Order Code RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Updated August 23, 2006
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Afghanistan’s political transition was completed with the convening of a
parliament in December 2005, but since then insurgent threats to Afghanistan’s
government have escalated to the point that some experts are questioning the future
of U.S. stabilization efforts. In the political process, a new constitution was adopted
in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and
parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has
become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to
debate and peacefully resolve differences. Afghan citizens are enjoying new
personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban. Women are participating
in economic and political life, including as ministers, provincial governors, and
senior levels of the new parliament.
Despite the political and social accomplishments since 2001, an insurgency led
by remnants of the former Taliban regime has escalated in 2006. Taliban fighters
have conducted several increasingly larger scale attacks on coalition and Afghan
security forces in several southern provinces since April 2006, setting back
reconstruction and thwarting efforts to extend Afghan government authority. In
addition, narcotics trafficking is resisting counter-measures, and independent militias
remain throughout the country, although many are being progressively disarmed.
U.S. stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government and
its security forces and on promoting reconstructing while combating the renewed
insurgent challenge. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan
National Army; deploying a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) to patrol Kabul and other cities; and running regional enclaves to secure
reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs). Approximately 23,000
U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban-led insurgency, but the
United States is shifting much of the security burden to NATO during 2006. That
transition accelerated on July 31, 2006 with the security leadership takeover in
southern Afghanistan by forces from Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands.
To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States gave
Afghanistan about $4.35 billion in FY2005, including funds to equip and train
Afghan security forces. Another $931 million is provided for in the the regular
FY2006 aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102). An FY2006 supplemental appropriation
(P.L. 109-234) provides about $2.1 billion for Afghanistan, of which about $1.9
billion is to go to Afghan security force development.
This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by Kenneth
Katzman; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.

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Contents
Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Taliban Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Bonn Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Strengthening Central Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Combating Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices . . . . . 15
Advancement of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) . . . 18
The NATO-Led International Security Force (ISAF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Afghan National Army (ANA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Afghan National Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Russia, Central Asian States, and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments . . . . . . 34
FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
World Bank/Asian Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
International Reconstruction Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and
WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

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Residual Issues From Past Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Stinger Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Mine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Security-Related Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table 3. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 5. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 6. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 8. ISAF Contributing Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 10. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Background to Recent Developments
Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani,
Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to
neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929)
launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won
complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi
(August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a
government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King
Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.
Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans
for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and
promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and
hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist
factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms
purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically
opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving
medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control
over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad
Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction.
They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by
redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by
Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into
Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic
militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.
Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the
country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-
Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-
fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against
Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of
natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s
losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the

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CRS-2
reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the
director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai.
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva
Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15,
1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed
its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its
pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991
collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting
communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and
Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.
Afghanistan at a Glance
Population:
31 million (July 2006 est.)
Ethnic Groups:
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen
3%; Baluch 2%; other 4%
Religions:
Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1%
GDP:
$21.5 billion (purchasing power parity)
GDP per capita
$800 (purchasing power parity)
GDP real growth
8% (2005)
Unemployment rate
40% (2005)
Revenues (2005)
$269 million
Expenditures (2005)
$561 million, including $42 million in capital expenditures
External Debt:
$8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. said Feb. 8,
2006, that the $108 million in debt to U.S. would be forgiven.
Major Exports:
fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium
Oil Production
none
Oil Consumption
5 million barrels per day
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to
Afghan government on March 15, 2006
Major Imports:
food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles
Source: CIA World Factbook, August 2006, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and
covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from
1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid
program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per
year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of
Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding.1
1 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from
$300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second
half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State
Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.

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CRS-3
With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed
to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off
a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders who were
nominally his allies. The defectors joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad
Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin
Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the
Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern
Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.2
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties.
The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic
scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, became president during April and May 1992.
Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June
1992 with the understanding that he would serve until December 1994. He refused
to step down, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear
successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions leader,
particularly the nominal “prime minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who accused
Rabbani of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar’s radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami
(Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet
war. Four years of civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban
as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting.
The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students,
many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued
conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic
seminaries (“madrassas”). They were practitioners of an orthodox Sunni Islam called
“Wahhabism,” which is similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was
composed of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan who viewed
the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for civil war.
With the help of defections, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of
Qandahar in November 1994; by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul,
after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995,
the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor,
Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge
in Iran. In September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of
Rabbani and Masud to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of
their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.
Immediately thereafter, Taliban gunmen entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize
Najibullah, his brother, and aides sheltered there, and subsequently hanged them.
Taliban Rule
The Taliban was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who fought (and lost an eye)
in the anti-Soviet war fighting under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party)
2 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul
until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.

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CRS-4
of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the
Faithful,” but he mostly remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar, rarely
appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and refused U.S.
demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar is about 60 years old.
The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed
strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh
punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to
enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and
dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what
many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two
large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, on the grounds that they
represented un-Islamic idolatry.
The Clinton Administration diplomatically engaged the Taliban before and after
it took power, but relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld
recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally
recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad
international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted
Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan
embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban
to end discrimination against women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups
urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in
May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to
recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton
Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan by 1998.3 In April 1998,
then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and
asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7,
1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton
Administration progressively pressured the Taliban on bin Laden, imposing U.S.
sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions against the Taliban. The
Clinton Administration also undertook some reported covert actions against it.4
Clinton Administration officials say that they did not try to oust the Taliban from
power with U.S. military force because domestic U.S. support for those steps was
then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold
U.S. values.
3 For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report
RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.
4 On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged bin Laden-controlled
terrorist training camps in retaliation for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

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The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban
The Taliban’s policies caused many different Afghan factions to ally with the
ousted President Rabbani and Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition,
into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Other components of the Alliance were the
Uzbeks, the Hazara Shiites, and the Pashtun Islamists (see also Table 10 on “Major
Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan”).
! Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major component was the Uzbek
militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. During the U.S.-
led war against the Taliban, Dostam led horse-mounted forces
against fixed Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-
Sharif, leading to the fall of that city and the Taliban’s collapse.
! Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims,
are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are
always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other large ethnic
factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite
grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight
smaller groups).
! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf headed a
Pashtun-dominated mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for
the Liberation of Afghanistan. Even though his ideology is similar
to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance.
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the
Taliban differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy: applying pressure
short of military while retaining dialogue with the Taliban. The Bush
Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance,
although the 9/11 Commission report says that, in the months prior to the September
11 attacks, the Administration was leaning toward such a step. That report adds that
some Administration officials wanted to also assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces and
not just the Northern Alliance; other covert options might have been under
consideration as well.5 In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush
Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan, in part to persuade it to end
support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333,
in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban
representative office in New York, although the Taliban representative continued to
operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received Taliban
foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi to discuss bilateral issues.
5 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles
Times, May 18, 2002.

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CRS-6
Fighting with only some Iranian, Russian, and Indian support, the Northern
Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the
time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country,
including almost all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a
major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks,
when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers
posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad
Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacked Masud’s charisma or undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom. After the
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden. The Administration decided that a
friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces
could capture Al Qaeda activists there. In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the
Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L. 107-40) authorized:6
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or
persons.
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on
October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda
forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S.
special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance
and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines)
moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of
the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between
U.S. and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its
Afghan opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan
militia forces in the war strengthened the militias in the post-war period.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November
9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially
promised U.S. officials they would not enter Kabul — entered the capital on
November 12 to popular celebrations. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and
east to pro-U.S. Pashtun leaders, such as Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban
regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered
Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by
Pashtun leaders such as the Bashir Noorzai brothers. Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan
forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez
(Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against as many as 800 Al Qaeda and
Taliban fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban
or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld said “major combat operations” had ended.
6 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL,
providing $17 million in funding for it for FY2002.

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CRS-7
Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction7
The war paved the way for the success of a decade-long U.N. effort to form a
broad-based Afghan government. The United Nations was viewed as a credible
mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation.
During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many
of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a
traditional assembly, the loya jirga. However, any U.N.-mediated ceasefires between
warring factions always broke down. Non-U.N. initiatives fared no better,
particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in
1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran,
China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Other efforts included
a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and Afghan exile efforts,
including one from the Karzai clan and one centered on former King Zahir Shah.
The Bonn Agreement. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former
U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought back (he had ended his efforts in
frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted
on November 14, 2001, calling for a “central” role for the United Nations in
establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send
peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in
November 2001, the United Nations invited the major Afghan factions, most
prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King — but not the Taliban
— to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the
“Bonn Agreement.”8 It was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385
(December 6, 2001). The agreement included the following provisions:
! Formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the
holding in June 2002 of an emergency loya jirga, which would
choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is
approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004).
Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration,
weighted toward the Northern Alliance with 17 out of 30 of the
positions, including Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanooni). The three ethnic Tajiks,
in their 40s, had been close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud. It was
agreed that, in the interim, Afghanistan would abide by the
constitution of 1964.9
7 More information on some of the issues in this section can be found in CRS Report
RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by Kenneth Katzman. For
an analysis of U.S. reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan, with a focus primarily on
economic reconstruction, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan
Reconstruction, GAO-05-742 (July 2005).
8 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm].
9 The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a
(continued...)

