Order Code RL33594
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nigeria in Political Transition
July 28, 2006
Ted Dagne
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Nigeria in Political Transition
Summary
On June 8, 1998, General Sani Abacha, the military leader who took power in
Nigeria in 1993, died of a reported heart attack and was replaced by General
Abdulsalam Abubakar. On July 7, 1998, Moshood Abiola, the presumed winner of
the 1993 presidential election, also died of a heart attack during a meeting with U.S.
officials. General Abubakar released political prisoners and initiated political,
economic, and social reforms. He also established a new independent electoral
commission and outlined a schedule for elections and transition to civilian rule,
pledging to hand over power to an elected civilian government by May 1999. In late
February 1999, former military leader General Olusegun Obasanjo was elected
president and was sworn in on May 29, 1999. Obasanjo won 62.8% of the votes
(18.7 million), while his challenger, Chief Olu Falae, received 37.2% of the votes
(11.1 million). In mid-April 2003, President Obasanjo was reelected, and the
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won a majority in the legislative elections. The
elections, however, were marred by serious irregularities and electoral fraud,
according to international election observers.
Relations between the United States and Nigeria improved with the transfer of
power to a civilian government. In late October 1999, President Obasanjo met with
President Clinton and other senior officials in Washington. President Clinton
pledged a substantial increase in U.S. assistance to Nigeria. In August 2000,
President Clinton paid a state visit to Nigeria. He met with President Obasanjo in the
capital of Abuja and addressed the Nigerian parliament. Several new U.S. initiatives
were announced, including increased support for AIDS prevention and treatment
programs in Nigeria and enhanced trade and commercial development. In May 2001,
President Obasanjo met with President Bush and other senior officials. The two
presidents discussed a wide range of issues, including trade, peacekeeping, and the
HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa. In early November 2001, President Obasanjo visited
Washington to express his government’s support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism
campaign and returned to Washington in June 2002. In July 2003, President Bush
visited Nigeria while on a five-day, five-country trip to Africa. President Obasanjo
visted Washington in 2005 and in 2006.
Nigeria continues to make progress in strengthening its fragile democracy but
faces serious economic challenges. Nigeria remains relatively stable, although ethnic
and religious clashes in some parts of the country have led to massive displacement
of civilian populations. Thousands of civilians have been killed over the past several
years and many more wounded in religious clashes. Under President Obasanjo,
Nigeria has emerged as a major player in Africa. President Obasanjo took a leading
role in the creation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and
the African Union (AU). Nigeria also played an important role in facilitating
negotiations between the government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels. In August
2003, Nigeria sent an estimated 1,500 troops to Liberia as part of a West African-led
peacekeeping force. This CRS report replaces CRS Issue Brief IB98046, Nigeria in
Political Transition, by Ted Dagne, and will be updated as the situation warrants.

---

Contents
Historical and Political Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Transition to Civilian Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Elections in 1998, 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The 2003 Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Current Economic and Social Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Humanitarian and Human Rights Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
HIV/AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Sharia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The United States and Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S.-Nigerian Relations: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
109th Congress Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

---

Nigeria in Political Transition
Historical and Political Background
Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa with an estimated 128.7 million
people (World Fact Book, 2005), has been in political turmoil and economic crisis
intermittently since independence in October 1960. The current borders were
demarcated by British colonial rulers in 1914, on the eve of World War I, by merging
the British dependencies of Northern and Southern Nigeria into a single territory with
promising economic prospects. The new Nigeria, as defined by the British, placed
over 250 distinct ethnic groups under a single administrative system. Of this large
number of groups, ten account for nearly 80% of the total population, and the
northern Hausa-Fulani, the southwestern Yoruba, and the southeastern Ibo have
traditionally been the most politically active and dominant. Since gaining
independence from Britain in 1960, Nigerian political life has been scarred by
conflict along both ethnic and geographic lines, marked most notably by northern and
Hausa domination of the military and the civil war fought by the separatist Ibo of
Biafra against the central government from 1967 to 1970. Questions persist as to
whether Nigeria and its multitude of ethnic groups can be held together as one nation,
particularly in light of the degree to which misrule has undermined the authority and
legitimacy of the state apparatus; but many Nigerians feel a significant degree of
national pride and belief in Nigeria as a state.
Nigeria’s political life has
been dominated by military
Nigeria At A Glance
coups and long military-imposed
Population:
131,859,731
transition programs to civilian
Independence:
October 1960
rule. The military has ruled
Comparative Area:
Slightly more than twice the
Nigeria for approximately 28 of
size of California
its 43 years since independence.
Religions:
50% Muslim, 40% Christian,
In August 1985, General Ibrahim
10% Indigenous beliefs
Babangida ousted another
Languages:
English (official)
m i l i t a r y r u l e r , G e n e r a l
GDP:
$174.1 billion (2005)
Muhammadu Buhari, and
GDP Per Capita:
$1,400 (2005)
imposed a transition program
Labor force:
57.21 million
that lasted until June 1993, when
Exports:
$52.16 billion (2005)
Nigeria held its first election in
Imports:
$25.95 billion (2005)
almost a decade, believed to
External Debt:
$37.49 billion (2005)
have been won by Chief
Moshood K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba
Source: The World Fact Book, 2006.
businessman from the south. In
the same month, General

