Order Code RL33509
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Lebanon
Updated July 24, 2006
Alfred B. Prados
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Lebanon
Summary
The United States and Lebanon continue to enjoy good relations. Prominent
current issues between the United States and Lebanon include progress toward a
Lebanon-Israel peace treaty, U.S. aid to Lebanon, and Lebanon’s capacity to stop
Hizballah militia attacks on Israel. The United States supports Lebanon’s
independence and favored the end of Israeli and Syrian occupation of parts of
Lebanon. Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon on May 23, 2000, and Syria
completed withdrawing its forces on April 26, 2005. Regional tensions increased in
mid-2006, however, as clashes between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza
territory spread to Lebanon. In July, Hizballah rocket attacks against Israel and
capture of two Israeli soldiers prompted large-scale Israeli bombing of Hizballah
positions and Lebanese infrastructure.
Lebanon’s government is based in part on a 1943 agreement that called for a
Maronite Christian President, a Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, and a Shi’ite Muslim
Speaker of the National Assembly, and stipulated that the National Assembly seats
and civil service jobs be distributed according to a ratio of 6 Christians to 5 Muslims.
On August 21, 1990, at the end of a devastating 15-year civil war, Lebanon’s
National Assembly adopted the “Taif” reforms (named after the Saudi Arabian city
where they were negotiated). The parliament was increased to 128 to be divided
evenly between Christians and Muslim-Druze, presidential authority was decreased,
and the Speaker’s and the Prime Minister’s authority was increased. President Ilyas
Hirawi signed the constitutional amendment implementing the reforms on September
21, 1990.
Since the civil war, Lebanon has held elections for the National Assembly in
1992, 1996, 2000, and, most recently, 2005. The National Assembly elected Emile
Lahoud President on October 15, 1998, and extended his term for three years by a
constitutional amendment in September 2004. The assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who opposed Lahoud’s extension, sparked a political
crisis, realignments in Lebanon’s domestic politics, and withdrawal of Syrian troops
from Lebanon. Since June 2005, an independent U.N. commission has been
investigating the circumstances of Hariri’s assassination, amid allegations of Syrian
involvement, directly or through pro-Syrian Lebanese officials.
This report replaces CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Alfred B. Prados,
and will be updated as significant changes occur in Lebanon or in U.S.-Lebanese
relations. Other CRS reports on Lebanon include CRS Report RL33487, Syria: U.S.
Relations and Bilateral Issues
, by Alfred B. Prados.

Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
United States and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Lebanon: Demography and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Sectarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political Structure and Power Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Civil War and Taif Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Political Upheaval of 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Assassination of Former Prime Minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Resolution 1595 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The First Mehlis Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Resolution 1636 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Possible Credibility Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
More Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Mehlis Follow-On Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Resolutions 1644 and 1664 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Brammertz Progress Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Elections of 2005 and Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Deadlock and Potential Realignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
National Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Recent or Current Foreign Presence in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Shib’a Farms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Palestinian and Palestinian-Associated Militia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Hizballah-Israel Confrontation of 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Resumption of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Diplomatic Endeavors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S.-Lebanese Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Recent and Current U.S. Assistance to Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
List of Tables
Table 1. Lebanon Population and Religious Sects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. 2005 Parliament: Composition by Major Bloc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Lebanon
Most Recent Developments
Tensions between Israel and the militant Palestinians in the Gaza territory
spread to Lebanon in mid-July 2006 as a cycle of violence began between Israel and
militants from the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim organization Hizballah. On July 12,
possibly in a gesture of solidarity with the radical Palestinian organization Hamas
combating Israel in Gaza, Hizballah units launched attacks across Syria’s northern
border, killing eight Israelis and seizing two Israeli soldiers as hostages. Israel
launched widespread air and artillery strikes on Hizballah targets in Lebanon and
Lebanese infrastructure including Beirut International Airport, vowing to continue
the attacks until the Israeli hostages are returned. Hizballah has launched daily
attacks on northern Israel with extended-range rockets, penetrating as far as the
northern Israeli port of Haifa, Israel’s third largest city. Military commentators have
said Hizballah has 12,000 or more largely unguided Katyusha rockets, with ranges
of 20-45 miles, but also some more advanced variants of Iranian or Syrian
manufacture. Though with limited accuracy, they can cover a wide range of Israeli
territory.
On July 21, Israel began massing ground forces on the Lebanese border, and the
following day, the Israeli Armed Forces Chief of Staff said “[w]e shall carry out
limited ground operations as necessary.” Israeli forces reportedly captured a town
approximately 2.5 miles on the Lebanese side of the border on July 23, and Israeli
forces reportedly continued efforts to seize a 15-square-mile area inside the Lebanese
border.
At the G-8 summit meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, attendees disagreed over
various aspects of the crisis; however, on July 16, they adopted a statement placing
blame for the immediate crisis on extremist forces of Hizballah and the militant
Palestinian organization Hamas, but calling on Israel to exercise utmost restraint and
avoid casualties among civilians. U.S. officials have been reluctant to support a
cease-fire resolution without dealing with “root causes,” which they identify as the
actions of Hizballah. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice embarked on July 22
on a round of visits aimed at defusing the crisis, beginning with a surprise visit to
Lebanon, where she met with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and parliamentary
speaker Nabih Berri. Neither Ms. Rice nor her Lebanese interlocutors spoke to
reporters after their meetings; however, the inclusion of Berri is of possible interest
in that he is part of the Hizballah-led Shi’ite bloc. On the other hand, he represents
the more moderate Amal organization rather than Hizballah. Other stops on Ms.
Rice’s schedule include Israel, the West Bank, and Rome, where she will meet with
several moderate Arab leaders.


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Meanwhile, as of July 24, U.S. officials said that approximately 11,700 U.S.
citizens had been evacuated from Lebanon, from a previous total of 25,000, including
business people, students, and tourists as well as more permanent residents. (For
more details on the recent fighting and diplomatic efforts, see section entitled “The
Hizballah-Israel Confrontation of 2006,” below.)
United States and Lebanon
Overview
The United States and Lebanon have traditionally enjoyed good relations, rooted
in long-standing contacts and interaction beginning well before Lebanon’s emergence
as a modern state. Factors contributing to this relationship include a large Lebanese-
American community (a majority of Arab-Americans are of Lebanese origin); the
pro-Western orientation of many Lebanese, particularly during the Cold War; cultural
ties exemplified by the presence of U.S. universities in Lebanon; Lebanon’s position
as a partial buffer between Israel and its principal Arab adversary, namely Syria;
Lebanon’s democratic and partially Christian antecedents; and Lebanon’s historic
role as an interlocutor for the United States within the Arab world.
Two U.S. presidents have described Lebanon as of vital interest to the United
States, President Eisenhower in 1958 and President Reagan in 1983. (Public Papers
of the Presidents, 1958, pp. 550-551; Public Papers of the Presidents, 1983, vol. II,
p. 1501.) Both statements were made in the context of brief U.S. military
deployments to Lebanon to help Lebanese authorities counter rebellions supported
by radical Arab states with ties to the former Soviet Union. Some would agree that
a friendly and independent Lebanon in a strategic but unstable region is vital to U.S.
interests. But others might disagree, pointing to the absence of such tangible interests
as military bases, oil fields, international waterways, military or industrial strength,
or major trading ties. In a broader sense, a ruinous 15-year civil war that created
turmoil in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 and that periodically threatened to spill
over into adjacent areas of the Middle East illustrated the dangers to U.S. interests
posed by instability in this small country.
Lebanon: Demography and Politics
Political Profile
Sectarianism. Lebanon, with a population of 3.8 million, has the most
religiously diverse society in the Middle East, comprising 17 recognized religious
sects. “Confessionalism,” or the distribution of governmental posts by religious sect,
is a long-standing feature of Lebanese political life, despite frequent calls to abolish
it. Because of political sensitivities related to power sharing among the various
communities, no census has been taken in Lebanon since 1932, when Lebanon was
under a French mandate. According to current estimates by the Central Intelligence
Agency as of 2005, Muslim groups comprise 59.7% of the population while Christian
groups comprise 39.0%, with another 1.3%of assorted religious affiliations. A more

