Order Code RL33590
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
August 1, 2006
Larry A. Niksch
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Summary
North Korea’s decisions at the end of 2002 to restart nuclear installations at
Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of
1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its
multiple missile tests of July 4, 2006, create a foreign policy problem for the United
States. Restarting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possible North Korean intent
to stage a “nuclear breakout” of its nuclear program and openly produce nuclear
weapons. North Korea’s actions follow the disclosure in October 2002 that North
Korea is operating a secret nuclear program based on uranium enrichment and the
decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in
November 2002 to suspend shipments of heavy oil to North Korea. North Korea
claims that it has nuclear weapons and that it has completed reprocessing of 8,000
nuclear fuel rods. U.S. officials stated that North Korea probably had reprocessed
most or all of the fuel rods and may have produced 4-6 atomic bombs from them.
The main objective of the Bush Administration is to secure the dismantling of
North Korea’s plutonium and uranium-based nuclear programs. Its strategy has been:
(1) terminating the Agreed Framework; (2) withholding U.S. reciprocal measures
until North Korea takes steps to dismantle its nuclear programs; (3) assembling an
international coalition, through six party negotiations, to apply diplomatic and
economic pressure on North Korea; and (4) imposing financial sanctions on foreign
banks that facilitate North Korea’s illegal counterfeiting activities. China, South
Korea, and Russia have criticized the Bush Administration for not negotiating
directly with North Korea, and they voice opposition to economic sanctions and to
the potential use of force against Pyongyang. China, Russia, and South Korea
increasingly have expressed support for North Korea’s position in six-party talks. The
talks have made little progress. North Korea’s two long boycotts of the talks (the
current one since November 2005 is continuing) appears aimed at creating a long-
term diplomatic stalemate on the nuclear issue. In the six party meetings of July-
September 2005, North Korea widened the gap between the U.S. and North Korean
positions when it asserted that it would not dismantle or even disclose its nuclear
programs until light water reactors were physically constructed in North Korea. The
widening gap was not narrowed by a statement of the six parties on September 19,
2005, in which North Korea agreed to rejoin the NPT and its 1992 safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency “at an early date” but which
also contained a reference to North Korea’s right to have a light water reactor.
Critics increasingly have charged that despite its tough rhetoric, the Bush
Administration gives North Korea a relatively low priority in U.S. foreign policy and
takes a passive diplomatic approach to the nuclear issue and other issues. As a result
of growing congressional criticism, the Senate approved an amendment to the
Defense Department authorization bill for FY2007 that would require President Bush
to name a high level coordinator of U.S. policy toward North Korea and report to
Congress on the status of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
This report replaces IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, by
Larry A. Niksch. It will be updated periodically.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Context of North Korea’s Two Boycotts of the Six Party Talks and the
September 19, 2005, Six Party Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bush Administration’s June 2004 Proposal and the “Hill
Amendments” of July-August 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
North Korea’s Response to the U.S. Core Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Six Party Statement and Second North Korean Boycott . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Background to the Six Party Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bush Administration Approach to the Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Roles of the Other Six Party Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
North Korea’s Approach to the Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
North Korea’s Nuclear Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Plutonium Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Highly Enriched Uranium Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
International Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
North Korea’s Delivery Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
State of Nuclear Weapons Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The 1994 Agreed Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Benefits to North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Light Water Nuclear Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Oil at No Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Diplomatic Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Lifting the U.S. Economic Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S. Nuclear Security Guarantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
North Korean Obligations Beyond the Freeze of the Nuclear Program . . . . 17
Inspections and Broader Nuclear Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Disposition of Fuel Rods from the Five Megawatt Reactor . . . . . . . . 17
Dismantlement of Nuclear Installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Most Recent Developments
The six party talks remained stalemated since November 2005 when North
Korea announced its second boycott of the talks (the first boycott was from August
2004 to July 2005), this time declaring that it would not attend the negotiations as
long as the United States maintained “financial sanctions” against the Banco Delta
of Macau. In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department had issued a notice
calling on U.S. financial institutions to cease dealing with Banco Delta, which the
Treasury Department charged was complicit in North Korean illegal activities such
as counterfeiting U.S. currency and drug trafficking. U.S. officials stated that it
would continue to pursue measures against North Korean illegal activities. On July
4, 2006, North Korea fired seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, including one long-
range Taepodong II missile. However, the Taepodong II’s liftoff failed after 40
seconds, and the missile fell into the sea. After intense diplomacy, the United
Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution on July 15, 2006. It
“requires all Member States” to prevent the transfer of financial resources and
technology to North Korea in relation to Pyongyang missile or weapons of mass
destruction programs. It “strongly urges” North Korea to return to the six party talks.
North Korea immediately rejected the resolution. In June 2006, the U.S. Senate
passed an amendment to the FY2007 defense authorization bill that would require
President Bush to appoint a senior presidential coordinator of policy toward North
Korea and submit to Congress an unclassified report on North Korea’s nuclear and
missile programs.
Context of North Korea’s Two Boycotts of the Six
Party Talks and the September 19, 2005, Six Party
Statement
Bush Administration’s June 2004 Proposal and the “Hill
Amendments” of July-August 2005. The context for North Korea’s two
boycotts of the six party talks (August 2004-July 2005 and December 2005 to the
present), the six party meeting of July-August and September 2005, and the Six Party
Statement issued on September 19, 2005, appears to be the Bush Administration’s
proposal at the six party meeting of June 2004 and North Korea’s response to it. The
Administration’s proposal was the first comprehensive proposal the Administration
had made at the talks. It called for a short-term dismantlement of North Korea’s
plutonium and uranium enrichment programs following a three-month “preparatory
period.” During the preparatory period, North Korea would declare its nuclear
facilities and materials, suspend their operation, allow effective international
inspections including a return of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