---

CRS-2
Babangida annulled the presidential election because of what he called “irregularities
in the voting” and ordered a new election with conditions that Abiola and his
challenger be excluded from participating. Amid confusion and growing political
unrest, Babangida handed over power to a caretaker government in August 1993,
then ousted the caretaker the following November.
General Sani Abacha took power in November 1993. Abacha had been an
active participant in several Nigerian military coups and was an authoritarian figure
who seemed unmoved by international opinion. Beginning in 1995, Abacha
imprisoned hundreds of critics, including former military leader Olusegun Obasanjo,
the only Nigerian military leader to have handed over power voluntarily to an elected
civilian government, and Moshood Abiola, who was charged with treason after
declaring himself president following the annulled election. The senior wife of
Abiola, Kudirat Abiola, was assassinated in June 1996 by unidentified men. Her
daughter blamed the military junta.
In October 1995, under pressure to implement political reforms, Abacha
announced a three-year transition program to civilian rule, which he tightly controlled
until his death on June 8, 1998. Abacha established the National Electoral
Commission of Nigeria (NECON), which published guidelines for party registration,
recognized five political parties in September 1996, and officially dissolved
opposition groups after refusing to recognize them. The military professed its
support for Abacha should he seek reelection as a civilian, and by April 20, 1998, all
five parties had nominated Abacha as the single presidential candidate despite
criticism by the international community and dissident groups. Major opposition
figures, especially those in exile, dismissed the transition program and called for
boycotts of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Only candidates from
among the five state-sanctioned political parties participated in state assembly
elections held in December 1997 and parliamentary elections held on April 25, 1998.
The United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), considered by many government
opponents to be the army’s proxy, won widespread victories in the December 1997
elections.
Transition to Civilian Rule
Abacha died, reportedly of a heart attack, on June 8, 1998. The Provisional
Ruling Council quickly nominated Major General Abdulsalam Abubakar to assume
the presidency. General Abubakar, a career serviceman from the Northern Hausa-
speaking elite, was regarded as a military intellectual. He served as chief of military
intelligence under General Ibrahim Babangida and was Abacha’s chief of staff. He
led the investigations of reported coup attempts by former President Olusegun
Obasanjo and Lt. General Oladipo Diya, charges that, critics argue, were fabricated
by the government. Following Abacha’s death, General Abubakar addressed the
nation and expressed his commitment to uphold the October 1998 hand-over date to
civilian government established by Abacha. In an effort to prove his commitment,
Abubakar released several prominent political prisoners, including General Olusegun
Obasanjo.

---

CRS-3
During a meeting with a U.S. delegation led by then Undersecretary of State
Thomas Pickering on July 7, 1998, Abiola suffered a heart attack and died soon after.
Pro-democracy leaders immediately claimed that Abiola was murdered. The autopsy
report, monitored by an independent team of Canadian, American, and British
doctors, confirmed that Abiola died of natural causes due to a long-standing heart
condition and that death as a result of poisoning was highly unlikely. Many
observers said, however, that Abiola’s care was deliberately neglected, resulting in
his early demise. His death crushed the hopes of many democracy supporters and
spurred riots for several days.
In August and September of 1998, Abubakar undertook rapid and dramatic
reforms to the Nigerian political system and economy. He replaced Abacha’s top
security staff and cabinet and dissolved the five political parties that Abacha had
established. He abolished major decrees banning trade union activity, which had
been used by Abacha to put down the political strikes that followed the nullification
of the 1993 election results and ended treason charges against Nobel Prize-winning
writer Wole Soyinka and 14 others. Abubakar has also made a concerted effort to
appeal to Nigerians in exile to return home and assist in the transition process, and
many have done so, most notably Nobel Prize-winning author Wole Soyinka in mid-
October. On September 7, Abubakar released the draft constitution for the next
civilian government, which Abacha had kept secret, but announced on October 1 that
he was setting up a committee to organize and collect views from various sections
of the country, after which he would finalize changes to the draft document in order
to make it “more representative and acceptable.” In early May 1999, the government
approved an updated version of the 1979 Nigerian constitution instead of the
constitution drafted by the Abacha regime.
Abubakar outlined a specific timetable for the transition to civilian rule, with
local polls on December 5, 1998, gubernatorial and state polls on January 9, 1999,
followed by national assembly polls on February 20, 1999, and presidential polls on
February 27. The official hand-over date was set for May 29, 1999. He also nullified
all of the previous state and gubernatorial elections because they were held under the
Abacha system and dismissed the National Electoral Commission established by
Abacha, replacing it with one of his own, the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC), in early August. Political party registration for elections ended
after an extension on October 12, and the INEC released the names of the nine
registered parties on October 19. The three major parties were the People’s
Democratic Party (PDP), the All People’s Party (APP), and the Alliance for
Democracy (AD). In order to be registered, a party had to be considered “national,”
defined as having offices in at least two-thirds of the 36 states that make up Nigeria,
and furthermore must win at least 10% of votes in two-thirds of the states in the local
elections in December 1998 in order to qualify a candidate for the national elections
in February. Abubakar warned of the dangers of a “proliferation of political parties
with parochial orientation that may lead to disunity and instability,” while urging
political leadership to represent the will of people of all ethnic and religious groups.
The international community cautiously welcomed the transition program.
Donor governments in Europe expressed support and urged transparency. French,
British, and German delegations met with the Nigerian leadership in Abuja, the
capital, in late July, and Abubakar made numerous trips abroad in an effort to

