Order Code RL32965
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2005
and FY2006 Results for Active and Reserve
Component Enlisted Personnel
Updated July 18, 2006
Lawrence Kapp
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2005 and
FY2006 Results for Active and Reserve Component
Enlisted Personnel
Summary
This report provides a brief overview of the recruiting and retention rates for
Active and Reserve Component enlisted personnel during FY2005 and the first nine
months of FY2006. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the United States has launched several major military
operations which have dramatically increased the operations tempo of the military
services, required the large scale mobilization of reservists, and resulted in significant
battle casualties. These factors have been particularly applicable to the Army, Army
Reserve, and Army National Guard, which have shouldered the bulk of the
manpower burden associated with the occupation of Iraq. The Marine Corps and
Marine Corps Reserve have also been heavily involved in Iraq. Many observers have
expressed concern that these factors might lead to lower recruiting and retention
rates, thereby jeopardizing the vitality of today’s all-volunteer military. Recruiting
and retention results for FY2005 and FY2006 to date are summarized below. This
report will be updated as necessary.
FY2005 — Active Components. Concerns about the strength of Army recruiting
grew in FY2005, as the Army missed its goal for shipping new recruits to basic training
by a significant margin and failed to meet one of the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s)
key quality benchmarks. The other Services met their quantity goals with recruit quality
well above DOD standards. Retention remained generally strong for the Active
Components. Although the Navy failed to met two of its retention goals, this should be
interpreted in the light of the Navy’s force reduction plans.
FY2005 — Reserve Components. The Army National Guard, Army Reserve,
Air National Guard and Navy Reserve all failed to meet their recruit quantity goals
in FY2005. The Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve failed
to meet one or both of the DOD quality benchmarks. Attrition rates for the Reserve
Components have generally remained at acceptable levels, although the Army
National Guard slightly exceeded its attrition ceiling and four of the Reserve
Components saw modest increases in the rate of people leaving compared with
FY2004.
FY2006 — Active Components. All of the Services achieved their quantity
goals for the first nine months of FY2006, but concerns about Army recruit quality
have grown. Retention remained generally strong for all Services.
FY2006 — Reserve Components. Most of the Reserve Components –
including the Army National Guard and Army Reserve – met their quantity goals for
the first nine months of FY2006, although the Navy Reserve and Air National Guard
fell well short. Recruit quality was stable or increasing for nearly all the Reserve
Components in comparison to the first nine months of 2005, although the Army
National Guard, Army Reserve, and Navy Reserve may still finish the year below one
or both of the DOD quality benchmarks. Enlisted attrition rates appear to be at
acceptable levels for all the Reserve Components.

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Contents
Recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Active Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Reserve Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Active Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Reserve Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
List of Tables
Table 1. Accession Data (Quantity) for Active Component Enlisted
Personnel, FY2005 and FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 2. Accession Data (Quality) for Active Component Enlisted
Personnel, FY2005 and FY2006 (Non-Prior Service Enlistees only) . . . . . 12
Table 3. Recruiting Data (Quantity) for Reserve Component Enlisted
Personnel, FY2005 and FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table 4. Recruiting Data (Quality) for Reserve Component Enlisted
Personnel, FY2005 and FY2006 (Non-Prior Service Only) . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table 5. Active Component Enlisted Retention Data, FY2005 and FY2006 . . . 14
Table 6. Reserve Component Enlisted Attrition Data for FY2005 and
FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of
FY2005 and FY2006 Results for Active and
Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel
This report provides a brief overview of the recruiting and retention rates for
Active and Reserve Component1 enlisted personnel during FY2005 and the first nine
months of FY2006. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the United States has launched several major military
operations which have dramatically increased the operations tempo of the military
services, required the large scale mobilization of reservists, and resulted in significant
battle casualties. These factors have been particularly applicable to the Army, Army
Reserve, and Army National Guard which have shouldered the bulk of the manpower
burden associated with the occupation of Iraq. The Marine Corps and Marine Corps
Reserve have also been heavily involved in Iraq. Many observers have expressed
concern that these factors might lead to lower recruiting and retention rates, thereby
jeopardizing the vitality of today’s all-volunteer military.
Recruiting
Recruiting has been called the life blood of the military. Without a robust
ability to bring new members into the military, it would lack sufficient manpower to
carry out mission essential tasks in the near term and would lack a sufficient pool of
entry-level personnel to develop into the mid-level and upper-level leaders of the
future. To protect against this, the Active and Reserve Components set goals for new
1 The term “Active Components” refers to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
The term “Reserve Component” refers to the seven individual reserve components of the
armed forces: the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air
Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. This report, however, does not provide
recruiting and retention data for the Coast Guard Reserve, which normally operates as part
of the Department of Homeland Security, rather than the Department of Defense (DOD).