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CRS-2
and negotiate the steps to be taken in dismantlement. In return South Korea and
Japan would supply North Korea with heavy oil. North Korea would receive a
“provisional multilateral security assurance” against a U.S. attack. The United States
and North Korea would begin talks over U.S. economic sanctions and North Korea’s
inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting countries. The participants in the
talks also would begin a study of North Korea’s energy situation. After North Korea
completed dismantlement (which Bush Administration officials say would take 2-3
years), it would receive a permanent security guarantee, and permanent solutions to
its energy problems would be undertaken.
In resumed six party talks in July 2005, after North Korea’s one year boycott,
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill adopted different negotiating tactics and
issued what amounted to several amendments to the U.S. proposal of June 2004. Hill
held several long bilateral negotiating sessions with the North Koreans, a tactic that
the Bush Administration had rejected at earlier six party meetings. Hill reaffirmed
the June 2004 proposal; but in response to North Korean complaints that the proposal
front-loaded North Korean obligations, he stated that the sequencing of U.S. and
North Korean obligations in the proposal could the subject of negotiations. Hill
reiterated the U.S. position that North Korea acknowledge the secret highly enriched
uranium (HEU) nuclear program; but he reportedly laid before the North Koreans
evidence of North Korea’s acquisitions of components for an HEU infrastructure and
stated that there could be progress on other issues prior to a settlement of the HEU
issue. Hill gave an Administration endorsement to South Korea’s June 2005 offer
of 2,000 megawatts of electricity to North Korea annually if Pyongyang dismantled
its nuclear programs — in effect incorporating the South Korean offer into the core
U.S. settlement proposal. U.S. officials later emphasized that dismantlement and
implementation of the South Korean electricity program could be done
simultaneously within a three-year period immediately after a settlement was signed.1
Hill also reportedly raised, at least with Chinese officials, an exchange of liaison
offices between the United States and North Korea; an exchange of liaison officials
had been a provision of the U.S.-North Korean 1994 Agreed Framework, which
North Korea rejected in 1997. However, Hill did not offer North Korea full
diplomatic relations in exchange for a settlement of the nuclear issue, despite urgings
by South Korea and China. The Bush Administration continued to hold that full
normalization of relations was linked to a settlement of other issues between the
United States and North Korea, including missiles and human rights. During the
talks, Hill actively issued public statements promoting U.S. positions and critiquing
North Korean positions; this apparently was an effort to counter North Korean
propaganda, which had been effective through much of the earlier six party talks.2
North Korea’s Response to the U.S. Core Proposal. On July 24, 2004,
North Korea’s Foreign Ministry denounced the U.S. June 2004 proposal as a “sham
proposal.” North Korea then refused to attend another six party meeting (which had
been tentatively set for September 2004) until the United States ended its “hostile
1 Yardley, Jim and Sanger, David E. U.S. tries a new approach in talks with North Korea,
New York Times, July 27, 2005. p. A9.
2 Ibid.

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CRS-3
policy” and “nuclear threat” toward North Korea, and it linked dismantlement of its
plutonium nuclear program to the satisfaction of these demands. It announced on
February 10, 2005, that it was suspending participation in the talks. On March 31,
it announced a radically new “regional disarmament” agenda for the talks, demanding
that the United States substantially reduce its military presence in and around Korea
and accept a “peace system” to replace the 1953 Korean armistice. It issued
increasingly frequent and specific statements claiming that it possesses nuclear
weapons.3
North Korea’s strategy appeared to have four objectives: (1) kill the Bush
Administration’s proposal of June 2004 as a basis for negotiations on the nuclear
issue: (2) establish a long-term diplomatic stalemate on the nuclear issue that will last
at least through the second Bush Administration; (3) gain extended time to continue
development of nuclear weapons programs; and (4) condition other governments to
accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Pyongyang followed four basic
tactics in pursuing these objectives. First, with its “hostile policy” and “nuclear
threat” demands and then with its regional disarmament agenda, North Korea
progressively enlarged the gap between its core proposal and the U.S. June 2004
proposal. Second, boycotting six party meetings for significant periods of time
would help to insure a protracted diplomatic stalemate and continue to pressure the
other six party participating governments to take benevolent positions toward North
Korea’s core proposal when meetings occurred. Third, by proclaiming itself a
nuclear weapons state, North Korea probably has sought to draw other states
gradually into at least a de facto recognition of North Korea’s claimed status as a
diplomatic stalemate continues. Fourth, in April 2005, North Korea shut down its
five electrical megawatt nuclear reactor after two years of operation and announced
that it had removed 8,000 fuel rods from the reactor for conversion into weapons-
grade plutonium. North Korea then started up the reactor in July 2005.
The key question regarding North Korea’s motives in ending its first boycott and
agreeing to the July-August and September 2005 talks was whether Pyongyang had
decided to modify or abandon these objectives or whether it viewed participating in
the meeting as another tactic to pursue them, especially the goal of a long-term
diplomatic stalemate. Part of the answer was how North Korea would respond to the
Bush Administration’s amendments to the June 2004 proposal outlined by
Christopher Hill at the July-August 2005 meeting.
North Korea responded to the Hill amendments by hardening its core proposal,
particularly widening the gap further between its proposal and the Bush
Administration’s proposal. North Korea maintained the agenda it had set out at
previous meetings. It reiterated its “reward for freeze” proposal (U.S. concessions
in return for a North Korean freeze of existing nuclear programs rather than
3 For an assessment of diplomacy on the North nuclear issue, see Pritchard, Charles L. Six
Party Talks Update: False Start or a Case for Optimism? Washington: The Brookings
Institute, December 1, 2005. Albright, David and Hinderstein, Corey. Dismantling the
DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, January
2006. Paik Haksoon. What is to be done for the North Korean nuclear resolution? Vantage
Point, May 2006. pp. 15-19.