---

CRS-4
improve relations with African and world leaders. The European Union announced
in late October 1998 that, effective November 1, some sanctions would be relaxed.
The visa ban was officially removed and some officials indicated that even the
military measures might be lifted after the official hand-over date in May. On May
31, 1999, the European Union restored full economic cooperation with Nigeria. In
late May, the Commonwealth also readmitted Nigeria as a member, after three years
of suspension.
Highlights of Abubakar’s Transition Program
Rejected:
National Conference
National Unity Government
Accomplished:
— Debt relief talks with World Bank and IMF
— Dissolution of old electoral commission and establishment of new Independent National
Electoral Commission
— Dissolution of old political parties and registration of new parties
— Voter registration
— Annulment of elections under Abacha
— Most political prisoners freed
— Greater freedom of press, human rights
— Publicized and amended 1995 constitution
— Dismissed Abacha officials and began investigation into misappropriated funds
— Exiled dissidents returned home
— Better-paid civil servants to combat corruption
— Repairs started on refineries, more oil imported, privatization program started
— Hand-over to civilian government May 29, 1999
— Presidential elections February 27, 1999
— National assembly elections February 20, 1999
— State/Gubernatorial elections January 9, 1999
— Local elections December 5, 1998; Partial lifting of international sanctions
Elections in 1998, 1999
In early December 1998, the PDP won in 389 out of 774 municipalities in local
elections, while the All People’s Party (APP) came a distant second with 182,
followed by Alliance for Democracy. In the governorship elections in early January,
the PDP won 21 states out of 36, the APP won in nine states, and the AD won in six
states. Shortly after the elections in January, the APP and AD began talks to merge
the two political parties. However, the Independent Electoral Commission rejected
a merger but agreed that the two parties “can present common candidates” for the
presidential elections.
In mid-February, the People’s Democratic Party nominated General Olusegun
Obasanjo as its presidential candidate. Obasanjo won the support of more than two-
thirds of the 2,500 delegates and a northerner, Abubakar Atiku, who was elected
governor in the January elections, was chosen as his running mate. The APP and AD
nominated Chief Olu Falae, a Yoruba, as their joint candidate for president. A former
Nigerian security chief and a northerner, Chief Umaru Shinakfi, was chosen as
Falae’s running mate.