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detailed but less recent estimate by an expert on the geography and demography of
the Middle East gives the following breakdown:1
Table 1. Lebanon Population and Religious Sects
Sect
Number
Percent
Shi’ite Muslim
1,192,000
34%
Sunni Muslim
701,000
20%
Maronite Christiana
666,000
19%
Druzeb
280,000
8%
Greek Orthodox (Christian)c
210,000
6%
Armenian (Christian)d
210,000
6%
Greek Catholic (Christian)a
175,000
5%
Other
70,000
2%
Total (not exact, due to rounding)
3,506,000
100%
a. Affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church but retain their own rituals.
b. Grouped with Muslims; regarded by some as derived from Shi’ite Islam.
c. A senior Lebanese official stated that there are more Greek Orthodox
than Druze in Lebanon. Conversation, February 21, 2006.
d. Armenians are the only sizeable ethnic minority in Lebanon; other
Lebanese groups are all ethnic Arab.
Lebanese political parties have developed along religious, geographical, ethnic,
and ideological lines and are often associated with prestigious families. Christian
groups, especially Maronites, tend to be strong advocates of Lebanese independence
and opposed to Syrian and other external influences. Christian parties include the
Phalange led by the Gemayel family, and smaller parties led by the Chamoun,
Frangieh, and Iddi families. Sunni Muslim parties, historically more Arab nationalist
in orientation, include the Independent Nasirite group and a new group, the Futures
Party, that has coalesced around anti-Syrian supporters of the recently assassinated
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Shi’ite parties include the more moderate Amal under
Nabih Berri and the more radical Hizballah (see below), former rivals but now at
least temporarily allied; Druze are largely associated with the Progressive Socialist
Party led by the leftist yet feudally based Jumblatt family, now somewhat tenuously
aligned with the Futures Party. A religiously mixed group, the Syrian National Social
Party (SNSP), favors a union of Syria, Lebanon, and possibly other nearby states.
Several of these parties and groupings formerly maintained militias, notably the
Lebanese Forces, which were affiliated with the Christian Phalange Party, and the
Shi’ite Muslim Hizballah, which has both a political and a military wing. Most of
the militias were disbanded after the civil war, but Hizballah’s militia continues to
function.
1 Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns, Westview Press, 2000, p. 262. Reflecting 1999
figures, Held uses an estimated total Lebanese population of 3.506 million, to which he
applies the percentages in Table 1.

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Political Structure and Power Sharing. Post-civil war Lebanon retains
the country’s unique political system, based on power sharing among the diverse
religious sectarian communities and political factions that comprise the modern
Lebanese state. Under the constitution of 1926, Lebanon is a republic with a
president elected by parliament for a non-renewable six-year term, a prime minister
and cabinet appointed by the president, and a parliament, elected by universal adult
suffrage for a four-year term. Composition of parliament varies in accordance with
electoral laws that are promulgated before each election; current membership is 128.
Unlike the President, the prime minister and cabinet must receive a vote of
confidence from parliament.
In 1943, when Lebanon became fully independent from France, leaders of the
principal religious communities adopted an unwritten agreement known as the
National Covenant, which provided that the President be a Maronite Christian, the
Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi’ite Muslim;
parliamentary seats were divided on the basis of six Christians to five Muslims.
Cabinet posts are generally distributed among the principal sectarian communities,
notably Maronites, Greek Orthodox, smaller Christian sects, Druze (a small sect
associated with Islam), Sunni Muslims, and Shi’ite Muslims.2 As time passed, the
1943 ratios, which had been based on the country’s sole census conducted in 1932,
became less reflective of Lebanese society as Muslims gradually came to outnumber
Christians, while within the Muslim community, Shi’ite Muslims came to outnumber
Sunni Muslims. Discontent over power sharing imbalances was a major factor in
inter-communal tensions and civil strife culminating in the 1975-1990 civil war.
The Civil War and Taif Reforms. At stake in the civil war was control over
the political process in Lebanon, the status of Palestinian refugees and militia, and
the respective goals of Syria and Israel (see the section below on Foreign Presence
in Lebanon). From 1975 to 1990, the civil war killed, wounded, or disabled hundreds
of thousands and rendered comparable numbers homeless at one time or another
during the fighting. At one point, a terror bombing in October 1983 killed 241 U.S.
armed forces personnel, who were part of a short-lived multinational force attempting
to keep peace among Palestinian refugees and Lebanese factions. From 1987 until
July 1997, the United States banned travel to Lebanon because of the threat of
kidnaping and dangers from the ongoing civil war. Lebanon continues to rebuild in
the aftermath of the civil war.
The Lebanese parliament elected in 1972 remained in office for 20 years, since
it was impossible to elect a new parliament during the civil war. After a prolonged
political crisis near the end of the war, Lebanese parliamentary deputies met in 1989
in Taif, Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of the Arab League and adopted a revised
power sharing agreement. The so-called Taif Agreement raised the number of seats
in parliament from 99 to 108 (later changed to 128), replaced the former 6:5 ratio of
Christians to Muslims in parliament with an even ratio, provided for a proportional
2 The National Covenant (sometimes translated National Pact) addressed various foreign
policy issues as well. For discussion of this unwritten document, see Fahim Qubain, Crisis
in Lebanon,
Washington, The Middle East Institute, 1961, pp. 17-18; Kamal S. Salibi, The
Modern History of Lebanon
, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,, 1965, pp. 186-188.