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CRS-4
dismantlement); it told South Korea that South Korea’s offer of electricity could be
linked only to a freeze of North Korea’s plutonium program rather than
dismantlement. In reiterating its demand that it retain a “peaceful nuclear program,”
it put special emphasis on receiving light water nuclear reactors (LWRs), making this
its core demand in connection with the timing of dismantlement. North Korean
negotiators asserted that dismantlement could be negotiated and implemented only
after light water reactors had been constructed; in short, a deferral of dismantlement
into the distant future, at least ten years, more likely 15. Thus, in contrast to its earlier
proposals, North Korea created a more substantive gap between its timeframe for
dismantlement and Christopher Hill’s proposal of dismantlement within three years
in the initial stage of a settlement. North Korean negotiators also continued to deny
the U.S. charge that Pyongyang has a secret HEU program. North Korean chief
negotiator, Kim Kye-gwan, reportedly said that the issue could be discussed further;
but he added after the meeting’s adjournment that the issue could be discussed if the
United States presented “credible information or evidence” — an apparent negative
reference to the evidence that Assistant Secretary Hill had laid out to him.
In addition to the old agenda with the new emphasis on light water reactors,
North Korea also raised the “regional disarmament” agenda that it had announced on
March 31, 2005. North Korean negotiators declared that North Korea would
“abandon our nuclear weapons and nuclear program” when the United States agreed
to “normalization” of relations and “nuclear threats from the United States are
removed.” They asserted that the United States must dismantle U.S. nuclear weapons
in South Korea (the United States claims there are no nuclear weapons in South
Korea), cease bringing nuclear weapons into South Korea, end the U.S. “nuclear
umbrella” in the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea, and agree to negotiate a
“peace mechanism” with North Korea to replace the 1953 Korean armistice
agreement.4 North Korean official commentary before and after the meeting also
called for restrictions on U.S. “nuclear strike forces” and joint U.S.-South Korean
military exercises on the Korean peninsula, and a withdrawal of U.S. forces from
South Korea under a peace mechanism. The commentary emphasized that major
U.S. military concessions related to Pyongyang’s agenda is a requirement for
settlement of the nuclear issue.5 In agreeing in the six party statement to a separate
negotiations of a peace agreement, North Korea may have decided to shift its focus
from the United States to South Korea, believing that South Korea now may be
prepared to make greater concessions concerning U.S. troops in South Korea than the
Bush Administration would. In early 2006, North Korea began to pressure South
Korea directly to suspend joint military exercises with the United States.
4 Fairclough, Gordon. North Korea hardens line, wants U.S. ‘Threat’ gone. Asian Wall
Street Journal, July 28, 2005. Paek, Mun-kyu. Outdated cold war structure must be
obliterated. Nodong Sinmun (Pyongyang), August 31, 2005. Nodong Sinmun is the official
journal of the North Korean Communist Party.
5 Ibid. No quick breakthrough expected from nuclear talks: EU delegation. The EU
delegation that visited North Korea in July 2005 reported that North Korean officials told
them that the United States had to negotiate on its nuclear presence in South Korea and
Japan.

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CRS-5
Six Party Statement and Second North Korean Boycott. The Bush
Administration supported China’s effort to draft a statement of principles to present
at the end of the meetings as a basis for future negotiations. China reportedly worked
up four drafts without success but achieved the six party statement with the fifth draft
that included the clause regarding LWRs. China reportedly pressured the Bush
Administration hard to accept the fifth draft.6 South Korean officials reportedly
backed the Chinese position. In the Six Party Statement of September 19, 2005,
North Korea committed to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs,” and returning to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allowing
safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “at an
early date.” The six parties agreed to discuss “at an appropriate time” North Korea’s
demand to receive LWRs. The statement did not address the core issue of the timing
of dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs. The Bush Administration
asserted before and after the statement that the process of dismantlement must be an
early stage in a settlement process. North Korea asserted strongly after September
19 that it would not dismantle until LWRs were physically constructed and that North
Korea would not declare its nuclear facilities and programs until LWRs were
constructed. After a short, inconclusive meeting in November 2005, North Korea
declared its second boycott of the talks, demanding that the Bush Administration
rescind U.S. financial measures against the Banco Delta in Macau, which the U.S.
Treasury Department charged was involved in illegal North Korean activities such
as counterfeiting of U.S. currency and drug trafficking.
North has maintained the second boycott through the present time. It has
proposed bilateral talks with the United States; China and South Korea have
endorsed the proposal. The Bush Administration has rejected bilateral talks except
within the strict framework of the six party talks.
Background to the Six Party Talks
The Bush Administration asserted on October 16, 2002, that North Korea had
revealed to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang on October
5, 2002, that it had a secret nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched
uranium (HEU). The program is based on the process of uranium enrichment, in
contrast to North Korea’s pre-1995 nuclear program based on plutonium
reprocessing. North Korea reportedly began a secret HEU program in the early 1990s
with the assistance of Pakistan. North Korea provided Pakistan with intermediate-
range ballistic missiles in the late 1990s, apparently as part of the deal.7
The initial U.S. response was to secure a decision by the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in November 2002 to end shipments of
heavy oil to North Korea, which had been carried out under the U.S.-North Korean
6 Kahn, Joseph and Sanger, David E. U.S. Korean deal on arms leaves key points open.
New York Times, September 20, 2005. p. A1.
7 Lancaster, John and Khan, Kamran. Pakistan’s nuclear club? Scientist says he aided
North Korea with superiors’ knowledge. Asian Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2004. p.
A2.

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CRS-6
Agreed Framework of 1994. North Korea’s moved in late December 2002 to expel
officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) placed there under the
Agreed Framework to monitor the shutdown. North Korea restarted the five
megawatt nuclear reactor shut down under the Agreed Framework. North Korea also
announced that it would restart the plutonium reprocessing plant that operated up to
1994, and it later asserted that it had reprocessed 8,000 nuclear fuel rods, which had
been in storage since 1994, into nuclear weapons-grade plutonium (U.S. intelligence
reportedly has been unable to verify the exact state of reprocessing, but U.S. officials
stated in late 2004 that North Korea probably had reprocessed most or all of the
8,000 fuel rods and might have produced four to six atomic bombs). North Korea
withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. It
justified its action by citing the U.S.-initiated cutoff of heavy oil shipments in
December 2002 and by charging that the Bush Administration planned a “pre-
emptive nuclear attack” on North Korea. Experts also have stated that North Korea
could produce two or three additional nuclear weapons with the fuel rods apparently
removed from the five megawatt reactor after the April 2005 shutdown.
Bush Administration Approach to the Talks. The Administration’s
policy since October 2002 is based on two views within the Administration. First,
President Bush has voiced distrust of North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong-il.
Second, there are divisions over policy within the Bush Administration. An
influential coalition has consisted of Pentagon officials and advisers around Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld, officials of Vice President Cheney’s office, and proliferation
experts in the State Department and White House led by former Undersecretary of
State John Bolton. They reportedly oppose negotiations with North Korea, favor the
issuance of demands for unilateral North Korean concessions on nuclear and other
military issues, and advocate an overall U.S. strategy of isolating North Korea
diplomatically and through economic sanctions and bringing about a collapse of the
North Korean regime. A second coalition, mainly in the State Department, maintains
that the Administration should attempt negotiations before adopting more coercive
measures, and they reportedly doubt the effectiveness of a strategy to bring about a
North Korean collapse.8
Until the July-August 2005 six party meeting, the Administration’s policy had
contained three elements: (1) a demand for an immediate North Korean commitment
to dismantlement, (2) the avoidance of direct negotiations with North Korea until
North Korea accepts dismantlement, and (3) the isolation of North Korea by creating
a bloc of governments demanding that North Korea accept CVID and willing to
impose economic sanctions on North Korea. The Administration called on North
Korea to commit to and take concrete measures to realize the “complete, verifiable,
irreversible dismantlement” of its nuclear programs, both the plutonium program and
the secret uranium enrichment program. This demand has become known as
“CVID.” The Administration stated that it would discuss ways to improve U.S.-
North Korean relations only after North Korea accepts CVID and takes concrete
measures to implement it.
8 Kessler, Glenn. U.S. has a shifting script on N. Korea. Washington Post, December 7,
2003. P. A25. Beck, Peter. The new Bush Korea team: a harder line? Weekly Dong-a
(Seoul), November 22, 2004.

