Order Code RL32593
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Thailand:
Background and U.S. Relations
Updated October 2, 2006
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Thailand:
Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
U.S.-Thailand relations are of particular interest to Congress because of
Thailand’s status as a long-time military ally, a key country in the war against
terrorism in Southeast Asia, and a significant trade and economic partner. A
proposed U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would require implementing
legislation to take effect. However, the recent ouster of Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra by a military coup has cast uncertainty on how these U.S. priorities will
fare in the near future. Future U.S.-Thai relations will likely depend upon how
quickly the military rulers fulfill their promise to restore democratic rule.
Despite differences on Burma policy and human rights issues, shared economic
and security interests have long provided the basis for U.S.-Thai cooperation.
Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S. military operations in both
Afghanistan and Iraq and was designated as a major non-NATO ally by President
Bush in December 2003. Thailand’s airfields and ports play a particularly important
role in U.S. global military strategy, including having served as the primary hub of
the relief effort following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The high-profile arrest of
radical Islamic leader Hambali in a joint Thai-U.S. operation in 2003 underscores
Thailand’s role in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. The U.S.-Thai bilateral trade total
is $25 billion; Thailand is the United States’s 19th largest trading partner.
Until the political turmoil of 2006, Thaksin and his populist Thai Rak Thai
party had consolidated broad control of Thai politics. Before his ouster, opposition
parties and international watchdog organizations had criticized his strongman style
as a threat to Thailand’s democratic institutions. Thaksin’s response to a
counterinsurgency in the southern majority-Muslim provinces also came under fire.
A series of attacks by insurgents, which has reportedly claimed over 1,700 lives since
January 2004, has renewed concerns about both indigenous and, potentially,
transnational terrorism in the country. The new government now faces the challenge
of dealing with the ongoing unrest.
With its favorable geographic location and broad-based economy, Thailand is
among the most likely countries to play a major leadership role in Southeast Asia and
has been an aggressive advocate of increased economic integration in the region. A
founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand
maintains close ties with China, has reached out to India, and is pursuing FTAs with
a number of other countries. Given its ties with the United States, Thailand’s stature
in the region may affect broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and prospects for
further multilateral economic and security cooperation in Southeast Asia. In the
context of the Pentagon’s transformation and realignment initiatives, current
logistical facilities in Thailand could become more important to U.S. strategy in the
region. This report will be updated periodically.

Contents
Most Recent Developments: Military Coup Ousts Thaksin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political Upheaval Preceding Coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A Royal Endorsement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Violence in the Southern Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Central Government Response Under Thaksin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A New Approach From Bangkok? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Degree of Foreign Involvement Uncertain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Background: Thailand Politics and Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Thaksin’s Consolidation of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Thaksin’s Support Falters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Political Crisis Deepens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Concern About Eroding Democracy Under Thaksin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Support for Recent U.S. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S.-Thai Partnership Elevated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Asia Pacific Military Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bilateral Security Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Military Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Counter-Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Human Rights Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A Difficult Road for U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
An Aggressive FTA Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Thailand in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Growing Ties with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Divergence with United States on Burma (Myanmar) Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ASEAN Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Regional Health Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
SARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
H5N1 (Avian Flu) Virus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2003-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Thailand:
Background and U.S. Relations
A long-time American ally in Asia, Thailand has continued to pursue close ties
to the United States as the political landscape of the region has evolved. Solidified
during the Cold War, the U.S.-Thai relationship strengthened on the basis of shared
economic and trade interests and was further bolstered since the September 11, 2001
attacks by a common commitment to fight terrorism in Southeast Asia. At the same
time, Thailand enjoys a strong economic and political relationship with China,
positioning itself as a potential battleground for influence in the region.
Thailand has been a significant partner for the United States and an important
element of U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific. Designated as a major non-
NATO ally in 2003, Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S. military
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Thailand has been an active partner in the
U.S.-led war on terrorism, a role highlighted by the high-profile 2003 arrest of a
radical Islamic leader in a joint Thai-U.S. operation. Until the September 2006
military coup, other bilateral cooperation on transnational issues such as narcotics
trafficking reinforced Thailand’s standing as a primary partner of the United States
in maintaining stability in Southeast Asia. With the suspension of U.S. military aid
to Thailand, that cooperation is largely on hold.
The start of negotiations in June 2004 for a U.S.-Thailand Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) marked Thailand’s possible entry into the expanding American
web of trade pacts with political allies. The United States and Thailand exchanged
$25 billion in total trade in 2005, a figure that was expected to rise if a proposed free
trade agreement (FTA) could be successfully concluded. However, FTA negotiations
had already been difficult, and they were suspended following a political crisis that
erupted in April 2006. Following the coup, U.S. officials said that the FTA could not
go forward without a return to democratic rule. Including Thailand for FTA
consideration follows a pattern of linking FTA negotiating status with support for
U.S. foreign policy and national security goals that former U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick noted in a 2003 address.1 In Asia and Oceania, the United States has
concluded FTAs with Australia and Singapore, also strong political allies who have
supported U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism.
Most Recent Developments: Military Coup Ousts Thaksin
On September 19, 2006, Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi
Boonyaratglin led a bloodless military coup in Bangkok, ousting the democratically-
1 See CRS Report RS21657, U.S. Trade Policy and Changing Domestic and Foreign
Priorities: A Historical Overview
, by Raymond J. Ahearn.