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CRS-2
recruit “accessions”2 each year. Officer and enlisted goals are set separately. There
are both “quantity”3 and “quality”4 goals.
Active Components
The recruiting data presented in Table 1 (all tables are at the end of this report)
show that, with the exception of the Army, all of the Active Components met their
enlisted accession quantity goals in FY2005. The Army fell short of its accession
quantity goal by 8%.
At the start of FY2005, there was great concern that the Army would not be able
to meet its quantity goal due to both the size of the goal (80,000 individuals) and the
small size of its Delayed Entry Pool (DEP).5 Typically, the Army likes to have about
35% of the coming year’s accession goal enrolled in the DEP; but at the start of
FY2005 the Army’s DEP was only about 18% of its FY2005 accession goal.6 The
Army planned to meet this challenge by increasing the size of its recruiting force by
nearly 20% and by offering more generous enlistment incentives. However, despite
these efforts, the Army experienced weak recruiting for a number of months in 2005.
2 In the case of the Active Component, “accessions” are individuals who have actually begun
their military service, as distinguished from those who have signed a contract to serve but
who have not yet begun their service. Accession for Active Component personnel usually
occurs when an individual is “shipped” to basic training. For the Reserve Components, the
term has a broader meaning: accession can occur shortly after an individual signs a contract,
when he or she is “shipped” to basic training, or when a servicemember transfers from an
Active Component to a Reserve Component.
3 This quantity goal is normally based primarily on the difference between the
congressionally authorized end strength of the Component for a given fiscal year and the
projected number of currently serving personnel that Component will retain through the end
of the year. Officer and enlisted accession goals are set separately. To simplify somewhat,
if a Component has an authorized end strength of 200,000 enlisted personnel in a given year,
and it projects that it will retain 175,000 of its current enlisted members through the year,
it will set a goal of bringing in approximately 25,000 new enlisted recruits for that year
(actually, the goal will be slightly higher to account for those new recruits who are
discharged early, usually while in initial entry training). The actual number of new enlisted
recruits a Component needs, however, may change during the year as new projections are
made about the retention of currently serving enlisted personnel or if the Component must
increase or decrease the total size of its force.
4 DOD measures enlisted recruit “quality” based on two criteria: graduation from high
school and score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Since FY1993, DOD’s
benchmarks for recruit quality stipulate that at least 90% of new recruits must be high
school diploma graduates and at least 60% must score above average on the AFQT.
5 The DEP is made up of those individuals who have signed a contract to join the military
at a future date, up to one year in advance, but who have not yet “shipped” to basic training.
In FY2004 the Army achieved its accession quantity goal in part by drawing heavily from
its DEP.
6 One reason for this reduction in the size of the DEP was the decision to increase the size
of the Army in early 2004,which created a need to send more people to basic training than
had previously been planned; another reason was that the Army missed its FY2004 goal for
new recruit contracts by 15%, thus undermining its ability to refill the DEP.

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CRS-3
It missed its monthly accession goals from February through May. Additionally,
from January through May 2005, the Army was only able to meet about 58% of its
goal for new contracts, thereby undermining its ability to replenish its DEP.7
Subsequently, the Army showed considerable improvement, meeting its quantity
goals every month from June through September. Additionally, in those same
months, the Army met over 80% of its recruit contract goal.8
Despite this improved performance towards the end of the fiscal year, the Army
failed to meet its overall quantity goal for FY2005. This undercut its efforts to
increase the size of its Active Component force.9 At the start of FY2005, there were
414,438 enlisted personnel in the Army; at the end of FY2005 there were 406,923.10
Additionally, the Army’s recruiting troubles resulted in a DEP at the start of FY2006
which was about 12% of the size of its FY2006 accession goal, an exceptionally low
figure.11
The Army’s accession goal for FY2006 is again 80,000 individuals. Achieving
this goal will be quite challenging, especially in light of the small DEP the Army
started with. However, the Army has improved its recruiting success in the first nine
months of FY2006 in comparison to FY2005. As Table 1 shows, the Army has
exceeded its goal of 49,700 recruits in the first nine months of FY2006 by about
2,000. More importantly, it has accessed nearly 4,500 more recruits in the first nine
7 While the standard measure of recruiting success for the various Components is the
achievement of their accessions goals, the ability to achieve contract goals is often seen as
a “leading indicator” of recruiting strength or weakness; it also has a direct impact on the
size of the DEP. The Army’s goal for new enlistment contracts in FY2005 was 111,929.
The actual number of new contracts it achieved was 77,348, a shortfall of 34,581 (31%).
The shortfall was most pronounced between January and May of 2005, when it achieved
28,411 contracts against a goal of 49,100 (58%).
8 From June to September 2005, the Army achieved 82% of its contract goal (30,530
contracts against a goal of 37,423). From October 2005 to June 2006, the Army achieved
79% of its contract goal (67,176 contracts against a goal of 85,390).
9 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-136, section 401)
authorized an end-strength of 482,400 for the Army, up from 480,000 in FY2003. In
January, 2004, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker announced that
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had authorized a temporary increase in Army
strength up to 512,400 in order to facilitate restructuring of the Army. Subsequently, the
Army increased its goal for new accessions in FY2004 from 72,500 to 77,000. The Ronald
W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (P.L. 108-375, sections
401 and 403), authorized an end-strength for the Army of 502,400 and provided the
Secretary of Defense with the authority to increase Army end-strength to 512,400 during
FY2005-FY2009 for certain purposes. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006
(P.L. 109-163, sections 401 and 403) authorized an Army end-strength of 512,400 and
provided the Secretary of Defense with the authority to increase this by 20,000 more for
certain purposes in FY2007-FY2009.
10 Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, available at
[http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms1.pdf].
11 However, this was substantially higher than the 9% DEP level which was predicted by
some during the Spring of 2005.