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CRS-8
! Authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security,
at least in Kabul. Northern Alliance forces were directed to
withdraw from Kabul. The agreement also referenced the need to
cooperate with the international community to counter narcotics
trafficking, crime, and terrorism. The international peacekeeping
force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386
(December 20, 2001).
Hamid Karzai
Hamid Karzai, about 50, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he is a credible
Pashtun leader who seeks factional compromise rather than intimidation of his opponents
through armed force. On the other hand, some observers believe him too willing to
compromise with rather than confront regional and other faction leaders, and to tolerate
corruption, resulting in a slower than expected pace of reform and professionalization
of government. He has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan.
Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s
government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the Taliban as
a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and
forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai
entered Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the
Taliban, supported by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts after
Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S.
support and was captured and hung by the Taliban. Some of his several brothers have
lived in the United States, including Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the
September 2005 election. Karzai said in August 2006 he might not run for a second term
in 2009 presidential elections.
Permanent Constitution. An “emergency” loya jirga (June 2002) put a
popular imprimatur on the transition government. Former King Zahir Shah returned
to Afghanistan in April 2002 for the meeting, for which 381 districts of Afghanistan
chose 1,550 delegates, of which about 200 were women. At the assembly, the
former King and Rabbani withdrew their candidacies and Karzai was selected to
remain leader until presidential elections. On its last day (June 19, 2002), the
assembly approved a new cabinet, with a few changes.

Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October
2002, drafted the permanent constitution and unveiled in November 2003. It was
debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya
jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by
Mojadeddi (mentioned above), ended with approval of the constitution with only
minor changes from the draft. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance
9 (...continued)
constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that
gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.

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CRS-9
factions and their allies did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the
presidency by setting up a prime minister-ship. However, major powers were given
to an elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and the
ability to impeach a president.
National Elections. The October 9, 2004 presidential voting was orderly and
turnout heavy (about 80%). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner
(55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a
runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were intended for April-May
2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in
confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for
the district councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, were
put off until later in 2006. (No date is set for these elections.)
Parliamentary results were delayed until November 12, 2005, because of the
need to examine 2,000 fraud complaints. Even though many believe the Karzai
supporters are a slight majority of the parliament, when it convened on December
18, the Northern Alliance bloc, joined by others, engineered selection of former
Karzai presidential election rival Qanooni for speaker of the lower house. Qanooni
subsequently said he would work cooperatively with Karzai; the role of “opposition
leader” was subsequently taken up by Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani,
who won a seat, although Rabbani told CRS in Kabul in March 2006 that he supports
“reform” and not opposition to Karzai. The 102-seat upper house, selected by the
provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known figures, as well
as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution).
The leader of that body is Mojadeddi, who was slightly injured in a bombing of his
convoy in March 2006.
The new parliament has asserted itself in the process of confirming a post-
election cabinet, deciding to confirm each nominee individually. After much debate,
on April 20, 2006, the parliament confirmed 20 out of the 25 nominated. The five
not confirmed were those perceived as at odds with Islamic conservatives in the new
parliament or those who had been perceived as poor performers as incumbents. The
parliament subsequently began a review of Karzai’s nine appointees to the Supreme
Court, confirming only two and voting down the remainder, including the re-
nominated 70-year old conservative Chief Justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari. Replacement
choices were subsequently approved and sworn in in August 2006; the new Chief
Justice is U.S.-educated Abdul Salam Azimi. Parliament also voted down Karzai’s
first proposed budget on the grounds that it did not raise civil service salaries enough.
Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition
The political transition has proceeded and Karzai’s government is slowly
expanding its writ in some regions, but Afghanistan continues to face challenges
beyond the ongoing insurgency discussed later. A Washington Post report on June
26, 2006, said that public confidence in Karzai, and the confidence in him on the part
of some European nations that contribute forces to Afghanistan, is also waning
because of government corruption and a lack of protection from robberies and other
crimes, as well as some recent decisions that conflict with comprehensive reform,

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CRS-10
discussed below. Secretary of State Rice subsequently rebutted the criticism of
Karzai.
Strengthening Central Government. A key part of the U.S. stabilization
effort is to build the capacity of the Afghan government, an objective that appears to
be making only slow progress, particularly in the southern provinces. Over the past
year, the commander of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Carl Eikenberry, has
worked to extend Afghan government authority by conducting visits to all provinces
along with Afghan ministers to determine local needs and demonstrate the ability of
the central government to act. As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for
Karzai, the Administration has maintained a pattern of senior visits. Vice President
Cheney attended Karzai’s inauguration in December 2004. In March 2005, First
Lady Laura Bush visited. President Bush made his first visit on March 1, 2006.
The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to build
democratic traditions at the local level. At the local level, an Afghan government
“National Solidarity Program” seeks to create and empower local governing councils
to prioritize local reconstruction projects. Elections to these local councils have been
held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected have been women.10
Observers in Kabul told CRS in March 2006 that the program is viewed as a success.
U.S. Embassy Operations and Funding. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American
of Afghan origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, became
ambassador in December 2003, and he reportedly had significant influence on
Afghan government decisions and factional reconciliation.11 Ambassador Ronald
Neumann replaced him in August 2005. To assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and
coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in 2004 the State Department created an
Office of Afghanistan Affairs, now headed by Ambassador Maureen Quinn. As part
of a 2003 U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration formed
a 15-person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy
in Kabul, to serve as additional advisors to the Afghan government. However,
observers in Kabul say the group, now mostly focused on helping Afghanistan attract
private investment, is phasing out.
The U.S. embassy, now housed in a newly constructed building, has expanded
its personnel and facilities to help accelerate the reconstruction process. The tables
at the end of this paper discuss U.S. funding for Embassy operations and Karzai
protection, which is now led by Afghan forces. An FY2006 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides a requested $50 million for security costs to
protect U.S. facilities and personnel.
Curbing Regional Strongmen and Militias. Karzai, as well as numerous
private studies and U.S. official statements, have cited regional and factional militias
10 Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.”
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004.
11 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times,
April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly
a Karzai aide.

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CRS-11
as a major threat to Afghan stability because of their arbitrary administration of
justice and generation of popular resentment. Some of these local militias have been
accused of past human rights abuses in a report released in July 2005 by the
“Afghanistan Justice Project.12 Some argue that Afghans have always sought
substantial regional autonomy, but others say that easily purchased arms and
manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking, sustains the local militias.
Suggesting that Karzai believes some militias can play a useful role in filling
security gaps, in June 2006 he said he was authorizing arming some local tribal
militias (arbokai) to help in local policing. Karzai said his assessment was that these
militias would provide security and be loyal to the nation and central government and
that arming them is not inconsistent with the disarmament programs discussed below.
Karzai has succeeded in marginalizing some major regional leaders. Herat
governor Ismail Khan was removed by Karzai in September 2004 and was later
appointed Minister of Water and Energy. On the other hand, he was tapped by
Karzai to help calm Herat after Sunni-Shiite clashes there in February 2006, clashes
that some in Kabul believe were stoked by Khan himself to demonstrate his
continued influence in Herat. Dostam (see above) was appointed Karzai’s top
military advisor, and in April 2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli
faction. In July 2004, Karzai removed charismatic Northern Alliance commander
Atta Mohammad from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area, appointing him
as governor of Balkh province. Afghan parliamentarians told CRS in February 2006
that Atta had purged several Balkh government officials for alleged narcotics
trafficking involvement. Two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and
Khan Mohammad (Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts; Hazrat
Ali was subsequently elected to parliament. Karzai has tried to appoint some
relatively young, pro-government technocrats in key governorships instead of local
strongmen; two examples are Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid and Paktika
governor Muhammad Akram Khapalwak.
As noted above, former Defense Minister Fahim was appointed by Karzai to the
upper house of parliament. The move gives him a stake in the political process and
reduces his potential to activate Northern Alliance militia loyalists. Fahim has also
turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces as of January
2005 (including four Scud missiles).
DDR and DIAG Programs. A cornerstone of the effort to curb regionalism
was a program, run by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
(UNAMA, whose mandate was extended until March 2007 by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1662 of March 23, 2006), to dismantle identified and illegal militias. The
program, which formally concluded on June 30, 2006, was the “DDR” program:
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The program was run in
partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with participation of the United States.
The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not
enact mandated reforms (primarily reduction of the number of Tajiks in senior
12 See [http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org].

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CRS-12
positions) by the targeted July 1, 2003, date. In September 2003, Karzai acted on the
issue, replacing 22 senior Tajik Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks,
and Hazaras.
The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters,
although that figure was later dropped to just over 60,000 by Afghan officials.
According to UNAMA, a total of 63,380 militia fighters were disarmed by the end
of the program. Of those, 55,800 exercised reintegration options provided by the
program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options, although U.N.
officials say about 25% of these have thus far found long-term, sustainable jobs. The
total cost of the program was $141 million, funded by Japan and other donors,
including the United States. Some studies have criticized the DDR program for
failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of
weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United
States and its partners.13
Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons.
According to UNAMA, at least 36,000 medium and light weapons were collected;
of these, 13,400 pieces have been transferred to the ANA. In addition, about 11,000
heavy weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces) were
collected, nearly all of the heavy weapons believed controlled by militia forces.
However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons were collected.
Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program
called “DIAG,” Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan
Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. The
program seeks to disarm, by December 2007, a pool of as many as 120,000 members
of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of
recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the rolls
of the Defense Ministry. However, UNAMA officials told CRS in Kabul in March
2006 that only “several hundred” groups (five or more fighters) are of sufficient
concern to merit disarmament efforts. As of August 2006, over 22,000 weapons had
been collected from these militia fighters, according to UNAMA.
Kapisa Province is considered a model for the program because 37 commanders
believed receptive to disarmament attended a ceremony to formally inaugurate the
DIAG program on May 1, 2006. Other provinces believed receptive are Takhar and
Herat; some commanders in Khost, which has sometimes been restive, agreed to
disarm under the program in March 2006. No payments are available to fighters
disarmed under the program, and the program depends on persuasion and negotiation
rather than direct use of force against the illegal groups. DIAG is not as well funded
as is DDR: thus far the program has received $11 million in operating funds. As an
incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors are making available $35 million
for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded.
13 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization
and Rearmament?, June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament
%20demobilization%20 rearmament.pdf].