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elected Prime Minister Thaksin and declaring martial law. Thaksin, in New York for
the United Nations General Assembly, flew to London and indicated he would not
fight the takeover. Following the coup, no violence was reported, and business
appeared to return to normal in Bangkok. The coup was the 18th since the formation
of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, but the first in 15 years.
The new leaders formed the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), later
changing the name to the Council for National Security. On October 1, the rulers
appointed former Army commander Surayud Chulanont to serve as the interim prime
minister, but reserved the power to remove him and his cabinet, as well as have final
say over the 100-member committee that will be tasked with reforming the 1997
constitution. The rulers have pledged to hold regular elections within a year.
U.S. Response. On September 28, 2006, the U.S. State Department
announced the suspension of several assistance programs under Section 5082 of the
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102): Foreign Military Financing
(FMF, for defense procurement), International Military Education Training funds
(IMET, provides training to professionalize the Thai military), and peace-keeping
operation programs. Also suspended were funds for counterterrorism and other U.S.-
participating operations appropriated under Section 1206 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2006. The suspended programs total nearly $24 million,
which includes unexpended funds from FY2006 and earlier years. Under Section
508, the funds can be reinstated once democratic rule is restored. Other programs
deemed to be in the U.S. interest will continue, according to the State Department.
After Surayud was appointed, U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce was the first foreign
diplomat to meet with him.
Political Upheaval Preceding Coup. The coup followed eight months of
political turmoil. Widespread protests against Thaksin, mostly focused on the tax-
free sale of his family’s telecommunications firm to a Singaporean government
holding company, led Thaksin to call for a new round of parliamentary elections in
April 2006. After a less-than-convincing victory by his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party
in an election boycotted by the opposition, Thaksin resigned, then quickly stepped
back into power as a “caretaker” prime minister. After Thailand’s king called for the
courts to resolve the crisis, the Constitutional Court ruled the elections invalid, and
new elections were set for November. Despite widespread discontent with Thaksin
among the country’s middle class and urban dwellers, Thaksin’s strong support in
rural areas was expected to propel the TRT to a win in the elections. In the months
leading up to the coup, the uncertainty of the future of Thai politics shook foreign
investors’ confidence and raised doubts about the durability of Thailand’s young
democratic institutions.
A Royal Endorsement. The revered King Bhumibol reportedly endorsed the
takeover after it occurred: in a statement, he appointed Sonthi as head of the
2 Sec. 508 reads: None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to
this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government
of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or
decree.

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temporary council “in order to create peace in the country.”3 The king has generally
been seen as a supporter of democratic governments in Thailand, but he had
reportedly clashed with Thaksin through his proxies, particularly former Prime
Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda, the chairman of the King’s Privy Council. In
late 2005, the king and Prem vetoed Thaksin’s choice for the commander of the
Army and instead appointed Sonthi, an unusual use of a royal power to overrule the
politicians’ choice. Many credit the king with providing stability in the political
process because of his overwhelming popularity, but some observers are concerned
that the patriarch, nearing 80 and in ill health, could die during this period of
uncertainty. The crown prince is not viewed with the same respect, and some fear
the consequences of the loss of the royal anchor.
Violence in the Southern Provinces
Since January 2004, sectarian violence between insurgents and security forces
in Thailand’s majority-Muslim provinces has left over 1,700 people dead. The toll
includes suspected insurgents killed by security forces, as well as victims of the
insurgents: both Buddhist Thais, particularly monks and teachers, and local Muslims.
The southern region, which includes the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and
Songhkla, has a history of separatist violence, though the major movements were
thought to have died out in the early 1990s. Thai Muslims have long expressed
grievances for being marginalized and discriminated against, and the area has lagged
behind the rest of Thailand in economic development.
After a series of apparently coordinated attacks in early 2004, the central
government declared martial law in the region. A pattern of insurgent attacks —
targeted shootings or small bombs that claim a few victims at a time — and counter-
attacks by the security forces has developed. The pattern crystallized into two major
outbreaks of violence in 2004: on April 28, Thai soldiers killed 108 insurgents,
including 34 lightly armed gunmen in a historic mosque, after they attempted to
storm several military and police outposts in coordinated attacks; and, on October 25,
84 local Muslims were killed: 6 shot during an erupting demonstration at the Tak Bai
police station and 78 apparently asphyxiated from being piled into trucks after their
arrest.4 The insurgents retaliated with a series of more gruesome killings, including
beheadings, following the Tak Bai incident. Facing a trend of more sophisticated and
coordinated attacks, observers note that such confrontations have led to an increasing
climate of fear and division along religious lines.5
Central Government Response Under Thaksin. The Thaksin
government’s handling of the violence was widely criticized as ineffective and
3 “Thailand Reinterprets the Rules of Democracy, Again,” International Herald Tribune.
September 21, 2006.
4 Independent forensic experts said that the men died piled on top of each other with their
hands tied behind their backs. See Mydans, Seth, “Thai King Urges Premier to Be More
Lenient in the Muslim South,” New York Times, November 2, 2004.
5 Chulalongkorn University professor Panitan Wattanyagorn, quoted in Christian Science
Monitor
. July 20, 2005.

