Order Code RL33566
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah:
The Current Conflict
July 21, 2006
Jeremy M. Sharp, Coordinator
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Christopher Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz,
Alfred Prados, Paul Gallis, Dianne Rennack, John Rollins, Marjorie
Browne, Steve Bowman, Connie Veillette, and Larry Kumins
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah: The Current Conflict
Summary
This report analyzes the current conflict between Israel and two U.S. State
Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), the Lebanese Shiite
Muslim group Hezbollah and the radical Palestinian Hamas organization. On July 12,
2006, what had been a localized conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in
the Gaza Strip instantly became a regional conflagration after Hezbollah captured
two Israeli soldiers in a surprise attack along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israel has
responded by carrying out air strikes against suspected Hezbollah targets in Lebanon,
and Hezbollah has countered with rocket attacks against cities and towns in northern
Israel. Fighting on the ground has also started. Meanwhile, Israeli clashes with
Hamas and other Palestinian militants have continued unabated in the Gaza Strip.
The Bush Administration has repeatedly stated its unequivocal support for Israel
during this time of crisis, and President Bush has charged that “the root cause of the
problem is Hezbollah... And part of those terrorist attacks are inspired by nation
states, like Syria and Iran.” Many in the international community have called for an
immediate cease-fire, while U.S. officials refrained from backing this demand or
engaging in immediate shuttle diplomacy while Israel conducts its extensive military
campaign to weaken Hezbollah.
On July 18, 2006, the Senate passed S.Res. 534, which, among other things,
calls for the release of Israeli soldiers who are being held captive by Hezbollah or
Hamas; condemns the governments of Iran and Syria for their continued support for
Hezbollah and Hamas; urges all sides to protect innocent civilian life and
infrastructure; and strongly supports the use of all diplomatic means available to free
the captured Israeli soldiers. On July 20, 2006, the House passed H.Res. 921, which
also condemns Hezbollah’s attack on Israel and urges the President to bring sanctions
against the governments of Syria and Iran for their alleged sponsorship of Hezbollah.
H.Con.Res. 450 (introduced in the House) calls upon the President to appeal to all
sides in the current crisis in the Middle East for an immediate cessation of violence
and, among other things, commit United States diplomats to multi-party negotiations
with no preconditions.
The extension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the Lebanese arena has
created a multifaceted crisis which cuts across a number of U.S. policy issues in the
Middle East. This report not only discusses the current military situation, but its
implications for regional stability, Syrian influence in Lebanon and calls for Lebanese
independence, Iranian regional aspirations and its pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction, and energy security. This report will be updated as events unfold. A
number of CRS analysts have made contributions to this report. For additional
questions, please contact the individual specialist listed under each section of the
report. For more information on the major countries in the current conflict, please see
CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States; CRS
Report RL33509, Lebanon; CRS Report RL33487, Syria: U.S. Relations and
Bilateral Issues, CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,
and CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Related
Developments, and U.S. Policy.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background to the Current Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Palestinian Elections and the Hamas-led PA Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Isolation of Hamas and Internecine Palestinian Violence . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Israeli-Palestinian Fighting in Gaza and the End of the Hamas Cease-Fire . 3
Enter Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Military Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Israel’s Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Regional Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Lebanese Domestic Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Iran’s Relationship to Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Regional Reactions: Public Responses and Leaders’ Positions . . . . . . . . . . 13
U.S. Policy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.S. Policy toward Hamas and Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Supporting Israeli-Palestinian Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Concern for Lebanese Democracy, Stability, and Independence . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S.-Syrian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
U.S. Efforts to Contain Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Diplomatic Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
U.N. Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The United Nations and the Current Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The European Union and France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Regional Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Legislation, Foreign Assistance, Sanctions, and Equipment Use
Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Recent Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Congress and Evacuation Costs for U.S. Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
U.S. Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Restrictions on the Use of U.S. Supplied Military Equipment . . . . . . 28
Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Prospects for a Regional War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
U.S. Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Possible Oil Market Disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chronology of Recent Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Hamas and Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
List of Figures
Figure 1. Fighting (Hezbollah Rocket Attacks and Israeli Air Strikes)
in Lebanon, Israel, and the Gaza Strip and West Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
List of Tables
Chronology of Conflict on the Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah:
The Current Conflict
Introduction
The current conflict between Israel and two U.S. State Department-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), the Lebanese Shiite Muslim group
Hezbollah and the radical Palestinian Hamas organization is fundamentally linked
to two distinct cross border attacks carried out by Hamas and Hezbollah operatives
on Israel. On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam
Brigades), the Popular Resistance Committees, and the previously unknown Army
of Islam attacked Israeli forces, just outside of the Gaza Strip, killing two Israeli
soldiers, wounding four, and kidnaping one. Israel launched a massive military
assault on Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip in an effort to secure the captured
soldier’s release, resulting in widespread infrastructure damage and dozens of
Palestinian civilian casualties. Hamas rocket attacks also struck the southern Israeli
city of Ashkelon. On July 12, Hezbollah forces crossed the international border from
Lebanon into northwestern Israel and attacked two Israeli vehicles, killing three
soldiers and kidnaping two in a raid linked in part to Hezbollah’s desire to intervene
in the Israel-Hamas confrontation in Gaza.
Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared that Hezbollah’s actions constituted
“an act of war,”1 and Israel and Hezbollah have traded an escalating series of air
strikes and rocket attacks since that have resulted in damage and civilian casualties
on both sides of the border. Israel has stated its official conditions for the end of
military operations against Lebanon as the following: the return of the kidnaped
soldiers, the end to Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel, and the deployment of the
Lebanese army along the Israeli-Lebanese border to replace Hezbollah units. The
United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and a number of Arab
governments are now engaged in diplomatic efforts to resolve the ongoing conflict.
Iran and Syria’s state sponsorship of Hezbollah and Hamas may complicate those
efforts.
1 “Eight IDF Soldiers Killed, 2 Kidnaped on Northern Frontier,” Jerusalem Post, July 12,
2006.

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CRS-2
Background to the Current Crisis
Palestinian Elections and the Hamas-led PA Government2
On January 25, 2006, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip voted in the
first Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections to be held since 1996.
Candidates of the “Change and Reform” party associated with the Islamic Resistance
Movement (Hamas)3 won a majority and defeated Fatah, the prior ruling party of the
PLC and of Palestinian Authority President (PA) Mahmoud Abbas. The day after the
election, the Quartet (i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and
Russia) reiterated its view that “there is a fundamental contradiction between armed
group and militia activities and the building of a democratic state.”4 Subsequent
Quartet statements described clear principles for reviewing further engagement and
assistance with a potential Hamas-led Palestinian government, namely “that all
members of a future Palestinian government must be committed to non-violence,
recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations,
including the Roadmap.”5 Although the Fatah-dominated Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) Executive Committee rejected the Hamas platform, President
Abbas prevented a constitutional crisis by endorsing the platform and cabinet
candidates while expressing his demand that Hamas comply with the Quartet’s
principles and support his efforts to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Since January 2006, Hamas leaders have largely rejected and
refused to discuss the Quartet principles, arguing that while President Abbas may
decide to negotiate with Israel, ultimately the Palestinian people would decide what
to accept. The PLC approved the majority Hamas-bloc on March 28, 2006.
The Isolation of Hamas and Internecine Palestinian Violence
The electoral victory of Hamas surprised many outside observers and created
a series of policy challenges for the Bush Administration, which had supported the
election process as part of its efforts to reform the Palestinian Authority and its
broader Middle East democracy promotion agenda. Following the Hamas victory,
Hamas leaders consistently refused to recognize Israel or endorse the principles
outlined by the Quartet. As a result, Israel and members of the Quartet took steps to
limit the provision of non-humanitarian aid and financial resources to the Hamas-
controlled Palestinian Authority. Israel ceased its monthly transfers of approximately
$55 million in taxes and customs revenue collected monthly on behalf of the PA, and
2 The following sections were prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Middle East Policy
Analyst, on July 20, 2006.
3 Hamas is an acronym for its full name in Arabic, Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah
(the Islamic Resistance Movement).
4 Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative Council Elections, January 26, 2006.
5 Quartet Statements released January 30, 2006 and March 30, 2006. “The Roadmap” refers
to the Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, which was presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on
April 30, 2003, by the Quartet as a plan to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the
conflict in three phases by 2005.

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CRS-3
two leading Israeli banks announced plans to sever their commercial relationships
with financial institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.6 The Bush
Administration suspended U.S.-funded development projects in the Palestinian
territories and prohibited any and all U.S. persons from engaging in any unauthorized
transactions with the Palestinian Authority because of its control by Hamas, a
designated terrorist entity.7 The European Union — the PA’s largest donor — also
suspended its direct aid to the Palestinian Authority and, at the Quartet’s behest, has
subsequently spearheaded efforts to develop an international mechanism to deliver
assistance to the Palestinian people without transfers to or through Hamas or the
elements of the PA under its control.
The loss of customs revenue and direct foreign aid created crippling budgetary
shortfalls for the PA and significant derivative economic hardship for many
Palestinian citizens. Although Arab and Islamic states pledged tens of millions of
dollars in budgetary support to relieve what both Hamas leaders and President Abbas
referred to as a “siege,” only a fraction of the funds necessary to meet the PA’s needs
have successfully been brought into the Palestinian territories by Hamas officials
since late March 2006. Throughout April, May, and June 2006, tensions over unpaid
salaries and disagreements over command responsibilities flared between the Hamas-
led government and armed security force personnel loyal to the Fatah movement and
President Abbas. The tensions erupted in a number of clashes and armed
confrontations, including an incident in which gunmen loyal to the Fatah movement
stormed the PLC building in Ramallah and destroyed the offices of several Hamas
cabinet officials. Palestinian leaders, including President Abbas, engaged in several
efforts to end the intra-Palestinian violence and bring closure to open questions of
official Palestinian support for the Quartet principles (see discussion of the National
Accord Document below). However, before these efforts could bear fruit, fresh
violence between Israel and Hamas erupted in the Gaza Strip and has escalated.
Israeli-Palestinian Fighting in Gaza and
the End of the Hamas Cease-Fire8
In March 2004, with the encouragement of Palestinian Authority (PA) President
Mahmud Abbas and the help of Egyptian officials, Hamas and 12 other Palestinian
groups agreed to extend an informal truce or “calm” (referred to in Arabic as a
hudna) with Israel for one year. Some call the agreement a cease-fire even though
it was a unilateral Palestinian declaration to which Israel was not a party. Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) did not agree to the calm and was responsible for several suicide
6 The latter announcement was made partly in response to Israeli banks’ fears of prosecution
under a strict new Israeli anti-terrorism law. Press reports suggested that Israel’s Bank
Discount and Bank Hapoalim have agreed to postpone their plans until August 15, 2006.
The proposals would directly affect Palestinian civilians by severely complicating or
preventing most Palestinian commercial financial transactions in Israeli shekels, the
principal currency used in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
7 For more information see CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians.
8 The following sections were prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs, on July 20, 2006.

