Order Code RS21333
Updated September 27, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process
Kristin Archick and Vince L. Morelli
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
For years, the British and Irish governments have sought to facilitate a peaceful
settlement to the conflict in Northern Ireland. After many ups and downs, the two
governments and the parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on
April 10, 1998. The implementation of the resulting Good Friday Agreement continues
to be difficult. A political stalemate in Northern Ireland since 2002 has halted the peace
process and forced London to suspend the devolved government and to resume
governance of the province. British and Irish leaders have set a November 24, 2006,
deadline to revive talks on governance in Northern Ireland. This report will be updated
as events warrant. See also CRS Report RS21692, Northern Ireland: The 2003
Election
, by Kristin Archick.
Overview
Since 1969, over 3,200 people have died as a result of political violence in Northern
Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom. The conflict, which has its origins in the
1921 division of Ireland, has reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and
religious identities.1 The Protestant majority (53%) in Northern Ireland defines itself as
British and largely supports continued incorporation in the UK (unionists). The Catholic
minority (44%) considers itself Irish, and many Catholics desire a united Ireland
(nationalists). For years, the British and Irish governments sought to facilitate a political
settlement. The Good Friday Agreement was reached on April 10, 1998. The Agreement
established a devolved government — the transfer of power from London to Belfast —
with an Assembly and Executive Committee in which unionists (Ulster Unionist Party,
UUP, and the Democratic Unionist Party, DUP) and nationalists (Socialist Democratic
Labor Party, SDLP and Sinn Fein) share power. Additionally, the Agreement created a
North-South Ministerial Council, and a British-Irish Council. It also contained provisions
on decommissioning (disarmament), policing, human rights, UK security normalization
(demilitarization), and the status of prisoners, and recognizes that a change in Northern
Ireland’s status can only come about with the consent of the majority of its people. Voters
1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from Britain. The
resulting Republic of Ireland occupies about five-sixths of the island of Ireland; Northern Ireland
occupies the remaining one-sixth.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the accord in referendums on
May 22, 1998. Elections to the Assembly took place on June 25, 1998.
In October 2002 Northern Ireland police raided Sinn Fein’s Assembly offices and
arrested four officials as part of an investigation into a suspected IRA spy ring.
Consequently, on October 14, 2002, London suspended Belfast’s devolved government
and reinstated direct rule. Since then, the political situation has remained stalemated.
Unionists remain concerned about the IRA’s commitment to non-violence and Sinn Fein’s
refusal to join the Policing Board. Nationalists worry about the pace of UK
demilitarization, police reforms, and the DUP’s refusal to share power with Sinn Fein.
Decommissioning, Devolved Government, and Recurrent Crises
Instability in Northern Ireland’s devolved government has been the rule rather than
the exception; decommissioning has been a key sticking point. Authority over local affairs
was first transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive on December 1,
1999, after 27 years of direct rule from London. But on February 11, 2000, London
suspended the devolved government because the Assembly’s First Minister, then-Ulster
Unionist Party (UUP) leader David Trimble, was poised to resign to protest the absence
of IRA decommissioning. After intense negotiations involving Trimble and Sinn Fein,
the IRA’s associated political party, an IRA pledge to put its arms “beyond use” was
issued. The power-sharing institutions were then reinstated in June 2000.
For the next twelve months, Unionists remained frustrated by the ongoing lack of
IRA decommissioning. As a result, Trimble resigned as First Minister on July 1, 2001.
Since the Assembly can operate no longer than six weeks without a First Minister or new
elections must be called, London suspended the devolved government on August 10 for
24 hours to avoid calling new elections. London feared elections would result in gains
for hardliners. The brief suspension reset the clock, giving negotiators another six weeks
to try to avert the collapse of Belfast’s political institutions. Meanwhile, pressure on the
IRA to decommission began to grow following the August 2001 arrests in Colombia of
three suspected IRA members on charges of training FARC guerrillas to use explosives.