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inflammatory. Over 40,000 soldiers and policemen were sent to the region, and
Thaksin issued decrees that allowed him to assume emergency powers, including
authority to grant immunity to security officials, hold suspects without charge for up
to 30 days, and a variety of other extraordinary measures that critics say impinge on
civil liberties.6 The measure was passed and later renewed by the TRT-controlled
Parliament. Critics also charge that the Thaksin Administration never put forth a
sustained strategy to define and address the problem, repeatedly but arbitrarily
shuffled leadership positions of those charged with overseeing the region, and failed
to implement adequate coordination between the many security and intelligence
services on the ground.7 Further, measures under the emergency decree and the
failure to stop the bloodshed have reportedly bolstered local suspicion of the security
forces. Some maintain that such distrust has led to local cooperation with the
militants.
In an effort to soften criticism that his policy overly stressed the use of military
force, Thaksin approved the formation of the National Reconciliation Commission
(NRC), headed by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun, to address the
violence. The NRC recommended lifting martial law and criticized the executive
decree as ineffective.8 The chairman of the NRC claimed that the emergency decree
provided a “license to kill” for security forces.9 In a move that may have forced
Thaksin to soften his statements, King Bhumibol Adulyadej publicly encouraged him
to take a more measured approach.
Multiple international human rights groups expressed concern about Thaksin’s
handling of the situation. A January 2006 report by Amnesty International accused
the government of unlawful methods, including “arbitrary arrest and detention
procedures; torture and ill-treatment of those arrested in relation to the violence;
failure to investigate killings and possible ‘disappearances’; and impunity of the
security forces under the provisions of the 2005 Emergency Decree.”10 Human
Rights Watch condemned the reported use of “blacklists” of suspected militants to
force individuals to attend “re-education camps.”11
A New Approach From Bangkok? Some analysts have voiced optimism
that the new rulers will help ease the crisis in the south. Upon his appointment,
interim Prime Minister Surayud identified solving the problems of the South as one
of his major priorities. The first Muslim commander of the Army, Sonthi has
6 “Thai Teachers Become Targets in the South,” Washington Post. August 12, 2005.
7 See “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” International Crisis Group Asia Report.
May 18, 2005.
8 “Draconian Powers for Thaksin,” Economist Intelligence Unit - Business Asia. July 25,
2005.
9 “Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution,” International Crisis Group Report.
November 18, 2005.
10 “If You Want Peace, Work for Justice,” Amnesty International Report. January 4, 2006.
Accessed at [http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA390012006].
11 “Thailand: Blacklists Create Climate of Fear,” Human Rights Watch News. December 17,
2005. Accessed at [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/16/thaila12317.htm].

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advocated negotiations with the separatist groups as opposed to the more
confrontational strategy pursed by Thaksin. Sonthi favors the implementation of the
recommendations made by the NRC and has supported efforts to crack down on
abuse by the central government security forces. One exiled separatist leader has
called for talks with Sonthi, but analysts stress that the problem will not easily be
solved under new leadership.
Degree of Foreign Involvement Uncertain. Most regional observers
stress that there is no convincing evidence to date of serious Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
involvement in the attacks in the southern provinces. Many experts characterize the
movement as a confluence of different groups: local separatists, Islamic radicals,
organized crime, and corrupt police forces. They stress, however, that sectarian
violence involving local Muslim grievances provides a ripe environment for foreign
groups to become more engaged in the struggle. Such experts have warned that
outside groups, including JI and other militant Indonesia-based groups, may attempt
to exploit public outrage with events like the October 2004 deaths to forge alliances
between local separatists and regional Islamic militants.12 Pictures of Muslim
casualties after the 2004 incidents were posted on an Al Qaeda website in an apparent
attempt to exploit the conflict. Some analysts believe that the heavy-handed response
by the Thai security forces, with the open support of Thaksin, swayed public opinion
of the southern population to support the movement.
Background: Thailand Politics and Government
The Kingdom of Thailand, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form
of government, is marked by an important historical dissimilarity from its regional
neighbors. Although occupied by Japan during World War II, Thailand was the only
country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized by Europeans, and it also avoided
the wave of communist revolutions that took control of the neighboring governments
of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. Thailand followed a
troubled path to democracy, enduring a series of mostly bloodless coups and multiple
changes of government in its modern history. Although Thailand became a
constitutional monarchy in 1932, it was ruled primarily by military dictatorships until
the early 1990s. A military and bureaucratic elite controlled Thai politics during this
period, denying room for civilian democratic institutions to develop. Brief periods
of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s ended with reassertions of military rule. After
Thai soldiers killed at least 50 people in demonstrations demanding an end to
military dominance of the government, international and domestic pressure led to
new elections in 1992. The 2006 coup was the first in 15 years.
Thailand’s government is composed of the executive branch (prime minister
as head of government and the king as chief of state), a bicameral National
Assembly, and the judicial branch of three court systems. Until Thaksin’s election
in 2001, the Democrat Party dominated Thai politics by instituting a series of
reforms that enhanced transparency, decentralized power from the urban centers,
tackled corruption, and introduced a broad range of constitutional rights. King
12 “Thailand ‘The Next Battleground,” The Australian. December 1, 2004.

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Bhumiphol, who has served since 1946, commands tremendous respect and loyalty
from the Thai public and continues to exercise a degree of influence over politics in
Thailand.
Thaksin’s Consolidation of Power. The Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party,
formed by Thaksin in 1999, benefitted politically from the devastation of the 1997
Asian financial crisis on Thailand’s economy, and the subsequent loss of support for
the ruling Democrats. Thaksin’s populist platform appealed to a wide cross-section
of Thais, and the TRT easily secured a clear majority in the parliament by forming
a coalition with a handful of smaller parties. Many analysts contended that Thaksin
and his party enjoyed power unprecedented in modern Thai politics.13 Fueled by
positive coverage of Thaksin’s response to the tsunami, the TRT won the February
2005 parliamentary elections outright — a first in Thai politics — by capturing 376
of the 500 seats. The main opposition party, the Democrats, captured only 96 seats.
Only in the restive South did the Democrats dominate, winning 52 of 54 seats.14
TRT swiftly dropped its former coalition party and formed a single-party
government.
Thaksin’s Support Falters. Shortly after TRT’s impressive victory,
however, Thaksin’s popularity faltered due to a weak economy in the face of rising
oil prices, coverage of a corruption scandal involving Cabinet members, and his
failure to stem violence in the South. In December 2005, King Bhumibol publicly
admonished Thaksin for refusing to acknowledge criticism. In early 2006, large
public demonstrations calling for his ouster gained momentum. The protestors,
mostly members of the urban, educated class, were reportedly unhappy with his
authoritarian style, perceived attacks on the free press, mishandling of the violence
in the southern provinces, and most of all, the tax-free sale of his family’s
telecommunications firm to a Singapore state company in a $1.9 billion deal that
many suspected was not taxed because of Thaksin’s clout.
Political Crisis Deepens. To renew his mandate, Thaksin dissolved
parliament on February 24, 2006, and called for snap elections. Opposition parties
boycotted the April election, drawing 10 million “abstention”ballots to TRT’s 16
million votes. As a result, 38 of the parliamentary seats were not filled because of
a constitutional stipulation that the winning candidate, even if unopposed, receive at
least 20% of the eligible vote. A subsequent by-election also failed to fill the open
seats, at which point King Bhumibol called for the Constitutional Court to resolve
the political paralysis. The Court ruled the elections invalid but continued to clash
with the Thai Election Commission (seen as favorable to the TRT). New elections
had been set for November 2006 before the September 19 coup occurred.
Concern About Eroding Democracy Under Thaksin
During Thaksin’s rule, detractors consistently voiced concern that his strongman
style threatened Thailand’s democratic institutions. Charges of cronyism and
13 See Ganesan, N. “Thaksin and the Politics of Domestic and Regional Consolidation in
Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 26, no. 1 (Apr. 2004).
14 “Why They All Love Thaksin,” The Economist, February 12, 2005.

