Order Code RL33543
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Tactical Aircraft Modernization:
Issues for Congress
July 14, 2006
Christopher Bolkcom
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress
Summary
This report examines DOD’s four largest tactical aircraft modernization
programs. The background section provides a brief description of each program, and
a discussion of how tactical aircraft fit into military air operations: the missions they
typically perform and how they contrast to longer-range combat aircraft.
The Analysis section examines a number of policy issues including
affordability, capability required, force structure, service roles and missions,
industrial base, and transformation. The paper concludes with a synopsis of recent
congressional action on these programs.
The Defense Department plans to buy the F-22 fighter for the Air Force, the
F/A-18E/F fighter/attack plane for the Navy, and the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft for the
Marines and Air Force special operations, as well as pursue a joint-service program
to develop a multirole Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft in three variants, some of
which might be operational around 2012.
Decisions in Congress and the Defense Department regarding these aircraft
programs may have important long-term implications. The F-22 and F/A-18E/F are
in full-rate production. The V-22 is now in transition from research-development
(R&D) to procurement and could remain in production for decades. The
next-generation combat aircraft that are expected to result from joint-service efforts
now getting underway through the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program might be in
production through the 2020s. Decisions about the funding of these programs will
influence the future of individual U.S. aircraft manufacturers, and may well affect the
division of combat roles and missions among the services in the next century.
Some in Congress have questioned these tactical aircraft modernization plans
on grounds of affordability and requirements. Because of the lack of consensus about
future threats and defense requirements, there has been increasing concern about the
need for some of these aircraft programs on grounds of cost and affordability,
military requirements and force levels, and effects on the defense industrial base.
Debate has also emerged on the need to balance modernization needs with military
transformation goals.
This report replaces Issue Brief IB92115 of the same name.
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Tactical Aircraft in the U.S. Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Major Tactical Aircraft Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Implications of Near-Term Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Analysis: Key Issues to Consider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Affordability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Capability Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Force Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Service Roles and Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Defense Industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Modernization vs. Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
List of Figures
F/A-18F Super Hornet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
F-22 Raptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
V-22 Osprey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
List of Tables
Table 1. FY2007 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Tactical Aircraft Modernization:
Issues for Congress
Most Recent Developments
The Bush Administration’s FY2007 defense budget included the following
requests for tactical aircraft programs: F-22 — $2.7 billion; JSF — $5.2 billion; F/A-
18E/F — $2.3 billion; EA-18G — $1.2 billion; V-22 — $2.2 billion. House and
Senate authorizing committees expressed concern over the services’ plans for
funding the F-22 and JSF.
Background
Tactical Aircraft in the U.S. Military
Tactical or theater aircraft — fighter planes, fighter/attack planes, and attack
planes — constitute a major component of U.S. military capability. They played a
prominent role in the 1991 Gulf War, and are expected to play a leading role in
contemporary and future military operations, particularly in situations where U.S.
leaders hope to limit or avoid the commitment of U.S. ground forces. Operation
Allied Force, the 1999 war in Kosovo, may have fueled these expectations. During
this 78-day war, hundreds of coalition aircraft attacked Serbian targets, losing only
two aircraft in the process. Navy tactical combat aircraft also played a prominent role
in Operation Enduring Freedom, the war in Afghanistan.
Tactical aviation accounts for a significant part of the defense budget, counting
the costs of developing, procuring, and operating aircraft, engines, avionics, and
weapon systems, and personnel, training, and administrative costs. The U.S. Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps had a total inventory of some 5,000 fixed-wing
tactical combat aircraft in 2005. Of these, the Air Force operated about 74% and the
Navy and the Marine Corps about 26%. In addition to these fixed-wing combat
aircraft, the DOD operates about 1,300 armed helicopters.1 This report focuses on
fixed-wing aircraft programs: the Air Force F-22, the Navy F/A-18E/F, the Marine
Corps V-22, and the Joint Strike Fighter.
These aircraft have been traditionally referred to as “tactical” aircraft to
distinguish them from the Air Force’s B-52, B-1, and B-2 “strategic” bombers.
When applied to aircraft, “tactical” generally refers to smaller and shorter-ranged
1 See CRS Report RL32447, Military Helicopter Modernization: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Christian Liles and Christopher Bolkcom.
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planes, while “strategic” generally refers to larger and longer-ranged aircraft. Both
tactical and strategic types are operated by USAF’s Air Combat Command, which
in 1992 replaced Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC).
Reflecting the post-Cold War demise of SAC and TAC, tactical types are sometimes
referred to as “theater aircraft.”
Fighter planes primarily engage in air-to-air combat, either at close/visual range
or at ranges requiring radar-guided missiles and stand-off munitions (including
“precision-guided munitions”/PGMs). Attack planes focus on air-to-surface combat
operations such as close air support (CAS) for friendly ground forces engaged in
battle, battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against enemy forces behind the lines, and
deep interdiction (also known as “deep strike”) against the enemy’s military,
political, and industrial infrastructure. Fighter/attack planes (also known as
fighter-bombers, strike fighters, or multirole fighters) perform both air-to-air and
air-to-surface missions. Long-range bombers and cruise missiles can also be used in
BAI and deep strike operations. Different air-to-air and air-to-surface missions and
different basing modes (sea- vs. land-based) give rise to different performance
requirements for combat aircraft, making use of a common aircraft for different
missions and services difficult, if not impossible, without major modifications.
