Order Code RL33530
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background,
Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Updated September 21, 2006
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Israeli-Arab Negotiations:
Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Summary
After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new peace process involved bilateral
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon with
mixed results. Milestones included the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1991, providing for
Palestinian empowerment and some territorial control; the Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty of October 26, 1994, and the Interim Self-Rule in the West Bank or Oslo II
accord of September 28, 1995, which led to the formation of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) to govern the West Bank and Gaza. However, Israeli-Syrian
negotiations were intermittent and difficult, and postponed indefinitely in 2000.
Negotiations with Lebanon also were unsuccessful, leading Israel to withdraw
unilaterally from south Lebanon on May 24, 2000. President Clinton held a summit
with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp David on final status issues that July, but
they did not produce an accord. A Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in
September. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel,
and rejected steps taken at Camp David and afterwards.
The post 9/11 war on terrorism prompted renewed U.S. focus on a peace
process, emphasizing as its goal a democratic Palestinian state as a precondition for
achieving peace. On April 30, 2003, the United States, the U.N., European Union,
and Russia (known as the “Quartet”) presented a “Roadmap” to Palestinian statehood
within three years. It has not been implemented by either Israel or the Palestinians.
In what he considered the absence of a Palestinian partner for peace, Sharon proposed
that Israel unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the
West Bank. On August 23, 2005, Israel completed this disengagement.
PA Chairman/President Yasir Arafat died on November 11, 2004; on January
9, 2005, Mahmud Abbas was elected to succeed him and he seeks final status talks.
Since Hamas, which Israel and the United States consider a terrorist group, won the
January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, however, the situation has been
complicated. Israeli officials offered ideas for unilateral disengagement from more
of the West Bank, but not a fully developed plan. The U.S. Administration and others
have urged them to negotiate first, but agree that Hamas is not a negotiating partner.
The kidnapings of Israeli soldiers by Hamas and Hezbollah in June and July,
respectively, sparked conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon and led Israeli officials to shelve
further unilateralism. They also cast shadows on the prospects for future talks.
Congress is interested in issues related to Middle East peace because of its
oversight role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and keen
constituent interest. It is especially concerned about U.S. financial and other
commitments to the parties. Members also have endorsed Jerusalem as the undivided
capital of Israel, although U.S. Administrations have consistently maintained that the
fate of the city is the subject of final status negotiations. This CRS report replaces
CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, and will be updated as
developments warrant. See also CRS Report RL33566, Lebanon: The
Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict, coordinated by Jeremy Sharp.
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Israel-Palestinians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Israel-Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Conference, Negotiations, Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Madrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Bilateral Talks and Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Israel-Palestinians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Israel-Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Israel-Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Israel-Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Significant Agreements and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Declaration of Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip . . . . . . 27
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Wye River Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Agreement on Movement and Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Compliance/Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Israeli Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
List of Figures
Figure 1. Israel and Its Neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background,
Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Most Recent Developments
Israel-Palestinians
On September 2, 2006, Palestinian public employees began an open-ended
strike for unpaid salaries, which continues to this day. This pressure resulted from
and added to that of an international embargo on aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian
Authority (PA) government since it took office in April. It apparently prompted
President Mahmud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyah to agree on September
11 to form a national unity government on the basis of the National Accord
Document approved earlier in the year.1 Among its provisions, the Document
mandates Abbas, as head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), to
negotiate with Israel. The Palestinians hope that a new government will lead to an
easing of the aid embargo. A U.S. State Department spokesman reiterated, however,
that a Palestinian government must accept principles set by the international
“Quartet” (U.S., U.N., European Union, and Russia) in January, that is, renounce
violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and accept previous Israeli-Palestinian
accords, before aid could be resumed. He noted that the proposed unity government
does not accept those conditions. In fact, a September 12 Hamas statement declared
that the Abbas-Haniyah agreement “does not include any tacit or open recognition
of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity...,” and Hamas officials have often repeated
that stance.2 Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni has stated that Israel expects any
Palestinian government to meet the international requirements.3 Abbas and Haniyah
are expected to resume negotiations shortly.
On September 20, the Quartet issued a statement welcoming Abbas’s effort to
form a government of national unity and hoped that the government’s platform would
reflect the Quartet’s principles.4 The Quartet’s new statement does not say that
acceptance of the principles is a precondition for aid or relations. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice asserted, however, “it only goes without saying that you cannot
1 For text of National Accord Document also known as the Prisoners’ Document, see
Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations Affairs Department website
[http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=news-updates_pre].
2 “HAMAS Statement Welcomes PA National Unity Government,” Palestine Information
Center, September 12, 2006, Open Source Center Document GMP20060912748009.
3 Sarah El Deeb, “Palestinian Cabinet Resigns in Unifying Effort,” Associated Press,
September 14, 2006.
4 For text of statement, see [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sg2116.doc.htm].
CRS-2
have peace if you do not recognize the right of the other party to exist and that the
renunciation of violence is a key to negotiations.” She noted that it would be difficult
for a Palestinian government to function without international support and implied
that support would not be forthcoming without a commitment to the Quartet’s
principles.5
Although Israeli officials had suggested that a meeting between President Abbas
and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would on take place only after the Israeli soldier
kidnaped on June 25 is released and rocket fire from Gaza ceases, on September 9,
Olmert announced that he is ready to meet Abbas without preconditions to discuss
a return to the Road Map (the international framework to achieve a two-state solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Similarly, on September 10, Abbas said that he
was ready to meet Olmert without prior conditions and wants to revive the Road
Map. The first stage of the Road Map requires Israel to end settlement activity and
the Palestinians to act against terrorists. Because Israel recently authorized the
construction of 650 new housing units in two settlements west of the security fence
it is building on the West Bank and a PA still led by Hamas is unlikely to act against
terrorists, the prospects for the Road Map may be doubtful.
In a September 15 speech, Counselor to the State Department Philip Zelikow
asserted that “an active policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute is an essential ingredient
to forging a coalition” with Arab moderate and Europeans to deal with the most
dangerous regional problems, notably Iran.6 Some in Israel believe that this suggests
that an increase in pressure on Israel to work with the Palestinians is in the offing.7
Israel-Lebanon
Israeli Chief of Staff Gen. Dan Halutz expects to pull the last troops out of
Lebanon after working out details with U.N. and Lebanese army forces taking their
place, or sometime after September 23. On September 19, he told a Knesset
committee that Hezbollah is respecting the cease-fire, its fighters are not carrying
weapons or wearing uniforms, and no significant resupply of weapons and missiles
from Syria and Iran has been detected.
Background
Before the first Gulf war in 1991, Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade
since the founding of Israel until the 1990s. With each clash, issues separating the
parties multiplied and became more intractable. The creation of the State of Israel
in 1948 provided a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing conflict made
refugees of hundreds of thousands of Arab residents of formerly British Palestine,
5 Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, see
[http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/72891.htm].
6 For text of speech, see [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=305]].
7 Joshua Mitnick, “ Abbas Recasts Himself as Key Palestinian Negotiator,” Christian
Science Monitor, September 21, 2006.
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with consequences troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. It also led to a mass
movement of Jewish citizens of Arab states to Israel. The 1967 war ended with Israel
occupying territory of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973
war, in part, to regain their lands. In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to
prevent terrorist incursions; it withdrew in 1985, but retained a 9-mile “security
zone” that Lebanon sought to reclaim. Middle East peace has been a U.S. and
international diplomatic goal throughout the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David
talks, the only previous direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, brought about the 1979
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.8
U.S. Role
With the Gulf war in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared solving the
Arab-Israeli conflict among his postwar goals. On March 6, 1991, he outlined a
framework for peace based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and
the principle of “land for peace.” Secretary of State James Baker organized a peace
conference in Madrid in October 1991 that launched almost a decade of the “Oslo
process” efforts to achieve peace. It continued under President William Clinton, who
asserted that only the region’s leaders can make peace and vowed to be their partner.
With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, however, the United States seemed to become an
indispensable and expected party to Israeli-Palestinian talks. Clinton mediated the
1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the United States coordinated its
implementation. He personally led negotiations at Camp David in 2000.
The current Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role, and
Secretary of State Colin Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy. After
the September 11, 2001, the Administration focused on the peace process mainly as
part of the war on terrorism. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also has not
appointed a special envoy, asserting, “Not every effort has to be an American effort.
It is extremely important that the parties themselves are taking responsibility.”9
Nonetheless, she has actively encouraged Israelis and Palestinians to act and
personally mediated a November 2005 accord to reopen the border crossing between
Gaza and Egypt after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza.
8 For additional background, see William B. Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press,
Revised Edition 2001; Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace
Process in the Middle East, New York, Other Press, 2003; Anton La Guardia, War Without
End: Israelis Palestinians and the Struggle for a Promised Land, New York, St. Martin’s
Griffin, Revised and Updated, 2003; Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, Cambridge, UK, Polity
Press, 2005; and Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle
East Peace, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004.
9 Anne Gearan, “Rice Blasts Way Iran Treats Its Own People,” Associated Press, February
4, 2005.
CRS-4
Conference, Negotiations, Conflicts
Madrid. The peace conference opened on October 30, 1991. Parties were
represented by 14-member delegations. A combined Jordanian/Palestinian
delegation had 14 representatives from each. An unofficial Palestinian advisory team
coordinated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The United States,
the Soviet Union, Syria, Palestinians/Jordan, the European Community, Egypt, Israel,
and Lebanon sat at the table. The U.N., the Gulf Cooperation Council,10 and the
Arab Maghreb Union11 were observers.