The September 11 terrorist attacks added to the pressure. According to an Irish diplomat,
“President Bush declared war against international terrorism ... If the IRA wanted to hold
on to their weapons any longer, the Americans would simply have none of it.”2 Sinn Fein,
was facing political isolation and the loss of private U.S. financial support.
Negotiations to restore devolution continued throughout the summer. On September
21, 2001, London suspended the Assembly again for 24 hours to buy more time. Finally,
on October 23, after Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams publicly called for IRA
decommissioning, the IRA announced that it had put a quantity of weapons “beyond use”
to “save the peace process.” In response, the UUP decided to rejoin the Executive. On
2 As quoted in Kevin Cullen, “Sinn Fein Prods IRA on Disarming,” Boston Globe, Oct. 23, 2001.
In April 2004, the IRA suspects were found not guilty on the charges of training the FARC, but
this verdict was overturned in December 2004 and the three suspects fled Colombia. In August
2005, they surfaced in the Republic of Ireland. Also see House International Relations
Committee, “International Global Terrorism: Its Links with Illicit Drugs as Illustrated by the IRA
and Other Groups in Colombia,” 107th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial No. 107-87, Apr. 24, 2002.

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November 5, David Trimble was reelected First Minister; Mark Durkan, leader of the
moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), was reelected Deputy
First Minister. Relative calm prevailed in early 2002. On April 8, the IRA carried out a
second act of decommissioning. Still, worries about the IRA’s long-term commitment
to the peace process persisted following allegations that the IRA was buying new
weapons, updating its “hit list,” and was behind the theft of intelligence documents from
a Belfast police barracks. On October 4, 2002 police raided Sinn Fein’s Assembly offices
and arrested four officials as part of an investigation into a suspected IRA spy ring. The
UUP and the harder line Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) threatened to withdraw from
the government unless Sinn Fein was expelled.
With the political process in turmoil, London once again suspended Belfast’s
devolved government and reinstated direct rule on October 14, 2002. Since then, London
and Dublin have led talks with Northern Ireland’s political parties to try to find a way
forward. Negotiations have largely focused on finding a formula to assure unionists that
the IRA was winding down as a paramilitary force, meeting nationalist demands for
government stability, and achieving more progress in the fields of policing, justice, and
human rights. In October 2003, the IRA announced a third act of decommissioning, but
UUP leader Trimble criticized the lack of details about the quantity of arms disposed, and
put further progress toward restoring devolution “on hold.”
Despite the suspension of power-sharing at the executive level, Assembly elections
took place in November 2003. The elections resulted in a shift toward the perceived
hardliners, the DUP led by the Reverend Ian Paisley and Sinn Fein led by Gerry Adams.
Immediately after the elections, the DUP asserted that it would not enter into government
with Sinn Fein until the IRA disarmed and disbanded. Most analysts predicted that the
election results would make restoring devolution more difficult. Negotiations continued
but remained stalemated for much of 2004.
Efforts to restore devolution were further complicated by a December 2004 bank
robbery in Belfast, which police believed was carried out by the IRA, and the January
2005 murder of Belfast man, Robert McCartney, during a bar brawl involving IRA
members. These incidents increased pressure on the IRA and Sinn Fein to also address
the issue of IRA criminality. On April 6, Gerry Adams effectively called on the IRA to
abandon violence and pursue politics as an “alternative” to “armed struggle.”
On July 28, 2005, the IRA ordered an end to its armed campaign. It instructed all
members to pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means” and to “not engage
in any other activities whatsoever.” All IRA units were ordered to “dump arms.” The
British, Irish, and U.S. governments welcomed the IRA’s statement but cautioned that
words must be followed by deeds. In response to the IRA announcement, and despite
unionist opposition, London began dismantling security posts along the Northern Ireland
border, and announced plans to cut the number of British troops in Northern Ireland to
5,000 by August 2007. Although many analysts asserted that the IRA’s statement was the
least ambiguous one ever, unionists were wary, noting that it did not explicitly address the
issue of IRA criminality or whether the IRA would disband.3
3 “A Long Time Coming,” Irish Times, July 29, 2005. For the text of the IRA’s July 28, 2005
statement, see BBC News [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4724599.stm].