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CRS-13
Combating Narcotics Trafficking.14 Narcotics trafficking is regarded by
some as the most significant problem facing Afghanistan, generating funds to sustain
local militias, Taliban and other insurgents, and criminal groups. Narcotics account
for an estimated $2.7 billion in value — nearly half of Afghanistan’s GDP. Since
late 2004, Karzai has called on Afghans to join a “jihad” against the opium trade and,
in relatively pessimistic comments on August 22, 2006, called for a focus on funding
alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from growing and on targeting key
traffickers, rather than on eradication of poppy fields. His statement reflected
setbacks from a November 2005 study by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) and the Afghan Counternarcotics Directorate; that report said that the area
devoted to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had dropped 21% over the past
year. Unofficial projections reported in August 2006 — in advance of a UNODC
assessment for 2006 — said that the area under cultivation grew 40% in 2006 to
370,000 acres. Some farmers say they have not been given the assistance promised
to them in exchange for declining to grow poppies.
To try to add effectiveness to the U.S. program, the U.S. military has overcome
its initial reluctance to expand its mission in Afghanistan and is now playing a greater
role in counter-narcotics. It is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug
Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates
casualties from any counter-drug operations. The Bush Administration also has
taken some legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers; 15 in April 2005,
a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker,
Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York. Alleged trafficker Baz
Mohammad was extradited from Afghanistan in October 2005. NATO commanders,
who are taking over security responsibilities in southern Afghanistan including the
large poppy growing Helmand province, say they will provide information to Afghan
counter-narcotics officials to help them target their efforts and increasingly target
operations against large drug traffickers.
The Bush Administration has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of
countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to
international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics
measures set forth in U.S. law.16 However, the Administration also has not, to date,
made a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that is required to provide
more than $225 million in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan (FY2006 funds). Narcotics
trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much
of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy
cultivation, which the U.N. International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said in
14 For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686,
Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
15 Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters,
November 2, 2004.
16 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every
year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug
trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.

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CRS-14
February 2001 had dramatically decreased cultivation.17 The Northern Alliance did
not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled.
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy. U.S. and Afghan
officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy
ravaged by war and lack of investment. U.S. economic reconstruction efforts are
showing some results, including roads and education and health facilities constructed.
International investors have returned to some extent, and there is substantial new
construction, such as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005.
However, the United States has not met all its reconstruction targets, according to a
July 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office.18 The five-year
development strategy outlined in the “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at the January
31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan re-states that the sectors
discussed below are priorities.
U.S. funding decisions reflect U.S. efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan. The
FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) appropriated $1.086 billion in ESF out of the
$1.3 billion in ESF requested for reconstruction projects. The FY2006 regular
foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102) contained about $620 million for civilian
sector reconstruction. Of that amount, according to USAID, a total of $405.8 million
is budgeted for FY2006 for infrastructure, agriculture, health, and education. The
FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provides the requested $43 million in requested
ESF for reconstruction, including $11 million to write off Afghanistan’s debt.
FY2007 appropriations are discussed at the end of the paper. Some sector-related
earmarks are discussed below.
! Roads. U.S. Ambassador Neumann told CRS in February 2006 that
expanding road building is a major U.S. priority to expand the writ
of the Afghan government and build a viable legitimate economy.
Some projects have been completed, such as the Kabul-Qandahar
roadway project (Phase I, completed December 2003, and Phase II,
completed November 2004). The Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded
by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, was largely
completed in late 2005. U.S.-funded ($16 million) work began on
July 5, 2006 for a road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul; it is
scheduled for completion in December 2006. On September 27,
2005, a $20 million road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, built by
U.S. military personnel, was inaugurated. A new U.S. focus is a
Khowst-Gardez road and roads in Badakhshan Province.
! Education and Health. According to U.S. officials, 5.2 million
Afghan children are now in school — up from only 800,000 in 2001
17 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New
York Times, February 7, 2001.
18 Numerous other examples of U.S. economic reconstruction initiatives are analyzed in a
General Accounting Office (GAO) report: Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some
Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement
of U.S. Goals, GAO Report GAO-05-742, July 2005.

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CRS-15
— and girls’ attendance is up sharply. About 525,000 girls were
enrolled in school during 2005, according to UNAMA. However,
those in school still represent only about half of the total Afghan
child population. Additional work is being conducted on school and
health clinic rebuilding (278 schools and 326 clinics have been built
thus far, according to Ambassador Quinn on September 22, 2005).
About $152 million in U.S. funds were programmed for
Afghanistan education during FY2003-FY2005. The Senate version
of FY2007 appropriations measure (H.R. 5522, S.Rept. 109-277)
earmarks $81 million for Afghanistan education in FY2007. Press
reports say that some projects are going uncompleted; a Washington
Post report of November 20, 2005, says that of 1,000 U.S.-funded
health clinics and schools to be built by the end of 2004 at a cost of
$73 million, only about 150 have been completed by November
2005, mostly refurbishing existing buildings. Egypt operates a 65-
person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan
physicians. Jordan operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
! Agriculture. According to the director of the USAID mission at
U.S. Embassy Kabul in December 2005, USAID has helped
Afghanistan double its agricultural output over the past four years.
Afghan officials say agricultural assistance and development should
be a top U.S. priority as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate
alternatives to poppy cultivation. The FY2006 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides a requested $5 million for
agriculture development. The Senate version of H.R. 5522 (FY2007
foreign aid appropriation) recommends $20 million in ESF for
Afghan agriculture assistance.
! Electricity. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for
electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in
rural areas by 2010. Currently, only about 10% of Afghans have
access to electricity, and press reports say that there are severe power
shortages in Kabul, partly because the city population has swelled to
nearly 4 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in
power. The government plans to import electricity from Central
Asian neighbors beginning in 2009 to help address the shortages.
The FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provides most of the $28
million requested for key electricity projects (Northeast
Transmission Project).
Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices.
Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban.
The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to
meet and organize freely, but there are also abuses based on ethnicity or political
factionalism and arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders, according to the
State Department report on human rights practices for 2005 (released March 8,

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CRS-16
2006).19 According to the report, “The lack of an effective police force, poor
infrastructure and communications, instability, and insecurity hampered
investigations of unlawful killings, bombings, or civilian deaths...” The State
Department International Religious Freedom report for 2005 (released November 8,
2005) supports accounts of progress but says there continues to be discrimination
against the Shiite (Hazara) minority. Some observers are likely to be disappointed
by Karzai’s decision to reconstitute a “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the
Suppression of Vice,” although Karzai says it would not abuse individual rights but
rather promote moral behavior and seek to discredit alcohol, drugs, and corruption.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom said in a report
released in May 2006 that there is rising religious persecution, a judgment that is
consistent with observations of other experts. Some observers have noted that the
government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule,
including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law.20 A major
religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan
man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working
for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death
penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international
pressure that the trial would undercut the new Afghan constitution’s commitment to
international standards of human rights protections, President Karzai apparently
prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him on March 29, 2006; he
subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His release came the same day
the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government to protect Afghan
converts from prosecution. Another case that demonstrated judicial conservatism on
religious matters was the October 2005 Afghan Supreme Court conviction of a male
journalist, Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s Rights” magazine), of
blasphemy; he was sentenced to two years in prison for his articles about apostasy.
A Kabul court reduced his sentence to time served and he was freed in December
2005, easing concerns.
Some have blamed the Afghan religious freedom record on the former chief
justice of the Afghan Supreme Court, Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative
who was appointed in late November 2001 by Rabbani (who was temporarily in
charge in Kabul before Karzai took office). His replacement in August 2006 by a
reform-minded chief justice (see above) might accelerate judicial reform.
U.S. programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system,
including police training and court construction; many of these programs are
conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial
reform. The United States has trained over 500 judges, according to USAID, and it
trains prosecutors and court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of
the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court.
An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) has been formed
to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department
19 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61704.htm].
20 Shea, Nina. “Sharia in Kabul?” National Review, October 28, 2002.