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distribution of seats among the various Christian and Muslim sub-sects, and left
appointment of the prime minister to parliament, subject to the president’s approval.
It also addressed the status of Syrian forces in Lebanon, as explained in a section
below. Parliamentary elections held in 1992, 1996, and 2000 resulted in pro-Syrian
majorities, given the presence and influence of Syrian forces in Lebanon ostensibly
as part of a peacekeeping force. Though supported by some Lebanese, including
many Shi’ite Muslims, the Syrian presence was increasingly resented by other
elements of the Lebanese population.
Political Upheaval of 2005
Assassination of Former Prime Minister. By 2004, tensions had
increased between the pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and the
independent Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a self-made billionaire who had
spearheaded the reconstruction of Lebanon after the civil war. Matters came to a
head when the Lebanese parliament, apparently under Syrian pressure, adopted a
Syrian-backed constitutional amendment extending President Lahoud’s tenure by an
additional three years. Hariri, who disagreed with the move, resigned in October
2004, and subsequently aligned himself with an anti-Syrian opposition coalition.
Hariri’s assassination in a car bombing on February 14, 2005, blamed by many on
Syrian agents, led to widespread protests by an anti-Syrian coalition comprising many
members of the Christian, Druze, and Sunni Muslim communities and counter-
demonstrations by pro-Syrian groups including Shi’ites who rallied behind the
Hizballah and Amal parties. Outside Lebanon, the United States and France were
particularly vocal in their denunciation of the assassination and a possible Syrian role
in it.
Resolution 1595. A statement by the President of the U.N. Security Council
on February 25, although it did not mention Syria by name, condemned the
assassination and requested the Secretary General “to report urgently on the
circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act.” In accordance with this
request, a U.N. fact-finding team visited Lebanon and concluded that “the Lebanese
investigation process suffers from serious flaws and has neither the capacity nor the
commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible conclusion.”
On April 7, as domestic and international outrage mounted, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1595, under which the council decided to “establish an
international independent investigation Commission (‘the Commission’ or UNIIIC)
based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all
aspects of this terrorist act, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors,
organizers and accomplices.” Heading the Commission was Detlev Mehlis,
described as “a 25-year veteran of the Berlin prosecutor’s office with a record of
solving high profile terror cases.”3 The resolution requested the Commission to
complete its work within three months from the date it commences operations,
authorized the Secretary General to extend the Commission’s mandate for another
period of up to three months, and requested an oral update every two months while
3 Warren Hoge, “Bush Pushes U.N. to Move Swiftly on Syria Report,” New York Times,
Oct. 22, 2005.

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the Commission is functioning. The U.N. Secretary General informed members of
the Security Council that the Commission was fully operational as of June 16, 2005.
On September 8, 2005, the Commission requested a 40-day extension to complete
its work. Upon submission of the Commission’s initial report on October 19, the
Secretary General extended its mandate until December 15 to enable the Commission
to pursue further gaps it had identified (see “The Mehlis Commission,” below). On
August 30, a U.N. spokeswoman announced that three former heads of Lebanese
intelligence agencies and a former Lebanese member of parliament had been
identified as suspects in the assassination of Hariri. A subsequent press report
describes the suspects as Syrian proxies with close ties to President Lahoud.4
The First Mehlis Report. Tensions mounted as reports circulated that Syrian
and Lebanese officials would be implicated in the findings of the Mehlis
Commission. After encountering initial resistance from Syria, from September 20-
23, members of the commission visited Damascus, where they interviewed senior
Syrian military and security officials including the last two Syrian chiefs of
intelligence in Lebanon, who were widely regarded as the effective viceroys of
Lebanon during their respective tenures: Generals Rustom Ghazali and Ghazi
Kanaan. Kanaan, who was reassigned to Syria in 2002 and appointed minister of the
interior, apparently committed suicide in October 2005. Some observers speculate
that Kanaan was killed or forced to commit suicide by Syrian authorities because of
what he might reveal — or might have revealed — about Syrian involvement in the
Hariri assassination or that he chose to take his own life because he feared that he
would become the scapegoat for Syrian actions in Lebanon. In actuality, however,
Kanaan is not mentioned in the Commission’s report of October 19 (see below).
The 54-page report submitted by the Mehlis Commission represented four
months of research in which Commission members interviewed more than 400
persons and reviewed 60,000 documents, identified several suspects, and established
various leads. Two central conclusions reached by the Commission deal with the
question of culpability, although they do not constitute a conclusive finding:
It is the Commission’s view that the assassination on 14 February 2005 was
carried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources
and capabilities.
...there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement
in this terrorist act.... Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society
by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be
difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could
have been carried out without their knowledge.
The Commission report adds that the investigation is not complete and calls for
further investigation; states that Syrian authorities, including the foreign minister,
while extending limited cooperation, have provided some false or inaccurate
information; and calls on Syria to help clarify unresolved questions. Syrian officials,
4 Hassan M. Fatah, “Lebanon’s President Facing Growing Pressure to Resign,” New York
Times
, Sept. 6, 2005. The press report lists the four as the current head of security, the
former head of security, a former military intelligence chief, and a former chief of police.

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including President Bashar al-Asad, have denied complicity in the Hariri
assassination and said the Mehlis report was biased. On October 29, President Asad
said Syria has set up a commission to investigate the assassination.5
Questions have been raised regarding the apparent exclusions in the report of
the names of suspects who had been identified in earlier drafts of the report. The
principal example appears in Paragraph 96 (page 29) of the report, in which a witness
told the Commission that in September 2004 “senior Lebanese and Syrian officials
decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri” and held several follow-up meetings in Syria to
plan the crime. An earlier version reportedly listed the names of five of the senior
officers, including President Asad’s brother Maher al-Asad and the President’s
brother-in-law Asif Shawkat, chief of military intelligence and widely considered the
second most powerful official in the regime. Some reporters questioned whether or
not the Commission chief Detlev Mehlis had come under pressure to make the report
less accusatory. At a news conference on October 21, both Mehlis and Secretary-
General Kofi Annan denied this; Mehlis went on to explain that he suppressed the
names of the officers when he found out that the Commission’s report was to be
made public, because he had only one anonymous source for the specific accusation.6
Maher al-Asad does not appear at all in the official copy of the report and Asif
Shawkat appears only once (paragraph 178) when Shawkat allegedly forced an
individual 45 days before the assassination to make a tape claiming responsibility for
the crime, purportedly in an effort to hide Syrian or Lebanese complicity.
Resolution 1636. On October 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1636, which requires Syria to cooperate “fully and
unconditionally” with the Mehlis investigation into the assassination of the late
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri or face unspecified “further action.” By
dropping a threat appearing in earlier drafts of specific economic sanctions, the
sponsors of the resolution were able to attract support from Russia and China while
leaving the door open to the imposition of sanctions at a later date. U.S. officials
noted that the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which
gives the Council power to impose penalties, including use of military force.7 After
temporizing, Syria acceded to a request by the Mehlis Commission to make five
Syrian officials available for questioning by the commission at U.N. offices in
Vienna, Austria. The Syrians, whose names were not announced, were reportedly
intelligence and security officials including the former Syrian intelligence chief in
Lebanon Rustom Ghazali; meetings took place from December 5 to 7.
Possible Credibility Issue. In a related development, on November 28 a
former key witness questioned by the Mehlis Commission stated on Syrian TV that
he had provided false testimony to the commission after having been kidnapped,
tortured, injected with drugs, and offered a $1.3 million bribe by Lebanese officials
5 Warren Hoge and Steven R. Weisman, “U.N. Is Expected to Pass Measure Pressuring
Syria,” New York Times, Oct. 31, 2005.
6 Warren Hoge, “Bush Pushes U.N. to Move Swiftly on Syria Report,” New York Times,
Oct. 22, 2005.
7 Warren Hoge, “U.N. Tells Syria to Stop Impeding Slaying Inquiry,” New York Times, Nov.
1, 2005.