---

CRS-5
In late February 1999, General Obasanjo was elected president by a wide
margin. Obasanjo won 62.8% of the votes (18.7 million), while his challenger, Chief
Olu Falae, received 37.2% of the votes (11.1 million). In the Senate elections, the
PDP won 58% of the votes, APP 23%, and AD 19%. In the elections for the House
of Representatives, PDP received 59% of the votes, AD 22%, and APP 20%.
On May 29, 1999, Obasanjo was sworn in president and the Nigerian Senate
approved 42 of 49 members of his cabinet. In his inaugural address, President
Obasanjo said that “the entire Nigerian scene is very bleak indeed. So bleak people
ask me where do we begin? I know what great things you expect of me at this New
Dawn. As I have said many times in my extensive travels in the country, I am not a
miracle worker. It will be foolish to underrate the task ahead. Alone, I can do little.”
The 2003 Elections
President Obasanjo was nominated by his party, the Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP), for a second-term bid. The All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) picked former
military strongman, General Muhammadu Buhari, as its presidential candidate.
Meanwhile, the former Biafra rebel leader, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who led the
secessionist war in the 1960s, was picked as the presidential candidate of the All
Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). The National Democratic Party (NDP) picked
former foreign minister Ike Nwachukwu as its presidential candidate.
In mid-April 2003, Nigerians went to the polls for the second time since military
rule gave way to a civilian government. President Obasanjo was reelected to a
second term, and his PDP party won in legislative elections. The Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared that Obasanjo won 61.9% of the
votes, while his nearest rival, General Muhammadu Buhari of ANPP, won 32.1% of
the votes. The elections, however, were marred by serious irregularities and electoral
fraud, according to international election observers. In the Senate, the PDP won 72
seats out of 109 seats, while the ANPP won 28 and the AD 5 seats. The PDP won
198 seats in the 360-seat House of Representatives, the ANPP 83 seats, and the AD
30 seats.
In late March 2004, elections for Local Government Council were held in thirty
of the thirty-six states. The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of 170
human rights and civil society groups, monitored the elections. In its preliminary
report, the TMG stated that “in virtually all the states where elections were held , the
process leading to the elections were substantially flawed.”
In early April 2006, the Nigerian Senate began to debate a bill that aims to
amend the constitution. One of the contentious proposals would allow a third-term
presidency; supporters of President Obasanjo have been pushing for this step for
months. The Nigerian constitution has a two-term limitation on the presidency. In
mid-May 2006, the Nigerian Senate effectively rejected the legislation.

---

CRS-6
Current Economic and Social Conditions
Western officials believe that Sani Abacha may have stolen more than $3.5
billion during the course of his five years in power. Abacha’s former national
security adviser, Ismaila Gwarzo, was accused of stealing an estimated $2.45 billion
from the Nigerian Central Bank. Swiss officials stated that about 120 accounts in
Zurich and Geneva have been frozen. In early 2000, Swiss officials charged a
businessman for falsifying documents to open a bank account for the Abacha family.
In mid-May 2000, President Obasanjo announced that his government had recovered
$200 million in public funds looted by former Nigerian dictator Abacha and his
associates. In July 2000, Nigerian authorities confirmed that Swiss officials had
transferred $64.3 million of the looted money to the Central Bank of Nigeria. In
April 2002, the government of Nigeria reached an agreement with the Abacha family
on the funds said to have been stolen by the late dictator. The agreement calls for the
return of $1 billion to the government of Nigeria, while the Abacha family would be
allowed to keep $100 million. The government of Nigeria has recovered $149
million of the funds stolen by former dictator General Sani Abacha and his family.
The funds were recovered from bank accounts in the British island of Jersey. In early
December 2003, President Obasanjo visited Switzerland in an effort to recover $618
million of looted funds by the late dictator.
In early April 2005, Nigerian Senate Speaker Adolphus Wabara was forced to
resign after President Obasanjo accused him of taking more than $400,000 in bribes
from the Minister of Education, Fabian Osuji. The Education Minister was
dismissed in March by President Obasanjo. The Minister of Housing, Alice Mobolaji
Osomo, was also fired in early April for allocating more than 200 properties to senior
government officials instead of public sale. President Obasanjo’s anti-corruption
campaign is seen as the most serious and effective effort in decades.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has subpoenaed documents from
Royal Dutch Shell related to a probe of an alleged bribery case at a gas plant in
Nigeria. The alleged bribery case is being investigated in several countries, including
France, Nigeria, and Japan. The companies involved in the natural gas project and
the alleged bribery include a Halliburton subcontractor, Chicago Bridge and Iron,
Total of France, Italy’s Eni, and the Nigerian government.
Due to decades of economic mismanagement, political instability, and
widespread corruption, the education system has suffered from lack of funding,
industry has idled, refineries are in poor conditions, and the sixth-largest oil-
producing country in the world suffers from severe fuel shortages from time to time.
The Nigerian economy depends heavily on oil revenues; about 90-95% of Nigeria’s
export earnings come from petroleum and petroleum products, which also represent
90% of its foreign exchange earnings and 80% of its government revenues (Energy
Administration Information, March 2003). The European Union is a major trading
partner, and the United States imports more oil from sub-Saharan Africa, primarily
Nigeria, than from the Middle East. On March 9, 2005, President Obasanjo stated
that he would stop Nigeria’s foreign debt payment if parliament passes legislation to
that effect. Nigeria’s House of Representatives passed a motion recommending that
Obasanjo “cease forthwith further external debt payment to any group of foreign