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CRS-17
reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. It is headed by former Women’s
Affairs minister Sima Samar.
Funding Issues. USAID plans to spend $149.237 million on democracy and
rule of law programs for FY2004-FY2007, composed of $105.292 million in ESF
and $43.945 million in DA. Of these funds, about $84 million has gone to support
the national elections in 2004 and 2005. The funding includes support for the new
parliament, civil society programs, political party strengthening, media freedom, rule
of law programs, and local governance.
Advancement of Women. According to State Department report, the
Afghan government is promoting the advancement of women, but numerous abuses
continue, primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. The first
major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry
of Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights. It promoted the
involvement of women in business ventures, and it has promoted interpretations of
the Quran that favor participation of women in national affairs. There were three
female ministers in the 2004-2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda
Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa Balkhi (Minister for Martyrs and the
Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). However, Karzai proposed only
one (Minister of Women’s Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the new cabinet and she was
voted down by opposition from Islamist conservatives in parliament. In March 2005,
Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as
governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted above, the
constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of
parliament, and several prominent women have won seats in the new parliament,
including some who would have won even if there were no set-aside for women.
More generally, women are performing some jobs, such as construction work,
that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996,
including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly
learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it
than was the case a few years ago.
The Administration and Congress are taking a continued interest in the
treatment of women in Afghanistan, and U.S. officials have had some influence in
persuading the government to codify women’s rights. After the Karzai government
took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan
Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s
visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United
States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women,
including women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs.
Funding Issues. Recent congressional action includes the following.
! On November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House
unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children

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Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The law (signed
December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of
supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the
Office of the President a $40 billion Emergency Response Fund to
respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks)21 to fund educational
and health programs for Afghan women and children.
! Subsequent appropriations for programs for women and girls are
contained in the tables at the end of this paper. The Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) authorized $15
million per year (FY2003-2006) for the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs. Recent appropriations have required that about $50 million
per year, from various accounts, be used specifically to support
programs and organizations that benefit Afghan women and girls.
Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building
The top security priority of the Administration has been to prevent Al Qaeda
and Taliban from regrouping there and posing a challenge to the Afghan government.
The pillars of the U.S. security effort are (1) combat operations by U.S. and other
coalition forces in Afghanistan; (2) peacekeeping by a NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) U.S. and NATO expansion of “provincial
reconstruction teams” (PRTs); and (4) the equipping and training of an Afghan
National Army and a police force.
Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 23,000
troops in Afghanistan — an increase from the 19,000 there in 2005 — in response
to a 2006 upsurge of Taliban attacks primarily in southern Afghanistan. In
conjunction with the assumption of greater NATO/ISAF responsibility in 2006, U.S.
officials had planned for a reduction of U.S. forces to about 16,500 later in 2006, but
those plans might now be on hold. The commander of U.S.-led combat forces in
Afghanistan is Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry (as of May 3, 2005, replacing Lt. Gen David
Barno), who heads the “Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A),”
headquartered at Camp Eggers, near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The operational
commander is Maj. Gen. Benjamin Freakley.
Nineteen coalition countries — primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy —
have been contributing another approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF, although
some of these forces are being “re-badged” to the expanded NATO-led ISAF
mission. As part of OEF, French combat aircraft are again flying strikes (after a
hiatus during November 2005-May 2006) from Bagram air base north of Kabul,
Tajikistan, and Qatar as part of the “Combined Air Operations Center.” Japan
provides naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea. Italy is now leading the
OEF-related naval mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea; the mission is designed
21 For more information on how the appropriated funds were distributed and used, see CRS
Report RL31173, Combating Terrorism: First Emergency Supplemental Appropriations-
Distribution of Funds to Departments and Agencies, by James R. Riehl.

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CRS-19
to prevent the movement of terrorists from Afghanistan/Pakistan to the Arabian
peninsula. This naval operation had been led by the United States out of its naval
headquarters based in Bahrain.
During 2001-2005, U.S. forces, along with Afghan troops, continued on the
offensive against insurgents but at a relatively low pace in response to low levels of
Taliban insurgent violence. The United States and Afghanistan conducted
“Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December
2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in
and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar; “Operation
Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil
(Elephant)” in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan (October 2005).
In 2006, Taliban-led insurgents, in some cases mimicking suicide and roadside
bombing tactics used in the Iraq insurgency, have stepped up their operations in
Afghanistan, particularly in Uruzgan, Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces.
These are the areas that NATO countries assumed responsibility for on July 31,
2006. In response, in June 2006, U.S. and NATO/ISAF forces began Operation
Mountain Lion in Kunar province (eastern Afghanistan) and Operation Mountain
Thrust (10,000 total forces involved) in Helmand, Uruzgan, and Qandahar. The
operation, which formally ended July 31 and resulted in the purported death of over
700 Taliban fighters, sometimes faced Taliban formations of several hundred
fighters, such as the Taliban group that took over Panjwai district in May 2006. The
upsurge of violence has led to U.S. military comments that the Taliban is “growing
in influence” in the south. Some attribute the stepped-up attacks to a reinforcement
of the Taliban insurgents by Al Qaeda militants who cross the border from Pakistan,
while others believe the cause is popular disappointment at the slow pace of
development and the lack of Afghan government capacity in these regions. Some
reports indicate that the insurgents, under pressure in the south, are moving into other
provinces, including Ghazni and Farah, which have seen increased violence in July-
August 2006.
The Taliban insurgent command structure apparently is still intact. In addition
to Mullah Umar, several key commanders remain at large: Jalaludin Haqqani (who
some believe heads a completely separate insurgent faction, operating around Khost),
Mullah Akhtar Usmani, and the purportedly ruthless Mullah Dadullah. In April
2005, Taliban remnants started a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,”
suggesting the movement still has substantial resources. On the other hand, in early
October 2005, Pakistan arrested and subsequently extradited to Afghanistan the
Taliban’s chief “spokesman,” Abdul Latif Hakimi.
The Afghan government asserts that Taliban and other insurgents have incited
recent riots against the United States and NATO-led forces. Such riots took place in
January and February 2006 over the Danish publication of cartoons unflatteringly
depicting the Prophet Mohammad. Afghan officials also blamed Taliban agitators
for inciting rioting on May 29, 2006, after a U.S. convoy killed some Afghan
civilians in a traffic accident. On the other hand, the May 2006 riot might have been
partly prompted by the unintended death of Afghan civilians during U.S. air strikes
on Taliban positions earlier in the month. Others said the demonstrators were

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CRS-20
supporters of the Northern Alliance, perhaps angry that the Alliance has been largely
marginalized in the cabinet.
Several Taliban militants have renounced their past and joined the political
process under Karzai’s offers of amnesty. According to press reports, about 50-60
militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the
reconciliation process, headed by Mojadeddi. Another Taliban figure, its former
ambassador to Pakistan, was released by U.S. forces in September 2005. As noted
above, several Taliban figures, including its foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil,
ran in the parliamentary elections. Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban
leadership would not be eligible for amnesty.
The Hunt for Al Qaeda and Other Militants. U.S. Special Operations
Forces in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan) continue to hunt for bin Laden and his close
ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive
against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December
2001.22 The two are now widely believed to be on Pakistan’s side of the border,
although Karzai said on June 21, 2006, that Zawahiri might be in Afghanistan and
should be arrested. The comment came after a tape of Zawahiri was released in
which he called for an uprising in Kabul following the May 29 riots discussed above.
On July 30, 2006, U.S. forces reportedly detained four suspected Al Qaeda operatives
in eastern Afghanistan, suggesting that some Al Qaeda fighters might still be fighting
or grouping there.
Another target of OEF is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG)
allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. On February 19, 2003, the U.S.
government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global
Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial
and other U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist
Organization,” but it is included in the section on “other terrorist groups” in the State
Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004, released April 2005. Some
accounts suggest that a Special Operations team ambushed in June 2005 might have
been searching for Hikmatyar; a U.S. helicopter sent to rescue the team was shot
down, killing the 16 aboard. U.S.-led OEF combat operations in July-August 2006
in Kunar province and other parts of eastern Afghanistan have reportedly been
directed against HIG fighters there; Hikmatyar’s power base was in that area of
Afghanistan.
Longer Term U.S. Military Presence. Even if the Taliban insurgency is
defeated, Afghan leaders say they want the United States to maintain a long-term
presence in Afghanistan, an outcome that U.S. officials have not committed to that
proposal. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a national
consultation in Kabul on whether Afghanistan should host permanent U.S. bases.
Delegates reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to
maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and
President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access
22 For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report
RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.

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CRS-21
to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international
terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give
Karzai his requested increased control over facilities used by the U.S. forces, over
U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations.
Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that are used in support of
OEF, and numbers of troops in surrounding countries, include the following.
! Bagram Air Base. This base, north of Kabul, is the operational hub
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.23 At least 500 U.S. military
personnel are based there. Bagram, along with thirteen other
airfields in Afghanistan, handles the 150 U.S. aircraft (including
helicopters) in the country and substantial infrastructure is being
added to it. A hospital is being constructed on the facility; one of
the first permanent structures to be built there. The FY2005
supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides a total of about $52 million for
various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control
tower and an operations center, and the FY2006 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $20 million for military
construction there. It is expected that NATO will be using the base
in conjunction with increased NATO security responsibilities in
Afghanistan, and NATO might share operational costs for it.
! Qandahar Airfield. This airfield, just outside Qandahar, bases about
500 U.S. military personnel. The FY2005 supplemental provided
$16 million for an ammunition supply facility at Qandahar.
! Shindand Air Base. This base is 20 miles from the Iranian border.
It has been used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft since October
2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, whose
forces controlled the facility.
! Karshi-Khanabad Airbase. This Uzbekistan base housed about
1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450
civilian) in supply missions to Afghanistan. U.S. forces ceased
using it in September 2005, following deterioration in U.S.-
Uzbekistan relations over the May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest
in Andijon.
! Peter Ganci Base, Kyrgyzstan. This base at Manas airport has about
1,100 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft.
Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising
against President Askar Akayev, but senior U.S. officials reportedly
received assurances about continued U.S. use of the base from the
new President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. However, in February 2006,
Bakiyev said the United States should pay $200 million per year to
23 Harris, Kent. “Buildings Going Up at Bagram Air Base as U.S. Forces Dig In for the
Long Haul.” Stars and Stripes, March 15, 2005.