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who wanted him to implicate Syrian intelligence in the murder of Hariri. The
witness, Hussam Tahir Hussam, describes himself as a Syrian intelligence agent.
Mehlis and Lebanese officials have expressed doubts regarding his statement. Two
other Syrian government employees have said another former witness, like Hussam,
would soon recant his original testimony before the commission, in what some
commentators think may be a Syrian-instigated campaign to undercut the credibility
of the Mehlis report.8
More Violence. On December 12, 2005, a car bomb killed Gibran Tueni, a
prominent Lebanese journalist and newly elected member of the Lebanese
parliament, who had often criticized Syria’s role in Lebanon. Several anti-Syrian
Lebanese politicians have blamed Syria, which in turn denied complicity and said the
crime was aimed at directing fresh accusations against Syria. Commentators note
that the explosion occurred only a few hours before the U.N. investigating
commission was due to submit an update of its report on the Hariri assassination to
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. Among other anti-Syrian Lebanese victims of
recent major attacks or assassinations were journalists Samir Kassir (June 2, 2005)
and Mai Chidiac (September 25, 2005) and politician George Hawi (June 21, 2005).
Of these, Chidiac was critically injured and the others were killed.
The Mehlis Follow-On Report. On December 12, the Mehlis commission
submitted a follow-on report which states that “[t]he Commission’s conclusions set
out in its previous report ... remain valid.” According to the follow-on report, the
Commission interviewed additional witnesses (for a total of 500 as of December 12),
identified 19 suspects (reportedly including the five Syrian officers interviewed in
Vienna), and reviewed additional documentation. Statements by two of the suspects
indicated that all Syrian intelligence documents concerning Lebanon had been
burned. Also, the head of a separate Syrian investigative commission informed the
Mehlis Commission that no material regarding the Hariri assassination had been
found in Syrian archives. The Mehlis follow-on report further expresses the view
that Hussam, the witness who recanted his statement, “is being manipulated by the
Syrian authorities.” Analysts are reportedly reviewing the material in an attempt to
find material relevant to planning for the assassination. The report stated that “[t]he
detailed information [from the additional statements and documents reviewed by the
commission] points directly at perpetrators, sponsors and organizers of an organized
operation aiming at killing Mr. Hariri, including the recruitment of special agents by
the Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services.” The report recommended that the
commission be extended by an additional six months.
Resolutions 1644 and 1664. On December 15, 2005, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1644, which extended the mandate of the Independent
Commission for six months until June 15, 2006, as recommended by the
Commission, and requested the Commission to report on its progress at three-month
intervals. The Council acknowledged a Lebanese request that suspects be tried by
“a tribunal of an international character” and asked the Secretary General to help the
Lebanese government identify the nature of such a tribunal (Paragraph 6). The
8 Michael Slackman, “Syria Attacks Evidence as U.N. Case Turns More Bizarre,” New York
Times
, Dec. 7, 2005.

CRS-9
Council also requested the Secretary General to present recommendations to expand
the Commission’s mandate to include investigations of other attacks on Lebanese
figures (Paragraph 7). In a subsequent Resolution 1664 adopted on March 29, 2006,
the Council requested the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with the
government of Lebanon aimed at establishing the requested tribunal. Meanwhile,
Mehlis, who wanted to return to his post in Germany, stepped down as Commission
chairman in early January 2006 and was replaced by Serge Brammertz, a Belgian
prosecutor serving with the International Criminal Court.
Brammertz Progress Report. On March 14, 2006, Brammertz released his
first progress report to the U.N. Security Council. The 25-page document, described
by one commentator as more conservative and less detailed than the Mehlis reports
(New York Times, March 15, 2006), stated that “[t]he individuals who perpetrated
this crime appear to be very ‘professional’ in their approach” and went on to say that
“[i]t must be assumed that at least some of those involved were likely experienced
in this type of terrorist activity” (Paragraph 33 of the Brammertz report). Syrian
spokesmen put a positive interpretation on the report, saying that it “was realistic and
has a lot of professionalism.” President Asad, who had temporized for several
months over the Commission’s demand for an interview, agreed to meet Brammertz
under a deal that will give the Commission access to individuals, sites, and
information, including the head of state (Paragraphs 91-95). Pursuant to these
understandings, news media reported that Brammertz met with the Syrian president
and vice president in Damascus on April 25; however, the news reports did not give
details on the course of the meetings. Earlier, U.S. State Department spokesman J.
Adam Ereli told a news briefing audience on March 15 that “we support the work of
Investigator Brammertz. He’s continuing the important and invaluable work of his
predecessor, Mr. Mehlis.”
Brammertz released his second progress report to the U.N. Security Council on
June 14, 2006. Like its predecessor, the June 10 report did not name suspects;
however, it described the crime as “a targeted assassination.” Brammertz said the
level of assistance provided by Syria to the Commission during the reporting period
“has generally been satisfactory,” with that country responding to all requests in a
timely manner. Brammertz welcomed and endorsed the request of the Lebanese
government for a one-year extension of the Commission’s mandate. On June 15, the
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1686, which extended the
Commission’s mandate until June 14, 2007 and supported the extension of the
Commission’s mandate to offer further technical assistance to Lebanese investigation
of other possibly related assassinations during the last two years.
Elections of 2005 and Aftermath
As Syrian troops departed from Lebanon under U.S. and international pressure
(see below), the Lebanese prepared to hold parliamentary elections without Syrian
interference for the first time since 1972. Parliamentary elections, held in four phases
between May 29 and June 5, 2005, gave a majority (72 out of 128 seats) to a large,
anti-Syrian bloc known as the Bristol Gathering or the March 14 Movement, headed
by Saad Hariri, a son of the late prime minister. A second, largely Shi’ite and pro-
Syrian bloc grouping Hizballah and the more moderate Amal organization won 33
seats. A third bloc, the Change and Reform Movement (also known as the Free

CRS-10
Patriotic Movement), consisted of largely Christian supporters of former dissident
armed forces chief of staff General Michel Awn,9 who returned to Lebanon from
exile in France in May 2005. Awn’s bloc, which adopted a somewhat equivocal
position regarding Syria, gained 21 seats. (See Table 2 below.) Despite Hariri’s
success, the electoral pattern resulted in a mixed government, which complicates its
abilities to adopt clear policy lines. Hariri associate Fuad Siniora became prime
minister and the 24-member cabinet contains 15 Hariri supporters; however, it also
contains five supporters of the Shi’ite bloc including for the first time in Lebanese
history a member of Hizballah — Mohammed Fneish, Minister of Energy and Water
Resources. Other key pro-Syrians remaining in the government are President Lahoud
and veteran parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, who heads the Amal organization
(Hizballah’s junior partner in the Shi’ite coalition) and has held the speakership since
1992.
Siniora will continue to face difficulties in working with this mixed government.
First, pressure has mounted for the resignation of President Lahoud with the
identification of several of his close associates in the Hariri assassination.10 Second,
the role of the formerly exiled General Awn is uncertain: though long an opponent
of the Syrian role in Lebanon, Awn formed tactical alliances with several pro-Syrian
Lebanese politicians during the recent elections in an effort to defeat pro-Hariri
candidates. On the other hand, Awn’s grouping is not represented in the newly
formed cabinet and Awn has said he will form the backbone of an opposition to
Siniora’s government. Some observers believe Awn has his eye on the presidency.
Third, the inclusion of a Hizballah official in the cabinet raises further potential
problems; for example, the U.S. State Department, while welcoming the Siniora
cabinet, has said it will not deal with an official of Hizballah, which the U.S.
Government has listed as a foreign terrorist organization. Fourth, a major stumbling
block for the government is a U.N. demand contained in Security Council Resolution
1559 that all militias be disbanded, which in effect refers mainly to Hizballah. This
demand has proven difficult to implement in view of Hizballah’s strong bloc of
supporters in parliament and its paramilitary capabilities, together with support for
Hizballah from Syria and Iran.
9 General Awn (variant spelling: Aoun), a controversial former armed forces commander
and prime minister, rejected the Taif Agreement and ultimately obtained political asylum
in France.
10 In early January an anti-Syrian Lebanese political figure described Lahoud’s extension
in office as “null and void.” On the other hand, Lahoud’s extension is not without
precedent. On two previous occasions, in 1949 and 1995, Lebanon has extended the term
of a president. Shi’ite cabinet ministers reportedly refused to attend a cabinet meeting
unless President Lahoud was present. Majdoline Hatoum, “Calls for Lahoud’s Resignation
Intensify,” The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 4, 2006; Adnan al-Ghoul, “Hizbullah Takes Gloves
off in Row with Jumblatt,” The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 16, 2006.