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CRS-4
months of FY2006 than it did during the same period of FY2005.12 However, while
the Army has shown improved recruiting performance with respect to quantity, there
are growing concerns about the quality of its new recruits.
The recruiting data presented in Table 2 show the performance of the Active
Components with respect to the Department of Defense (DOD) enlisted accession
quality benchmarks. The two principal DOD quality benchmarks are the percentage
of non-prior service enlistees who are high school diploma graduates (HSDG) and
the percentage who score above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT Categories I-IIIA). With the exception of the Army, all of the Active
Components exceeded the DOD quality benchmarks in FY2005, often by significant
margins.
The FY2005 quality metrics for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps were
little changed from those of FY2004. However, FY2005 saw a clear drop in recruit
quality for the Army in comparison to FY2004. In FY2004, 92% of Army recruits
were high school diploma graduates, but in FY2005 only 87% were. This latter
figure was below the DOD benchmark of 90%.13 Additionally, the proportion of
Army recruits who scored above average on the AFQT dropped from 72% in FY2004
to 67% in FY2005. While this proportion is well above the DOD benchmark of 60%
and is similar to the rate experienced by the Army from 1995-2001, the size of the
decline is noteworthy. Also, in FY2005 the Army accepted a much higher proportion
of “Category IV” recruits – that is, recruits who score in the 10th through 30th
percentile of the AFQT. In FY2004, only 0.5% of Army recruits had AFQT scores
in Category IV; in FY2005, that proportion increased to 3.9%, just shy of the DOD
maximum of 4%.14
The data for the first nine months of FY2006 indicate a continuing decline in
recruit quality for the Army. So far, only 82% of Army accessions are high school
diploma graduates and just 62% scored above average on the AFQT.15 However, it
12 Specifically, the Army had 51,612 accessions in the first nine months of FY2006 versus
47,122 in the same months of FY2005. For the purposes of assessing improvements in
Army recruiting, this comparison is more important than the comparison of “goal versus
achieved” because the Army substantially changed the allocation of its monthly accession
goals in FY2006, weighting them more heavily towards the end of the fiscal year.
Specifically, in FY2005, the accessions goal for the first nine months was 54,935, while in
FY2006 it was 49,700 for those months. Had the FY2005 monthly goals remained in place
in FY2006, the Army would currently be about 3,300 short of goal. This reallocation of
goals will make the last three months of FY2006 particularly important – and challenging
– for the Army.
13 The last year in which less than 90% of the Army’s accessions were high school diploma
gr a d u a t e s w a s 1 9 8 3 . P a s t r e c r u i t q u a l i t y d a t a a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/recqual04.pdf]. Past recruit quantity data available at
[http://www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/numgoals04.pdf].
14 DOD Instruction 1145.01, Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower, September 20,
2005, paragraph 4.1.
15 Tom Bowman, Baltimore Sun, “Army Met Recruiting Goal in November,” December 16,
(continued...)

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should be noted that Army accessions to date are about two-thirds of the total
accession goal for the year. Therefore, the Army certainly has the opportunity to
improve recruit quality in the last quarter of this fiscal year.
Reserve Components
The recruiting data show that only two of the Reserve Components – the Marine
Corps Reserve and the Air Force Reserve – met their enlisted quantity goals in
FY2005 (see Table 3). The Army National Guard missed its quantity goal by 20%,
the Army Reserve missed its goal by 16%, the Navy Reserve missed its goal by 12%,
and the Air National Guard missed its goal by 14%.
The Army National Guard’s recruiting problem was the most serious because
its shortfall was the largest and followed its failure to meet its quantity goal in
FY2003 and FY2004.16 The Air National Guard’s shortfall was also quite substantial
and followed its failure to meet its recruit quantity goal in FY2004.17 While the
Army Reserve did meet its quantity goal in FY2004, its failure to do so in FY2005
was a cause for concern, owing both to the magnitude of the shortfall and in light of
the similar recruiting difficulties faced by the Army and Army National Guard. The
significance of the Navy Reserve’s recruit quantity shortfall should be assessed in
light of current plans to reduce the size of the Navy Reserve.18
The FY2005 recruiting shortfalls of the Army National Guard and the Army
Reserve were particularly noteworthy as these shortfalls have inhibited them from
achieving the end-strength levels authorized by Congress for FY2005.19 As of
September 2005, the actual personnel strength of the Army National Guard was
333,177 — about 95% of its authorized end-strength of 350,000. The actual strength
15 (...continued)
2005. The article, however, cites an Army official stating that they would not have more
than 4% of recruits from Category IV by the end of the year.
16 In FY2004, the Army National Guard fell short of its recruit quantity goal of 56,002 by
7,209, or 13%. In FY2003, the Army National Guard fell short of its recruit quantity goal
of 62,000 by 7,798, or 13%.
17 In FY2004, the Air National Guard missed its recruit quantity goal of 8,842 by 566, or
6%.
18 The authorized end-strength for the Naval Reserve in FY2005 was 83,400 (2,500 less than
it was in FY2004), while its authorized end-strength for FY2006 is 73,100. Both the House
and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 specify an
authorized end-strength for the Naval Reserve in FY2007 of 71,300.
19 The term “end-strength” refers to the authorized strength of a specified branch of the
military at the end of a given fiscal year. (The term authorized strength means “the largest
number of members authorized to be in an armed force, a component, a branch, a grade, or
any other category of the armed forces”). The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 stipulated an authorized strength for the Army
National Guard of 350,000 as of September 30, 2005. (P.L. 108-375, sec. 411, October 28,
2004). While end-strengths for the reserve components are maximum strength levels, not
minimum strength levels, the inability to maintain a force at the authorized end-strength
level can be an indicator of strength management problems.

