Order Code RS21473
Updated September 20, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report updates recent information concerning, specifically, North Korea’s
long-range ballistic missile program. On July 4-5, 2006, North Korea test-launched
seven ballistic missiles, including a new Taepo Dong 2 that failed soon after launch.
The apparently successful shorter-range missile tests included some combination of
SCUDs and No Dongs. As of this update, North Korea is reporting that additional test
launches of the shorter-range missiles may be forthcoming. This report will be updated
as events warrant. Additional information is provided by CRS Report RL30427, Missile
Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries
and CRS Report RL30699,
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, both by
Andrew Feickert, and CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
Program
, by Larry A. Niksch.
The Taepo Dong Program
The North Korean Taepo Dong program traces its origins to the No Dong medium
range ballistic missile1 program of the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, North Korea
initiated the development of two ballistic missile programs known to the West as Taepo
Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2.2 The supposed design objectives for the Taepo Dong 1 system
were to deliver a 1,000 to 1,500 kg warhead to a range of 1,500 to 2,500 km and for the
1 Ballistic missiles are classified by range as follows:
Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) = 150 - 799 kms.
Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) = 800 - 2,399 kms.
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) = 2,400 - 5,499 kms.
Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) = 5,500 kms and greater.
2 Joseph S. Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occasional
Paper No. 2,” Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
1999, p. 26.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Taepo Dong 2 to deliver the same warhead to a 4,000 to 8,000 km range.3 Initial
prototypes for both systems were probably manufactured in 1995 or 1996 with a possible
initial production run for the Taepo Dong 1 initiated in early 1997 or 1998.4 Analysts
estimate that North Korea may have produced from one to ten Taepo Dong 1 and one or
two Taepo Dong 2 prototypes by the end of 1999.5 These missiles are not believed to be
deployed.6 North Korea is believed to have had extensive foreign assistance from China,
Russia, Pakistan, and Iran throughout the program.7 Very little was known about the
actual program until the August 31, 1998 launch of a Taepo Dong 1 from the Musudan-ri
Launch Facility in North Hamgyong Province, northeast coast of North Korea.8
The stated objective of this launch was to place North Korea’s first satellite
(Kwangmyongsong 1) into orbit. Initial U.S. intelligence reports postulated that the
Taepo Dong 1 SLV was only a two stage rocket. The first stage fell into international
waters 300 km east of Musudan-ri and the second stage flew over the Japanese island of
Honshu and fell into the water 330 km away from the Japanese port of Hachinohe for a
total distance of approximately 1,646 km.9 Further analysis of radar tapes revealed that
the Taepo Dong 1 had a small third solid propellant stage (presumably designed to place
the satellite into orbit).10 Debris from this third stage was believed to have impacted as
far as 4,000 km from the launch point.11 Some analysts believe that if the missile had
functioned properly, the Taepo Dong 1 space launch vehicle (SLV) could have achieved
a 3,800 to 5,900 km range.12
Potential Configurations and Ranges
In order to strike targets from North Korea, a North Korean missile would need to
achieve the following ranges:13
Target
Washington, DC
Chicago
San Francisco
Seattle
Anchorage
Honolulu
Range (km)
10,700
10,000
8,600
7,900
5,600
7,100
3 Joseph S. Bermudez, “North Korea’s Long-Range Missiles,” Jane’s Ballistic Missile
Proliferation
, 2000, p. 5.
4 Bermudez, Monterey Institute, p. 29.
5 Ibid.
6 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. NASIC-1031-0985-06, March 2006, p. 10.
7 Ibid., pp 23 - 29.
8 Bermudez, Janes, p. 6.
9 Michael Dutra and Gaurav Kampani, “North Korea: A Second Taepo Dong Test?Monterey
Institute of International Studies, 1999, p. 2.
