Order Code RL33512
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Transportation Security:
Issues for the 109th Congress
July 5, 2006
David Randall Peterman
Analyst in Transportation
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
John Frittelli
Specialist in Transportation
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Transportation Security: Issues for the 109th Congress
Summary
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for
accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to
terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is
difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is
how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response
that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack
without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties.
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these
attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and mandating a federalized workforce of security screeners
to inspect airline passengers and their baggage.. The act gave the TSA broad
authority to assess vulnerabilities in aviation security and take steps to mitigate these
risks. The TSA’s progress on aviation security has been the subject of considerable
congressional oversight. Funding authorization for the TSA’s aviation security
functions is set to expire at the end of FY2006.
The July 2005 bombing of trains in London and the bombings of commuter
trains and subway trains in Madrid and Moscow in 2004 highlighted the vulnerability
of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. The volume of ridership and number
of access points make it impractical to subject all rail passengers to the type of
screening airline passengers undergo. Nevertheless, there are steps that can be taken
to reduce the risks and consequences of an attack. These include vulnerability
assessments, emergency planning, and emergency response training and drilling of
transit personnel, ideally in coordination with police, fire, and emergency medical
personnel, as well as purchase of communication and safety equipment. Additional
options include increasing the number of transit security personnel, installing video
surveillance equipment in vehicles and stations, and conducting random inspections
of passengers, platforms, and trains.
A leading issue with regard to securing truck, rail, and waterborne cargo is the
desire of government authorities to track a given freight shipment at a particular time.
Most of the attention with regard to cargo vulnerability concerns the tracking of
marine containers as they are trucked to and from seaports. Security experts believe
this is a particularly vulnerable point in the container supply chain. Debate over who
should pay for cargo security, government or industry, and whether mandates or
guidelines are the best approach to ensure industry’s due diligence in protecting their
supply chains are other leading issues. Hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation
raises numerous security issues. Many Members of Congress want to know whether
current federal policies, regulations, and grants could more effectively promote
hazmat transportation security at reasonable costs. There are issues regarding routing
of hazmat through urban centers, and debate persists over the pros and cons of
rerouting high-hazard shipments. This report replaces CRS Issue Brief IB10135,
Transportation Security: Issues for the 109th Congress.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Passenger Prescreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Passenger Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Baggage Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
In-Flight Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
General Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Related Legislation in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Transit and Passenger Rail Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Truck, Rail, and Marine Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Cargo Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Imported Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Private Industry’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Paying for Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program . . . . . . . . . 13
Selected Legislation in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Hazmat Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Congressional Hearings, Reports, and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Non-Mode Specific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Transit and Passenger Rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Surface and Marine Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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Transportation Security:
Issues for the 109th Congress
Most Recent Developments
On June 6, 2006, the House passed the FY2007 Department of Homeland
Security appropriations bill (H.R. 5441), which included $200 million for grants for
transit, intercity passenger rail, and freight rail security.
On May 22, 2006 the TSA and the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) for implementing the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) at U.S. ports. Longshoremen, port truck drivers, merchant
mariners, and other maritime workers will need to apply for a TWIC card to obtain
unescorted access to port facilities or vessels. The card will use biometric technology
for positive identification and TSA will conduct a security threat assessment on each
worker before issuing a card.
The proposed sale in the spring of 2006 of some U.S. port terminal facilities by
a British company to a Dubai company raised the issue of the security implications
of foreign ownership of transportation facilities, and refocused attention on port
security matters generally. Several bills on port security were introduced, and some
existing bills received further attention.
The original 9/11 Commission members, acting as a private organization called
the “9/11 Public Discourse Project,”issued a report on December 5, 2005, grading the
federal government’s progress in implementing its various recommendations. The
Commission members issued Congress a failing grade for not allocating homeland
security funds based on risk, a grade of “B” for not fully giving the House and Senate
homeland security committees exclusive jurisdiction over all counterterrorism
functions of the DHS, a “C minus” regarding DHS’s “National Strategy for
Transportation Security,” an “F” for airline passenger pre-screening, a “C” for airline
screening explosive detection, and a “D” for airline checked baggage and cargo
screening.1
In September 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) delivered a
classified report to Congress on a “National Strategy for Transportation Security.”