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creeping authoritarianism grew increasingly louder as his political power
strengthened. Previously independent watchdog agencies reportedly weakened under
his watch,15 and some commentators alleged that Thaksin undermined anti-corruption
agencies by installing political loyalists to protect the business interests of his family
and members of his cabinet — sometimes one and the same, as Thaksin has a record
of appointing relatives and friends to prominent posts.16 Thaksin insisted that
political strength enhances development, citing Singapore’s economic success and
lack of political opposition as a model for Thailand to follow.17
Outside groups warned that press freedom has been squeezed in recent years,
documenting multiple cases in which critical journalists and news editors were
dismissed, and pointing to a libel suit against an outspoken editor filed by a
telecommunications corporation that Thaksin founded.18 Shin Corporation,
Thaksin’s family company, bought the only independent television station; the others
are owned by the government and armed forces.19 Human Rights Watch claims that
Thaksin has stifled criticism from the media of his Administration’s controversial
policies, such as the deaths of over 2,000 individuals in the government-sponsored
“war on drugs.”20
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations
A Long-Standing Southeast Asian Ally
The military coup and subsequent suspension of military aid by the United
States threatens to derail the strong bilateral defense relationship. Resumption of
military ties will likely depend on how quickly the military rulers fully restore
democratic rule. Several of the programs listed below have been suspended under
Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102). (See U.S.
Response section.)
The 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), together with the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communique, forms the basis of the
long-standing U.S.-Thai security relationship. Although SEATO was dissolved in
1977, Article IV (1) of the Manila Pact, which calls for signatories to “act to meet the
common danger” in the event of an attack in the treaty area, remains in force.
15 “Thaksin’s Way - Thailand’s Election,” The Economist. February 5, 2005.
16 “Thailand Risk: Alert — Corruption May Still Go Unchecked,” Economist Intelligence
Unit,
July 19, 2004.
17 “One Party Rule: Opposition Does Not Need to Be Strong, Says PM,” The Nation
(Bangkok), August 10, 2004.
18 “Rights Group Says Libel Suit Deepens Assault on Thailand’s Media,” Agence France
Press
, August 31, 2004.
19 “Thai Vote: Democratic Backslide?” Christian Science Monitor. February 4, 2005.
20 “Thailand: Libel Suit Deepens Assault on the Press,” Human Rights Watch. September
1, 2004.

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Thailand is considered to be one of the major U.S. security allies in East Asia, along
with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines.
The U.S. security relationship with Thailand has a firm historical foundation
based on joint efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Persian
Gulf War. Thailand sent more than 6,500 troops to serve in the United Nations
Command during the Korean War, where the Thai force suffered over 1,250
casualties.21 A decade later, the United States staged bombing raids and rescue
missions over North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand. During the Vietnam War, up
to 50,000 U.S. troops were based on Thai soil, and U.S. assistance poured into the
country to help Thailand fight its own domestic communist insurgency.22 Thailand
also sent troops to South Vietnam and Laos to aid the U.S. effort. The close security
ties continued throughout the Cold War, with Thailand serving as solid anti-
Communist ally in the region. More recently, Thai ports and airfields played a
crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies to the theater
in both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.
Thailand served as the logistics hub for much of the U.S. and international relief
effort after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. U.S. relief operations by air and sea for
the entire region were directed out of Utapao air base and Sattahip naval base.
Thailand’s government immediately granted full U.S. access to the bases following
the disaster.
Support for Recent U.S. Operations. Thailand has strengthened its
partnership with the United States by contributing troops to two American military
operations and the broader war on terrorism since the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Thailand sent 130 soldiers, largely engineers, to Afghanistan to participate in the
reconstruction phase of Operation Enduring Freedom. Thai forces were responsible
for the construction of a runway at Bagram Airbase, medical services, and some
special forces operations.23 Although Thailand remained officially neutral during the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, it contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq by
dispatching over 450 troops, including medics and engineers, to the southern city of
Karbala. The deployment proved unpopular with the Thai public, particularly after
the deaths of two soldiers in December 2003. In spring 2004, Thaksin threatened to
withdraw the troops early if the security situation continued to disintegrate and
resisted U.S. calls to postpone the withdrawal until after the January 2005 Iraqi
elections. The withdrawal was completed in September 2004.
Thailand reportedly also provided a “black site” where U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency officials were allowed to secretly hold suspected terrorists. According to
21 See [http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/allied.shtml] (official public access
website for Department of Defense Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean
War).
22 The Eagle and the Elephant: Thai-American Relations Since 1833 (Bangkok: U.S. Agency
for International Development, 1997).
23 “Thai Soldiers Help Rebuild Afghanistan,” The Nation (Thailand), July 4, 2003.