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CRS-4
bombings within Israel in the period that followed. Hamas, which had been
responsible for many suicide bombings during the second intifadah (Palestinian
uprising against Israeli occupation) that had begun in September 2000, refrained from
perpetrating such attacks after declaring the hudna. Hamas did, however, continue
to fire mortars and rockets against Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip before Israel’s
summer 2005 withdrawal from the region and into southern Israel after Israel’s
withdrawal, and Hamas operatives killed an Israeli settler in the West Bank in
September 2005. Israel usually responded with air and artillery strikes, but it also
carried out what it terms targeted killings of terrorists and, before the January 2006
Palestinian parliamentary elections, arrested many potential Hamas election
candidates and others.
On June 9, 2006, a Palestinian family was killed on a Gaza beach. The
Palestinians claimed that the victims had been struck by Israeli artillery fire, but
Israel denied responsibility for the deaths. Nonetheless, Hamas called off its truce
and intensified rocket launches into southern Israel.
In June, Palestinian factions held an intense national dialogue in the West Bank
and Gaza in which they tried to agree on a National Accord Document (also known
as the Prisoners’ Document because Hamas and Fatah leaders imprisoned by Israel
had collaborated on the first draft). Among other positions, the Document states that
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the President of the PA will be
responsible for negotiations with Israel to create a state on territories occupied by
Israel in 1967. It also stipulates that, in tandem with political action, resistance will
be concentrated in (but not limited to) territories occupied in 1967. Some interpret
the Document as Hamas’s abandoning its goal of establishing an Islamic state on all
of the territory of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza; as its implicit recognition of
Israel; and as its acceptance of a two-state solution. None of these changes is explicit
in the Document.
Although Hamas claims that all of its decisions are arrived at by consensus in
its shura or consultative council, it has been suggested that the group’s leaders in
Damascus, notably political bureau chief Khalid Mish’al, did not agree with the
National Accord Document. On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing (Izz
ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades), the Popular Resistance Committees, and the previously
unknown Army of Islam attacked Israeli forces in Israel, near Kerem Shalom and the
Egyptian border, just outside of Gaza, killing two Israeli soldiers, wounding four, and
kidnaping one. The terrorists had entered Israel via a long tunnel from Gaza and
demanded the release of women and minors (an estimated 400 persons) from Israeli
prisons. It was the first cross-border attack since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip
in August 2005. Israel held the PA and its Hamas-led government responsible for the
attack and the fate of the kidnaped soldier. Some analysts suggest that Mish’al was
behind the attack and that the perpetrators intended the attack to torpedo the political
approach evinced in the National Accord Document.
On June 27, after unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to secure the kidnaped
soldier’s release, Israeli forces began a major operation to rescue him, to deter future
Hamas attacks, including rocket launches from Gaza into southern Israel, and to
weaken, bring down, or change the conduct of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority
government. Israeli officials claimed that Hamas had crossed a “red line” with the

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CRS-5
kidnaping and attack within pre-1967 Israel. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert asserted,
however, that Israel did not intend to reoccupy Gaza. On June 28, Hamas officials
in the Palestinian Authority echoed the demands of the kidnapers; Israeli officials
responded by insisting on the unconditional release of the soldier. On June 29, Israel
forces arrested 64 Palestinian (Hamas) cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and other
Hamas officials in the West Bank and Jerusalem. An Israeli spokeswoman stated
that the arrests were not an effort to get bargaining chips to exchange for the soldier,
and the Foreign Ministry described the action as a “normal legal procedure” targeting
suspected terrorists.
On June 30, Israeli planes bombed the empty Palestinian Interior Ministry
office, weapons depots, training camps, and access roads in a series of 30 air raids
over Gaza. On July 2, Israeli missiles destroyed the empty offices of Palestinian
Prime Minister Ismail Haniyah. The next day, Israeli troops and tanks began
sweeping northern Gaza to locate tunnels and explosives near the border and
continued operations targeting Hamas offices in the West Bank. On July 4, Israeli
planes destroyed more of the Interior Ministry building that had been damaged on
June 30, an empty Hamas-run school in Gaza City, a building at the Islamic
University, and a Hamas training site. Israeli artillery continued to pound empty
areas of the Gaza Strip.
After Hamas militants fired an upgraded rocket at the Israeli port city of
Ashkelon on July 4, the Israeli cabinet approved “prolonged” activities against
Hamas. Meanwhile, the kidnapers reportedly revised their demands, insisting that
Israel release all women prisoners (said to number about 100) and 30 male prisoners.
Some international mediators have tried to resolve this latest escalation. On July
3, an advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad and Hamas leader Khalid Mish’al in Syria to discuss the crisis.
Egyptian mediators reportedly proposed a resolution in which Hamas would release
the soldier in exchange for an Israeli promise to release prisoners at a later date. On
July 10, however, Khalid Mish’al insisted on the mutual release (“swap”) of
prisoners. On the same day, Prime Minister Olmert said, “Trading prisoners with a
terrorist bloody organization such as Hamas is a major mistake that will cause a lot
of damage to the future of the State of Israel.”9 He added that to negotiate with
Hamas would signal that moderates such as President Abbas are not needed.
Enter Hezbollah10
On July 12, under cover of massive shelling of a town in northern Israel,
Hezbollah forces crossed the international border from Lebanon into northwestern
Israel and attacked two Israeli vehicles, killing three soldiers and kidnaping two.
Hezbollah thereby opened a second front against Israel ostensibly in support of
Hamas. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, suggested that the Hezbollah
operation might provide a way out of the crisis in Gaza because Israel had negotiated
9 “Olmert Says No Deal With ‘Bloody’ Hamas,” FoxNews.com, July 10, 2006.
10 For the purposes of this report, “Hezbollah” is used in referring to the Lebanese Shiite
Muslim group. Common alternate spellings include Hizballah, Hizbullah, and Hizb`allah.

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CRS-6
with Hezbollah indirectly in the past although it is refusing to negotiate with Hamas
now. He said that the only way the soldiers would be returned would be through a
prisoner exchange. Although Hezbollah and Hamas are not organizationally linked,
Hezbollah has acted in some ways as a mentor or role model for Hamas, which has
sought to emulate the Lebanese group’s political and media success. Hamas’s
kidnaping of the Israeli soldier follows a different Hezbollah example. Hezbollah
reportedly also has provided terrorist training for Hamas, and the two groups share
the goal of driving Israel from occupied territories and ultimately from Israel proper;
both maintain close ties with Iran.
The reasons for the Hezbollah action may extend beyond Nasrallah’s often
publicly espoused intention to kidnap Israelis for a prisoner exchange. Hezbollah has
the capacity to decide to act on its own and could have done so as part of a wave of
“Shi’a triumphalism” in accordance with the ascension to power of Iraqi Shiites and
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. It also may have acted in solidarity with the
besieged Palestinians or with its Syrian and Iranian supporters. Some observers,
however, question Hezbollah’s autonomy and offer other explanations for the July
12 kidnaping. Much speculation focuses on whether Hezbollah acted at the behest
of or with the approval of Iran, its main sponsor, because Iran also supports Hamas
or may have wanted to divert international attention from the impasse over its nuclear
program. On the same day as the Hezbollah attack, Iran was supposed to respond to
a package offered by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and
Germany in order to get Iran to stop uranium enrichment.
In the absence of a response, the six governments were to ask the U.N. Security
Council to sanction Iran for its noncompliance with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Due to the situation in Lebanon, however, the Council has postponed
consideration of the issue, which suggests to some that a kidnaping ploy may have
worked. However, delays in the Council are not unusual as members undertake
protracted negotiations for resolutions and there is no indication that the international
community has backed down on Iran because of the Lebanon crisis. Others suggest
that Syria may have been using its Hezbollah allies to reestablish a role in Lebanon,
from which it had been forced to withdraw in 2005. Another explanation is that
Hezbollah may have wanted to prevent mediators from resolving the Gaza crisis.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Palestinian Authority President Mahmud
Abbas have claimed that, immediately before the Hezbollah attack, an agreement had
almost been reached for a prisoner exchange. Hezbollah’s action appears to have
complicated or prevented that resolution.
Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared that Hezbollah’s actions “do not
constitute a terrorist attack, but rather ... an act of war, without any provocation, on
sovereign territory over which there is no argument.” Olmert first charged that “The
Lebanese government, which Hezbollah is a part of, is trying to undermine regional
stability. Lebanon will suffer the consequences of its actions.”11 The Lebanese
government has stated that it had no prior knowledge of the Hezbollah operation and
does not take responsibility or credit for it. Israeli officials also singled out Syria and
Iran for blame.
11 “Atmosphere of War in Cabinet Meeting,” Jerusalem Post, July 13, 2006.

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CRS-7
The Military Conflict
Military Operations12
Israeli military operations have thus far been confined primarily to air strikes in
Lebanon and a naval blockade of Lebanese ports, though as of July 21, there were
reports of Israeli plans to launch extensive ground operations in southern Lebanon
to push Hezbollah forces back from the Lebanon-Israeli border all the way to north
of the Litani River. Targeting, for the most part, Hezbollah area strongholds,
transportation nodes, and rocket launchers, air strikes have sought not only to destroy
or degrade Hezbollah’s military capability, but also to interdict movement both into
Lebanon and within the country. By not restricting strikes to the southern border
region, Israeli operations have demonstrated that the Israeli government does not
consider the Hezbollah threat to be a “localized” problem, and consequently,
targeting has extended throughout the country. Attacks on Hezbollah strongholds in
and around residential areas have resulted in approximately 300 Lebanese casualties
as of July 20, 2006 according to various media sources. By severely damaging
Beirut’s international airport and destroying key bridges and highway segments to
isolate the southern area of the country, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has sought to
prevent the movement and re-supply of Hezbollah forces. The IAF has paid
particular attention to locating and destroying rocket launch sites and mobile launch
vehicles. As evidenced by the relative lack of success of the “Scud Hunt” by U.S.
forces during the 1991 war in Iraq, these mobile launchers present a very significant
challenge.
Though Israeli ground forces have been moved to the border area, no large scale
incursion into Lebanon has taken place. It is nevertheless likely that Israeli special
forces are operating in Lebanon to locate targets and direct air strikes. Most military
analysts agree that air strikes alone will be not be sufficient to destroy Hezbollah’s
ability to attack Israeli targets, and that a relatively large-scale infantry operation
would be necessary to destroy Hezbollah’s offensive capabilities. The significant
political implications of such an operation aside, even a successful Israeli offensive
would raise the question of how to prevent the return of Hezbollah and stabilize the
border region in the long-term. Few anticipate an Israeli incursion on the scale of its
1982 occupation of Lebanon or a reestablishment of the former Israeli-occupied
security zone along the border. Nevertheless, defeating a guerilla organization which
enjoys such strong local support and can disperse into the general population with
relative ease will be virtually impossible without an extended occupation force of
some kind. There has been some discussion of inserting an international force,
though providing such a force with credible components and leadership may prove
a challenge, given the on-going military commitments of many potential contributors
to current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
12 This section was prepared by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Defense, on July 20,
2006.

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CRS-8
Figure 1. Fighting (Hezbollah Rocket Attacks and Israeli Air Strikes)
in Lebanon, Israel, and the Gaza Strip and West Bank

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CRS-9
Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel have been primarily restricted to rocket attacks on
the northern section of the country, which have killed 13 and wounded approximately
300 people as of July 20, 2006 according to various media sources. Supplied by both
Syria and Iran, Hezbollah has accumulated a reportedly very large arsenal of these
weapons, with estimates reaching up to 12,000 munitions. The vast majority of these
munitions are unguided rockets, often called Katushyas. Having ranges of between
20-45 miles they are able to strike a wide area of Israeli territory. Though originally
developed in Russia during World War II, new variants are manufactured in a variety
of nations, including Syria and Iran.13 Though unguided and of varying accuracy, this
indiscriminate aspect can enhance their effectiveness as “terror” weapons against
urban populations. Iran also has reportedly supplied Hezbollah with a limited
number of the more advanced Zelzal (earthquake) rocket having a range of up to 120
miles. As noted, many of these munitions can be launched from mobile launchers,
enabling them to ‘shoot and scoot,’ thereby significantly reducing the effectiveness
of counterattacks. Though Israel has invested significantly in developing missile
defense systems, these relatively short-range munitions have such brief flight times
that interception is virtually impossible.14 Consequently, offensive operations against
the launchers and munition storage sites remain the primary effective
countermeasure.
Israel’s Goals15
On July 17, in a speech to the Knesset (parliament), Prime Minister Olmert
summarized Israel’s official conditions for the end of military operations against
Lebanon: the return of the kidnaped soldiers, the end to Hezbollah rocket attacks, and
the deployment of the Lebanese army along the Israeli-Lebanese border to replace
Hezbollah units. The last is a requirement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559
and would increase the distance that Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles would have to
traverse before striking Israel.16 Israeli officials do not have any illusions that their
forces will be able to disarm Hezbollah completely. However, the bombing of
Hezbollah rocket launching sites, airports, and roads, and the imposition of a naval
blockade show that they clearly hope to degrade the militia’s military capabilities
considerably and prevent re-supplies. In addition, Israeli officials might hope that, in
order to stop the devastation, more moderate Lebanese would exert pressure on
Hezbollah to change its conduct and concede to Israel’s demands. However, Israel
risks creating a greater commonality among Lebanese factions in their opposition to
Israel’s actions.
13 The Iranian versions of these systems are called the Fajr models 1, 3, 5, and the Arash.
14 The Tactical High Energy Laser missile defense system, jointly developed by Israel and
the United States, is capable of defending against these rockets; however, it remains in
development and is not expected to be fully operational until 2007. Israel does have
developmental models that could be deployed.
15 This section was prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, on
July 20, 2006.
16 Text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, is available online
at [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html].