Also in September 2005, DHS announced the completion of a national strategy for
maritime cargo security and in October 2005 announced the completion of eight
1 9/11 Public Discourse Project, Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations,
December 5, 2005. Available at [http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf]
(viewed 7/3/2006).

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action plans to implement the maritime security strategy.2 During committee
hearings held in July 2005 on the reorganization of DHS, Secretary Chertoff
discussed a “Secure Freight” initiative that would incorporate additional shipment
documentation to better target higher risk or unknown risk marine containers for
inspection.
Background and Analysis
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for
accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to attack.
The difficulty and cost of protecting the transportation sector from attack raises a
core question for policymakers: how much effort and resources to put towards
protecting potential targets versus pursuing and fighting terrorists. While hardening
the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to
deter terrorists. The focus of this report is how best to construct and finance a system
of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and
consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel,
commerce, and civil liberties.
For all modes of transportation, one can identify four principle policy objectives
that would support a system of deterrence and protection: (1) ensuring the
trustworthiness of the passengers and the cargo flowing through the system, (2)
ensuring the trustworthiness of the transportation workers who operate and service
the vehicles, assist the passengers, or handle the cargo, (3) ensuring the
trustworthiness of the private companies that operate in the system, such as the
carriers, shippers, agents, and brokers, and (4) establishing a perimeter of security
around transportation facilities and vehicles in operation. The first three policy
objectives are concerned with preventing an attack from within a transportation
system, such as occurred on September 11, 2001. The concern is that attackers could
once again disguise themselves as legitimate passengers (or shippers or workers) to
get in position to launch an attack. The fourth policy objective is concerned with
preventing an attack from outside a transportation system. For instance, terrorists
could ram a bomb-laden speed boat into an oil tanker, as they did in October 2002
to the French oil tanker Limberg, or they could fire a shoulder-fired missile at an
airplane taking off or landing, as they attempted in November 2002 against an Israeli
charter jet in Mombasa, Kenya. Achieving all four of these objectives is difficult,
at best, and in some modes, is practically impossible. Where limited options exist for
preventing an attack, policymakers are left with evaluating options for minimizing
the consequences from an attack.
A narrower set of policy questions consider how to tailor a security strategy that
corresponds with the service requirements of each particular mode. For instance,
while prescreening all airline or cruise ship passengers is possible, pre-screening all
transit riders is practically impossible. Likewise, inspecting 100% of imported
marine cargo is practically impossible, so inspectors rely heavily on shipment
2 Available at [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0597.xml] (viewed
7/3/2006).

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documentation to select which shipments to examine more closely. The issue for
policymakers is deciding whether ensuring the trustworthiness of the passengers and
cargo flowing through each mode of transportation can be reasonably achieved and,
if so, how best to achieve it without impeding travel and commerce. Another issue
is ensuring the trustworthiness of the companies that operate in the system. The
TSA’s “known shipper” program for cargo carried aboard passenger planes and
Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) “Trade Partnership Against Terrorism” (C-
TPAT) program for cargo imported by all modes are initiatives designed to ensure
the trustworthiness of the companies that operate in the system. These two programs
essentially require the companies that routinely operate in their respective
transportation systems to vouch for the trustworthiness of each other and to alert
authorities when they spot any anomalies or suspicious activity. A point of
contention is to what extent government can rely on the transportation industry to
exercise due diligence in protecting their operations from terrorist attack. In addition
to the integrity of transportation companies, there is also the issue of the
trustworthiness of their employees. As requested by Congress, the TSA is
developing a universal biometric transportation worker ID card that is intended to
restrict access to sensitive areas within transportation facilities. One unresolved issue
is deciding what should disqualify a transportation worker from obtaining a card.
What sort of background would make someone a “security risk?”
The 109th Congress is debating other areas of disagreement with regard to
transportation security. It is debating whether the nation is doing enough, and is
acting in a timely fashion, to secure transportation systems, particularly for non-
aviation modes of transportation. It is debating financial issues, such as what level
of spending will buy what level of security and who should pay for security: federal
taxpayers, state and local governments, system users, or some sort of cost share
arrangement among all of the above. How federal security dollars should be
allocated across the country is a focal point of the debate. In its oversight role,
Congress continues to examine the effectiveness of DHS initiatives to strengthen
transportation security, including the degree of coordination among agencies within
DHS towards that effort.