Bilateral Talks and Developments
Israel-Palestinians. (Incidents of violence are noted selectively.) In
November 1991, Israel and the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to separate
the Israeli-Jordanian and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating tracks, the latter to
address a five-year period of interim Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. In the third year, permanent status negotiations were to begin. On August 9,
1993, Palestinian negotiators were appointed to a PLO coordination committee,
ending a charade that had distanced the PLO from the talks. Secret talks in Oslo in
1993 produced an August 19 agreement on a Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed
by Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993. Through the end of the decade,
incremental advances were made with interim accords. Perhaps the most important
developments were Israel’s withdrawal from major cities and towns and the
achievement of Palestinian self-government as the Palestinian Authority (PA),
electing a chief executive (translated as “chairman” or “president”) and a legislature
to administer those territories. However, no final agreement was ever reached. (See
“Significant Agreements,” below, for summaries of and links to accords reached
between 1993 and 2000. This narrative resumes with the Camp David summit.)
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority
(PA) Chairman Yasir Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24,
2000, to forge a framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. The
parties had agreed that there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved.
Jerusalem was the major obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain united under its
sovereignty, leaving the Palestinians control, not sovereignty, over East Jerusalem
and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to cede more than 90% of the West Bank,
wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000 settlers lived, and offered to admit
thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification program. An international
fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from Arab countries. The
Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the Jewish quarter
of Jerusalem and the Western Wall, but sought sovereignty over East Jerusalem,
particularly the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims.
10 The Gulf Cooperation Council is comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
11 The Arab Maghreb Union is comprised of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and
Tunisia.
CRS-5
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security
forces, visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel
responded forcefully. The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising against the
occupation began. On October 12, a mob in Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers,
provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on Palestinian official sites. An
international summit in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, on October 16 set up a commission
under former U.S. Senator George Mitchell to look into the violence.
Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister
in Israel. Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, in Washington,
D.C., December 19-23. On December 23, President Clinton suggested that Israel
cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and Arab neighborhoods
in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip, and annex settlement
blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza. Jerusalem
would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede the right of
refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple Mount
and sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. Israeli forces would
control borders in the Jordan Valley for three to six years, and then be replaced by an
international force. The agreement would declare “an end to conflict.”12 Barak said
he would accept the plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so. Arafat sought
clarifications on contiguity of Palestinian state territory, the division of East
Jerusalem, and refugees’ right of return, among other issues. The Israeli-Palestinian
talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.
On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel and
vowed to retain united Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley, and other
areas for security. Sharon’s associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and
after Camp David were “null and void.”13 The Bush Administration said that
Clinton’s proposals “were no longer United States proposals.”14 Sharon sought an
interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, or a Palestinian
state and, in an interview published on April 13, said that he could accept a disarmed
Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank.15
On April 30, 2001, the Mitchell commission made recommendations for ending
violence, rebuilding confidence, and resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two
sides accepted CIA Director George Tenet’s plan to cement a cease-fire. On June 28,
they agreed to a seven-day period without violence followed by a six-week cooling-
off period. Secretary Powell said Sharon would determine if violence abated. On
12 For text of the President’s speech describing his proposal, also known as “the Clinton
Plan” or “Clinton Parameters,” see the Israel Policy Forum website at [http://www.israel
policyforum.org/display.cfm?rid=544].
13 Lee Hockstader, “Jerusalem is ‘Indivisible,’ Sharon Says; Camp David Concessions are
Called ‘Null and Void,’” Washington Post, February 8, 2001.
14 Jane Perlez, “Bush Officials Pronounce Clinton Mideast Plan Dead,” New York Times,
February 9, 2001.
15 Interview by Ari Shavit, Ha’aretz, April 13, 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) Document GMP200110413000070.
CRS-6
August 8, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated in Jerusalem. On August 10, Israeli
forces seized Orient House, the center of Palestinian national activity in East
Jerusalem, and then repeatedly entered Palestinian territory. On August 27, Israel
killed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) leader.
On September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel wants to give the Palestinians what
no one else gave them before, the possibility of a state.” On October 2, President
Bush said, for the first time, “The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of
a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected.”16 The PFLP assassinated
Israel’s Minister of Tourism on October 17. On November 10, President Bush
declared that the United States is “working toward the day when two states — Israel
and Palestine — live peacefully together within secure and recognized borders....”
Secretary Powell sent General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) to work on a cease-fire,
but violence impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat to his headquarters in
Ramallah on December 3. On December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be
reached with Arafat, “who is a real terrorist....” On December 12, Hamas ambushed
an Israeli bus in the West Bank and perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings
in Gaza. The Israeli cabinet charged that Arafat was “directly responsible” for the
attacks “and therefore is no longer relevant....”17
On January 3, 2002, Israeli forces seized the Karine A, a Palestinian-
commanded freighter, carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell
stated that Arafat “cannot engage with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at
the same time permit or tolerate continued violence and terror.” At the White House
on February 7, Sharon said that he believed that pressure should be put on Arafat so
that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.
On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah unprecedentedly called for “full
withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including
Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations.” (On March 28, the Arab
League endorsed his proposal with some revisions; it is known as the “Arab Peace
Initiative.”18) Prime Minister Sharon said that he was willing to explore the idea but
that it would be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel’s right to
“secure and recognized borders” with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.
On March 27, Hamas perpetrated a suicide bombing at a hotel in Netanya during
Passover celebrations, killing 27 and wounding 130. Israel declared Arafat “an
enemy” and the Israeli armed forces besieged his compound in Ramallah; they soon
controlled all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities.
On May 2, the Quartet (i.e., U.S., EU, U.N., and Russian officials), proposed a
conference on reconstructing the PA and related issues. After another Hamas suicide
16 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov] for presidential statements cited in this report.
17 “Israeli Cabinet Decision on Cutting Contacts with Arafat,” Government Press Office,
December 13, 2001, FBIS Document GMP200111213000010.
18 For “Beirut Declaration” or “Arab Peace Initiative,” see [http://www.saudiembassy.net/
2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142].
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bombing near Tel Aviv, Sharon called for “the complete cessation of terror” before
negotiations. After meeting Sharon on June 9, President Bush said that conditions
were not ripe for a conference because “no one has confidence” in the Palestinian
government. On June 24, the President called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders
“not compromised by terror” and to build a practicing democracy. Then, he said, the
United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and
certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement. He added,
“as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to
positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and (Israeli) settlement activity
must stop.” The President foresaw a final peace accord within three years.19 On
September 17, the Quartet outlined a preliminary “Roadmap” to peace.
On March 7, 2003, in what was seen as a gesture to appeal to the Quartet, Arafat
named Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister. On April 14, Sharon
acknowledged that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the history
of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people’s
right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to
Israel.20 On April 14, Israeli emissaries submitted 14 reservations on the Roadmap
to U.S. officials.21 On April 30, the Quartet officially presented the Roadmap. Abbas
accepted it. On May 23, the Administration stated that Israel had explained its
concerns and that the United States shares the view “that these are real concerns and
will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the Roadmap,” leading
Sharon and his cabinet to accept “steps defined” in the Roadmap “with reservations”
on May 25. The next day, Sharon declared, “to keep 3.5 million people under
occupation is bad for us and them,” using the word occupation for the first time.
On June 4, the President met Abbas and Sharon at a conference hosted by
Jordan’s King Abdullah in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas vowed to achieve the Palestinians’
goals by peaceful means, while Sharon expressed understanding of “the importance
of territorial contiguity” for a viable Palestinian state and promised to “remove
unauthorized outposts.” Abbas said that he would use dialogue, not force, to
convince Palestinian groups. On June 29, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
suspended military operations against Israel for three months, while Fatah declared
a six-month truce. Israel was not a party to the accord, but began withdrawing forces
from Gaza. Abbas asked Sharon to release Palestinian prisoners, remove roadblocks,
withdraw from more Palestinian cities, allow Arafat free movement, and end
construction of a security barrier that Israeli is building in the West Bank. Israel
demanded that the Palestinians dismantle terrorist infrastructures and act against
terrorists.
On August 6, Israel released 339 prisoners. On August 19, a Hamas suicide
bomber exploded in Jerusalem, killing 22, including 5 Americans, and injuring more
19 For text of the speech, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-
3.html].
20 “Sharon, ‘Certain” of Passing ‘Painful Concessions’ in Knesset,” Ma’ariv, April 15, 2003,
FBIS Document GMP20030415000091.
21 For text of Israel’s reservations, see Israel’s Response to the Road Map, online at
[http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm].
CRS-8
than 130. Abbas cut contacts with Hamas and the PIJ, and unsuccessfully sought
Arafat’s support to act against terrorists. Israel suspended talks with the Palestinians,
halted plans to transfer cities to their control, and resumed “targeted killings” of
terrorist leaders, among other measures. On September 6, Abbas resigned because
of what he charged was lack of support from Arafat, the United States, and Israel. On
September 7, Arafat named Palestinian Legislative Council Speaker Ahmed Qureia,
aka Abu Ala, to be Prime Minister.
On October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing
three U.S. security guards and wounding a fourth. Palestinian authorities arrested
members of Popular Resistance Committees — disaffected former members of the
Palestinian security services, Fatah, and other groups. (They would be freed in April
2004.)
Sounds of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel, culminating
in the signing of the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status Agreement by Israeli
opposition politicians and prominent Palestinians on December 1.22 Perhaps partly
to defuse these efforts, on December 18, Sharon declared that, “to ensure a Jewish
and democratic Israel,” he would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by
redeploying Israeli forces and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and
intensifying construction of the security fence in the West Bank.23 On February 13,
2004, the White House said that an Israeli pullback “could reduce friction,” but that
a final settlement “must be achieved through negotiations.” After an upsurge in
violence, on March 22, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin
and others.