Major Tactical Aircraft Programs
In response to an emerging congressional consensus and recommendations by
the Defense Department’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of force structure
requirements, the Clinton Administration decided in late 1993 to continue two major
aircraft programs then underway — the F-22, a low-observable-to-radar (stealthy)
fighter for the Air Force; and the F/A-18E/F version of the F/A-18 fighter/attack
plane for the Navy — while also pursuing new aviation technology initiatives
through the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which later evolved
into the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Clinton Administration also
supported procurement of the Marine Corps’ V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, which had been
opposed by the first Bush Administration on grounds of affordability.
The George H. Bush Administration’s plan for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft
had focused on four key aircraft programs: (1) the F-22, (2) the F/A-18E/F, (3) the
AFX, a stealthy attack/fighter aircraft to be developed for the Navy and Air Force,
and (4) the Multi-Role Fighter (MRF), either a new aircraft or an upgraded version
of the F-16 fighter/attack plane for the Air Force. Since there was no funding for the
MRF and only minimal funding for the AFX, their rejection by the BUR in 1993 was
more a recognition of their demise than the termination of viable programs.
The Defense Department’s first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released
in May of 1997, recommended buying fewer tactical aircraft than was then projected,
with reduced annual procurement of the F-22 and the F/A-18E/F and accelerated
procurement of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. Major tactical aircraft programs since the
early 1990s are noted below.
F-22 Raptor, built by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, features a stealthy design,
advanced engines by Pratt and Whitney, and new avionics by Hughes and other
subcontractors. It will replace the F-15 as the Air Force’s air superiority fighter. Like
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the F-15E, the F-22 will also have air-to-surface attack capabilities. The program
was in competitive prototyping from 1986 to 1991 and then entered engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD), with prototype flights beginning in 1997. On
September 14, 2001, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) announced its much-
awaited decision that the F-22 program had successfully completed EMD and was
ready to move on to low-rate initial production. On December 15, 2005, the Air
Force announced that a 12-aircraft detachment of F-22s had achieved initial
operational capability (IOC).
In recent years, the Air Force has stated a requirement for 381 Raptors. The Air
Force’s FY2007 budget request, however, presents a plan to fund the production of
F-22s through FY2010, for a total inventory of 183 aircraft. This proposed funding
plan has raised concern among many, because it proposes to incrementally fund
procurement and may require congressional waivers of statutory acquisition
requirements.
F-22 Raptor
F/A-18F Super Hornet
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, built by Boeing (since its acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas in 1997) and Northrop Grumman, is a larger and more
expensive version of the current F/A-18C/D fighter/attack plane. It has more
range/payload than that of existing F/A-18s and more potential for future
modernization. The E/F version will replace the Navy’s older F/A-18s in
fighter/attack missions and will eventually assume some missions now performed by
F-14 fighters and formerly by A-6 attack planes. In May 1992, the program entered
EMD, with prototypes beginning flight-tests in late 1995 and procurement funding
beginning in FY1997. In December 2003, the Navy awarded a five-year, $8.6 billion
multi-year procurement contract for 210 F/A-18E/Fs to the Boeing Company.
Procurement of 462 F/A-18E/Fs is currently projected, at a cost $43.9 billion
current-year dollars (actual past expenditures and projected future costs) as estimated
in September 2005.2 At least 90 electronic attack versions of the aircraft — the EA-
2 See CRS Report RL30624, Military Aircraft, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Christopher Bolkcom.
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18G will be procured as a replacement for the Navy’s aging EA-6B Prowler fleet.3
A separate $1 billion contract was also awarded to develop this aircraft, which is
estimated to cost a total of $8.6 billion. F/A-18E/F squadrons from the aircraft
carriers Abraham Lincoln and Nimitz participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) began in FY1994 as the Joint Advanced
Strike Technology (JAST) program, which emerged after cancellations of the AFX
and MRF. The JSF program seeks to design, develop, and produce a family of
affordable joint-service fighter/attack planes, with conventional take-off and landing
(CTOL) aircraft for the Air Force and Navy and short take-off vertical landing
(STOVL) aircraft for the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.K. Royal Navy. In February
2004, Air Force leaders announced that the Air Force would also procure some
number of STOVL variants to improve its ability to prosecute the close air support
(CAS) mission and reduce the potential implications of uncertain access to forward
bases.
Participation is related to the financial contributions to the program by these
governments, the British government being the major non-U.S. contributor of
development funds. Eight foreign countries have pledged funds to the JSF program.
A number of other countries are being considered for either JSF partnership or as
purchasers. From1997-2001 the program was in a competitive design phase
involving prototypes built by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. On October 26, 2001,
the DOD announced that Lockheed Martin won the competition, and would move on
to the production phase.