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CRS-7
The Administration viewed the six party talks as giving it a vehicle to secure
support from China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia — North Korea’s immediate
neighbors — for the U.S. demand that North Korea agree to total dismantlement of
its nuclear programs. U.S. officials have spoken of creating a five versus one
situation in the six party talks, thus isolating North Korea. This in turn would lay the
groundwork for the participation of China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia in
sanctions against North Korea if North Korea rejected CVID. Throughout the early
stage of the talks, Administration officials expressed a view that North Korea would
isolate itself through its provocative actions in reopening its plutonium nuclear
program and its threats to proliferate nuclear materials and test nuclear weapons and
missiles. The Far Eastern Economic Review of September 11, 2003, cited two U.S.
officials as asserting that “it’s worse now for North Korea than it has been — this
isolation” and that “we’re letting them dig their own grave.” U.S. officials were
“convinced that Pyongyang’s [provocative] statements [at the August six party
meeting] were pushing its opponents closer together.”
The Administration has placed special emphasis on China’s role in the six party
talks. U.S. officials praise China’s role in hosting the meetings in Beijing. They
state that China should exert diplomatic pressure on North Korea to accept CVID.
The importance of China is pointed up by the mutual defense treaty China has with
North Korea and China’s role in supplying North Korea with an estimated 90 % of
its oil and 40% of its food.
The Administration did not achieve a clear measure of diplomatic isolation of
North Korea until the U.N. Security Council Resolution of July 2006 condemning
North Korea for its July 4, 2006, missile tests, calling on countries not to aid North
Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs, and calling on North Korea to end
its boycott of the six party talks.
Roles of the Other Six Party Governments. However, from the start of
multilateral talks, the other participants have voiced criticisms of the
Administration’s positions. China, Russia, and South Korea have criticized the
Administration for not negotiating directly with North Korea, and they have urged
the Administration to propose detailed settlement proposals on the nuclear issue.
They have asserted that the Administration should spell out the reciprocal measures
it would take if North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear programs. China,
Russia, and South Korea issued no positive pronouncements toward the U.S. June
23, 2004, proposal. To the contrary, the Chinese and South Korean foreign ministers
told Secretary of State Colin Powell in October 2004 that the Administration needed
to formulate new, “creative” proposals. Russia, China, and South Korea also have
voiced support for several of North Korea’s key positions in the six party talks,
including Pyongyang’s “reward for freeze” proposal and its denials that it has a secret
HEU program. They also have expressed opposition to economic sanctions. Only
Japan has voiced support for sanctions. Russia, South Korea, and China did not
publicly criticize North Korea’s boycott of the six party talks after July 2004, and
their reactions to the North Korean announcements of February 2005 avoided public

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CRS-8
criticism of North Korea.9 The U.S. core proposal of June 2004 and Christopher
Hill’s initiatives in the July-August 2005 Beijing meeting were attempts by the Bush
Administration to respond to these criticisms. Only Japan has supported the Bush
Administration generally, but even Japan pressed the Administration prior to June
2004 to issue a settlement proposal.
North Korea’s Approach to the Talks. In the summer of 2003, in the
wake of the perceived U.S. military victory in Iraq and negative international
reactions to North Korea’s restarting of the plutonium program and threats, the North
Korean leadership appeared worried that they faced international isolation and much
heavier U.S. pressure. From that point, there emerged a multifaceted North Korean
diplomatic strategy backed by a concerted propaganda campaign aimed primarily at
strengthening Pyongyang’s position in the six party talks and weakening the U.S.
position. A lead component of North Korea’s strategy was to threaten that it would
abandon the six party talks, thus playing on the psychological fears of the other
parties. North Korea also apparently employed this threat to demand that China, the
host of the talks, provide it with financial subsidies and increased shipments of food
and oil as “payment” for North Korean agreement to attend future sessions of the six
parties in Beijing. North Korea also began to claim that it has nuclear weapons,
reportedly first in private at the April 2003 Beijing talks and then publicly after the
August 2003 Beijing meeting.
But with these repeated threats, North Korea made a series of proposals, the first
installment in late 2003: first, a formal U.S.-North Korean non-aggression pact, later
modified to a formal U.S. guarantee that the United States would not attack North
Korea; second, a long-term “freeze” of North Korea’s plutonium program; and third,
retention by North Korea of a “peaceful” nuclear program. North Korean proposals
also have called for extensive concessions by the United States and Japan, including
removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting states, supply of
electricity, several billion dollars in “compensation” from Japan, restoration of
shipments of heavy oil and construction of the two light water nuclear reactors under
the 1994 Agreed Framework, and an end to U.S. economic sanctions and U.S.
interference in North Korea’s economic relations with other countries.10 North Korea
has retained these proposals while subsequently adding the light water reactor and
“regional disarmament” proposals discussed above.
While purposefully keeping its proposals vague regarding content and its own
obligations, North Korea engaged in a concerted propaganda campaign to promote
its proposals. Propaganda — aimed especially at South Korea, Russia, and China —
asserted that a U.S. guarantee of non-aggression is necessary to prevent the Bush
Administration from carrying out a plot to stage an “Iraq-like” unilateral attack.
Pyongyang’s propaganda organs contended that a “freeze” of plutonium facilities is
a logical “first stage” in a settlement process. The propaganda organs employed
enticing captions, such as “simultaneous actions,” “action versus action,”
9 Park Sang-hyun. Mediator makes difference: the role of South Korea in six party talks.
East Asian Review, Fall 2005. pp. 114-132.
10 Text — North Korean Foreign Ministry statement on talks. Reuters News, December 9,
2003.

