Order Code RL33566
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict
Updated August 14, 2006
Jeremy M. Sharp, Coordinator
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Christopher Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz,
Alfred Prados, Paul Gallis, Dianne Rennack, John Rollins, Marjorie
Browne, Steve Bowman, Connie Veillette, and Lawrence Kumins
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict
Summary
This report analyzes the current conflict between Israel and two U.S. State
Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), the Lebanese Shiite
Muslim group Hezbollah and the radical Palestinian Hamas organization. On July 12,
2006, what had been a localized conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in
the Gaza Strip instantly became a regional conflagration after Hezbollah captured
two Israeli soldiers in a surprise attack along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israel has
responded by carrying out air strikes against suspected Hezbollah targets in Lebanon,
and Hezbollah has countered with rocket attacks against cities and towns in northern
Israel. In order to push Hezbollah back from its border, Israel has launched a full-
scale ground operation in Lebanon with the hopes of establishing a security zone free
of Hezbollah militants. Meanwhile, Israeli clashes with Hamas and other Palestinian
militants have continued in the Gaza Strip.
The Bush Administration has repeatedly stated its unequivocal support for Israel
during this time of crisis, and President Bush has charged that “the root cause of the
problem is Hezbollah... And part of those terrorist attacks are inspired by nation
states, like Syria and Iran.” Many in the international community have called for an
immediate cease-fire. On August 11, after intensive diplomacy, the U.N. Security
Council adopted a U.S.-French drafted resolution (Resolution 1701) that would end
the fighting and lead to the formation of a new or expanded international
peacekeeping force in Lebanon.
On July 18, 2006, the Senate passed S.Res. 534, which, among other things,
calls for the release of Israeli soldiers who are being held captive by Hezbollah or
Hamas; condemns the governments of Iran and Syria for their continued support for
Hezbollah and Hamas; urges all sides to protect innocent civilian life and
infrastructure; and strongly supports the use of all diplomatic means available to free
the captured Israeli soldiers. On July 20, 2006, the House passed H.Res. 921, which
also condemns Hezbollah’s attack on Israel and urges the President to bring sanctions
against the governments of Syria and Iran for their alleged sponsorship of Hezbollah.
The extension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the Lebanese arena has
created a multifaceted crisis that cuts across a number of U.S. policy issues in the
Middle East. This report discusses not only the current military situation but also its
implications for regional stability, Syrian influence in Lebanon and calls for
meaningful Lebanese independence, Iranian regional aspirations and its pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction, and energy security. This report will be updated as
events unfold. A number of CRS analysts have contributed to this report. For
additional questions, please contact the individual specialist listed under each section
of the report. For more information on the major countries in the current conflict,
please see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United
States; CRS Report RL33509, Lebanon; CRS Report RL33487, Syria: U.S. Relations
and Bilateral Issues, CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy
Responses, and CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background,
Related Developments, and U.S. Policy.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A Multi-Dimensional Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Differing Views of U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Prelude to the Current Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Palestinian Elections and the Hamas-led PA Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Isolation of Hamas and Internecine Palestinian Violence . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Israeli-Palestinian Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Enter Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Possible Explanations for Hezbollah’s Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Military Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Is Israel Achieving its Goals? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Diplomatic Efforts and Possible Deployment of International Peacekeepers . . . 12
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Differing EU and U.S. Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Arab Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Regional Dimension and Issues for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S. Concern for Lebanese Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Syrian Support for Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S. Policy Toward Syria During the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Iran’s Relationship to Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
U.S. Efforts to Contain Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Regional Reactions: The Moderate Arab States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Legislation, Foreign Assistance, Sanctions, and Equipment
Use Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Recent Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Congress and Evacuation Costs for U.S. Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
U.S. Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Restrictions on the Use of U.S. Supplied Military Equipment . . . . . . 26
Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Prospects for a Regional War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
U.S. Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Hezbollah: Assessing Capabilities and Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Sympathizer Attacks: Threats and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Cyber-Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

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Islam, Al Qaeda, and the Global War on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Conclusion: The Unresolved Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix A: Chronology of Recent Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix B: Chronology of Conflict on the Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian Border . . 45
Appendix C: U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Hamas and Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Lebanon, Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank . . . . . . . . . 9

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Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-
Hezbollah Conflict
Introduction
A Multi-Dimensional Conflict
Hezbollah’s1 July 12, 2006, attack in northern Israel, in which two Israeli
soldiers were kidnaped, elicited an Israeli military response that has again embroiled
the region in a multi-dimensional conflict. This conflict has serious implications for
an array of U.S. policy issues in the Middle East ranging from U.S. efforts to combat
terrorist organizations to the preservation of Lebanon’s sovereignty and
independence. Though the primary combatants remain part of a triangular dynamic
in which Israel is at war with Hezbollah in Lebanon and with Palestinian militants,
including Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, there are secondary players who add additional
layers of complexity to the conflict, namely Iran and Syria.2 Both countries have
played significant roles in arming, training, and financing Hezbollah (and to a lesser
extent Hamas) and have used the Lebanese Shiite organization as a proxy to further
their own goals in the region. Iran may have aspirations to become the dominant
power in the Middle East, and many in the international community are closely
focused on its potential weapons of mass destruction capability. In this light, fighting
in southern Lebanon is viewed by some as a contest between two of the Middle
East’s most bitter rivals and most powerful actors, Israel and Iran (via Hezbollah by
proxy), and it could be a harbinger of future indirect confrontations between two
possibly nuclear-armed nations.
In Lebanon itself, the fighting has demonstrated Israel’s political will to push
Hezbollah back from its border despite the high cost the campaign has paid in
civilian casualties from rocket attacks in northern Israel and soldiers’ lives lost in
ground operations. On the other hand, Hezbollah has tried to write its own narrative
of the current conflict, in which it claims victory for merely “surviving” and for
sustaining its ability to fire low-tech Katyusha rockets into Israel. What impact the
conflict has had on Lebanese politics remains to be seen. There is still much anger
among Lebanese Christians and other sects directed at Hezbollah for instigating a war
that has produced the widespread destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure,
1 For the purposes of this report, “Hezbollah” is used in referring to the Lebanese Shiite
Muslim group. Common alternate spellings include Hizballah, Hizbullah, and Hizb`allah.
2 There also are tertiary actors with an interest in the war in Lebanon. The European Union,
other Arab states, and the United Nations all have been closely involved in trying to resolve
the crisis.

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CRS-2
environment, and economy. Yet, at the same time, the conflict may strengthen
Hezbollah politically, as many in Lebanon and in the region are already lionizing the
organization for fighting Israel.
From the U.S. standpoint, the current war in Lebanon also touches on broader
themes beyond the realm of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, U.S. military
analysts reportedly are closely monitoring the tactics and strategy of Iranian-trained
Hezbollah fighters so that U.S. military doctrine can adapt to their style of warfare.
Some have dubbed it “net-centric warfare,” in which small guerrilla units operate
autonomously against an enemy’s conventional military force. Such adaptations
already have been underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other policy makers are
concerned with how the conflict will affect U.S. democracy promotion efforts. The
Administration had hailed the Lebanese “Cedar Revolution,” which brought an anti-
Syrian coalition to power in the 2005 elections following the assassination of former
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and led to the ouster of Syrian forces from the country.
Some speculate that Hezbollah has gained more popular support from fighting Israel
and complicating U.S. democracy promotion efforts. It and Hamas are both U.S.-
designated foreign terrorist organizations, yet they hold seats in their respective
parliaments and executive branches. Finally, some terrorism specialists believe that
the current conflict will further fan the flames of radicalism in the Arab and Muslim
worlds. Although Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shiite organization allied with Shiite Iran,
radical Sunni groups, such as Al Qaeda, may use the conflict as a pretext for attacks
against Western interests abroad in the name of unity among Arabs and all Muslims
(Sunni and Shiite) alike.
Differing Views of U.S. Policy
With fighting in southern Lebanon unabated as of early August, there are
various views on the level of U.S. involvement in the current crisis. The
Administration has on multiple occasions offered its steadfast support for Israel’s
military operations in Lebanon and has been willing to give Israel time to uproot
Hezbollah from its entrenched positions. The international community, while critical
of Hezbollah’s provocations, has been far more outspoken about Israel’s sustained
military response, and calls for an immediate cease-fire grew more intense after
Israel’s bombing of the Lebanese village of Qana in which 28 civilians, mostly
women and children, were killed. Supporters of Israel believe that should Israel
succeed in pushing Hezbollah back from the Israeli-Lebanese border and weakening
the organization militarily, the United States and Israel would send a clear message
to Hezbollah’s backers, Iran and Syria, that their support for terrorism will not be
tolerated. On the other hand, many independent observers and former Administration
officials call for more U.S. diplomatic and even-handed engagement, out of concern
that the historic U.S. role as an honest broker between Arabs and Israelis in
furthering peace in the Middle East is being undermined. Some argue that by
unequivocally siding with Israel, U.S. credibility in the Arab world may be
irreparably damaged.

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CRS-3
Prelude to the Current Crisis
Although Hezbollah’s July 12, 2006, kidnaping of two Israeli soldiers initiated
the conflict in southern Lebanon, tensions in the region had grown since the Hamas
electoral victory in Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006. Over the course
of the next six months, Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated rapidly, culminating
in renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip, only months after Israel withdrew entirely from
the territory and evacuated its settlements. Most observers assert that Hezbollah used
the clashes between Hamas and Israel as a pretext and justification for its July 12
attack. The following sections provide background on how the region has been
transformed over the past six months from one of relative calm to full-scale war.
Palestinian Elections and the Hamas-led PA Government3
On January 25, 2006, candidates of the “Change and Reform” party associated
with the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)4 won a majority in Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) elections, defeating Fatah, the prior ruling party of the
PLC and of Palestinian Authority President (PA) Mahmoud Abbas. In response, the
Quartet (i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) stated
that “there is a fundamental contradiction between armed group and militia activities
and the building of a democratic state.”5 Subsequent Quartet statements established
clear principles for reviewing further engagement and assistance with the Hamas-led
Palestinian government, namely “that all members of a future Palestinian government
must be committed to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous
agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap.”6 President Abbas endorsed
Hamas’ platform and cabinet candidates while expressing his demand that Hamas
comply with the Quartet’s principles and support his efforts to achieve a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.7 Since January 2006, Hamas leaders have
largely rejected and refused to discuss the Quartet principles, arguing that while
President Abbas may decide to negotiate with Israel, ultimately the Palestinian people
would decide what to accept.
3 The following sections were prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Middle East Policy
Analyst.
4 Hamas is an acronym for its full name in Arabic, Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah
(the Islamic Resistance Movement).
5 Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative Council Elections, January 26, 2006.
6 Quartet Statements released January 30, 2006, and March 30, 2006. “The Roadmap” refers
to the Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, which was presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on
April 30, 2003, by the Quartet as a plan to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the
conflict in three phases by 2005.
7 The PLC approved the majority Hamas-bloc on March 28, 2006.

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CRS-4
The Isolation of Hamas and Internecine Palestinian Violence
The electoral victory of Hamas surprised many outside observers and created
a series of policy challenges for the Bush Administration, which had supported the
election process as part of its efforts to reform the Palestinian Authority and its
broader Middle East democracy promotion agenda. Israel and members of the
Quartet took steps to limit the provision of non-humanitarian aid and financial
resources to the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority based on Hamas leaders’
refusal to accept the Quartet principles. Israel ceased its monthly transfers of
approximately $55 million in taxes and customs revenue collected monthly on behalf
of the PA, and two leading Israeli banks announced plans to sever their commercial
relationships with financial institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.8 The Bush
Administration suspended U.S.-funded development projects in the Palestinian
territories and prohibited any and all U.S. persons from engaging in any unauthorized
transactions with the Palestinian Authority because of its control by Hamas, a
designated terrorist entity.9 The European Union — the PA’s largest donor — also
suspended its direct aid to the Palestinian Authority and, at the Quartet’s behest, has
subsequently spearheaded efforts to develop an international mechanism to deliver
assistance to the Palestinian people without transfers to or through Hamas or the
elements of the PA under its control.
The loss of customs revenue and direct foreign aid created crippling budgetary
shortfalls for the PA and significant derivative economic hardship for many
Palestinian citizens. President Abbas referred to the steps as a “siege,” and
throughout April, May, and June 2006, tensions over unpaid salaries and
disagreements over command responsibilities flared between the Hamas-led
government and armed security force personnel loyal to Fatah. Palestinian leaders,
including President Abbas, engaged in several efforts to end the intra-Palestinian
violence and bring closure to open questions of official Palestinian support for the
Quartet principles (see discussion of the National Accord Document below).
However, before these efforts could bear fruit, fresh violence between Israel and
Hamas erupted in the Gaza Strip and has escalated.
Israeli-Palestinian Fighting10
For many months prior to the late spring/summer 2006 outbreak of fighting,
violence had been somewhat subdued due to some self-imposed restraint by the
major players involved. In March 2005, Hamas and 12 other Palestinian groups
agreed to extend an informal truce or “calm” (referred to in Arabic as a hudna) with
Israel for one year. Some call the agreement a cease-fire even though it was a
8 Press reports suggested that Israel’s Bank Discount and Bank Hapoalim have agreed to
postpone their plans until August 15, 2006. The proposals would directly affect Palestinian
civilians by severely complicating or preventing most Palestinian commercial financial
transactions in Israeli shekels, the principal currency used in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
9 For more information see CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians.
10 The following sections were prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs, on August 3, 2006.