In May 2005, DOD approved a plan to revamp the JSF program to account for
developmental difficulties. The revised plan entails stretching out development
efforts 16 to 22 months, adding $11.7 billion in costs and cutting the number of
aircraft the Defense Department will buy. As now projected, some 2,458 JSFs would
be procured, with low rate production starting in 2008 and operational service to
begin around 2013. The JSF program is currently estimated (September 2005) at
$256.6 billion.4 As part of its FY2007 budget request, DOD proposed to cancel the
JSF’s F136 alternate engine program. This program was initiated by Congress in
FY1996.5
3 Electronic attack aircraft increase the survivability of attack aircraft by jamming radars
used by enemy aircraft and air defenses and making it difficult for them to target U.S.
aircraft. For more information about electronic warfare and the EA-6B. See CRS Report
RL30639 and CRS Report RL30841.
4 See CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status,
and Issues, by Christopher Bolkcom.
5 Those in Congress who initiated the alternate engine program hoped to create a
competitive environment during JSF production, in which engine manufacturers would
compete against each other for business. This competition would generate cost savings and
improved engine reliability and performance. Supporters believe the Air Force was
successful in creating such an environment when it funded an alternate engine for the F-16
Falcon.
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
V-22 Osprey
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft built by Bell Helicopter Textron and
Boeing Helicopters primarily for the U.S. Marine Corps to replace their aging
helicopters that transport troops and equipment into combat zones. The Air Force
also wants the V-22 for its special forces and the Navy is considering the Osprey for
search and rescue missions. The V-22’s distinguishing characteristic is its ability to
take off, land, and hover like a helicopter, but also rotate its rotors 90 degrees and
fly like a conventional airplane.
Although not part of the tactical aircraft modernization program of the early
1990s, the V-22 is in funding competition with these programs. The first production
aircraft were procured in FY1997. In September 2005, the V-22 program was
estimated by the Defense Department to cost $50.5 billion current-year dollars for
development and production of 458 aircraft. While proponents focus on what they
believe to be the Osprey’s unique operational capabilities (i.e., long range, high
speed, large payload coupled with vertical take off and landing capability) some
opponents say that the aircraft’s tilt-rotor technology is not mature and has
contributed to a number of V-22 crashes over the past several years. Opponents also
challenge whether the Osprey’s operational capabilities will be as big an
improvement over modern helicopters as proponents claim. Investigations into the
V-22 program, its crashes, and allegations of malfeasance came to a head in the
spring of 2001.
On May 1, 2001, a Blue Ribbon panel formed by then-Secretary of Defense
William Cohen to review all aspects of the V-22 program reported its findings and
recommendations during congressional testimony. The panel recommended cutting
production to the “bare minimum” while an array of tests were carried out to fix a
long list of problems they identified with hardware, software and performance. On
July 5, 2001, it was reported that the DOD Inspector General (IG) found evidence
that the V-22 squadron at New River, NC, falsified maintenance and readiness
records, and in September 2001, three Marines were disciplined. (See CRS Report
RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft, by Christopher Bolkcom.) After a
lengthy hiatus, the V-22 resumed operational flight testing June 2, 2002.
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In the fall of 2005, the V-22 program achieved some key milestones. In
September 2005, DOD’s Office of Operational Test and Evaluation announced that
the V-22 had successfully completed operational testing and was effective, reliable
and capable of conducting its primary missions. Additional testing is still required,
the office reported, and additional work is needed in areas such as aircraft
countermeasures. This announcement was followed by a letter from the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to Congress, certifying that the Osprey was
operationally fit, and on September 28, the Defense Acquisition Board approved full
rate production. DOD’s FY2007 budget request proposed production of 16 V-22
aircraft. This is the first year since the V-22 Blue Ribbon Panel recommendation that
DOD has proposed building more Ospreys than the “minimum sustainable rate.”
Implications of Near-Term Decisions
Decisions in Congress and the Defense Department in regard to these aircraft
programs may have important long-term implications. The V-22, and the F-22 are
now in transition from research-development (R&D) to procurement and could
remain in production for decades. The next-generation combat aircraft that are
expected to result from joint- service efforts now getting underway through the JSF
program might be in production through the 2020s. Decisions about the funding of
these programs will influence the future of individual U.S. aircraft manufacturers and
may well affect the division of combat roles and missions among the services.
Congressional debate on tactical aviation has often reflected desires by the
defense committees to assess these programs from a joint and interservice perspective
rather than on a program-by-program or service-by-service basis. The JSF program
is a prime example of this concern for joint-service development and procurement
of weapon systems and equipment. In 1994, the Senate Armed Services Committee
concluded that “the only affordable long-term modernization plan must maximize
commonality, where the Air Force and the Navy procure and operate the same
aircraft,” adding that “both the Air Force and the Navy could face the same threats
and operate side by side, necessitating a common technological approach” (S.Rept.
103-282, p. 82). During an April 2005 hearing of the Senate Airland Subcommittee,
witnesses and subcommittee members discussed how DOD might operate its tactical
aviation forces in a more joint, integrated manner, and thus potentially reduce the
number of purchased aircraft, without eroding combat power.6
Some in Congress have expressed doubts about the affordability of tactical
aircraft modernization programs as currently projected, and some question the need
for as many of these aircraft as currently planned by the services. These concerns
were also reflected in the recommendations of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review, and PBD 753, which resulted in reductions in the projected numbers of
tactical aircraft to be procured.
