcement,” Internet page, Feb. 14, 2006, at [http://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/Enforcement.htm].
29 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Pipeline Safety: Management of the Office of
Pipeline Safety’s Enforcement Program Needs Further Strengthening, GAO-04-80 July
2004, p. 26.
30 B. McCown, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., statement before the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit
and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, March 16, 2005.
31 Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Pipeline Safety. Pipeline
Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Hazardous Liquid Operators with 500
or More Miles of Pipeline), Federal Register, Dec. 1, 2000, p. 75378.
32 P.L. 107-355 encourages the implementation of state “one-call” excavation notification
programs (Sec. 2) and allows states to enforce “one-call” program requirements. The act
expands criminal responsibility for pipeline damage to cases where damage was not caused
“knowingly and willfully” (Sec. 3). The act adds provisions for ending federal-state pipeline
oversight partnerships if states do not comply with federal requirements (Sec. 4).

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CRS-6
conduct risk analysis and implement integrity management programs similar to those
required for oil pipelines.33 The act authorizes the DOT to order safety actions for
pipelines with potential safety problems (Sec. 7) and increases violation penalties
(Sec. 8). The act attempts to streamline the permitting process for emergency
pipeline restoration by establishing an interagency committee, including the DOT,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Land Management, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, and other agencies, to ensure coordinated review
and permitting of pipeline repairs (Sec. 16). The act authorizes $100 million for
research and development in pipeline integrity, safety, reliability, and security (Sec.
12). It requires DOT to study ways to limit pipeline safety risks from population
encroachment and ways to preserve environmental resources in pipeline rights-of-
way (Sec. 11). P.L. 107-355 also includes provisions for public education, grants for
community pipeline safety studies, “whistle blower” and other employee protection,
employee qualification programs, and mapping data submission.
OPS Pipeline Security Activities. Presidential Decision Directive 63
(PDD-63), issued during the Clinton administration, assigned lead responsibility for
pipeline security to the DOT.34 At the time, these responsibilities fell to the OPS,
since the agency was already addressing some elements of pipeline security in its role
as safety regulator. In 2002, the OPS conducted a vulnerability assessment to
identify critical pipeline facilities and worked with industry groups and state pipeline
safety organizations “to assess the industry’s readiness to prepare for, withstand and
respond to a terrorist attack....”35 Together with the Department of Energy and state
pipeline agencies, the OPS promoted the development of consensus standards for
security measures tiered to correspond with the five levels of threat warnings issued
by the Office of Homeland Security.36 The OPS also developed protocols for
inspections of critical facilities to ensure that operators implemented appropriate
security practices. To convey emergency information and warnings, the OPS
established a variety of communication links to key staff at the most critical pipeline
facilities throughout the country. The OPS also began identifying near-term
technology to enhance deterrence, detection, response, and recovery, and began
seeking to advance public and private sector planning for response and recovery.37
On September 5, 2002, the OPS circulated formal guidance developed in
cooperation with the pipeline industry associations defining the agency’s security
33 A 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the OPS’s gas
integrity management program benefitted public safety, although the report recommended
revisions to the OPS’s performance measures. See GAO. Natural Gas Pipeline Safety:
Integrity Management Benefits Public Safety, but Consistency of Performance Measures
Should Be Improved. GAO-06-946, Sept. 8, 2006. pp. 2-3.
34 Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures, May
22, 1998.
35 RSPA, RSPA Pipeline Security Preparedness, Dec. 2001.
36 Ellen Engleman, RSPA Administrator, statement before the Subcommittee on Energy and
Air Quality, House Energy and Commerce Committee, Mar. 19, 2002.
37 Ellen Engleman, RSPA Administrator, statement before the Subcommittee on Highways
and Transit, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Feb, 13, 2002.