CRS-11
Table 2. 2005 Parliament: Composition by Major Bloc
Bloc
Leader(s)
Number
March 14 Movement
Saad Hariri
72
Prime Minister: Fuad Siniora
Shi’ite Bloc (Hizballah, Amal)
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah
33
Speaker: Nabih Berri
Free Patriotic Movement
General Michel Awn
21
Independents
N/A
2
Deadlock and Potential Realignments. Disputes over Lahoud’s status
and Hizballah disarmament led to a cabinet crisis and temporary boycott by Shi’ite
cabinet ministers in December 2005. The crisis was temporarily resolved when
Prime Minister Siniora stated on February 3, 2006, that “we have never called and
will never call the resistance [Hizballah] by any other name” [thereby avoiding the
term “militia” in characterizing Hizballah]. In the meantime, leaders of two major
parliamentary blocs with strongly differing views on Syria and other topics —
Hizballah chief Hasan Nasrallah and Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel
Awn — held what some describe as a historic meeting in a Beirut church on February
6, 2006. At the meeting, the two adopted a “Paper of Understanding” that called for
finding ways to end rampant corruption; drafting a new election law; finding ways
to confront issues such as the demarcation of borders and establishment of diplomatic
relations with Syria; and disarming Hizballah guerrillas and Palestinian factions. The
parties emphasized that they were not forming an alliance or seeking to terminate
other bilateral undertakings involving either of the two parties. Some parties,
however, have gone so far as to call the Awn-Nasrallah meeting a “coup,” saying that
a meeting between the two leaders who have wide followings in their respective
communities “will leave its impact on balances of power that have emerged since
Hariri’s assassination.”11
National Dialogue. On March 2, 2006, 14 Lebanese leaders representing
major sectarian communities and political groups convened a National Dialogue
conference to address key issues currently dividing Lebanon. The ground-breaking
conference, pushed by parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri and other Lebanese
politicians, agreed to address such issues as the status of President Lahoud, the
international investigation of the Hariri and other assassinations, arms maintained by
Hizballah and Palestinians outside refugee camps, demarcation of the Syrian-
Lebanese border including the disputed Shib’a Farms area (see below), and
establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria (which has never
taken place). According to press reports, the conferees reached initial agreement on
March 13 to disarm Palestinians outside refugee camps and to work to establish
diplomatic relations with Syria; however, Syria resisted border demarcation or
establishment of diplomatic relations at this time; moreover, the parties were unable
so far to agree on the status of President Lahoud or disarmament of Hizballah.
11 Hussein Dakroub, “Alliance between pro-and anti-Syrian leaders seen as “coup in
Lebanon’s politics,” Associated Press, February 8, 2006.

CRS-12
Further sessions have been held intermittently, but as of June 8, the parties had
agreed only on a “Code of Honor” pact stipulating that the various parties “respect
each other.” The National Dialogue briefly reconvened on June 29 but adjourned
until July 25, according to the Speaker of Parliament.
Recent or Current Foreign Presence in Lebanon
Syria
Thirty-five thousand Syrian troops entered Lebanon in March 1976, in response
to then President Suleiman Frangieh’s appeal to protect the Christians from Muslim
and Palestinian militias; later, Syria switched its support away from the main
Christian factions. Between May 1988 and June 2001, Syrian forces occupied most
of west Beirut and much of eastern and northern Lebanon. Syrian forces did not
venture south of a “red line” running east and west across Lebanon near Rashayah,
inasmuch as territory south of the line was considered to fall within the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) operating area.
In October 1989, as part of the Taif agreements, Syria agreed to begin
discussions on possible Syrian troop redeployment from Beirut to the eastern Beqaa
Valley two years after political reforms were implemented and discuss further
withdrawals at that time. Then President Elias Hirawi signed the reforms in
September 1990. However, the withdrawal discussions, which according to most
interpretations of the Taif Agreement were to have started in September 1992, did not
take place, in part because the Lebanese government said it needed more time to
establish its authority over the country. Syrian officials maintained that they were
waiting for the Lebanese government to complete rebuilding the army and police
forces and assume security responsibilities in Lebanon before beginning the
withdrawal discussions. In the meantime, Syria and Lebanon signed a treaty of
brotherhood, cooperation, and coordination in May 1991, which called for creating
several joint committees to coordinate policies. Although Syrian troop strength in
Lebanon reportedly declined from 35,000-40,000 in the 1980s to approximately
14,000 by early 2005, Syria continued to exercise controlling influence over
Lebanon’s domestic politics and regional policies; moreover, its intelligence agents
were active in Lebanon. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 adopted on
September 2, 2004, called among other things upon “all remaining foreign forces to
withdraw from Lebanon.”
The Hariri assassination in February 2005 prompted strong international
pressure on the Syrian regime, particularly from the United States and France, to
withdraw its forces and intelligence apparatus from Lebanon in accordance with
Resolution 1559. On April 26, 2005, the Syrian foreign minister informed U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan and the President of the U.N. Security Council that
Syrian forces had completed their withdrawal from Lebanon. In his first semi-annual
report on the implementation of Resolution 1559,12 the U.N. Secretary General stated
that as of April 26, however, he had not been able to verify full Syrian withdrawal;
12 U.N. Security Council document S/2005/272, Paragraph 17.