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CRS-10
In addition, in the face of Hezbollah’s initial aggression, the Israeli government
could take the opportunity to gain international sympathy and support for its “just
war.” However, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, European, and other leaders
rapidly expressed dismay at Israel’s use of “disproportionate” force, suggesting that
this goal may be unrealistic. The concern on the part of world leaders might lead to
the formation of a more robust international force along the border than the more
limited United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Should the Israeli
government be willing to accept it, an international force could achieve the goal of
pushing Hezbollah back from the border.
Some suggest that the Israeli government could benefit domestically from a
successful military campaign. Unlike its predecessors, the Olmert government has
few former military generals in key positions. Moreover, it replaced a government
headed by a former general with considerable expertise and charisma, Ariel Sharon.
Prime Minister Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and Foreign Minister Tzipi
Livni all lack significant military experience. The politics of forming a coalition
government resulted in moving former Chief of Staff and former Defense Minister
Shaul Mofaz to the Transportation Ministry, with former Histadrut labor union head
and Labor Party leader Peretz taking over Defense. Thus, many observers believe that
the current crisis and military campaign affords the militarily inexperienced leaders
a chance to prove their ability. In addition, although Olmert’s Kadima Party won a
plurality in the national elections in March, Olmert is not considered a particularly
popular politician. However, polls so far show overwhelming popular support in
Israel both for the military campaign and for the government’s conduct.
The Regional Dimension
Lebanese Domestic Politics17
The Lebanese political scene has undergone major changes since a ruinous civil
war (1975-1990) and 30-year Syrian military presence in Lebanon (1976-2005).
Though supported by some Lebanese, including many Shiite Muslims, the Syrian
force presence was increasingly resented in other Lebanese communities. Matters
came to a head in 2004, when the Lebanese parliament, apparently under Syrian
pressure, adopted an amendment extending the term of the pro-Syrian President
Emile Lahoud for three more years. The subsequent assassination in a car bombing
of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who had opposed the extension, was widely
blamed on Syrian agents and led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in
April 2005 under Lebanese domestic and international pressure, including U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1559. This resolution, among other things, called for
withdrawal of “foreign forces” from Lebanon and disarming of militia, such as the
militant Shiite Muslim organization Hezbollah and some Palestinian groups.
Relatively free and fair parliamentary elections held in May-June 2005 gave a
majority of to an anti-Syrian bloc (“the March 14 Movement”) headed by the son of
the slain prime minister.
17 This section was prepared by Alfred Prados, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, on July
20, 2006.

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CRS-11
Serious issues remained unresolved, however, as Lebanon tries to function with
a mixed government. On one hand, the anti-Syrian bloc has a majority in parliament
and one of its members, Fouad Siniora, is prime minister. However, pro-Syrian
forces, notably a bloc in parliament headed by Hezbollah, remain strong. Also, for
the first time in Lebanese history, a member of Hezbollah entered the cabinet as
Minister of Energy and Water Resources. In this connection, U.S. policy does not
allow U.S. officials to deal with members of Hezbollah, which is listed by the U.S.
State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). One of the most
difficult issues dividing Lebanese factions has proven to be the disarmament of
militias (mainly Hezbollah), which wants to participate in political life, but maintains
that it must keep its weapons to confront what it describes as a threat from Israel. As
an example, Hezbollah cites the continued presence of Israeli troops in a disputed
enclave near the Lebanon-Syria-Israel tri-border area, known as the Shib’a Farms),18
as a threat justifying Hezballah’s retention of its arms.
In launching an attack on Israel beginning on July 12, Hezbollah has gambled
that it will gain credit among Lebanese if Israel is perceived to back down under
Hezbollah pressure. Hezbollah leaders recall that its reputation in Lebanon was
enhanced when Israel withdrew unilaterally from southern Lebanon in May 2000
after Hezbollah inflicted mounting casualties on Israel troops in the area. On the
other hand, as the conflict continues, mounting resentment of Hezbollah’s actions in
precipitating the crises may cause a reaction against Hezbollah to set in. Prime
Minister Siniora, no ally of Hezbollah, has said that Israeli military pressure is not
likely to sway Hezbollah from its current course, has criticized the international
community for not doing enough to end the crisis, and called for release of all
Lebanese imprisoned in Israel. He further suggested reviving a long dormant mixed
armistice commission originally created in 1949 after the establishment of Israel.19
Iran’s Relationship to Hezbollah20
Iran maintains a relationship with Lebanese Hezbollah that could be described
as patron-client, or mentor and protégé. Many Iranian leaders see Hezbollah as an
outgrowth of the 1979 Islamic revolution, and U.S. experts have long assumed that
Iran would expend substantial resources and take significant risks to ensure that
Hezbollah survives and prospers in Lebanese politics. Others see Hezbollah as a
surrogate with which Iran can strike at and weaken Israel, and thereby strengthen
18 The Shib’a Farms enclave is regarded by the United Nations and the United States as part
of the Israeli-occupied Syrian territory of the Golan Heights. However, Syria and Lebanon
maintain that it is Lebanese territory from which Israel failed to withdraw when it withdrew
from southern Lebanon in 2000. Hezbollah argues that they are justified in keeping their
arms as long as Israel remains in the Shib’a Farms area, which Hezbollah regards as
Lebanese territory. For more information, see CRS Report RL31078, The Shib’s Farms
Dispute and Its Implications.
19 The Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC), one of several armistice
commissions established between Israel and neighboring states. For Siniora’s comments,
see AFP News Wire, July 19, 2006.
20 This section was prepared by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle East Affairs, on July
18, 2006.

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CRS-12
Iran’s credentials as a hardline, rejectionist Muslim state. Hezbollah was formed in
1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics sympathetic to Iran’s Islamic revolution, some of
whom had studied under Iran’s revolutionary leader, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, when Khomeini was in exile in Najaf, Iraq (1963-1978).
On the other hand, Hezbollah has matured as a political movement, and many
no longer see Iran as directing Hezbollah, as it did in the 1980s. At the height of
Iran’s influence over Hezbollah, it had about 2,000 Revolutionary Guard forces in
Lebanon, advising and training Hezbollah’s militia and coordinating arms shipments
to it. After Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from south Lebanon, the number of Guard
advisers fell to less than 50, according to a Washington Post report of April 13, 2005.
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials said Iran was giving Hezbollah about
$100 million per year in financial assistance, but that assistance apparently has also
dropped as Hezbollah has developed its own sources of revenue.21
Iranian arms flows to Hezbollah have continued in recent years. The method
of transfer, by all accounts, have been Iranian cargo flights, off-loaded at Damascus
airport and trucked into Lebanon for delivery to Hezbollah. Reported shipments have
included “Stinger” anti-aircraft weapons obtained by Iran in Afghanistan, “Fajr-5”
rockets (45-mile range) that can reach the Israeli city of Haifa, and over 10,000
Katyusha rockets (18-mile range).22 Some observers believe Iran might have
transferred to Hezbollah the Zelzal missile (120-mile range) that might be able to hit
the outskirts of Tel Aviv from south Lebanon.23 The U.S. State Department report
on terrorism for 2004 (released April 2005) says that Iran supplied Hezbollah with
an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Mirsad, that Hezbollah briefly flew over the
Israel-Lebanon border on November 7, 2004 and April 11, 2005. Some reports
suggest that Hezbollah used a Chinese-made C-802 sea skimming cruise missile to
strike an Israeli naval vessel on July 14, 2006. Iran is known to have outfitted
Chinese-made patrol boats with C-802’s during the 1990s, and Iran apparently
transferred some C-802’s to Hezbollah.24
Syria25
Syria has emerged as a key, if indirect, actor in the current crisis, primarily
though its role as a source and conduit for the delivery of rockets and other Iranian
weaponry to Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon; some believe Syria is shipping
weapons from its own inventories to Hezbollah as well. The Lebanese civil war of
1975-1990 gave Syria an opportunity for the first time to station troops in Lebanon,
ostensibly as part of an Arab League peacekeeping force. Despite a provision in the
21 Hezbollah reportedly receives millions in donations from overseas supporters, from
various criminal operations, and from Lebanese Shiite businessmen. It also generates
revenue from Hezbollah-owned businesses in Lebanon.
22 “Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah.” Reuters, Feb. 4, 2002.
23 See [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/zelzal-2.htm].
24 See [http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=1184].
25 This section was prepared by Alfred Prados, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, on July
20, 2006.

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CRS-13
1989 Ta’if Agreement calling for redeployment of Syrian forces, these forces
remained in Lebanon, albeit at somewhat reduced levels, until forced to withdraw in
April 2005 by a popular outcry in Lebanon over alleged Syrian complicity in the
murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. At the time, many observers
interpreted the Syrian withdrawal and subsequent election of an anti-Syrian majority
in the Lebanese parliament as a major setback for Syria’s ambitions in the region, and
some even predicted that the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Asad might have
been seriously weakened in backing down under external pressure. In fact, however,
Syria retained some assets in Lebanon, particularly the militant Shiite Muslim
organization Hezbollah, which refused to relinquish its arms and continued to
support Syria’s agenda by periodically attacking Israeli military positions near the
Israeli-Lebanese border, as noted above.
Many commentators believe Syria’s re-supply activity on behalf of Hezbollah
was an important factor in encouraging Hezbollah leaders to initiate large-scale
border and rocket attacks against Israel on July 12. In doing so, Syria achieves two
goals. First, Syria’s actions help forestall any move by the small Lebanese army to
replace Hezbollah units near the Israeli-Lebanese border and help ensure that
Lebanon will be unable to make an independent peace with Israel without Syrian
participation. Second, Syria’s policy strengthens the view in some Lebanese circles
that the departure of Syrian troops has led to stalemate and ultimately to nation-wide
devastation. At the same time, the current situation complicates any effort by the
United States to effect a “regime behavior change” along the lines of Libya and
increases the possibility that the United States, after shunning Syria for several years,
may have to deal with Damascus at some point in an effort to contain escalating
violence. Observers have noted that “Syria appears anxious to reassert its claim as
a crucial guarantor of stability in the Middle East.” So far, by employing Hezbollah
as a proxy against Israel, Syrian policy has appeared to reap benefits without
incurring any retaliatory attacks on Syrian territory. Some observers have suggested,
however, that Syria’s leadership is playing a dangerous game that could lead to
reprisals against Syria itself.26
Regional Reactions: Public Responses
and Leaders’ Positions27
Public responses to the Gaza-Israel-Lebanon crisis in the Arab and wider
Islamic world have featured a number of convergent and divergent themes. The most
common theme emanating from the region has been the expression of concern for the
well-being of civilian populations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and the of
expression of anger over perceived and alleged disproportionate use of force by the
Israeli military. Regional media sources have characterized the United States as
politically and materially supportive of Israel’s actions, and some parties have alleged
that the U.S. government is complicit in the deaths of Palestinian and Lebanese
26 Kim Murphy, “Crisis May Put Syria Back In Political Mix,” Los Angeles Times, July 18,
2006.
27 This section was prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Middle East Policy Analyst, on July
20, 2006.

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CRS-14
civilians. Other themes have highlighted the negative roles of Iran and Syria as state
sponsors of Hezbollah’s terrorist activities and have identified leaders in those two
countries as responsible for the dangerous escalation of the conflict as well as
ultimately culpable for the deaths of civilians on all sides.
Other public considerations of the crisis in the region have focused on possible
signs of an emerging rivalry between Shiite and Sunni powers in the Middle East,
particularly between Iran, supported by Alawite-led Syria, and the traditional leaders
of the Sunni Arab states, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Officials from these
countries criticized Hezbollah’s “unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible acts “
at an emergency Arab League meeting on July 15. Yemen, Algeria, Syria, and
Lebanon disagreed, however, and Yemen called for severing all Arab ties with Israel.
Significant attention has been focused on the public positions outlined by King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, and
unnamed Saudi officials who have identified Hezbollah and those “behind its back”
as responsible for the current crisis. They also have characterized Hezbollah’s
actions as “uncalculated adventures” that are distinct from “legitimate resistance” to
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The critical statements from Saudi leaders and others Arab leaders have been
interpreted as reflective of the perspective of sovereign national governments
suffering from terrorist attacks on their own territory and disturbed by the precedent
potentially set by Hamas and Hezbollah’s actions - the permissibility of armed, non-
state Islamist actors initiating massive conflict with other states without the approval
or support of their national governments. At the same time, leaders of most Arab
states have spoken out against what some of them have publicly characterized as “the
war being launched by Israel on Lebanon, its people, economy and infrastructure” in
order to balance their criticism of Hezbollah and its supporters with statements
expressing criticism of Israel and concern for Arab civilians.28 Support for Lebanon
also has moved beyond rhetoric: Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have announced $70
million in donations to support the Lebanese government, and bank accounts have
been established to collect donations from other governments and concerned
individuals. On July 20, Saudi Crown Prince and Defense Minister Sultan bin
Abdulaziz stated that “we cannot let Israel pursue its actions,” and endorsed
proposals for sending an international force to Lebanon.
28 Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh) “King Abdullah chairs Cabinet’s session,” July 17, 2006.
The Saudi Cabinet statement criticized “Israel’s premeditated and repeated destructive
practices, its violations which disregard human rights, and its targeting and punishing of the
civilian and innocent people without consideration for international pacts, conventions and
norms.” The statement also called on “the world community, particularly the great powers
linked to the region by economic interests” to “shoulder the responsibility of protecting the
Lebanese people... rapidly move to halt the Israeli destructive war on Lebanon... end the
siege imposed on the Palestinian people and its legitimate institutions,” and “provide
support for the Lebanese government in its efforts to preserve Lebanon, maintain its
sovereignty and spread its authority.”