---

CRS-7
creditors.” Speaking on behalf of the African leaders invited to the G-8 Summit in
Scotland in July 2005, President Obasanjo welcomed the proposed aid package for
Africa. Meanwhile, Nigeria reached a separate agreement with the Paris Club to
reduce its external debt burden. According to the agreement, creditors are expected
to write off 60% of Nigeria’s estimated $30 billion in external debt.
The state of the economy has most affected the poorest segments of the
population and has sparked violence around the country, particularly in the oil-
producing regions. Several thousand people have been killed in pipeline explosions
in southeast Nigeria since the late 1990s; the largest single toll from an explosion was
approximately 1,000 in October of 1999. These explosions are triggered because
people siphon off oil from holes punched in the above-ground pipeline for personal
use, resulting in a loss of what’s estimated to be up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day
(Integrated Regional Informational Networks, July 15, 2003). Ethnic clashes over
rights to a promising oil prospect in the southwest also killed hundreds of people in
September and October 1999. In the Niger Delta, youths from the ethnic Ijaw tribe
periodically stop the flow of one-third of Nigeria’s oil exports of more than two
million barrels per day in order to protest sub-standard living conditions in the
country’s richest oil-producing region. The government established a national task
force on surveillance of petroleum pipelines in order to prevent a recurrence of the
pipeline explosion tragedy.
In September 2004, a new rebel movement, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer
Force (NDPVF), launched a series of attacks against government forces and
threatened to attack foreign oil workers. The oil-rich Niger Delta has been afflicted
by persistent rebellion over the past several years. The NDPVF is demanding
autonomy for the region and a share of oil revenues. An estimated 500 people were
reportedly killed in September in the ensuing violence, according to Amnesty
International. The Nigerian government disputes this figure. On September 29,
2004, the NDPVF and the Nigerian government reportedly reached a cease-fire
agreement. The leader of the rebel group stated that “there should be a cessation of
hostilities on both sides. Apart from that, we have not agreed on anything else for
the time being.”
In late November 2005, the Nigerian army deployed additional troops to the oil-
rich Bayelsa State after lawmakers began impeachment proceedings against State
Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha. In September 2005, British authorities had
charged Alamieyeseigha, while visiting in London, with money laundering, but the
governor skipped bail and returned to Nigeria in November.
Humanitarian and Human Rights Concerns
HIV/AIDS
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 5.8% is relatively small in comparison
to some Southern African nations with seropositivity rates of over 30% of the adult
population. However, the West African nation composes nearly one-tenth of the
world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with 3.5 million infected people (UNAIDS 2001

---

CRS-8
estimate), the largest HIV-positive population in Africa after South Africa. Nigeria’s
population is expected to double by the year 2025, which will multiply the spread of
the HIV virus considerably. In addition to the devastation HIV/AIDS has caused and
continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, half of the current population
is under the age of 15. With only 55% of primary-school-aged children in school and
the high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates among adults, Nigeria faces serious challenges
and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors (USAID
Congressional Budget Justification, 2004). In late July 2001, the government of
Nigeria announced a major AIDS treatment program. President Obasanjo declared
that his government would provide cheap generic drugs to AIDS patients beginning
September 2001. Patients were expected to pay about $7 a month for the treatment.
The government of Nigeria plans to distribute anti-retroviral drugs to an estimated
10,000 patients, but numerous obstacles have inhibited the implementation of this
program.
Sharia
Twelve of Nigeria’s states in the Muslim-dominated North of the country have
adopted Sharia law within the last four years, which has resulted in much-publicized
rulings, several of which have been criticized by human rights groups as well as by
Nigerians in the Southern and mostly Christian part of the country. Kano state ruled
on September 1, 2003, that all school girls attending government schools are to wear
the hijab, Islamic head scarf, regardless of whether they are Muslim. President
Obasanjo has said that the best way to respond to Sharia is to ignore it: “I think
Sharia will fizzle out. To confront it is to keep it alive.” In March 2002, in Katsina
State, Amina Lawal was sentenced to death by stoning after a court found her guilty
of adultery. In August 2003, Ms. Lawal appealed her sentence to the Katsina State’s
Appeals Court. On September 25, 2003, Amina Lawal won her appeal after the
Sharia Court of Appeal ruled that her conviction was invalid. The court ruled that
“it is the view of this Court that the judgment of the Upper Sharia Court, Funtua, was
very wrong and the appeal of Amina Lawal is hereby discharged and acquitted.” In
October 2001, in another highly publicized case, a Sharia court in the State of
Sokoto sentenced Safiya Hussaini to death for adultery. Ms. Hussaini appealed her
sentence and was exonerated on the grounds that she was impregnated by her former
husband and that the affair took place before Sharia law was enacted.
The United States and Nigeria
U.S.-Nigerian Relations: Background
Three primary issues have dominated U.S.-Nigerian relations in the last two
decades: the absence of democracy, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking.
Washington took a series of measures against the military junta shortly after the 1993
election results were annulled. These included suspending development assistance,
terminating joint military training with Nigeria, and imposing visa restrictions of
Nigeria’s military leaders and their family members. These measures, however, did
not affect trade between U.S. companies and Nigeria. Washington was also engaged
in diplomatic efforts, albeit unsuccessful, to break the political impasse in the West