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CRS-5
unilateral Palestinian declaration to which Israel was not a party. Palestine Islamic
Jihad (PIJ) did not agree to the calm and was responsible for several suicide
bombings within Israel in the period that followed. Hamas, which had been
responsible for many suicide bombings during the second intifadah (Palestinian
uprising against Israeli occupation) that had begun in September 2000, refrained from
such attacks after declaring the hudna. It did, however, continue to fire mortars and
rockets against Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip before Israel’s summer 2005
withdrawal from the region and into southern Israel after Israel’s withdrawal. Israel
usually responded with air and artillery strikes, but it also carried out what it terms
targeted killings of terrorists.
On June 9, 2006, a Palestinian family was killed on a Gaza beach. The
Palestinians claimed that the victims had been struck by Israeli artillery fire, but
Israel denied responsibility for the deaths. Nonetheless, the incident provoked
Hamas to call off its truce and intensify rocket fire into southern Israel.
Also in June, Palestinian factions held an intense national dialogue in the West
Bank and Gaza in which they ultimately agreed on a National Accord Document
(also known as the Prisoners’ Document because Hamas and Fatah leaders
imprisoned by Israel had collaborated on the first draft) to reconcile their positions
and goals. Hamas leaders in Damascus, notably political bureau chief Khalid
Mish’al, reportedly did not agree with the National Accord Document because it
might be seen as suggesting that Hamas had moderated its views regarding Israel and
the peace process. On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing (Izz ad-Din al-
Qassam Brigades) and two other groups attacked Israeli forces in Israel, just outside
of Gaza, killing two Israeli soldiers, wounding four, and kidnaping one. The
perpetrators demanded the release of Palestinian women and minors from Israeli
prisons. Some analysts suggest that Mish’al was behind the attack in order to assert
his power over more “moderate” Hamas officials in the territories and to undermine
the National Accord.
On June 27, after unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to secure the kidnaped
soldier’s release, Israeli forces began a major operation to rescue him, to deter future
Hamas attacks, including rocket launches from Gaza into southern Israel, and to
weaken, bring down, or change the conduct of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority
government. Israeli officials claimed that Hamas had crossed a “red line” with the
kidnaping and attack within pre-1967 Israel, but said that Israel did not intend to
reoccupy Gaza.
On June 28, Hamas officials in the Palestinian Authority allied themselves with
the kidnapers by adopting their demands. Israeli officials responded by insisting on
the unconditional release of the soldier. On June 29, Israel forces arrested 64
Palestinian (Hamas) cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and other Hamas officials
in the West Bank and Jerusalem in what the Foreign Ministry described the action
as a “normal legal procedure” targeting suspected terrorists.
In early military operations, Israeli planes bombed offices of PA ministries
headed by Hamas, weapons depots, training sites, and access roads; ground forces
entered Gaza to locate tunnels and explosives near the border and targeted Hamas
offices in the West Bank. After Hamas militants fired an upgraded rocket at the

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CRS-6
Israeli port city of Ashkelon on July 4, the Israeli cabinet approved “prolonged”
activities against Hamas; air and artillery strikes and ground incursions are still
occurring. Meanwhile, Palestinian militants continue to fire rockets into southern
Israel.
International mediators have tried to calm the recent upsurge in violence. The
Egyptians have reportedly proposed a resolution in which Hamas would release the
soldier in exchange for an Israeli promise to release prisoners at a later date. On July
10, however, Khalid Mish’al insisted on the mutual release or “swap” of prisoners.
On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that trading prisoners with
Hamas would cause a lot of damage to the future of the State of Israel, perhaps
because it would continue a precedent that he seeks to break.11 He later observed that
negotiating with Hamas also would signal that moderates such as Palestinian
Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas are not needed.
Abbas told a visiting U.N. team that he wanted to “de-link” the crisis in the
Palestinian areas from the crisis that developed subsequently between Israel and
Hezbollah in Lebanon in order to prevent non-Palestinian extremists (Hezbollah)
from hijacking the leadership of the Palestinian issue.12 Yet, neither President Abbas
nor the Hamas-led PA government officials represent the kidnapers and can bring
about a resolution. Hamas leader Mish’al appears to be in control and emphasizes
the importance of cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah and specifically calls
for not separating the Palestinian and Lebanese issues.13
Enter Hezbollah
On July 12, under cover of massive shelling of a town in northern Israel,
Hezbollah forces crossed the international border from Lebanon into northwestern
Israel and attacked two Israeli vehicles, killing three soldiers and kidnaping two.
Hezbollah thereby opened a second front against Israel ostensibly in support of
Hamas. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, suggested that the Hezbollah
operation might provide a way out of the crisis in Gaza because Israel had negotiated
with Hezbollah indirectly in the past even though it refuses to negotiate with Hamas
now. He said that the only way the soldiers would be returned would be through a
prisoner exchange. Although Hezbollah and Hamas are not organizationally linked,
Hezbollah provides military training as well as financial and moral support to the
Palestinian group and has acted in some ways as a mentor or role model for Hamas,
which has sought to emulate the Lebanese group’s political and media success.
Hamas’s kidnaping of the Israeli soldier follows a different Hezbollah example.
Moreover, two groups share the goal of driving Israel from occupied territories and
ultimately eliminating it; both maintain close ties with Iran.
11 “Olmert Says No Deal With ‘Bloody’ Hamas,” FoxNews.com, July 10, 2006.
12 As reported to the U.N. Security Council, July 21, 2006, meeting record S/PV.5493.
13 Reported on Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, July 31, 2006, Open Source Center
Document GMP20060731635002.

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CRS-7
Possible Explanations for Hezbollah’s Attack. The reasons for the
Hezbollah action may extend beyond Nasrallah’s often publicly espoused intention
to kidnap Israelis for a prisoner exchange. Hezbollah has the capacity to decide to
act on its own and could have done so in the spirit of “Shi’a triumphalism” spurred
by the Iraqi Shiites’ ascension to power and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. It also
may have acted in solidarity with the besieged Palestinians or with its Syrian and
Iranian supporters. Another explanation is that Hezbollah may have wanted to
prevent a resolution of the Gaza crisis. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and
Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas have claimed that an agreement for
a prisoner exchange had almost been reached, immediately before the Hezbollah
attack, but Hezbollah’s action complicated or prevented it.
Some observers question Hezbollah’s autonomy and offer other explanations
for the July 12 action. Much speculation focuses on whether Hezbollah acted at the
behest of or with the approval of Iran, its main sponsor, because Iran also supports
Hamas or may have wanted to divert international attention from the impasse over
its nuclear program. If the latter is the case, it gained only a limited time when the
U.N. Security Council postponed consideration of the nuclear issue due to the
Lebanon situation because, on July 31, the Council approved a resolution demanding
that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program by August 31 or face sanctions.
Others suggest that Syria may be using its Hezbollah allies to resurrect its influence
in Lebanon, from which it had been forced to withdraw in 2005.14

Other experts give a more nuanced appraisal. U.S. CENTCOM Commander
General John Abizaid observed that it is more likely that Syria and Iran are exploiting
the situation created by the kidnaping than that they ordered it. U.S. State Department
Coordinator for Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton asserted that Syria and Iran do not
control Hezbollah, but added that Hezbollah asks Iranian permission if its actions
have broader international implications. In this case, Hezbollah may not have
foreseen the implications of its July 12 operation and expected “the usual, limited”
Israeli response characteristic of the period since 2000.15 Therefore, it may not have
asked permission from Teheran.
14 Syria already has benefitted somewhat from the conflict as the U.N. envoy investigating
the assassination of former Lebanese Rafiq Hariri, and possible Syrian involvement in that
killing, was evacuated from Beirut.
15 Observation of Mahmoud Komati, an Hezbollah political official, quoted by Greg Myre
and Helene Cooper, “Israel to Occupy Area of Lebanon as a Security Zone,” New York
Times, July 26, 2006.

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CRS-8
The Military Conflict
Military Operations16
To date, the current war in the Middle East is nearing the completion of its
fourth week, and while both sides are claiming victory, Israel and Hezbollah continue
to mount attacks and counter-strikes with regularity. In their efforts to stem
Hezbollah rocket fire and destroy its infrastructure in southern Lebanon, Israeli
military operations have spanned the air-sea-land spectrum. Extensive airstrikes
throughout Lebanon, a naval blockade of Lebanese ports, large-scale mechanized
infantry incursions, and commando raids have all played a role. Hezbollah appears
to have limited its operations to repeated rocket barrages against the Israeli civilian
population centers and defense of its tactical strongholds.
To date, the conflict has highlighted the challenges that even a technically
advanced military confronts when fighting a well-organized and equipped guerilla
force on its own territory. Despite the intensity and breadth of Israeli operations,
Hezbollah’s ability to sustain its rocket attacks and slow Israeli ground advances
appears to remain significant. A number of factors have contributed to this situation.
In the six years since the end of the Israeli occupation of the area, Hezbollah has
constructed a seemingly extensive system of fortifications and weapons storage
facilities. Israeli ground intelligence appears to have been somewhat limited. The
high mobility of the Iranian-supplied rocket launchers allows them to “shoot and
scoot” thereby significantly reducing the effectiveness of any counterattack.17 Unless
they choose to stand and fight, the Hezbollah militants can blend in and out of the
civilian population at will. And, dispersal of Hezbollah facilities and launching points
amidst the civilian population significantly complicates Israeli targeting, despite its
relatively sophisticated reconnaissance capabilities.
Generally, a successful anti-guerilla campaign is predicated on a sizeable
occupation force and the ability to separate the guerillas from both their civilian
support and outside supplies. While Israeli forces appear to have been relatively
successful in interdicting outside re-supply of Hezbollah, they have not sought a full-
scale occupation of southern Lebanon as they did in 1982. Though the conflict may
have drained Hezbollah’s arsenal somewhat, there appears to be little reduction in its
ability to maintain harassing attacks on the Israeli population. Israeli officials have
16 This section was prepared by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Defense.
17 Hezbollah has accumulated a reportedly very large arsenal of these weapons, with
estimates reaching up to 12,000 munitions. The vast majority of these munitions are
unguided rockets, often called Katyushas. Having ranges of between 20-45 miles they are
able to strike a wide area of Israeli territory. Though unguided and of varying accuracy, this
indiscriminate aspect can enhance their effectiveness as “terror” weapons against urban
populations. Iran also has reportedly supplied Hezbollah with a limited number of the more
advanced Zelzal (earthquake) rocket having a range of up to 120 miles. Israel has invested
significantly in developing missile defense systems. However, the Tactical High Energy
Laser missile defense system, jointly developed with the United States, though capable of
defending against these rockets, is not expected to be fully operational until 2007. Israel
reportedly has developmental models that could be deployed.

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CRS-9
nevertheless claimed very extensive destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure in
southern Lebanon.
Figure 1. Map of Lebanon, Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank

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CRS-10
Is Israel Achieving its Goals?18
On July 17, 2006, in a speech to the Knesset (parliament), Prime Minister
Olmert summarized Israel’s official conditions for the end of military operations
against Lebanon: the return of the kidnaped soldiers, the end to Hezbollah rocket
attacks, and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the Israeli-Lebanese border
to replace Hezbollah units in order to increase the distance that Hezbollah’s rockets
and missiles would have to traverse before striking Israel.19 Israeli officials did not
express any illusions that their forces would be able to disarm Hezbollah completely.
However, subsequent operations have suggested that they hoped to degrade the
militia’s military capabilities considerably and prevent re-supplies from Syria and
Iran. The government also decided that, unlike its predecessors, it would not allow
Hezbollah to continue to build up its arsenal to use against Israel at will, and it would
not cave in to what it viewed as the “blackmail” of kidnapings that are resolved by
the disproportionate exchange of a few Israelis for hundreds of suspected terrorists.
As the military campaign progressed, Israel appeared to revise its goals
somewhat. The government acknowledged that the Lebanese army would need the
assistance of an international force to accomplish Israel’s goals and declared that it
would pave the ground for such a force by creating a buffer zone north of border.
From expanded Israeli ground operations in early August, it appeared that Israel’s
desired zone could extend north to the Litani River. Prime Minister Olmert has said
that Israel is in no rush to reach a cease-fire before it reaches its main objectives or
before an effective and robust international military force is present; otherwise, he
admits, Israel would have achieved nothing. Israel’s view of the international force’s
mission, i.e., to disarm Hezbollah and prevent arms smuggling from Syria, however,
may exceed the will of contributing countries.
Israel also has more strategic goals. After it withdrew from Lebanon in 2000,
Israel generally responded to Hezbollah’s rocket attacks with a few air strikes or
artillery barrages, which Israeli analysts argue undermined the deterrent effects of the
enemy’s belief in Israel’s military superiority. By showing Israel’s military might
and civilian resilience to Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, in this view, the current
campaign could restore Israel’s essential deterrence and prevent future attacks. A few
observers suggest that the devastation that Israel has wrought in Lebanon in itself will
deter future Hezbollah adventurism or force other Lebanese to try to restrain it
(although others predict the violence will increase Hezbollah’s resolve). Finally,
some even suggest that re-established deterrence would enable the Olmert
government to proceed with plans to withdraw from parts of the West Bank.20
18 This section was prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
19 Text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, is available online
at [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html].
20 On deterrence, see “Pundits: Failure To Beat Hizballah To Weaken Israeli Deterrence,
Arab Moderates,” Open Source Center Report, Document GMP20060727735001, July 27,
2006.

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CRS-11
There also is an Israeli domestic political element to its military goals in
Lebanon. Some suggest that the Israeli government that only took office in March
2006 could benefit domestically from a successful military campaign. Unlike its
predecessors, the Olmert government has few former military generals in key
positions, and its principal leaders all lack significant military experience. Many
observers believe that the current crisis affords these politicians a chance to prove
their ability to protect Israel’s security. In addition, although Olmert’s Kadima Party
won a plurality in the national elections in March, Olmert is not considered a
particularly popular politician. However, polls so far show overwhelming popular
support in Israel both for the military campaign and for the government’s conduct.
This surge may not survive the inevitable postwar second-guessing of decisions or
recriminations for a resolution that will inevitably result from compromises that may
not appear to fulfill Israel’s goals.
Finally, Israeli officials may have had other goals. They might have hoped that,
in order to stop the devastation, moderate Lebanese forces would pressure Hezbollah
to change its conduct and concede to Israel’s demands. If this was so, then they had
the opposite effect as Israeli military operations appeared to create commonality
among Lebanese factions in their opposition to Israel’s actions. At the Rome
Conference on Lebanon on July 26, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, a Sunni, praised
Hezbollah as having been key to ending Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon and
as a legitimate part of the Lebanese government and adopted Hezbollah’s conditions
for the end of the conflict.
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has defined victory minimally as the
survival of Hezbollah at the end of the conflict. Many observers believe that the
group has already been victorious by standing up to the Israeli Defense Forces longer
than Arab governments had done in the past. Hezbollah’s political standing in
Lebanon, and the Arab and Muslim worlds, has risen as the war has continued and,
especially after the incident at Qana on July 30, some Hezbollah domestic rivals were
supporting its fight against Israel.
A resolution to the conflict may contain elements that could lead Hezbollah to
claim a greater victory. These might include a cease-fire before Israel achieves the
objectives of its military operations, a de facto prisoner exchange, and Israeli
withdrawal from the Shib’a Farms.21 The last would enable Hezbollah to claim credit
for reclaiming additional Arab lands, but also might deprive it of the rationale for its
“resistence” and lead it to consider disarming or integrating into the Lebanese army.
21 The Shib’a Farms enclave is regarded by the United Nations and the United States as part
of the Israeli-occupied Syrian territory of the Golan Heights. However, Syria and Lebanon
maintain that it is Lebanese territory from which Israel failed to withdraw when it withdrew
from southern Lebanon in 2000. Hezbollah argues that they are justified in keeping their
arms as long as Israel remains in the Shib’a Farms area, which Hezbollah regards as
Lebanese territory. For more information on this issue, see CRS Report RL31078, The
Shib’a Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred B. Prados.

