Order Code RS21592
Updated July 20, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iran’s Nuclear Program:
Recent Developments
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed
almost two decades’ worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive
activities in exchange for promises of assistance from Germany, France, and the UK
(EU-3), but negotiations broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the
IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement (GOV/2005/77) and voted
(GOV/2006/14) on February 4, 2006, to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council. The
Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in
February – reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider
construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol,
and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and
failed to meet the Security Council’s request. The IAEA reported little progress at the
end of April (GOV/2006/27). While the permanent members of the Security Council
plus Germany (P-5 +1) wait for positive Iranian action on their June 6th proposal, they
continue efforts to craft a tough U.N. resolution. This report will be updated as needed.
Background
Iran has had a nuclear program for close to 50 years, beginning with a research
reactor purchased from the United States in 1959. The Shah’s plan to build 23 nuclear
power reactors by the 1990s was regarded as grandiose, but not necessarily viewed as a
“back door” to a nuclear weapons program, possibly because Iran did not then seek the
technologies to enrich or reprocess its own fuel.1 There were a few suspicions of a
nuclear weapons program, but these abated in the decade between the Iranian 1979
1 Reports in the 1970s indicated that Iran sought laser enrichment technology in the United States
and conducted reprocessing-related experiments. Intelligence reports suggested that the Shah had
a secret group to work on nuclear weapons. See Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 204.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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revolution and the end of the Iran-Iraq war, both of which brought a halt to nuclear
activities. Iran’s current plans — to construct seven nuclear power plants (1000 MW
each) by 2025 — are still ambitious, particularly for a state with considerable oil and gas
reserves.2 Iran argues, as it did in the 1970s, that nuclear power is necessary for rising
domestic energy consumption, while oil and gas are needed to generate foreign currency.
Few observers believe that such an ambitious program is necessary or economic for Iran.
Iran has asserted repeatedly that its nuclear program is strictly peaceful, stating in
May 2003 that “we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons
inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran’s
defense doctrine.”3 Iranian officials have also insisted on their right to develop peaceful
uses of nuclear technology. Former President Khatami stated in March 2005 that ending
Iran’s uranium enrichment program is “completely unacceptable,” but that Iran would
provide “objective guarantees” of the peaceful uses of enrichment. Uranium enrichment
can be used for both peaceful (nuclear fuel) and military (nuclear weapons) uses. At the
heart of the debate lie two issues: doubt about Iran’s intentions, magnified by revelations
of almost two decades of clandestine activities, and whether the international community
can adequately verify the absence of enrichment for nuclear weapons or should further
restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies.
What Inspections Revealed
In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR) helped expose Iran’s
undeclared nuclear activities by providing information about nuclear sites at Natanz
(uranium enrichment) and Arak (heavy water production). In three years of intensive
inspections, the IAEA has revealed significant undeclared Iranian efforts in uranium
enrichment (including centrifuge, atomic vapor laser and molecular laser isotope
separation techniques) and separation of plutonium, as well as undeclared imported
material. Iranian officials have delayed inspections, changed explanations for
discrepancies, cleaned up facilities and in one case, Lavizan-Shian, razed a site.4
According to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, “Iran tried to cover up many
of their activities, and they learned the hard way.”5 Only in January 2005 did Iranian
officials share a copy of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s 1987 offer of a centrifuge
enrichment “starter kit.”6 In November 2005, Iran finally admitted that the Khan network
supplied it with information on casting and machining parts of nuclear weapons.7
2 See statement by Iran’s former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi at [http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec04/iran_9-27.html].
3 Statement by H.E. Mr. G. Ali Khoshroo, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International
Affairs, Second Session of the Prepcom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Apr. 29, 2003.
4 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran: Countdown to Showdown,” Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists, Nov./Dec. 2004, vol. 60, no. 6.
5 “Iran Was Offered Nuclear Parts,” Washington Post, Feb. 27, 2005.
6 Ibid.
7 “Iran ‘Hands Over Nuclear Cookbook,’” Nov. 18, 2005, Aljazeera.net
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Iran admitted in 2003 it conducted “bench scale” uranium conversion experiments
in the 1990s (required to be reported to the IAEA) and later, admitted that it used for those
experiments some safeguarded material that had been declared lost in other processes (a
safeguards violation). In February 2004, the IAEA concluded that, “given the size and
capacity of the equipment used, the possibility cannot be excluded that larger quantities
of nuclear material could have been involved than those declared.”8 The IAEA has found
Iran’s explanation that it needed to convert uranium into metal for its laser enrichment
program (revealed only in October 2003) credible. Yet, in January 2006, Iran revealed
that A.Q. Khan provided information on key processes related to weapons production,
including uranium conversion into metal and casting uranium metal hemispheres.