On April 14, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters.24 The
President welcomed Israel’s plan to disengage from Gaza and restated the U.S.
commitment to the Roadmap. He noted the need to take into account changed
“realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers,”
(i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status
negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” The
President stated that a solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling
Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, “rather than in Israel,” thereby rejecting
a “right of return.” He called for a Palestinian state that is “viable, contiguous,
sovereign, and independent.” Sharon presented his disengagement plan as
independent of but “not inconsistent with the Roadmap.” He said that the
“temporary” security fence would not prejudice final status issues including borders.
A day before, he had identified five large West Bank settlements and an area in
Hebron that Israel intends to retain and strengthen. Palestinians denounced the
President’s “legitimization” of settlements and prejudgement of final status. On
22 For text, see the Geneva Initiative website at [http://www.heskem.org.il].
23 For text, see “Sharon Outlines Disengagement Plan from Palestinians in Herzliyya
Speech,” Parts 1 and 2, Voice of Israel, December 18, 2003, Open Source Center Documents
GMP20031218000215 and GMP200312180002167.
24 For text of letters, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-
Apr-2004.htm].
CRS-9
April 19, Sharon’s chief of staff Dov Weissglas gave National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice a written commitment to dismantle illegal settlement outposts.25
(As of September 2006, very few outposts had been dismantled.)
On June 6, Israel’s cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan whereby
Israel would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the
northern West Bank. On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the
government’s right to build a security fence in the West Bank, but struck down some
land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian rights and ordered the route to be
changed. The government said that it would abide by the ruling. The Israeli Court
has attempted to balance Israel’s security needs and the humanitarian claims of
Palestinians in subsequent rulings; in some of the cases, it has required that the
barrier be rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a non-
binding, advisory opinion that the wall violates international law.26
On October 6, Sharon’s aide Dov Weissglas claimed that disengagement was
aimed at freezing the political process in order to “prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian state and a debate regarding refugees, borders, and Jerusalem.”27
Yasir Arafat died on November 11. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the
PLO and a candidate for president of the PA. On January 9, 2005, Abbas won
election as President. He called for implementing the Roadmap while beginning
discussion of final status issues and cautioned against interim solutions designed to
delay reaching a comprehensive solution.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7.
She praised the Israelis’ “historic” disengagement decision, discussed the need to
carry out obligations concerning settlements and outposts, and warned them not to
undermine Abbas. She appointed Lt. Gen. William Ward as Middle East Security
Coordinator and emphasized the importance of Israeli-Palestinian security
cooperation for the disengagement. The Secretary did not attend a February 8
meeting of Sharon, Abbas, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Jordanian King
Abdullah II in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, where Sharon and Abbas declared the end
of violence and military operations.
On February 20, the Israeli cabinet adopted a revised route for the security fence
closer to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7% to 8% of the West Bank
that includes major settlement blocs. On March 16, Israel handed Jericho over to PA
control. On March 17, 13 Palestinian groups agreed to extend a “calm” or informal
truce until the end of the year. On March 21, Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to
PA control.
25 For text of letter, see [http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/Disengageme
Plan/letter1804.htm].
26 For text, see [http://www.icj-cij.org]. Note, Israel refers to the barrier as a “fence” and
the Palestinians and other critics refer to it as a “wall.” Neutral observers often use the word
“barrier.”
27 Interview by Ari Shavit, “The Big Freeze,” Ha’aretz, October 8, 2004, FBIS Document
GMP20041008000026.
CRS-10
On March 20, it was reported that the Israeli defense minister had approved the
building of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and
East Jerusalem, in the E-1 corridor. Critics charge that the construction would cut
East Jerusalem off from Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern
and southern West Bank, and prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary
Rice asserted that the plan was “at odds with American policy.” On April 11,
President Bush conveyed to Sharon his “concern that Israel not undertake any activity
that contravenes Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.”
Sharon responded, “It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli population centers
will remain in Israel’s hands under any final status agreement,” declared that Ma’ale
Adumim is a major population center, and, therefore, Israel is interested in contiguity
between it and Jerusalem.
On April 15, 2005, the Quartet appointed outgoing World Bank President James
Wolfensohn to be their Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement. He served until
April 30, 2006.
On May 26, President Bush met Abbas at the White House and said that
“changes to the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to.” The President
reaffirmed, “A viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank,
and a state of scattered territories will not work. There must also be meaningful
linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States
today, it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status
negotiations.” He also said, “The barrier being erected by Israel ... must be a
security, rather than political, barrier.” Abbas said that the boundaries of a future state
should be those of before the 1967 war and asserted, “there is no justification for the
wall and it is illegitimate.” He also stated that the PA was ready to coordinate the
Gaza disengagement with Israel and called for moving immediately thereafter to final
status negotiations.
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in
Netanya on July 12, killing 5 and injuring more than 90. Israeli forces launched
operations against the PIJ, reoccupied Tulkarem, and closed the West Bank.
Meanwhile, Hamas increased rocket and mortar fire against settlements in Gaza and
towns in southern Israel in an effort to show that disengagement meant that Hamas
was forcing Israel to withdraw from the Strip. Israel helicopters fired missiles at
targets in Gaza and the West Bank.
On August 15, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that Israel would keep
the settlement blocs of Ma’ale Adumim, the Etzyon Bloc, Efrat, Ari’el, Qedumim-
Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan Shaqed — all are within or expected to be on Israel’s
side of the security barrier. Mofaz added that Israel would retain the Jordan Rift
Valley to guarantee Israel’s eastern border. 28
Israel evacuated all of its settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small
settlements in the northern West Bank between August 17 and August 23. On
28 Interview by Golan Yokhpaz, IDF Radio, August 15, 2005, FBIS Document
GMP20050815621002.
CRS-11
August 29, Sharon declared that there would be no further unilateral or coordinated
disengagements and that the next step must be negotiations under the Road Map. He
affirmed that while the large blocs of settlements would remain in Israeli hands and
linked territorially to Israel, not all West Bank settlements would remain; but this
would be decided in the final stage of negotiations.
After an upsurge in Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, Hamas
announced on September 25 that it would halt operations from Gaza, but, on
September 27, it claimed responsibility for kidnaping and killing an Israeli settler in
Ramallah in the West Bank. Israel responded with air and artillery strikes, closure
of charities linked to terror groups, mass arrests including likely Hamas candidates
in Palestinian elections, and targeted killings of terrorists.
On October 20, at the White House, President Bush pressed Abbas to “confront
the threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine,” but did not urge
him to prevent Hamas from participating in parliamentary elections or to request that
candidates renounce violence. Abbas asserted that legislators should be asked to
renounce violence after election.
On October 26, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 6 and wounded more than 20 in
Hadera, on the Israeli coast. Sharon announced a “broad and relentless offensive”
against terrorism. He ruled out talks with Abbas until Abbas takes “serious action”
against armed groups.
On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her
that Israel would not interfere if Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian
elections, but it also would not coordinate preparations for the elections with the PA
or allow Hamas people to move around more during the campaign. He said if an
armed terrorist organization is a partner in the Palestinian administration it could lead
to the end of the Roadmap. Only if Hamas disarms and annuls its Covenant which
calls for the destruction of Israel would Israel provide assistance for the elections and
accept Hamas’s participation. Rice asserted that it would be easier to compel Hamas
to disarm after the elections because the entire international community would then
exert pressure. She added that Abbas would lose U.S. and international support if he
does not disarm Hamas. Rice vowed that the United States would not hold contacts
with an armed Hamas even if it were part of the Palestinian administration. On
November 15, she announced that Israel and the PA had achieved an Agreement on
Movement and Access from the Gaza Strip. On November 25, the Rafah border
crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt reopened with European Union (EU)
monitors.
On December 5, PIJ, which has no apparent ambitions to participate in the
Palestinian political process, perpetrated another suicide bombing in Netanya, killing
5 and wounding more than 50. Israel barred Palestinians from entering Israel for one
week, arrested militants in the West Bank, and began air strikes in Gaza. Israeli
officials suspended talks with the PA about West Bank-Gaza bus convoys that were
to begin on December 15. PIJ claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings at an
Israeli army checkpoint in the northern West Bank on December 28, killing a soldier.
CRS-12
After Hamas’s victories in December 2005 Palestinian municipal elections,
speculation increased about possible effects on the peace process if Hamas achieved
similar successes in January 25, 2006, parliamentary elections. On December 28, the
Quartet stated that a future Palestinian cabinet “should include no member who has
not committed to the principles of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and an
unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.”29 On January 11, 2006, Secretary Rice
stated, “It remains the view of the United States that there should be no place in the
political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence,
recognize Israel’s right to exist, and disarm.”
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke on January 4.
Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime Minister and, on January
12, he told President Bush that peace efforts could not progress if terrorist
organizations like Hamas joined the Palestinian government. On January 19, PIJ
perpetrated a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, injuring 30.
Hamas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary elections. It is a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, claims the entire land of Palestine,
including Israel, “from the river to the sea” as an Islamic trust, rejects the Oslo
agreements of the 1990s, insists on the right of Palestinian refugees to return to
Israel, and on the right to “resistance,” which it claims forced Israel from the Gaza
Strip.30 Olmert declared that Israel would not negotiate with a Palestinian
administration that included an armed terrorist organization calling for its destruction
and demanded that Hamas disarm, annul its Covenant that calls for the destruction
of Israel, and accept all prior agreements. President Bush stated that the United
States would not deal with a political party “that articulates the destruction of Israel
as part of its platform” and, on January 31, called on Hamas to “recognize Israel,
disarm, reject terrorism, and work for a lasting peace.”