---

CRS-9
African nation. The Clinton Administration sent civil rights leader Jesse Jackson,
then-U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson, and former Ambassador Donald McHenry
as envoys to convince Abacha to implement reforms.
In response to the execution of nine Ogoni activists in 1995, the Clinton
Administration recalled its ambassador and pushed a resolution at the U.N. General
Assembly that condemned Nigeria’s action. The imprisonment of Moshood Abiola
and many others was a contentious issue in U.S.-Nigerian relations. In its Country
Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, the Department of State wrote: “The
human rights record remained dismal. Throughout the year, Abacha’s Government
relied regularly on arbitrary detention and harassment to silence its most outspoken
critics.” The report further stated that security forces “continued to commit
extrajudicial killings and use excessive force to quell anti-government protests as
well as to combat crime, resulting in the death or injury of many individuals,
including innocent civilians.” Human rights groups reported the torture of prisoners
and constant harassment of journalists under the Abacha regime.
Washington’s concern was not limited to human rights abuse allegations. Drug
trafficking by Nigeria emerged as a major issue in U.S.-Nigerian relations after the
mid-1980s. Although Nigeria is not a drug-producing country, it has become a major
transit point. An estimated 35%-40% of all the heroin coming into the United States
is brought by Nigerian couriers. In 1989, the United States and Nigeria established
a joint Counter-Narcotics Task Force. Lack of cooperation by Nigerian authorities
in combating the drug trafficking problem led to a decision by the Clinton
Administration in March 1998, as in 1994 and 1996, to put Nigeria on the State
Department’s list of non-cooperative drug trafficking nations, which includes Burma
and Iran. As a consequence, the U.S. had to vote “no” on all loans to Nigeria being
considered by the World Bank and the African Development Bank, and Nigeria was
ineligible for any Export-Import Bank financing of U.S. exports. In March 2000,
however, President Clinton provided a waiver, a Vital National Interests
Certification, for Nigeria in order to allow support for the democratic transition
program. In March 2001, the Bush Administration certified that Nigeria was fully
cooperating with U.S. officials. In January 2003, in a report to Congress, President
Bush identified Nigeria as one of 12 “major illicit drug-producing and Drug-Transit
countries.”
Through legislative action, Members of Congress have been active concerning
Nigeria. In 1994, the House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res. 151, which called
for additional measures against the military junta by the Clinton Administration. A
bill calling for the imposition of sanctions and freezing of assets was introduced in
1996 by then-Senator Nancy Kassebaum and Representative Donald M. Payne.
Although the bill enjoyed significant bipartisan support, it did not move out of
committees, in part because of opposition by Members of Congress who favored
dialogue with the Nigerian government. Pro-Nigerian groups and some American
business interests actively opposed the bill (Washington Post, November 24, 1996).
The Nigerian Democracy Act, introduced by Representative Donald Payne and
Representative Amo Houghton in 1997, contained similar provisions, including a ban
on new U.S. corporate investment in Nigeria. In May 1998 House International
Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman and Representative Donald M.
Payne introduced the Nigerian Democracy and Civil Society Empowerment Act