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program recommendations and implementation expectations. This guidance
recommended that operators identify critical facilities, develop security plans
consistent with prior trade association security guidance, implement these plans, and
review them annually.38 While the guidance was voluntary, the OPS expected
compliance and informed operators of its intent to begin reviewing security programs
within 12 months, potentially as part of more comprehensive safety inspections.39
Transportation Security Administration
In November 2001, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (P.L. 107-71) establishing the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) within the DOT. According to TSA, the act placed the DOT’s pipeline
security authority (under PDD-63) within TSA. The act specified for TSA a range
of duties and powers related to general transportation security, such as intelligence
management, threat assessment, mitigation, security measure oversight and
enforcement, among others. On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) creating the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Among other provisions, the act transferred to DHS the
Transportation Security Administration from the DOT (Sec. 403). On December 17,
2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7),
clarifying executive agency responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and
protecting critical infrastructure. HSPD-7 maintains DHS as the lead agency for
pipeline security (par. 15), and instructs the DOT to “collaborate in regulating the
transportation of hazardous materials by all modes (including pipelines)” (par. 22h).
The order also requires that DHS and other federal agencies collaborate with
“appropriate private sector entities” in sharing information and protecting critical
infrastructure (par. 25). HSPD-7 supersedes PDD-63 (par. 37). Pipeline security
activities at TSA are led by the Pipeline Security Program Office (PSPO) within the
agency’s Intermodal Security Program Office.
TSA Pipeline Security Activities. In 2003, TSA initiated its Corporate
Security Review (CSR) program, wherein the agency visits the largest pipeline and
natural gas distribution operators to review their security plans and inspect their
facilities. (The OPS participated with TSA in a number of security reviews in 2003,
but has not done so since then.) During the reviews, TSA evaluates whether each
company is following the intent of the OPS security guidance, and seeks to collect
the list of assets each company had identified meeting the criteria established for
critical facilities. In 2004, the DOT reported that the plans reviewed to date
(approximately 25) had been “judged responsive to the OPS guidance.”40 As of
August 2006, TSA had completed 57 CSR reviews, with a long-term goal of one per
38 James K. O’Steen, RSPA, Implementation of RSPA Security Guidance, presentation to
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Feb. 25, 2003.
39 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), personal communication, June 10, 2003.
40 Department of Transportation (DOT), “Action Taken and Actions Needed to Improve
Pipeline Safety,” CC-2004-061, June 16, 2004, p. 21.

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CRS-8
month.41 According to TSA, virtually all of the companies reviewed through 2005
had developed security plans, identified critical assets, and conducted background
checks on new employees. Most had also implemented employee security training
programs and raised local community and law enforcement awareness of pipeline
security as part of their emergency response obligations. The TSA reviews also
identified inadequacies in some company security programs such as poor access
controls, deficient security equipment, lack of real-time threat information, and
irregular security exercises.42
In addition to its CSR program, TSA has engaged in a number of other pipeline
security activities. The TSA has worked to establish qualifications for personnel
seeking unrestricted access to critical pipeline assets and maintains its own inventory
of critical pipeline infrastructure.43 The agency has also addressed legal issues
regarding recovery from terrorist attacks, such as FBI control of crime scenes and
eminent domain in pipeline restoration. TSA has been performing cross-border
pipeline system vulnerability assessments with other U.S. federal agencies and
Natural Resources Canada.44 In October 2005, TSA issued an overview of
recommended security practices for pipeline operators “for informational purposes
only ... not intended to replace security measures already implemented by individual
companies.”45 The agency plans to release revised guidance on security best
practices by the end of 2006. TSA has joined both the Energy Government
Coordinating Council and the Transportation Government Coordinating Council
under provisions in HSPD-7. The missions of the councils are to work with their
industry counterparts to coordinate critical infrastructure protection programs in the
energy and transportation sectors, respectively, and to facilitate the sharing of
security information. TSA has also performed a limited number of vulnerability
assessments for specific companies and assets where intelligence information has
suggested potential terrorist activity. The agency sponsors an annual pipeline
security conference as part of its outreach to the private sector.46
According to TSA, the Pipeline Security Program Office’s current pipeline
security mission includes developing security standards; implementing measures to
mitigate security risk; building and maintaining stakeholder relations, coordination,
education and outreach; and monitoring compliance with security standards,
requirements, and regulations.47 The President’s FY2007 budget request for DHS
does not include a separate line item for TSA’s pipeline security activities. The
41 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006.
42 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, presentation to the DGC Homeland Security
Conference, Alexandria, VA, Dec. 7, 2005. pp. 18-20.
43 TSA, TSA Multi-Modal Criticality Evaluation Tool, TSA Threat Assessment and Risk
Management Program, slide presentation, April 15, 2003.
44 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006.
45 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, Pipeline Security Best Practices, Oct. 19,
2005, p. 1.
46 TSA, Intermodal Security Program Office, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006.
47 Ibid.