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CRS-12
Diplomatic Efforts and Possible Deployment of
International Peacekeepers
After several weeks in which the United States refrained from fully engaging the
international community in an effort to reach a cease-fire, U.S. and French officials
began working to co-draft a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for
an end to the violence. On August 5, the U.S. and French officials proposed a joint
resolution aimed at securing an initial cease-fire resolution, probably to be followed
by a second resolution aimed at securing a more lasting peace. The U.S.-French
proposal called for cessation of hostilities, monitoring of a cease-fire by an expanded
U.N. force, delineation of the Israeli-Lebanese border, a buffer zone in the south
closed to all military forces except U.N. and Lebanese forces, and an arms embargo
against weapons shipments to militias.
The language of the resolution came under debate, especially over the mandate
of an international force. Discussions at the United Nations focused on the
organization, composition, timing, and possible mandate of such a force Lebanese
and other Arab leaders complained that the resolution addressed Israeli rather than
Lebanese needs. Lebanese officials complained in particular that the proposed
resolution allowed Israeli forces to remain in southern Lebanon; a Lebanese minister
said Lebanon would abide by the resolution only on condition that “no Israeli soldier
remains inside Lebanese land.” The United States and France themselves differed
over some of the terms that they had jointly drafted.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701
After extended discussion and debate, the U.N. Security Council on August 11,
2006, unanimously adopted as Resolution 1701 a revised U.S.-French resolution
calling for a “full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate
cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all
offensive military operations.” Among the other terms of the resolution are expansion
of the existing U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)22 from 2,000 to a maximum
of 15,000; deployment of UNIFIL plus a Lebanese Army force23 to southern Lebanon
to monitor the cease-fire; withdrawal of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon “in
parallel” with the deployment of U.N. and Lebanese forces to the south; a ban on
delivery of weapons to “any entity or individual” in Lebanon, except the Lebanese
Army. The resolution requests the U.N. Secretary General to develop proposals
within 30 days for delineation of Lebanon’s international borders, including the
22 The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a peacekeeping operation that
has been in southern Lebanon since 1978. The mandate of the current force, consisting of
approximately 1,990 troops, assisted by 50 military observers, was recently extended until
August 31, 2006 by the Security Council. Critics of UNIFIL believe that its lack of
manpower and inability to prevent attacks in Israel have hampered its overall effectiveness
and that any new international peacekeeping deployment authorized by the Security Council
should be larger and with a more robust mandate or concept of operations than UNIFIL. On
July 24, 2006, four UNIFIL peacekeepers were killed in an errant Israeli airstrike.
23 The Lebanese Prime Minister offered to deploy 15,000 military personnel. (See below.)

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CRS-13
disputed Shib’a (Shebaa) Farms enclave. In preambular language, the resolution also
emphasizes the need to address the issue of prisoners on both sides The resolution
also calls upon the international community to extend financial and humanitarian
assistance to the Lebanese people, including facilitating safe return of displaced
persons.
According to the U.N. Secretary-General, the agreement entered into force on
August 14 at 5:00 a.m. GMT (8:00 a.m. in the region). The Secretary-General noted
with satisfaction that the leaders of Israel and Lebanon had accepted the resolution.
The Israeli cabinet voted on August 13, with one abstention, to approve the
resolution; however, Israeli officials have qualified their position by saying that
“defensive” military actions designed to prevent delivery of arms to Hezbollah or to
remove unauthorized militias from southern Lebanon would be permissible even
after the cease-fire goes into effect. The Lebanese cabinet, for its part, postponed a
meeting scheduled for August 13 to consider enforcement of the resolution (including
disarmament of Hezbollah), apparently reflecting divisions within the Lebanese
government, which contains two Hezbollah cabinet ministers.24 In this connection,
both Hezbollah and the Israeli military carried out heavy attacks to improve their
respective positions before the resolution went into effect.
Observers note that a number of factors will be key to the effectiveness of
international peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. Foremost is its acceptance by
both Israel, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese population. Secondly, given the intensity
of the situation and the potential for instances of armed resistance, the troops
deployed must be well-trained and equipped, and prepared to respond confidently to
instances of aggression. This would not be a “symbolic” or “presence” mission,
particularly if disarming the Hezbollah militia is part of the mandate. Consequently,
the so-called “rules of engagement,” which govern the range of military responses
troops may employ, would be of great significance. Nations contributing to this
international force also should be prepared to support their forces for what is likely
to be a lengthy deployment. Currently, the focus for contributions to this international
force has been on NATO nations, though with their on-going commitments to
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, available resources may be constrained for some.
Differing EU and U.S. Positions25
Although European governments have condemned Hezbollah’s kidnaping of
Israeli soldiers as a provocation, most European governments believe that the United
States is too close to Israel, to the detriment of any effort to end the conflict. Some
European observers believe that the United States has lost its influence in the region
due to the war in Iraq and to its support for Israel, which have complicated
Washington’s capacity to serve as an interlocutor with Arab governments.26
24 Steven Erlanger, “Cease-Iire Begins After a Day of Fierce Attacks,” The New York Times,
August 14,, 2006.
25 This section was prepared by Paul Gallis, Specialist in European Affairs.
26 Chris Patten, “While Bush and Blair fumble and fiddle, Beirut burns,” Financial Times,
(continued...)

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CRS-14
A conference gathering European governments, the United States, and some
Arab governments in Rome on July 26 failed to reach a consensus on how to end the
conflict. Arab and most European governments sought an immediate cease-fire. The
United States and Britain wanted instead a “sustainable” cease-fire, preceded by a
political settlement, interpreted by other European governments as a signal to Israel
to continue to strike targets in Lebanon.27 U.S. officials called for a multinational
force in southern Lebanon as soon as a cease-fire can take hold, but offered few if
any U.S. troops for such a force.
Some European governments, most notably France, then made proposals on
their own for settling the conflict. Few European allies support the U.S. approach for
an international force because they believe it would place their soldiers in the midst
of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict before a political settlement is in place. The French
government presented a memorandum, subsequently elaborated by President Chirac
and the foreign ministry, to end hostilities, reach a political settlement, and put in
place an international force on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Paris captured these
points in a draft resolution before the U.N. Security Council. The proposed
sequencing of steps to put in place the multinational force included an immediate
cease-fire; release by Hezbollah of Israeli prisoners; implementation of U.N.S.C.
1559, which returns full sovereignty to Lebanon and calls for the disarmament and
disbandment of Hezbollah; the evacuation of the Shib’a Farms by Israel; and the
deployment of an international force in southern Lebanon that would act in concert
and support of Lebanese forces there, and a separate international force occupying
the Shib’a Farms until an agreement can be reached settling their ownership.28
The EU also has called for a cease-fire, and the release of Israeli soldiers held
by Hezbollah and by Hamas. At the same time, the EU is calling on Israel not to
resort to “disproportionate action” in response to the situation.29 The EU position
buttressed that of France by calling for an international force after a political
settlement had been reached. On August 2, the European Union announced that it
will provide 10 million euros ($12.6 million) in aid to Lebanon to assist those
displaced by the fighting.
Divisions between the European allies and the United States have emerged in
an uncharacteristically public way. President Chirac and other European leaders have
said repeatedly that “there is no military solution” to problems on Israel’s borders,
while the Bush Administration has endorsed military action until there is a
26 (...continued)
July 19, 2006, p. 13; Eric Leser, “Washington, en s’alignant sur Israël, a perdu son
influence,” Le Monde, July 20, 2006, p.4.
27 “Il y a deux cessez-le-feu à réaliser,” Le Monde, July 28, 2006 [interview with Italian
Foreign Minister D’Alema].
28 “Mémorandum de la France sur la crise israëlo-libanaise,” July 27, 2006; Interview with
President Chirac, Le Monde, July 26, 2006; press briefing, French embassy, Washington,
July 28, 2006.
29 Statement from EU Council meeting of July 17-18, 2006; “Liban: Les Pays De L’ue Ne
S’entendent Pas Sur un “Cessez-le-feu Immédiat,” Le Monde, Aug. 2, 2006.

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CRS-15
“sustainable” political agreement. The Europeans are seeking to serve as a balancing
factor between the Arabs and Israel, in part no doubt due to significant Muslim
populations in many European states. Most European governments believe that the
U.S. approach to terrorism has become too ideological and impractical to yield a
solution. These Europeans condemn Hezbollah and Hamas as “extremists,” but they
separate such regional groups from Al Qaeda, which, in contrast, in their view, is not
interested in a political settlement of issues. These Europeans believe that the Bush
Administration’s proclaimed “war on terror” puts all three groups into the same box,
and sees their military defeat or annihilation as a prerequisite for Israeli security.
Whatever these differences, significant hurdles remain to fielding an
international force in Lebanon. Most European governments do not believe that
NATO, given U.S. leadership, would be acceptable to the Arab world as the core of
an international force. Possible alternatives include an EU force or one led by France.
Either the EU or France would face difficulties in organizing and leading such a
force. Such a force would require a headquarters, experienced at assembling,
commanding, and supplying troops; the Europeans lack experience in managing a
force of the size and complexity likely necessary for Lebanon. Open questions
include the following: With most European governments stretched by troop
deployments in Afghanistan and the Balkans, from where would its soldiers come?
While the mandate for an international force would be to secure borders under a U.N.
imprimatur, what rules of engagement would it follow? For example, would it be
prepared to engage, with force, Israeli incursions across the Lebanese border? Would
the international force have the concurrence of the Lebanese army in suppressing
Hezbollah elements that might still be active?
Arab Governments30
Regional governments, particularly the Sunni Arab regimes of Egypt, Jordan,
and Saudi Arabia, were initially critical of Hezbollah’s attack against Israel. Overall,
these governments are largely suspicious of Iran’s growing influence in the region,
particularly among Shiites, as King Abdullah of Jordan has publicly warned against
the formation of a “Shiite crescent” extending from Iran to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Nevertheless, Arab public opinion largely favors Hezbollah’s actions against Israel,
making Arab governments anxious to bring about a quick resolution to the conflict
with minimal Lebanese civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. The
moderate Sunni Arab regimes have called for an immediate cease-fire between Israel
and Hezbollah, the deployment of international peacekeepers along the
Israeli/Lebanese border, the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon,
and a prisoner exchange between the two sides.
Most Arab governments may have limited influence over the warring parties and
may direct their efforts toward the United States in trying to secure its involvement
in negotiations. Saudi Arabia may be one of the few countries who can use its vast
financial resources to entice Syria to take a harder stance toward Hezbollah, though
some analysts assert that the Syrian economy had already been benefitting from
30 This section was prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Analyst in Middle East Policy.

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CRS-16
increased Gulf investment and high oil prices before fighting broke out in Lebanon.31
Egypt continues to serve as an intermediary between Israel and Hamas, though it has
considerably less influence with Syria to encourage a cease-fire in the north.
The Regional Dimension and
Issues for U.S. Policy
Lebanon32
In launching an attack on Israel beginning on July 12, Hezbollah has gambled
that it will gain credit among Lebanese if Israel is perceived to back down under
Hezbollah pressure. Hezbollah leaders recall that its reputation in Lebanon was
enhanced when Israel withdrew unilaterally from southern Lebanon in May 2000
after Hezbollah inflicted mounting casualties on Israel troops in the area. On the
other hand, as the conflict continues, mounting resentment of Hezbollah’s actions in
precipitating the crisis may cause a reaction against Hezbollah to set in. The strong
reaction within Lebanon and elsewhere against Israel’s retaliatory campaign in
Lebanon, including bombing of the southern Lebanese village of Qana, resulting in
the death of dozens of civilians including many children, suggests that Israel’s
campaign is uniting sentiment among the often fractious Lebanese and causing
popular attitudes to harden. Hezbollah’s chief, Shiite cleric Hassan Nasrallah, has
acquired heroic status among many Lebanese for resisting the Israeli attacks. Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora, no ally of Hezbollah, has proposed a 6-part peace plan which
includes a provision to integrate the Hezbollah militia into the Lebanese Army,
thereby facilitating the deployment of Lebanese Army units up to the Israeli border.
U.S. Concern for Lebanese Independence. The outbreak of large-scale
fighting between Israel and Hezbollah and accompanying destruction of large parts
of Lebanon’s newly rebuilt infrastructure cast doubt on the future of U.S. support for
Lebanon as the situation evolves. In a broader sense, the conflict jeopardizes not
only the long-term stability of Lebanon but faces the Bush Administration with a
basic dilemma. On one hand the Administration is sympathetic to Israeli military
action against a terrorist organization; President Bush has spoken in favor of Israel’s
right of self-defense. On the other hand, the fighting deals a setback to
Administration efforts to support the rebuilding of democratic institutions in
Lebanon. As one commentator put it, “the two major agendas of his [Bush’s]
presidency — anti-terrorism and the promotion of democracy — are in danger of
colliding with each other in Lebanon.”33
If Lebanon disintegrates through a return to communal civil strife or becomes
closely aligned with a radicalized Syria or Iran, U.S. goals could be seriously
31 “Syria May be the Key to Peace,” Al Jazeera.net, July 27, 2006.
32 The following section was prepared by Alfred Prados, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs.
33 Michael Hirsh, “The Legacy On the Line,” Newsweek, July 24, 2006, p. 30.