On January 30, the Quartet stated that “future assistance to any new
(Palestinian) government would be reviewed by donors against the government’s
commitment to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance
of previous agreements and obligations, including the Road Map.”31 Hamas
countered that it will never recognize Israel, would consider negotiating a “long-term
truce” if Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders, released all prisoners, destroyed all
settlements, and recognized the Palestinian refugees’ right to return (to Israel), and
would create a state on “any inch” of Palestinian territory without ceding another.
Abbas remained committed to negotiating a two-state solution and suggested
continuing to use the PLO for this purpose.
On February 8, Olmert said that Israel was moving toward a separation from the
Palestinians and permanent borders that would include a united Jerusalem, major
29 This and subsequent Quartet statements cited, may be found at the State Department’s
website: [http://www.state.gov].
30 For text of the Hamas Covenant, see [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/
hamas.htm].
31 “UN: Statement by Middle East Quartet,” M2 Presswire, January 31, 2006.
CRS-13
settlement blocs, and the Jordan Valley. On March 5, his security advisor, Avi
Dichter, asserted new borders would consolidate isolated settlements into settlement
blocs. He added that the Israeli Defense Forces would retain control over territory
to prevent terrorism. On March 8, Olmert stated that he would wait a “reasonable”
amount of time to see whether Hamas met his conditions. He aimed to reach a
national consensus on permanent borders by 2010 and stated that the security barrier
would be moved to those borders. Olmert also declared that construction would
begin in the E-1 corridor between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and Jerusalem. No
Hamas official accepted Olmert’s plan, but Prime Minister-designate Ismail Haniyah
declared, “Let them withdraw. We will make the Authority stronger on every inch
of liberated land....” Damascus-based Hamas Political Bureau chief Khalid Mish’al
said that his group would make no concessions to Israel and would “practice
resistance side by side with politics as long as the occupation continued.” On March
15, Israeli forces besieged a Palestinian prison in Jericho to capture men wanted for
the October 2001 killing of an Israeli minister, indicating a lack of trust in a Hamas-
led PA to keep a 2002 agreement to hold the prisoners.
After his Kadima party placed first in the March 28 Israeli parliamentary
elections, Olmert said that he aspired to demarcate permanent borders for a Jewish
state with a permanent Jewish majority and a democracy. He called for negotiations
based on mutual recognition, agreements already signed, the principles of the Road
Map, a halt to violence, and the disarming of terrorist organizations. He said he
hoped to hear a similar announcement from the PA, but “Israel will take its fate into
its own hands” if the Palestinians do not act. On March 30, Secretary Rice said,
referring to Olmert’s plan, “I wouldn’t on the face of it just say absolutely we don’t
think there’s any value in what the Israelis are talking about.”
Prime Minister Haniyah said that Hamas would not object to President Abbas
negotiating with Israel and that Hamas could redefine its position if the result serves
the people’s interests. In an op-ed in (the British newspaper) The Guardian on
March 31, Haniyah described Olmert’s unilateralism as “a recipe for conflict” and
a “plan to impose a permanent situation in which the Palestinians end up with a
homeland cut into pieces....” He appealed for no more talk about recognizing Israel’s
“right to exist” or ending resistance until Israel commits to withdraw from the
Palestinians’ lands and recognizes their rights. On April 1, PA Foreign Minister
Mahmud al-Zahhar stated that he dreamed of a map with an independent state on all
of historic Palestine and “which does not show Israel on it.”32 On March 30, the Al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades had claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing near the
Israeli settlement of Kedumim, killing four. Reacting to the bombing, the Palestinian
Deputy Prime Minister said that Hamas would never object to the Palestinians’ “self-
defense” as long as they were under occupation.
On April 9, the Israeli security cabinet recommended severing all ties with the
Hamas-led PA, which it called a “hostile entity.” Because it views the PA as “one
32 “Hamas Foreign Minister Moots Temporary Two-State Solution,” BBC Monitoring
Middle East, April 3, 2006.
CRS-14
authority and not as having two heads,” the cabinet declared that there could be
personal contacts, but not negotiations, with President Abbas.
On April 17, PIJ carried out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, killing 11 and
wounding 60, including an American teenager. Abbas condemned the attack as
“despicable” and counter to Palestinian interests, while Hamas officials called it an
act of “self-defense.” Israel did not respond militarily, but revoked the Jerusalem
residency of three Hamas officials among other steps. Some Israelis maintained that
Hamas’s repeated defense of bombings and its appointment of a leader of the terrorist
Popular Resistance Committees to head security forces (despite Abbas’s veto) would
serve to justify Israel’s unilateralism.
On April 26, President Abbas called for an immediate international peace
conference with himself as the Palestinian negotiator. He said that the Hamas-led
government is not an obstacle to negotiations because the PLO, which he heads, has
the mandate to negotiate as it had all previous agreements. He also has noted that he
is empowered as the democratically elected leader of the Palestinians. In response,
an Israeli spokesman cited the Road Map, which does not call for an international
conference until its final phase, as the best way to move forward. Meanwhile, Hamas
officials said that, for negotiations to begin, Israel must accept withdrawal from
territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, recognition of the refugees’
right to return, the release of prisoners, and the dismantling of the (security) wall.
On May 4, a new Israeli government took office, with guidelines vowing to
strive to shape the permanent borders of the State of Israel as a democratic Jewish
state, with a Jewish majority. Although preferring to achieve this goal through
negotiations, the government said that it would act to determine borders in their
absence. Prime Minister Olmert asserted that the security fence would be adapted
to conform to the borders in both east and west. The PLO rejected the Olmert Plan
as aimed at undermining the Palestinian people’s right to a state in all territories
occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital.
On May 10, imprisoned Fatah, Hamas, and other political detainees drafted a
“National Accord Document” calling for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its
capital, the right of the return of refugees, and the release of all prisoners. It also
called for renewing, perhaps recreating, the PLO and for Hamas and PIJ to join it.
It supported the right to resist the occupation in lands occupied in 1967. It asserted
that the PLO is responsible for negotiations and that any agreement should be put to
a vote by the Palestinian National Council or a referendum.33 Abbas accepted the
document, but Hamas officials rejected its implied recognition of pre-1967 Israel.
On May 21, Prime Minister Olmert asserted that, since the Hamas-led
government was elected, President Abbas is “powerless,” and “unable to even stop
the minimal terror activities amongst the Palestinians, so how can he seriously
negotiate with Israel and assume responsibility for the most major, fundamental
33 For text of a later, final version of the National Accord Document (also known as the
Palestinian Prisoners’s Agreement), see Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations
Affairs Department website [http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=news-updates_pre].
CRS-15
issues that are in controversy between us and them?”34 Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi
Livni met Abbas on the sidelines of a World Economic Forum meeting in Egypt,
where Abbas asserted that “permanent” arrangements are impossible without
resolving the main issues of conflict: security, borders, Jerusalem, and refugees. He
warned that Israeli “unilateralism will quickly put an end to the two-state solution
and will increase violence.”35
On May 21, Prime Minister Haniyah said if Israel withdraws to the 1967
borders, then his government will maintain a cease-fire for many years. He added
that his government was prepared to talk with Israel about practical but not political
issues.
On May 23, Olmert met President Bush at the White House. The President
reiterated his vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side
in peace and security and said that Olmert agrees that a negotiated final status
agreement best serves both peoples and the cause of peace. The President said that
Olmert’s ideas for removing most Israeli settlements could lead to a two-state solution
if a pathway to progress on the Road Map is not open in the period ahead. The
President described the ideas as “bold.” Olmert extended his “hand in peace” to
Mahmud Abbas, but noted that despite Israel’s sincere desire for negotiations, “we
cannot wait indefinitely for the Palestinians to change. We cannot be held hostage by
a terrorist entity which refuses to change or to promote dialogue.” He said that he had
presented the President ideas for a “realignment” in the West Bank to “reduce friction
between Israelis and Palestinians, ensure territorial contiguity for the Palestinians, and
guarantee Israel’s security as a Jewish state with the borders it desires.”36 In his
address to Congress on May 24, Olmert said that realignment would allow Israel to
build its future without being held hostage to terrorist activities, significantly reduce
friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and prevent much of the conflict between
the two nations.37 Afterwards, Olmert reiterated that he accepted Abbas as the elected
president of the Palestinians and knew that Abbas would like to create conditions for
negotiations, but doubted that he could do it.
On May 25, President Abbas called on Hamas to agree within 10 days to the
prisoners’ National Accord Document or he would hold a national referendum on the
document within 40 days.38 Prime Minister Haniyah claimed that Palestinian laws do
not authorize referenda and demanded more time for a dialogue to revise the
proposals. On June 10, Abbas scheduled a July 26 referendum on the question: “Do
you agree to the National Accord Document, the prisoners’ document?” He also
34 In interview on CNN Late Edition, May 22, 2006.
35 “‘Full text’ of Palestinian President’s Speech at World Economic Forum,” BBC
Monitoring Middle East, May 25, 2006.
36 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060523-9.html] for text of joint
news conference.
37 For text of speech, see [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+ Israeli+
leaders/2006/Address+by+PM+Olmert+to+a+joint+meeting+of+US+Congress+24-May-
2006.htm].
38 See note 33, above.
CRS-16
stated that the dialogue with Hamas would continue and an agreement could preclude
the referendum. Hamas officials rejected the Document and the referendum and called
on the people to boycott it, and Hamas prisoners who had co-authored the Document
withdrew their support for it. Nonetheless, dialogue continued.
Violence increased especially between Gaza and Israel. The Hamas military
wing and other Palestinian groups repeatedly launched rockets at Sderot in southern
Israel and Israel responded with artillery fire and air strikes. On June 10, Hamas
called off its 16-month truce in response to the deaths of Palestinian civilians on a
Gaza beach from Israeli artillery fire on June 9. Israel denied responsibility for those
deaths, but there were other Palestinian civilian casualties of Israeli strikes.