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budget request does include a $37 million line item for “Surface Transportation
Security,” which encompasses all security activities in non-aviation transportation
modes, including pipelines.48 The PSPO has traditionally received from the agency’s
general operational budget an allocation for routine operations such as regulation
development, travel, and outreach. According to the PSPO, the current budget funds
11 full-time staff within the office. These staff will conduct pipeline security
inspections, maintain TSA’s asset database, support TSA’s multi-modal risk models,
develop new security standards, and issue regulations as required. In addition, the
PSPO states that it has access to approximately 100 surface transportation inspectors
within TSA who could potentially be trained to perform pipeline inspections in the
future should the need arise.49
Key Legislative Issues
The 109th Congress is proposing legislation to reauthorize the OPS and to amend
pipeline security law. Consideration of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006
(H.R. 5782), the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of
2006 (S. 3961), and the Transportation Security Improvement Act of 2005 (S. 1052)
may provide an opportunity to examine a number of key issues associated with
federal pipeline safety and security programs. This section discusses selected
pipeline issues which have drawn particular attention in legislative debate. The bills
cited above contain additional provisions not discussed in this report
Pipeline Damage Prevention
According to OPS statistics, third-party excavation damage is the single greatest
cause of accidents among natural gas distribution pipelines.50 It is also a leading
cause of damage among natural gas transmission and hazardous liquids pipelines.
Both reported versions of H.R. 5782 would impose federal civil penalties for
violations of state “one-call” notification programs to prevent excavation damage to
underground pipelines (Sec. 2). S. 3961 contains similar provisions related to “one-
call” program civil enforcement (Sec. 4). While supporting stronger enforcement of
excavation damage prevention programs, some stakeholders have argued that such
enforcement is best performed by state regulators responsible for administering one-
call programs rather than by the federal government. They favor an approach which
encourages state enforcement, unless the federal government determines that a state’s
enforcement efforts are ineffective.51 Accordingly, H.R. 5782 would prohibit federal
enforcement in states already imposing such penalties (Sec. 2).
48 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2005 — Appendix, Washington, DC, Feb. 2, 2004, p. 485.
49 TSA, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006.
50 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). “Distribution Pipeline Incident Summary by Cause:
1/1/2006 - 07/26/2006.” Aug. 15, 2007. [http://ops.dot.gov/stats/NGDIST06.HTM]
51 Felt, T., President and CEO, Explorer Pipeline. Statement before the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality hearing on
Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act. July 27, 2006.

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Although their specific language differs, both reported versions of H.R. 5782
would also authorize grants to states (and certain municipalities) for improving
damage prevention programs if the states have been certified (under 49 U.S.C. §
60106) or can demonstrate that they are establishing an “effective” program, as
subsequently defined. S. 3961 contains similar provisions for state grants (Sec. 4).
While supporting grants to assist state pipeline programs, some state regulators are
concerned that the grant requirements could exclude states working towards, but not
already meeting the aforementioned eligibility requirements.52 If assisting such states
in meeting certification and “effectiveness” standards under H.R. 5782 or S. 3961 is
a goal, Congress may consider expanding grant eligibility for these purposes.
Low-Stress Pipeline Regulations
Pipelines operated at less than 20% of the specified minimum strength of the
material from which they are constructed are classified as “low-stress” pipelines
under 49 C.F.R. § 195.2. According to the OPS, federal pipeline safety regulations
originally did not apply to low-stress pipelines because they operated at low
pressures, were not prone to accidents, and were thought to pose little risk to the
public. In 1994, however, OPS extended its hazardous liquid pipeline regulations
under 49 C.F.R. § 195 to include low-stress pipelines that 1) transport highly volatile
liquids, 2) are not located in rural areas, 3) are located offshore, or 4) are located in
waterways used for commercial navigation (§ 195.1(b)(3)).
The regulation of low-stress pipeline regulations has come under greater
Congressional scrutiny since March 2006, after a spill from a BP pipeline oil pipeline
led to the partial shutdown of the Prudhoe Bay area oil field on the North Slope of
Alaska. In its March 15, 2006, Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued to BP, the
OPS found that BP’s pipelines met the definition of a “hazardous pipeline facility”
under 49 U.S.C. § 60112(a), which grants general authority under the statute, but that
specific federal pipeline safety regulations under 49 C.F.R. § 195 did not apply
because BP’s pipelines were classified as “low-stress” and fell under the exception
in 49 C.F.R. § 195.1(b)(3).53 In August, 2006, BP announced additional disruption
of North Slope oil supplies to conduct major pipeline repairs “following the
discovery of unexpectedly severe corrosion and a small spill from a Prudhoe Bay oil
transit line.”54 BP has since admitted to flaws in its maintenance models and, in
retrospect, the inadequacy of its overall maintenance program for its North Slope
operations.55
52 Mason, D.L., Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. Statement before the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality hearing on
Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act. July 27, 2006.
53 Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Admin. (PHMSA). Corrective Action Order in
the Matter of BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.,Respondent. CPF No. 5-2006-5015H. March 15,
2006. [http://ops.dot.gov/regions/west/BP%205-2006-5015H%20-%20Final.pdf]..
54 BP Exploration Alaska, Inc. “BP to Shutdown Prudhoe Bay Oil Field.” Press release. Aug.
6, 2006. [http://usresponse.bp.com/go/doc/1249/127496]
55 Marshall, S., President, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc. Comments to the Joint Alaska
(continued...)