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CRS-15
U.S. Policy
U.S. Policy toward Hamas and Hezbollah29
The U.S. government has designated both Hamas and Hezbollah as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorist entities, making
the groups and their supporters subject to a number of economic and diplomatic
sanctions. The death of U.S. citizens including military personnel in numerous
Hamas and Hezbollah sponsored terrorist attacks since the early 1980s has hardened
the U.S. government’s official position toward both groups, in spite of their recent
moves toward participation in democratic politics in the Palestinian territories and
Lebanon. With regard to Hamas, the United States government has long held a
policy of non-engagement with the group’s officials in the Palestinian territories or
its strategic and financial leadership in Syria and other Arab countries. Principal U.S.
concerns include the organization’s use of terrorism, its refusal to recognize Israel’s
right to exist, and its rejection of the core principles outlined in the Israeli-Palestinian
agreements of the 1990s, and, more recently, the international Roadmap for a two-
state solution. With regard to Hezbollah, the U.S. policy of non-engagement has
traditionally been based on the group’s responsibility for attacks on U.S. citizens
including military and diplomatic personnel, its use of terrorist tactics against Israelis,
and its unwillingness to disarm under the terms of U.S. Security Council Resolution
1559.
Despite Hezbollah’s terrorist record, President Bush indicated, in comments to
journalists in March 2005, that the United States might accept Hezbollah as a
legitimate political force in Lebanon if it disarmed.30 As the current crisis
demonstrates, such disarmament did not occur and the Administration has maintained
its refusal to deal with Hezbollah-affiliated members of the Lebanese government
and parliament. The Administration has identified both groups as the primary
instigators of the current crisis and has indirectly identified the groups’ state sponsors
in Iran and Syria as equally culpable parties. Well documented U.S. animosity
toward both groups has led some U.S. and regional observers to speculate that U.S.
policy in the current crisis will be influenced by a desire to allow the Israeli military
to weaken both groups’ military and terrorist capabilities in line with broader U.S.
national security interests.
29 This section was prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Middle East Policy Analyst, on July
20, 2006.
30 In a joint appearance Jordan’s King Abdullah on March 15, 2005, President Bush said,
“I would hope that Hezbollah would prove that they’re not [a terrorist organization] by
laying down arms and not threatening peace.” Robin Wright, “In Mideast, Shiites May Be
Unlikely U.S. Allies,” Washington Post, March 16, 2005.

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CRS-16
Supporting Israeli-Palestinian Peace31
Every U.S. Administration in recent decades has vowed to advance the Arab-
Israeli peace process. The Bush Administration came to power shortly after the
failure of the Clinton Administration to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace after
intensive efforts at the Camp David summit and elsewhere and appeared to give the
issue a lower priority among U.S. foreign policy interests. In the aftermath of the
9/11 attacks on the United States, however, some analysts and U.S. allies argued that
lack of Arab-Israeli peace was contributing to the rise of Islamist extremism and the
Bush Administration appeared to agree somewhat. In October 2001, President Bush
became the first American president to state outright that “The idea of a Palestinian
state has always been part of a vision,” with the qualification, “so long as the right
of Israel to exist is respected.”32
As thinking evolved, the Administration adopted the position that a stable peace
is best achieved between democracies and that, therefore, the Palestinians were being
held back by the leadership of Yasir Arafat, whom U.S. and Israeli officials held
responsible for terrorism. On June 24, 2002, President Bush delivered a landmark
speech in which he called on Palestinians to elect new leaders “uncompromised by
terror” and to build a practicing democracy. Then, he said, the United States will
support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and certain aspects of
sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement is achieved. He added, “as we
make progress toward security, Israeli forces will have to withdraw to positions they
held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and (Israeli) settlement activity must stop.”
(After the outbreak of the Palestinian intifadah or uprising against Israeli occupation
in September 2000, Israeli forces had reoccupied much of the West Bank territories
from which they had withdrawn during the peace process of the 1990’s.)
The United States joined with the European Union (EU), United Nations (U.N.),
and Russia as the “Quartet” to flesh out a framework for achieving a comprehensive
peace in three phases called the “Roadmap” or, officially, “A Performance-Based
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.”33
Presented to the parties on April 30, 2003, the Roadmap remains the only existing
international peace plan and the main reference for U.S. policy makers. However,
no part of the Roadmap has ever been implemented.
In April 2004, President Bush exchanged letters with Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon that some suggest may prejudge a final settlement. The President noted
the need to take into account changed “realities on the ground, including already
existing major Israeli population centers (i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic
to expect the outcome of final status negotiations will be full and complete return to
the armistice lines of 1949.” The President also said that a solution to the refugee
issue would be found by settling Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, rather
31 This section was prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, on
July 20, 2006.
32 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov] for presidential statements.
33 For text, see [http://state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].

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CRS-17
than in Israel, thereby rejecting what the Palestinians believe is their “right of
return.”34 Nonetheless, the President and other Administration officials continued to
maintain that negotiations are the way to resolve all issues.
In the absence of a peace process, the United States supported Israel’s 2005
unilateral disengagement or withdrawal of settlers and forces from the Gaza Strip,
while characterizing it as a way to return to the Roadmap. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice encouraged Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to coordinate
disengagement with the Palestinians, and some coordination was undertaken to
enable a relatively peaceful disengagement to occur. With the advent of a Palestinian
government led by a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), Hamas,
Israel has proposed additional unilateral withdrawals from the West Bank, which it
terms “realignment,” or the dismantling of isolated settlements and their merger into
larger settlement blocs to the west of a security barrier that Israel has been
constructing in the West Bank. In May 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
presented his ideas for realignment to President Bush, saying “we cannot be held
hostage by a terrorist entity which refuses to change or to promote dialogue.”35 The
President said that Olmert’s ideas could lead to a two-state solution if a pathway to
progress on the Roadmap is not open in the period ahead and described Olmert’s
ideas as “bold.”
Unlike its predecessors, the Bush Administration has never appointed a special
envoy for the purpose of achieving Middle East peace. It has relied on individuals
for specific tasks, such as (Ret.) Gen. Anthony Zinni to try to obtain a cease-fire
during the intifadah, Lt. Gen. William Ward and subsequently Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton
as Middle East Security Coordinator, and former World Bank President James
Wolfensohn, who was the Quartet’s envoy to assist with Israel’s disengagement from
Gaza in 2005. In addition, National Security Council Middle East expert Elliott
Abrams and the incumbent Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs have
worked with regional governments and the Quartet at various times to further U.S.
interests; but they do not seem to have an overarching peace mission.
Concern for Lebanese Democracy,
Stability, and Independence36
The United States and Lebanon have traditionally enjoyed good relations, rooted
in long-standing contacts and interaction lasting over a number of years. Factors
contributing to this relationship include a large Lebanese-American community; the
pro-Western orientation of many Lebanese, particularly during the Cold War; cultural
34 For text of letters, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at [http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-
Apr-2004.htm].
35 After Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered a stroke in January 2006, Deputy Prime
Minister Olmert succeeded him. Olmert remained Prime Minister after his Kadima Party
won a plurality in the March 2006 parliamentary elections in israel.
36 The following sections were prepared by Alfred Prados, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs, on July 20, 2006.

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CRS-18
ties exemplified by the presence of U.S. universities in Lebanon; Lebanon’s position
as a partial buffer between Israel and Syria; Lebanon’s democratic and partially
Christian antecedents; and Lebanon’s historic role as a point of contact within the
Arab world. More recently, a ruinous 15-year civil war that created turmoil in
Lebanon between 1975 and 1990, turned Lebanon into a breeding ground for
terrorism, and periodically threatened to spill over into adjacent areas of the Middle
East illustrated the dangers to U.S. interests posed by instability in this small country.
The Bush Administration reacted strongly to the assassination of the late Prime
Minister Hariri in February 2005, criticized the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and
demanded the withdrawal of Syrian forces. The United States welcomed the
formation of a new Lebanese government after the withdrawal of Syrian forces from
Lebanon and largely free and fair parliamentary elections in May-June 2005. The
United States continued its efforts to support the reconstruction of Lebanon which
had begun after the 1975-1990 civil war; U.S. economic aid has hovered around $35
million per year since 2000, and the Administration has requested a small amount
($4.1 million) of military aid for fiscal year 2007, as Lebanon appeared to be
asserting its independence in the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal.
The outbreak of large-scale fighting between Israel and Hezbollah and
accompanying destruction of large parts of Lebanon’s newly rebuilt infrastructure
cast doubt on the future of U.S. support for Lebanon as the situation evolves. In a
broader sense, the conflict jeopardizes not only the long-term stability of Lebanon but
faces the Bush Administration with a basic dilemma. On one hand the
Administration is sympathetic to Israeli military action against a terrorist
organization; President Bush has spoken in favor of Israel’s right of self-defense. On
the other hand, the fighting deals a setback to Administration efforts to support the
rebuilding of democratic institutions in Lebanon. As one commentator put it, “the
two major agendas of his [Bush’s] presidency — anti-terrorism and the promotion
of democracy — are in danger of colliding with each other in Lebanon.”37
U.S.-Syrian Relations
The United States and Syria have long had an uneasy relationship. In recent
years, Syria has been at the forefront of a number of important U.S. policy issues in
the Middle East, and the two sides have been increasingly at odds on such issues as
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the former Syrian occupation of Lebanon, and the war on
terror. The United States has taken a keen interest in the Syrian regime’s behavior,
in particular demanding Syrian cooperation in monitoring the Iraqi-Syrian border in
order to curb the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq. In addition, following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and Administration efforts to foster
democracy into the Middle East region, the United States has spoken out against
authoritarian regimes like Syria and promoted reform in the “broader Middle East.”
Currently, an array of U.S. legislative provisions and executive directives
prohibit direct aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade between the two countries. The
most recent restrictions appear in the Syria Accountability Act of 2003, which
37 Michael Hirsh, “The Legacy On the Line,” Newsweek, July 24, 2006, p. 30.

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CRS-19
reinforces existing bans on aid and restrictions on trade, and contains a menu of
additional sanctions, from which the President must choose two. During the current
fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, some Members of Congress have suggested
the imposition of additional sanctions under the Syria Accountability Act or the
enactment of further legislative sanctions against Syria. Two bilateral issues are of
particular concern to U.S. policy makers at this time: terrorism and Syria’s role in
Lebanon.
Since 1979, Syria has appeared regularly on a list of countries identified by the
U.S. State Department as sponsors of international terrorism. Although not directly
implicated in terrorist acts since 1986, Syria has supported anti-Israel terrorist groups,
notably by providing safe haven for radical Palestinian groups (including Hamas)38
and by supplying the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia Hezbollah and allowing it to
conduct raids against Israeli targets from Hezbollah bases in southern Lebanon.
Syria’s continued involvement in shipping weapons to Hezbollah has continued to
be a serious issue in U.S.-Syrian relations and is viewed by U.S. officials as a major
contributing cause of the current conflict. Israeli officials point to their destruction
of a truck traveling from Syria to Lebanon and suspected of carrying weaponry for
Hezbollah as an example of the type of target they believe should be hit.
After the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents, U.S. officials reiterated their demands for a
full Syrian withdrawal of its military forces from Lebanon and recalled U.S.
Ambassador Margaret Scobey to Washington. Although Syrian forces did withdraw
in April 2005, some observers think Syrian officials have tried to circumvent the
effect of the withdrawal by maintaining their influence through contacts they have
acquired over the years in the Lebanese bureaucracy and security services.39 In this
connection, U.N. teams have said that no visible or significant Syrian intelligence
presence remained in Lebanon, but have qualified their statement by noting that
“distinctly close historical and other ties” between Syria and Lebanon must be
considered “when assessing a possibly ongoing influence of Syrian intelligence in
Lebanon.”40
Some believe that Syria’s prompt compliance with demands for its withdrawal
may have concealed a long-term plan to reestablish its influence and possibly its
presence in Lebanon if and when an opportunity arises. Commentators suggest that
Syria appears to be a central player in the present scenario and that U.S. efforts to
resolve the crisis may necessitate dealing with Syria at some stage. At present, they
point out, U.S. dealings with Syria are complicated by U.S. efforts to keep Syria
isolated and by lack of diplomatic contacts. (The U.S. Ambassador to Syria has not
returned to Damascus and the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is headed by a lower level
diplomat, although the Syrian Ambassador remains in Washington.) According to
38 Hamas leader Khalid Mish’al maintains his office in Damascus. Israeli officials have said
he and others in Syria deemed to be terrorists could be vulnerable to Israeli attack.
39 Robin Wright,”Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 31,
2005.
40 U.N. Security Council document S/2005/673, Paragraph 20.