6 “Hearing of the Airland Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee,” Federal
News Service, Apr. 6, 2005.
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Analysis: Key Issues to Consider
Affordability
Given probable constraints on defense spending in future years, can we afford
tactical aircraft modernization programs as currently projected?
Tactical aviation accounts for a significant share of the U.S. defense budget,
although estimates vary widely, depending on what is included and how costs are
allocated. In 1996, some Defense Department analysts estimated that over 40% of
the projected cost of developing and producing the 20 most expensive weapon
systems during the FY1996- FY2013 period would go to three tactical aviation
programs: JSF (16.5 %), F-22 (14.5%), and F/A-18E/F (11%). These analyses did
not assess the relative military value of such aircraft in comparison with other
weapon systems, however, nor did they compare the cost of aircraft with that of other
weapon systems on an historical basis.
Since the early 1990s, Administration officials have argued that their tactical
aircraft modernization plans are designed to be affordable within the smaller
procurement budgets projected for future years. In efforts to reduce tactical aviation
costs, the George H. Bush Administration terminated several aircraft programs in
1990-92, including continued procurement of Navy F-14D fighter/attack planes,
development of a naval variant of the Air Force F-22 stealth fighter, and development
of the Navy’s A-12 attack plane. In a hearing on tactical aircraft before the House
Armed Services Committee on April 29, 1992, Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
analysts testified that the procurement costs of the four tactical aircraft then in the
Administration’s plan would be affordable “only under optimistic assumptions about
trends in costs and available funds.” CBO concluded that these aircraft would
probably be procured in smaller numbers than originally planned and without some
of the technological features and performance capabilities that earlier were regarded
as military requirements.
In a hearing on the same subject before the House National Security
Committee’s R&D and Procurement Subcommittees on June 27, 1996, CBO analysts
expressed similar doubts about the JSF, F-22, and F/A-18E/F programs, concluding
that DOD is understating the costs of these aircraft, which “may not be affordable
and will probably need to be scaled back....” General Accounting Office (GAO)
analysts also testified that attempting to pay for DOD’s tactical aviation programs as
planned “appears to be unrealistic” in light of probable levels of defense spending in
the 2000s.
On March 5, 1997, these programs were discussed in a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing and later in a joint hearing of the House National Security
Committee’s R&D and procurement subcommittees, where GAO and CBO analysts
and DOD officials (Air Force General Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Paul Kaminsky, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology) testified. Options noted by General Ralston ranged from canceling
the F- 22, F/A-18E/F, or JSF program, or buying 25-50% fewer planes than
projected, to increasing funding for these three tactical aircraft programs — which
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as then projected accounted for about 10% of projected spending for development
and procurement of all weapons through FY2003 and would rise to 16% through
FY2009 and 18% through FY2015.
Representative Curt Weldon stated that since procurement of tactical aircraft in
the Administration’s FY1998 budget accounted for only about 6% of total
procurement funding, the currently projected funding levels and production schedules
for these three programs — estimated by CBO to cost over $350 billion through the
2020s — were unrealistic. Several other Members also expressed doubts about the
affordability of these programs, given current budgetary concerns, uncertainties about
future threats, and competing funding requirements of other programs. CBO and
GAO analysts expressed considerable skepticism about the affordability and
schedules of these programs as currently planned.7
These programs were also the subject of the Senate Armed Services
Committee’s Air-Land Subcommittee hearing on April 16, 1997, which focused
mainly on differing estimates of the F-22’s production cost by Defense Department
and Air Force officials. 8 On July 11, 1997, during Senate debate on the FY1998
defense authorizations bill (S. 936), an amendment by Senator Russell Feingold
requiring DOD to recommend which of three programs (JSF, F-22, or F/A- 18E/F)
should be terminated if funding were available for only two programs was defeated
79-19.9
Similar concerns about the rising costs of these aircraft programs were voiced
in 1999 during hearings by the House Armed Services Committee (March 3, 1999)
and the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Airland Subcommittee (March 10 and
17, 1999), when projected increases in the development cost of the F-22 and the JSF
were discussed at length. CBO and GAO analysts expressed many of the same
concerns about these programs that they have noted in recent years. Concerns about
the affordability of these programs played a major role in congressional opposition
to procurement funding for the F-22 program in the FY2000 defense budget.
In the spring of 2003 F-22 affordability was again at issue. During an April 11
hearing of the House Government Reform Committee’s national security
subcommittee, Defense Department and Air Force officials estimated that rising costs
and the program’s congressionally mandated $36.8 billion production cost cap could
converge to reduce the total Air Force purchase to as few as 225 Raptors —
compared to earlier projections of 381 aircraft.10
7 “Tacair Modernization on Hill: Questions, but No Decisions Yet,” Aerospace Daily, Mar.
12, 1997, pp. 377-378 and Tony Capaccio, “GOP Defense Staff: Tac Air Problem ‘Out Of
Control,’” Defense Week, Mar. 10, 1997, pp. 1, 15.