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CRS-6
of the Army Reserve was 189,005 in September, 2005 — about 92% of its authorized
end-strength of 205,000.20

In the first nine months of FY2006, the Army National Guard dramatically
improved its ability to meet its quantity goal, achieving 103% of a goal that was
dramatically higher than its FY2005 goal. This strong recruiting performance has
allowed the Army National Guard to reverse the troubling decline in its personnel
strength mentioned previously. As a result, by June 30, 2006, the Army National
Guard had increased its strength to 339,844 – about 97% of its FY2006 authorized
end-strength.
The Army Reserve has also shown improvement in its ability to meet its
quantity goals, achieving 100.7% of a goal that was also much higher than its
FY2005 goal. Despite this, the personnel strength of the Army Reserve continues to
decline, dropping to 186,140 by June 20, 2006 – about 91% of its FY2006 authorized
end-strength. This may mean that the Army Reserve needs to set its recruit quantity
goal higher still if it hopes to build up its personnel strength to congressionally
authorized levels.
The Marine Corps Reserve and the Air Force Reserve continue to succeed in
meeting their quantity goals in the first nine months of FY2006, while the Air
National Guard continues to have difficulty in meeting its goal. Again, recruit
quantity shortfalls for the Navy Reserve should be interpreted in light of current plans
to reduce the size of the Navy Reserve.21

In addition to difficulties meeting recruit quantity goals in FY2005, the data
show that four of the Reserve Components – the Army National Guard, the Army
Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, and the Navy Reserve – failed to meet one or both
of the DOD quality benchmarks in FY2005 (see Table 4). This was a substantial
change from FY2004, when only the Army National Guard failed to meet them.22 A
comparison with FY2004 shows other negative trends in these metrics, especially for
the Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve.23 On the other hand, there were some
20 Figures include both officer and enlisted personnel. The strength of the Naval Reserve in
September, 2005, was 76,473 — 92% of its authorized end-strength for FY2005 of 83,400
— but the Navy plans to reduce the size of the Naval Reserve substantially over the next two
years (see footnote 18). The Marine Corps Reserve was at 101% of authorized end-strength
in September, 2005, while the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve were about
99.5% of their authorized end-strengths. All references to end-strength in this paragraph are
for the Selected Reserve elements of the respective Reserve Components.
21 See footnote 18.
22 In FY2004, 83% of Army National Guard accessions were high school diploma graduates,
while 57% scored above average on the AFQT. The Navy Reserve may also have failed to
meet one or both DOD quality benchmarks in FY2004; however, this is not clear due to the
inaccurate accounting process which the Navy Reserve used at the time. In FY2005, the
Navy Reserve modified their accounting process to correct this problem.
23 From FY2004 to FY2005, the proportion of recruits with high school diplomas dropped
from 91% to 88% in the Army Reserve and from 91% to 87% in the Air Force Reserve.
(continued...)