On June 13, Olmert said that while he would prefer to negotiate with a
Palestinian partner, he would not do so until the Quartet’s January 30 conditions were
met. He stated that he would meet with Abbas to discuss what each of them can do
to enable the Palestinians to meet the conditions. He told a group of British
parliamentarians that, even with negotiations, “Israel will never agree to withdraw
from the entire West Bank because the pre-1967 borders are not defensible.” Olmert
also asserted that Israel would withdraw from approximately 90% of the West Bank
and observed that not all of Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods would be part of the
future Jewish capital.39 On June 22, Olmert and Abbas had a cordial, informal
meeting in Jordan and agreed to meet officially in a few weeks.
On June 28, the national dialogue among Palestinian factions agreed on a revised
National Accord Document. The Document states that the PLO and the President of
the PA will be responsible for negotiations with Israel to create a state on territories
occupied by Israel in 1967. The Document insists on the right of Palestinian refugees
“to return to their homes and properties.” All agreements with Israel will be presented
to a new Palestine National Council to be formed before the end of 2006 or to a
referendum in which Palestinians in both the occupied territories and the diaspora will
vote. In tandem with political action, resistance will be concentrated in (but not
limited to) territories occupied in 1967. The signatories also vow to work toward
establishing a national unity government. The PLO will be reformed to allow Hamas
and PIJ to join.40 PIJ rejected the Document, while Hamas officials insisted that it
does not require them to recognize Israel or to accept two states. The Israeli Foreign
Ministry, among other comments, noted that the Document does not mention
recognizing Israel’s right to exist or ending the conflict with Israel. It said that the
demand for the return of all refugees is a formula for the ultimate destruction of Israel
and contradicts a two-state solution.41
39 Gil Hoffman, “Olmert Bids to Enlist Chirac Support for Realignment; PM tells British
MPS: Israel Would Never Agree to Withdraw to pre-1967 Borders,” Jerusalem Post, June
14, 2006.
40 “Text of National Consensus Document signed by the Palestinian factions, except the
Islamic Jihad Movement,” Ramallah Al-Ayyam, Open Source Center Document
GMP20060628253002.
41 For text of Foreign Ministry comments, see [http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa].
CRS-17
On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam
Brigades), the Popular Resistance Committees, and the previously unknown Army of
Islam had attacked Israeli forces in Israel, near Kerem Shalom and the Egyptian
border, just outside of Gaza, killing two Israeli soldiers, wounding four, and kidnaping
one. The terrorists had entered Israel via a long tunnel from Gaza and demanded the
release of women and minors (an estimated 400 persons) from Israeli prisons. It was
the first cross-border attack since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in August 2005.
Israel held the PA and its Hamas-led government responsible for the attack and the
fate of the kidnaped soldier. Some analysts suggest that militants intended the attack
to torpedo the political approach evinced in the National Accord Document.
On June 27, after unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to secure the soldier’s release,
Israel forces began a major operation to rescue him, to deter future Hamas attacks,
including rocket launches from Gaza into southern Israel, and to weaken, bring down,
or change the conduct of the Hamas-led government. Israeli officials claimed that
Hamas had crossed a “red line” with the kidnaping and attack within pre-1967 Israel.
Prime Minister Olmert asserted, however, that Israel did not intend to reoccupy Gaza.
The operation first targeted infrastructure more than individuals and, therefore, was
considered restrained compared to past Israeli military actions. Israeli forces first
knocked out much of Gaza’s electrical supply and bridges that the kidnappers could
use to escape or move their victim. On June 28, Hamas political leaders echoed the
demands of the kidnapers; Israeli officials responded by insisting on the unconditional
release of the soldier.
On June 29, Israel forces arrested 64 Palestinian (Hamas) cabinet ministers,
parliamentarians, and other Hamas officials in the West Bank and Jerusalem. An
Israeli spokeswoman stated that the arrests were not an effort to get bargaining chips
to exchange for the soldier, and the Israeli Foreign Ministry described the action as a
“normal legal procedure” targeting suspected terrorists.
On June 30, Israeli planes bombed the empty Palestinian Interior Ministry office,
weapons’ depots, training camps, and access roads in a series of 30 air raids over
Gaza. The Israeli Interior Minister also stripped four Hamas Palestinian officials of
their Jerusalem residency, denying them the right to live in the city.
On July 1, the three groups that had perpetrated the kidnaping demanded that
Israel release 1,000 prisoners in exchange for the soldier. Israeli officials again
demanded his unconditional release. The next day, Israeli missiles destroyed the
empty offices of the Palestinian Prime Minister. Israeli troops and tanks began
sweeping northern Gaza to locate tunnels and explosives near the border and
continued operations targeting Hamas offices in the West Bank. On July 4, Israeli
planes destroyed a wing of the PA Interior Ministry building that had been damaged
on June 30 and other Hamas facilities.
The Hamas military wing fired an upgraded rocket at the Israeli port city of
Ashkelon, hitting near a vacant school in that major population center. It was the
farthest north that a Palestinian rocket had ever struck and prompted the Israeli cabinet
to approve “prolonged” activities against Hamas. Israeli operations in northern Gaza
were expanded, with forces deploying in former Jewish settlements that had been used
as sites to fire rockets. In the first intense fighting in Palestinian populated areas since
CRS-18
the crisis began, the Israeli soldiers encountered militants from Hamas and other
groups and Palestinian casualties mounted.
Meanwhile, the kidnapers reportedly again revised their demands, insisting that
Israel release of all women (said to number about 100) and 30 male prisoners, and
some diplomatic efforts were undertaken to resolve the crisis. On July 3, an advisor
to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met President Asad and Hamas
leader Khalid Mish’al in Syria. Egyptian mediators reportedly proposed that Hamas
release the soldier in exchange for an Israeli promise to release prisoners at a later
date. On July 10, however, Mish’al insisted on the mutual release (“swap”) of
prisoners. On the same day, Prime Minister Olmert said, “Trading prisoners with a
terrorist bloody organization such as Hamas is a major mistake that will cause a lot
of damage to the future of the State of Israel.” He added that to negotiate with Hamas
would signal that moderates such as President Abbas are not needed.
Reacting to the kidnaping and subsequent developments, the White House
spokesman has said that Hamas had been “complicit in perpetrating violence” and that
Israel had a right to defend itself. He urged Israel not to harm civilians and to avoid
unnecessary destruction of property and infrastructure. On June 30, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the U.N. John Bolton told an emergency session of the Security
Council, “The United States is of the firm view that a prerequisite for ending this
conflict is that the governments of Syria and Iran end their role as state sponsors of
terror and unequivocally condemn the actions of Hamas.”
In remarks on July 5, Secretary of State Rice described the abduction as the “root
cause” of the problem. She asserted that the Syrians need to use their considerable
leverage to gain the soldier’s release and also spoke of the need for pressure on
Hamas to stop rocket attacks, but also called on the Israelis to exercise restraint. A
spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in said, “We understand why Israel is taking the
actions it does, it has a right to protect itself and its citizens. We put the blame on the
group that caused the raid and the kidnaping, and secondly, on the Hamas government
for not taking on its responsibility to prevent terrorism, rather than helping precipitate
these events.”
In July, Israeli forces expanded their offensive in Gaza. On July 13, they
conducted air strikes against a house where members of the Hamas military wing were
believed to be meeting and reportedly wounded the wing’s commander and nine
civilians. Continuing their round-up of Hamas officials, Israel forces arrested the
Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council Abd al-Aziz Duwayk on August 6 and
Deputy Prime Minister Nasser Shaer on August 19.
Although he appeared to have been sidelined by the kidnaping, Palestinian
President Mahmud Abbas persisted in his efforts to assert his power. On July 15, he
said that the National Accord Document would be implemented after Israel released
the arrested Palestinian officials and that a national referendum was no longer needed
to approve it. He also discussed the formation of a national unity government with
Hamas officials. Prime Minister Ismail Haniyah insisted that political representation
in the new government be proportional to the results of the January election, meaning
a Hamas majority, and that Hamas would not accept a technocratic government.
CRS-19
Abbas told a visiting U.N. team in July that he wanted to “de-link” the crisis in
the Palestinian areas from the crisis in Lebanon in order to prevent non-Palestinian
extremists (Hezbollah) from hijacking the leadership of the Palestinian issue. (For
the war in Lebanon, see Israel-Lebanon below.) Prime Minister Olmert said that a
prisoner release would only be done in coordination with Abbas in order to strengthen
his authority and that Israel would continue to avoid Hamas. However, neither Abbas
nor Prime Minister Haniyah is in control of the kidnaped soldier, and Hamas political
bureau leader Mish’al, who may have power over the matter, opposes de-linking the
Palestinian and Lebanese issues.
Israel-Syria. Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450
square miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law
and administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not
recognize. In 1991, Syria referred to its goal in the peace conference as an end to the
state of belligerency, not a peace treaty, preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace,
and rejected separate agreements between Israel and Arab parties. Israel emphasized
peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations,
security, and access to water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (after the 1967
war) applies to all fronts, meaning that it includes Syria’s Golan. Syria submitted a
draft declaration of principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement,” not simply
an end to belligerency. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin accepted an undefined
withdrawal on the Golan, pending Syria’s definition of “peace.” On September 23,
1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace in exchange for total
withdrawal.” Israel offered “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Hafez al-Asad
announced interest in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress at
different speeds. In June, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the
United States might be willing to guarantee security arrangements in the context of a
sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that
Syria was ready to talk about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel. The sides
inched toward each other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again
told President Clinton on October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful
relations in return for full withdrawal. On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced
terms of reference for military talks under U.S. auspices. Syria reportedly conceded
that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take topographical features into account
and be unequal, if security arrangements were equal. Israel offered Syria an early-
warning ground station in northern Israel in exchange for Israeli stations on the Golan
Heights, but Syria insisted instead on aerial surveillance only and that each country
monitor the other from its own territory and receive U.S. satellite photographs. It was
proposed that Syria demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes.