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CRS-17
affected. The United States would lose a promising example of a modernizing,
pluralist state moving toward a resumption of democratic life and economic reform
and quite possibly face a return to the chaos that prevailed in Lebanon during the 15-
year civil war. Such conditions would be likely to foster terrorism, unrest on Israel’s
border, and other forms of regional instability. Alternatively, the growth of Syrian
or Iranian influence or some combination could strengthen regional voices supporting
extremist and likely anti-Western views associated with clerical regimes (Iran),
totalitarian models (Syria), or a militant stance toward Israel, quite possibly resulting
in some type of costly U.S. regional involvement to protect allies or maintain
stability.
Consequently, on July 28, after the latest fighting had begun, a State Department
official announced that the Administration is requesting an additional $10 million in
military aid to help prepare the Lebanese Army, in conjunction with international
forces, to deploy up to the Israeli-Lebanese border in the future. The U.S.
Administration has also provided some humanitarian aid since the crisis began.
Syria34
Syrian Support for Hezbollah. Syria has emerged as a key, if indirect, actor
in the current crisis, primarily though its role as a source and conduit for the delivery
of rockets and other Iranian weaponry to Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon; some
believe Syria is shipping weapons from its own inventories to Hezbollah as well.
The Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990 gave Syria an opportunity for the first time to
station troops in Lebanon, until it was forced to withdraw in April 2005 by a popular
outcry in Lebanon over alleged Syrian complicity in the murder of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. At the time, many observers interpreted the Syrian
withdrawal and subsequent election of an anti-Syrian majority in the Lebanese
parliament as a major setback for Syria’s ambitions in the region, and some even
predicted that the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Asad might have been
seriously weakened in backing down under external pressure. However, Syria
retained some assets in Lebanon, particularly the militant Shiite Muslim organization
Hezbollah, which refused to relinquish its arms and continued to support Syria’s
agenda by periodically attacking Israeli military positions near the Israeli-Lebanese
border.
Syrian support for Hezbollah is facilitated by long-standing ties between the
Syria and Iran, which helped create Hezbollah in the 1980s. This association has long
troubled U.S. policy makers, who see the two countries as reinforcing each other in
supporting terrorism and interfering in Lebanon. According to news stories,
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah visited Syrian President Bashar al-Asad
on July 27, reportedly to discuss resupply of Hezbollah units. The reports did quote
Nasrallah as saying that Hezbollah would not accept any “humiliating” conditions for
a cease-fire in Lebanon. Also, according to the reports, a senior Iranian security
official was in Damascus but it was not clear whether or not he met with Nasrallah
and Asad.
34 This section was prepared by Alfred Prados, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

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CRS-18
Many commentators believe Syria’s re-supply activity on behalf of Hezbollah
was an important factor in encouraging Hezbollah leaders to initiate large-scale
border and rocket attacks against Israel on July 12. In doing so, Syria achieves two
goals. First, Syria’s actions help forestall any move by the small Lebanese army to
replace Hezbollah units near the Israeli-Lebanese border and help ensure that
Lebanon will be unable to make an independent peace with Israel without Syrian
participation. Second, Syria’s policy strengthens the view in some Lebanese circles
that the departure of Syrian troops has led to stalemate and ultimately to nation-wide
devastation. At the same time, the current situation complicates any effort by the
United States to effect a “regime behavior change” along the lines of Libya and
increases the possibility that the United States, after shunning Syria for several years,
may have to deal with Damascus at some point in an effort to contain escalating
violence. Observers have noted that “Syria appears anxious to reassert its claim as
a crucial guarantor of stability in the Middle East.” So far, by employing Hezbollah
as a proxy against Israel, Syrian policy has appeared to reap benefits without
incurring any retaliatory attacks on Syrian territory. Some observers have suggested,
however, that Syria’s leadership is playing a dangerous game that could lead to
reprisals against Syria itself.35
U.S. Policy Toward Syria During the Conflict. Since the outbreak of
fighting, U.S. officials have increased their criticism of Syria’s political and logistical
support for Hezbollah. On July 22, President Bush commented that “[f]or many
years, Syria has been a primary sponsor of Hezbollah and it has helped provide
Hezbollah with shipments of Iranian-made weapons.”36 Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, speaking to reporters on July 26, rejected comments that the
United States and Syria lack diplomatic channels for communication, pointing out
that there are existing diplomatic channels that can be used when Syrian leaders are
ready to talk. On his side, Syrian Ambassador to the United States Imad Moustapha
told Associated Press in comments reported on July 27 that there has been “not a
single contact” by the U.S. Government with Syria since the fighting began. Another
Syrian official commented that “Syria is not going to help while it is being isolated
and President Bush is attacking Syria all the time.” In another vein, Syrian officials
have pointed out that Syria has accommodated the United States by issuing large
numbers of visas to Americans fleeing from Lebanon via Syria for evacuation to the
United States and has opened its doors to other groups of refugees from Lebanon as
well.
More broadly, Secretary Rice has signaled that the United States will not accept
a resumption of Syria’s former influential role in Lebanon. She was quoted by
Reuters News Wire on July 26 as saying that Syria should not be allowed to return to
Lebanon and influence events there, and neither should Iran. She warned Syria and
Iran not to “torpedo” any attempts to stop the fighting between Hezbollah and Israeli
forces and expressed the hope that the two countries would “behave responsibly.”
Subsequently, on July 28, Israeli Minister of Defense Amir Peretz commented that
“we have no intention of an offensive toward Syria” but warned that “[w]e hope
35 Kim Murphy, “Crisis May Put Syria Back In Political Mix,” Los Angeles Times, July 18,
2006.
36 “Rice Rejects Cease-Fire As Mideast Quick Fix,” Dow Jones News Wire, July 22, 2006.

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CRS-19
Hezbollah does not drag Damascus into the conflict.” On July 30, in his first public
comment on the recent fighting in Lebanon, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad
described the Israeli strikes on the southern Lebanese village of Qana as “state
terrorism” and added that “[t]he Syrian people are ready to offer anything that might
support, help and bolster Lebanon.”
Iran37
Iran’s Relationship to Hezbollah. Iran maintains a relationship with
Lebanese Hezbollah that could be described as patron-client, or mentor and protégé.
In the current crisis, Iranian leaders appear to want Hezbollah’s popularity in
Lebanon to increase as a steadfast opponent of Israeli hegemony, but Iranian
strategists also reportedly are wary that Hezbollah might be damaged militarily by
Israel and less able to act against Israel in the future. Many Iranian leaders see
Hezbollah as an outgrowth of the 1979 Islamic revolution, and U.S. experts have
long assumed that Iran would expend substantial resources and take significant risks
to boost Hezbollah’s prospects. Others see Hezbollah as a surrogate with which Iran
can strike at and weaken Israel, and strengthen Iran’s credentials as a hardline,
rejectionist Muslim state. Hezbollah was formed in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics
sympathetic to Iran’s Islamic revolution, some of whom had studied under Iran’s
revolutionary leader, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, when Khomeini was in
exile in Najaf, Iraq (1963-1978).
On the other hand, Hezbollah has matured as a political movement, and many
no longer see Iran as directing Hezbollah, as it did in the 1980s. At the height of
Iran’s influence over Hezbollah, it had about 2,000 Revolutionary Guard forces in
Lebanon, advising and training Hezbollah’s militia and coordinating arms shipments
to it. After Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from south Lebanon, the number of Guard
advisers fell to less than 50, according to a Washington Post report of April 13, 2005.
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials said Iran was giving Hezbollah about
$100 million per year in financial assistance, but that assistance apparently has
transitioned to in-kind provisions of arms and humanitarian projects.38 Iranian arms
flows to Hezbollah have continued in recent years. The method of transfer, by all
accounts, have been Iranian cargo flights, off-loaded at Damascus airport and trucked
into Lebanon for delivery to Hezbollah.
U.S. Efforts to Contain Iran. Well before the recent crisis between Israel and
Hezbollah, the Administration’s “National Security Strategy” document, released on
March 16, 2006, said the United States “may face no greater challenge from a single
country than Iran.” This assessment is largely based on the apparent acceleration of
Iran’s nuclear program, which the Administration believes is intended to achieve a
37 This section prepared by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, on
August 3, 2006. For more information, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and
Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
38 Hezbollah reportedly receives millions in donations from overseas supporters, from
various criminal operations, and from Lebanese Shiite businessmen. It also generates
revenue from Hezbollah-owned businesses in Lebanon.

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nuclear weapons capability. Hezbollah’s receipt of funding, training, and weapons
from Iran is likely to solidify the Administration’s view of Iran.
To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues in attempting to
contain Iran — to prevent it from building weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or
from generating revenues that can be used to fund terrorist groups such as Hezbollah.
The Bush Administration also is supporting a long-term policy of changing Iran’s
regime by providing funds to pro-democracy and human rights activists inside and
outside Iran. However, the near-term Administration focus is on attempting to
prevent any Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough. As part of that effort, the Bush
Administration announced on May 31, 2006 that it would negotiate with Iran in
concert with U.S. allies; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited
dialogue with Iran. The U.S. offer of talks is predicated on Iran accepting a package
of incentives and disincentives, presented to Iran on July 6 by the permanent U.N.
Security Council members plus Germany, if Iran suspends its uranium enrichment
efforts. Iran has not accepted that offer to date, and, on July 31, 2006, the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 1696, demanding that Iran suspend uranium
enrichment activities by August 31, 2006 or face possible U.N. sanctions.

To date, the United States is the only country that has strict economic sanctions
on Iran, including a ban on U.S. trade with and investment in that country. Pending
legislation (H.R. 282, S. 333, and S. 2657) would renew or tighten a law that
sanctions foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector (Iran-Libya Sanctions Act or
ILSA). To avoid allowing ILSA to lapse while the bills cited above are under
consideration, both chambers have passed H.R. 5877 that extends ILSA until
September 29, 2006. It has been presented to the President. If diplomacy and
international sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran’s
nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran.
Iraq39
Iraq’s post-Saddam political structure is dominated by Shiite Islamists who
share common ideological roots with those of Hezbollah. As a result, senior Iraqi
figures, including Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the undisputed Shiite leader
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and powerful radical Shiite faction leader Moqtada al-Sadr
have all expressed support for Hezbollah in the current conflict. Maliki’s comments,
in particular — he said on July 24, 2006 that Israeli raids on civilian targets constitute
a “violation of all the laws of war” — complicated his visit to Washington DC during
July 25-26, 2006.40 During his visit, some Members of Congress called on him to
condemn the Hezbollah provocation that began the crisis, and questioned whether his
government could be a reliable partner in the global war on terrorism. Sistani,
followed by most Iraqi Shiites and by many Shiites in Lebanon as well, issued a
pronouncement on July 31, 2006 threatening unspecified “dire consequences” if an
39 Prepared by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, on August 3, 2006.
See also CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth
Katzman.
40 Strange, Hannah. "Mideast Crisis 'Threatening Iraq': Maliki." United Press International,
July 24, 2006.

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immediate cease-fire to stop “this Israeli aggression on Lebanon” is not imposed.
The faction of Moqtada al-Sadr, which fields a militia called the “Mahdi Army,” said
it was forming a group of 1,500 fighters to go to Lebanon to help Hezbollah. On the
other hand, Iraqi leaders are wrestling with continuing Sunni-led insurgency and
growing Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, and many view their positions on Lebanon
as more rhetorical than operational.
Regional Reactions: The Moderate Arab States41
Public responses to the Gaza-Israel-Lebanon crisis in the Arab and wider
Islamic world have featured a number of convergent and divergent themes. The most
common theme emanating from the region has been the expression of concern for the
well-being of civilian populations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and the expression
of anger over perceived and alleged disproportionate use of force by the Israeli
military. Regional media sources have characterized the United States as politically
and materially supportive of Israel’s actions, and some parties have alleged that the
U.S. government is complicit in the deaths of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians.
Following an Israeli military strike on the Lebanese village of Qana in which a
number of Lebanese civilians were killed, Arab media has increasingly featured
commentary characterizing Israel’s military operations as war crimes. Other themes
have highlighted the negative roles of Iran and Syria as state sponsors of Hezbollah’s
terrorist activities and have identified leaders in those two countries as responsible
for the dangerous escalation of the conflict as well as ultimately culpable for the
deaths of civilians on all sides.
Other public considerations of the crisis in the region have focused on possible
signs of an emerging rivalry between Shiite and Sunni powers in the Middle East,
particularly between Iran, supported by Alawite-led Syria, and the traditional leaders
of the Sunni Arab states, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Officials from these
countries criticized Hezbollah’s “unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible acts “
at an emergency Arab League meeting on July 15. Yemen, Algeria, Syria, and
Lebanon disagreed, however, and Yemen called for severing all Arab ties with Israel.
Significant attention has been focused on the public positions outlined by King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, and
unnamed Saudi officials who have identified Hezbollah and those “behind its back”
as responsible for the current crisis. They also have characterized Hezbollah’s
actions as “uncalculated adventures” that are distinct from “legitimate resistance” to
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The critical statements from Saudi leaders and other Arab leaders have been
interpreted as reflective of the perspective of sovereign national governments
suffering from terrorist attacks on their own territory and disturbed by the precedent
potentially set by Hamas and Hezbollah’s actions - the permissibility of armed, non-
state Islamist actors initiating massive conflict with other states without the approval
or support of their national governments. At the same time, leaders of most Arab
states have spoken out against what some of them have publicly characterized as “the
war being launched by Israel on Lebanon, its people, economy and infrastructure” in
41 This section was prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Middle East Policy Analyst.

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order to balance their criticism of Hezbollah and its supporters with statements
expressing criticism of Israel and concern for Arab civilians. The Saudi government,
in particular, has adapted its public statements significantly to reflect growing
condemnation of Israel’s military campaign and criticism of the United States and
others for their refusal to support an immediate cease-fire.42 Support for Lebanon and
the Palestinian Authority also has moved beyond rhetoric: Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
have announced over $2 billion in donations to support the Lebanese and Palestinian
governments, and numerous bank accounts have been established to collect donations
from other governments and concerned individuals in a number of Arab countries.43
Role of Congress
Legislation, Foreign Assistance, Sanctions,
and Equipment Use Restrictions
Congress has engaged and may continue to engage in U.S. efforts to resolve
crises in the Middle East using three distinct legislative tools: the appropriation of
foreign assistance, the passage of sanctions legislation, and the exercise of oversight
regarding legal restrictions on the use of U.S. military assistance by foreign
recipients. The United States has longstanding aid programs to countries in the
Middle East, including (among others) Israel, Lebanon, and since 1993, the
Palestinian Authority. Foreign assistance has been used to promote the peace process,
spur economic development, and in the case of Israel, to strengthen its defense
capabilities through military assistance. Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah — the
states and entities that Congress has noted for aggression against Israel, support for
terrorism, or terrorist activities in the current crises — are currently subject to fairly
comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions. In accordance with the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA), the U.S. Government places conditions on the use of defense
articles and defense services transferred by it to foreign recipients. Violation of these
conditions, when identified by the executive branch, can lead to the suspension of
deliveries or termination of the contracts for such defense items, among other things.
Israeli military activities have come under scrutiny pursuant to the AECA in the past
(see below).
42 See CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations. Saudi Press
Agency (Riyadh) “King Abdullah chairs Cabinet’s session,” July 17, 2006; “Saudi Arabia’s
Royal Court Issues Statement On Situation in Lebanon,” al-Ikhbariyah Satellite Channel
(Riyadh), OSC Document FEA20060725025650, July 25, 2006; Saudi Press Agency, “King
Abdullah Chairs Cabinet Session,” July 31, 2006; Prince Turki al-Faisal, Remarks to the
New American Foundation, Washington, D.C., July 31, 2006.
43 Kuwait News Agency, “Kuwait Announces USD 500 Million Deposit in Lebanon Central
Bank,” July 30, 2006; Khalid Al-Zaid, “Kuwait Offers USD 45 Million for Palestinian
Authority’s Budget,” Kuwait News Agency, August 3, 2006; Andrew Hammond, “Saudi says
Israel Attacks Threaten Wider War,” Reuters, July 25, 2006; Reuters, “Details of aid to
Lebanon,” August 2, 2006.