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On September 6, 2006, the OPS published in the Federal Register proposed
rules for risk-based regulation of hazardous liquid low-stress pipelines located in
“unusually sensitive areas” and currently exempted from its regulations under 49
C.F.R. § 195.56 The OPS defines an unusually sensitive area (USA) as “a drinking
water or ecological resource area that is unusually sensitive to environmental damage
from a hazardous liquid pipeline release” (49 C.F.R. § 195.6).57 Although USAs
would be identified on a site-by-site basis, the OPS has indicated that the North Slope
is a USA.58 The agency expects to finalize regulations for low-stress hazardous
liquids pipelines in USAs by the end of 2006.59 There is general agreement that the
OPS can promulgate new low-stress pipeline regulations under its existing statutory
authority under Section 49 of the U.S. Code.
Members of Congress, the pipeline industry, and public advocates have
expressed support in principle for addition regulation of low-stress pipelines as well
as the OPS’s rulemaking schedule.60 One open question, however, is how broadly
those regulations will apply. The OPS has stated its intention to regulate currently
exempt low-stress pipelines in USAs, a proposal which reportedly would cover
approximately 1,600 miles out of approximately 5,000 miles of U.S. low-pressure
pipelines.61 Public and environmental advocacy groups have proposed regulation of
nearly all low-stress pipelines, regardless of location.62 Other advocates have
proposed using the “high consequence” criteria in the OPS’s existing integrity
management regulations for determining which specific pipelines should be covered
under OPS’s new provisions. Consistent with the OPS’s proposals, the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s version of H.R. 5782 would mandate
low-stress pipeline regulations only in USAs (Sec. 5). The bill would also define
low-stress pipelines as having a diameter greater than 8 5/8 inches (Sec. 5),
55 (...continued)
Senate and House Resources Committee. Aug.18, 2006; Malone, R.,. Aug. 7, 2006.
56 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration(PHMSA). “Pipeline Safety:
Protecting Unusually Sensitive Areas From Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Gathering
Lines and Low-Stress Lines.” Federal Register. Vol. 71. No. 172. Sept. 6, 2006. pp. 52504-
52519.
57 49 C.F.R. § 195.6 further define “drinking water” or “ecological resource” areas.
58 Dept. of Transportation (DOT). “U.S. Department of Transportation Proposes New Safety
Requirements for Rural Low-Stress and Gathering Pipelines in Unusually Sensitive Areas.”
Press release. PHMSA 8-06. Aug. 31, 2006.
59 Ibid. DOT. Aug. 31, 2006; Hebert, H.J. “In Wake of Pipeline Trouble in Alaska,
Government Renews Push for Regulations.” Associated Press. Aug. 10, 2006.
60 See testimony in: “Pipeline Safety: a Progress Report since the Enactment of the Pipeline
Safety Improvement Act of 2002.” Hearing before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality. Serial No. 109-84. April 27, 2006.
61 “Oversight of Pipelines May Increase.” Los Angeles Times. Aug. 18, 2006. p. C3.
62 Epstein, L.N., Cook Inlet Keeper. Testimony before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality hearing on Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act Reauthorization and H.R. 5782, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2006. July 27, 2006.