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CRS-7
improvements in FY2005 in comparison to FY2004: the Air National Guard
significantly increased the proportion of its recruits with high school diplomas and
the Marine Corps Reserve saw a slight increase in this metric.24
Data for the first nine months of FY2006 appear to show increasing accession
quality for the reserve components. Specifically, the proportion of new accessions
with high school diplomas appears to be increasing or stable for all of the reserve
components, and the proportion of new accessions with above average scores on the
AFQT appears to be stable or rising for all the reserve components except the Army
Reserve, which saw a drop in this metric from 67% to 59%. These improvements
may not be enough, however, to bring all of the reserve components above the DOD
quality benchmarks by the end of the year.
Analysis
Military recruiting in FY2005 experienced some very substantial shortcomings,
both in terms of quantity and quality, particularly with respect to the active Army and
several of the reserve components. So far, the data for FY2006 indicate substantial
improvement by the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve in meeting
their quantity goals; however, some concerns about quality remain, especially with
respect to the active Army.
There are a number of likely causes for these recruiting difficulties. One factor
that can have a powerful impact on military recruiting is the state of the economy.
Military recruiting is generally easier in times of high unemployment and more
difficult in times of low unemployment. Historical data indicate that unemployment
has been dropping in recent years, falling from 6.0% in 2003 to 4.6% as of June,
2006.25 Institutions of higher education also compete with the military for
manpower. Over the past 25 years, the proportion of high school graduates going
directly on to college has increased from about half to about two-thirds.26 This
historically high proportion of college-bound youth reduces the size of the pool
which military recruiters have traditionally targeted: young people who have recently
graduated from high school.
23 (...continued)
From FY2004 to FY2005, the proportion of recruits who scored above average on the
AFQT dropped from 70% to 67% in the Army Reserve, from 78% to 76% in the Marine
Corps Reserve, from 79% to 72% in the Air National Guard, and from 73% to 69% in the
Air Force Reserve. Due to changes in the way the Navy Reserve calculates the quality
metrics for its recruits that began in FY2005, an accurate quality comparison cannot
currently be made for the Navy Reserve between FY2005 and FY2004.
24 From FY2004 to FY2005, the proportion of recruits with high school diplomas increased
from 79% to 91% in the Air National Guard, and from 95% to 96% in the Marine Corps
Reserve.
25 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at [http://www.bls.gov/]
26 Department of Education, Digest of Education Statistics: 2003, Table 186.

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However, while these factors contribute to a challenging recruiting environment
in general, it is important to recognize that recruiting shortfalls are most severe in the
Army and its Reserve Components — the Army Reserve and the Army National
Guard. Thus, in addition to broad social and economic forces which are likely
having a dampening effect on recruiting generally, there are also other factors which
appear to be undercutting recruiting for the Army in particular.
One factor likely affecting recruiting for the Army, Army Reserve, and Army
National Guard is the major role they are playing in the Iraq conflict. Recent survey
research indicates that the certain segments of the adult population — especially
women and African Americans — have become less likely to recommend military
service to young people since the war in Iraq began.27 As a major source of recruits
for the Army and its Reserve Components are young people without prior military
service (primarily those who have recently graduated from high school), negative
attitudes towards military service among those adults who are youth
“influencers”28can have a powerful effect. There have been reports that Army
recruiters are having difficulty signing up high school seniors, especially those below
the age of 18, who require parental consent to enlist. Even among those old enough
to enlist without parental consent, opposition to military service by parents or other
influencers may discourage them from joining.29
Another factor affecting recruiting for the Army and its Reserve Components
is the ongoing effort to increase the size of the active Army. In order to expand, the
active Army has increased its goal for new recruits from 73,800 in 2003 to 80,000 in
2005 and 2006, thus providing active Army recruiters with a goal that is more
difficult to reach. Additionally, this affects Army Reserve Component recruiting as
well, as the active Army is now competing more vigorously with the Army Reserve
and Army National Guard for some of the same potential recruits.
The comparatively high rates of mobilization in the Army Reserve Components
in recent years may also be undercutting their recruiting efforts. A major source of
recruits for both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard is people leaving
the active Army. These are people who want to embark on a civilian career but still
27 For example, in a November 2002 survey, 60% of the men and 54% of the women
surveyed indicated that they would recommend military service to a young person who came
to them for advice. By May 2004, those figures had dropped to 57% for men and 37% for
women. Also in the November 2002 survey, 59% of white respondents, 53% of African
American respondents, and 51% of Hispanic respondents indicated they would recommend
military service to a young person who came to them for advice. By May 2004, the figures
had changed to 47% for white respondents, 28% of African American respondents, and 56%
for Hispanic respondents. See Mothers’ Attitudes Towards Enlistment, produced by the
Department of Defense’s Joint Advertising, Market Research, and Studies Program, May
2004.
28 Influencers are those adults who regularly interact with youth, such as parents, coaches,
teachers, and mentors.
29 See for example: Washington Post, “Schools and Military Face Off,” June 19, 2005, A3;
New York Times, “Growing Problems for Military Recruiters: Parents,” June 3, 2005, A1;
USA Today, “Army and Marines Shift Focus to Wary Parents,” April 5, 2005, A1.