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one observer, “After years spent edging Syrian troops out of Lebanon in a bid to win
independence for the beleaguered nation, Western leaders face the prospect of
pressing Damascus to reassert its influence with Islamic militants there to halt rocket
attacks on Israel and free Israeli prisoners.”41
In another vein, Syrian officials have pointed out that Syria has accommodated
the United States by issuing large numbers of visas to Americans fleeing from
Lebanon via Syria for evacuation to the United States.
U.S. Efforts to Contain Iran42
Well before the recent crisis between Israel and Hezbollah, the Administration’s
“National Security Strategy” document, released on March 16, 2006, said the United
States “may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.” The fact that
Hezbollah receives funding, training, and weapons from Iran is likely to solidify the
Administration’s assessment of the threat posed by Iran, even though Iran’s nuclear
program has been the main U.S. concern over the past three years.
To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues in attempting to
contain Iran — to prevent it from building weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or
from generating revenues that can be used to fund terrorist groups such as Hezbollah.
The Bush Administration also is supporting a long-term policy of changing Iran’s
regime by providing funds to pro-democracy and human rights activists inside and
outside Iran. However, the near-term Administration focus is on attempting to
prevent any Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough, and this concern has brought
diplomatic and economic strategies to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that
effort, the Bush Administration announced on May 31, 2006 that it would negotiate
with Iran in concert with U.S. allies; in past years the Bush Administration had only
limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. However, that diplomacy is
predicated on Iran accepting a package of incentives and disincentives, presented to
Iran on July 6 by the permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany, if
Iran suspends its uranium enrichment efforts. Iran has not accepted that offer to date,
raising the possibility of U.N. sanctions such as financial and travel restrictions on
Iranian officials and entities.
To date, the United States is the only country that has strict economic sanctions
on Iran, including a ban on U.S. trade with and investment in that country. Pending
legislation (H.R. 282, S. 333, and S. 2657) would renew or tighten a law that
sanctions foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector (Iran-Libya Sanctions Act or
ILSA). If diplomacy and international sanctions do not succeed, some advocate
military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a
nuclear-armed Iran.
41 Kim Murphy, “Crisis May Put Syria Back In Political Mix,” Los Angeles Times, July 18,
2006.
42 This section was prepared by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle East Affairs, on July
19, 2006. For more information, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy
Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Diplomatic Efforts
The United Nations43
U.N. Framework. The United Nations was created in 1945, with the primary
purpose of maintaining “international peace and security.” The U.N. Secretary-
General, Security Council, and the General Assembly all have major roles in
carrying out this mandate, especially as set forth under Chapters VI and VII of the
U.N. Charter. Under Chapter VI of the Charter, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” the
parties to any dispute are to seek a solution by peaceful means. Any U.N. member
may bring a dispute to the U.N. Security Council or to the Assembly. Under Chapter
VII of the Charter, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” the Security Council is empowered to determine the
existence of any threat, breach, or act, to make recommendations, or to decide
measures to be taken by the entire U.N. membership to maintain or bring about
international peace and security. Article 99 of the Charter authorizes the Secretary-
General to bring to the attention of the Council any matter which in his opinion may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. This article is viewed
as providing the foundation for the Secretary-General to use his “good offices,” either
directly or through the appointment of representatives or other officials to intercede,
mediate, or otherwise promote and work toward peaceful settlement of disputes.
The United Nations and the Current Crisis. The United Nations has been
engaged in broad Middle East crisis issues since the early days of its history. On July
13, 2006, in the aftermath of the Hezbollah kidnaping of two Israeli soldiers, the
Secretary-General condemned Hezbollah’s actions and sent a high-level three-
member team to the region to help defuse the crisis. The Security Council called on
all sides to cooperate with the team. 44 Also in the region is the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping operation that has been in
southern Lebanon since 1978.45 Its mandate, which includes some humanitarian
assistance, has reportedly been restricted by the current conflict.46 The current force,
consisting of approximately 1,990 troops, assisted by 50 military observers, will end
on July 31, 2006, unless renewed by the Security Council. U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, since the start of the crisis, has been on the phone and in contact with
leaders in the region and around the world. The Secretary-General and British Prime
Minister on July 17, 2006 suggested that an international stabilization force be set up
in southern Lebanon to give the Lebanese government time to organize and prepare
43 This section was prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations,
on July 20, 2006.
44 Current actors for Lebanon include Terje Roed-Larsen, the Secretary-General’s Special
Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004), and Geir O.
Pedersen, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon.
45 Its mandate was to confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore
international peace and security, and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the
return of its effective authority in the area.
46 See press releases issued from UNIFIL headquarters at [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
missions/unifil/unifilpress.htm].

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CRS-22
to extend its authority in the area. The force, envisioned to be authorized by the
Security Council, would be larger and with a more robust mandate or concept of
operations than UNIFIL, now in the area. The Security Council, on July 20, 2006,
met in closed session to hear reports from the Secretary-General and his senior-level
team.
The impact of the conflict on civilians in the region was an equally important
issue facing the United Nations. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
on July 19, 2006, called for protection of civilians. The U.N. Relief and Works
Agency, the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program and the
World Health Organization have all expressed concern over the conditions created
by the conflict and by the displacement of civilians from their homes and villages.
The European Union and France47
European governments and the European Union have condemned Hezbollah’s
kidnaping of Israeli soldiers as a provocation. At the same time, most European
governments believe that the United States is too close to Israel, to the detriment of
the peace process and regional stability. Some European observers believe that the
United States has lost its influence in the region due to the war in Iraq and to its
support for Israel, which have complicated Washington’s capacity to serve as an
interlocutor with Arab governments.48
The European Union is supporting efforts by Kofi Annan to prepare a U.N.
Security Council resolution that would call for a force to be deployed to the
Lebanese-Israeli border to provide security and monitor developments there. Italian
Prime Minister Prodi has proposed that an enhanced U.N. force total as many as
10,000 soldiers, and has said that his government will contribute to such a force. The
Finnish government, serving a six-month rotation as EU president, has said that the
EU as a whole would also contribute to such a force. The EU has called for a cease-
fire, and the release of Israeli soldiers held by Hezbollah and by Hamas. At the same
time, the EU is calling on Israel not to resort to “disproportionate action” in response
to the situation.49
Among European states, France has the closest political and historical
connections to Lebanon. Lebanon was a protectorate of France for a time after the
First World War, and France helped to shape the political structures still evident in
the country. In 2004, with the United States, France drafted United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1559, which calls for Lebanon’s full sovereignty and the
disarming and disbandment of Hezbollah and other militias there. The French
47 This section was prepared by Paul Gallis, Specialist in European Affairs, on July 20,
2006.
48 Chris Patten, “While Bush and Blair Fumble and Fiddle, Beirut Burns,” Financial Times,
July 19, 2006, p. 13; Eric Leser, “Washington, en S’alignant sur Israël, a Perdu son
Influence,” Le Monde, July 20, 2006, p.4.
49 “bush Doubts Lebanon Peace Plan,” Financial Times, July 18, 2006, p. 1; Statement from
EU Council meeting of July 17-18, 2006.

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CRS-23
government has repeatedly criticized Syria for its efforts to influence and destabilize
Lebanon. There has been some evolution in French statements since the beginning
of the current crisis in Lebanon. While France immediately condemned Hezbollah’s
seizure of two Israeli soldiers and called for full implementation of resolution 1559,
Paris at first criticized Israel’s military response as “disproportionate.” By July 18,
the French government called instead for a cease-fire at the border, and repeated its
call for Hezbollah to release the soldiers. President Chirac sent his prime minister
and foreign minister to Beirut on July 16 to demonstrate France’s support for the
Lebanese government. France has been evacuating its citizens and other Europeans,
as well as some U.S. citizens from Lebanon, and now has warships with 1,500
soldiers off the Lebanese coast to ensure the safety of French and other Europeans
seeking to leave Lebanon.50
Regional Governments51
Regional governments, particularly the Sunni Arab regimes of Egypt, Jordan,
and Saudi Arabia, were initially critical of Hezbollah’s attack against Israel. Overall,
these governments are largely suspicious of Iran’s growing influence in the region,
particularly among Shiites, as King Abdullah of Jordan has publicly warned against
the formation of a “Shiite crescent” extending from Iran to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
After the July 12 kidnaping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah, Sunni Arab
governments, in a rare public departure from Arab solidarity, quickly called
Hezbollah’s attack unhelpful to the pursuit of regional peace and stability. In a joint
statement, President Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah of Jordan stated that “The
region is being dragged along by an adventurism that does not serve the interests of
Arab affairs.... The necessity for all the parties in the region is to act responsibly and
not to move towards an escalation aimed at taking the region to a dangerous situation
and confrontations that will leave the countries and their peoples bearing the
consequences.”52
Nevertheless, Arab public opinion largely favors Hezbollah’s actions against
Israel, making Arab governments anxious to bring about a quick resolution to the
conflict with minimal Lebanese civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. The
moderate Sunni Arab regimes have called for an immediate cease-fire between Israel
and Hezbollah, the deployment of international peacekeepers along the
Israeli/Lebanese border, the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon,
and a prisoner exchange between the two sides.
While no major breakthroughs have been reported, Egypt has reportedly been
in contact with Israel and Syrian officials to assess the possibility of reaching a cease-
50 “Déclaration de M. Jacques Chirac... sur la Situation au Liban,” Office of the President,
July 19, 2006; “La France Soumet Ses Propositions sur le Liban au Conseil de Sécurité,”
Le Monde, July 18, 2006.
51 This section was prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Analyst in Middle East Policy, on July
20, 2006.
52 “Joint Statement by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak Jordanian King Abdullah II,
Agence France Presse, July 14, 2006.

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CRS-24
fire. Jordan’s King Abdullah has reportedly contacted U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice to emphasize the need for a U.S. role in brokering a cease-fire.
Overall, Arab governments may have limited influence over the warring parties and
may direct their efforts toward the United States in trying to secure its involvement
in negotiations. Egypt continues to serve as an intermediary between Israel and
Hamas, though it has considerably less influence with Syria to encourage a cease-fire
in the north.
Role of Congress
Legislation, Foreign Assistance, Sanctions,
and Equipment Use Restrictions
Congress has engaged and may continue to engage in U.S. efforts to resolve
crises in the Middle East using three distinct legislative tools: the appropriation of
foreign assistance, the passage of sanctions legislation, and the exercise of oversight
regarding legal restrictions on the use of U.S. military assistance by foreign
recipients. The United States has longstanding aid programs to countries in the
Middle East, including (among others) Israel, Lebanon, and since 1993, the
Palestinian Authority. Foreign assistance has been used to promote the peace process,
spur economic development, and in the case of Israel, to strengthen its defense
capabilities through military assistance. Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah — the
states and entities that Congress has noted for aggression against Israel, support for
terrorism, or terrorist activities in the current crises — are currently subject to fairly
comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions. In accordance with the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA), the U.S. Government places conditions on the use of defense
articles and defense services transferred by it to foreign recipients. Violation of these
conditions, when identified by the executive branch, can lead to the suspension of
deliveries or termination of the contracts for such defense items, among other things.
Israeli military activities have come under scrutiny pursuant to the AECA in the past
(see below).
Recent Legislation.53 In response to the recent crisis, Congress took swift
steps to express its views. The Senate, on July 18, 2006, agreed by voice vote to
S.Res. 534;54 in the House, three resolutions were introduced, also on July 18, and
a fourth on July 19, and referred to the Committee on International Relations.55
H.Res. 921 was brought to the floor on July 19, debated for nearly three hours, before
53 The following section was prepared by Dianne Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
Legislation, on July 21, 2006.
54 S.Res. 534, introduced on July 18, 2006, by Senator Frist and others, considered and
agreed to by voice vote the same day; Congressional Record of July 18, 2006, S7766-7767,
and S7692-7694.
55 Each introduced on July 18, 2006: H.Res. 921, by Representative Boehner and others;
H.Res. 922, by Representative Ackerman and others; and H.Res. 923, by Representative
Shaw. On July 19, 2006, H.Con.Res. 450, introduced by Representative Kucinich and
others.