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eliminating numerous smaller pipelines from potential inclusion under new OPS
rules. The House Energy and Commerce Committee’s version of H.R. 5782 would
require that all low-stress hazardous liquids pipelines be subject to the same
regulations as other hazardous liquids pipelines (Sec. 2(h)). S. 3961 contains similar
provisions (Sec. 3). Both versions of H.R. 5782 as well as S. 3961 would mandate
the promulgation of these new regulations within one year of enactment. In
establishing the final criteria for low-stress pipeline regulation, Congress may
consider the balance between the potential safety benefits and the potential costs of
stricter safety programs in light of BP’s pipeline problems and potential problems
among similar pipeline systems elsewhere in the United States.
OPS Safety Enforcement
The adequacy of the OPS’s enforcement strategy has been an ongoing concern
of Congress, particularly after the fatal pipeline accidents in Washington and New
Mexico. A report from the General Accounting Office in 2000 called into question
fundamental changes in OPS’s enforcement strategy at the time, such as sharply
reducing the use of fines to enforce compliance with pipeline safety regulations.63
Provisions in the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-355) put added
scrutiny on the effectiveness of the OPS’s enforcement strategy and assessment of
civil penalties (Sec. 8). A 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
reexamining OPS enforcement stated that the agency had made a number of changes
in its enforcement strategy with the potential to improve pipeline safety. The report
concluded, however, that the effectiveness of the strategy could not yet be determined
because OPS’s program had not incorporated “clear program goals, a well-defined
strategy for achieving those goals, and performance measures linked to the program
goals.”64 In March 2006 testimony before Congress, the GAO reported that the OPS
had adopted measures that appeared to be responsive to the agency’s earlier concerns,
although the GAO had not reviewed the strategy or its implementation in depth.65
In April 2006, PHMSA testified before Congress that the OPS had
institutionalized a “tough-but-fair” approach to enforcement, “imposing and
collecting larger penalties, while guiding pipeline operators to enhance higher
performance.”66 According to the agency, $4 million in proposed civil penalties in
2005 was three times greater than penalties proposed in 2003, the first year higher
penalties could be imposed under P.L. 107-355 (Sec. 8(a)).67 Notwithstanding these
efforts to change its pipeline safety enforcement strategy, some analysts believe that
63 General Accounting Office (GAO). Pipeline Safety: The Office of Pipeline Safety Is
Changing How It Oversees the Pipeline Industry. GAO/RCED-00-128. May 2000. p. 22.
64 Ibid. GAO. July, 2004. p3.
65 Siggerud, K. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Testimony before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and
Pipelines hearing on Pipeline Safety. GAO-06-474T. March 16, 2006. p11.
66 Gerard, S. L., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Admin.(PHMSA). Testimony before the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee hearing
on Pipeline Safety. Serial No. 109-84. April 27, 2006. p. 14.
67 Ibid.

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the OPS’s enforcement actions are not sufficiently transparent to the public, other
government agencies, or industry.68 The House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee’s version of H.R. 5782 would not impose new requirements for
enforcement transparency. The House Energy and Commerce Committee’s version
would require the agency to issue monthly summaries of OPS enforcement actions
including violation and penalty information for each action, and provide a
mechanism for pipeline operators to make response information available to the
public (Sec. 2(m)). S. 3961 contains similar provisions for OPS enforcement
summaries, although it includes no provisions related to operators response
information (Sec. 9).
Federal Pipeline Security Authority
Congress has repeatedly raised questions about the appropriate division of
pipeline security authority between the OPS and TSA.69 Both the OPS and TSA have
played important roles in the federal pipeline security program, with TSA the
designated lead agency since 2002. In 2004, the DOT and DHS entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning their respective security roles in
all modes of transportation. The MOU notes that DHS has the primary responsibility
for transportation security with support from the DOT, and establishes a general
framework for cooperation and coordination. The MOU states that “specific tasks
and areas of responsibility that are appropriate for cooperation will be documented
in annexes ... individually approved and signed by appropriate representatives of
DHS and DOT.”70 On August 9, 2006, the departments signed an annex “to delineate
clear lines of authority and responsibility and promote communications, efficiency,
and nonduplication of effort through cooperation and collaboration between the
parties in the area of transportation security.”71 An amendment to H.R. 5782 passed
by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on July 19, 2006 would
require the Secretary of Transportation to clarify the pipeline security roles of the
OPS and TSA. Similarly, a provision in S. 1052 would require an annex to the
existing memorandum of agreement between the OPS and TSA regarding their
relative security activities (Sec. 408). These requirements may have been satisfied
by the annex referred to above.