8 Sheila Foote. “Senators Raise Questions about Affordability of TACAIR,” Defense Daily.
Apr. 17, 1997. P. 101-102.
9 Congressional Record, July 11, 1997. P. S7227-S7234.
10 Marc Selinger, “F-22 Production Estimate Questioned by Lawmakers,” Aerospace Daily,
Apr. 28, 2003.
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In March 2005, Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Chairman
Representative Curt Weldon began a hearing by observing that tactical aviation is “in
the midst of a massive train wreck financially.” Representative Weldon noted that
the costs of the F-22 and JSF had increased by “well over 100” and 80 percent
respectively, and one impact of these increases was reduced aircraft purchases.11
Capability Required
Given the demise of the Soviet Union and the apparent dominance U.S. air forces
have demonstrated in recent conflicts, and the apparent growth of low-intensity
conflicts, what capabilities are required in U.S. tactical aircraft?
The F-22 program was started in the mid-1980s, when the Soviet Union was
expected to continue producing high-performance aircraft and air-defense missiles that
could pose serious threats in the 1990s and beyond. The F-22 was then justified as an
advanced aircraft capable of performing combat missions in a high-threat environment.
With the demise of the Soviet Union and a much changed international environment,
some question the need to procure large quantities of such expensive, high-capability
aircraft. Alternatives would be to produce only limited numbers of these aircraft, while
upgrading and extending the service lives of existing aircraft such as Air Force F-15Es
and F-16Cs, Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18C/Ds, and Navy F/A-18E/Fs. Others
argue that advanced combat aircraft are not the most applicable airpower resources for
counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism operations. These observers would reduce
planned combat aircraft procurement programs in favor of increased investments in
unmanned aerial vehicles, special operations helicopters, medical evacuation aircraft,
and training and equipping forward air controllers.12
Others argue that large numbers of high-capability aircraft are still necessary
because Russian aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are available to potential
adversaries of the United States and its allies, and some European and Asian
companies may soon be able to market advanced aircraft and missiles to potential
enemies. In this view, the demise of the Soviet Union does not mean the end of
potential high-threat areas requiring advanced aircraft. Recent acquisitions of fighter
aircraft and surface-to-air missiles by China, and to a lesser degree India, have fueled
some observers’ concerns that these countries may effectively challenge U.S.
airpower in the future. In recent conflicts in Iraq and Yugoslavia, the F-117 stealth
attack plane played a crucial role in destroying targets in high-threat areas. Having
large numbers of such advanced aircraft, it is argued, will help ensure operational
success in future conflicts with well-armed adversaries.
Most of those questioning the modernization plan acknowledge that proliferation
of advanced aircraft and air-defense equipment in the Third World will require the
United States to field some new-generation high-capability aircraft. They argue,
however, that the Gulf War showed the United States has a formidable advantage in
11 “Hearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee,” Federal News Service, Mar. 25, 2005.
12 See CRS Report RL32737: Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating
Terrorism and Counterinsurgency, by Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman.
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air-to-air combat, which can be maintained by procuring a limited number of F-22s for
use against those adversaries who may be able to make effective use of modern Soviet
or European aircraft. They note that the stealthy F-117s used in the Gulf War constituted
a tiny percentage of all tactical aircraft employed against Iraq, and only a few
non-stealthy planes were shot down, even in the early days of the war. Moreover, they
argue that cruise missiles and stealthy B-2 bombers and non-stealthy B-1s equipped with
adequate standoff munitions could be used against heavily defended targets. In this view,
F-22s would be procured in some smaller quantity than the 381 planes currently desired
by the Air Force and could be operated as special “silver bullet” forces.
Others take issue with the need for any F-22s, arguing that the Air Force and Navy
will face generally the same adversary aircraft in the future, and these services now have
roughly equal capability in air-to-air combat as well as considerable air-to-surface attack
capabilities with F-15Es. Others point out that the Navy will eventually conduct its
air-to-air combat mission primarily with the F/A-18E/F. If the Navy does not need a
new- generation stealth fighter for the post-Cold War era, they ask, why is such an
aircraft required for the Air Force? Some also argue that the improved attack capability
of the F/A-18E/F will be sufficient for carrier-based attack missions against the most
likely adversaries in regional conflicts. Furthermore, it can be argued that the successful
development of longer-range and more accurate and lethal standoff munitions would
significantly increase the combat effectiveness of current-generation tactical aircraft.
The need for the V-22’s capabilities are also debated. Those in favor of the
program say the V-22 is needed to replace aging military helicopters in all the
services, which are costly to maintain and operate safely and effectively. This
tilt-rotor aircraft will provide the operational flexibility of a helicopter without the
helicopter’s inherent limitations of speed, range, and altitude. When landing on
hostile shores in a third-world conflict, the V-22 would be critical for the transport
of Marines from ship to shore. In sum, it is the Marine Corps’ most important
program and a key pillar supporting emerging Marine Corps warfighting concepts
such as Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Those who question the need for the V-
22’s capabilities say that ship-to-shore logistical operations can be performed by less
expensive helicopters for the kinds of landing operations in which the Marines are
likely to be involved, where the V-22’s greater speed and range would not be needed.