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CRS-25
it was held over to the next day. It was agreed to on July 20, 2006, by a vote of 410
— 8 (with 4 voting “present”).56 While the four resolutions introduced on July 18
differ in that each emphasizes one aspect of the crisis over another, or characterizes
the relationships between and among Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah as varying
in strength and influence, the differences among the resolutions are only at the
margins. Generally, all the resolutions, in similar language to that found in S.Res.
534, reaffirm Congress’ “steadfast support for the State of Israel”, support “Israel’s
right of self-defense and...right to take appropriate action to deter aggression by
terrorist groups and their state sponsors”, and urge “the President to continue fully
supporting Israel as Israel exercises its right of self-defense in Lebanon and Gaza”.57
Congress at this time appears to be, for the most part, of one voice and supportive of
the President’s position on the current crises.58
Congress and Evacuation Costs for U.S. Citizens. In the early stages
of U.S. government-conducted or -supported evacuations of Americans from
Lebanon, the evacuees were required to sign promissory notes to assume financial
liability of the costs of their evacuation. Several Members of Congress objected to
this, noting that the law is ambiguous at best, and called on the U.S. Secretary of
State to waive the statutory requirements for reimbursement.59 On July 18, 2006,
after the Secretary of State consulted with some Members, the State Department
announced that such fees would be waived. For the time-being, congressional efforts
to legislate a suspension of the collecting of reimbursements from American
nationals for emergency evacuations seem to have been averted.
U.S. Foreign Assistance.60 The United States has longstanding aid programs
to countries in the Middle East, including (among others) Israel, Lebanon, and since
1993, the Palestinian Authority. Foreign assistance has been used to promote the
peace process, spur economic development, and in the case of Israel, to strengthen
its defense capabilities through military assistance.
56 Roll Call No. 391, July 20, 2006, at [http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2006/roll391.xml].
57 S.Res. 534, Resolved clauses (1), (2), and (3).
58 Some Members are reported to have drafted a resolution that would have cast Lebanon’s
responsibility differently than those resolutions agreed to, and would have called for
restraint from all sides. Flaherty, Anne Plummer. “House on Track to Voice Support for
Israel’s Military Campaign in Lebanon,” Associated Press, July 20, 2006. By contrast,
S.Res. 534 “urges all sides to protect innocent civilian life and infrastructure...”. H.Res. 921
“recognizes Israel’s longstanding commitment to minimizing civilian loss and welcomes
Israel’s continued efforts to prevent civilian casualties”. H.Con.Res. 450 calls on the
President to “appeal to all sides in the current crisis...for an immediate cessation of
violence.”
59 § 4(b)(2)(A) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended (22
U.S.C. 2671), authorizes the Secretary of State to expend funds to evacuate “U.S. citizens
or third-country nationals, on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable”
“when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster”.
60 This section was prepared by Connie Veillette, Analyst in Foreign Policy, on July 19,
2006.

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! Israel:61 Since 1949, the United States has provided more than $96
billion in various forms of assistance to Israel, and it is the largest
annual recipient of U.S. aid, outside of current operations in Iraq.
Israel receives various types of assistance, the two largest being
Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF). ESF, totaling an estimated $237.6 million in FY2006. FMF,
totaling an estimated $2.26 billion in FY2006 and expected to reach
$2.4 billion by FY2008, is used for defense purchases, 75% of which
is used to purchase U.S. manufactured defense articles. U.S.
assistance to Israel has strong support in Congress and is justified
based on the two countries’ historic ties, their generally shared
strategic goals in the Middle East and shared democratic values. Aid
proponents believe that Israel is a besieged ally that deserves U.S.
support in order to flourish in a hostile environment. Critics of
assistance believe that Israel often acts unilaterally in ways that may
not, on some occasions, be in the best interests of the United States.
! Lebanon:62 The United States provides modest amounts of assistance
to Lebanon. Annual funding for Lebanon has been maintained at
roughly $35 to $40 million since FY2001.63 ESF funding in FY2006
is an estimated $40 million, with $36 million proposed for FY2007.
FMF grants are an estimated $1 million in FY2006, but the FY2007
request is $4.8 million. According to DefenseNews.com, “The
United States has renewed its promise of military aid to Lebanon
with more concentration on improving Internal Security Forces (ISF)
to reduce the burden imposed on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and bolstering Lebanon’s capabilities to deal with internal threats.”64
With the Finance Minister of Lebanon estimating that damage to the
country’s infrastructure from the Israeli bombing campaign is $2
billion in the first week,65 it is conceivable that the United States
may be called upon to increase future assistance to Lebanon to help
with rebuilding. With continued military action, the damage
assessment is likely to increase.
61 For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy
M. Sharp, and CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East:
Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2007 Request, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
62 See also CRS Report RL33509, Lebanon, by Alfred B. Prados.
63 For FY2003, Congress directed that $10 million in assistance could not be obligated until
the President certified that the Lebanese Armed Forces had deployed to the internationally
recognized border with Israel, and that Lebanon was asserting its authority over the border
area. The provision was meant to compel Lebanon to exercise control of the border area
that was controlled by Hezbollah forces. Lebanon had resisted moving into the area until
Israel evacuated the disputed Shabaa Farms area. The funds were released in March 2004
after negotiations among the United States, Israel and Lebanon.
64 “U.S. Pledges More Aid to Lebanon in 2007, DefenseNews.com, July 10, 2006.
65 Roula Khalaf and Ferry Biedermann, “Lebanon Puts Cost of Raids at $2 Billion,”
Financial Times, July 18, 2006.

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! Palestinian Authority:66 Since the signing of the Oslo Accord in
1993, the United States has provided more than $1.8 billion in
economic assistance to the Palestinians, but with the formation of
the Hamas-led government in March 2006, the United States has
withheld both direct and indirect foreign aid to the Palestinians. For
FY2006, Congress appropriated $150 million in Economic Support
Funds, which has now been suspended. The FY2007 House-passed
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act provides no funding.
Sanctions.67 Syria, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah — the states and entities that
Congress has noted for aggression against Israel, support for terrorism, or terrorist
activities in the current crises — are currently subject to fairly comprehensive U.S.
economic sanctions. The Secretary of State designated Syria and Iran as state
sponsors of acts of international terrorism, in 1979 and 1984 respectively, thus
triggering a myriad of statutorily required restrictions and prohibitions on aid, non-
emergency agricultural aid, trade, support in the international banks, and other
economic transactions.68 Such a designation generally triggers a prohibition on all
66 For more information, see CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians,
by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.
67 For more detail on U.S. economic sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048,
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman. For Syria, see CRS
Report RL33487, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B. Prados.
68 § 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. 2405(j)), under
which the state sponsor of acts of international terrorism designation is made, authorizes the
curtailment of commercial trade in dual-use goods and technology to named countries. §
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371) prohibits most
foreign aid, non-emergency agricultural aid, peace corps programs, or Export-Import Bank
funding to designated countries. § 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22
U.S.C. 2780) prohibits government sales or leases of defense goods or defense services to
named countries. § 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985 (P.L. 99-83; 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) authorizes the President to ban the importation of
goods and services from any state found to support acts of international terrorism. § 1621
of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118; 22 U.S.C. 262p-4q), § 6 of the
Bretton Woods Agreements Act amendments, 1978 (P.L. 95-435; 22 U.S.C. 286e-11) each
state similar prohibitions relating to international bank programs. § 502(b)(2)(F) of the
Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462) requires the withholding of favorable trade
terms with cited countries. Annual foreign operations appropriations measures usually
restrict or prohibit most forms of aid to designated countries. Other legislation prohibits
certain transactions with countries found to be not cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism
efforts, and still other legislation prohibits or curtails economic relations with third countries
that aid terrorist-designated states.

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but the most basic of humanitarian exchanges.69 Please see Appendix C for detailed
information on sanctions.
Restrictions on the Use of U.S. Supplied Military Equipment.70 In
accordance with United States law, the U.S. Government places conditions on the use
of defense articles and defense services transferred by it to foreign recipients.
Violation of these conditions can lead to the suspension of deliveries or termination
of the contracts for such defense items, among other things. On occasion, the
President has indicated that such violations by foreign countries “may” have
occurred, raising the prospect that termination of deliveries to or imposition of other
penalties on such nations might take place. Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) sets the general standards for countries or international organizations
to be eligible to receive United States defense articles and defense services provided
under this act. It also sets express conditions on the uses to which these defense items
may be put. Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act states that U.S. defense
articles and defense services shall be sold to friendly countries “solely” for use in
“internal security,” for use in “legitimate self-defense,” to enable the recipient to
participate in “regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations,” to enable the recipient to participate in “collective
measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring
international peace and security,” and to enable the foreign military forces “in less
developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities
helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries.” Section
3(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to report promptly to
the Conress upon the receipt of information that a “substantial violation” described
in section 3(c)(1) of the AECA “may have occurred.” This Presidential report need
not reach any conclusion regarding the possible violation or provide any particular
data other than that necessary to illustrate that the President has received information
indicating a specific country may have engaged in a “substantial violation” of an
applicable agreement with the United States that governs the sale of U.S. defense
articles or services.
Questions raised regarding the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment by Israel
in Lebanon in June and July 1982 led the Reagan Administration to determine on
July 15, 1982, that Israel “may” have violated its July 23, 1952, Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement with the United States (TIAS 2675). Concerns centered on
whether or not Israel had used U.S.-supplied anti-personnel cluster bombs against
civilian targets during its military operations in Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. The
69 Some trade, albeit highly restricted, is allowed with Iran and Syria. U.S. exporters may,
for example, market agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical supplies to countries
designated as supporters of international terrorism under terms of the Trade Sanctions
Reform Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.). Suppliers may provide spare
parts related to civil air safety. U.S. persons may import and export informational material
and propaganda. And since 2000, in an attempt through trade diplomacy to open relations
with Iran, one may import nuts, dried fruit, caviar, and carpets from that country.
70 For more detailed information, see CRS Report RL30982, U.S. Defense Articles and
Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: Restrictions on their Use, by Richard F. Grimmett.

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pertinent segment of that 1952 agreement between Israel and the United States reads
as follows:
The Government of Israel assures the United States Government that such
equipment, materials, or services as may be acquired from the United States ...
are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its
legitimate self defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of
which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and
measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other
state.
It should be noted that none of the critical terms such as “internal security,”
“legitimate self-defense,” or “act of aggression” are defined within this 1952 U.S.-
Israeli agreement. On July 19, 1982, the Reagan Administration announced that it
would prohibit new exports of cluster bombs to Israel. This prohibition was lifted in
November 1988. In light of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor on June 7,
1981, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., reported to Congress on June 10,
1981, that the Israeli use of American-supplied military equipment in this raid “may”
have constituted a substantial violation of the applicable 1952 U.S.-Israeli agreement.
The President chose to exercise the authority set forth in sections 2 (b) and 42(e)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act to suspend “for the time being” the shipment of F-16
aircraft scheduled for delivery to Israel. However, on August 17, 1981, the Reagan
Administration lifted its suspension on deliveries to Israel and all of the planes were
transferred. On two other occasions — April 5, 1978, and August 7, 1979 — the
Carter Administration chose to find that the Israelis “may” have violated their 1952
agreement with the United States through the use of American-origin military
equipment in operations conducted in Lebanon. However, the U.S. did not suspend
or terminate any Israeli arms sales, credits, or deliveries in either of these cases.
In two notable instances, questions concerning the improper use by Israel of
U.S. weapons were raised, but the President expressly concluded that a violation of
the agreement regarding use of U.S. supplied equipment did not occur. On October
1, 1985, Israel used U.S.-supplied aircraft to bomb Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia. The Reagan Administration subsequently
stated that the Israeli raid was “understandable as an expression of self-defense,”
although the bombing itself “cannot be condoned.” On July 14, 1976, following the
Israeli rescue mission at Entebbe, Uganda in early July 1976, the Department of State
declared that Israel’s use of U.S.-supplied military equipment during that operation
was in accordance with the 1952 U.S.-Israeli agreement.