CRS-9
press reports, two major Al Qaeda figures captured in Pakistan were flown to
Thailand for interrogation by U.S. officials.24
U.S.-Thai Partnership Elevated. In October 2003, President Bush
designated Thailand as a “major non-NATO ally,” a distinction which allows more
access to U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, including credit guarantees for
major weapons purchases.25 An agreement concluded with the United States in July
2001 allows Thailand to purchase advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles for its
F-16 fighters, a first for a Southeast Asian state.26 Thaksin also authorized the
reopening of the Vietnam-era U.S. airbase in Utapao and a naval base in Sattahip,
from which the U.S. military can logistically support forces in Afghanistan and the
Middle East.
Asia Pacific Military Transformation. The U.S. Department of Defense
initiative to transform and realign the U.S. military around the globe provides
potential opportunities for increased security cooperation with Thailand. Pentagon
planners are breaking with the quantitative assurance of keeping 100,000 troops on
the ground in East Asia in favor of a more mobile, capability-based force. In the past
few years, U.S. military planners have emphasized a “places, not bases” concept in
Southeast Asia in which U.S. troops can temporarily use facilities for operations and
training, without maintaining a lengthy and costly permanent presence. In a State
Department press release, a senior Defense Department official points to cooperation
with Thailand as an example of the military’s new approach, citing the annual Cobra
Gold exercises.27 Facilities used by the U.S. military in Thailand fall under the
Pentagon’s “cooperative security location” (CSL) concept, in which host countries
provide access in exchange for upgrades and other aid.28
Bilateral Security Cooperation
Security Assistance. The United States has provided funds for the purchase
of weapons and equipment to the Thai military through the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program. As a major non-NATO ally, Thailand also qualifies for
the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, which allows for the transfer of used
U.S. naval ships and aircraft. The United States faces stiff competitors in the market
for foreign military sales in Thailand, particularly because other countries are more
willing to engage in barter trade for agricultural products.
24 “CIA Operates Secret Prisons Outside U.S.,” Wall Street Journal Asia. November 2, 2005.
25 Under section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President can designate a
non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization state as a major ally for the purposes of the Foreign
Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
26 Limaye, Satu P. “Minding the Gaps: The Bush Administration and U.S.-Southeast Asia,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 26, no. 1 (Apr. 2004).
27 “U.S. to Transform Military in Parallel with Allies — Capabilities Will Be Emphasized
Instead of Numbers of Troops,” State Department Press Releases and Documents. August
16, 2004.
28 Kaplan, Robert D., “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly. June 2005.

CRS-10
Military Exercises. Thailand and the United States have conducted over 40
joint military exercises a year, including Cobra Gold, America’s largest combined
military exercise in Asia. The May 2006 drill featured over 7,800 troops from the
United States and 4,200 from Thailand. Singapore, Japan, and Indonesia also
participated in a simulation of a U.N. multi-national peace-keeping operation.
Training. Tens of thousands of Thai military officers, including many of those
in top leadership positions throughout the services and in the civilian agencies, have
received U.S. training under the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program.29 Designed to enhance the professionalism of foreign militaries as
well as improve defense cooperation with the United States, the program is regarded
by many as a relatively low-cost, highly effective means to achieve U.S. national
security goals. Until the suspension of aid in September 2006, Thailand was among
the largest recipients of IMET funding in the world.
Intelligence. Intelligence cooperation between Thailand and the United States
reportedly increased markedly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, culminating in
the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (known as the CTIC)
in 2001. The CTIC, which combines personnel from Thailand’s intelligence agency
and specialized branches of the military and armed forces, provides a forum for CIA
personnel to work closely with their Thai counterparts, sharing facilities and
information daily, according to reports from Thai security officials.30 Close
cooperation in tracking Al Qaeda operatives that passed through Thailand reportedly
intensified into active pursuit of suspected terrorists following the 9/11 strikes.31 The
most public result of enhanced coordination was the arrest of suspected Jemaah
Islamiyah leader Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, outside of Bangkok in
August 2003. Other intelligence cooperation focuses on counter-narcotics or
specialized military intelligence.
Law Enforcement. In 1998, the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) Bangkok was established to provide legal training for officials to combat
transnational crime.32 The center is open to government officials from any Southeast
Asian country, with the exception of Burma (Myanmar), and had trained nearly 3,900
participants by December 2004. ILEA Bangkok aims to enhance law enforcement
capabilities in each country, as well as to encourage cross-border cooperation.
Instruction for the courses is provided largely by the Royal Thai Police, the Thai
Office of the Narcotics Control Board, and various U.S. agencies, including the
Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
29 In 1997, over 20,000 had received IMET training. See The Eagle and the Elephant, p. 143.
30 Crispin, Shawn, and Leslie Lopez, “U.S. and Thai Agents Collaborate in Secret — Cold-
War-Style Alliance Strikes Jemaah Islamiyah Where It Least Expects It.” Asian Wall Street
Journal
, October 1, 2003.
31 Ibid.
32 ILEA-Bangkok is one of four ILEAs in the world. The others are located in Hungary,
Botswana, and Roswell, New Mexico.