Rabin insisted that Israeli troops stay on the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said
that this would infringe on its sovereignty, but Syrian government-controlled media
accepted international or friendly forces in the stations. Talks resumed at the Wye
Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were suspended when Israeli
negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
CRS-20
A new Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for
negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential to Israel’s security and water needs
and that retaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan would be the basis for an
arrangement with Syria. Asad would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior
understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total withdrawal to the June 4,
1967-border (which differs slightly from the international border of 1923). Israeli
negotiators say that Rabin had suggested possible full withdrawal if Syria met Israel’s
security and normalization needs, which Syria did not do. An Israeli law passed on
January 26, 1999, requires a 61-member majority and a national referendum to
approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights.
In June 1999, Israeli Prime Minister-elect Ehud Barak and Asad exchanged
compliments via a British writer. Israel and Syria later agreed to restart talks from
“the point where they left off,” with each side defining the point to its satisfaction.
Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister met in Washington on December 15-16, 1999,
and in Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10, 2000. President Clinton intervened.
On January 7, a reported U.S. summary revealed Israeli success in delaying discussion
of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and an early-warning station.
Reportedly because of Syrian anger over the leak of the summary, talks scheduled to
resume on January 19, 2000 were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House spokesman
reported “significant differences remain” and said that it would not be productive for
talks to resume. Barak indicated that disagreements centered on Israel’s reluctance
to withdraw to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of Galilee, on security
arrangements, and on the early-warning station. Syria agreed that the border/Sea issue
had been the main obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son, Bashar, succeeded him.
Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister of Israel in February 2001 and vowed to retain
the Golan Heights. In a December 1 New York Times interview, Bashar Asad said that
he was ready to resume negotiations from where they broke off. Sharon responded
that Syria first must stop supporting Hezbollah and Palestinian terror organizations.42
On August 29, 2005, Sharon said that this is not the time to begin negotiations
with Syria because it is collaborating with Iran, building up Hezbollah, and
maintaining Palestinian terrorist organizations’ headquarters in Damascus from which
terrorist attacks against Israel are ordered. Moreover, Sharon observed that there was
no reason for Israel to relieve the pressure that France and the United States are
putting on Syria (over its alleged complicity in the February 2005 assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri).
On June 28, 2006, Israeli warplanes caused sonic booms over President Bashar
Asad’s summer residence in Latakia to warn him to discontinue support for the
Damascus-based head of the Hamas political bureau, Khalid Mish’al, whom Israel
considered responsible for a June 25 attack in Israel, and for other Palestinian
terrorists. On July 3, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem denied that Mish’al had
a role in the attack and said that Syria would never force him to leave the country.
42 See also CRS Report RL33487, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B.
Prados.
CRS-21
In a speech on August 15 to mark the end of the war in Lebanon, President Asad
declared that the peace process had failed since its inception and that he did not expect
peace in the near future.43 Subsequently, he said that Shib’a Farms are Lebanese, but
that the border between Lebanon and Syria there cannot be demarcated as long as it
is occupied by Israel. The priority, he said, must be liberation.44
Responding to speculation by some members of his cabinet about reopening
peace talks with Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert said on August 21 that Syria
must stop supporting terrorist organizations before negotiations resume.
Israel-Lebanon. Citing Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought
Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from the 9-mile “security zone” in southern
Lebanon, and the end of Israel’s support for Lebanese militias in the south and its
shelling of villages that Israel said were sites of Hezbollah activity. Israel claimed no
Lebanese territory, but said that its forces would withdraw only when the Lebanese
army controlled the south and prevented Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel.
Lebanon sought a withdrawal schedule in exchange for addressing Israel’s security
concerns. The two sides never agreed. Syria, which then dominated Lebanon, said
that Israel-Syria progress should come first. Israel’s July 1993 assault on Hezbollah
prompted 250,000 people to flee from south Lebanon. U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher arranged a cease-fire. In March/April 1996, Israel again attacked
Hezbollah and Hezbollah fired into northern Israel. Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense
Forces agreed to a cease-fire and to refrain from firing from or into populated areas
but retained the right of self-defense. The agreement was monitored by U.S., French,
Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli representatives.
On January 5, 1998, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai indicated
readiness to withdraw from southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425,
calling for the restoration of peace and security in the region, were implemented. He
and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu then proposed withdrawal in exchange for
security, not peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria called for an unconditional
withdrawal. As violence in northern Israel and southern Lebanon increased later in
1998, the Israeli cabinet twice opposed unilateral withdrawal. In April 1999, however,
Israel decreased its forces in Lebanon and, in June, the Israeli-allied South Lebanese
Army (SLA) withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone. On taking office, new
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised to withdraw in one year, by July 7, 2000.
On September 4, 1999, the Lebanese Prime Minister confirmed support for the
“resistance” against the occupation, (i.e., Hezbollah). He argued that Palestinian
refugees residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their homeland and rejected
their implantation in Lebanon. He also rejected Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright’s assertion that refugees will be a subject of Israeli-Palestinian final status
talks and insisted that Lebanon be a party to such talks.
43 For text of speech, see “Syria’s Asad Addresses ‘New Middle East,’ Arab ‘Failure’ to
Secure Peace,” Syrian Arab Television TV1, Open Source Center Document
GMP200608156070001.
44 In interview by Hamdi Qandil on Dubai TV, August 23, 2006, Open Source Center
Document GMP20060823650015.
CRS-22
On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon
by July. Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel
unless Israel also withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue.
On April 17, Israel informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon told the U.N.
that Israel’s withdrawal would not be complete unless it included the small area
known as Shib’a Farms, where the Israeli, Lebanese, and Syrian borders meet. On
May 23, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that most of Shib’a is within the
area of operations of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing
the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement, and recommended proceeding without
prejudice to later border agreements. On May 23, the SLA collapsed, and on May 24
Israel completed its withdrawal. Hezbollah took over the former security zone. On
June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed that Israel had withdrawn. The U.N. Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed only 400 troops to the border region because the
Lebanese army did not back them against Hezbollah.45
On October 7, Hezbollah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli
soldiers. On October 16, Hezbollah announced that it had captured an Israeli colonel.
On November 13, the Security Council said that Lebanon was obliged to take control
of the area vacated by Israel. On April 16 and July 2, 2001, after Hezbollah attacked
its soldiers in Shib’a, Israel, claiming that Syria controls Hezbollah, bombed Syrian
radar sites in Lebanon. In April, the U.N. warned Lebanon that unless it deployed to
the border, UNIFIL would be cut or phased out. On January 28, 2002, the Security
Council voted to cut it to 2,000 by the end of 2002.
In March 2003, Hezbollah shelled Israeli positions in Shib’a and northern Israel.
Israel responded with air strikes and expressed concern about a possible second front
in addition to the Palestinian intifadah. At its request, the Secretary General contacted
the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents and, on April 8, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney
called President Asad. In April, Secretary Powell visited northern Israel and called
on Syria to curb Hezbollah. On January 30, 2004, Israel and Hezbollah exchanged
400 Palestinian and 29 Lebanese and other Arab prisoners, and the remains of 59
Lebanese for the Israeli colonel and the bodies of the three Israeli soldiers.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, called for the
withdrawal of all foreign (meaning Syrian) forces from Lebanon.46 Massive anti-
Syrian demonstrations occurred in Lebanon after the February 14, 2005, assassination
of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents. On
March 5, Asad announced a phased withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which
was completed on April 26. On December 28, Israeli jets attacked a terrorist base
south of Beirut after rockets fired from Lebanon hit a northern Israeli town; Al Qaeda
in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks, but the claim has not been verified.
On May 28, 2006, Palestinian rockets hit deep inside northern Israel and Israeli
planes and artillery responded by striking PFLP-GC bases near Beirut and near the
45 See CRS Report RL31078, The Shib’a Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred
Prados.
4 6 For text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, see
[http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html].
CRS-23
Syrian border. Hezbollah joined the confrontation and, in turn, was targeted by
Israelis. UNIFIL eventually brokered a cease-fire.
On July 12, in the midst of massive shelling of a town in northern Israel,
Hezbollah forces crossed into northwestern Israel and attacked two Israeli military
vehicles, killing three Israeli soldiers and kidnaping two. Hezbollah demanded that
Israel release three Lebanese and other Arab prisoners in exchange for the soldiers and
for a third soldier who had been kidnaped by the Palestinian group Hamas on June 25.
(For more on the latter situation, see Israel-Palestinians, above.) Hezbollah leader
Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah said that the soldiers would be returned only through
indirect negotiations for a prisoner exchange. Hezbollah had acted in order to open
a second front in support of Hamas, which has been under siege by Israeli forces since
the June kidnaping. Nasrallah suggested that the Hezbollah operation might provide
a way out of the crisis in Gaza because Israel has negotiated with Hezbollah in the
past, although it refuses to negotiate with Hamas now. Hezbollah is a mentor and role
model for Hamas, with which it shares a desire to destroy Israel and Iranian and Syrian
support.