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Implications
Prospects for a Regional War71
With Israel fighting what amounts to a two-front war in the Gaza Strip and
Lebanon against two non-state actors, the possibility of a third front opening up may
depend largely on whether or not the fighting spreads to Syria. Observers have long
noted how Syria has used Hezbollah as a proxy to pressure Israel, shielding itself
from a direct military confrontation in which it would be at a technological and
operational disadvantage to the more advanced Israeli military. Syrian influence over
Hezbollah also has been wielded as a diplomatic chip in Syria’s back pocket, giving
the relatively weak state some amount of bargaining power in the region. Syria seeks
the return of the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, which it lost to Israel in the June
1967 War.72
Some analysts believe that the prospect of open war between Syria and Israel
grows more likely the longer the current conflict continues. Israel has warned Syria
that attacks could be imminent should the Syrian regime remain intransigent in
halting Hezbollah attacks or if Syria is found to be directly involved in re-supplying
Hezbollah with short-range rockets and long-range missiles. In recent days, Israel has
accused Syria of re-supplying Hezbollah with rockets, claiming to have struck one
convoy carrying rockets on its way to Lebanon from Syria.73 Israel has occasionally
struck targets inside Syria in order to forcibly remind Syria to tighten its grip over
Hezbollah and prevent it from launching attacks on Israel’s northern border. In
October 2003, Israel bombed an abandoned Palestinian terrorist training camp
northeast of Damascus.74 On July 13, 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad telephoned President Bashar al-Asad and declared that an attack on
Syria would be an attack on the Islamic world and would elicit a response.75
Some observers believe that Syrian interests are best served by remaining out
of the current conflict to the extent that it can. During past conflicts along the Israeli-
Lebanese border, U.S. officials sought Syrian cooperation in curtailing Hezbollah’s
militant activities. Although Syria no longer directly occupies Lebanon, many believe
that Syria can still use its considerable influence in the area to help broker a cease-
fire. However, analysts assert that the Bush Administration may be reluctant to seek
71 This section was prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Analyst in Middle East Policy, on July
20, 2006.
72 Technically, Israel and Syria are still at war, though both sides are bound by the 1974
Golan Heights disengagement agreement brokered by former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger following the 1973 October War.
73 “Olmert Sends Al-Asad ‘Tough Message; ‘US ‘Wouldn’t Be Sorry’ If Israel Hit Syria,”
Open Source Center Report in Hebrew, July 19, 2006, Document ID#
GMP20060719738003.
74 See Gary C. Gambill, “Implications of the Israeli Reprisal in Syria,” Middle East
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 5 No. 10 October 2003.
75 “Iran Playing Key Role in Israel-Lebanon Crisis,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
Newsline, Volume 10, Number 129 (18 July 2006).

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CRS-31
Syrian cooperation given recent U.S. policy of isolating Syria due to its perceived
support for the Iraqi insurgency and possible complicity in the assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Additional scenarios include widespread rioting among Palestinians in the West
Bank in sympathy with their fellow Palestinians in Gaza or token deployments of
fighters from other parts of the Muslim world to southern Lebanon to support
Hezbollah units engaged in the fighting. The prospect of renewed sectarian conflict
in Lebanon itself also is a possibility. Hezbollah’s unilateral decision to attack Israel,
dragging the whole of Lebanon into a conflict many groups did not desire, may lead
to the arming of factions politically opposed to Hezbollah. According to Michael
Young, commentator in the Lebanese newspaper The Daily Star, “When the diverse
religious communities decide the problem is that one side has the weapons while the
others have nothing but a choice to remain silent, Lebanon will break down, and it
could do so violently.”76
U.S. Homeland Security77
Hezbollah has a long history of attacking U.S. personnel and interests overseas;
however, it has never claimed to have carried out a terrorist attack in the United
States.78 Notwithstanding this fact, Hezbollah’s presence in the U.S. is noted by
Administration leaders with the organization “having the capability to strike inside
the U.S.”79 Hezbollah has concentrated its efforts in the United States on actions that
provide financial support to overseas operations and further the establishment of its
presence in the United States. In recent years a number of individuals suspected of
belonging to U.S.-based Hezbollah cells have been arrested and charged with crimes
ranging from credit card scams, trafficking in cigarettes, money laundering, evading
immigration laws, loan fraud, and the purchase of dual use technology equipment.
In February 2006, Director of National Intelligence Negroponte testified during the
Annual Threat Assessment Briefing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
that “Hezbollah, while focused on its agenda in Lebanon, has a worldwide support
network and is capable of attacks against U.S. interests if it feels its Iranian patron
is threatened.” Soon thereafter, in March, 2006, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Director Mueller announced that Hezbollah had succeeded in smuggling some
76 “The Meaning of a Hizbullah Victory,” The Daily Star (Beirut), July 20, 2006.
77 This section was prepared by John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and International
Crime, on July 20, 2006.
78 It should be noted past activities are not indicative of future actions. Al-Qaeda, prior to
the attacks on the homeland of September, 11, 2001, frequently attacked U.S. facilities and
personnel located overseas. There is little understanding of the types of actions undertaken
by the U.S. or Israel that would precipitate a terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland from
Hezbollah. Some analysts assert that should the current situation in the Middle East directly
threaten Iran’s sense of security or if Hezbollah is significantly degraded in its ability to
manage a worldwide presence and supporting activities, Hezbollah may launch terrorist
attacks against domestic and international U.S. targets as a sign of support to Iran or in
attempt to assert its relevancy in the worldwide perception of its organization.
79 Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, testimony before the
Senate Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, February 16, 2005.

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CRS-32
operatives across the Mexican border into the United States. He further noted that
“this was an occasion on which Hezbollah operatives were assisting others with some
association with Hezbollah in coming into the United States.” The Director testified
that this particular Hezbollah effort was dismantled and the individuals that had been
smuggled in were identified.80 Though the disruption of this group’s effort was
heralded as good news, some analysts are concerned that other Hezbollah human and
material smuggling efforts may not have been detected.
A January 2005, multi-year planning document authored by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) concludes that Hezbollah is unlikely to attack the U.S.
homeland. As recently as July 16, 2006, the DHS and FBI issued a joint threat
bulletin stating that although there was no specific or credible information suggesting
an imminent threat to the United States, “vigilance is urged during this heightened
state of tension in the Middle East.” Shortly thereafter, on July 18, 2006 Iranian
Hezbollah’s spokesman Mojtaba Bigdeli stated that “2000 volunteers have been
trained and are ready to be dispatched to every corner of the world to jeopardize
Israel and America’s interests. They only await the Supreme Leader’s green light to
take action. If America wants to ignite World War Three, we welcome it.”81 Media
reports indicate that in response to the recent military operations between Israel and
Lebanese Hezbollah, the FBI has increased surveillance and is re-energizing
investigations of known and suspected Hezbollah agents and supporters residing in
the U.S. Reflecting on the current situation in the Middle East, William Kowalski,
Assistant Special Agent In Charge of the FBI Field Office in Detroit, questioned “if
the situation escalates, will Hezbollah undertake an attack in the United States?”82
Possible Oil Market Disruption83
Crude oil is widely traded on an international basis. Trading takes place on
several well-recognized commodity exchanges, as well as among private parties. The
volatility of these markets — and the participation of speculators — has increased
during the past several years. As a result, oil markets are susceptible to traders’
perceptions of risk associated with geopolitical developments. Prices can fluctuate
greatly, for example, on developments in Israel and Lebanon. Many see recent
developments there as having led crude oil to a new price peak exceeding $76 per
barrel.
Traders see the world’s supply oil shipped through the Persian Gulf’s Strait of
Hormuz as potentially at risk, and this has a direct impact on prices. About 19 million
barrels per day (mbd) — 22% of the 85 mbd consumed globally — flows through the
Persian Gulf. Were a credible threat to be made to interdict shipping in the Strait,
trading markets would instantly re-price all the world’s oil upward. Additionally,
80 Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, testimony before the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Science,
State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies March 28, 2006.
81 Iran’s Hizbollah says ready to attack US and Israel, Reuters, 18 July, 2006.
82 FBI Eyes Hezbollah in U.S. as Tensions with Iran Rise, Reuters, July 18, 2006.
83 This section was prepared by Larry Kumins, Specialist in Energy Policy, on July 20, 2006.

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CRS-33
insurers of marine cargos transiting the waterway would react to the same risks,
increase insurance premiums, and add higher cost to consumers’ oil bills.
Another kind of risk that trading markets evaluate and price is the possibility
that Iran, or other producers, might unilaterally cut oil exports. Iran currently exports
about 2.7 mbd., about 3% of world consumption. Iran could theoretically halt all or
some part of its exports, although significant domestic financial constraints make this
less likely. Given the extremely limited amount of spare production capacity and the
tight balance between present supply and demand, even a partial cessation of exports
from Iran would have a profound impact on prices, which would likely set another
record high.

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CRS-34
Appendix A
Chronology of Recent Events84
WEDNESDAY, JULY 12
Ground war
In a cross-border raid, Hezbollah guerrillas seize two Israeli soldiers before retreating
back into Lebanon, insisting on a prisoner exchange and warning against
confrontation. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert describes the capture of the
soldiers as “an act of war.” Israel calls up reserve troops as it pledges a swift and
large-scale response to the Hezbollah attack.
Air war
Hezbollah fighters based in southern Lebanon launch Katyusha rockets across the
border with Israel, targeting the town of Shlomi and outposts in the Shib’aa Farms
area. In response Israeli planes bomb Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon.
Casualties
Eight Israeli soldiers are killed and two others are injured during fighting with
Hezbollah.
THURSDAY, JULY 13
Air war
After a night of Israeli air raids across southern Lebanon, Israeli jets strike the
runways at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport forcing the airport to close. As
night falls a Hezbollah-fired rocket hits Israel’s third-largest city, Haifa.
Casualties
Reports emerge of significant numbers of civilian casualties in Lebanese towns and
villages close to Israeli targets, with at least 35 people reported killed. Two Israeli
civilians are reported killed by rockets or mortar shells fired into Israel.
Diplomatic
U.S. President George W. Bush asserts that Israel has a right to defend itself from
attack, but France, Russia and the European Union call Israel’s use of force
“disproportionate”to the initial Hezbollah kidnaping operation.
FRIDAY, JULY 14
Air war
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah promises “open war” against Israel after
his offices in Beirut are bombed. The strikes are part of Israel’s ongoing operation
against targets across Lebanon. Bridges, roads and fuel depots are hit, with new
84 Prepared by Lyle Minter, using the following sources: BBC News at
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/defa
ult.stm] and The New York Times at [http://www.nytimes.com].

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CRS-35
strikes against the Beirut airport. The main highway connecting Beirut and
Damascus, Syria, is bombed. Off the coast of Lebanon, an Israeli ship is hit by an
Iranian-supplied Hezbollah missile guided by on-shore radar.
Casualties
The number of Lebanese civilians killed in the strikes rises above 50. Two Israelis
are killed by rocket strikes.
Diplomatic
The United Nations Security Council in an emergency meeting calls for an end to the
Israeli operation, saying it is causing the death of innocent civilians. Iran’s president
warns that any Israeli attack on Syria, seen as a sponsor of Hezbollah, will provoke
a “fierce response.”
SATURDAY, JULY 15
Air war
Israel expands its strikes in Lebanon, attacking a large number of targets including
radar installations in the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli. The headquarters of
Hezbollah are destroyed in southern Beirut. Hezbollah responds by firing Katyusha
rockets on the town of Tiberias in its deepest attack into Israel so far.
Casualties
Sixteen Lebanese fleeing a village on the Israeli border are killed when their vehicles
are struck with missiles on the road to the southern city of Tyre.
Diplomatic
Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa says the Middle East peace process is
dead and calls on the U.N. Security Council to tackle the crisis. Lebanon’s prime
minister says his country is a “disaster zone” and calls for international help.
Speaking ahead of the G-8 meeting in St Petersburg, U.S. President George W. Bush
blames Hezbollah for the crisis and urges Syria to put pressure on the militants.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, is critical of Israel’s bombing campaign, saying
that the “use of force should be balanced.”
SUNDAY, JULY 16
Air war
Hezbollah rockets kill eight Israelis in the coastal city of Haifa in the worst attack on
Israel since the fighting started. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert says that the
Haifa attack will have “far-reaching consequences.”
Casualties
Israeli air-raids kill at least 23 people in southern Lebanon, including 16 in the city
of Tyre. Eight Canadians of Lebanese origin are killed in a village about 33 miles
(50 kilometers) south of Beirut.
Diplomatic
Leaders of the G-8 nations meeting in St Petersburg blame extremist forces for the
crisis, but call on Israel to end military operations.