CRS-11
Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal
Revenue Service.33
Counter-Narcotics. Counter-narcotics cooperation between Thailand the
United States has been extensive and pre-dates the foundation of ILEA-Bangkok.
Coordination between the DEA and Thailand’s law enforcement agencies, in
conjunction with a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty, has led to
many arrests of international drug traffickers. Specialized programs include the
establishment of Task Force 399, in which U.S. Special Forces train elite Thai units
in narcotics interdiction tactics.34
Human Rights Concerns
Some members of Congress and other U.S. officials have criticized Thailand’s
record on human rights. The 2005 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report
states that security forces continued to use excessive, lethal force against criminal
suspects and committed or were connected to numerous extrajudicial, arbitrary, and
unlawful killings.35 Thailand has neither signed the United Nations Convention
Against Torture nor joined the International Criminal Court. Human rights activists
are particularly critical of Thaksin’s 2003 anti-narcotics campaign, in which over
2,000 suspected drug dealers were killed, according to press reports.
Concern by international human rights groups regarding abuse of criminal
suspects by Thai police forces has been exacerbated by the crackdown on Muslim
militants in the southern provinces since early 2004. Human rights groups have
particularly cited the disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit, a prominent Muslim
human rights lawyer, in March 2004.36 The emergency decree on administrative rule
announced in summer 2005 alarmed international rights groups further: the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, among others, has voiced concern that the
executive order and other developments were undermining Thailand’s democratic
process and human rights record.37
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations
Thailand, like many other countries in the region, saw its economy devastated
by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. With loan and policy assistance from the
International Monetary Fund, Thailand has recovered substantially, although other
33 Course information from [http://www.ileabangkok.com].
34 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 3. December 2004.
35 Thailand Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005, accessible at
[http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61628.htm].
36 See Human Rights Watch report, at [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/17/thaila8127.htm].
37 See the Office of United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights website at
[http://www.ohchr.org/english/].

CRS-12
setbacks such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak have hurt
progress. GDP growth is forecast to decline slightly to 4.2% in 2006 from 4.5% in
2005, but, if the political situation stabilizes, growth is expected to increase to 4.8%
in 2007.38 As a major recipient of foreign direct investment, and with merchandise
exports making up over half of its GDP, Thailand’s economy depends heavily on its
trading partners.
Economic relations with the United States are central to Thailand’s outward-
looking economic strategy.39 In 2005, the United States was Thailand’s second
largest export market and its fifth largest supplier of imports. According to the U.S.
Department of Commerce, the United States invested $8.6 billion in Thailand in
2005 and over 95,000 Thai nationals are on the payrolls of U.S. majority-owned
foreign affiliates.40 In 2005, bilateral trade in goods totaled $25 billion, making the
U.S. Thailand’s fourth largest trade partner after ASEAN, Japan, and the E.U.
A Difficult Road for U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations
FTA negotiations were suspended by Thailand since the political crisis erupted
in April 2006. Following the coup, U.S. officials said that the FTA could not go
forward without a return to democratic rule. Although studies indicate that a U.S.-
Thailand FTA would increase trade and investment for both countries and yield net
benefit for Thailand, negotiations must address a list of challenging issues to reach
a successful conclusion. The agreement sought by the United States is the most
comprehensive of the multiple FTAs Thailand has attempted; the agenda includes
issues such as intellectual property rights, investment, environment, labor rights,
textiles, telecommunications, agriculture, electronic commerce, and government
procurement.41 In the six rounds of talks held, market access for sugar, rice, and
trucks are among the thorniest of the differences between the two sides. Further,
some sources have speculated that Thaksin launched negotiations without consulting
adequately with the bureaucracies in charge of the controversial areas. The sixth
round of negotiations in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in January 2006 were marked by slow
progress, disruptions by thousands of protestors, and the resignation of the chief Thai
negotiator following the meetings. Even before the suspension of talks, many
analysts said that the prospects for an FTA were severely diminished.
An Aggressive FTA Strategy
Until the political turmoil of 2006, Thailand was aggressively pursuing FTAs
with countries other than the United States in its campaign to expand trading
opportunities. Agreements have been signed with Bahrain, China, Peru, Australia,
38 “Thailand: Plagued by Politics,” Economist Intelligence Unit. September 18, 2006.
39 See CRS Report RS21478, Thailand-U.S. Economic Relations: An Overview, by Wayne
M. Morrison.
40 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Indicators, accessed at
[http://www.bea.gov].
41 “Ives to Leave USTR to Take Position in Medical Trade Association,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 16, 2004.

CRS-13
and India; negotiations for the largest FTA to date were concluded with Japan, but
there have been delays in signing the document. Further deals are possible with New
Zealand, South Korea, Chile, and the European Union (EU). Thailand has
championed ASEAN regionalism, seeing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA,
among ASEAN countries only) as a vehicle for investment-driven integration which
will benefit Thailand’s outward-oriented growth strategy.42 Many observers see
Thailand’s pursuit of FTAs as an indication of its shift away from a multilateral
approach, such as working through the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
toward a bilateral or regional approach.
Thailand in Asia
Although the coup’s impact has so far spared Thailand of any widespread
violence or precipitous economic losses, there are concerns about longer-term
repercussions for Southeast Asia. Thailand is important to the region because of its
strong economy and, until the coup, its relatively longstanding democratic rule.
Regional observers fear that the loss of Thailand as a stabilizing presence could hurt
democratic efforts in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Southeast
Asia is considered by many Asian experts to be a key arena of soft power competition
between the United States and China: the loss of a democratic government, as well
as any resulting friction with the United States, could be considered an opening for
closer Sino-Thai relations. On the other hand, Thaksin was an ardent supporter of
establishing a closer economic and political relationship with Beijing.
The clout of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be
affected as well. Thailand was a founding member of ASEAN, and, previous to his
political troubles, Thaksin was considered to be poised to provide crucial leadership
for the organization. Thailand has been an aggressive advocate of increased
economic integration in the region: Singapore and other developed economies may
fear that any domestic weakening in Thailand could set back those efforts as well.
On the international stage, former deputy prime minister of Thailand Surakiart
Sathirathai had launched a strong campaign to become the next secretary-general of
the United Nations (UN). Although ASEAN countries have declared their continued
support for him, most observers think his chances — and the chance for ASEAN to
gain greater global recognition at the UN — were derailed by the coup.
Growing Ties with China
Chinese-Thailand ties strengthened considerably under Thaksin’s leadership.
Thaksin came to power promoting a business-oriented, engagement approach toward
the rest of Asia that de-emphasized human rights and democracy.43 Even while re-
42 Chirathivat, Suthiphand, and Sothitorn Mallikamas, “Thailand’s FTA Strategy: Current
Developments and Future Challenges,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 21, no. 1 (Apr.
2004).
43 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?”
(continued...)