CRS-13
consequently, he dispatched a U.N. team to verify whether there had been a full
Syrian withdrawal. On May 23, the U.N. Secretary General forwarded a report by
a team he had sent to Lebanon to verify Syrian withdrawal. The team “found no
Syrian military forces, assets or intelligence apparatus in Lebanese territory, with the
exception of one Syrian battalion” deployed near the disputed village of Deir Al-
Ashayr on the Lebanese-Syrian border. The team also concluded that “no Syrian
military intelligence personnel remain in Lebanon in known locations or in military
uniform” but added that it was “unable to conclude with certainty that all the
intelligence apparatus has been withdrawn.”13
On June 10, 2005, following reports of Syrian involvement in attacks on anti-
Syrian Lebanese officials and journalists, Secretary General Annan sent the
verification team back to Lebanon to see if Syrian intelligence agents were still in the
country. The team returned on July 11 and subsequently submitted a report to
Annan. In his second semi-annual report on implementation of Resolution 1559,
submitted on October 26, 2005, Annan reported that “[o]verall, the team corroborated
its earlier conclusion that there was no remaining visible or significant Syrian
intelligence presence or activity in Lebanon, though the distinctly close historical and
other ties between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon also had to be taken into
account when assessing a possibly ongoing influence of Syrian intelligence in
Lebanon.” He acknowledged that there were some credible reports that Syrian
intelligence continued to influence events in Lebanon but said most of these reports
were exaggerated.
On the other hand, the Secretary General noted that other requirements of
Resolution 1559 remained to be implemented, particularly disbanding and disarming
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia (notably Hizballah and several Palestinian
groups) and extension of Lebanese government control throughout all of the
country.14 The third semi-annual report on implementation of Resolution 1559,
submitted to the Security Council on April 19, 2006, recounted previously reported
threats by Syrian officials against Lebanese legislators if they did not vote for
extension of President Lahoud’s term. The report says that Syrian forces and
intelligence services have effectively left Lebanon, but some other U.N. demands
remain unmet, including disarmament of Hizballah, demarcation of the border, and
establishment of diplomatic relations. In an interview with Lally Weymouth
published in the May 1, 2006, edition of Newsweek, Prime Minister Siniora said
“Syria has its men and people in the country: supporters, some politicians and quite
a number of Syrian intelligence.”
Syria has long regarded Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence. Some
international observers have expressed concern that Syrian leaders might try to
circumvent the effect of the withdrawal by maintaining their influence through
contacts they have acquired over the years in the Lebanese bureaucracy and security
13 Annex to U.N. Security Council document S/2005/331, Letter dated May 23, 2005, from
the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.
14 Text of report is attached to U.N. Security Council document S/2005/673, Oct. 26, 2005.

CRS-14
services.15 Attacks on and assassinations of some prominent Lebanese critics of
Syria in addition to Hariri have accentuated these fears. Another remaining question
concerns the ability of the Lebanese security forces to assume responsibility for
maintaining order in areas vacated by Syrian forces. Lebanon’s ground forces
number approximately 70,000 organized into 11 under strength brigades and a few
separate units and armed largely with obsolescent equipment, plus minuscule air and
naval forces, each consisting of about 1,000 personnel.16
Continuing Lebanese-Syrian frictions have led to proposals for mediation. In
January 2006, after a visit to Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister visited Lebanon,
where he floated a joint Saudi-Egyptian proposal reportedly including the following
principal provisions: an end to hostile media campaigns, a ban on provocative
statements by politicians, exchange of diplomatic representation between Lebanon
and Syria (the two countries have never established diplomatic relations), and
coordination of foreign policy. Lebanese reactions have been mixed, and the
Lebanese government has not officially responded to the Saudi initiative.
Israel
In March 1978, Israel invaded and occupied Lebanese territory south of the
Litani River, to destroy Palestinian bases that Israel believed were the source of
attacks against Israelis. Israeli forces withdrew in June 1978, after the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was placed south of the Litani to serve
as a buffer between Israel and the Palestinians (U.N. Security Council Resolution
425, March 19, 1978). In June 1982, Israel mounted a more extensive invasion
designed to root out armed Palestinian guerrillas from southern Lebanon, defeated
Syrian forces in central Lebanon, and advanced as far north as Beirut. As many as
20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese may have perished in the fighting. Israeli forces
completed a phased withdrawal in 1985, but maintained a 9-mile wide security zone
in southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000. About 1,000 members of the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) patrolled the zone, backed by a 2,000-3,000 Lebanese militia
called the South Lebanon Army (SLA), which was trained and equipped by Israel.
On its part, Israel continued its air and artillery retaliation against Palestinian and
Lebanese Shi’ite militia and Lebanese armed forces units that attacked IDF and SLA
positions.
In May 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak fulfilled a 1999 campaign
promise to withdraw Israeli forces from the security zone in southern Lebanon.
Barak had hoped to do this in conjunction with a Syrian withdrawal, but the
continued stalemate in Syrian-Israeli talks led Barak to decide to move unilaterally.
Some 500 Hizballah militia moved into portions of the southern security zone
vacated by the IDF and SLA. Israel gave asylum to approximately 6,700 SLA
fighters and their families, while another 1,500 SLA were captured by Hizballah and
turned over to the Lebanese Government to stand trial. Of the 6,700 exiles, many
15 Robin Wright, “Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 31,
2005. Syria also has potential built-in assets through the continued presence of President
Lahoud and parliamentary speaker Berri.
16 Recent estimates appear in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance, 2005-2006
, London, pp. 197-198.

CRS-15
emigrated to Australia, Canada, and Latin America; approximately 2,000 remained
in Israel as of mid-2005, where they were later granted the right to Israeli citizenship
but few applied.
The Shib’a Farms. Syria and the then pro-Syrian Lebanese government
asserted that the Israeli withdrawal was incomplete because it did not include a 10-
square-mile enclave known as the Shib’a Farms near the Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian tri-
border area. Most third parties maintain that the Shib’a Farms is part of the Israeli-
occupied Syrian Golan Heights and is not part of the Lebanese territory from which
Israeli was required to withdraw under the 1978 U.N. Security Council Resolution
425 (see above). On June 16, 2000, the U.N. Secretary General informed the
Security Council that Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon in compliance with
Resolution 425.
Hizballah, on its part, claimed credit for forcing Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanon, thereby boosting its credentials within the Arab world. Since May 2000,
Israeli forces in the Shib’a Farms area have been the main focus of Hizballah attacks.
Some analysts believe that Syria, the Lebanese government, and Hizballah raised the
issue of this obscure enclave as a justification for continuing to put military pressure
on Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights in the aftermath of its withdrawal from
Lebanon.17 Syria denies this. Moreover, Lebanese politicians across the spectrum,
including those opposed to Syria, appear to agree that the Farms are Lebanese
territory; in his interview with Lally Weymouth, Prime Minister Siniora said the
“Sheba (variant spelling) Farms is Lebanese.” Commentators have speculated that
through its contacts with Hizballah, Iran may seek to fill the vacuum left by Syria’s
withdrawal from Lebanon. Others doubt that Iran has the means to fill Syria’s former
role in Lebanon, noting that unlike Syria, Iran does not have contiguous borders with
Lebanon.18
Palestinian and Palestinian-Associated Militia
Among Lebanon’s largely refugee Palestinian population are several militias,
including some “rejectionist groups” opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process.19 In
the past, Palestinian militias in Lebanon were secular and in some cases Marxist in
outlook, with little affinity for Islamic fundamentalism. More recently, however
some Palestinians in Lebanon have moved closer to the type of hard-line Sunni
Muslim fundamentalism espoused by Osama bin Laden and the late Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi. Some have joined the insurgency in Iraq, while others have sought to turn
Lebanon into a recruiting ground for terrorist activities. According to observers,
Lebanese authorities have been concerned about two new militias in southern
Lebanon with reported ties to bin Laden:
17 Michael Slackman, “Shabaa [variant spelling] Farms at Center of Tension for Lebanon,
Syria and Israel,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 28, 2001.
18 Michael Slackman, “As Syria’s Iinfluence in Lebanon Wanes, Iran Moves In,” New York
Times
, March 13, 2006.
19 The U.S. State Department estimates Lebanon’s Palestinian population at 200,000 to
400,000. Extension of Lebanese citizenship to Palestinians is opposed by most Lebanese,
who fear that such a step would upset Lebanon’s delicate confessional balance. U.S.
Department of State, Background Note: Lebanon. August 2005.