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CRS-36
MONDAY, JULY 17
Air war
Israel extends its air strikes to the north, killing at least 15 people in and around
Tripoli, Lebanon’s second-largest city. Other targets include the nearby port of
Abdeh; the capital, Beirut; and the eastern city of Baalbek. Hezbollah continues to
fire rockets into Israel. One hits a block of flats in Haifa, injuring at least four people.
In a barrage of Hezbollah rocket fire in the evening, one lands near a hospital in
Safed, reportedly injuring six people.
Casualties
Ten people are reportedly killed driving across a bridge south of Beirut as Israeli
missiles strike. Nine Lebanese soldiers die in an Israeli attack on the port of Abdeh.
Evacuation of foreign nationals
The international community steps up its evacuation of foreigners from Beirut, as
thousands of Lebanese flee their homes.
Diplomatic
In Israel, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert says the attacks will go on until two captured
Israeli soldiers are freed, Hezbollah is disarmed, and the Lebanese army controls the
south. U.N. chief Kofi Annan and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair suggest sending an
international force in Lebanon to halt the Hezbollah attacks, but Israel says it is too
soon to consider such a move. Lebanon’s President, Emile Lahoud, insists he will
never betray Hezbollah and its leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.
TUESDAY, JULY 18
Air war
Israeli strikes continue for a seventh day, again hitting southern Beirut and also the
southern coastal city of Tyre. Hezbollah rockets continue to target the Israeli port city
of Haifa.
Casualties
Eleven Lebanese soldiers die in an air attack on their barracks east of Beirut, while
nine bodies are pulled from the rubble of a building in the town of Aitaroun. The
number of Lebanese killed since the start of Israel’s offensive reaches about 230,
with 25 Israelis killed.
Evacuation of foreign nationals
One hundred and eighty Britons are evacuated from Beirut on the naval warship
HMS Gloucester. The group, which sails overnight to Cyprus, are the first of
thousands of U.K. citizens expected to be evacuated in the coming days. They join
1,600 Europeans transferred to Cyprus on Monday and Tuesday by France and Italy.
Diplomatic
The U.N. warns of a humanitarian disaster as Lebanese flee their homes, with air
strikes on roads and bridges hampering efforts to help them.

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CRS-37
WEDNESDAY, JULY 19
Ground war
Israeli troops cross into southern Lebanon to carry out what the army called
“restricted pinpoint attacks.” Two Israeli soldiers die in clashes with Hezbollah
fighters inside Lebanon.
Air war
Meanwhile, Israeli strikes hit Hezbollah positions in Beirut, as well as targets in
southern and eastern parts of the country. The Israeli military says its aircraft
dropped 23 tons of explosives in an evening raid on a bunker in south Beirut where
senior Hezbollah leaders, possibly including Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, were hiding.
But Hezbollah denies any of its “leaders or personnel” were killed and says the Israeli
raid hit a mosque under construction rather than a bunker. Rockets fired from
Lebanon strike the northern Israeli city of Haifa, and kill two children in the Israeli
Arab city of Nazareth. They are the first Arab Israelis to die in the rocket attacks.
Casualties
More than 60 Lebanese civilians are killed in raids — 12 in the southern village of
Srifa, near Tyre, six in the southern town of Nabatiyeh, and many more elsewhere in
the south as well as Baalbek in the east. At the border, two Israelis are killed in
clashes with Hezbollah militants, and two Israeli-Arab children are killed in
Nazareth.
Evacuation of foreign nationals
Thousands of people continue to flee Lebanon. A British warship arrives in Cyprus,
carrying the first 180 British citizens. A Norwegian ferry takes hundreds of
Norwegians, Swedes and Americans to Cyprus, while a U.S.-chartered ship docks in
Beirut to evacuate U.S. and Australian citizens.
Diplomatic
After meeting Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the European Union’s foreign
policy chief, Javier Solana, says he has seen the suffering of Lebanese civilians and
it is nothing to do with the battle against Hezbollah — it was “disproportionate.” But
Ms. Livni says the Israeli military response is proportionate to the threat posed by
Hezbollah to the entire region.
THURSDAY, JULY 20
Ground war
Heavy fighting erupts between Israeli troops and Hezbollah militants inside
Lebanon’s border with injuries on both sides, the Israeli military says.
Air war
Israel continues its bombing of Lebanon, carrying out 80 air strikes early in the day.
Evacuation of foreign nationals
The mass evacuation of foreign nationals continues. Forty US marines come ashore
to help U.S. citizens — the first presence of US troops in Lebanon since Hezbollah
militants blew up a marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, killing 241 personnel.

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CRS-38
Diplomatic efforts
The United Nations warns that without a truce allowing aid agencies to begin the
relief effort there will be a “catastrophe.” U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice are to meet later on Thursday to discuss the
crisis.
Appendix B
Chronology of Conflict on the Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian Border
December
Israeli commandos destroy 13 passenger planes at the Beirut airport, in
1968
reprisal for attack by Palestinian terrorists trained in Lebanon on an
Israeli airliner in Athens.
March 1978
Israel invades south Lebanon and sets up a roughly 10-km (6-mile)
occupation zone. Most troops withdraw within weeks, leaving a
security area held by Israel’s Lebanese Christian allies, the South
Lebanon Army (SLA).
January 1979
Israeli agents detonate a car bomb in west Beirut, killing Ali Hassan
Salameh, security chief of the Black September group. Salameh, known
as Abu Hassan, was one of the plotters of the Munich Olympics attack
against Israeli athletes in 1972.
June 1982
Terrorist and rocket attacks by Lebanon-based Palestinian groups and
Israeli counter-strikes culminate in Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Syrian
army ousted from Beirut and thousands of Palestinian guerrillas under
Yasser Arafat depart for Tunisia by sea.
September
Israel captures Beirut after pro-Israel Christian leader Bashir Gemayel,
1982
who had been elected president, is assassinated. Hundreds of civilians
in Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila are killed by
Christian militiamen allied with Israel.
May 1983
Israel and Lebanon sign peace agreement under U.S. patronage. Syria
opposes it, and it is never ratified.
March 1984
Peace agreement with Israel is cancelled and Lebanese President Amin
Gemayel breaks with Israel under Syrian pressure.
June 1985
Israel pulls back to a self-declared 15-km (9-mile) border security zone
in south Lebanon controlled by Israeli forces and their Lebanese militia
allies.
February
Israeli helicopter gunships rocket car convoy in south Lebanon, killing
1992
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Abbas Musawi, his wife and six-year-old son.
July 1993
Hezbollah launches rocket attacks on northern Israel. Israel unleashes
“Operation Accountability,” a week-long air, artillery and naval
operation.

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CRS-39
April 1996
After Hezbollah began shelling towns in northern Israel, Israel launched
“Operation Grapes of Wrath,” a 17-day campaign against Hezbollah
positions in south Lebanon. On April 18, Israeli artillery fire targeting
Hezbollah rocket crews falls in and around a U.N. refugee camp near
the village of Qana, killing 91 civilians and sparking international calls
for an immediate ceasefire, achieved on April 26.
June 1999
The South Lebanon Army retreats from the Jezzine enclave north of the
Israeli zone it held for 14 years.
May 2000
Israel ends 18-year occupation of south Lebanon. On June 18, 2000, the
U.N. Security Council certifies Israel’s withdrawal in accordance with
U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 (1978).
October 2003
After a suicide bombing in Haifa killed 20 Israelis, Israel launches air
strikes against an alleged terrorist training camp at Ain Saheb,
northwest of Damascus, Syria.
September
Months before the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister
2004
Rafiq Hariri, which was widely blamed on Syrian agents, the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 1559 calling for withdrawal of
“foreign forces” from Lebanon (Syria) and disarming of militia, such
as Hezbollah.
Source: Reuters, “Chronology - Israel’s interventions in Lebanon,” July 19, 2006.
Appendix C
U.S. Sanctions
Iran. Iran is also denied investment dollars intended for development of its
petroleum industry under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.85 Sanctions
available under this act, to be imposed on those who engage in unlawful investment
in Iran, include a prohibition on Export-Import Bank funds, prohibition on exports,
denial of loans from U.S. financial institutions, denial of rights to financial
institutions to participate as a dealer in U.S. debt instruments, denial of procurement
contracts, and any other transaction the President wishes to restrict if the authority to
do so also is stated under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA). Petroleum-related investments are restricted also by Executive Order, and
all new investments, regardless of the industry, are also restricted under the IEEPA.86
85 P.L. 104-172 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note). This act no longer applies to Libya, following the
President’s determination that the country was in compliance with terms of the act
(Presidential Determination No. 2004-30; 69 F.R. 24907; May 5, 2004).
86 Petroleum-related investments in Executive Order 12957 (March 15, 1995; 60 F.R. 14615;
50 U.S.C. 1701 note); other new investments in Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995; 60
F.R. 24757; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note); and a consolidation of earlier orders in Executive Order
13059 (August 19, 1997; 62 F.R. 44531; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

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Syria. Although Syria has been identified as a state sponsor of acts of
international terrorism since 1979, regulations that implement restrictions on trade
and transactions with that country are less restrictive than those that pertain to other
designated countries, reportedly because Syria is considered instrumental in the
Middle East peace process. Congress took this into account when it sent the Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 to the President.87
The act, triggered by increasingly organized and forceful efforts in Lebanon to shed
itself of foreign forces, and reflecting recent statements from the Bush
Administration targeting Syria’s involvement with terrorism, development and trade
of weapons of mass destruction, and support of the insurgency in Iraq, requires the
President to curtail trade and transactions until certain conditions are met. The act
requires the denial of export licenses for any item on the U.S. Munitions List
(USML) or Commerce Control List (CCL). The act also requires the President to
impose two or more of the following restrictions:88
! prohibit export of all products (except food and medicine, as made
exempt by the Trade Sanctions Reform Act of 2000);
! prohibit investment in Syria;
! restrict travel of Syrian diplomats to only the environs of
Washington, D.C. and the United Nations in New York;
! prohibit Syrian-owned air traffic in or over the United States;
! reduce diplomatic contact; and
! block transactions in property.
The President implemented terms of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act on May 11, 2004, by complying with the mandatory
restrictions on USML and CCL exports, and by prohibiting U.S. exports and
restricting Syrian air traffic.89
87 P.L. 108-175 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note).
88 The act provides the President the authority to waive the application of sanctions if he
finds it in the national security interest of the United States to do so (§ 5(b)).
89 Executive Order 13338 (69 F.R. 26751; May 13, 2004). The Order also cited the National
Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act as its underlying
statutory basis.

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Lebanon. For fiscal year 2003 and each fiscal year thereafter, of any
Economic Support Funds allocated or obligated to Lebanon, $10 million shall be
withheld:
unless and until the President certifies...that
(1) the armed forces of Lebanon have been deployed to the
international recognized border between Lebanon and Israel; and
(2) the Government of Lebanon is effectively asserting its
authority in the area in which such armed forces have been
deployed.90
To date, the President has not certified that these conditions have been met.
Hamas and Hezbollah. In 1995, the President identified Hamas and
Hezbollah as Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT) that threaten to disrupt the
Middle East peace process and authorized the blocking of all assets and of
transactions with persons associated with either organization.91 Subsequent
legislative and executive initiatives led to the creation of several other lists.
Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which
also authorizes deportation or exclusion from entry into the United States, generated
the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list.92 The President issued an Executive
Order to create the Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) list in the wake
of events of September 11, 2001.93 All these lists were subsequently consolidated
into one Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (the “SDN list”),
administered by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control in
2002.94 Hamas and Hezbollah, or individuals associated with each, are on each of
the lists.
90 § 1224 of the Security Assistance Act of 2002 (division B of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003; P.L. 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2346 note).
91 Executive Order 12947 (January 23, 1995; 60 F.R. 5079; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note). Each of
the executive orders cited in this paragraph are issued under the authority vested in the
President in the National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. ), and § 203
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1702).
92 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), particularly as
it amends the Immigration and Nationality Act at § 219 (8 U.S.C. 1189).
93 Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001; 66 F.R. 49079).
94 Office of Foreign Assets Control SDN list: [http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/sdn/index.shtml]

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