CRS-14
asserting its alliance with the United States, Thailand has continued to court China,
including signing agreements on technology, environmental protection, and strategic
cooperation. In addition, the government has denied visas to a group of Taiwanese
legislators, a decision which Thaksin defended based on Thailand’s close ties to
China.44 Military-to-military ties have also increased through both exchanges and
arms sales: China exports major weapons and military equipment to Thailand,
continuing a practice originating in the 1980s when both countries supported
Cambodian resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge, against the Vietnamese-
installed government in Phnom Penh.45
Trade has boomed between Thailand and China: in 2005 bilateral trade totaled
over $20 billion, with Chinese exports of $7.8 billion and imports of $14.0 billion.46
A limited free trade agreement covering mostly agricultural goods but with tariff
reductions on industrial products has been in place since 2003. Both countries have
aggressively promoted the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Zone by
pursuing joint infrastructure projects that link Thailand with China’s Yunnan
province.47 In May 2005, Thailand demonstrated its commitment to implement
promptly the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA, among China and
ASEAN countries) by announcing it would open four new consulates in China.48
Thailand’s strong relationship with China is based on a history far less
antagonistic than Beijing’s past with many other ASEAN countries. After the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, Bangkok pursued a strategic alignment with Beijing in
order to contain Vietnamese influence in neighboring Cambodia. Bangkok restored
diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1975, far before other Southeast Asian nations.
Thailand also has no territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, unlike
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The sizeable overseas Chinese population
in Thailand assimilated relatively easily and became a strong presence in the business
world, and eventually in the political arena as well. Thaksin himself is a member of
a prominent Sino-Thai family. Thai companies were among the first to explore
investment opportunities after the Chinese economy opened up in the late 1970s,
pursuing ventures with China’s state-run enterprises. As other regional powers
tentatively began to explore commercial relationships with China, investment from
43 (...continued)
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 3. December 2004.
44 “Thai Visa Refusal Aids Strains to Ties with Taiwan,” Financial Times, January 22, 2003.
45 See R. Bates Gill, “China Looks to Thailand: Exporting Arms, Exporting Influence.”
Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 6. June 1991.
46 Global Trade Atlas Navigator, using Chinese data. Accessed at [http://www.gtis.com].
47 Masviriyakul, Siriluk, “Sino-Thai Strategic Economic Development in the Greater
Mekong Subregion. Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 2. August 2004.
48 Montaperto, Ron, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Dancing with China.” Comparative
Connections
, July 2005.

CRS-15
Sino-Thai companies flourished in the 1990s, fueling a rebirth of interest in Chinese
language and culture in Thailand.49
Given the simultaneous emphasis on building close relationships with the
United States and China, Thailand’s foreign policy could be construed as a classic
hedging strategy designed to avoid dominance by any one power. Some analysts
suggest that Bangkok’s embrace of China indicates a slow move away from the Cold
War reliance on the United States, despite enhanced cooperation in the war on
terrorism, and could be an indicator of how Southeast Asia will deal with China’s
increasing influence.50
Divergence with United States on Burma (Myanmar) Policy
Bangkok’s approach toward Burma has long been seen as conflicting with U.S.
policy. While the United States has pursued strict economic and diplomatic
sanctions against the regime, Thailand has led ASEAN’s “constructive engagement”
initiative, which favors integration and incentives to coax Burma into reform.51 For
Thailand, this policy minimizes the danger of a large-scale military struggle and
expands Thai business opportunities in Burma.
Thailand’s relationship with Burma grew closer under Thaksin’s administration.
During the 1990s, Thailand voiced harsh criticism of the military junta ruling Burma,
particularly its crackdown on the National League for Democracy, the opposition
party led by democratic activist Aung San Su Kyi. Thailand also has chafed at the
huge inflow of illegal drugs from Burma. But the Thaksin government placed special
emphasis on maintaining normal relations with Burma, even as European countries
tightened sanctions and other Southeast Asian countries distanced themselves from
Rangoon. In December 2004, Thaksin called the continued detention of Aung San
Su Kyi “reasonable,” prompting angry reactions from some U.S. lawmakers and
Administration officials. Critics have also questioned whether Thaksin’s engagement
with Burma was driven by his own commercial interests: Shin Corp, his family’s
telecom company, has secured lucrative contracts to provide Internet service and
satellite stations in Burma.52
Some congressional leaders also have criticized Bangkok for its treatment of
Burmese refugees, migrant workers, and political dissents living in Thailand. Backed
by human rights groups’ reports, some U.S. lawmakers have leveled charges of
arrests and intimidation of Burmese political activists, as well as the repatriation of
49 Vatikiotis, Michael, “Sino Chic: Suddenly, It’s Cool to Be Chinese,” Far Eastern
Economic Review,
January 11, 1996.
50 Vatikiotis, Michael, “Catching the Dragon’s Tail: China and Southeast Asia in the 21st
Century,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 25, no. 1 (Apr. 2003).
51 See CRS Report RS20749, Burma-U.S. Relations, by Larry Niksch.
52 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 3. December 2004.