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CRS-9
wish to maintain their military affiliation and certain military benefits. However, the
flow of enlisted personnel from the active Army to the Army National Guard
decreased in recent years, dropping from 6,275 in FY2002 to 3,104 in FY2004. This
may be partially due to concerns about being promptly called back to active service
via mobilization orders and deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, or some other location.
On the other hand, this explanation is weakened by data showing that the number of
people transferring from the active Army into the Army Reserve actually increased
during this time frame, from 2,951 to 3,472.30
Retention
The term retention refers to the rate at which military personnel voluntarily
choose to stay in the military after their original obligated term of service has ended.31
Imbalances in the retention rate can cause problems within the military personnel
system.32 A common retention concern is that too few people will stay in, thereby
creating a shortage of experienced leaders, decreasing military efficiency and
lowering job satisfaction.
Active Components
The retention data presented in Table 5 show that the Active Components met
or exceeded nearly all their goals for enlisted personnel in FY2005. Of particular
note is the strong retention performance of the Army and Marine Corps, both of
which are heavily involved in combat operations in Iraq. Both of these services
exceeded their retention goals in FY2005, often by large margins; the Army, in fact,
reenlisted over 9,000 more soldiers in FY2005 than it did in FY2004. The Navy was
the only service which failed to meet a retention goal in FY2005, falling about 6
30 However, the Army Reserve’s increase may be related to recent improvements in its
ability to offer desirable positions and schooling to prospective recruits. Additionally, as
the Army National Guard has a heavy concentration of combat units, while the Army
Reserve is largely made up of combat support and combat service support units, potential
recruits may view the Army Reserve as a safer option. Transition figures from Reserve
Component Transition Branch, Army Human Resources Command.
31 The obligated term of service for enlisted personnel is determined by their initial
enlistment contract. The normal service obligation incurred is eight years, which may be
served in the Active Component, in the Reserve Component, or some combination of both.
For example, an individual may enlist for four years of service in the Active Component,
followed by four years of service in the Reserve Component. See 10 USC 651 and DOD
Instructions 1304.25.
32 If too few people stay in, the military will suffer from a lack of experienced leaders,
decreased military efficiency and lower job satisfaction. If too many people stay in,
promotion opportunities decrease and a higher percentage of people must be involuntarily
separated in order to prevent the organization from becoming “top heavy” with middle and
upper level leaders. Each of these outcomes, in turn, can have a negative impact on
recruiting by making the military a less attractive career option.

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CRS-10
percentage points short of its goal for “Zone B” sailors and one percentage point
short of its goal for “Zone A” sailors.33
So far, the data for FY2006 show that the Marine Corps has already exceeded
its enlisted retention goals for the entire year, and the Air Force is exceeding all of
its goals. The Navy is exceeding its goals in two of its retention categories while
essentially meeting its goal for “Zone A” sailors. The Army achieved 116% of its
retention goal for career enlisted personnel, 114% of its retention goal for first term
enlistees, and nearly 99% of its retention goal for mid-career enlisted personnel.
Reserve Components
The Department of Defense tracks Reserve Component retention via attrition
rates. Attrition rates are a measure of the ratio of people who leave the reserves in
a given year; they are the inverse of retention rates, which measure the ratio of people
who stay in the service. Attrition goals are thus a maximum rate or ceiling, which
the various Reserve Components try not to exceed. The data show all of the Reserve
Components – except the Army National Guard – achieved enlisted attrition rates
below these ceilings for FY2005 (see Table 6). The Army National Guard only
exceeded its ceiling by a small margin.
For the first eight months of FY2006, the data show better attrition rates for the
Army National Guard and Army Reserve in comparison to what was experienced by
these components during the same period of time in FY2005.34 However, even if this
were sustained over the course of the year for the Army National Guard and Army
Reserve, it will likely be insufficient to restore their personnel strengths to
congressionally authorized levels by the end of the fiscal year. Rebuilding the
personnel strengths of these two components may require several years of strong
recruiting and retention. Attrition for the Air Force Reserve was also slightly better
in the first eight months of FY2006 than it was during the same months of FY2005.
Attrition rates for the other reserve components for the first eight months of
FY2006 were slightly higher in comparison to what these components experienced
in FY2005. However, it appears likely that all the reserve components will finish the
year below their attrition ceiling, with the possible exception of the Navy Reserve.
The Navy Reserve will likely finish the year very close to, and perhaps slightly
above, its attrition ceiling.
Analysis
The fact that retention for the Active and Reserve Components has remained
generally strong in recent years may seem counter-intuitive, given the high
33 See Table 5 for definitions of the various retention categories for each of the Services.
34 FY2000 is sometimes used as a “baseline” year, as it was the last year unaffected by post-
September 11th military operations. It should also be pointed out that the attrition rates for
the Army Reserve and Army National Guard may be skewed downward somewhat by
“stop-loss” policies, which prevent soldiers alerted for mobilization or deployed from
leaving the military until after their deployment is completed.