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Recent Legislation.44 In response to the current crisis, Congress took swift
steps to express its support of Israel and that country’s “right to take appropriate
action to deter aggression by terrorist groups and their state sponsors,” and to urge
“the President to continue fulling supporting Israel as Israel exercises its right of self-
defense in Lebanon and Gaza.”45 Some Members of Congress have called on the
President to appeal to all parties for an immediate cessation of violence, to commit
to multi-party negotiations, and have expressed support for an international
peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon.46 Others have called for “the cessation
of targeting...of infrastructure vital to non-combatants”; establishment of “a secure
humanitarian corridor” for purposes of evacuation and transporting of food and
medicine to the civilian population; an immediate cease-fire; and a “comprehensive
and just solution”.47 Finally, one House resolution calls on the President to appoint
a Special Envoy for Middle East Peace.48
Congress and Evacuation Costs for U.S. Citizens. In the early stages
of U.S. government-supported evacuations of Americans from Lebanon, the State
Department required evacuees to sign promissory notes to assume financial liability
of the costs of their evacuation. Several Members of Congress objected to this, noting
that the law is ambiguous at best, and called on the U.S. Secretary of State to waive
the statutory requirements for reimbursement.49 On July 18, 2006, after the Secretary
44 The following section was prepared by Dianne Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
Legislation.
45 S.Res. 534, Resolved clauses (1), (2), and (3). Generally, all the resolutions introduced
on July 18 and 19, 2006. contained similar language. Since the current crisis has emerged,
to date, Congress has received 5 resolutions, and has voted on two. S.Res. 534, introduced
on July 18, 2006, by Senator Frist and others, was considered and agreed to by voice vote
the same day; Congressional Record of July 18, 2006, S7766-7767, and S7692-7694.
H.Res. 921, introduced on July 18, 2006, by Representative Boehner and others, was
considered and agreed to on July 20, 2006, by a vote of 410 — 8 (with four voting
“present”). H.Res. 922, introduced on July 18, 2006, by Representative Ackerman and
others; H.Res. 923, introduced on July 18, 2006, by Representative Shaw; and H.Res. 926,
introduced on July 19, 2006, by Representative Issa were each referred to the Committee on
International Relations. It was reported that some Members drafted a resolution that would
have cast Lebanon’s responsibility differently than those resolutions agreed to, and would
have called for restrain from all sides. See Flaherty, Anne Plummer. “House on Track to
Voice Support for Israel’s Military Campaign in Lebanon,” Associated Press, July 20, 2006.
By contrast, S.Res. 534 “urges all sides to protect innocent civilian life and infrastructure...”.
H.Res. 921 “recognizes Israel’s longstanding commitment to minimizing civilian loss and
welcomes Israel’s continued efforts to prevent civilian casualties”.
46 H.Con.Res. 450, introduced on July 19, 2006, by Representative Kucinich and others,
referred to Committee on International Relations.
47 H.Res. 945, introduced on July 25, 2006, by Representative Jackson-Lee and others,
referred to Committee on International Relations.
48 H.Res. 954, introduced on July 26, 2006, by Representative Leach, referred to Committee
on International Relations.
49 § 4(b)(2)(A) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended (22
U.S.C. 2671), authorizes the Secretary of State to expend funds to evacuate “U.S. citizens
(continued...)

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of State consulted with some Members, the State Department announced that such
fees would be waived. Congress has before it legislative proposals that authorize the
Secretary of State to redistribute funds within the State Department’s budget to cover
the costs of evacuations, permanently change the statutory basis under which the
State Department requests reimbursements, or replenish funds in the budget of the
Department of Health and Human Services that are expended once evacuees have
returned to the United States.50
U.S. Foreign Assistance.51 The United States has longstanding aid programs
to countries in the Middle East, including (among others) Israel, Lebanon, and since
1993, the Palestinian Authority. Foreign assistance has been used to promote the
peace process, spur economic development, and in the case of Israel, to strengthen
its defense capabilities through military assistance.
! Israel:52 Since 1949, the United States has provided more than $96
billion in various forms of assistance to Israel, and it is the largest
annual recipient of U.S. aid, outside of current operations in Iraq.
Israel receives various types of assistance, the two largest being
Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF). ESF, totaling an estimated $237.6 million in FY2006, can be
used in a number of ways to support Israel’s economy. FMF, totaling
an estimated $2.26 billion in FY2006 and expected to reach $2.4
billion by FY2008, is used for defense purchases, 75% of which is
used to purchase U.S. manufactured defense articles. During the
current conflict, the United States has reportedly accelerated
deliveries of Israeli-purchased precision-guided bombs and jet fuel.
49 (...continued)
or third-country nationals, on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable”
“when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster”.
50 Related to the State Department’s authority to require reimbursement: H.R. 5828,
introduced July 18, 2006, by Representative Dingell, referred to the Committee on
International Relations, amends the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to
remove the reimbursement requirement from permanent law. S. 3690, introduced July 19,
2006, by Senator Stabenow, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, authorizes the
Secretary of State to cover the costs of evacuation related to the Israel-Hezbollah crisis
without amending the underlying statute. S. 3741, introduced by Senator Lugar and others
on July 26, 2006, and agreed to by Unanimous Consent, authorizes the Secretary of State
to move funds from one account to another to cover the costs of evacuations. Two measures
introduced on July 24, 2006 — H.R. 5865 and H.R. 5869 — amend the Social Security Act
to increase near-term funding for assistance to newly evacuated U.S. citizens. H.R. 5865,
introduced by Representative Thomas, and referred to the Committee on Ways and Means,
has been agreed to by both chambers by voice vote (in the House) or unanimous consent (in
the Senate, with an amendment). H.R. 5869, introduced by Representative McDermott and
others, was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.
51 This section was prepared by Connie Veillette, Analyst in Foreign Policy.
52 For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy
M. Sharp, and CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East:
Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2007 Request, also by Jeremy M. Sharp.

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On August 1, 2006, the London Times reported that Israel has more
than $4 billion in outstanding credit and undelivered orders with
American defense contractors.53
! Lebanon:54 The United States provides modest amounts of assistance
to Lebanon. Annual funding for Lebanon has been maintained at
roughly $35 to $40 million since FY2001.55 ESF funding in FY2006
is an estimated $40 million, with $36 million proposed for FY2007.
FMF grants are an estimated $1 million in FY2006, but the FY2007
request is $4.8 million. According to DefenseNews.com, “The
United States has renewed its promise of military aid to Lebanon
with more concentration on improving Internal Security Forces (ISF)
to reduce the burden imposed on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and bolstering Lebanon’s capabilities to deal with internal threats.”56
Lebanese leaders have estimated that damage to the country’s
infrastructure from the Israeli bombing campaign could be as high
as $2 billion. It is conceivable that the United States may be called
upon to increase future assistance to Lebanon to help with
rebuilding. The United States has already pledged $30 million in
immediate humanitarian aid. The European Union announced more
than $50 million, while Saudi Arabia has committed to $50 million
in immediate assistance and $500 million for reconstruction.
! Palestinian Authority:57 Since the signing of the Oslo Accord in
1993, the United States has provided more than $1.8 billion in
economic assistance to the Palestinians, but with the formation of
the Hamas-led government in March 2006, the United States has
withheld both direct and indirect foreign aid to the Palestinians. For
FY2006, Congress appropriated $150 million in Economic Support
Funds, which has now been suspended. The FY2007 House-passed
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act provides no funding.
53 “Israel Awaits Delivery Of $4.2Bn In Weaponry From US Defence Firms,” London
Times, August 1, 2006.
54 See also CRS Report RL33509, Lebanon, by Alfred B. Prados.
55 For FY2003, Congress directed that $10 million in assistance could not be obligated until
the President certified that the Lebanese Armed Forces had deployed to the internationally
recognized border with Israel, and that Lebanon was asserting its authority over the border
area. The provision was meant to compel Lebanon to exercise control of the border area
that was controlled by Hezbollah forces. Lebanon had resisted moving into the area until
Israel evacuated the disputed Shib’a Farms area. The funds were released in March 2004
after negotiations among the United States, Israel and Lebanon.
56 “U.S. Pledges More Aid to Lebanon in 2007, DefenseNews.com, July 10, 2006.
57 For more information, see CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians,
by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.

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Sanctions.58 Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah — the states and entities that
Congress has noted for aggression against Israel, support for terrorism, or terrorist
activities in the current crises — are currently subject to fairly comprehensive U.S.
economic sanctions. The Secretary of State designated Syria and Iran as state
sponsors of acts of international terrorism, in 1979 and 1984 respectively, thus
triggering a myriad of statutorily required restrictions and prohibitions on aid, non-
emergency agricultural aid, trade, support in the international banks, and other
economic transactions.59 Such a designation generally triggers a prohibition on all
but the most basic of humanitarian exchanges.60 Please see Appendix C for detailed
information on sanctions.
Restrictions on the Use of U.S. Supplied Military Equipment.61 Some
critics of U.S. policy in the Middle East raise questions regarding the use of U.S.-
supplied military equipment to Israel during times of heightened Arab-Israeli conflict
in the region. In accordance with United States law, the U.S. Government places
conditions on the use of defense articles and defense services transferred by it to
foreign recipients. Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act states that U.S. defense
articles and defense services shall be sold to friendly countries “solely” for use in
58 For more detail on U.S. economic sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048,
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman. For Syria, see CRS
Report RL33487, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B. Prados.
59 § 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. 2405(j)), under
which the state sponsor of acts of international terrorism designation is made, authorizes the
curtailment of commercial trade in dual-use goods and technology to named countries. §
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371) prohibits most
foreign aid, non-emergency agricultural aid, peace corps programs, or Export-Import Bank
funding to designated countries. § 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22
U.S.C. 2780) prohibits government sales or leases of defense goods or defense services to
named countries. § 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985 (P.L. 99-83; 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) authorizes the President to ban the importation of
goods and services from any state found to support acts of international terrorism. § 1621
of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118; 22 U.S.C. 262p-4q), § 6 of the
Bretton Woods Agreements Act amendments, 1978 (P.L. 95-435; 22 U.S.C. 286e-11) each
state similar prohibitions relating to international bank programs. § 502(b)(2)(F) of the
Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462) requires the withholding of favorable trade
terms with cited countries. Annual foreign operations appropriations measures usually
restrict or prohibit most forms of aid to designated countries. Other legislation prohibits
certain transactions with countries found to be not cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism
efforts, and still other legislation prohibits or curtails economic relations with third countries
that aid terrorist-designated states.
60 Some trade, albeit highly restricted, is allowed with Iran and Syria. U.S. exporters may,
for example, market agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical supplies to countries
designated as supporters of international terrorism under terms of the Trade Sanctions
Reform Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.). Suppliers may provide spare
parts related to civil air safety. U.S. persons may import and export informational material
and propaganda. And since 2000, in an attempt through trade diplomacy to open relations
with Iran, one may import nuts, dried fruit, caviar, and carpets from that country.
61 For more detailed information, see CRS Report RL30982, U.S. Defense Articles and
Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: Restrictions on their Use, by Richard F. Grimmett.