---

CRS-10
(H.R. 3890), calling for additional sanctions and increased U.S. aid to democratic
opposition groups. The bill was also introduced in the Senate in May 1998 by
Senators Feingold, Jeffords, Leahy, and Wellstone. The bill was sent to committees
in both houses, but the 105th Congress did not act further on either piece of
legislation.
Conflicts within the Clinton Administration regarding the appropriate strategy
toward Nigeria while under the control of Abacha surfaced in speeches given by
senior Administration officials and President Clinton in early 1998. Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs Dr. Susan Rice stated in a speech on March 17,
1998, that the United States would hold “General Abacha to his three-year-old
promise to undertake a genuine transition to civilian rule this year and to establish a
level playing field by allowing free political activity, providing for an open press, and
ending political detention. Let me state clearly and unequivocally to you today that
an election victory by any military candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections
would be unacceptable.” In late March, President Clinton stated that U.S. policy
toward Nigeria was “to do all that we can to persuade General Abacha to move
toward general democracy and respect for human rights, release of political prisoners,
and the holding of elections.” Referring to General Abacha’s rumored candidacy,
however, President Clinton seemed to contradict Rice by suggesting that “if [Abacha]
stands for election we hope he will stand as a civilian.” President Clinton’s March
statement led some critics to question the Administration’s policy toward Abacha and
the military junta.
The Administration came to a final decision on May 28, saying that the
proposed transition was clearly “unacceptable” as long as Abacha remained the single
candidate and that current sanctions would remain. Following Abacha’s death, State
Department spokesman James P. Rubin stated that Abubakar had “a historic
opportunity to open the political process and institute a swift and credible transition
to civilian democratic rule.” Rubin said that Washington would “accept” only a
transition that included “three things: first, freeing political prisoners; second,
ensuring respect for the basic freedoms of speech, press, and assembly; and third,
returning the Nigerian army to its rightful position as a professional armed force
committed to defending the constitution and civilian rule.” U.S. officials had
anticipated that Abubakar would be more cooperative with the United States because
he received military training here. On June 14, 1998, President Clinton called
Abubakar and “underscored our desire for improved bilateral relations in the context
of Nigeria taking swift and significant steps toward a successful transition to a
democratically-elected government.”1
The U.S. officials who met with Abubakar in July 1998 reported that he
appeared very receptive to implementing the transition to democracy, although he
would continue consultations before releasing the final details of the transition.
Critics asserted that the United States should have pushed harder for Abiola’s
unconditional release in order for him to consult with advisers rather than consent to
renouncing his title under political pressure. Critics also warned that a hands-off
policy could enable the regime to proceed slowly with reforms that may escalate civil
1 Associated Press, June 14, 1998.

---

CRS-11
conflict to the point of war in which ethnic rivalries could erupt on a massive scale.
The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, welcomed Abubakar’s transition program,
and on October 30, 1998, the U.S. State Department announced that the Secretary,
after consulting with Members of Congress, has terminated a Presidential
Proclamation that restricted entry into the United States by high-ranking Nigerian
officials and their family members.
Recent Developments
Relations between Washington and Abuja began to improve shortly after
General Abubakar assumed power and have since continued to grow during President
Bush’s term in office. In September 1998, Abubakar visited the United States for the
U.N. General Assembly meeting, and also came to Washington to meet with
President Clinton at the White House. After the meeting, Abubakar said President
Clinton told him that if Nigeria stayed on its democratic course, the United States
was prepared to help win some debt relief from international lending institutions and
might also allow the resumption of direct air links between the U.S. and Nigeria.
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also praised Abubakar for taking steps to
improve conditions in Nigeria. U.S. officials applauded Abubakar’s transition
program and warmly welcomed the transfer of power to an elected civilian
government and promised to work closely with the Obasanjo government.
In mid-October 1999, then Secretary of State Albright visited Nigeria and met
with senior government officials and civil society groups. At a press briefing
following her Africa tour, Secretary Albright stated that the government and people
of Nigeria are “engaged in a dramatic and high-stakes struggle to establish a viable
democratic system.” She said President Obasanjo “appears truly committed to jump-
starting the economy, fighting corruption and resolving regional problems that
remain a source of unrest within Nigeria.” In late October 1999, President Obasanjo
met with President Clinton and other senior government officials in Washington. At
a White House press briefing, President Clinton said that “it is very much in
America’s interests that Nigeria succeed, and therefore we should assist them in their
success. We intend to increase our assistance to Nigeria to expand law-enforcement
cooperation and to work toward an agreement to stimulate trade and investment
between us. We intend to do what we can to help Nigeria recover assets plundered
by the previous regime.” President Clinton stated that the United States will support
“generous debt rescheduling through the Paris Club and encourage other countries
to take further steps.”
In a meeting with President Obasanjo in Abuja on August 26, 2000, President
Clinton stated that the United States is “committed to working with the people of
Nigeria to help build stronger institutions, improve education, fight disease, crime
and corruption, ease the burden of debt and promote trade and investment in a way
that brings more of the benefits of prosperity to people who have embraced
democracy.” Clinton also made an unprecedented address before the Nigerian
parliament in which he underscored the major issues facing Nigeria today, including
democratization and ethnic and religious strife. President Clinton announced a
number of new initiatives during his Nigeria visit. He pledged $60 million for AIDS
vaccine research and more than $20 million for Obasanjo’s campaigns against
malaria, polio, and HIV/AIDS. He also praised Nigeria’s regional leadership and