68 Ibid. Epstein, L.N.. July 27, 2006.
69 For example, see Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr., statement at the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines,
hearing on Pipeline Safety, Mar. 16, 2006.
70 Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) and Dept. Of Transportation (DOT). Memorandum
of Understanding Between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation on Roles and Responsibilities. Sept. 28, 2004. p. 4.
71 Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) and Dept. of Transportation (DOT). Annex to the
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Transportation Concerning Transportation Security Administration and
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Cooperation on Pipelines and
Hazardous Materials Transportation Security. Aug. 9, 2006. p. 1.

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It remains to be determined what additional cooperative activities will be put in
place between the OPS and TSA based on the provisions in their MOU and annex,
and whether they can be implemented effectively given the two agencies’ existing
structures and obligations. One specific concern among pipeline operators is
inspection and enforcement authority. DOT officials acknowledge TSA’s superior
access to information on threats and vulnerabilities, but believe that the OPS might
more efficiently administer pipeline security inspections due to strong linkages
between pipeline safety and security. The DOT has stated that it is “hard to justify
why we need a whole different inspection staff in TSA” while the OPS already has
a large and experienced staff of pipeline safety inspectors which could readily
accommodate security inspection and associated enforcement responsibilities.72 TSA
has not commented publicly on this issue. Since any change in authority could
potentially disrupt the federal government’s established pipeline security activities,
proposals to do so require careful consideration of potential benefits and costs.
Pipeline Security Regulations
As noted earlier in this report, federal pipeline security activities have to date
relied upon voluntary industry compliance with OPS security guidance and TSA
security best practices. By initiating this voluntary approach, the OPS sought to
speed adoption of security measures by industry and avoid the publication of
sensitive security information (e.g., critical asset lists) that would normally be
required in public rulemaking.73 Likewise, although TSA’s FY2005 budget
justification stated that the agency would “issue regulations where appropriate to
improve the security of the [non-aviation transportation] modes,” the agency has not
done so for pipelines.74 TSA believes that the pipeline industry “has taken the
security guidance seriously and has done a good job” to date.75 Accordingly, the
agency is not actively developing pipeline security regulations, although it has not
ruled out doing so in the future.
Provisions in S. 1052 would require the federal government to develop pipeline
security regulations and associated civil penalties for non-compliance within one year
of enactment (Sec. 407d). S. 3961 would require TSA and OPS to promulgate
pipeline security recommendations and, “if appropriate,” subsequently promulgate
pipeline security regulations and carry out necessary inspection and enforcement
(Sec. 23), along with provisions for a federal pipeline security and incident recovery
plan (Sec. 24). The pipelines industry has expressed concern that new security
regulations and related requirements may be “redundant” and “may not be necessary
72 T. J. Zinser, Acting Inspector General, Dept. of Transportation, testimony before the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit
and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, Mar. 16, 2006.
73 GAO, Pipeline Security and Safety: Improved Workforce Planning and Communication
Needed, GAO-02-785, Aug. 2002, p. 22.
74 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration Fiscal
Year 2005 Congressional Budget Justification, Washington, DC, Feb. 2, 2004, p. 20.
75 TSA, personal communication, Aug. 30, 2006