Enrichment Activities. Inspections revealed two enrichment plants at Natanz —
a pilot-scale facility (planned to have 1000 centrifuges) and a commercial-scale plant
under construction (planned to have 50,000 centrifuges). The pilot-scale plant started up
in June 2003 only to shut down after Iran suspended enrichment activities in December
2003. Iran’s resumption of enrichment-related activities in February 2006 has included
testing a 10-centrifuge cascade with uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6). This has been
conducted under IAEA safeguards, but constitutes small-scale enrichment of uranium
(See GOV/2006/15).9 On April 11, Iranian officials announced they had enriched
uranium to 3.5% U-235 in a cascade of 164 centrifuge machines.10
Construction on the commercial-scale plant was also suspended in 2003, but Iran
announced plans in April 2006 to install 3,000 centrifuges. Its construction partly
underground raises concerns about Iran’s intentions. IAEA concerns focused on whether
Iran introduced UF6 into the pilot-scale plant because it could have constituted
unsafeguarded enrichment, and because there were doubts about Iran’s ability to advance
to a production stage of centrifuge enrichment without such testing.11
Another key concern arose from environmental sampling by the IAEA that detected
highly enriched uranium (HEU) particles. Iranian officials asserted that HEU particles
found at the Natanz pilot plant in 2003 were contaminants from foreign centrifuge
assemblies, a first clue revealing the Pakistani A.Q. Khan network. Iran admitted to
enriching uranium to just 1.2%, while the particles sampled ranged from 36% to 70% U-
235. In October 2003, Iranian officials admitted they tested centrifuges at the Kalaye
Electric Company using UF6 between 1998 and 2002. IAEA report GOV/2006/15
reveals that components also came from another country besides Pakistan.
A third concern arose from Iran’s reluctance to provide information about its pursuit
of more sophisticated centrifuge and laser enrichment technology. Iran did not admit until
October 2003 that it also pursued a laser enrichment program beginning in the 1970s, and
did not admit that it possessed more advanced centrifuge designs (P-2) until asked by the
IAEA in January 2004. Iran insists that it received no P-1 or P-2 components after 1995,
but admitted it received a limited number of magnets for P-2 centrifuges in 2003 and in
8 Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2004/11, Feb. 24, 2004.
9 Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2006/15, Feb. 27, 2006.
10 “Nuclear Energy Facilitates Sustainable Development: Aqazadeh,” IRNA, Apr. 11, 2006.
11 Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003.
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April admitted to purchasing magnets suitable for the P-2 design. The IAEA continues
to investigate this issue.
Plutonium-Related Activities. In October 2003 Iran revealed that it had
conducted plutonium reprocessing experiments in a hot cell at the Tehran Nuclear
Research Center and estimated the amount separated as 200 micrograms. The IAEA
calculated that more plutonium would have been produced (about 100g) and Iran admitted
in May 2004 that it understated the amount. Inspections also revealed that Iran
experimented between 1989 and 1993 on irradiating bismuth, which can be used to
produce Polonium-210 for civilian purposes (for nuclear batteries) or in conjunction with
beryllium to create a neutron initiator for a nuclear weapon. However, polonium,
according to many observers, is not ideal for nuclear weapons purposes.
The heavy water program also has raised questions about Iran’s intentions. Iran first
told the IAEA that it planned to export heavy water, then suggested that the heavy water
would be used as a coolant and moderator for a planned IR-40 reactor for research and
development, radioisotope production, and training. However, Iran’s design information
for the facility, which omitted necessary hot cell equipment for producing radioisotopes,
conflicted with reports of Iran’s efforts to import hot cell equipment. Construction of the
IR-40 reactor has continued, despite the Board’s continued calls for a halt, although
Iranian officials predict that the reactor will not be operational until 2011.12 The heavy
water production plant may soon produce heavy water.13
Significance for a Nuclear Weapons Program
Iran is likely years away from producing weapons-grade plutonium or highly
enriched uranium. Vice Admiral Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2005 that Iran is expected to be able
to produce a weapon early next decade. According to one report, the 2005 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iran assesses that it will be 10 years before Iran has a bomb.14
That said, Iran has pursued three different methods of enriching uranium and has
experimented with separating plutonium, suggesting a steady accrual of expertise in
weapons-relevant areas, according to some observers. If Iran received the same nuclear
weapon design that A.Q. Khan gave Libya, the remaining technical hurdle (albeit the most
difficult) would be fissile material production. Covert production of fissile material could
be very difficult to detect, particularly at an undeclared facility. In other states, such as
North Korea, U.S. intelligence capabilities have found it difficult to locate clandestine
centrifuge facilities. The interim application of the Additional Protocol in Iran aided the
IAEA in verifying the absence of undeclared materials or facilities, but has been
suspended since February 2006. A solution endorsed by many is a complete ban of
enrichment and reprocessing in Iran to build confidence, with a collateral benefit of
demonstrating that noncompliance carries a price. Iran, so far, is resisting this approach.
12 GOV/2006/15.
13 For analysis, see [http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/arakconstruction.html].
14 “Iran is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb,” Washington Post, Aug. 2, 2005.
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Iran’s 3.5% enrichment of uranium in a 164-centrifuge cascade, at the least, indicates
Iran’s continued defiance of world opinion, and at most, a further step towards acquiring
a capability to make nuclear weapons. However, this laboratory-scale capability should
not be equated with an industrial scale capability, which requires the sustained operation
of centrifuges aligned in cascades containing many thousands of machines. Iran reportedly
has plans to install 3,000 centrifuges by the end of this year, with a goal of 54,000
centrifuges in future years.