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CRS-22
use the facility instead of the $2 million it now pays. In July 2006,
the dispute was resolved with a U.S. agreement to give Kyrgyzstan
$150 million in assistance and base use payments over the coming
year, pending congressional approval.
! Persian Gulf Bases. Several bases in the Persian Gulf are used to
support the Afghanistan mission, including Al Dhafra in the UAE
(about 1,800 U.S. military personnel in UAE) and Al Udeid in Qatar
(10,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar). P.L. 109-13 appropriates $1.4
million to upgrade Al Dhafra. As noted above, military facilities in
Bahrain house U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF and Iraq-
related naval operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.
(About 5,100 U.S. military personnel are in Bahrain.)
! Incirlik Air Base. On April 21, 2005, Turkey said it would extend
for another year an agreement allowing the United States to use
Incirlik air base to supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(About 2,100 U.S. military personnel are in Turkey.)
OEF Costs and Casualties. As of August 23, 2006, 329 U.S. military
personnel have been killed in OEF-Afghanistan, including one DOD civilian. In
2005, 90 U.S. soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, double the 2004 number. No
reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been
announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan civilian deaths generally cite
figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in
Afghanistan appear to be relatively stable at about $1 billion per month.
Supplemental FY2005 funds for Afghanistan combat were provided in P.L. 108-287
and P.L. 109-13, and additional military operations funds were provided in the
FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234). For information on U.S. military costs, see
CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Enhanced Base Security
Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
The NATO-Led International Security Force (ISAF).24 As discussed
above, international forces are assuming from the United States a greater share of the
security burden, although NATO nations generally see their role primarily as
peacekeeping and promoting reconstruction. The Bonn Agreement and U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) created an international
peacekeeping force for Afghanistan: the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF).25 ISAF was initially limited to Kabul but broadened with NATO’s takeover
of command of ISAF (August 2003) and NATO/ISAF’s assumption of control over
24 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to
OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF.
25 Its mandate was extended on September 13, 2005, until October 2006 (U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1623).

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CRS-23
additional provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in northern and western
Afghanistan (Stage 1 in 2004 and Stage 2 in 2005, respectively).26
The process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this
Stage 3, a British/Canadian/Dutch-led 8,000 person “Regional Command South” has
been formed, led by Britain’s Lt. Gen. David Richards, who heads “ISAF 9.” Britain
is deploying about 4,200 troops (a 900-person increase from original plans,
announced in July 2006); Canada 2,300; and the Netherlands 1,700. About 4,000
U.S. troops will be participating in this force in the south, serving under NATO/ISAF
command. British commanders say they want to get back to the reconstruction
mission in the south following the intense anti-insurgency combat of July-August
2006. NATO officials said on August 15, 2006, that they will soon sign an agreement
with Afghanistan to formalize the NATO presence in Afghanistan and stipulate 15
initiatives to secure Afghanistan and rebuild its security forces.
In conjunction with the restructuring, NATO/ISAF force levels are increasing
to over 18,000 from the 2005 levels of about 12,000. NATO is expected to announce
a timetable for the NATO/ISAF takeover of eastern Afghanistan (Stage 4) at the
NATO summit in November 2006. U.S. military officials in Kabul told CRS in
February 2006 that once the transition is completed, OEF might technically cease
and CFC-A might close. While OEF remains, NATO has agreed on a formula under
which a deputy commander of ISAF would be “dual-hatted” — commanding the
OEF combat mission as well reporting to the ISAF command structure. (During
2002-2004, ISAF’s force was about 6,400 troops from all 26 NATO countries, plus
10 non-NATO nations.) Table 8 lists each contributing country to ISAF and the
approximate number of forces contributed.
The NATO takeover in the south represents a quieting of the initial opposition
of European NATO nations to mixing reconstruction-related peacekeeping with anti-
insurgent combat. Afghan and some U.S. officials have privately questioned the
resolve of NATO nations to combat the Taliban resurgence, although U.S. officials
have tried to reassure Afghan leaders that U.S. forces will still be operating in sectors
controlled by NATO/ISAF. In December 2005, NATO adopted rules of engagement
that allow NATO/ISAF forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as
aggressively as the combat conducted by the U.S.-led OEF forces. Some in the
Dutch parliament opposed their country’s deployment, but the parliament voted on
February 3, 2006, to permit the move. On May 17, 2006, despite recent deaths of
Canadian forces in Qandahar, Canada’s House of Commons voted to keep Canadian
soldiers in Afghanistan until at least 2009.
One source of the official Afghan nervousness about the transition is that
NATO has had chronic personnel and equipment shortages for the Afghanistan
26 In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities,
contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after
Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the
city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003)
formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul.

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CRS-24
mission. Those shortages eased somewhat in December 2003 when NATO identified
additional equipment for ISAF operations, including 12 helicopters from Germany,
the Netherlands, and Turkey; and aircraft and infantry from various nations. In
connection with their increased responsibilities as of July 2006, Britain has brought
in additional equipment, including Apache attack helicopters, and the Netherlands
is deploying additional Apache helicopter and F-16 aircraft to help protect its forces
in the south. Italy is reportedly sending “Predator” unmanned aerial vehicles,
helicopters, and six AMX fighter-bomber aircraft.27
The core of NATO/ISAF is the Kabul Multinational Brigade (4,400 personnel),
which was headed by Canada until August 2004, then by the “Eurocorps,” a rapid
response force composed of forces from France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and
Luxembourg. Turkey took over the lead force role in February 2005, and Italy was
lead during August 2005-May 2006. Britain then took over the lead. At the
headquarters level, there are 600 personnel from 15 contributing nations. ISAF
coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists
the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul
International Airport (where Dutch combat aircraft also are located).
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). NATO/ISAF expansion in
Afghanistan builds on a December 2002 U.S. initiative to establish provincial
reconstruction teams (PRTs) — military-run enclaves that provide safe havens for
international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the
Kabul government. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes to
coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs focus mostly
on counter-insurgency. Each U.S.-run PRT is composed of U.S. forces (50-100 U.S.
military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of
USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior
Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have
personnel to train Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in restive regions are
“co-located” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops. (One
U.S.-run PRT is under NATO auspices.)
Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began,
fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.28 However, other relief
groups do not want to associate with military force because doing so might taint their
perceived neutrality. Plans are to eventually establish PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s
34 provinces. The list of PRTs, including lead country, is shown in Table 9.
In conjunction with broadening NATO security responsibilities, the United
States is progressively turning over PRTs to its partners. In August 2005, in
preparation for the establishment of Regional Command South, Canada took over
the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain took over the PRT at
Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province. The Netherlands has taken over the PRT
27 Kington, Tom. Italy Could Send UAVs, Helos to Afghanistan. Defense News, June 19,
2006.
28 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times,
April 11, 2003.

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CRS-25
at Tarin Kowt, capital of restive Uruzgan Province, home province of Mullah Umar.
As noted above, Italy (with Spain), through their PRTs, now have primary control for
western Afghanistan. Germany (with Turkey and France) has taken over the PRTs
and the leadership role in the north from Britain as Britain has deployed to the south.
Some other countries, including Turkey, are considering taking over other PRTs.
U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in February 2006 that there is a move to turn over
the lead in the PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State
Department or USAID officials. That process began in early 2006 with the
establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley.
U.S. funds support PRT reconstruction projects. USAID has allocated about
$83 million on PRT “quick impact programs from FY2005 funds. It plans to
allocate $37 million for these programs in FY2006. Appropriations for this function
are noted in the tables at the end of this paper.
Afghan National Army (ANA). U.S. forces (“Office of Security Cooperation
Afghanistan,” OSC-A), in partnership with French, British, and other forces, are
training the new ANA. As of July 2006, the ANA numbers about 33,000 troops in
40 battalions, (5 Corps) of which 24 are combat battalions. That is about half its
total target strength of 70,000 that it is expected to reach by 2010. The target level
was reiterated in the Afghanistan Compact adopted in London on February 1, 2006,
although some observers believe the goal might be scaled back to 50,000 because of
the sustainment costs to the Afghan government. Afghanistan’s Defense Minister
says that even 70,000 is highly inadequate and believes that the target size should be
at least 150,000. Gen. Bob Durbin is the commander of the Combined Security
Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the entity that is building the ANA; he
says that the ANA is growing by about 1,000 per month.29 The United States has
built four regional bases for it (Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif).
The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers. Coalition
officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the
“Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. Fully trained recruits are paid
about $70 per month; generals receive about $530 per month. The FY2005 foreign
aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that ANA recruits be
vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug
trafficking.
The ANA is earning mixed reviews. Some U.S. and allied officers say that,
with the help of its embedded U.S. trainers (ten to twenty U.S. embeds per battalion),
the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol.
The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and
to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city.
It deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005
Pakistan earthquake. It is increasingly able to conduct its own battalion-strength
operations, according to U.S. officers.
29 DOD News Briefing With Major General Durbin. July 13, 2006.