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to increase pipeline security.”76 In considering whether to impose regulations,
Congress may evaluate the effectiveness of the TSA’s current voluntary security
standards based on findings from the agency’s CSR reviews.
TSA Security Resources
Congress has long been critical of TSA’s funding of non-aviation security
activities, including pipeline activities. For example, as one Member remarked in
2005, “aviation security has received 90% of TSA’s funds and virtually all of its
attention. There is simply not enough being done to address ... pipeline security.”77
At its current staffing level, TSA’s Pipelines Branch has limited field presence for
inspections and possible enforcement of future regulations. TSA’s plan to focus
security inspections on the largest pipeline and distribution system operators seeks
to make the best use of limited resources. The concern is that TSA currently lacks
sufficient resources for rigorous security plan verification and a credible threat of
enforcement, so operator compliance with security guidance may be inadequate,
leaving the pipeline network as a whole less secure than it might be with more
universal inspection and enforcement coverage. Provisions in S. 1052 would
specifically authorize funding of $2 million annually through FY2008 for TSA’s
pipeline security inspections and enforcement program (Sec. 407(e)). It is an open
question whether this level of funding would be sufficient to enable TSA to meet
congressional expectations for federal pipeline security activities.
Identifying Critical Assets
Pipeline operators have long sought clear definitions of pipeline asset
“criticality” so they will know exactly what assets to protect and how well to protect
them. The definition of “criticality” developed by industry in 2002 (and supported
in the OPS guidance) avoided numerical thresholds, relying instead on discretionary
qualitative metrics like “significance” of impact.78 The OPS has since expressed its
belief that this definition may be too general and that clearer criticality thresholds are
needed.79 The HSPD-7 directive appears to narrow the definition of “criticality” by
emphasizing infrastructure “that could be exploited to cause catastrophic health
effects or mass casualties” (par. 13), but it is not clear how this emphasis applies to
pipelines. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate
within DHS has developed a list of critical pipelines within its national asset
database, but Congress, the GAO, and the DHS Inspector General have identified
76 American Gas Association (AGA), American Petroleum Institute (API), Association of
Oil Pipelines (AOPL), and American Public Gas Association (APGA), joint letter to
members of the Senate Commerce Committee providing views on S. 1052, Aug. 22, 2005.
77 Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, opening statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, hearing on the President’s FY2006 Budget Request for the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Feb. 15, 2005.
78 American Gas Association (AGA) and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
(INGAA), Security Guidelines Natural Gas Industry Transmission and Distribution,
Washington, DC, Sept. 6, 2002, p. 6.
79 OPS, personal communication, June 9, 2003.

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problems with DHS’s criteria for critical asset identification.80 As discussed above,
TSA has developed its own list of critical pipeline systems in support of its CSR
program, but has not made public its methodology or the list itself.
The House Energy and Commerce Committee’s version of H.R. 5782 would
require the Department of Energy, in consultation with the DOT, to perform a study
identifying reliability concerns among “critical” pipelines (Sec. 2(j)). Provisions in
S. 1052 (Sec. 407(b) and S. 3961 (Sec. 23(b)) call for “inspection of the critical
facilities of the 100 most critical pipeline operators” identified by the TSA. Given
the continuing uncertainty among industry and policy makers about what constitutes
a critical asset, how the DOT or TSA will develop a list of critical operators under
H.R. 5782, S. 1052 or S. 3961 may require clarification.
Additional Issues
In addition to the issues mentioned above, Congress may consider several key
issues related to proposed pipeline legislation or otherwise raised by pipeline
stakeholders.
Distribution integrity management. As noted earlier in this report, the
OPS made integrity management programs mandatory for oil transmission pipelines
in 2001 and for gas transmission pipelines in 2003. Congress and other stakeholders
have since sought to extend these regulations to natural gas distribution pipelines,
such as those operated by regional natural gas utilities. Because distribution
pipelines are designed and operate differently from transmission lines, the OPS has
been developing approaches to structuring unique regulations for distribution
systems.81 Natural gas distribution companies seek flexible, risk-based options in any
future integrity management regulations directed at distribution systems.82 Both
versions of H.R. 5782 and S. 3961 would mandate the promulgation by OPS of
minimum standards for integrity management programs for distribution pipelines
within one year of enactment. As the OPS’s study of distribution integrity
management measures continues, Congress may act to ensure that any resulting
regulations balance the potential benefits of improved pipeline safety with the
potential costs to distribution pipeline operators.
80 For example, see Rep. Zoe Lofgren, remarks at the House Homeland Security Committee,
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee, hearing
on Terrorism Risk Assessment at the Department of Homeland Security,” Nov. 17, 2005;
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed
to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 81-82; Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS),
Office of Inspector General. Progress in Developing the National Asset Database. OIG-06-
04. June 2006.
81 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin. (PHMSA) et al. Integrity Management
for Gas Distribution Pipelines, Report of Phase 1 Investigations. Dec. 2005.
82 E. F. Bender, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, testimony before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and
Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, Mar. 16, 2006, p. 10.