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CRS-11
operational tempo and large scale reserve mobilizations that have occurred since
September 11, 2001, and especially since the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
However, a number of studies conducted in the late 1990s indicate that deployments
can enhance retention, perhaps by providing participants with a sense of
accomplishment.35 However, some of these studies also indicate that after a certain
threshold level, this positive effect diminishes or becomes negative. Additionally,
these studies focused on retention behavior during the 1990s, when the deployments
were generally shorter and less hostile than at present.
Some survey data have raised concerns about future retention rates. For
example, a DOD sponsored survey showed that respondents’ intention to remain on
active duty has remained fairly stable for those in the Navy and Air Force between
March, 2003 and August, 2004. However, during this same time frame, “retention
intention” dropped from 59% to 52% for respondents in the Army and from 53% to
46% for those in the Marine Corps.36 A similar study of Reserve Component
personnel showed that respondents’ intention to stay in the reserves has remained
fairly stable from May 2003 to November 2004 for those in the Air National Guard,
Air Force Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Naval Reserve. However, “retention
intention” during this period dropped from 70% to 58% among respondents in the
Army National Guard, and from 69% to 57% among those in the Army Reserve.37
Options for Congress
Congress has a number of options to address shortfalls in recruiting and
retention. The traditional policy levers used by Congress and DOD include increasing
funding for advertising, increasing the number of recruiters, and providing larger
enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. Some have also argued that the high
operational tempo must be reduced in order to bolster current recruiting efforts and
to prevent retention problems in the future. To facilitate this, they have advocated
either increasing the size of military — especially the Active Component Army and
Marine Corps — or reducing the U.S. military presence in Iraq and other places.
Others have advocated reinstating the draft, something which would require
congressional action to implement. Opponents of the draft, however, argue that even
if it were politically feasible, conscription would not generate the type of highly
35 See for example James Hosek and Mark Totten, Does Perstempo Hurt Reenlistment? The
Effect of Long or Hostile Perstempo on Reenlistment, RAND, 1998; Paul Sticha, Paul
Hogan and Maris Diane, Personnel Tempo: Definition, Measurement, and Effects on
Retention, Readiness and Quality of Life, Army Research Institute, 1999; Peter Francis,
OPTEMPO and Readiness, Center for Naval Analysis, 1999; and Paul Hogan and Jared
Lewis, Voluntary Enlisted Retention and PERSTEMPO: An Empirical Analysis of Army
Administrative Data, The Lewin Group.
36 Defense Manpower Data Center, Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, Note
No. 2004-014, “August 2004 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members: Leading
Indicators.”
37 Defense Manpower Data Center, Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, Note
No. 2005-002, “November 2004 Status of Forces Survey of Reserve Component Members:
Leading Indicators.”

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CRS-12
motivated and highly trained individuals which the military has come to rely on.38
Those particularly concerned about Reserve Component recruiting and retention
often urge a reduction in the number of reserve personnel deployed to places like Iraq
or a shortening of the duration of reserve mobilizations for those who do get called
up; doing so, however, could put additional strains on Active Component forces.
Table 1. Accession Data (Quantity) for Active Component
Enlisted Personnel, FY2005 and FY200639
Service
FY2005
FY2005
FY2005
FY2006
FY2006
FY2006
FY2006
(Goal)40
(Achieved)
(Percent
(Goal)
Oct-Jun
Oct-Jun
Oct-Jun
of Goal)
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Percent
of Goal)
Army
80,000
73,373
91.7%
80,000
49,700
51,612
103.8%
Navy
37,635
37,703
100.2%
37,456
24,456
24,456
100.0%
Marine Corps
32,917
32,961
100.1%
32,701
20,875
21,103
101.1%
Air Force
18,900
19,222
101.7%
30,822
22,843
22,959
100.5%
Table 2. Accession Data (Quality) for Active Component
Enlisted Personnel, FY2005 and FY2006 (Non-Prior Service
Enlistees only)41
Service
DOD Quality
FY2005
FY2006
Benchmarks
(Achieved)
Oct-Jun
(Achieved)
HSDG
AFQT
HSDG
AFQT
HSDG
AFQT
CAT I-IIIA
CAT I-IIIA
CAT I-IIIA
Army
90%
60%
87%
67%
82%
62%
Navy
90%
60%
97%
71%
94%
75%
Marine Corps
90%
60%
96%
68%
96%
68%
Air Force
90%
60%
99%
80%
99%
78%
HSDG: High School Diploma Graduate
AFQT: Armed Forces Qualification Test
CAT I-IIIA: Categories I-IIIA (above average scores)
38 See CRS Report RL31682, The Military Draft and a Possible War with Iraq, by Robert
Goldich, for a more detailed discussion of arguments for and against a draft.
39 Data provided by the Department of Defense. Past recruit quantity data available at
[http://www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/numgoals04.pdf].
40 Some of these goals were changed during the course of FY2005. At the start of the
FY2005, the accessions goal was 38,500 for the Navy, 33,052 for the Marine Corps, and
24,465 for the Air Force.
41 Data provided by the Department of Defense. Past recruit quality data available at
[http://www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/recqual04.pdf].