Hezbollah has the capacity to act on its own in solidarity with the besieged
Palestinians or with Syria or Iran. Yet, some observers suggest that Hezbollah acted
at the behest of or with the approval of Iran, its main sponsor, because Iran also
questions Israel’s right to exist, also supports Hamas and perhaps wanted to divert
international attention from its nuclear program. It also is possible that Hezbollah
acted to advance the interests of a Syria seeking to reclaim influence in Lebanon by
showing the weakness of the Lebanese government. Finally, Hezbollah may have
wanted to exercise influence over the Palestinians by preventing a resolution of the
Gaza crisis. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Palestinian President Mahmud
Abbas have claimed that, immediately before the Hezbollah attack, an agreement had
almost been reached to solve the kidnaping of the Israeli soldier near Gaza through a
prisoner exchange.47 The Hezbollah attack complicated that resolution.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared that Hezbollah’s attack was “an act
of war” and promised that Lebanon would suffer the consequences of Hezbollah’s
actions. The Lebanese government replied that it had no prior knowledge of the
operation and did not take responsibility or credit for it. Israeli officials also blamed
Syria and Iran but were careful to say that they had no plans to strike either one.
Immediately after the Hezbollah attack, Israeli forces launched a major military
campaign against Lebanon, using artillery and air strikes aimed at power stations,
Hezbollah strongholds, as well as bridges, roads, and the Beirut airport, used to
resupply Hezbollah. They also imposed an air, sea, and ground blockade on Lebanon.
Israeli planes concentrated on Hezbollah sites in southern Beirut and elsewhere and
targeted vehicles suspected of transporting Hezbollah rocket launchers, but hit
civilians in the process. According to the Lebanese government, one million people
were internally displaced or under siege during the war.
47 “PA’s Abbas Speaks to Journalists on Palestinian, Lebanese Developments,” Al-Hayah
al-Jadidah, July 16, 2006, Open Source Center Document, GMP 200607116620002.
CRS-24
Israel mobilized reserves. Limited ground operations expanded to target villages
in south Lebanon, where Hezbollah forces and rockets were believed to be situated.
In return, Hezbollah fired rockets unrelentingly into what it calls “Zionist occupied
northern Palestine” (northern Israel, one-third of the state), reaching many cities and
towns, including Haifa, Israel’s third largest city. On July 14, Hezbollah launched a
radar-guided Iranian C-802 missile at an Israeli naval vessel and disabled it.
On July 17, in a speech to the Knesset (parliament), Olmert summarized Israel’s
conditions for the end of military operations: the return of the kidnaped soldiers, the
end to Hezbollah rocket attacks, and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the
border.48
Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora requested U.N. help in obtaining a cease-
fire. His cabinet agreed on a seven-point proposal to end the crisis: an immediate
cease-fire; the release of Lebanese prisoners by Israel and of Israeli soldiers by
Hezbollah; the return of displaced Lebanese to their homes; Israeli-Lebanese
negotiations on Shib’a Farms, which would be put under U.N. supervision until a
settlement on the territory’s fate; Israeli disclosure of minefields north of the border;
the deployment and strengthening of the Lebanese army and the expansion of the U.N.
force in the south; and implementation of the Taif Accords of 1990, which call for the
disarming of militias. Hezbollah ministers in the government agreed to the proposal
despite reservations about the international force and disarmament, with the
understanding that additional discussion would occur after the U.N. Security Council
decides on the force.
On July 30, an Israeli bombing of Qana killed a large number of civilians, many
of them children, and provoked an international outcry. Israeli officials said that it
was a “tragic accident” and blamed Hezbollah for using civilians as shields for a
rocket launching site. On August 1, the Israeli cabinet voted to expand ground
operations and double the number of troops in Lebanon in order to prepare the ground
for a multinational force. The following days saw intense skirmishes in southeastern
Lebanon, an Israeli commando attack in Ba’albek, an Hezbollah stronghold 10 miles
from the Syrian border, and an increase in Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel. On
August 3, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah threatened to bomb Tel Aviv if Israel bombed
Beirut, but he also offered to stop firing if Israel did so.
On August 8, the Lebanese government promised to deploy 15,000 troops to the
south for the first time since 1978 if Israel withdrew its forces. Hezbollah agreed to
the government proposal, while Israeli Prime Minister Olmert found it “interesting.”
On August 9, the Israeli political-security cabinet authorized the Prime Minister and
Defense Minister to determine when to expand the ground campaign while continuing
efforts to achieve a political agreement. Their stated goals for an agreement included
the immediate, unconditional return of the kidnaped soldiers, the cessation of
hostilities against Israel, implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559,
which called for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, deployment of an
international force and the Lebanese army in south Lebanon along the border, and
48 For text of Olmert’s speech, see [http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/
PMSpeaks/speechknesset170706.htm].
CRS-25
prevention of the rearming of Hezbollah. Only after the U.N. Security Council passed
a resolution calling for the end to hostilities on August 11 did Olmert authorize the
offensive, and two costly days of fighting for both sides ensued.
The U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 1701 on August 11.49 It called
for the full cessation of hostilities, the extension of the government of Lebanon’s
control over all Lebanese territory, and for the deployment of Lebanese forces and an
expanded UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, 15,000 each, in a buffer zone between the
Israeli-Lebanese border and the Litani River to be free of “any armed personnel” other
than the Lebanese army and UNIFIL. The deployment would occur parallel to the
withdrawal of Israeli forces. The resolution authorizes UNIFIL to insure that its area
of operations is not used for hostile activities and to resist by forceful means attempts
to prevent it from discharging its duties. The resolution also bans the supply of arms
to Lebanon, except as authorized by the government. Reiterating prior resolutions, it
calls for the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. The resolution does not
require the return of the abducted Israeli soldiers or the release of Lebanese prisoners.
It requests the Secretary General to develop proposals for the delineation of the
international borders of Lebanon, “including by dealing with the Shib’a Farms area.”
On August 14, the truce went into effect. The Lebanese Army began to move
south to the border on August 17 as Israeli forces began to hand over positions to the
U.N.
Hezbollah leader Nasrallah declared victory for Lebanon and said that Hezbollah
would not disarm as long as Israel did not withdraw completely from Lebanon,
including the Shib’a Farms. On August 14, Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr
said that the army had no intention of disarming Hezbollah, but Hezbollah weapons
would no longer be visible. On August 19, Israeli commandos raided an Hezbollah
stronghold near Ba’albek in the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah did not respond and the
cease-fire held.
In a speech on August 14, Prime Minister Olmert accepted responsibility for the
military operation, but claimed achievements in a terrorist organization no longer
being allowed to operate from Lebanon and the government of Lebanon taking
responsibility for its territory. He claimed that a severe blow had been dealt to
Hezbollah. Olmert appointed a special representative to coordinate the return of the
captured soldiers.50
After the war, Olmert expressed hope that the cease-fire could help “build a new
reality between Israel and Lebanon.” Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora declared,
however, that Lebanon would be the last country to sign a peace agreement with
Israel. On September 7, Olmert said that if the Shib’a Farms area is determined to be
Lebanese and not Syrian and if Lebanon fulfills its obligations under U.N. Security
49 Text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 is accessible via
[http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm].
50 For text of Olmert’s statement, see Israeli Television Channel 1, August 14, 2006, Open
Source Center Document GMP20060814728001.
CRS-26
Council Resolutions, including the disarming of Hezbollah, then Israel would agree
to discuss the Farms issue with Lebanon.
Israel-Jordan. Of Jordan’s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian.
Jordan initialed a June 1993 agenda with Israel on water, energy, environment, and
economic matters on September 14, 1993. On July 25, 1994, Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein signed the Washington Declaration, a non-
belligerency accord. A peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. (See “Significant
Agreements,” below). The border was demarcated and Israel withdrew from
Jordanian land on February 9, 1995. More agreements followed.
Although supportive of the peace process and of normalization of relations with
Israel, on March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu was “bent on destroying the peace process....” After Israeli agents bungled
an attempt to assassinate Hamas official Khalid Mish’al in Jordan on September 25,
1997, the King demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh Yassin, which it
did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the
detained Israeli agents. On December 5, 1998, the King called for Jordan-Palestinian
coordination, observing that many final status issues are Jordanian national interests.
King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, and was succeeded by his son.
King Abdullah said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy sites
in Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of his family, and proposed that Jerusalem
be an Israeli and a Palestinian capital, but rejected a Jordanian-Palestinian
confederation. On November 21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of its new
ambassador to Israel because of Israeli “aggression” against the Palestinians. On
March 18, 2004, the King met Sharon to discuss Israel’s security fence and
disengagement from Gaza. In February 2005, Jordan proposed deploying about 1,500
Palestinian soldiers (Badr Brigade) from Jordan to the northern West Bank, pending
approval of the PA and Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Mofaz has said that the Badr
Brigade could train Palestinians in the West Bank. Jordan is training Palestinian
security force officers in Jordan. Also in February, Jordan sent an ambassador to
Israel and, in March, its foreign minister visited Israel for the first time in four years.
Jordanian officials have expressed concern about a possible Israeli unilateral
disengagement from the West Bank, fearing that it could produce instability that might
spread to Jordan.
Significant Agreements and Documents
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition. On September 9, 1993, PLO Chairman
Yasir Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East peace process, and the peaceful resolution
of conflicts. He renounced terrorism and violence and undertook to prevent them,
stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict his commitments are
invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National Council, and
called upon his people to reject violence. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
CRS-27
recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to
negotiate with it.51
Declaration of Principles. On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians
announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-
government for the West Bank and Gaza, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway,
since January 1993. Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza
and Jericho; transfer of authority over domestic affairs in the West Bank and Gaza to
Palestinians; election of a Palestinian Council with jurisdiction over the West Bank
and Gaza. During the interim period, Israel is to be responsible for external security,
settlements, Israelis in the territories, and foreign relations. Permanent status
negotiations to begin in the third year of interim rule and may include Jerusalem.52
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Signed on May 4,
1994, provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho, and describes the Palestinian
Authority’s (PA) responsibilities. The accord began the five-year period of interim
self-rule.53
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Signed on October 26, 1994.