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“internal security,” for use in “legitimate self-defense,” to enable the recipient to
participate in “regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations,” to enable the recipient to participate in “collective
measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring
international peace and security,” and to enable the foreign military forces “in less
developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities
helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries.”
Questions raised regarding the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment by Israel
in Lebanon in June and July 1982 led the Reagan Administration to determine on
July 15, 1982, that Israel “may” have violated its July 23, 1952, Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement with the United States (TIAS 2675). Concerns centered on
whether or not Israel had used U.S.-supplied anti-personnel cluster bombs against
civilian targets during its military operations in Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. The
pertinent segment of that 1952 agreement between Israel and the United States reads
as follows:
The Government of Israel assures the United States Government that such
equipment, materials, or services as may be acquired from the United States ...
are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its
legitimate self defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of
which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and
measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other
state.
None of the critical terms such as “internal security,” “legitimate self-defense,”
or “act of aggression” is defined within this 1952 U.S.-Israeli agreement. On July 19,
1982, the Reagan Administration announced that it would prohibit new exports of
cluster bombs to Israel. This prohibition was lifted in November 1988. In light of the
Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981, Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., reported to Congress on June 10, 1981, that the Israeli use
of American-supplied military equipment in this raid “may” have constituted a
substantial violation of the applicable 1952 U.S.-Israeli agreement. The President
chose to exercise the authority set forth in sections 2 (b) and 42(e)(1) of the Arms
Export Control Act to suspend “for the time being” the shipment of F-16 aircraft
scheduled for delivery to Israel. However, on August 17, 1981, the Reagan
Administration lifted its suspension on deliveries to Israel and all of the planes were
transferred. On two other occasions — April 5, 1978, and August 7, 1979 — the
Carter Administration stated that the Israelis “may” have violated their 1952
agreement with the United States through the use of American-origin military
equipment in operations conducted in Lebanon. However, the U.S. did not suspend
or terminate any Israeli arms sales, credits, or deliveries in either of these cases.
In two instances, questions concerning the improper use by Israel of U.S.
weapons were raised, but the President concluded that a violation of the agreement
regarding use of U.S. supplied equipment did not occur. On October 1, 1985, Israel
used U.S.-supplied aircraft to bomb Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia. The Reagan Administration subsequently stated that
the Israeli raid was “understandable as an expression of self-defense,” although the
bombing itself “cannot be condoned.” On July 14, 1976, following the Israeli rescue

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mission at Entebbe, Uganda in early July 1976, the Department of State declared that
Israel’s use of U.S.-supplied military equipment during that operation was in
accordance with the 1952 U.S.-Israeli agreement.
Implications
Prospects for a Regional War62
With Israel fighting what amounts to a two-front war in the Gaza Strip and
Lebanon against two non-state actors, the possibility of a third front opening up may
depend largely on whether or not the fighting spreads to Syria. After several weeks
of fighting, neither Israel nor Syria has indicated any willingness to see the conflict
expand, though Syrian President Bashar al-Asad placed his military on high alert
following Israeli air and ground maneuvers close to the Syrian border. Syria would
be at a major technological and operational disadvantage to the more advanced
Israeli military in a potential confrontation. Israel also wants to contain the fighting
to southern Lebanon, though it is concerned that Syria may continue to allow the re-
supply of Hezbollah over its borders.
So far, there have been no reports of foreign fighters joining Hezbollah in
southern Lebanon and protests around the region have been limited and contained by
local authorities. However, many Lebanese continue to worry over the prospect of
renewed sectarian conflict in Lebanon itself. Hezbollah’s unilateral decision to attack
Israel, dragging the whole of Lebanon into a conflict many groups did not desire, may
lead to the arming of factions politically opposed to Hezbollah. According to Michael
Young, commentator in the Lebanese newspaper The Daily Star, “When the diverse
religious communities decide the problem is that one side has the weapons while the
others have nothing but a choice to remain silent, Lebanon will break down, and it
could do so violently.”63
U.S. Homeland Security64
Hezbollah: Assessing Capabilities and Intent. Hezbollah has a history
of attacking U.S. personnel and interests overseas; however, it has never claimed to
have carried out a terrorist attack in the United States.65 The Administration believes
62 This section was prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Analyst in Middle East Policy.
63 “The Meaning of a Hezbollah Victory,” The Daily Star (Beirut), July 20, 2006.
64 This section was prepared by John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and International
Crime.
65 It should be noted past activities are not indicative of future actions. Al Qaeda, prior to
the attacks on the homeland of September 11, 2001, frequently attacked U.S. facilities and
personnel located overseas. There is little understanding of the types of actions undertaken
by the U.S. or Israel that would precipitate a terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland from
Hezbollah. Some analysts assert that should the current situation in the Middle East directly
threaten Iran’s sense of security or if Hezbollah is significantly degraded in its ability to
(continued...)

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that Hezbollah has a presence in the United States and “has the capability to strike
inside the United States.”66 The U.S. government’s assessments of Hezbollah’s
intent to attack inside the United States have been more nuanced. In a January 2005
multi-year planning document authored by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Administration concluded that Hezbollah is unlikely to attack the U.S.
homeland. However, in February 2006, Director of National Intelligence Negroponte
testified during the Annual Threat Assessment Briefing to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that “Hezbollah, while focused on its agenda in Lebanon,
has a worldwide support network and is capable of attacks against U.S. interests if
it feels its Iranian patron is threatened.” On July 16, 2006, the DHS and FBI issued
a joint threat bulletin stating that although there was no specific or credible
information suggesting an imminent terrorist threat to the United States.
Hezbollah has concentrated its efforts on actions that provide financial support
to overseas operations and further the establishment of its presence in the United
States. In recent years, a number of individuals suspected of belonging to and
supporting U.S.-based Hezbollah cells have been arrested and charged with crimes
ranging from credit card scams, trafficking in cigarettes, money laundering, evading
immigration laws, loan fraud, and the purchase of dual use technology equipment.
In March, 2006, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Mueller announced
that Hezbollah had succeeded in smuggling some operatives across the Mexican
border into the United States. He further noted “this was an occasion on which
Hezbollah operatives were assisting others with some association with Hezbollah in
coming into the United States.” The Director testified that this particular Hezbollah
effort was dismantled and the individuals that had been smuggled in were
identified.67 Though the disruption of this group’s effort was heralded as good news,
some analysts are concerned that other Hezbollah human and material smuggling
efforts may not have been detected.
Media reports indicate that in response to the recent military operations
between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah, the FBI has increased surveillance and is re-
energizing investigations of known and suspected Hezbollah agents and supporters
residing in the United States. Some national security observers also note that the FBI
is working with local law enforcement and community leaders in hopes of identifying
individuals that may undertake criminal actions as a sign of sympathetic support to
one party involved in the current conflict. Since the start of the latest conflict,
unconfirmed reports suggest 300 members of U.S. based Hezbollah have been
arrested since the 1980s.
65 (...continued)
manage a worldwide presence and supporting activities, Hezbollah may launch terrorist
attacks against domestic and international U.S. targets as a sign of support to Iran or in
attempt to assert its relevancy in the worldwide perception of its organization.
66 Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, testimony before the
Senate Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, February 16, 2005.
67 Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, testimony before the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Science,
State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies March 28, 2006.

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Sympathizer Attacks: Threats and Responses. While U.S. authorities
continue to stress there is no intelligence of an imminent threat to the homeland,
there is always a concern regarding an attack by individuals sympathetic to the efforts
of Hezbollah or Hamas. Such attacks might not be ordered by the parent organization
thus making detection and prevention by U.S. law enforcement extremely difficult.
Since the beginning of this recent Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, it appears related
sympathizer attacks have occurred. On July 28, 2006, a Seattle gunman, described
by his parents as mentally unstable, killed one person and wounded five others at a
Jewish charity office due to his desire for “the United States to leave Iraq and stop
arming Israel”.68 An FBI spokesperson described this attack as a hate crime, not an
act of terrorism. Other reports of criminal activity possibly related to the Israeli-
Hezbollah conflict include an incendiary device being thrown at a Jewish temple in
New York City on July 28, 2006.69 Two Jewish businesses were vandalized with
graffiti that included swastikas and messages stating “U R Next.”
In response to these incidents, many major metropolitan cities have increased
security and patrolling around Jewish synagogues and neighborhoods. However,
some observers are concerned that the increase in the number of unresolved
suspicious incidents coupled with additional patrols may have an negative impact on
the operational readiness of local law enforcement and first responder organizations.
DHS grants are reserved for non-governmental organizations and faith-based
communities that are assessed to be at increased risk due to crises such as the current
conflict. However, to date none of the $25 million allocated to DHS for this program
has been distributed. DHS Secretary Chertoff recently directed that these funds be
made available to “provide appropriate parties, based on risk, to allow organizations
to take precautionary and preventative measures to strengthen security in their
communities.”
Cyber-Security. A significant increase in cyber-attacks directed at the U.S.
government and private sector entities has been underway since the beginning of the
conflict in Lebanon.70 Of the approximately ten-thousand attacks that have occurred,
many have been focused on prominent public and private entities such as the U.S.
House of Representatives, the U.S. military, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and Microsoft. To date these incidents have been limited to minor
web intrusions and website defacements.71 However, as with past Israeli-Hezbollah
conflicts, some observers are concerned that the longer the conflict persists the more
68 “Gunman Spoke of Outrage at U.S. and Israel,” Gulf Times, July 31, 2006
[http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=100078&version=
1&template_id=43&parent_id=19].
69 Synagogue Security is Beefed Up, New York Post, August 1, 2006; online at
[http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/nypost/access/1086889471.html?dids=1086889471:108688
9471&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Aug+1%2C+2006&author=Perry+Chiaramo
nte&pub=New+York+Post&edition=&startpage=008&desc=SYNAGOGUE+SECURIT
Y+IS+BEEFED+UP].
70 Digital implication of the Attack to Lebanon: It’s cyber war, Zone-H, August 1, 2006
[http://www.zone-h.org/content/view/13932/30/].
71 Cyberwar the Beginning, Zone-H, July 28, 2006 [http://www.zone-h.org/content/view/
13932/30/].

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sophisticated the cyber-attacks will become, thus placing U.S. computer systems and
national cyber-infrastructure at greater risk.72
Islam, Al Qaeda, and the Global War on Terrorism73
The conflict in Lebanon has challenged many Sunni Islamists, including jihadist
Al Qaeda leaders such as Ayman Al Zawahiri, to reconcile their documented
animosity toward Shiite Muslims with their desire to appear to be in solidarity with
anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment and activity emerging around the Islamic
world in response to the crisis. Debate over the legitimacy of providing support for
Hezbollah, a Shiite Lebanese militia, has been particularly pointed on many extremist
Internet fora and in a series of public statements issued by conservative Sunni Islamic
leaders. Some have condemned Hezbollah’s actions as part of a Shiite conspiracy
to gain regional power or a leadership bid by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah,
while others have argued that Sunni and Shiite Muslims should unite to confront
Israel and its supporters.74 To the extent that these debates may inspire unity or
division within and across religious and political communities in the Arab world and
beyond, they may have important implications for the success of U.S. foreign policy
initiatives in the region, and for U.S. counterterrorism policy objectives in particular.
The airing of diverse perspectives across the Arab and wider Islamic worlds has
brought the competing religious and political priorities of some important figures and
groups in contrast and conflict. Some conservative Sunni Islamic leaders, such as
Qatar-based cleric and international Muslim Brotherhood figure Yusuf Al Qaradawi
have argued that Muslims should support the activities of Hezbollah and Hamas as
legitimate “resistance” activities, based on Quranic injunctions to defend Muslim
territory that has been invaded by outsiders.75 Similarly, Egypt’s Grand Mufti Ali
Gomaa has stated that “Hezbollah is defending its country and what it is doing is not
terrorism.”76 Senior clerics in Saudi Arabia have offered mixed reactions to the crisis.
For example, Sheikh Abdallah Bin Jibrin has re-released a statement declaring that
any support for “rejectionist” (a derogatory term for Shiite) parties, including
Hezbollah was impermissible on religious grounds, whereas Sheikh Salman Al Awda
has called for Sunnis to set aside their “fundamental and deep disagreement” with
Hezbollah and Shiites in order to confront “the criminal Jews and Zionists.”77
72 For more information, see CRS Report RL33123, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack,
by John Rollins and Clay Wilson.
73 This section was prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Middle East Policy Analyst, on
August 3, 2006.
74 For discussions of these competing views, see Bernard Haykel, “The Enemy of My Enemy
Is Still My Enemy,” New York Times, July 26, 2006; and, Annia Ciezadlo, “Sheikh Up,”
New Republic, August 7, 2006.
75 “Islamic Cleric Al-Qaradawi Supports Hizballah, HAMAS,” Al-Jazirah Television
(Doha), OSC Document GMP20060730638004, July 30, 2006.
76 Reuters, “Egypt’s Mufti Defends Hizbollah Operations,” July 28, 2006.
77 Sheikh Abdallah Bin-Jibrin, “Is It Permissible to Support the So-Called Rafidi [Shiite]
Hizballah?” Nur al-Islam (website), OSC Document GMP20060721827005, July 19, 2006;
(continued...)

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While many of the strongest critical statements primarily serve rhetorical
purposes, they may have political implications: Many religious figures have sought
to distance themselves from the more nuanced positions of Arab political leaders,
some of whom have been characterize as detached from public opinion and
vulnerable to revolt. Moreover, groups or individuals may utilize religious figures’
judgments and statements to justify attacks on the interests or personnel of Israel, the
United States, or their own governments should the crisis continue or escalate.
Similar disagreements have emerged among violent Sunni Islamist extremists,
including Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The view of Al Qaeda leadership figures, as
expressed by Ayman Al Zawahiri in a video released on July 27, is somewhat
ambiguous: he stated that “our nation will get together to fight [Israel and its allies],”
but refrained from directly urging Sunni-Shiite unity or advocating direct Sunni
support for Hezbollah.78 A Hezbollah official interviewed on Al Jazeera television
following the release of Al Zawahiri’s tape stated that Al Zawahiri’s statement
“should be clearer in its reference to the ideological and political dimensions of unity
among Muslims, and that, “there should be clear and direct references to Hizballah
and Shiites in a positive sense.”79 In a July 31 Internet posting, an Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula representative seemingly rejected any unitarian sentiment that Al
Zawahiri may have meant to inspire by characterizing Hezbollah as “the head of the
Iranian spear in the Arab region,” and arguing that “any support to Hezbollah in
Lebanon is indirect support for the Iranian objectives.”80 The as yet undelivered
opinion of Osama Bin Laden may be crucial to the resolution of debate within the
Sunni jihadist community over the proper response to the ongoing conflict.81 The
resolution of the Sunni jihadist debate, in turn, will likely have broader implications
for any potential widening of the conflict by jihadist cells and others that look to Al
Qaeda leaders for guidance.
77 (...continued)
and, Abdallah al-Rashid, “Al-Awdah: We Disagree with Hizballah, But We Reject Israel’s
Aggression,” Islam Today (Riyadh), OSC Document GMP20060724837002, July 24, 2006.
78 “Al-Zawahiri Comments on Lebanon, Gaza” OSC Document - FEA20060727025705,
July 27, 2006.
79 Interview with Hezbollah Political Council member, Hasan Hudruj, “Al-Jazirah TV:
Hizballah Official Comments on Al-Zawahiri’s New Videotape,” Al-Jazirah Television
(Doha), OSC Document - GMP20060727648002, July 27, 2006.
80 “Al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia Urges Countering Hizballah,” OSC Document -
FEA20060802025964 August 2, 2006.
81 Bin Laden claimed prior to the U.S. presidential election in October 2004 that the 1982
Israeli invasion and U.S. intervention in Lebanon played a pivotal role in his later decision
to wage religious war on the United States: “The events that influenced me directly trace
back to 1982 and subsequent events when the United States gave permission to the Israelis
to invade Lebanon, with the aid of the sixth US fleet... While I was looking at those
destroyed towers in Lebanon, it occurred to me to punish the unjust one in a similar manner
by destroying towers in the United States so that it would feel some of what we felt and to
be deterred from killing our children and women.” “Bin Ladin Addresses American People
on Causes, Outcome of 11 Sep Attacks” Al-Jazirah Television (Doha), OSC Document -
GMP20041029000220, October 29, 2004.