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CRS-9
“simultaneous package deal,” “bold concessions,” and “non-interference in our
economic development.”
Another element in North Korea’s counter-strategy has been a campaign to deny
that it has a uranium enrichment (HEU) program. From the summer of 2003, North
Korean propaganda organs escalated steadily denials of an HEU program and denials
that North Korean officials admitted to an HEU program to Assistant Secretary of
State James Kelly in October 2002. North Korean officials stressed this denial to
visiting foreign delegations. North Korean propaganda organs compared U.S. claims
of an HEU program to the perceived erroneous U.S. claims of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, and they demanded that the United States provide evidence of its
claim.
North Korea retained much of this strategy after the June 2004 six party
meeting; but, as described previously, it initiated an actual boycott of the talks and
enlarged its agenda as part of a strategy to “kill” the Bush Administration’s June
2004 proposal and create a long-term diplomatic stalemate on the nuclear issue.
North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Plutonium Facilities
Most of North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear installations are located at
Yongbyon, 60 miles from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. They are the
facilities covered by the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. (For more
information see CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: How Soon
an Arsenal?) The key installations are:11
! An atomic reactor, with a capacity of about 5 electrical
megawatts that began operating by 1987: it is capable of
expending enough reactor fuel to produce about 6 kilograms of
plutonium annually — enough for the manufacture of a single
atomic bomb annually. North Korea in 1989 shut down the reactor
for about 70 days; U.S. intelligence agencies believe that North
Korea removed fuel rods from the reactor at that time for
reprocessing into plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons. In May
1994, North Korea shut down the reactor and removed about 8,000
fuel rods, which could be reprocessed into enough plutonium (25-30
kilograms) for 4-6 nuclear weapons. North Korea started operating
the reactor again in February 2003, shut it down in April 2005, and
said it had removed another 8,000 fuel rods.
! Two larger (estimated 50 megawatts and 200 electrical
megawatts) reactors under construction at Yongbyon and
Taechon since 1984: According to U.S. Ambassador Robert
11 Albright, David and O’Neill, Kevin. Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.
Washington, D.C., Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2000. pp. 57-82.

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CRS-10
Gallucci, these plants, if completed, would be capable of producing
enough spent fuel annually for 200 kilograms of plutonium,
sufficient to manufacture nearly 30 atomic bombs per year.
However, when North Korea re-opened the plutonium program in
early 2003, reports indicate that construction on the larger reactors
was not resumed, but construction reportedly was resumed in June
2005.
! A plutonium reprocessing plant about 600 feet long and several
stories high: The plant would separate weapons grade
Plutonium-239 from spent nuclear fuel rods for insertion into the
structure of atomic bombs or warheads. U.S. intelligence agencies
reportedly detected North Korean preparations to restart the
plutonium reprocessing plant in February and March 2003.
According to press reports, the CIA estimated in late 2003 that North
Korea had reprocessed some of the 8,000 fuel rods. In January 2004,
North Korean officials showed a U.S. nuclear expert, Dr. Sigfried
Hecker, samples of what they claimed were plutonium oxalate
powder and plutonium metal. Dr. Hecker later said in testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (January 21, 2004)
that, without testing, he could not confirm whether the sample was
metallic plutonium “but all observations I was able to make are
consistent with the sample being plutonium metal.”
Satellite photographs reportedly also show that the atomic reactors have no
attached power lines, which they would have if used for electric power generation.
Persons interviewed for this study believe that North Korea developed the two
reactors and the apparent reprocessing plant with its own resources and technology.
It is believed that Kim Jong-il, the son and successor of President Kim Il-sung who
died in July 1994, directs the program, and that the military and the Ministry of
Public Security (North Korea’s version of the KGB) implement it. North Korea
reportedly has about 3,000 scientists and research personnel devoted to the Yongbyon
program. Many have studied nuclear technology (though not necessarily nuclear
weapons production) in the Soviet Union and China and reportedly Pakistan. North
Korea has uranium deposits, estimated at 26 million tons. North Korea is believed
to have one uranium producing mine.
Highly Enriched Uranium Program
North Korea’s secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program appears to date from
at least 1996. Hwang Jang-yop, a Communist Party secretary who defected in 1997,
has stated that North Korea and Pakistan agreed in the summer of 1996 to trade
North Korean long-range missile technology for Pakistani HEU technology.12 Other
information dates North Korea-Pakistan cooperation to 1993. The Clinton
Administration reportedly learned of it in 1998 or 1999, and a Department of Energy
12 Kim Min-cheol. Hwang tells of secret nuke program. Choson Ilbo (Seoul, internet
version), July 5, 2003.

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CRS-11
report of 1999 cited evidence of the program. In March 2000, President Clinton
notified Congress that he was waiving certification that “North Korea is not seeking
to develop or acquire the capability to enrich uranium.” The Japanese newspaper
Sankei Shimbun reported on June 9, 2000, the contents of a “detailed report” from
Chinese government sources on a secret North Korean uranium enrichment facility
inside North Korea’s Mount Chonma. Reportedly, according to a CIA report to
Congress, North Korea attempted in late 2001 to acquire “centrifuge-related materials
in large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program.”
The CIA estimated publicly in December 2002 that North Korea could produce
two atomic bombs annually through HEU beginning in 2005; other intelligence
estimates reportedly project a bomb producing capability between 2005 and 2007.
Ambassador Robert Galucci, who negotiated the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed
Framework, and Mitchell Reiss, head of the State Department’s Policy Planning
Bureau until 2004, have stated that a functioning North Korean HEU infrastructure
could produce enough HEU for “two or more nuclear weapons per year.” The
Washington Post of April 28, 2004, quoted an U.S. intelligence official saying that
a North Korean HEU infrastructure could produce as many as six atomic bombs
annually. Administration officials have stated that they do not know the locations of
North Korea’s uranium enrichment program or whether North Korea has assembled
the infrastructure to produce uranium-based atomic bombs; but U.S. intelligence
agencies reportedly have extensive information on North Korea’s accelerated
overseas purchases of equipment and materials for the uranium enrichment program
since early 1999.
International Assistance
Knowledgeable individuals believe that the Soviet Union did not assist directly
in the development of Yongbyon in the 1980s. The U.S.S.R. provided North Korea
with a small research reactor in the 1960s, which also is at Yongbyon. However,
North Korean nuclear scientists continued to receive training in the U.S.S.R. up to
the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. East German and Russian nuclear
and missile scientists reportedly were in North Korea throughout the 1990s. Since
1999, reports have appeared that U.S. intelligence agencies had information that
Chinese enterprises were supplying important components and raw materials for
North Korea’s missile program.13
North Korea’s Delivery Systems
North Korea’s missile launchings of July 4, 2006, re-focused U.S. attention on
North Korea’s missile program and Pyongyang’s apparent attempts to develop long-
range missiles that could strike U.S. territories. North Korea succeeded by 1998 in
developing a “Nodong” missile with a range estimated at up to 900 miles, capable
of covering South Korea and most of Japan. North Korea reportedly deployed nearly
100 Nodong missiles by 2003. On August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired a three-
13 ROK source views CIA report on DPRK production of plutonium. Chungang Ilbo
(internet version), February 25, 2001. Gertz, Bill. Pyongyang’s launch met by indifference.
Washington Times, May 16, 1999. p. C1.