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CRS-13
Table 3. Recruiting Data (Quantity) for Reserve Component
Enlisted Personnel, FY2005 and FY200642
Reserve
FY2005
FY2005
FY2005
FY2006
FY2006
FY2006
FY2006
Component
(Goal)43
(Achieved)
(Percent
(Goal)
Oct-Jun
Oct-Jun
Oct-Jun
of Goal)
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Percent
of Goal)
Army
63,002
50,219
79.7%
70,000
49,988
51,477
103.0%
National
Guard
Army
28,485
23,859
83.8%
36,032
24,836
25,004
100.7%
Reserve
Navy
11,141
9,788
87.9%
11,180
8,152
6,745
82.7%
Reserve
Marine
8,180
8,350
102.1%
7,930
6,076
6,130
100.9%
Corps
Reserve
Air National
10,272
8,859
86.2%
9,380
6,988
6,425
91.9%
Guard
Air Force
8,801
9,942
113.0%
6,836
5,208
5,404
103.7%
Reserve
Table 4. Recruiting Data (Quality) for Reserve Component Enlisted
Personnel, FY2005 and FY2006 (Non-Prior Service Only)44
Reserve Component
DOD Quality
FY2005
FY2006
Benchmarks
(Achieved)
(Oct-Jun
Achieved)
HSDG
AFQT
HSDG
AFQT
HSDG
AFQT
CAT I-IIIA
CAT I-IIIA
CAT I-IIIA
Army National Guard
90%
60%
83
57
88
57
Army Reserve
90%
60%
88
67
90
59
Navy Reserve
90%
60%
69
59
81
69
Marine Corps Reserve
90%
60%
96
76
96
75
Air National Guard
90%
60%
91
72
94
77
Air Force Reserve
90%
60%
87
69
95
78
42 Data provided by the Department of Defense.
43 Some of these goals were changed during the course of FY2005. At the start of the year,
the accessions goal was 12,600 for the Navy Reserve; 8,538 for the Marine Corps Reserve;
10,361 for the Air National Guard; and 8,162 for the Air Force Reserve.
44 Data provided by the Department of Defense.

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CRS-14
Table 5. Active Component Enlisted Retention Data,
FY2005 and FY200645
Service/
FY2005
FY2005
FY2005
FY2006
FY2006
FY2006
FY2006
Retention
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Achieved
Oct-Jun
Oct-Jun
Oct-Jun
(Total
Category
Compared
(Goal)
(Achieved)
(Achieved
Goal)
to Goal)
Compared
to Goal)
Army46
Initial Term
26,935
27,818
103.3%
21,456
24,539
114.4%
26,490
Mid Career
23,773
24,407
102.7%
19,854
19,571
98.6%
24,510
Career
13,454
17,287
128.5%
10,692
12,421
116.2%
13,200
Navy47
Zone A
53%
52%
-1 pt
11,265
11,215
99.6%
15,000
Zone B
69%
63%
-6 pts
6,302
6,516
103.4%
8,000
Zone C
85%
85%
Met
3,141
3,581
114.0%
4,000
Air Force48
Zone A
52%
56%
+4 pts
13,497
14,769
109.4%
19,356
Zone B
69%
80%
+11 pts
6,866
7,844
114.2%
9,319
Zone C
85%
90%
+5 pts
4,833
5,204
107.7%
6,178
Marine Corps49
1st term
5,949
6,152
103.4%
4,419
5,914
133.8%
5,892
Subsequent
5,079
6,987
137.6%
4,688
6,391
136.3%
6,250
45 Data provided by the Department of Defense.
46 The Army tracks retention rates in three categories: initial term (serving in first
enlistment, regardless of length), mid-career (second or subsequent enlistment with less than
ten years of service), and career (second or subsequent enlistment with ten or more years of
service). It states its retention goals in numerical terms.
47 The Navy’s most important retention categories are Zone A (up to six years of service),
Zone B (6 years of service to under 10 years of service) and Zone C (10 years of service to
under 14 years of service). Through FY2005, the Navy stated its retention goals in terms
of the percentage of those eligible to reenlist; starting in FY2006 it began stating its
retention goals in numerical terms.
48 The Air Force recently changed its retention metric. The Air Force’s most important
retention categories are Zone A (17 months to under 6 years of service), Zone B (six years
of service to under ten years of service), and Zone C (ten years of service to under fourteen
years of service). Through FY2005, the Air Force stated its retention goals in terms of the
percentage of those eligible to reenlist; starting in FY2006 it began stating its retention goals
in numerical terms.
49 The Marine Corps tracks retention rates in two categories: first term (serving in first
enlistment) and subsequent (second or subsequent enlistment). The Marine Corps’ retention
goal is stated in numerical terms. The year to date goal is based on prorated projections of
their annual goal by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as the Marine Corps does not
set quarterly or monthly retention goals.

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CRS-15
Table 6. Reserve Component Enlisted Attrition Data for FY2005
and FY200650
Reserve Component
FY2005
FY2005
FY2006
FY2001-
FY2005
FY2006
(Ceiling)
(Achieved)
(Ceiling)
FY2005
Oct-May
Oct-May
Average
(Achieved)
(Achieved)
Oct-May
(Achieved)
Army National
19.5%
20.2%
19.5%
13.31%
13.97%
12.54%
Guard
Army Reserve
28.6%
23.4%
28.6%
15.95%
15.21%
14.08%
Naval Reserve
36.0%
31.2%
36.0%
19.24%
20.51%
23.11%
Marine Corps
30.0%
22.0%
30.0%
16.37%
13.35%
16.07%
Reserve
Air National Guard
12.0%
10.2%
12.0%
7.1%
6.89%
7.41%
Air Force Reserve
18.0%
14.7%
18.0%
9.14%
9.85%
9.68%
50 Data provided by the Department of Defense.

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