CRS-16
! Jund al-Sham (Army of Greater Syria), composed mainly of
Lebanese veterans of the 1980s war against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. It numbers less than 100.
! Asbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans), composed mainly of
Palestinians and numbering 300-400.
One Lebanese military official expressed the belief that the two organizations were
largely the same and described them as “very dangerous men.”20
The Hizballah-Israel Confrontation of 2006
Resumption of Violence
As agreement on basic domestic and regional issues continued to elude the
Lebanese, the fragile consensus they had achieved in the year following the Hariri
assassination began to unravel. Tensions between Israel and the militant Palestinians
in the Gaza territory spread to Lebanon in mid-July 2006 as a cycle of violence began
between Israel and militants from the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim organization
Hizballah. On July 12, possibly in a gesture of solidarity with the radical Palestinian
organization Hamas combating Israel in Gaza, Hizballah units launched attacks
across Israel’s northern border, killing eight Israelis and seizing two Israeli soldiers
as hostages. Israel launched widespread air and artillery strikes on Hizballah targets
in Lebanon and Lebanese infrastructure including Beirut International Airport,
vowing to continue the attacks until the Israeli hostages are returned. Hizballah has
launched daily attacks on northern Israel with extended-range rockets, penetrating as
far as the northern Israeli port of Haifa, Israel’s third largest city. Military
commentators have said that Hizballah has more than 12,000 largely unguided
Katyusha rockets, with ranges of 20-45 miles, but also some more advanced variants
of Iranian or Syrian manufacture. Though with limited accuracy, they can cover a
wide range of Israeli territory.
So far, the Israelis have used primarily airpower and artillery in their strikes
against Hizballah; however, by mid- to late July, they had carried out some small
ground operations in southern Lebanon. On July 21, Israel began massing ground
forces on the Lebanese border, and the following day, the Israeli Armed Forces Chief
of Staff Lt. General Dan Halutz said “[w]e shall carry out limited ground operations
as necessary in order to strike at the terrorism which strikes at us.”21 On July 23,
Israeli forces reportedly captured part of the town of Bint Jbail, a center of Hizballah
activity located approximately 2.5 miles on the Lebanese side of the border, as part
of a campaign to seize a 15-square-mile area inside the Lebanese border. Lebanon’s
20 Mitch Prothero, “A Wellspring of Anger,” U.S. News and World Report, June 26, 2006,
p. 34.
21 Greg Myre and Jad Mouawad, “Israeli Buildup at Lebanese Line as Fight Rages,” The
New York Times,
July 22, 2006. On the other hand, unnamed Israeli officials were quoted
as saying that a larger invasion may not be needed to achieve Israel goals. Scott Wilson and
Anthony Shadid, “Israel Fights To Secure Key Region in Lebanon,” The Washington Post,
July 23, 2006.

CRS-17
Defense Minister Elias Murr said the Lebanese army would resist and defend the
country if Israel invaded, but the army’s relatively small size and obsolescent
equipment casts doubt on its ability to fulfill the minister’s undertaking. In another
vein, in Iraq, the fiery young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr said his “Mahdi Army” militia
is forming a unit of up to 1,500 elite fighters to deploy to Lebanon in support of his
fellow Shi’ites, but the leaders of the Iraqi government have not commented on
Sadr’s undertaking.22
The question of a peacekeeping force may arise in the course of diplomatic
efforts to end the fighting. In the past, Israeli leaders have generally opposed the
employment of foreign forces as unreliable and potentially biased against Israeli
interests. Sensing a somewhat changed attitude within the international community,
Israeli sources have been quoted as expressing new interest in an international
peacekeeping force in Lebanon as a means of curbing Hizballah over the long term.
Diplomatic Endeavors
At the G-8 summit meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, attendees disagreed over
various aspects of the crisis; however, on July 16, they adopted a statement placing
blame for the immediate crisis on extremist forces of Hizballah and the militant
Palestinian organization Hamas, but calling on Israel to exercise utmost restraint and
avoid casualties among civilians. U.S. officials have been reluctant to support a
cease-fire resolution without dealing with “root causes,” which they identify as the
actions of Hizballah. On July 23, two veteran officials from Saudi Arabia, Foreign
Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former Saudi
Ambassador to the United States and presently chief of the Saudi National Security
Council, met with President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to
propose a cease-fire that would postpone the question of disarming Hizballah. The
U.S. leaders made no public commitment to back this plan; however, the two sides
reportedly discussed restoring sovereignty to Lebanon, strengthening the Lebanese
Armed Forces, and rebuilding the country.23
On the same day, Secretary Rice embarked on July 23 on a round of visits aimed
at defusing the crisis, beginning with a surprise visit to Lebanon, where she met with
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri. Neither Ms.
Rice nor her Lebanese interlocutors spoke to reporters after their meetings; however,
the inclusion of Berri in her schedule is of possible interest in that he is part of the
Hizballah-led Shi’ite bloc. On the other hand, he represents the more moderate Amal
organization rather than Hizballah. Other stops on Ms. Rice’s schedule include
Israel, the West Bank, and Rome, where she will meet with several moderate Arab
leaders.
Meanwhile, as of July 24, U.S. officials said approximately 11,700 U.S. citizens
had been evacuated from Lebanon, from a previous total of 25,000, including
22 Sharon Behn, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militia Ready to Join Fight,” The Washington Times, July 24,
2006.
23 “In Battle To Remove Hezbollah, Both Israel, Lebanon Pay Price,” The Wall Street
Journal
, July 24, 2006. Note: Hezbollah is a variant spelling for Hizballah.

CRS-18
business people, students, and tourists as well as more permanent residents of
Lebanon.24
U.S.-Lebanese Relations
U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon. The United States has enjoyed good
diplomatic relations with Lebanon and has supported its political independence.
During the 1975-1990 civil war, the United States expressed concern over the
violence and destruction taking place there; provided emergency economic aid,
military training, and limited amounts of military equipment; and briefly deployed
military forces to Lebanon in the early 1980s, as noted earlier. The United States
supported and participated in various efforts to bring about a cease-fire during the
civil war and subsequent efforts to quiet unrest in southern Lebanon along the
Lebanese-Israeli border. In 1996 the United States helped negotiate an agreement
between Hizballah and Israel to avoid targeting civilians and is a member of a five-
party force monitoring this agreement. The United States endorsed the U.N.
Secretary General’s findings in May 2000 that Israel had completed its withdrawal
from southern Lebanon. The U.S. Administration reacted strongly to the
assassination of the late Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005, criticized the Syrian
presence in Lebanon, and demanded withdrawal of Syrian forces; following the
assassination.
The United States has welcomed the formation of a new Lebanese government
following the withdrawal of Syrian forces. On July 22, 2005, Secretary of State Rice
met with President Lahoud, Prime Minister Siniora, and other officials during a brief
surprise visit to Lebanon. After a meeting with Siniora, Dr. Rice said, “I think that
you cannot find a partner more supportive of Lebanon than the United States. This
is a tremendous achievement for the Lebanese people; namely, to be able to control
their future by themselves.” On a subsequent trip to Lebanon, however, Ms. Rice
declined to meet with President Lahoud. After meeting with President Bush in
Washington on April 18, 2006, Prime Minister Siniora said in his Lally Weymouth
interview that he asked President Bush for three things: to empower the Lebanese
government politically through restoration of all its territories (including the Shib’a
Farms); to help build the capabilities of Lebanon’s armed forces and security forces;
and to empower the government economically.
Role of Congress
Congress has also shown considerable interest in Lebanon and Members have
spoken frequently against Syrian domination of the Lebanese scene. For example:
On July 1, 1993, the U.S. Senate passed by voice vote S.Con.Res. 28, which
stated that Syria had violated the Taif Agreements (see below) by not withdrawing
24 “Toll Climbs in Mideast As Fighting Rages On,” The Washington Post, July 18, 2006.
“U.S. Rescue Bogs Down in Lebanon,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2006. Lauren Frayer,
“11,700 Americans Evacuated From Lebanon,” AP News Wires, July 24, 2006. According
to the press, the 25,000 figures includes a number of students, tourists, and business
travelers as well as resident Americans and American-Lebanese.