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CRS-12
stage rocket, apparently the prototype of the Taepodong I missile; the third stage
apparently was an attempt to launch a satellite. U.S. intelligence estimates reportedly
concluded that such a missile would have the range to reach Alaska, Guam, and the
Northern Marianas Commonwealth. Media reports in early 2000 cited U.S.
intelligence findings that without further flight tests, North Korea could deploy an
intercontinental ballistic missile that would be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii,
and the U.S. west coast. Japan’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper reported on August 6,
2003, that North Korea and Iran were negotiating a deal for the export of the long-
range Taepo Dong-2 missile to Iran and the joint development of nuclear warheads.
U.S. officials claimed in September 2003 that North Korea had developed a more
accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missile that could reach Okinawa and
Guam (site of major U.S. military bases) and that there was evidence that North
Korea had produced the Taepodong II, which could reach Alaska, Hawaii, and the
U.S. west coast.
However, the apparent failure of the Taepodong missile launched July 4, 2006,
indicated that North Korea had not succeeded in developing such a long-range
missile. However, evaluations of all seven of the missiles launched on July 4, 2006,
by intelligence agencies of the United States and other governments reportedly have
concluded that North Korea has increased the accuracy of its Scud and Nodong
missiles and that the launches displayed the ability of North Korea’s command and
control apparatus to coordinate multiple launchings of missiles at diverse targets.14
(For additional information, see CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States.)
These projections led the Clinton Administration to press North Korea for new
talks over North Korea’s missile program. In talks held in 1999 and 2000, North
Korea demanded $1 billion annually in exchange for a promise not to export missiles.
U.S. negotiators rejected North Korea’s demand for $1 billion but offered a lifting
of U.S. economic sanctions. This laid the ground for the Berlin agreement of
September 1999, in which North Korea agreed to defer further missile tests in return
for the lifting of major U.S. economic sanctions. President Clinton formalized the
lifting of key economic sanctions against North Korea in June 2000. North Korea
continued the moratorium, but it appears to have used Pakistan and Iran as surrogates
in testing intermediate-range missiles based on North Korean technology.15
State of Nuclear Weapons Development
A CIA statement of August 18, 2003, estimated “that North Korea has produced
one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has validated the designs without
14 An expert is amazed by the targeting accuracy: an exclusive report based on complete data
on the landing points of North Korean missiles. Yomiuri Weekly (Tokyo) in Japanese,
August 6, 2006. p. 22-23.
15 Gertz, Bill. Pakistan’s missile program aided by North Korea. Washington Times,
September 14, 1998. p. A1. Alon, Ben-David. Iran successfully tests Shahab 3. Janes
Defence Weekly (internet version), July 9, 2003. Coughlin, Con. China, N. Korea send
experts to hone Iran’s long-range missiles. New York Times, November 23, 1997. p. A5.

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CRS-13
conducting yield-producing nuclear tests.” The initial estimate of one or two nuclear
weapons is derived primarily from North Korea’s approximately 70-day shutdown
of the five megawatt reactor in 1989, which would have given it the opportunity to
remove nuclear fuel rods, from which plutonium is reprocessed. The U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reportedly
estimated in late 1993 that North Korea extracted enough fuel rods for about 12
kilograms of plutonium — sufficient for one or two atomic bombs. The CIA and
DIA apparently based their estimate on the 1989 shutdown of the five megawatt
reactor.16
South Korean and Japanese intelligence estimates reportedly were higher: 16-24
kilograms (Japan) and 7-22 kilograms (South Korea). These estimates reportedly are
based on the view that North Korea could have acquired a higher volume of
plutonium from the 1989 reactor shutdown and the view of a higher possibility that
North Korea removed fuel rods during the 1990 and 1991 reactor slowdowns.
Russian Defense Ministry analyses of late 1993 reportedly came to a similar estimate
of about 20 kilograms of plutonium, enough for two or three atomic bombs. General
Leon LaPorte, former U.S. Commander in Korea, stated in an interview in April 2006
that North Korea possessed three to six nuclear weapons before the 1994 U.S.-North
Korean Agreed Framework.17
Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly have learned of significant
technological advances by North Korea toward nuclear weapons production. On
March 10, 1992, the Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts)
published the text of a 1990 Soviet KGB report to the Soviet Central Committee on
North Korea’s nuclear program. It was published again by Izvestiya on June 24,
1994. The KGB report asserted that “According to available data, development of
the first nuclear device has been completed at the DPRK nuclear research center in
Yongbyon.” The North Korean government, the report stated, had decided not to test
the device in order to avoid international detection.
Additionally, a number of reports and evidence point to at least a middle-range
likelihood that North Korea may have smuggled plutonium from Russia. In June
1994, the head of Russia’s Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) said
at a press conference that North Korea’s attempts to smuggle “components of nuclear
arms production” from Russia caused his agency “special anxiety.” U.S. executive
branch officials have expressed concern in background briefings over the possibility
that North Korea has smuggled plutonium from Russia. One U.S. official, quoted in
the Washington Times, July 5, 1994, asserted that “There is the possibility that things
having gotten over the [Russia-North Korea] border without anybody being aware of
it.” The most specific claim came in the German news magazine Stern in March
1993, which cited Russian Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had
smuggled 56 kilograms of plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia.
16 Ibid., p. 111-166. Kim Kyoung-soo. North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Problems and Prospects. Elizabeth, New Jersey, and Seoul, Hollym, 2004. pp. 27-50.
17 Kang Chan-ho. Former USFK commander: transfer of wartime control should not be
carried out overnight. Joong Ang Ilbo (Seoul), April 3, 2006. p. 13.