Moreover, Marine assault missions in an opposed landing would involve
ship-to-shore movement of troops and equipment, which would require coordination
with aircraft having less speed and range than the V-22.
Force Structure
How many tactical aircraft does the United States need?
The George H. Bush Administration’s proposed base force for the mid-1990s and
beyond reduced force structure to 26.5 Air Force fighter and attack wings, 13 Navy
carrier air wings, and 4 Marine Corps air wings (compared to 35, 15, and 4 air wings
respectively in FY1990). Budgetary considerations and radically altered international
conditions led to these reductions, which some argued were appropriate for the
post-Cold War era, while others viewed this force structure as excessive. Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin announced in September 1993 that the Clinton Administration
projected a base force of 20 Air Force fighter/attack wings (13 active, 7 reserve), 11
CRS-11
Navy carrier air wings, and 4 Marine Corps air wings. The 1997 QDR recommended
no major changes in this force structure, although the 20 Air Force tactical wings
would comprise 12 active and 8 reserve wings.
In an attempt to save money, but maintain combat capability, the Navy-Marine
Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan, proposed in late 2002, reduced the number of
Navy and Marine Corps combat aircraft squadrons by nine.13 Deputy Secretary of
Defense Gordon England reportedly views this reduction as a potential model for
DOD’s entire tactical aviation force. In a March 21, 2005 interview, Mr. England
noted that by better integrating Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation, the Defense
Department was able to reduce aircraft purchases and save $35 billion, while
maintaining the same combat capabilities. Increased efficiencies that might be
realized across DOD’s tactical air enterprise might include better integration, and
more common assets, he told reporters. Mr. England advocated that DOD examine
its “whole [tactical aviation] enterprise” and search for efficiencies and savings. He
predicted, reportedly, that “the most efficient, effective way to construct our air
assets” may be one of the biggest debates in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.14
The question of how many wings of tactical aircraft the United States needs for
the “post-9/11” era, and how this number should be determined, is part of an ongoing
debate in the Defense Department and Congress over the proper overall size of U.S.
military forces. Decisions on this issue can affect views on the affordability and
focus of plans for modernizing tactical aircraft. A reduction in the number of air
wings would lead to a corresponding reduction in the number of aircraft to be
procured. However, a reduction in the number of air wings may lead to a decision
to increase the proportions of F-22s and F/A-18E/Fs in the force, on grounds that
reduced forces need more capable equipment.
Service Roles and Missions
How should views on service roles and missions be factored into decisions on
tactical aircraft modernization?
The high cost of tactical aircraft programs has renewed interest in the division
of tactical aviation roles and missions among the services. The apparent redundancy
in tactical aviation among the services — the Air Force plus air components of the
Navy, Marine Corps, and Army — has often been criticized as a duplication of
efforts. In May 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions advocated the
continuation of air components in every service, but suggested that the overall force
structure as well as the mix of capabilities and support infrastructure should be
reviewed. GAO analysts concluded subsequently that DOD’s plans for tactical
aviation have not taken adequate account of overall capabilities and requirements
from a joint-service perspective.
13 See CRS Report RS21488, Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Christopher Bolkcom and Ronald O’Rourke. A
Carrier Air Wing typically includes four strike fighter squadrons.
14 Christopher J. Castelli, “DEPSECDEF Nominee Sees Potential For DoD-Wide TACAIR
Integration,” Inside the Navy, Apr. 4, 2005.
CRS-12
The main roles-and-missions issue affecting current modernization plans
concerns the respective roles of the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps in projecting
U.S. air power overseas. Most defense analysts view this as not an either-or question
but a question of the appropriate balance between these services in a shared and joint
mission. Some would give the Air Force primary responsibility for power projection
overseas; others argue that geo-political factors would require naval assets for
sustained air operations in many situations. Canceling the AFX and relying mainly
on the attack capabilities of the F/A-18E/F has been viewed by some as reducing the
Navy’s role in overseas projection of air power, which to some would call into
question the value of aircraft carriers. Others would argue that carrier-based aircraft
are needed for missions other than deep-strike operations, such as shorter-range land
attack, air superiority, airborne early warning, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and
anti-submarine warfare. Recent operations, such as the 2001 war in Afghanistan,
highlighted the importance of carrier-based aviation.
Defense Industrial Base
How should industrial-base considerations be factored into decisions on tactical
aircraft modernization?
The health of the U.S. defense industrial base has been a perennial issue. A report
by the Defense Science Board published in the Spring of 2000 noted that the defense
industry was in the midst of a painful transition that was complicated by the “new
economy,” which was draining human and financial resources. Unless steps were taken
promptly, the study concluded, the U.S. defense industry would likely be less
competitive and financially viable in 5 to 10 years than it was in 2000. A July 2000
study by Booz-Allen Hamilton reported that the U.S. defense industrial base was in a
state of decline and national security would be affected if then-current trends went
unchecked.15 A 2005 study by DOD, however, found no major problems with U.S.
defense industry.16
Congressional decisions on tactical aviation programs have serious implications
for the aerospace sector of the U.S. industrial base, which is a major source of
technological innovations as well as export earnings. Aerospace is the nation’s
leading net exporter of manufactured goods, with exports exceeding imports in 2004
by $31 billion (including $9.5 billion in military exports), according to the Aerospace
Industries Association. There is general agreement that there were more aircraft
manufacturers and subcontractors than recent levels of defense spending could
sustain. Consequently, the aerospace industry, like other industries heavily
dependent on Pentagon spending, has been undergoing a shakeout, with some
companies leaving the military aircraft business and others merging with financially
stronger competitors and downsizing production lines.