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On September 26, 2005, Northern Ireland’s Independent International Commission
on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had put all of its arms beyond use,
asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable matched estimates
provided by the security forces. The DUP and other unionists have remained skeptical,
but London and Dublin appear to believe that the IRA as an organization was now
incapable of carrying out a major attack or destabilizing Northern Ireland politics. On
February 1, 2006, the International Monitoring Commission (IMC), which monitors
paramilitary ceasefires and political party compliance with the peace agreement, issued
a status report. The IMC asserted that the IRA seemed to be moving in the right direction.
The British and Irish governments responded positively to the IMC’s report, maintaining
that it demonstrated “enough progress” to make the “process of talking meaningful.”4
However, despite the IICD certification that the IRA has put its weapons “beyond use”
and the IRA statement abandoning sectarian violence, DUP leaders refused to govern
alongside Sinn Fein until the DUP was convinced that the IRA had completely disarmed
and disbanded and until Sinn Fein agreed to participate on the Police Board for Northern
Ireland.
In an attempt to break the stalemate, on April 6, 2006, London and Dublin
announced that the Northern Ireland Assembly would be recalled in mid-May and given
an initial six weeks to appoint ministers to the Executive, thereby restoring the devolved
government. The Northern Ireland Assembly reconvened on May 15, 2006. The
Assembly was permitted to debate policy matters but was not given the power to make
laws. London and Dublin had hoped that by recalling the Assembly, even in such a
“shadow” form, confidence would build between the opposing parties and in the political
process.
When this attempt ultimately failed, London and Dublin gave the parties until
November 24, 2006, to reach an agreement on an Executive or a new British-Irish
governing scheme would be implemented to effectively govern Northern Ireland. The
exact form of such partnership arrangements remains unclear, but some analysts view this
prospect as a veiled threat to unionists to reach a deal to restore devolution or risk ceding
greater authority over the affairs of Northern Ireland to Dublin.5
Throughout the summer both London and Dublin insisted that the November 24
deadline was firm despite the warning from the DUP that the deadline would not be met.
With no real progress in the negotiations achieved by mid-September, Prime Ministers
Blair and Ahern announced a plan to convene a meeting of all of the parties in Scotland
in October in an attempt to hammer out a deal. Neither the DUP nor the UUP feel such
talks outside of Belfast would accomplish any more than what had taken place thus far,
but London and Dublin continue to insist the meetings take place.
Many analysts believe that the immediate prospects for reestablishing an Executive
are dim. The DUP maintains that the IRA has not lived up to its commitments on
4 “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News, September 26, 2005; “Governments
Welcome Positive Report on IRA,” Irish Times, Feb. 2, 2006.
5 Brian Lavery, “Blair and Ahern Warn Ulster: End the Standoff by Fall Deadline,” New York
Times
, Apr. 7, 2006. For the text of the Blair-Ahern statement on Apr. 6, 2006, see BBC News
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4883600.stm].

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disarmament and criminal activity and must disband and that Sinn Fein must join the
Policing Board. Sinn Fein insists that DUP first agrees to return to a power-sharing
government. Many experts believe that no further progress can be expected unless
Reverend Paisley decides that he and his DUP leadership can sit in the same room and
talk to Sinn Fein directly or that Sinn Fein agrees to join the Police Board.6 The members
of the Assembly have been told that if there is no agreement to restore the power-sharing
government by November 2006, the Assembly will be disbanded.
Implementing Police Reforms
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) — Northern Ireland’s former, 92% Protestant
police force — was long viewed by Catholics as an enforcer of Protestant domination.
The Good Friday agreement called for an independent commission to help “ensure
policing arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and
symbols, are such that ... Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread
support from ... the community as a whole.” In June 1998, Prime Minister Blair
appointed Chris Patten to head this commission. In September 1999, the Patten
Commission released a report with 175 recommendations. It proposed a new name for
the RUC, a new badge, and new symbols free of the British or Irish states. Other key
measures included reducing the size of the force from 11,400 to 7,500, and increasing the
proportion of Catholic officers. Unionists responded negatively, but nationalists were
mostly positive.