10 Ibid.
11 Bermudez, Janes, p. 6.
12 Michael Dutra and Gaurav Kampani, p. 2.
13 Bermudez, Janes, p. 8.

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Within possible range of the Taepo Dongs are U.S. military facilities in Guam (3,500
km), Okinawa, and Japan. The Taepo Dong 1 missile (as opposed to the SLV) is believed
to be a two-stage missile that uses a No Dong missile derivative as its first stage and
SCUD C derivative (called the Hwasong 6) as its second stage. In this configuration, it
is estimated that it could deliver a 700 - 1,000 kg warhead to a range of 2,500 km,14 which
would put Japan and Okinawa within range. For the Taepo Dong 1 to achieve greater
range its payload would have to be decreased. Some analysts speculate that a reduced-
payload configuration could deliver a 200 kg warhead into the U.S. center and a 100 kg
warhead to Washington D.C., albeit with poor accuracy.15
Until recently, the Taepo Dong 2 had not yet been flight tested. The Taepo Dong 2
is believed to be a two-stage missile about 35 meters long. The first stage has been said
to bear close resemblance to the Chinese CSS-2 and CSS-3 first stage. The second stage
is believed to be based on the No Dong missile. The two-stage variant is assessed a range
potential of as much as 3,750 km with a 700 to 1,000 kg payload and, if a third stage were
added, some believe that range could be extended to 4,000 to 4,300 km with a full
payload.16 Some analysts further believe that the Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a 700 to
1,000 kg payload as far as 6,700 km.17 Pyongyang has yet to test the guidance system, and
the missile is believed to be fairly inaccurate.18 How it might be deployed (i.e., silo or
transportable) also remains undetermined. In order to achieve ranges capable of striking
Hawaii and targets on the U.S. mainland, some analysts believe that the Taepo Dong 2’s
payload would need to be reduced to 200 - 300 kgs.19 Some believe the Taepo Dong 2
may be exported to other countries in the future.20
In recent weeks, the Taepo Dong 2 was observed being assembled and fueled at the
Musudan-ri test site along the northeast coast of North Korea. At the time, some
observers believed a test was imminent while others expressed caution because much
technical uncertainty remained. On July 4, 2006 (at 4:12 p.m. EST), North Korea
launched the Taepo Dong 2. The launch was preceded by three shorter-range ballistic
missile launches, and then followed by three more.21 About 40 seconds into the flight, the
Taepo Dong 2 failed on its own during the first stage and fell into the Sea of Japan,
according to USNORTHCOM (U.S. Northern Command). Causes for the failure are
being studied, and details may become public in coming days or weeks.
14 Ibid., p. 5.
15 Bermudez, Monterey Institute, p. 30.
16 “Taepo Dong 2,” The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, 2002, the above
discussion of the Taepo Dong 2 is found on p. 3.
17 See North Korean Missile Could Bring U.S. into Range: Experts, Agence France-Presse, June
20, 2006, and Bermudez, Monterey Institute, p. 30.
18 North Korea: An Impending Missile Launch?, Stratfor, June 16, 2006.
19 Siegel, p. 5.
20 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence center, p. 17.
21 The short-range test launches, some combination of SCUDs and No Dong missiles, occurred
on July 4 (all EST) at 1) 2:32 p.m.; 2) 3:04 p.m.; 3) 3:59 p.m.; 4) 6:31 p.m.; 5) 7:12 p.m.; and 6)
4:15 a.m (July 5, 2006).

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Meanwhile, Japanese sources reported details of the missile launches, suggesting
greater accuracy in their impact areas than other analyses.22 The report also suggested
greater Russian engineering support than indicated elsewhere.
North Korea’s Military Spending23
Some experts have voiced concern over North Korea’s level of military spending in
relation to its missile program. North Korea reportedly spends as much as 40 percent of
its gross domestic product (GDP) on the military.24 In 2004, U.S. Forces Korea
commander, General Leon J. LaPorte, reportedly stated that North Korea’s military
investments are primarily in their nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs in
order to gain an “asymmetrical” advantage over U.S. and South Korean forces.25 General
LaPorte reportedly emphasized his concern over missile development and North Korea’s
continued development of its nuclear weapons program that could eventually lead to
“weaponizing their weapons-grade materials on missiles.”26
North Korea’s apparent willingness to devote such a large portion of its GDP to
missiles and weapons of mass destruction could be cause for additional concern when
viewed in the light of their alleged cooperation with other countries. Evidence suggests
that North Korea has had extensive dealings with Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, Yemen,
and Libya on ballistic missiles and possibly even nuclear warheads.27 One particular
concern is that Chinese warhead designs, sold to Libya by Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr.
A.Q. Khan, might also be in the hands of North Korea, which could help accelerate its
efforts to develop long-ranged nuclear ballistic missiles.28 Some suggest that North
Korea’s access to these countries’ missile and WMD technologies might enable North
Korea to advance its long-range nuclear ballistic missile program at a more accelerated
rate without having to conduct extensive testing, particularly if they use proven missile
designs from other countries.
New Medium or Intermediate Range Missiles
Various reports indicate that North Korea is in the process of developing and
deploying at least two new medium to intermediate range ballistic missile systems. It is
not known if North Korea is continuing development of a reported new version of its
22 Japan: Analysis of Data on Landing Points of DPRK’s 5 July Missile Launches, Yomiuri
Weekly (Tokyo), Aug, 6, 2006, pp. 22-23.
23 For a more detailed discussion of North Korea’s economy see CRS Report RL32493, The
North Korean Economy: Background and Policy Analysis,
by Dick K. Nanto and Emma
Chanlett-Avery.
24 Bill Gertz, “North Korea Pumps Money Into Military,” Washington Times, Aug. 3, 2004.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 See CRS Report RL30427,Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries,
by Andrew Feickert.