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CRS-14
If, as it claims, North Korea reprocessed the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods in 2003 that
it had moved from storage at the beginning of that year, North Korea gained an
additional 25-30 kilograms of plutonium, according to Dr. Sigfried Hecker in his
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 2004. Dr.
Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos Laboratories, had visited North Korea’s
Yongbyon nuclear complex in January 2004. U.S. officials and nuclear experts have
stated that this amount of plutonium would give North Korea the potential to produce
between four to eight atomic bombs.18 These estimates appear to be based on
projections that a country like North Korea would need 6-8 kilograms of plutonium
to produce one atomic bomb. The IAEA has had a standard that a non-nuclear state
would need about eight kilograms of plutonium to produce an atomic bomb.
The question of whether North Korea produced additional nuclear weapons with
the plutonium that it apparently acquired after 2003 may depend on whether North
Korea is able to develop a nuclear warhead that could be fitted onto its missiles.
Experts believe that the one or two atomic bombs developed earlier likely are similar
to the large-size plutonium bomb dropped by the United States on Nagasaki in
August 1945. However, North Korea has few delivery systems that could deliver
such a bomb to a U.S. or Japanese target. Thus, Pyongyang probably would not
produce additional Nagasaki-type bombs but would retain its weapons-grade
plutonium until it could use it a producing a nuclear warhead. Statements by U.S.
officials reflect an apparent uncertainty over whether North Korea has achieved a
warheading capability.19
According to press reports in late 2002, the CIA concluded that North Korea
accelerated its uranium enrichment program in the 1999, 2000, and 2001. According
to U.S. News and World Report, September 1, 2003, the CIA estimated that North
Korea could produce a uranium-based atomic weapon by the second half of 2004.
Another report, in the Washington Post, April 28, 2004, stated that U.S. intelligence
officials had “broadly concluded” that a North Korean uranium enrichment program
would be operational by 2007, producing enough material for as many as six atomic
bombs.20 However, U.S. officials have stated that they know less about the secret
uranium enrichment program (HEU) than they know about the plutonium program.
North Korea received designs for uranium enrichment centrifuges from Pakistan
nuclear “czar,” A.Q. Khan, and has attempted to purchase overseas key components
for uranium enrichment centrifuges; but some of these purchases have been
blocked.21 Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill stated on September 28,
18 Kessler, Glenn. N. Korea nuclear estimate to rise. Washington Post, April 28, 2004. p.
A1. U.S. Expert says N. Korea has plutonium to make 8 bombs. Yonhap News Agency,
January 2, 2006.
19 Cloud, David S. and Sanger, David E. U.S. aide sees arms advance by North Korea. New
York Times, April 29, 2005. p. A1. Morgan, David. U.S. not certain North Korea has
nuclear weapons. Reuters News, February 28, 2005.
20 Kessler, N. Korea nuclear estimate to rise, Washington Post, April 28, 2004. p. A1.
21 Albright and Hinderstein, Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program, pp. 35-36.

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CRS-15
2005, that “where there is not a consensus is how far they [North Korea] have gone
with this [the HEU program.].”22
The 1994 Agreed Framework
North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. In a
denuclearization agreement signed in December 1991, North Korea and South Korea
pledged not to possess nuclear weapons, not to possess plutonium reprocessing or
uranium enrichment facilities, and to negotiate a mutual nuclear inspection system.
In January 1992, North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which requires North Korea to report all nuclear
programs to the IAEA and gives the IAEA the right to conduct a range of inspections
of North Korean nuclear installations and programs. In 1992, North Korea rebuffed
South Korea regarding implementation of the denuclearization agreement, but it did
allow the IAEA to conduct six inspections during the period June 1992-February
1993.
In late 1992, the IAEA found evidence that North Korea had reprocessed more
plutonium than the 80 grams it had disclosed to the agency. In February 1993, the
IAEA invoked a provision in the safeguards agreement and called for a “special
inspection” of two concealed but apparent nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. North
Korea rejected the IAEA request and announced on March 12, 1993, an intention to
withdraw from the NPT.
In May 1994, North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect the 8,000 fuel
rods that it had removed from the five-megawatt reactor. In June 1994, North
Korea’s President Kim Il-sung reactivated a longstanding invitation to former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter to visit Pyongyang. Kim offered Carter a freeze of North
Korea’s nuclear facilities and operations. Kim took this initiative after China
reportedly informed him that it would not veto a first round of economic sanctions,
which the Clinton Administration had proposed to members of the U.N. Security
Council. According to former Defense Secretary William Perry, the Pentagon also
developed a contingency plan to bomb the Yongbyon nuclear facilities if North
Korea began to reprocess the 8,000 fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. The
Clinton Administration reacted to Kim’s proposal by dropping its sanctions proposal
and entering into a new round of high-level negotiations with North Korea. This
negotiation led to the Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994.23
The heart of the Agreed Framework was a U.S. commitment to provide North
Korea with a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits; in return
North Korea would halt the operations and infrastructure development of its nuclear
22 Parties concur N.K. has HEU material, but disagree on program’s progress: Hill. Yonhap
News Agency, September 29, 2005.
23 Wit, Joel S., Poneman, Daniel B., and Gallucci, Robert L. The First North Korean
Nuclear Crisis: Going Critical. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2004. pp.
192-330.