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip. (Also
called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. Annexes deal
with security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations,
Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, and the release of prisoners. Negotiations on
permanent status to begin in May 1996. An 82-member Palestinian Council and Head
of the Council’s Executive Authority will be elected after the Israeli Defense Force
redeploy from Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and 450
towns and villages. Israel will redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary for
security of Israelis. Israel will be responsible for external security and the security of
Israelis and settlements. Palestinians will be totally responsible for Area “A,” the six
cities, plus Jericho. Israeli responsibility for overall security will have precedence
over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area “B,” Palestinian towns and
villages. Israel will retain full responsibility in Area “C,” unpopulated areas.
Palestinian Charter articles calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within
two months of the Council’s inauguration.54
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron. Initialed by Israel
and the PA on January 15, 1997. Details security arrangements. Accompanying
Israeli and Palestinian Notes for the Record and letter from Secretary of State
Christopher to Prime Minister Netanyahu.55
51 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm].
52 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22602.htm].
53 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22676.htm].
54 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22678.htm].
55 For Protocol text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22680.htm].
CRS-28
Wye River Memorandum. Signed on October 23, 1998. Delineated steps to
complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of agreements accompanying
the Hebron Protocol. Israel will redeploy from the West Bank in exchange for
Palestinian security measures. The PA will have complete or shared responsibility for
40% of the West Bank, of which it will have complete control of 18.2%. The PLO
Executive and Central Committees will reaffirm a January 22, 1998, letter from Arafat
to President Clinton that specified articles of the Palestinian Charter that had been
nullified in April 1996. The Palestine National Council will reaffirm these decisions.
President Clinton will address this conclave.56
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum. (Also called Wye II.) Signed on
September 4, 1999.57 Israeli Prime Minister Barak and PA Chairman Arafat agreed
to resume permanent status negotiations in an accelerated manner in order to conclude
a framework agreement on permanent status issues in five months and a
comprehensive agreement on permanent status in one year. Other accords dealt with
unresolved matters of Hebron, prisoners, etc.
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. (More briefly referred to as the Roadmap.)
Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April 30, 2003, by the Quartet
(i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia). To achieve a
comprehensive settlement in three phases by 2005. Phase I calls for the Palestinians
to unconditionally end violence, resume security cooperation, and undertake political
reforms, and for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied since September 28, 2000,
and to freeze all settlement activity. Phase II will produce a Palestinian state with
provisional borders. Phase III will end in a permanent status agreement which will
end the conflict.58
Agreement on Movement and Access. From the Gaza Strip, reached on
November 15, 2005, calls for reopening the Rafah border crossing to Egypt with
European Union monitors on November 25, live closed circuit TV feeds of the
crossing to Israel, Palestinian bus convoys between the West Bank and Gaza
beginning December 15, exports from Gaza into Israel, and construction of the Gaza
seaport.59
56 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22694.htm].
57 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm].
58 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].
59 For text, see [http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/
Agreed+documents+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm].
CRS-29
Role of Congress
Aid.60 Unless the President certifies that it is in the national security interest,
P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2006,
prohibits aid for a Palestinian state and the PA unless its leaders have not supported
terrorism, been democratically elected, demonstrated their commitment to peaceful
coexistence with Israel, taken measures to counter terrorism and terrorism financing,
and established security entities that cooperate with Israeli counterparts. It also
provides $150 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
After Hamas took power on March 30, 2006, Secretary of State Rice said, “We
are not going to fund a Hamas-led government. But we are going to look at what we
can do to increase humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people....” The
Administration requested that the PA return $50 million in direct aid provided in
2005; as of April 7, $30 million had been returned. On April 7, the Administration
announced that it would provide $245 million for basic human needs and democracy
building through various U.N. and nongovernmental agencies, suspend or cancel $239
million for programs related to the PA ($105 million of which will be redirected to
human needs), and review $165 million in other projects. It redirected about $100
million for humanitarian needs and $42 million for civil society groups.61
On May 9, the Quartet endorsed a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM)
to be developed by the EU to ensure direct delivery of aid to the Palestinian people.
In June, the EU presented a three-prong plan open to all donors to bypass the PA
government. It calls for the expanding a World Bank emergency support program for
essential health and social services programs and employees, for contributions to
ensure uninterrupted supply of essential utilities (fuel for electricity from Israel), and
for a needs-based social safety net based on for the poorest Palestinians. The first two
programs already exist; the third has yet to be worked out in detail. The Quartet
endorsed the TIM on June 17, and money was expected to begin to flow in August.
P.L. 109-234, June 15, 2006, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, prohibits
obligation of ESF appropriated in P.L. 109-102 for the West Bank and Gaza (above)
until the Secretary of State submits a revised plan for such assistance and ensures that
it is not provided to or through entities associated with terrorist activity. Section 550
prohibits assistance to the PA unless the Secretary of State determines that it has
complied with the Quartet’s January 30 conditions. The President may waive the
prohibition with respect to the administrative and personal security costs of the Office
of the President of the PA and for his activities to promote democracy and peaceful
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if it is in the U.S. national security
60 See also CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical
Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2006 Request; CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign
Aid to the Palestinians; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, all by Jeremy
Sharp.
61 For details, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/64234.htm].
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interest, if the President of the PA is not associated with Hamas or any other foreign
terrorist group, and if aid will not be transferred to Hamas.
H.R. 5522, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for 2007, passed on June
9, prohibits the provision of economic aid to the PA unless the President certifies that
it is important to U.S. national security interests. When the President exercises the
waiver authority, he must report to Congress on the steps that the PA has taken to
arrest terrorists, confiscate weapons, and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. It also
prohibits assistance to support a Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State certifies
that its leadership has been democratically elected, has demonstrated a commitment
to peaceful coexistence with the State of Israel, is taking measures to counter terrorism
and terrorist financing, is establishing a new security entity that is cooperative with
Israel, and the PA is working for a comprehensive peace. Again it grants the President
waiver authority.
Other legislation reacting to the Hamas victory in the January 2006 Palestinian
parliamentary elections includes S.Con.Res. 79, passed in both houses in February,
which expressed the sense of Congress that no assistance should be provided directly
to the PA if a party calling for the destruction of Israel holds a majority of its
parliamentary seats. Also, H.R. 4681, passed in the House on May 23, would limit
assistance to the PA until it meets a number of specific conditions, to
nongovernmental organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza, and to specified
U.N. agencies and programs that “fail to ensure balance” in the U.N. approach to
Israeli-Palestinian issues, proportionate to U.N. aid to the PA; deny visas to PA
officials; restrict the travel of PA and PLO officials stationed at the U.N.; and prohibit
PA and PLO representation in the United States, among other measures. The White
House said that H.R. 4681 “unnecessarily constrains the executive’s ability to use
sanctions, if appropriate, as tools to address rapidly changing circumstances.” The
Senate version of the bill, S. 2370, passed on June 23, is less restrictive regarding
nongovernmental organizations and adds a call for the establishment of a $20 million
Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Reconciliation, and Democracy Fund.
P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003, appropriated $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel
over three years to be used only within its 1967 borders. In November 2003, the
Administration deducted $289.5 million from $3 billion in guarantees for the year
because it determined that amount had been spent on the security barrier and
settlements in the occupied territories. Congress has extended the guarantees through
2008. The Administration has agreed to extend them for an additional three years, or
until 2011, but Congress has not yet acted.
After the 2006 war in Lebanon, President Bush promised $230 million in aid to
help rebuild Lebanon and to train and equip its armed forces. However,
Representative Tom Lantos put a hold on the aid until UNIFIL and the Lebanese army
are deployed to the border with Syria.
Jerusalem. Israel annexed the city in 1967 and proclaimed it to be Israel’s
eternal, undivided capital. Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital.
Successive U.S. Administrations have maintained that the parties must determine the
fate of Jerusalem in negotiations. H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and S.Con.Res. 21,
May 20, 1997, called on the Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must remain the
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undivided capital of Israel. Congress has repeatedly prohibited official U.S.
government business with the PA in Jerusalem and the use of appropriated funds to
create U.S. government offices in Israel to conduct business with the PA and allows
Israel to be recorded as the place of birth of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem.62 The
State Department does not recognize Jerusalem, Israel as a place of birth for passports
because the U.S. government does not recognize all of Jerusalem as part of Israel.
A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is not in the
capital, that Israel’s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy, is
unquestioned, and that Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital in
Jerusalem. Opponents say a move would undermine the peace process and U.S.
credibility in the Islamic world and with Palestinians, and would prejudge the final
status of the city. P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the embassy’s
relocation by May 31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national security
interest, to suspend limitations on State Department expenditures that would be
imposed if the embassy did not open. Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the
authority. The State Department Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, P.L. 107-
228, September 30, 2002, urged the President to begin relocating the U.S. Embassy
“immediately.” The President replied that the provision would “if construed as
mandatory ... impermissibly interfere with the president’s constitutional authority to
conduct the nation’s foreign affairs.” The State Department declared, “our view of
Jerusalem is unchanged. Jerusalem is a permanent status issue to be negotiated
between the parties.”
Compliance/Sanctions. The President signed the Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175, on December 12, 2003, to hold
Syria accountable for its conduct, including actions that undermine peace. On May
11, 2004, he issued executive orders to impose sanctions on Syria and, on May 5,
2005 and May 8, 2006, he extended them for a year.
Israeli Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah. S.Res. 524, passed on July
18, 2006, condemns the two terror groups and their state sponsors and supports
Israel’s exercise of its right to self-defense; H.Res. 921, passed on July 20, expresses
the same views.
62 See P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005, and H.R. 5522, June 9, 2006, for recent
restrictions.
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Figure 1. Israel and Its Neighbors