Negotiating with Iran
Since 2003, negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program have essentially taken place
on two levels – with IAEA inspectors and at the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, and
with the European Union foreign ministers (known as the EU-3) of Germany, the UK, and
France. Some observers may view the second negotiating track as necessary because the
IAEA and Board of Governors failed to take decisive action against a clear pattern of
deception early on; others may view it as necessary because the short path leading from
a finding of noncompliance in Vienna to the U.N. Security Council is one that Iran clearly
sought to avoid. The voluntary measures Iran undertook through the EU-3 negotiations
allowed IAEA greater access for its inspectors than would otherwise be granted under
Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. At the same time, some observers would
argue that the second track of negotiations left Iran free to set the terms of engagement,
since its concessions were voluntary and political. While it is true that the EU-3 have been
unable to obtain Iran’s agreement to a permanent halt to uranium enrichment activities —
their key objective — such an objective could not have been pursued by the IAEA because
that is not in its mandate. To some observers, two years of negotiation and a temporary
shutdown have bought the world community two years of time to change Iran’s mind
about nuclear weapon aspirations.
The course of negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 has not been easy. In 2004,
Iran continued certain activities that called into question its October 2003 suspension,
leading to the November 2004 Paris agreement. In March 2005, Iran proposed running
its pilot-scale enrichment facility, which EU-3 negotiators rejected. In April 2005, Iran
said that unless negotiations progressed, it would start up its uranium conversion plant,
which it did in August 2005.15 Following Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory
remarks at the September 2005 U.N. Summit, the IAEA Board voted on resolution
GOV/2005/77, which found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.
For several months thereafter, Iran provided limited details on outstanding issues and
negotiated an offer to conduct uranium enrichment on Russian soil as an alternative to
indigenous production. In January 2006, Iran abandoned its voluntary suspension of
enrichment-related activities negotiations, as well as the interim application of the
Additional Protocol, prompting an emergency Board meeting. An IAEA report prepared
for the meeting linked, for the first time, a Khan network document in Iran’s possession
on uranium casting and machining to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components.16
Iran asserts that the Khan network provided the document on its own initiative.
15 INFCIRC/648, Communication dated 1 August 2005 received from the Permanent Mission of
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency. Available at [http://www.iaea.org].
16 See [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2006/heinonen31012006.pdf]
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Nonetheless, Article II of the NPT obligates Iran not to receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear explosives, so the question of whose initiative prompted transfer
of the document is moot. The February Board passed a resolution (GOV/2006/14, upon
a vote with no consensus) to report Iran to the Security Council.
The U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement on March 29 calling upon
Iran to reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of
its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and implement
transparency measures.17 Iran continued its enrichment activities, while claiming it was
cooperating with the IAEA.18 The IAEA reported to the U.N. Security Council
(GOV/2006/27) on April 28 that it was “unable to make progress in its efforts to provide
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.” Its June
8 report (GOV/2006/38) reported even less progress, given a lack of new information.
Next Steps
On June 6, 2006, the EU-3 and the United States offered Iran a new negotiating
proposal, which reportedly included incentives such as affirmation of Iran’s inalienable
right to peaceful nuclear energy, assistance in building state-of-the-art light water reactors
for Iran, fuel supply guarantees, dismissing U.N. Security Council consideration of Iran’s
NPT noncompliance, WTO membership, and an end to certain U.S. sanctions to allow Iran
to purchase agriculture appliances and Boeing aircraft parts.19 In return, Iran would
suspend enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities, resume implementation of the
Additional Protocol and fully cooperate with the IAEA. Iran’s moratorium could be
reviewed once several conditions had been met, including resolving all issues and
restoring international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The
proposal also outlined several measures targeted at Iran’s nuclear program should Iran not
agree to cooperate: a ban on nuclear-related exports, freeze of assets, travel/visa bans,
suspension of technical cooperation with the IAEA, a ban on investment in related entities,
and on Iranians studying abroad in nuclear and missile-related areas. Broader measures
could include an arms embargo, no support for WTO membership, and a general freeze
on assets of Iranian financial institutions.
Iran’s reaction thus far has been muted, first delaying a response until August and
then calling the proposal a “good starting point.” The United States, Russia, China,
France, Britain, and Germany continue to negotiate the contours of an acceptable Security
Council resolution should it be necessary. Russia and China reportedly oppose a
resolution with sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which they believe could
lead to military action. U.S., U.K. and French officials hope that a resolution under Article
41, which specifies measures “not involving the use of armed force,” will satisfy Russian
and Chinese objections. Several resolutions and bills in the U.S. Congress urge imposition
of sanctions, including H.Con.Res. 341, S.Res. 351 and H.Res. 782.
17 See [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm] for full text.
18 “EU says Iran Nuclear Announcement ‘Regrettable,’” Reuters, Apr. 12, 2006.
19 ABC News released some details, which have not been confirmed by official sources, in an
following article by Luis Martinez on June 6, 2006, “Nuclear ‘Carrots and Sticks’ for Iran:
Proposal Offers Rewards, Punishment to Convince Iran to Dump Enrichment Program.”