15 Anthony Velocci, “Industry Prognosis Flags Ominous Trends,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, July 17, 2000.
16 Sharon Weinberger, “Annual Report Paints Rosy Picture of Defense Industrial Base,”
Defense Daily, Mar. 28, 2005.
CRS-13
Congressional decisions on which military aircraft programs to support may
influence which aircraft manufacturers and subcontractors remain in business. While
the U.S. economy as a whole regularly absorbs declines equal in magnitude to that
projected for defense aerospace, in the short- and medium-term, thousands of skilled
engineering and manufacturing jobs as well the health of local and regional
economies could be at stake. Some argue that preservation of critical components
of U.S. defense industry is now as important as military requirements, which have
always been matters of judgment based on threat assumptions that are subject to
change. There is no apparent consensus, however, about what is most critical to
future U.S. military requirements or how excess military industrial capabilities can
be converted to civilian production that might enhance international competitiveness
in export trade.
Several questions arise out of the industrial base issue: How many aircraft
manufacturers are needed to support U.S. military needs? To what extent should the
survivability of these firms be taken into account in deciding which aircraft programs
to pursue? Which aspects of the aerospace industry are really unique and vital to
production of tactical aircraft? How can competitiveness among U.S. defense
contractors be maintained with fewer firms, particularly regarding different design
concepts and cost-reduction innovations in the development and production of planes?
Should foreign sales of U.S. military aircraft be factored into decisions on which
tactical aircraft programs to pursue? How might decisions on tactical aircraft programs
affect U.S. export earnings and international competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace
industry? There are no easy answers to such questions and no consensus on these
industrial base issues, which confront all industrial nations in the early 2000s.
Modernization vs. Transformation17
How can tactical aircraft modernization needs be balanced with transformation
goals?
Over the past several years, defense analysts and decision makers have
increasingly discussed the need for DOD to transform itself in light of rapidly
changing politico-military circumstances.18 Unlike modernization, transformation
is generally viewed as discontinuous change, or a “leap ahead” in capabilities.
Transformation is thought to be fueled by a combination of new technologies,
innovative operational concepts, and codified by new organizational schema.
Modernization and transformation objectives may not be compatible. This potential
incompatibility raises several questions: What emphasis should DOD place on
tactical aviation modernization vs. transformation goals? To what degree do DOD’s
current tactical aviation modernization programs facilitate transformation? To what
degree do they conflict with transformation?
17 For a more detailed discussion of transformation, see CRS Report RS20859, Air Force
Transformation, by Christopher Bolkcom.
18 For instance: the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review; The National Security Strategy of
the United States; the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress;
the 1998 National Defense Panel; P.L. 105-261, Title IX, Subtitle A, Sec. 903.
CRS-14
Many proponents of transformation argue that instead of pursuing the tactical
aviation programs described in this report, DOD should upgrade the F-16, F-15 and
F/A-18C/Ds. Then, DOD would have sufficient resources to pursue more aggressive
aviation technologies such as unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and next
generation bombers, which, transformation advocates argue, would more likely
generate a “leap ahead” in aviation capabilities. Advocates of the F-22, JSF, and
Super Hornet argue that these aircraft have capabilities that could contribute to
transformation. Furthermore, they argue, DOD has already skipped a generation of
tactical aircraft modernization and can not wait for more aggressive technologies that
may or may not emerge in the distant future. They also maintain that today’s combat
aircraft are losing ground to Russian and other combat aircraft, and need to be
replaced sooner rather than later.
Congressional Action
This section presents recent legislative activity on DOD’s four major tactical
aircraft modernization programs. It includes the Administration’s annual budget
request, and annual authorization and appropriations.
FY2007
The Bush Administration’s FY2007 defense budget included the following
requests for tactical aircraft programs: F-22 — $4.8 billion; JSF — $5 billion; F/A-
18E/F — $3.2 billion; EA-18G — $0.75 billion; V-22 — $1.7 billion. Details of the
request are summarized in Table 1, below.
Table 1. FY2007 Budget Request
($ millions)
USAF
USN
DOD Procure
USAF
USN
DOD
Total
Program
Procure
Procure
RDT&E
RDT&E
RDT&E
$
$
#
$
#
$
#
F-22
1503.9
0
0
2781.6
477.4 APCY
584.2
216.1 Mods
JSF
869.7
5
145.3 APCY
245.0
APCY
1999.1
2030.9
5290.0
V-22 208.6
2
1304.7
14
26.6
268.4
0 2165.1
34.4 APCY
67.3
APCY
.5 Mods
85.8
Mods
168.8
**2
F/A-
2362.5
30
*31.1
2999.2
18E/F
194.1
APCY
*411.5
Mods
EA-18G
865.4
12
372.3
1277.5
39.8
APCY
Sources: Procurement Programs (P-1), Department of Defense Budget for FY2005, Feb. 2004.