28 Bill Gertz, Op. Cit.

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Taepo Dong ballistic missile,29 the so-called Taepo Dong X, which could achieve
intercontinental ranges. The two new medium to intermediate range missiles are believed
to be based on the decommissioned Soviet R-2730 submarine launched ballistic missile.31
The R-27, which was allegedly acquired from Russia in the 1990s and possibly
enhanced with the help of Russian missile specialists, has been called an “excellent
choice” on which to base a new missile system.32 Its 40 year-old, liquid-fuelled
technology is considered within the technological and industrial capabilities of North
Korea and versions of its engines are already used in North Korean SCUDs and No
Dongs. Perhaps the greatest advantage of this system is that the R-27 is a proven design
meaning that North Korea may be able to develop and deploy these missiles without
having to conduct extensive ground and flight tests.
Land-Based Version.33 The land-based version is a road-mobile medium to
intermediate range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,500 - 4,000 km. The
North Korean version of this missile is 12 m long — 2.4m longer than the R-27 — and,
although smaller than the No Dong and Taepo Dong 1, has a greater range than these two
missiles. This range puts most of East Asia within range, including U.S. military bases
at Guam and Okinawa, although experts point out that the North Korean No Dong 2
missile could also reach Japan and Okinawa. Initial prototypes of the land-based version
were reportedly first identified in 2000, and pre-production models and a new transporter-
erector-launcher (TEL) were believed to have been completed by mid-2003.
The North Koreans are reportedly constructing two new missile bases to
accommodate the new land-based version of the R-27. One base is near Yangdok-gun
and the other is at Sangnam-ni, previously reported as a No Dong and Taepo Dong base.
North Korea has reportedly constructed administrative and maintenance facilities at these
two sites as well as fortified underground tunnels for storing the missiles and TELs. By
July 2004, experts reported that these new bases were from 70 to 80 percent completed.
Sea-Based Version. The sea-based version of the R-27 is reportedly either a
submarine or ship-mounted system with an estimated range of at least 2,500 km. Russian
versions of the R-27 reportedly had both a single nuclear reentry vehicle as well as a
version with three reentry vehicles, each with a 200 kiloton (KT) nuclear weapon. It is not
known if North Korea possesses reentry vehicles for their versions of the R-27. There are
indications that North Korea may be actively pursuing a sea-based ballistic missile
capability, which could have potential security implications for the United States.
In September 1993, the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) reportedly purchased 12
decommissioned Russian Foxtrot class and Golf-II class submarines for scrap metal from
29 Bill Gertz, “North Korea to Display New Missiles,” Washington Times, Sept. 9, 2003.
30 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) classification for the R-27 is the SS-N-6.
31 Joseph S. Bermudez, “North Korea Deploys New Missiles,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Aug. 4,
2004.
32 Information in this section comes from Joseph S. Bermudez, “North Korea Deploys New
Missiles,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Aug. 4, 2004.
33 Ibid.

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a Japanese company. The Golf-IIs, which are capable of carrying three SS-N-5 SLBMs,
did not have their missiles or electronic firing systems when they were sold to the North
Koreans, but they did allegedly retain significant missile launch sub-systems including
launch tubes and stabilization systems. Some analysts believe that this technology, in
conjunction with the R-27’s well-understood design, gives North Korea the capability to
develop either a submarine or ship-mounted ballistic missile. Many experts postulate that
North Korea does not have the capability to develop a new SLBM on its own and that
none of North Korea’s other ballistic missiles are easily convertible to SLBMs.
North Korea apparently integrated the Golf-IIs missile stabilization and launch
technology into a new class of conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines,
possibly modified versions of Golf-IIs or Romeo class Russian submarines.34 It is also
possible that North Korea might attempt to incorporate this launch technology into a
merchant ship. It is not known if North Korea has sold or will sell this new system to
other countries. Some analysts suggest that Iran might be an ideal candidate for such a
system, as it has allegedly researched a sea-based ballistic missile capability in the past,
and such a system could enable Iran to strike Israel from its territorial waters.
Security Implications. DPRK systems have the potential to increase the ballistic
missile threat to the United States. The new missiles, if they are indeed closely modified
versions of the R-27, are likely more accurate and have greater range than North Korea’s
SCUD, No Dong, and Taepo Dong missiles. Some analysts believe that the sea-launched
version has the potential to pose the greatest threat by posing a direct threat to the
continental United States. These experts suggest that a North Korean sea-launched missile
capability could complicate intelligence collection efforts as well as present challenges
for South Korean, Japanese, and U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. Others, however,
are skeptical that North Korea can reach the continental United States with the new sea-
based version. Anonymous U.S. government officials have reportedly stated that North
Korea does not presently have a submarine that is capable of transporting a missile within
striking distance of the continental United States.35 These officials also expressed doubt
that North Korea had intentions of developing a missile to hide inside a freighter to be
used against targets in the United States.36
34 Ibid.
35 Thom Shanker, “Korean Missile Said to Advance; U.S. is Unworried,” New York Times, Aug.
5, 2004.
36 Ibid.