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Conclusion: The Unresolved Issues
With fighting in Lebanon well into its fourth week, a number of unresolved
issues and unanswered questions remain. There is much speculation not only over
how the conflict in southern Lebanon might end, but also whether the international
community can broker a solution that provides for long term stability in the region.
A widespread concern is that expedient or temporary measures will avoid addressing
the root causes of the conflict (e.g., Iranian and Syrian support for Hezbollah and
Hamas, and the lack of a peace process on both the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-
Syrian/Lebanese tracks). From a military standpoint, many analysts have been
surprised by the ability of Hezbollah to withstand Israeli air assaults and ground
attacks, and many are questioning if, over the long term, Hezbollah has the
manpower or resources to hold out indefinitely against a large-scale Israeli ground
operation. Hezbollah’s willingness over the coming days and weeks to take casualties
among its hard-core militia forces may be a key indicator of how long the conflict
will continue.
Many questions also remain concerning Syria: the willingness of the United
States and Israel to bring Syria into the diplomatic mix, Syria’s influence over
Hezbollah in a Lebanon free of Syria’s military occupation, and what demands Syria
will make in exchange for its possible cooperation. Observers suggest a variety of
theoretical incentives that the West could provide Syria, including the end of its
isolation by the United States and the removal of Syria from the State Department’s
terrorism list and the relaxation of economic sanctions; the tacit recognition of its
influence in Lebanese politics; the ratification of the EU Association Agreement with
Syria that provides it with certain trade benefits; diminished international pressure
regarding the U.N.-led investigation into the murder of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri; increased financial support, possibly from Arab Gulf states;
and finally (though less likely), a resumption of negotiations over the Israeli-occupied
Golan Heights - a longstanding Syrian goal since its defeat in the June 1967 Six-Day
War. Others believe that U.S. refusal to reward Syria for its intransigence should
continue and that any U.S. engagement would undermine Western efforts to
strengthen Lebanese independence and sovereignty, even if the unspoken reality is
one in which Syria’s special role in Lebanese affairs is widely recognized.
Finally, speculation continues over the winners and losers of the current conflict.
Israeli officials believe that their overwhelming response to Hezbollah’s provocation
caught it and Iran off-guard and that Israel’s subsequent operations have eroded its
opponents’ deterrent capabilities along the Israeli-Lebanese borders. Hezbollah
claims that by merely surviving somewhat intact, it will gain a symbolic victory over
the more powerful Israeli army and that it has continued to threaten Israel with rocket
attacks after weeks of Israeli attempts to destroy its arsenal. Iran also believes that it
has achieved an ideological victory against Israel, seeing the conflict as producing
increased Arab and Muslim support for Lebanese Shiites and for overall Iranian
opposition to Israel. Analysts caution that increased Arab and Muslim support for
Hezbollah may simply be a temporary phenomenon in response to solidarity with the
Lebanese people and sympathy for Lebanese civilian casualties. Others see increasing
domestic political pressure in moderate Arab states, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi

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CRS-34
Arabia, to condemn Israel and hold the United States partially responsible for civilian
casualties in Lebanon as a way to deal with popular anger and their own Islamists.

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Appendix A: Chronology of Recent Events82
WEDNESDAY, JULY 12
Ground War
In a cross-border raid, Hezbollah guerrillas seize two Israeli soldiers before retreating
back into Lebanon, insisting on a prisoner exchange and warning against
confrontation. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert describes the capture of the
soldiers as “an act of war.” Israel calls up reserve troops as it pledges a swift and
large-scale response to the Hezbollah attack.
Air War
Hezbollah fighters based in southern Lebanon launch Katyusha rockets across the
border with Israel, targeting the town of Shlomi and outposts in the Shib’a Farms
area. In response Israeli planes bomb Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon.
Casualties
Eight Israeli soldiers are killed and two others are injured during fighting with
Hezbollah.
THURSDAY, JULY 13
Air War
After a night of Israeli air raids across southern Lebanon, Israeli jets strike the
runways at Beirut’s Rafiq Hariri International Airport forcing the airport to close. As
night falls a Hezbollah-fired rocket hits Israel’s third-largest city, Haifa.
Casualties
Reports emerge of significant numbers of civilian casualties in Lebanese towns and
villages close to Israeli targets, with at least 35 people reported killed. Two Israeli
civilians are reported killed by rockets or mortar shells fired into Israel.
Diplomatic Efforts
U.S. President George W. Bush asserts that Israel has a right to defend itself from
attack, but France, Russia and the European Union call Israel’s use of force
“disproportionate”to the initial Hezbollah kidnaping operation.
FRIDAY, JULY 14
Air War
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah promises “open war” against Israel after
his offices in Beirut are bombed. The strikes are part of Israel’s ongoing operation
against targets across Lebanon. Bridges, roads and fuel depots are hit, with new
strikes against the Beirut airport. The main highway connecting Beirut and
82 Prepared by Lyle Minter, using the following sources: BBC News, online at
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/defa
ult.stm] and The New York Times at [http://www.nytimes.com].

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Damascus, Syria, is bombed. Off the coast of Lebanon, an Israeli ship is hit by an
Iranian-supplied Hezbollah missile guided by on-shore radar.
Casualties
The number of Lebanese civilians killed in the strikes rises above 50. Two Israelis
are killed by rocket strikes.
Diplomatic Efforts
The United Nations Security Council in an emergency meeting calls for an end to the
Israeli operation, saying it is causing the death of innocent civilians. Iran’s president
warns that any Israeli attack on Syria, seen as a sponsor of Hezbollah, will provoke
a “fierce response.”
SATURDAY, JULY 15
Air War
Israel expands its strikes in Lebanon, attacking a large number of targets including
radar installations in the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli. The headquarters of
Hezbollah are destroyed in southern Beirut. Hezbollah responds by firing Katyusha
rockets on the town of Tiberias in its deepest attack into Israel so far.
Casualties
Sixteen Lebanese fleeing a village on the Israeli border are killed when their vehicles
are struck with missiles on the road to the southern city of Tyre.
Diplomatic Efforts
Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa says the Middle East peace process is
dead and calls on the U.N. Security Council to tackle the crisis. Lebanon’s prime
minister says his country is a “disaster zone” and calls for international help.
Speaking ahead of the G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg, U.S. President George W. Bush
blames Hezbollah for the crisis and urges Syria to put pressure on the militants.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, is critical of Israel’s bombing campaign, saying
that the “use of force should be balanced.”
SUNDAY, JULY 16
Air War
Hezbollah rockets kill eight Israelis in the coastal city of Haifa in the worst attack on
Israel since the fighting started. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert says that the
Haifa attack will have “far-reaching consequences.”
Casualties
Israeli air-raids kill at least 23 people in southern Lebanon, including 16 in the city
of Tyre. Eight Canadians of Lebanese origin are killed in a village about 33 miles
(50 kilometers) south of Beirut.
Diplomatic Efforts
Leaders of the G-8 nations meeting in St. Petersburg blame extremist forces for the
crisis, but call on Israel to end military operations.

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CRS-37
MONDAY, JULY 17
Air War
Israel extends its air strikes to the north, killing at least 15 people in and around
Tripoli, Lebanon’s second-largest city. Other targets include the nearby port of
Abdeh; the capital, Beirut; and the eastern city of Baalbek. Hezbollah continues to
fire rockets into Israel. One hits a block of flats in Haifa, injuring at least four people.
In a barrage of Hezbollah rocket fire in the evening, one lands near a hospital in
Safed, reportedly injuring six people.
Casualties
Ten people are reportedly killed driving across a bridge south of Beirut as Israeli
missiles strike. Nine Lebanese soldiers die in an Israeli attack on the port of Abdeh.
Evacuation of Foreign Nationals
The international community steps up its evacuation of foreigners from Beirut, as
thousands of Lebanese flee their homes.
Diplomatic Efforts
In Israel, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert says the attacks will go on until two captured
Israeli soldiers are freed, Hezbollah is disarmed, and the Lebanese army controls the
south. U.N. chief Kofi Annan and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair suggest sending an
international force in Lebanon to halt the Hezbollah attacks, but Israel says it is too
soon to consider such a move. Lebanon’s President, Emile Lahoud, insists he will
never betray Hezbollah and its leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.
TUESDAY, JULY 18
Air War
Israeli strikes continue for a seventh day, again hitting southern Beirut and also the
southern coastal city of Tyre. Hezbollah rockets continue to target the Israeli port city
of Haifa.
Casualties
Eleven Lebanese soldiers die in an air attack on their barracks east of Beirut, while
nine bodies are pulled from the rubble of a building in the town of Aitaroun. The
number of Lebanese killed since the start of Israel’s offensive reaches about 230,
with 25 Israelis killed.
Evacuation of Foreign Nationals
One hundred and eighty Britons are evacuated from Beirut on the naval warship
HMS Gloucester. The group, which sails overnight to Cyprus, are the first of
thousands of U.K. citizens expected to be evacuated in the coming days. They join
1,600 Europeans transferred to Cyprus on Monday and Tuesday by France and Italy.
Diplomatic Efforts
The U.N. warns of a humanitarian disaster as Lebanese flee their homes, with air
strikes on roads and bridges hampering efforts to help them.

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CRS-38
WEDNESDAY, JULY 19
Ground War
Israeli troops cross into southern Lebanon to carry out what the army called
“restricted pinpoint attacks.” Two Israeli soldiers die in clashes with Hezbollah
fighters inside Lebanon.
Air War
Meanwhile, Israeli strikes hit Hezbollah positions in Beirut, as well as targets in
southern and eastern parts of the country. The Israeli military says its aircraft
dropped 23 tons of explosives in an evening raid on a bunker in south Beirut where
senior Hezbollah leaders, possibly including Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, were hiding.
But Hezbollah denies any of its “leaders or personnel” were killed and says the Israeli
raid hit a mosque under construction rather than a bunker. Rockets fired from
Lebanon strike the northern Israeli city of Haifa, and kill two children in the Israeli
Arab city of Nazareth. They are the first Arab Israelis to die in the rocket attacks.
Casualties
More than 60 Lebanese civilians are killed in raids — 12 in the southern village of
Srifa, near Tyre, six in the southern town of Nabatiyeh, and many more elsewhere in
the south as well as Baalbek in the east. At the border, two Israelis are killed in
clashes with Hezbollah militants, and two Israeli-Arab children are killed in
Nazareth.
Evacuation of Foreign Nationals
Thousands of people continue to flee Lebanon. A British warship arrives in Cyprus,
carrying the first 180 British citizens. A Norwegian ferry takes hundreds of
Norwegians, Swedes and Americans to Cyprus, while a U.S.-chartered ship docks in
Beirut to evacuate U.S. and Australian citizens.
Diplomatic Efforts
After meeting Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the European Union’s foreign
policy chief, Javier Solana, says he has seen the suffering of Lebanese civilians and
it is nothing to do with the battle against Hezbollah — it was “disproportionate.” But
Ms. Livni says the Israeli military response is proportionate to the threat posed by
Hezbollah to the entire region.
THURSDAY, JULY 20
Ground War
Heavy fighting erupts between Israeli troops and Hezbollah militants inside
Lebanon’s border with injuries on both sides, the Israeli military says.
Air War
Israel continues its bombing of Lebanon, carrying out 80 air strikes early in the day.
Evacuation of Foreign Nationals
The mass evacuation of foreign nationals continues. Forty US marines come ashore
to help U.S. citizens — the first presence of US troops in Lebanon since Hezbollah
militants blew up a marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, killing 241 personnel.

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CRS-39
Diplomatic Efforts
The United Nations warns that without a truce allowing aid agencies to begin the
relief effort there will be a “catastrophe.” U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice are to meet later on Thursday to discuss the
crisis.
FRIDAY, JULY 21
Ground War
Israel masses soldiers and tanks on the Lebanese border, calls up thousands of
reserves, and drops leaflets in southern Lebanon urging residents to leave.
Air War
Israel’s continued bombardment of Lebanon hits more than 40 targets, mostly in
Beirut’s southern suburbs. The United States expedites shipments of precision-
guided bombs to Israel.
More than 50 Hezbollah rockets hit Haifa and other towns in northern Israel.
Casualties
Israeli tank fire kills a man in the Gaza Strip.
Evacuation of Foreign Nationals
Thousands of evacuees arrive in Cyprus.
Diplomatic Efforts
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora alleges that the offensive is no longer against
Hezbollah, but against all of Lebanon.
SATURDAY, JULY 22
Ground War
The Israeli army continues its ground operations in southern Lebanon, claiming to
have gained control of the village of Maroun al-Ras after several days of fighting.
Civilians in 14 villages are warned to leave.
Air War
Israel strikes more than 150 targets in Lebanon, including mobile phone and
television transmission towers.
Hezbollah fires 130 rockets into Israel.
Casualties
The death toll rises to at least 370 Lebanese and 35 Israelis.
Diplomatic Efforts
The U.N. calls for the designation of secure routes for civilians to escape as
thousands attempt to flee. The U.N.’s emergency relief coordinator, Jan Egeland,
suggests that “more than half a million people are directly affected.”

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CRS-40
SUNDAY, JULY 23
Air War
Israeli air strikes hit southern Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, Tyre, and for the first time,
Sidon, where many refugees have sought shelter. Palestinian militants in the Gaza
Strip fire more than a dozen Qassam rockets into southern Israel, causing little
damage.
Casualties
Two people are killed and 15 are wounded when Hezbollah rockets strike Haifa.
Diplomatic Efforts
Envoys from Britain and France hold talks in Israel, looking for ways to resolve the
situation. Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz indicates Israel would agree to the
proposed NATO-led deployment of a multi-national force in southern Lebanon.
MONDAY, JULY 24
Ground War
Fierce fighting takes place around Bint Jbeil, a Hezbollah stronghold in southern
Lebanon.
Air War
Hezbollah claims to have shot down an Israeli helicopter in northern Israel, killing
the two pilots. Israel denies this claim. Hezbollah fires more than 80 rockets, striking
the town of Kiryat Shmona in northern Israel. Palestinian militants fire light rockets
into southern Israel.
Casualties
Two Israeli soldiers are killed in the attack on Bint Jbeil. Israeli air strikes around
Tyre kill seven people. Israeli shelling kills ten Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
Diplomatic Efforts
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice makes a surprise visit to Beirut for talks
with Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The U.N. launches an appeal for $150
million in relief aid, and the United States pledges immediate aid in the amount of
$30 million. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan says the international ministerial
talks to be held in Rome must not fail. British Prime Minister Tony Blair says the
situation in Lebanon is “a catastrophe.”
TUESDAY, JULY 25
Ground War
U.N. observers report that Israel has taken the town of Bint Jbeil, a Hezbollah
stronghold in southern Lebanon.
Air War
Israel resumes air raids on Beirut. Hezbollah continues to fire Katyusha rockets. The
Israeli air force bombs buildings in Gaza, and Palestinian militants fire several
rockets into southern Israel.