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CRS-26
Other officers report continuing personnel (desertion, absentee) problems, ill
discipline, and drug abuse, although some concerns have been addressed. At the time
the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures
reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base.
Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S.
officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better
pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically
integrated in each unit. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense
Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in
that position in the cabinet confirmed April 2006). The chief of staff is Gen.
Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander; he visited the
United States in October 2005. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits
take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then
return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according to U.S. observers, often
refuse to serve far from their home towns.
An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior
to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has
about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. Russia
overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain. In
May 2005, representatives of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said
the United States is considering obtaining for Afghanistan additional transport planes
and helicopters, although the equipment might not necessarily be U.S. equipment,
according to DSCA. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. Afghanistan is
seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in
Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan.
ANA Armament. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue
to plague the ANA. Few soldiers have helmets, many have no armored vehicles or
armor. In July 2006, the Administration announced it would be drawing down about
$2 billion worth of equipment for transfer to the ANA over the next 12 to 18 months.
To date, weaponry for the ANA has come primarily from Defense Ministry weapons
stocks, from international donors, primarily the former East bloc,30 and from the
DDR program discussed above. In October 2005, Russia announced it would give
the ANA four helicopters and other non-lethal military aid and equipment; it has
already provided about $100 million in military aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Egypt has made two major shipments of weapons to the ANA containing 17,000
small arms.
Afghan National Police. Some Afghan officials believe that building up a
credible and capable national police force is at least as important to combating the
Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. Some Afghans do not believe the ANA
should have a role in maintaining internal security, and that this should be the role
of the police. The United States and Germany are training the Afghan National
Police (ANP) force. The U.S. effort has been led by State Department/INL, primarily
through a contract with DynCorp, but the Defense Department is beginning to play
30 Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July
22, 2003.

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CRS-27
a role in that effort, particularly in “police reform.” About 62,000 ANP are on duty,
of which 58,000 are trained and 37,000 are both trained and equipped, according to
CSTC-A on July 13, 2006. To address equipment shortages, CSTC-A said on July
13, 2006, that the ANP will soon receive 8,000 new vehicles and thousands of new
weapons of all types.
Some governments criticized Karzai for setting back police reform in June 2006
when he approved a new list of senior police commanders that included 11 (out of
86 total) who had failed merit exams. His approval of the 11 were reportedly to
satisfy faction leaders and went against the recommendations of a police reform
committee. There are seven police training centers around Afghanistan, which
includes training in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts.
However, the ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them
in local factional or ethnic disputes. The June 2005 GAO report, cited above, notes
progress and continued problems, including the continued influence of local leaders
on the national police.
The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry
to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities.
According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the
first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police
of Afghanistan. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol
forces (which are included in the figures cited above).
U.S. Security Forces Funding. U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover ANA salaries. Recent appropriations for
the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this paper. As noted in
the table, the security forces funding has shifted to DOD funds instead of assistance
funds controlled by the State Department. In addition:
! The FY2006 supplemental requested in February 2006 asked $2.197
billion in additional DOD funding to equip and train the Afghan
security forces, including ANA and ANP. The law as passed (P.L.
109-234) provides $1.908 billion for this purpose.
! According to a GAO report of June 2005, in addition to direct
funding, the United States drew down $287 million worth of defense
articles (including M-113 armored personnel carriers) and services
for the ANA during FY2002-FY2004, plus $11 million worth of
military trucks and armored personnel vehicles. On June 16, 2005,
the President authorized an additional draw-down of $161.5 million.
In FY2006, Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant Excess Defense
Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
International donors have furnished $120 million in cash for the
ANP and provided another $126 million in equipment and training.

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Table 1. Major Security-Related Indicators
(August 2006)
Force
current level
target level
U.S. Forces (OEF)
23,000
16,600 (late 2006)
OEF Partner Forces
will go to zero in late 2006 as
4,000
OEF is merged into
NATO/ISAF
NATO/ISAF Peacekeeping
about 15,000+
17,500 (end July 2006)
Afghan National Army (ANA) 33,000
70,000 (official figure, 2010)
Afghan National Police (ANP) 62,000 on duty, of which
62,000 trained and equipped
37,000 are both trained and
equipped
Legally Armed Fighters
0
0
(Disarmed by DDR program
by June 2005)
DIAG/Weapons Collected
“Several hundred” significant
goal is no remaining illegal
from Illegal Armed Groups
illegal groups (five or more
groups by 2010
fighters) remain. 22,000
weapons collected thus far
Regional Context
Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban
has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments
are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though
six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration)
on December 23, 2002. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Afghanistan now has observer
status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is discussed below.
Pakistan
Some Afghan leaders continue to resent Pakistan because it was the most public
defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power (one of only three countries
to formally recognize it as the legitimate government.; Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates are the others). Pakistan purportedly viewed (and according to some
Afghan leaders, still views) the Taliban as an instrument with which to build an
Afghanistan sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth
against rival India. Pakistan ended its public support for the Taliban after the
September 11, 2001, attacks. For its part, Pakistan is wary that any Afghan
government might fall under the influence of India, which Pakistan says is using its
diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents.

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The efforts by Afghanistan and Pakistan to build post-Taliban relations have not
recovered from a setback in March 2006, when Afghan leaders openly asserted that
Pakistan was exerting insufficient efforts to prevent Taliban remnants from operating
there. That assessment was subsequently reinforced in comments by State
Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Henry Crumpton, on a visit to Kabul
in May 2006. Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf has retorted that Afghanistan’s
information on Taliban suspects operating in Pakistan is old and unreliable. Pakistan
says it is too difficult to distinguish Afghan Taliban from Pakistani nationals.
Suggesting it can act against the Taliban, on July 19, 2005, Pakistan arrested five
suspected senior Taliban leaders, including a deputy to Mullah Umar, and, as noted
above, in October 2005 it arrested and turned over to Afghanistan Taliban spokesman
Hakimi. On August 15, 2006, Pakistan announced the arrest of 29 Taliban fighters
in a hospital in the Pakistani city of Quetta.
The United States has praised Pakistan for its efforts against Al Qaeda. After
the September 11 attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with requested access
to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Pakistan also has
arrested over 550 Al Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them
over to the United States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide
Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al
Shibh September 11, 2002; top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March
2003); and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). A U.S. Predator drone-
launched January 13, 2006, strike on Damadola village in Pakistan targeted Zawahiri,
according to U.S. officials, but his subsequent video appearance proved that the
strike did not succeed. It also caused anti-U.S. demonstrations in Pakistan because
some civilians apparently were killed in the strike; press sources say up to four Al
Qaeda militants were hit in it.
Following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against President
Musharraf, Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas
who are suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani
forces began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the
Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other
indirect support. Pakistan now has nearly 80,000 forces poised near the north
Waziristan area of Pakistan, and the U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that
it is training Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.31 On the
other hand, some say that “Pakistani Taliban” are gaining influence over the villages
in these regions.
Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the
“Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893,
separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan
after the 1947 partition). As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees
31 Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” New York Times, April
27, 2005.

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CRS-30
have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees
remain in Pakistan.
Iran
Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional
influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the
Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran’s assistance to
Afghanistan has totaled about $205 million since the fall of the Taliban, mainly to
build roads and schools and provide electricity and shops to Afghan cities and
villages near the Iranian border. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President
Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S.
criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar,
although it did not arrest him. Since then, the Bush Administration criticism of
Iranian “meddling” has lessened as the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance has been
marginalized in the government. For his part, Karzai, who again visited Iran in May
2006 — and who met with hardline Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in
Tajikistan on July 26, 2006 — says that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan.
Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan in September
2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the Shindand air base.32
Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their
border. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban
fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society.
Even though Iran’s position in Afghanistan has waned since 2004, it is still
greatly enhanced from the time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its
interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western
province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer
to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and
ammunition,33 and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. In September 1998, Iranian
and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of
its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern
Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the
crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene
on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan
during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian
aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the reverse of
those of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Afghanistan from providing “strategic
depth” to Pakistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in
32 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall
Street Journal, October 18, 2004.
33 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997.

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CRS-31
the mid-1990s. A possible reflection of these ties is that Tajikistan allows India to
use one of its air bases; Tajikistan supports the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance.
India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because
of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated
to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have
committed major acts of terrorism in India. For its part, Pakistan accuses India of
using its nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian influence.
India is becoming a major investor in and donor to Afghanistan. It is co-
financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in
northern Afghanistan. In January 2005, India promised to help Afghanistan’s
struggling Ariana national airline and it has begun India Air flights between Delhi
and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known Habibia High School in Kabul and
committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house
for Afghanistan’s parliament. Numerous other India-financed reconstruction projects
are under way throughout Afghanistan. India, along with the Asian Development
Bank, is financing the $300 million project, mentioned above, to bring electricity
from Central Asia to Afghanistan.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan
stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF.
Russia. During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt
Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.34 Russia, which still feels humiliated
by its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, apparently views Northern Alliance
figures as instruments with which to rebuild Russian influence in Afghanistan. In
October 2005, Russia supplied the ANA with helicopters. Although Russia
supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear
of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, more recently Russia has sought to reduce the
U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating
from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab
origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al
Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only one in the world to
recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside
Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Central Asian States. During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian
leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving
safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous
February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is
34 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July
27, 1998.

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CRS-32
linked to Al Qaeda.35 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed
while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas
transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
These countries generally supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban;
Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that
Alliance. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China
into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the
Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the
region, the group issued a statement in early July 2005, reiterated by a top official of
the group in October 2005, that the United States should set a timetable for ending
its military presence in Central Asia. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their
pledges of facility support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows access primarily to French
combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.) In
July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train
some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose
to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly
viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical
Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov,
saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see below). The September 11 events stoked
Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly
supported the U.S.-led war. No OEF forces have been based in Turkmenistan.
China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China
has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see
map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda
to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern
China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led
war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing China’s
increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with
Mullah Umar. China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action
against the Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of
strategic considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition,
China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi
Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the
35 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in
September 2000.