In May 2000, the Blair government introduced the Police Bill in the House of
Commons. Nationalists were critical, arguing that Patten’s proposals had been gutted.
London responded that amendments would deal with human rights training, promoting
50-50 recruitment of Catholics and Protestants, and oversight responsibilities. The Police
Bill became law on November 23, 2000. While some nationalist concerns had been
addressed, Sinn Fein and the SDLP asserted that the reforms did not go far enough. In
March 2001, recruiting began for the future Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).
To help ensure nationalist support, London proposed further concessions in July 2001,
which included halving the anti-terrorist “Special Branch.”
In August 2001, the SDLP broke with Sinn Fein over the proposal to create a
democratic oversight body known as the Policing Board and along with the UUP and
DUP accepted the British revisions and agreed to nominate representatives to the Board.
On November 4, 2001, the Policing Board came into being. That same day, the RUC was
renamed the PSNI, and the first class of recruits drawn 50-50 from both Catholic and
Protestant communities began their training. Sinn Fein continues to oppose the Board,
and many say that Sinn Fein’s absence from the Policing Board has discouraged more
Catholics from joining the PSNI. To assuage nationalist concerns further, London
outlined plans in November 2002 for new policing legislation to provide more public
accountability and eventually allow former paramilitaries to sit on Northern Ireland’s new
District Policing Partnerships (DPPs), which seek to foster greater local involvement in
policing.
6 “Paisley Nomination Smart Tactics,” BBC News, May 22, 2006; “Hain Plays Down Failure To
Elect First Minister,” Irish Times, May 23, 2006.

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In November 2004, Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams met with PSNI chief Hugh Orde
for the first time. However, many experts believe that Sinn Fein will not join the Policing
Board until there is a deal to revive the devolved government. Sinn Fein also wants to see
the transfer of policing and justice powers from London to a restored Assembly and
Executive. In February 2006, London introduced a new bill in the UK Parliament to pave
the way for such a transfer. Sinn Fein views the proposed legislation as a first step but
maintains that the “devil is in the details.”7 In September 2006, reports circulated that
Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams had signaled that Sinn Fein may be willing to cooperate
with police on the ground but would not join the Board until the devolved government
was back in full operation. This idea has been rejected by the DUP and the SDLP.
U.S. Policy
The Bush Administration views the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework
for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. U.S. officials assert that trust and confidence can
only be rebuilt if the IRA and other paramilitaries “go out of business” and that Sinn Fein
must join the Policing Board. The Bush Administration reacted positively to the IRA’s
July 2005 statement that it was ending its armed struggle and called the announcement
that the IRA had fully decommissioned a “critical first step” in translating its words into
action. Most Members of Congress actively support the peace process. Encouraged by
the progress on police reforms, several Members prompted the Administration in
December 2001 to lift a ban on contacts between the FBI and the new PSNI. Congress had
initiated this prohibition in 1999 because of the former RUC’s human rights record.
Recent hearings in the 109th Congress have focused on the peace process, policing
reforms, and the status of public inquiries into several high-profile murders in Northern
Ireland. The U.S. has provided aid through the International Fund for Ireland since 1986.
For FY2007, the House of Representatives added $10.8 million to the Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill for the IFI.
Recent Legislation
P.L. 109-102 (Nov. 14, 2005) appropriated $13.5 million for the International Fund
for Ireland as part of the FY2006 foreign operations spending measure.
H.R. 2601 authorized Department of State appropriations for FY2006-FY2007,
including $100,000 per year for training for the Office of the Police Ombudsman for
Northern Ireland, and $20 million per year for the International Fund for Ireland.
Introduced by Representative Smith, May 24, 2005; passed House, July 20, 2005.
H.Res. 744 (April 4, 2006) expresses support for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement
as the blueprint for lasting peace in Northern Ireland and for ongoing police reforms.
Introduced by Representative Hyde, March 29, 2006.
7 “MPs To See Devolved Policing Bill Today,” Irish Times, Feb. 16, 2006.