RDT&E Programs (R-1), Department of Defense Budget for FY2005, Feb. 2004.
Note: 0 indicates previous funding, but none for this fiscal year. Blank cell indicates never funded. APCY =
Advanced Procurement, Current Year.
* Some of these funds would be spent on F/A-18A/C/D models as well as E/F models.
** The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is spending procurement money to add SOF peculiar upgrades
to the two CV-22s procured by the Air Force. The two aircraft in this column are the same aircraft in the Air
Force column.
CRS-15
In their report 109-452 (H.R. 5122), House authorizers matched all FY2007
funding requests for the V-22, EA-18G, F/A-18E/F. Authorizers also increased
Super Hornet R&D by $17.1 million. The House Armed Services Committee
recommended a reduction of $153 million and $88 million in the JSF Navy and Air
Force procurement accounts respectively, and increased the Air Force JSF request for
R&D by $409.5 million for the F136 engine and alternate tires. House Authorizers
rejected the Air Force’s proposal to incrementally fund F-22 procurement, and added
$1.4 billion to the FY2007 request. House and Senate authorizers granted the Air
Force authority to enter into a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract.
In their report 109-254 (S. 2766) Senate authorizers matched all FY2007
procurement and R&D funding requests for the EA-18G, F/A-18E/F, and V-22.
Senate authorizers denied the Air Force requests to incrementally fund the F-22, and
therefore added $1.6 billion to the Air Force’s request for FY2007 F-22 procurement.
They also denied the Air Force request to enter into a multiyear procurement
contract, and and cut $200 million from advanced procurement (current year).
Concerned about too much concurrency between JSF development and production,
Senate authorizers recommended a one year delay in F-35 production. They cut $955
million from the Air Force’s procurement request, and eliminated the Navy’s
procurement request. Concerned about a lack of analysis justifying DOD’s proposed
cancellation of the F136 alternate engine, authorizers added $400.8 million to JSF
R&D for this program.
FY2006
In their report H.Rept. 109-89 (H.R. 1815), House authorizers generally
supported the President’s budget. House authorizers matched all funding requests
for the F-22 and EA-18G. They also matched all funding requests for the V-22 and
the F/A-18E/F and recommended increases of $2 million and $3.2 million
respectively. While House authorizers matched DOD’s request for JSF RDT&E, it
recommended no funds for advanced procurement (-$152 million). The committee
wrote (p.92) that “the obligation of funds to begin low-rate initial production in
FY2007 is premature...” considering the recent changes to the JSF program that
postpone certain development milestones.
In report S.Rept. 109-69 (S. 1042) Senate authorizers also supported the
President’s budget. They matched all funding requests, and added $3.2 million to the
F/A-18E/F RDT&E request.
In H.Rept. 109-119 (H.R. 2862) House appropriators matched requests for F-22
procurement and RDT&E funding. Appropriators followed House authorizers by
matching the JSF RDT&E funding request but denying the request for advance
procurement, calling it premature. Appropriators provided most of the funds
requested for F/A-18E/F and EA-18G, trimming $5 million from the Super Hornet’s
$422.4 million request for modifications, and $9 million from the Growler’s RDT&E
request. Appropriators matched the Navy’s and DOD’s V-22 funding requests, but
cut a net of $8 million from Air Force procurement and added $2 million to Air Force
RDT&E accounts.
CRS-16
In S.Rept. 109-141 (H.R. 2863), Senate appropriators matched the Air Force’s
request for F-22 procurement funding, but cut the R&D request by $25 million.
Appropriators matched the Air Force’s request for JSF advanced procurement funds,
but reduced the R&D request by $270 million ($146 million from the Air Force
request and $124 million from the Navy request.) Appropriators matched the Navy’s
request for EA-18G procurement and increased the R&D request by $9 million.
Procurement requests for the F/A-18 were increased a total of $27.8 million and the
Super Hornet’s R&D request was increased by $2 million. Senate appropriators
matched all funding requests for the V-22 Osprey.
In H.Rept. 109-360 (H.R. 1815) authorization conferees matched all
procurement and funding requests. Conferees also increased the Navy’s F/A-18E/F
procurement request by $3.2 million for the Shared Reconnaissance Pod, and
increased the Air Force’s R&D request for V-22 by $2 million.
In H.Rept. 109-359, (H.R. 2863) appropriations conferees matched the Navy’s
procurement request for the EA-18G, but cut R&D by $9.1 million. Conferees
increased F/A-18E/F procurement funds by $4 million for the Shared Reconnaissance
Pod, and provided a net increase of $11 million in procurement funds for F/A-18
spare engines and modules. Appropriators cut, however, the Navy’s R&D request
for F/A-18 by $1.3 million. Appropriators matched all funding requests for the V-22,
and increased the Air Force’s R&D account by $1 million. Procurement funds
requested for the JSF were cut by $32.3 million, and R&D was reduced by $99
million. Conferees matched the Air Force’s procurement request for the F-22, but
cut R&D funds by $25 million.