CRS-19
from Lebanon in September 1992, urged an immediate Syrian withdrawal, and called
upon the President to continue withholding aid and support for Syria.
The House of Representatives added an amendment to the State Department
Authorization bill, Section 863 of H.R. 1646, in mid-May 2001, which would have
cut $600,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds to
Lebanon unless Lebanon deployed its armed forces to the border with Israel. Section
863 also called upon the President to present a plan to Congress to cut ESF funds if
Lebanon did not deploy within six months.
Section 1224 of P.L. 107-228, the Security Assistance Act of 2002, stated that
$10 million of the funds available for FY2003 and subsequent years could not be
obligated until the President certified to Congress that Lebanese Armed Forces had
deployed to the internationally recognized Lebanon-Israel border and that Lebanon
was asserting its authority over the border area. The amendment (popularly called
the “Lantos Amendment” after its initial sponsor) was added to compel Lebanon to
exercise control over the border area, displacing Hizballah forces. Lebanon refused
to move to the border until Israel evacuated the Shib’a Farms disputed area.
According to unconfirmed sources, the $10 million was held in an escrow account
pending discussions among the U.S. Administration, Israel, Lebanon, and Members
of Congress.
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (P.L. 108-175), which
directs the President to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions to Syria if Syria
does not meet several demands, including withdrawal from Lebanon and deployment
of Lebanon’s armed forces in all parts of Lebanon.
Both houses have passed measures condemning the Hariri assassination, calling
for a full investigation, and calling on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon (for example,
H.Res. 91, H.Res. 273, S.Res. 63, and S.Res. 77).
During the Israeli-Hizballah fighting in July 2006, Congress has appeared to be
of one mind and supportive of the President’s position on the current crisis. For
more information on legislation introduced during this period, see CRS Report
RL33566, Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah: The Current Conflict, coordinated by Jeremy M.
Sharp.
Recent and Current U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
In December 1996, the United States organized a Friends of Lebanon
conference, which resulted in a U.S. commitment of $60 million in U.S. aid to
Lebanon over a five-year period beginning in FY1997 and ending in FY2001 (i.e.,
$12 million per year mainly in Economic Support Funds (ESF)). Congress increased
this amount to $15 million in FY2000 and $35 million in FY2001, reportedly to help
Lebanon adjust to new conditions following Israel’s withdrawal and cope with
continuing economic strains. U.S. economic aid to Lebanon has hovered around $35
million in subsequent years.
The Bush Administration requested $35 million in ESF and $700,000 in
International Military Education and Training (IMET) for FY2006. H.R 3057 (the

CRS-20
foreign operations appropriations bill for FY2006), which was passed by the House
on June 28, 2005, raises the requested ESF amount from $35 million to $40 million,
of which $6 million is to be devoted to scholarships and U.S. educational institutions
in Lebanon. The Senate version of H.R. 3057, reported on June 30, contained $35
million in ESF, of which $4 million is for educational institutions. During floor
debate on July 19, however, the Senate adopted Amendment 1298, which increased
ESF to Lebanon by $5 million and provided that an additional $2 million of these
funds would be available for scholarships and educational institutions, thereby
aligning the Senate figures with those of the House bill. The Senate passed its
version of the bill on July 20. (See Table 3, below, for annual U.S. aid to Lebanon.)
The conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) contained the $40 million for Lebanon
(including $6 million for scholarships). The President signed H.R. 3057 as P.L. 109-
102 on November 14, 2005. H.R. 5522, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill
for FY2007 passed by the House on June 9, 2006, contains $35,500,000 in ESF for
Lebanon provided that not less than $6,000,000 will be spent on scholarships and
direct support to American educational institutions in Lebanon.
According to the Administration’s original planning (based on $35 million in
ESF), ESF for Lebanon in FY2006 is targeted toward three main objectives:
economic growth, agriculture, and trade ($22 million); promoting democracy and
good governance ($7 million); and protection of the environment ($6 million). IMET
programs are designed to increase military professionalism among Lebanese Armed
Forces personnel, reduce sectarianism in a major national institution, foster personal
working relationships with U.S. military personnel, and offer an alternative to
training conducted by Syria and other countries less amenable to U.S. democratic
ideals. IMET-funded maritime training will emphasize port security and search and
rescue operations.

CRS-21
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
(millions of dollars)
Military
Economic Aid
Food Aid
Aid
I.M.E.T.
Year
Total
(Grants)
(Grants)
(Loans)
(Grants)
1946 - 1980
332.7
120.2a
86.2b
123.3c
3.0
1981
24.3
4.0
0
20.0
0.3
1982
21.8
9.0
2.2
10.0
0.6
1983
153.9
52.2
0
100.0
1.7
1984
44.0
28.1
0.3
15.0
0.6
1985
21.1
19.9
0.5
0
0.7
1986
17.6
16.0
1.1
0
0.5
1987
23.0
12.8
9.7
0
0.5
1988
12.3
5.1
6.8
0
0.4
1989
15.5
2.8
12.3
0
0.4
1990
19.4
8.3
10.7
0
0.4
1991
19.2
9.3
9.9
0
0
1992
16.4
9.2
7.2
0
0
1993
14.4
10.3
3.5
0
0.6
1994
2.0
1.7
0
0
0.3
1995
16.0
15.6d
0
0
0.4
1996
2.5
2.0
0
0
0.5
1997
12.8
12.3
0
0
0.5
1998
12.6
12.0
0
0
0.6
1999
12.6
12.0
0
0
0.6
2000
15.6
15.0
0
0
0.6
2001
35.4
34.9
0
0
0.5
2002
35.6
35.0
0
0
0.6
2003
35.5
34.8
0
0
0.7
2004
35.9
35.2
0
0
0.7
2005
35.9
35.2
0
0
0.7
2006e
40.7
40.0e
0
0
0.7
2007
41.2
35.5
0
4.8
.9
Totals
1,069.9
628.4
150.4
273.1
18.0
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants.
I.M.E.T. = International Military Education and Training
a. Of the $120.2 million total, $19 million was loans.
b. Of the $86.2 million total, $28.5 million was loans.
c. Of the $123.3 million total, $109.5 was loans and $13.8 million was grants.
d. Includes about $6 million from 1994.
e. Administration requested $35 million in ESF, increased to $40 million by P.L. 109-102.