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CRS-16
program.24 The Agreed Framework committed North Korea to “freeze its
graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities” with the freeze monitored by the
IAEA. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who negotiated for the United States, stated
that “related facilities” include the plutonium reprocessing plant and 8,000 stored fuel
rods. Clinton Administration officials reportedly said that a secret “confidential
minute” to the Agreed Framework prohibits North Korea from construction of new
nuclear facilities elsewhere in North Korea.
Benefits to North Korea
Light Water Nuclear Reactors. North Korea was to receive two light water
reactors (LWRs) with a generating capacity of approximately 2,000 megawatts. The
Agreed Framework set a “target date” of 2003. The United States was obligated to
organize an international consortium arrangement for the acquisition and financing
of the reactors. The Clinton Administration and the governments of South Korea,
Japan, and other countries established in March 1995 the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) to coordinate the provision of the LWRs. After
the groundbreaking at the reactor site in August 1997, KEDO officials changed the
estimated completion date from 2003 to 2007; other experts predicted a much later
date. The laying of the foundation for the LWRs occurred in August 2002 just before
the Kelly mission to North Korea and the Bush Administration’s subsequent
suspension of construction.
Oil at No Cost. The Agreed Framework committed the United States to
provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy oil to North Korea annually until the first of
the two light water reactors became operational. The oil shipments continued until
KEDO’s decision in November 2002 to cancel future shipments..
Diplomatic Representation. The United States and North Korea announced
in the Agreed Framework an intention to open liaison offices in each other’s capitals
and establish full diplomatic relations if the two governments make progress “on
issues of concern to each side.” However, North Korea displayed reluctance to
finalize arrangements, and talks over liaison offices ended in 1997. Ambassador
Gallucci asserted that a full normalization of diplomatic relations would depend on
a successful resolution of non-nuclear military issues. In October 1999, William
Perry, the Administration’s Special Adviser on North Korea, cited normalization of
diplomatic relations as one of the benefits which the United States could offer North
Korea for new agreements on nuclear and missile issues.
Lifting the U.S. Economic Embargo. The Agreed Framework specified
that within three months from October 21, 1994, the two sides would reduce barriers
to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and
financial transactions. This required the Clinton Administration to relax the U.S.
economic embargo on North Korea, which the Truman Administration and Congress
put in place during the Korean War. On January 20, 1995, the Administration
announced initial, limited measures. North Korea complained loudly that these
measures failed to meet the commitment stated in the Agreed Framework. In U.S.-
24 Ibid., pp. 421-423.

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CRS-17
North Korean talks in September 1999, the United States agreed to end a broader
range of economic sanctions in exchange for a North Korean moratorium on future
missile testing. President Clinton ordered the end of most economic sanctions in
June 2000.
U.S. Nuclear Security Guarantee. Article III of the Agreed Framework
states that “Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free
Korean peninsula.” Under that heading, it states, “The U.S. will provide formal
assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.”
While the language is not totally clear on the timing of the U.S. delivery of a formal
nuclear security guarantee, it seems to imply that this would come when North Korea
had dismantled its nuclear program or at least had advanced dismantlement to a
considerable degree.
North Korean Obligations Beyond the Freeze of the Nuclear
Program
Inspections and Broader Nuclear Obligations. The Agreed Framework
stated, “The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its [1992] safeguards
agreement under the Treaty.” Gallucci stated in congressional testimony that the
Agreed Framework did not restrict the right of the IAEA to invoke special
inspections if it discovered any new North Korean nuclear activities. Gallucci said
that the Agreed Framework only restricted the IAEA with respect to the two
suspected nuclear waste sites and the nuclear installations and the stored fuel rods at
Yongbyon and Taechon. He stressed that any new North Korean nuclear program
would fall immediately under the IAEA-North Korea safeguards agreement and that
North Korea must place it under IAEA safeguards. Failure to do so, he said, would
constitute a violation of the Agreed Framework. Thus, according to Gallucci’s
interpretation, North Korea’s secret HEU program violated this clause of the Agreed
Framework.
In the Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to “consistently take steps to
implement the [1991] North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.” North Korea thus extended its obligations to South Korea in the
North-South denuclearization agreement to the United States. This clause of the
Agreed Framework also is relevant to North Korea’s secret HEU program, since the
North-South denuclearization agreement specifically prohibits uranium enrichment.
Disposition of Fuel Rods from the Five Megawatt Reactor. The
Agreed Framework provided for the storage of the rods in North Korea under IAEA
monitoring and a North Korean promise not to reprocess plutonium from the rods.
It also provided for subsequent talks on the “ultimate disposition” of the rods.
Dismantlement of Nuclear Installations. The Agreed Framework states
that “Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities
will be completed when the LWR project is completed.”

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CRS-18
Role of Congress
The role of Congress from the 1994 Agreed Framework to 2003 was to
appropriate money to finance the shipments of heavy oil to North Korea under the
Agreed Framework and to finance the administrative costs of KEDO. However, with
the Bush Administration’s suspension of heavy oil and the LWR project in 2002 and
2003, the Administration has not requested funding for KEDO in FY2004, 2005, and
2006.
Congress also has been the source of criticisms of the policies of both the
Clinton and Bush administrations toward the North Korean nuclear issue; and there
has been congressional legislation that has attempted to influence U.S. policy.
Congress included in the Omnibus Appropriations bill for FY1999 (H.R. 4328) the
requirement that the President certify progress in negotiations with North Korea over
the nuclear, missile, and other issues. H.R. 4328 also called the President to name
“a very senior presidential envoy” as “North Korea Policy Coordinator” to conduct
a review of U.S. policy and direct negotiations with North Korea. This resulted in
President Clinton’s appointment of William Perry as the policy coordinator. The
Bush Administration, however, terminated the senior policy coordinator position.
The stalemate in the six party talks and North Korea’s reported advances in
nuclear weapons development produced congressional criticism of the Bush
Administration in 2006. A number of Members of Congress called for the
Administration to drop its refusal to negotiate with North Korea bilaterally.25 On
June 22, 2006, the Senate approved an amendment to the FY2007 Defense
Authorization bill that would require President Bush to appoint, within 60 days of the
bill’s enactment, a North Korea Policy Coordinator who would conduct a review of
policy toward North Korea and would make recommendations to the President and
Congress. The amendment also would require the Bush Administration to submit a
report to Congress every 180 days on the status of North Korea’s nuclear and missile
programs.
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RL33567, Korea: U.S.-South Korean Relations — Issues for Congress,
by Larry A. Niksch.
CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Missiles: Policy Issues, by Shirley A. Kan.
CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,
by Steve Hildreth.
CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
25 Senators advocate N. Korea talks. Washington Times, June 26, 2006. p. A4. Letter from
Senate Democratic Leaders to President Bush, July 12, 2006.

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CRS-19
CRS Report RL31785, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin.
CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by Raphael
F. Perl and Dick K. Nanto.
CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?, by
Sharon Squassoni.

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