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Mandatory Pipeline Assessment Intervals. The Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002 requires that natural gas pipelines operators subject to the
act perform integrity management reassessments at least every seven years after an
initial baseline assessment (Sec. 14a). Some pipeline operators believe that this
reassessment interval may be too prescriptive and may not be appropriate for all
pipelines. Operators argue that assessing pipelines too frequently is costly and
inefficient, diverting limited safety resources from other uses with greater pipeline
safety benefits.83 Based on assessments conducted through 2005, “and the generally
safe condition of gas transmission pipelines,” the GAO has concluded that the seven
year reassessment interval “appears to be conservative.”84 The GAO recommends
that Congress permit pipeline operators to reassess gas transmission pipelines at
intervals based on risk factors, technical data, and engineering analyses. The agency
believes such a revision would allow the OPS more flexibility to establish longer or
shorter reassessment intervals as warranted by pipeline conditions.85 Neither S. 3961
nor H.R. 5782 would change gas pipeline assessment intervals.
National Pipeline Mapping System Access. The National Pipeline
Mapping System (NPMS) was established by the OPS as a publicly accessible
geographic information system (GIS) containing geospatial and attribute data for
pipelines and LNG facilities under OPS jurisdiction. The NPMS is an essential
decision support tool for emergency planning, inspection planning, and safety
enhancement in the nation’s pipeline system. While security issues related to the
NPMS have always been a concern of the OPS, according to agency staff, the Chief
Infrastructure Assurance Officer and other security personnel at the DOT determined
by early 2001 that “NPMS data pose no threat to national security due to the inability
of ‘worst-case scenarios’ to be derived from the use of these data.”86
Notwithstanding this determination, in response to the terror attacks of September
11, 2001, the OPS restricted NPMS access to government officials and pipeline
operators only and prohibited the transfer of NPMS data outside the NPMS system.
Some analysts believe that these access and data restrictions hamper the ability of
local agencies and the general public to incorporate essential pipeline information
into local safety planning, ultimately jeopardizing public safety. They believe that
the NPMS restrictions are also ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks because
pipeline location maps are publicly available from other sources and because
83 J. L. Mohn, Panhandle Energy, testimony before the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, hearing on pipeline
Safety, Mar. 16, 2006, p. 9.
84 Government Accountability Office (GAO). Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Risk-Based
Standards Should Allow Operators to Better Tailor Reassessments to Pipeline Threats.
GAO-06-945. Sept. 8, 2006. p. 3.
85 Ibid. p. 6.
86 S. Hall, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), “The National Pipeline Mapping System: A
Decision Support Tool,” paper for the 21st Annual ESRI International User Conference, San
Diego, CA, July 9, 2001, at [http://gis.esri.com/library/userconf/proc01/professional/papers/
pap245/p245.htm].

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pipelines must be physically marked under federal regulation.87 Congress may
reevaluate whether the OPS’s security restrictions on NPMS data are appropriately
balanced with respect to their potential impacts on local community safety and
security planning.
Conclusions
Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline
safety and security since 2001. Federal activities in these areas are evolving and
agency responsibilities are still being sorted out. Although pipeline impacts on the
environment remain a concern of some public interest groups, both federal
government and industry representatives suggest that federal pipeline programs have
been on the right track. Furthermore, ongoing dialogue among the operators and
federal agencies appears to be addressing many elements of federal pipeline safety
and security policy that have been causing concern.
As oversight of the federal role in pipeline safety and security continues,
questions may be raised concerning the effectiveness of state pipeline damage
prevention programs, the promulgation of low-stress pipeline regulations, federal
pipeline safety enforcement, the relationship between DHS and the DOT with respect
to pipeline security, and particular provisions in federal pipeline safety regulation.
In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to assess how the various
elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in the nation’s
overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. For example, mandating
pipeline security requirements could be of limited value if asset “criticality” is not
clearly defined and federal threat information remains ambiguous. Likewise,
diverting pipeline resources away from safety to enhance security might further
reduce terror risk, but not overall pipeline risk, if safety programs become less
effective as a result. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve many groups:
federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small pipeline operators,
and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve
common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress.
87 C. Weimer, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, testimony before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and
Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, Mar. 16, 2006.

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