---

CRS-12
promised continued U.S. support for the West African peacekeeping mission in
Sierra Leone. He pledged continued U.S. support for education, including the
provision of Internet access through the work of NGOs and universities.2
In May 2001, President Obasanjo met with President Bush and other senior
officials in Washington. President Bush stated that the United States is “in the
process of helping provide technical assistance to Nigerian troops so that they are
better able to keep those peace missions.” At a joint White House press conference,
President Bush pledged $200 million to a new global fund for HIV/AIDS. President
Obasanjo said he discussed a number of issues of mutual interest, including the
conflicts in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone.
President Obasanjo returned to the White House following the September 11,
2001, attacks to discuss Nigeria’s and United States’ “mutual concern to fight and
win the war against terror.” Returning again to Washington in June 2002 and
receiving President Bush on his first official state visit to Africa in July of 2003,
President Obasanjo has cultivated a friendship with President Bush. In a speech
concluding his week-long trip to Africa, President Bush emphasized the importance
of “partnerships” and underscored that “the relationship between America and Africa
will benefit both our people.”3
The United States is offering a $2 million reward for the capture of former
Liberian president Charles Taylor, who was in exile in Nigeria. Taylor has been
charged with war crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The $2 million
reward was inserted in the Iraqi Emergency Supplemental bill, S. 1689, in late
October 2003. The provision did not specifically refer to Taylor, although it is
widely believed that the reference was to Taylor. The Nigerian government has said
that any attempt to kidnap Taylor would be viewed as “a violation of Nigeria’s
territorial integrity.” The Bush Administration has acknowledged that Washington
encouraged the Obasanjo government to offer Taylor political asylum. The Bush
Administration also stated that Taylor should be held accountable for the crimes he
committed in Liberia and Sierra Leone. President Obasanjo is opposed to transferring
Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which indicted Taylor on 17 counts of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violation of international humanitarian law.
In early May 2005, President Obasanjo met with President Bush and other senior
Administration officials in Washington to discuss the crisis in Darfur, Sudan; debt
relief; and the legal status of former Liberian president Charles Taylor. Taylor was
captured by Nigerian authorities in late March 2006, after his failed attempt to flee
to neighboring countries. On March 29, 2006, a day after Taylor was arrested by
Nigerian authorities, Obasanjo visited Washington and met with President Bush.
The International Religious Freedom Report for 2004 stated that “interreligious
tension between Christians and Muslims remained high in some areas of the country,
2 See U.S. Embassy in Nigeria press release,[http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/
wwwhcltx.html#Transcripts].
3 See White House press release, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/print/
20030712.html]).

---

CRS-13
and there were several violent economic, ethnic, and political conflicts that took on
religious overtones.”
Meanwhile, P.L. 108-199, a consolidated appropriations bill that was signed
into law by President Bush on January 24, 2004, contains several provisions on
Nigeria. A provision in the bill restricts International Military Education and
Training (IMET) assistance to Nigeria. Section 560 of the Foreign Appropriations
bill states that “none of the funds appropriated under the headings (International
Military Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing Program) may be
made available for assistance for Nigeria until the President certifies to the
Committees on Appropriations that the Nigerian Minister of Defense, the Chief of
the Army Staff, and the Minister of State for Defense/Army are suspending from the
Armed Forces those members, of whatever rank, against whom there is credible
evidence of gross violations of human rights in Benue State.”
In early March 2005, the Nigerian Minister of State for Defense, Dr. Rowland
Oritsejafor, announced that Nigeria received four gunboats from the United States
and is expecting four more. The gunboats will be used to tackle the growing illicit
oil trade in the Niger Delta, according to the Minister of Defense. Oritsejafor stated
that Nigeria has “lost over $2 billion in the oil sector as a result of illegal Activities
in the Niger Delta.”
In mid-August 2005, the Nigerian Senate passed a resolution calling on the
Obasanjo government to rescind an agreement signed between the governments of
Nigeria and the United States, prohibiting extradition of American personnel
suspected of war crimes to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
($ millions, fiscal years)
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Program
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Est.
Req.
DA
15.8
23.3
13.6
14.8
14.00
21.2
CSH
36.6
47.9
42.5
28.2
21.5
19.6
ESF
8.5
3.8
4.9
4.9
4.9
5.0
FMF Grants
.990
.800
GHAI
85.9
138.1
272.0
INCLE
2.2
.990
.400
NADR-CTF
.100
.200
.600
NADR-ATA
.435
IMET
.792
.590
Total
66.5
75.1
61.1
136.2
181.9
320.1
Table Abbreviations:
DA = Development Assistance
CSH = Child Survival and Health Programs Fund
ESF = Economic Support Fund
IMET = International Military Education and Training (Notification required)
INCLE = International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement
NADR-ATF = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
GHAI = Global HIV/AIDS Initiative
FMF = Foreign Military Financing

---

CRS-14
109th Congress Legislation
H.Con.Res. 127 (Royce)
Calls on the government of Nigeria to transfer former Liberian president Charles
Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Introduced April 12, 2005. Passed the
House May 4; passed the Senate May 10, 2005.

---