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CRS-41
Casualties
Four U.N. observers are killed in an Israeli air strike on Khiaim. Seven Lebanese are
killed in Nabatiyeh. An Israeli Arab girl is killed when a Hezbollah rocket strikes a
house in Mughar.
Diplomatic Efforts
Secretary Rice completes her tour of the region, having visited Beirut and having
held separate talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert. Israel’s Defense Minister Amir Peretz says Israel will keep
control of an area in southern Lebanon until this force is deployed.
WEDNESDAY, JULY 26
Ground War
Israeli tanks move back into the north of the Gaza Strip.
Casualties
Nine Israeli soldiers are killed in fierce fighting in the town of Bint Jbeil, and another
soldier dies in nearby Maroun al-Ras. Israeli air strikes and ground fire kill at least
23 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
Diplomatic Efforts
At talks in Rome, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and Arab states
decide to work toward a “lasting and sustainable” cease-fire, backed up by an
international force operating under a U.N. mandate.
THURSDAY, JULY 27
Ground War
The Israeli security cabinet calls up more military reserves. Fighting continues around
Bint Jbeil.
Air War
Hezbollah fires 110 rockets into northern Israel. Israel conducts more air and artillery
attacks on suspected Hezbollah targets.
Casualties
One Lebanese policeman is killed in Zahle. Three Palestinians are killed when Israeli
troops and Palestinian militants clashed in Gaza City.
Diplomatic Efforts
Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri warns in a video that Al Qaeda will respond
with force to attacks in Lebanon and Gaza.

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CRS-42
FRIDAY, JULY 28
Air War
Hezbollah fires more than 100 rockets into Northern Israel, for the first time using
long-range Khalbar-1 rockets in five air strikes on Afula, more than 30 miles from
the Lebanese border.
Casualties
Lebanese officials say at least ten people are killed as Israel conducts dozens of
strikes on Lebanon.
Diplomatic Efforts
After talks in Washington D.C., President Bush and Prime Minister Blair affirm that
the United States and the United Kingdom wish to achieve “lasting peace” in the
region, and call for an international force to be sent to Lebanon to bolster the
Lebanese army and distribute humanitarian relief supplies. The U.N. calls for a 72-
hour truce to permit humanitarian aid to enter into and to get casualties out of the
conflict zone. The U.N. plans to move unarmed observers to United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) posts along the Israeli border.
SATURDAY, JULY 29
Ground War
Israeli tanks move into the Gaza Strip, cutting power to Rafah.
Air War
Israeli warplanes strike targets across Lebanon, including the main highway linking
Beirut and Damascus. The Israeli military says it hit the road, closing the border
crossing between Lebanon and Syria, “to prevent smuggling of weapons.” Israeli
aircraft also bomb a building in Gaza City that allegedly held a weapons cache.
Hezbollah fires at least 40 Katyusha rockets across northern Israel.
Casualties
Israeli air strikes kill a Lebanese family of seven, and wound two U.N. monitors in
their post in southern Lebanon.
Diplomatic Efforts
Secretary of State Rice returns to the Middle East for more talks on how to end the
fighting, saying she is encouraged by Hezbollah’s agreement at a Lebanese cabinet
meeting to accept a cease-fire and an international military force. Hezbollah leader
Hasan Nasrallah says in a televised speech, “It is clear that Israeli enemy cannot
achieve any military success. The whole world knows that.” He threatens more
rocket attacks on Israeli cities if Israel does not quickly end its air and artillery
strikes. Humanitarian aid arrives in Beirut for the more than 750,000 Lebanese
displaced by the fighting.

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CRS-43
SUNDAY, JULY 30
Air War
Hezbollah fires at least 156 rockets into northern Israel. Protests erupt in Beirut
where a crowd begins to attack buildings, including a U.N. facility.
Casualties
More than 28 people are killed when Israeli missiles hit an apartment building in the
village of Qana.
Diplomatic Efforts
Secretary Rice cancels her visit to Beirut, but continues to work on drafting a U.N.
Security Council Resolution that would put an international peacekeeping force on
the southern Lebanese border and ensure the return of captive Israeli soldiers.
MONDAY, JULY 31
Ground War
Fighting continues across the border, while Israeli warplanes strike several targets.
Hezbollah shells the Israeli border town of Kiryat Shmona.
Air War
Israel calls a 48-hour halt to air strikes in southern Lebanon to allow an investigation
into the civilian deaths in Qana, although air cover is still provided for ground forces
in the border zone where Israeli troops are battling Hezbollah.
Diplomatic Efforts
British Prime Minister Tony Blair calls for “maximum pressure” to get the proposed
U.N. Security Council resolution passed.
Diplomacy
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert apologizes to the Lebanese people “for the pain
caused,” and says Israel’s fight is against Hezbollah, not Lebanon.
President George W. Bush says any peace between Israel and Lebanon has to be
“long-lasting and sustainable.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says the United
States would seek a U.N. resolution calling for a cease-fire this week.
TUESDAY, AUGUST 1
Ground War
Israeli forces clash with Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon. Israeli troops push
towards the Litani River, according to media reports.
Air War
Hezbollah fires only ten rockets into Israel, fewer than on any recent day.
Casualties
Three Israeli soldiers are killed and 25 slightly injured in clashes in the border village
of Ait al-Shaab.

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CRS-44
Diplomacy
Six aid convoys, two from the U.N.’s World Food Program and four carrying
International Committee of the Red Cross supplies, are unable to leave for affected
areas in the absence of safe passage guarantees.
Senior Iranian cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati calls on Muslim countries to send
weapons to Hezbollah to fight Israel.
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2
Ground War
Israeli troops continue to push into southern Lebanon, while commandos carry out
the deepest raid yet in Baalbek, some 60 miles north of the border.
Air War
According to Israeli military sources, Hezbollah fires more than 230 rockets into
Israel — the highest number in one day. Some rockets hit as far as 43 miles inside
Israel.
Casualties
Israeli soldiers kill ten Hezbollah members in a raid near Baalbek, and an Israeli air
strike kills three Palestinian soldiers near Sidon. One Israeli civilian is killed by
rocket fire.

Diplomacy
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert indicates the fighting will continue until an
international peacekeeping force is deployed in southern Lebanon.
THURSDAY, AUGUST 3
Air War
Israeli warplanes resume air attacks on the Lebanese capital, Beirut, after a lull of
several days. Hezbollah continues to launch rockets into northern Israel.
Diplomacy
Diplomats at the United Nations say delegates from the United Kingdom, France, and
the United States are close to agreeing on a U.N. resolution calling for an immediate
cease-fire.

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CRS-45
Appendix B: Chronology of Conflict on the
Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian Border

December
Israeli commandos destroy 13 passenger planes at the Beirut airport, in
1968
reprisal for attack by Palestinian terrorists trained in Lebanon on an
Israeli airliner in Athens.
March 1978
Israel invades south Lebanon and sets up a roughly 10-km (6-mile)
occupation zone. Most troops withdraw within weeks, leaving a
security area held by Israel’s Lebanese Christian allies, the South
Lebanon Army (SLA).
January 1979
Israeli agents detonate a car bomb in west Beirut, killing Ali Hassan
Salameh, security chief of the Black September group. Salameh, known
as Abu Hassan, was one of the plotters of the Munich Olympics attack
against Israeli athletes in 1972.
June 1982
Terrorist and rocket attacks by Lebanon-based Palestinian groups and
Israeli counter-strikes culminate in Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Syrian
army ousted from Beirut and thousands of Palestinian guerrillas under
Yasser Arafat depart for Tunisia by sea.
September
Israel captures Beirut after pro-Israel Christian leader Bashir Gemayel,
1982
who had been elected president, is assassinated. Hundreds of civilians
in Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila are killed by
Christian militiamen allied with Israel.
May 1983
Israel and Lebanon sign peace agreement under U.S. patronage. Syria
opposes it, and it is never ratified.
March 1984
Peace agreement with Israel is cancelled and Lebanese President Amin
Gemayel breaks with Israel under Syrian pressure.
June 1985
Israel pulls back to a self-declared 15-km (9-mile) border security zone
in south Lebanon controlled by Israeli forces and their Lebanese militia
allies.
February
Israeli helicopter gunships rocket car convoy in south Lebanon, killing
1992
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Abbas Musawi, his wife and six-year-old son.
July 1993
Hezbollah launches rocket attacks on northern Israel. Israel unleashes
“Operation Accountability,” a week-long air, artillery and naval
operation.
April 1996
After Hezbollah began shelling towns in northern Israel, Israel launched
“Operation Grapes of Wrath,” a 17-day campaign against Hezbollah
positions in south Lebanon. On April 18, Israeli artillery fire targeting
Hezbollah rocket crews falls in and around a U.N. refugee camp near
the village of Qana, killing 91 civilians and sparking international calls
for an immediate ceasefire, achieved on April 26.
June 1999
The South Lebanon Army retreats from the Jezzine enclave north of the
Israeli zone it held for 14 years.

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CRS-46
May 2000
Israel ends 18-year occupation of south Lebanon. On June 18, 2000, the
U.N. Security Council certifies Israel’s withdrawal in accordance with
U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 (1978).
October 2003
After a suicide bombing in Haifa killed 20 Israelis, Israel launches air
strikes against an alleged terrorist training camp at Ain Saheb,
northwest of Damascus, Syria.
September
Months before the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister
2004
Rafiq Hariri, which was widely blamed on Syrian agents, the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 1559 calling for withdrawal of
“foreign forces” from Lebanon (Syria) and disarming of militia, such
as Hezbollah.
Source: Reuters, “Chronology - Israel’s interventions in Lebanon,” July 19, 2006.
Appendix C: U.S. Sanctions
Iran. Iran is also denied investment dollars intended for development of its
petroleum industry under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.83 Sanctions
available under this act, to be imposed on those who engage in unlawful investment
in Iran, include a prohibition on Export-Import Bank funds, prohibition on exports,
denial of loans from U.S. financial institutions, denial of rights to financial
institutions to participate as a dealer in U.S. debt instruments, denial of procurement
contracts, and any other transaction the President wishes to restrict if the authority to
do so also is stated under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA). Petroleum-related investments are restricted also by Executive Order, and
all new investments, regardless of the industry, are also restricted under the IEEPA.84
Syria. Although Syria has been identified as a state sponsor of acts of
international terrorism since 1979, regulations that implement restrictions on trade
and transactions with that country are less restrictive than those that pertain to other
designated countries, reportedly because Syria is considered instrumental in the
Middle East peace process. Congress took this into account when it sent the Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 to the President.85
The act, triggered by increasingly organized and forceful efforts in Lebanon to shed
itself of foreign forces, and reflecting recent statements from the Bush
Administration targeting Syria’s involvement with terrorism, development and trade
of weapons of mass destruction, and support of the insurgency in Iraq, requires the
83 P.L. 104-172 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note). This act no longer applies to Libya, following the
President’s determination that the country was in compliance with terms of the act
(Presidential Determination No. 2004-30; 69 F.R. 24907; May 5, 2004).
84 Petroleum-related investments in Executive Order 12957 (March 15, 1995; 60 F.R. 14615;
50 U.S.C. 1701 note); other new investments in Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995; 60
F.R. 24757; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note); and a consolidation of earlier orders in Executive Order
13059 (August 19, 1997; 62 F.R. 44531; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
85 P.L. 108-175 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note).

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CRS-47
President to curtail trade and transactions until certain conditions are met. The act
requires the denial of export licenses for any item on the U.S. Munitions List
(USML) or Commerce Control List (CCL). The act also requires the President to
impose two or more of the following restrictions:86
! prohibit export of all products (except food and medicine, as made
exempt by the Trade Sanctions Reform Act of 2000);
! prohibit investment in Syria;
! restrict travel of Syrian diplomats to only the environs of
Washington, D.C. and the United Nations in New York;
! prohibit Syrian-owned air traffic in or over the United States;
! reduce diplomatic contact; and
! block transactions in property.
The President implemented terms of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act on May 11, 2004, by complying with the mandatory
restrictions on USML and CCL exports, and by prohibiting U.S. exports and
restricting Syrian air traffic.87
Lebanon. For fiscal year 2003 and each fiscal year thereafter, of any
Economic Support Funds allocated or obligated to Lebanon, $10 million shall be
withheld:
unless and until the President certifies...that
(1) the armed forces of Lebanon have been deployed to the
international recognized border between Lebanon and Israel; and
(2) the Government of Lebanon is effectively asserting its
authority in the area in which such armed forces have been
deployed.88
To date, the President has not certified that these conditions have been met.
Congress, however, has ensured that the $10 million would be made available each
86 The act provides the President the authority to waive the application of sanctions if he
finds it in the national security interest of the United States to do so (§ 5(b)).
87 Executive Order 13338 (69 F.R. 26751; May 13, 2004). The Order also cited the National
Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act as its underlying
statutory basis.
88 § 1224 of the Security Assistance Act of 2002 (division B of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003; P.L. 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2346 note).

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CRS-48
year by overriding the restriction. Annual foreign operations appropriations measures
have provided assistance to Lebanon “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”89
Hamas and Hezbollah. In 1995, the President identified Hamas and
Hezbollah as Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT) that threaten to disrupt the
Middle East peace process and authorized the blocking of all assets and of
transactions with persons associated with either organization.90 Subsequent
legislative and executive initiatives led to the creation of several other lists.
Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which
also authorizes deportation or exclusion from entry into the United States, generated
the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list.91 The President issued an executive
order to create the Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) list in the wake
of events of September 11, 2001.92 All these lists were subsequently consolidated
into one Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (the “SDN list”),
administered by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
in 2002.93 Hamas and Hezbollah, or individuals associated with each, are on each of
the lists.
89 Most recently, in sec. 534(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102).
90 Executive Order 12947 (January 23, 1995; 60 F.R. 5079; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note). Each of
the executive orders cited in this paragraph are issued under the authority vested in the
President in the National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. ), and § 203
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1702).
91 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), particularly as
it amends the Immigration and Nationality Act at § 219 (8 U.S.C. 1189).
92 Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001; 66 F.R. 49079).
93 Office of Foreign Assets Control SDN list: [http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/sdn/index.shtml]

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