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CRS-33
Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government.
The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-
Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor
in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan
during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to
suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that
Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi
Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime.
Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed,
but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to
decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an
offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that
he could become a rallying point for opposition to the regime.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not
publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September
2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of
U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch
strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to
allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized.
U.S. and International Aid
to Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s economy and society are reemerging after decades of warfare that
left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan
children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. In addition
to 3.6 million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war36 another 500,000
Afghans were displaced internally before U.S. military action began, according to
Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001, report. Since January 2002, more than
3.5 million Afghan refugees have returned. The government has made significant
progress in generating a growing portion of its budget domestically. It now raises
domestically about half of its $900 million annual operating budget from tax and
customs revenues. It has succeeded in forcing customs revenue to be remitted to the
central government. Tax revenue from such growing Afghan companies as Roshan
and Afghan Wireless (cell phone service), and Tolo Television are providing
substantial funds as well. Karzai also has sought to reassure international donors by
establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Nonetheless, the Afghan
government still depends on international donors, U.N. agencies, and NGOs for
operating as well as reconstruction funds. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.
36 About 1.5 million Afghan refugees were in Iran; 2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia;
17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states.

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CRS-34
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of
assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to
that government; monies were provided through relief organizations. Between
1985-1994, the United States had a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan,
implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of
administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals. Since the beginning of FY2002 (which began
just before Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in October 2001) and including
funds appropriated in the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriation (but not the
FY2006 supplemental), the United States has provided $3.793 billion in civilian-
related reconstruction and other civilian assistance and $4.416 billion in
military/security-related assistance. This latter category is defined as funds for
training and equipping the ANA and ANP, counter-narcotics operations, Karzai
protection, and de-mining/anti-terrorism. Table 2 breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid
by program, and the other tables cover FY2003- FY2006. A history of U.S. aid to
Afghanistan prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998) is in Table 7.37
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments. A key
post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized U.S. aid. The
total authorization, for all categories for all years, is over $3.7 billion. For the most
part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets
authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations.
However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion has
been funded by contributing nations. It authorized the following:
! $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $30 million in assistance for political development, including
national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for
FY2003-FY2005);
! $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights
oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-
2006 to the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan);
! $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
! $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for
Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for
37 In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured.
The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds
were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency
Response Fund.

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CRS-35
$300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by
P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and
! $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand
ISAF if such an expansion takes place.
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contained a subtitle called “The
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the
appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional
Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and
progress of reconstruction — an amendment to the report required in the original law;
(2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other
countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense
Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also
contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR
activities; expansion of ISAF; and counter-narcotics initiatives. The law did not
specify dollar amount authorizations for FY2005 and FY2006.
FY2007. On December 2, 2005, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ron
Neumann signed an agreement with the Afghan Finance Minister under which the
United States pledges to provide Afghanistan with $5.5 billion in aid over the next
five years. The U.S. aid plan is reportedly programmed for education, health care,
and economic and democratic development. It is not clear whether the purported
figures include funding for the ANA, the national police, counter-narcotics, and other
security-related programs. On February 6, 2006, the Administration released its
budget for FY2007, which included a request for the following for Afghanistan:
! $42.8 million for Child Survival and Health (CSH);
! $150 million in Development Assistance (DA);
! $610 million in ESF (an increase of about $190 million over what is
being provided in ESF for FY2006);
! $297 million for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) for counter-narcotics operations (an increase of about $60
million over what is being provided for FY2006);
! $1.2 million in International Military Education and Training
(IMET);
! no funds specifically requested for Karzai protection (NADR) or
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and a
! total request of about $1.1 billion, in line with the Administration
pledge at the February 1, 2006, “London Conference.”
In congressional action, the House passed H.R. 5522, the regular FY2007
foreign aid appropriation. It (H.Rept. 109-486) contains $510.77 million in ESF for
Afghanistan and $235 million for counter-narcotics programs in Afghanistan, but
appears to fully fund the remaining program categories. The Senate version (S.Rept.
109-277), which awaits Senate action, contains $1.124 billion for Afghanistan,
slightly more than the total request and matching the request in many of the aid
categories. However, it funds only $381 million in ESF but provides $161 million
for democracy programs in Afghanistan, a category not in the Administration request.

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CRS-36
The Senate version also provides $30 million more than requested for Child Survival
programs and $36 million more than requested for Development Assistance (DA).
Additional Funds and Other U.S. Assistance. Since the fall of the
Taliban, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC)
has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking
entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, and
another $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. These funds were used for
currency stabilization; mostly gold held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States
to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Another $20 million in overflight fees withheld
by U.N. sanctions on the Taliban were provided as well. Together with its allies,
over $350 million in frozen funds were released to the Afghan government. The
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has made available total investment
credits of $100 million.
World Bank/Asian Development Bank. In May 2002, the World Bank
reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced
a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World
Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the
telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in
Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in
Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in
project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned
Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance,
and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90
million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy
sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from
Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a
project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. In December 2004, the
Bank approved an additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections
of the road system.
International Reconstruction Pledges. Afghan leaders said that
Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. At donors
conferences in 2002 (Tokyo), Berlin (April 2004), and Kabul (April 2005), about
$9.5 billion in non-U.S. contributions were pledged. However, only about half has
been received as of January 2006. At the London conference in February 2006,
another $6 billion (non-U.S.) in pledges was made for the next five years. Of the
new pledges, Britain pledged about $900 million. The London conference also
leaned toward the view of Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be
channeled through the Afghan government rather than directly by the donor
community. In exchange, the Afghan government is promising greater financial
transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that international
contributions are used wisely and effectively.
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development. In an effort to find a
long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian problems, the United States
has tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan
living standards and political stability over the long term. During 1996-98, the
Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through

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CRS-37
western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A
consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion
Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), which is now estimated to cost $3.7 billion to
construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through
Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.38 The deterioration in
U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while
the Taliban was in power.
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit
meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of
the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a
series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, and all
three continued to express support for the project at a February 2006 meeting of their
oil ministers, although financing for the project is unclear. Some U.S. officials view
this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India,
transiting Pakistan.
Afghanistan’s prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in
March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of
gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan
relatively self-sufficient in energy and possibly able to provided some exports to its
neighbors. Some Afghan leaders believe the government needs to better develop
other resources such as copper and coal mines that have gone unused.
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO
Membership. The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war
economic rebound. Following a meeting with Karzai on June 15, 2004, President
Bush announced the United States and Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade
and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen
as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement. On
December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start
membership talks with Afghanistan.
Residual Issues From Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict.
Stinger Retrieval. Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the
Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft
missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300
Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below
38 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the
government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably
receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3.

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CRS-38
100.39 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when
U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the
war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are
likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably pose
less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold
to terrorists for use against civilian aircraft. In February 2002, the Afghan
government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.40 In late
January 2005, Afghan intelligence began a push to buy remaining Stingers back, at
a reported cost of $150,000 each.41
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the
United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a
premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported
on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was
competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA
would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On
March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a
fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers.
The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran
bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some
reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a
Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in
Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.42 It was
a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by
Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against
an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their
targets. SA-7s were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
Mine Eradication. Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute
one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that
5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates
are lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by land
mines. U.N. teams have destroyed one million mines and are now focusing on de-
mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including lands around
Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002 (Table 2), the U.S. de-
mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the
amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds
have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program
for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006
39 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
40 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters,
February 4, 2002.
41 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
42 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.

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CRS-39
states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan
contaminated by mines by 70%.
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY2002
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
(Final)
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for
131.0
198.12 (for
Agriculture (DOA)
wheat
165,000 metric
(300,000
food
and USAID Food For
(100,000
tons. (60,000
metric tons
commodities)
Peace (FFP), via
metric tons
tons for May
under P.L.480,
World Food
under
2000 drought
Title II, and
Program(WFP)
“416(b)”
relief)
416(b))
program.
State/Bureau of
16.95 for
14.03 for the
22.03 for
136.54 (to
Population, Refugees
Afghan
same purposes
similar
U.N. agencies)
and Migration (PRM)
refugees in
purposes
via UNHCR and
Pakistan and
ICRC
Iran, and to
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for
18.934 for
113.36 (to
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
drought relief
similar
various U.N.
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
and health,
programs
agencies and
(OFDA)
Afghanistan
water, and
NGOs)
sanitation
programs
State
2.615
3.0
2.8
7.0 to Halo
Department/HDP
Trust/other
(Humanitarian
demining
Demining Program)
Aid to Afghan
5.44 (2.789
6.169, of
5.31 for
Refugees in Pakistan
for health,
which $3.82
similar
(through various
training -
went to similar
purposes
NGOs)
Afghan
purposes
females in
Pakistan
Counter-Narcotics
1.50
63.0
USAID/
0.45 (Afghan
24.35 for
Office of Transition
women in
broadcasting/
Initiatives
Pakistan)
media
Dept. of Defense
50.9 ( 2.4
million
rations)
Foreign Military
57.0 (for
Financing
Afghan
national army)
Anti-Terrorism 36.4
Economic Support
105.2
Funds (E.S.F)
Peacekeeping
24.0
Totals
76.6 113.2 182.6
815.9

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CRS-40
Table 3. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003
($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 2)
From the FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)
Development/Health
90
Food Aid
47
Peacekeeping
10
Disaster Relief
94
ESF
50
Non-Proliferation, Demining,
5
Anti-Terrorism (NADR)
Refugee Relief
55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and
21
equip (FMF)
Total from this law:
372
From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction
100
(ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)
10
Afghan government support (ESF)
57
ANA train and equip (FMF)
170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining
28
(NADR, some for Karzai protection)
Total from this law:
365
Total for FY2003
737