CRS-16
Burmese who seek political asylum.53 Congress has passed legislation that provides
money to refugees who fled Burma, particularly those in Thailand.54
ASEAN Relations
Thailand’s positive engagement with Burma complements its broader strategy
of strengthening relations with Southeast Asian countries for economic and political
gain. Bangkok has continued to develop strong relations with its Indochina neighbors
through infrastructure assistance and other aid. In turn, Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia provide raw materials, cheap manufacturing, and expanding markets for
Thailand. Thaksin also pursued enhanced relations with Singapore based on a
common interest in liberalizing trade in the region and with the Philippines centered
on a mutual interest in combating terrorism.
Relations with Indonesia and Malaysia are more complex, particularly since the
insurgency in the south has become more inflamed. The violence has especially hurt
relations with Malaysia. Many of the Muslim Thais are ethnically Malay and speak
Yawi, a Malay dialect. Relations with Malaysia were significantly strained after
more than130 Thai Muslims fled across the border into Malaysia in September 2005,
seeking asylum and claiming persecution by Thai security forces. Bangkok has
demanded their repatriation, but Malaysia instead engaged the United Nations to
determine the individuals’ refugee status. The Malaysian public has grown
increasingly angry at the perceived violence against Muslims in Thailand. This
downturn in bilateral relations followed some progress in cross-border cooperation
since the violence began: Malaysia had pledged more troops and equipment to
increase border security, conducted joint border patrols with Thai counterparts, and
agreed to terminate the joint citizenship privileges that some believe facilitate the
passage of terrorists across the border.
Regional Health Issues
AIDS. Thailand’s relationship with its neighbors is defined by not only
traditional security concerns but also by a series of transnational public health issues
that have afflicted the region. Thailand was among the earliest and hardest hit by the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1990s, with infection spreading rapidly among the sex
worker industry with adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rates peaking at about 1.5% in
1996. Rates are now falling, due largely to an extensive prevention campaign
focused on managing risk in the sex industry. Cambodia undertook similar measures,
but countries such as China and Vietnam are now threatened by equally dangerous
outbreaks, providing another potential arena for regional cooperation.55

53 See Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Thai Policy Toward Burmese Refugees and Migrants,
Human Rights Watch Report, released February 2004.
54 H.R. 4818, Foreign Operations Appropriations, Section II, Bilateral Assistance.
55 Kiat Ruxrungtham, Tim Brown, and Praphan Phanuphak. “HIV/AIDS in Asia,” The
Lancet,
vol. 364, no. 9428 (July 3-9, 2004).

CRS-17
SARS. In addition to its relative success in curbing the spread of AIDS,
Thailand has been largely commended by the international health community for its
response to outbreaks of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the
avian bird flu. Because of the importance of tourism to Thailand’s economy,
government officials have, by some accounts, been reluctant to admit a public health
problem but have been generally effective once determined to address it. In 2003,
seven cases and two deaths from SARS were reported in Thailand, but the kingdom
was removed quickly from the World Health Organization’s list of at-risk countries
in 2003 after taking steps to curb the spread of the virus.
H5N1 (Avian Flu) Virus. Among the earliest and hardest hit areas by the
avian flu, Thailand has emerged as a leader in fighting the spread of the virus.
Sixteen of Thailand’s 24 total reported cases have been fatal. After an initially
sluggish response, including allegations by the press that government officials
covered up evidence of an outbreak,56 Thai authorities have led the effort to respond
to the problem and particularly to facilitate regional cooperation. Considerable
economic damage from the virus has spurred Bangkok to address the problem.
Thailand’s poultry exports, the fourth-largest in the world, bring in over $1 billion
annually.
Thailand has promoted regional cooperation on containing the flu, proposing an
ASEAN animal hygienic fund and pledging $300,000 to start the project. This center
would enhance cross-border surveillance and control measures, as well as serve as
an information distribution center for all ASEAN countries on the spread of the
virus.57 Thailand also hosts platforms that are cited as key to the U.S. government
response; USAID lists two Bangkok-based organizations as crucial implementing
partners: the active regional headquarters of FAO and the Center for Disease Control
Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP).58
56 “Thai Authorities Should Take Strong Action Against Bird Flu,” Bangkok Post editorial.
October 4, 2005.
57 “Thailand Proposes Regional Bird Flu Control Center,” Thai News Service. September
27, 2005.
58 “U.S. Government Emergency Response to Avian Influenza: A Plan of Action for
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia - Report from Country Planning Visits July 11-24, 2005. “
United States Agency for International Development.

CRS-18
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2003-2007
(thousands of dollars)
FY2006
FY2007
Account FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
estimate
request
DF



1, 980

CSH
1,500 0 0 0
0
DA
1,250 0 0 0
0
ESF
0 0
992
990
0
FMF* 1,990
881
1,488
1,485
1,300
IMET
*
1,768 2,572 2,526 2,376
2,370
INCLE
3,700 2,000 1,608 990
900
NADR
200 1,380 1,782 4,301
2,134
Peace
Corps
1,818 1,840 2,143 2,190
2,185
PKO*
0 500
0 0
0
Totals
12,226 9,173
10,539
14,312
8,889
Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID.
*These programs were suspended on September 28, 2006, under Section 508 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102).
Notes: DF = Democracy Funds; CSH = Child Survival Health; DA = Development Assistance; ESF
= Economic Support Funds; FMF = Foreign Military Sales Financing; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; NADR =
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related; PKO = Peace-keeping Operations.













CRS-19
Figure 1. Map of Thailand
CHINA
VIETNAM
MYANMAR
LAOS
P h i t s anu l ok
N a kh on
S aw an
THAILAND
Ub on
R at c ha th an i
N ak h on
R at ch as i ma
KAMPUCHEA
Andaman Sea
Gul f of Thai l and
P hu k et
H at
P at t an i
Y a i
N ara th i w at
Y a l a
St r ai t of
Sout h Chi na
Mal acca
MALAYSIA
INDONESIA
Sea
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 3/23/04)