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CRS-41
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)
From the FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106)
Disarmament and Demobilization (DDR program) (ESF)
30
Afghan government (ESF) $10 million for customs collection
70
Elections/democracy and governance (ESF)
69
Roads (ESF)
181
Schools/Education (ESF)
95
Health Services/Clinics (ESF)
49
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
58
Private Sector/Power sector rehabilitation
95
Water Projects
23
Counter-narcotics/police training/judiciary training (INCLE).
170
Defense Dept. counter-narcotics support operations
73
Afghan National Army (FMF)
287
Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR)
35
U.S. Embassy expansion and security/AID operations
92
Total from this law:
1,327
(of which $60 million is to benefit Afghan women and girls)
From the FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199)
Development/Health
171
Disaster Relief
35
Refugee Relief
72
Afghan women (ESF)
5
Judicial reform commission (ESF)
2
Reforestation (ESF)
2
Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF)
2
Other reconstruction (ESF)
64
ANA train and equip (FMF)
50
Total from this law:
403
Total for FY2004
1,727

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CRS-42
Table 5. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005
($ in millions)
From the FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447)
Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF)
225
Train and Equip ANA (FMF)
400
Assistance to benefit women and girls
50
Agriculture, private sector investment, environment,
primary education, reproductive health, and democracy-
300
building
Reforestation
2
Child and maternal health
6
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
2
Total from this law
985
From Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
Other ESF: Health programs, PRT programs, agriculture,
alternative livelihoods, government capacity building,
training for parliamentarians, rule of law programs
1,073.5
(ESF).
Aid to displaced persons (ESF)
5
Families of civilian victims of U.S. combat ops (ESF)
2.5
Women-led NGOs (ESF)
5
DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces.
Of the funds, $34 million may go to Afghan security
elements for that purpose. Also, $290 million of the
1,285
funds is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already
obligated for this purpose.
DOD counter-narcotics support operations
242
Counter-narcotics (INCLE)
220
Training of Afghan police (INCLE)
400
Karzi protection (NADR funds)
17.1
DEA operations in Afghanistan
7.7
Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul
60
Total from this law
3,317
Total from all FY2005 laws
4,302

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CRS-43
Table 6. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2006
($ in millions)
From the FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102
ESF for reconstruction, governance, democracy-building
430
(ESF over $225 million subject to certification that Afghanistan is
cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts.)
Counter-narcotics (INCLE).
235
Of the funds, $60 million is to train the ANP.
Peacekeeping (ANA salaries)
18
Karzai protection (NADR funds)
18
Child Survival and Health (CSH)
43
Reforestation
3
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
2
Aid to civilian victims of U.S. combat operations
2
Programs to benefit women and girls
50
Development Assistance
130.4
Total from this law:
931.4
From the FY2006 Supplemental Appropriation (P.L. 109-234)
Security Forces Fund
1,908
ESF (Includes $11 million for debt relief costs and $5 million for
43
agriculture development)
DOD counter-narcotics operations
103
Embassy operations
50.1
Migration and Refugee aid
3.4
DEA counter-narcotics operations
9.2
Total from this law:
2,116.7
Total for FY2006:
3,048.1

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CRS-44
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Econ.
Other
Fiscal
Devel.
Supp.
P.L. 480
(Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
(Title I and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978
4.989
—
5.742
0.269
0.789
11.789
1979
3.074
—
7.195
—
0.347
10.616
1980
—
(Soviet invasion - December 1979)
—
—
1981
—
—
—
—
—
—
1982
—
—
—
—
—
—
1983
—
—
—
—
—
—
1984
—
—
—
—
—
—
1985
3.369
—
—
—
—
3.369
1986
—
—
8.9
—
—
8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6
—
—
32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9
—
—
74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6
—
—
77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1
—
—
88.1
1991
30.0
30.0
20.1
—
—
80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4
—
—
81.4
1993
10.0
10.0
18.0
—
30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0
—
27.9
42.3
1995
1.8
—
12.4
—
31.6
45.8
1996
—
—
16.1
—
26.4
42.5
1997
—
—
18.0
—
31.9a
49.9
1998
—
—
3.6
—
49.14b
52.74
Source: U.S. Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and
$1.54 for counternarcotics.

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CRS-45
Table 8. ISAF Contributing Nations
(Following NATO Stage 3 transition completed July 31, 2006)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partner Nations
Belgium
616
Albania
22
Bulgaria
37
Austria
3
Canada
2,300
Azerbaijan
22
Czech Republic
17
Croatia
45
Denmark
122
Finland
61
Estonia
10
Macedonia
20
France
742
Ireland
10
Germany
2,200
Sweden
85
Greece
171
Switzerland
4
Hungary
159
New Zealand
5
Iceland
20
Total ISAF force
17,483
Italy
1,400 (will
decline to
Note: See NATO’s Afghanistan
1,000 in
page at [http://www.nato.int/issues/
late ‘06)
afghanistan].
Latvia
9
Lithuania
9
Luxemburg
10
Netherlands 1,700
Norway
313
Poland
5
Portugal
21
Romania
680
Slovakia
16
Slovenia
27
Spain
1,400
Turkey
900
United Kingdom
4,200
United States
120

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CRS-46
Table 9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Country
Gardez
Paktia
U.S.
Ghazni
Ghazni
U.S.
Parwan
Parwan
U.S./South Korea
Jalalabad
Nangarhar
U.S.
Khost
Khost
U.S.
Qalat
Zabol
U.S.
Asadabad
Kunar
U.S.
Sharana
Paktika
U.S.
Mehtarlam
Laghman
U.S.
Meydan Shahr
Wardak
U.S. (Turkey may assume)
Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province
U.S. (State Department lead)
Nuristan
Nuristan
U.S.
NATO/ISAF and Partner-Run PRTs
Qandahar
Qandahar (as of 9/05)
NATO/Canada
Lashkar Gah
Helmand
NATO/ Britain (as of May 2006)
NATO/Netherlands
Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan
(as of June 2006, with 200
Australian forces)
Herat
Herat
NATO/Italy (with Spain)
Farah
Farah
NATO/Italy (with Spain)
Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh
NATO/Germany
Konduz
Konduz
NATO/Germany
Faizabad
Badakhshan
NATO/Germany
Meymaneh
Faryab
NATO/Norway and Finland
Chaghcharan
Ghowr
NATO/Lithuania
Qalah-ye Now
Badghis
NATO/Spain (with Italy)
Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan
NATO/Germany
Bamiyan
Bamiyan
New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF)

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CRS-47
Table 10. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/
Regional
Commander
Leader
Ethnicity
Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at
ultra-
Insurgent
large possibly in Afghanistan)/Mullah
orthodox
groups, mostly
Dadullah/Jalaludin Haqqani.
Islamic,
in the south
Pashtun
and east, and
in Pakistan.
Islamic
Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (elected to
moderate
Much of
Society
lower house)/Muhammad Fahim (in upper
Islamic,
northern and
(leader of
house)/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister
mostly
western
“Northern
2001-2006). Ismail Khan heads faction of the
Tajik
Afghanistan,
Alliance”)
grouping in Herat area.
including
Kabul
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. Best known for March
secular,
Mazar-e-
Islamic
1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated his
Uzbek
Sharif,
Movement of
overthrow. Subsequently fought Rabbani
Shebergan,
Afghanistan
government (1992-1995), but later joined
and environs
Northern Alliance. Commanded about 25,000
troops, armor, combat aircraft, and some Scud
missiles, but was unable to hold off Taliban forces
that captured his region by August 1998. Karzai
rival in October 2004 presidential election, now
Karzai’s chief “security adviser.”
Hizb-e-
Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad
Shiite,
Bamiyan
Wahdat
Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in presidential election
Hazara
province
and parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part
tribes
of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought
unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan city,
the Hazara base.
Pashtun
Various regional governors; central government
Moderate
Dominant in
Leaders
led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
southern,
Pashtun
eastern
Afghanistan
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.
orthodox
Small groups
Gulbuddin
Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in Islamic,
around
(HIG)
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in
Pashtun
Jalalabad,
2002. Now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda;
Nuristan and
likely in Pakistan or eastern Afghanistan. Leader
in southeast.
of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the
mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative,
orthodox
Paghman
leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. He lived
Islamic,
(west of
many years in and is politically close to Saudi
Pashtun
Kabul)
Arabia, which shares his conservative brand of
Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”). During anti-Soviet
war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar, was a
principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized
the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

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CRS-48
Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed
during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been
lifted.
! On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making
Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products.
Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive
Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of
Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464].
! On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of
agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls
were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the
Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of
Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-
72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that
Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This
opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the
U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to
Afghanistan.
! On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President
Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided
for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and
suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of
negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a
non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the
United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United
States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the
Taliban, by President Bush.
! On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to
the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986
proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437)
that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for
Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations
for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President
to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status
for Afghanistan.
! On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22
C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government,

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CRS-49
reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of
countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports
of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had
also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had
been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with
U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
! On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999
declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with
respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton
determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked
Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade
with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these
sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana
assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S.
citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Taliban-
controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when
the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no
territory within Afghanistan.
! U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October
15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution
1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al
Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267
banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana),
and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets.
Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice
to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of
Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel
by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors
in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was
provided to the Taliban.
! P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright,
completing a pre-Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to
restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had
issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer
a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not
implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank
guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the
1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition,
Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because
the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize
for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)

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CRS-50
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan
crsphpgw

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