Aviation Security
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these
attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the TSA and mandating a federalized
workforce of security screeners to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The
act gave the TSA broad authority to assess vulnerabilities in aviation security and
take steps to mitigate these risks. The TSA’s progress on aviation security has been
the subject of considerable congressional oversight. Aviation security policy and
programs continue to be of considerable interest in the 109th Congress and funding
authorization for the TSA’s aviation security functions is set to expire at the end of
FY2006.
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach. Aviation security policy since
September 11, 2001, consists of two basic principles: a risk-based approach for
allocating limited security resources to where they are considered most needed, and

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a multi-layered strategy that establishes redundancies to thwart a potential terrorist
attack.
The risk-based approach implemented by the TSA has been criticized by some
who believe that an overemphasis on allocating resources to screening airline
passengers has left the system vulnerable to attacks in other areas — namely air cargo
operations; airport access controls; protecting airliners from shoulder-fired missiles;
and the security of general aviation aircraft. In essence, these critics argue that the
implementation of aviation security policy since September 11, 2001, has focused too
heavily on protecting aircraft from past attack scenarios — such as suicide hijackings
and luggage bombs carried out by airline passengers — and has not given enough
attention to other potential vulnerabilities.
Given the emphasis on protecting against bombings and suicide hijackings, the
multi-layered concept for aviation security is most apparent in the protection of
passenger airliners. Passengers undergo prescreening to check their names against
lists of known and suspected terrorists, then passengers and their carry-on items are
screened and checked baggage is passed through explosive detection systems (EDS)
prior to aircraft boarding. Once on board, security measures such as air marshals,
hardened cockpit doors, and armed pilots provide added layers of security to thwart
an attempted hijacking. The principle objectives of these measures are to prevent
aircraft bombings and hijackings by terrorist passengers. However, the effectiveness
of the TSA’s implementation of virtually all of these security layers has been brought
into question at some time or another since its creation.
Passenger Prescreening. Efforts to improve passenger prescreening have
been impacted by concerns over the adequacy of measures to protect fliers’ personal
information and not infringe upon their civil rights. Critics argued that the TSA’s
ever-expanding vision for prescreening was to include data mining of commercial
and government databases to look for indicators that someone may pose a threat, and
searches of notoriously inaccurate criminal databases. These concerns were spurred
by vague statements issued by the TSA as to how it might authenticate passenger
identity and check for possible links to terrorism along with media reports linking
passenger prescreening to controversial proposals such as the Department of
Defense’s Total Information Awareness program to detect terrorists by mining
personal data. This controversy ultimately led the TSA to scrap its proposed
enhanced passenger prescreening system, the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening II (CAPPS II), in August 2004, and pursue enhanced prescreening
capabilities under a new system called Secure Flight. While Secure Flight is touted
to be a significantly scaled down approach to prescreening compared to CAPPS II,
concerns over data protections and redress procedures for passengers falsely
identified by the system have also delayed its deployment. Provisions in the FY2006
Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90) prohibit the TSA from fully
deploying the Secure Flight program until these ongoing concerns are adequately
addressed and also prohibit the use of commercial data or the transfer of passenger
data to a non-federal entity. While commercial databases have potential to
authenticate the identity of passengers, concerns have been raised about TSA’s past
handling of passenger data in a manner that was not fully explained to the public,
leading to this restriction on the transfer of personal data between the government

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and private entities other than the initial exchange of passenger name records from
the airlines.
The TSA is also evaluating trials of a Registered Traveler (RT) program
designed to speed the passage through security checkpoints of frequent fliers who
voluntarily submit background information and biometric identifiers. The RT trials
concluded in October 2005, but the TSA has indicated that a nationwide RT program
should be up and running by summer 2006. According to the TSA, it will be up to
individual airports to determine if they wish to participate in the future RT program.
Trials of a public-private partnership similar to the RT program are still ongoing at
Orlando International Airport and this pilot program is expected to continue through
mid-2006. About 20 airports are expected to be part of the initial roll out of the
nationwide RT program. However, as TSA moves forward with RT, the airline
industry, which once backed this program as a means to reduce hassles for frequent
fliers, now characterizes the manner in which it is being implemented as having
limited and questionable benefit.
Passenger Screening. With regard to screening passengers, the TSA has
struggled to strike a balance between effectively screening passengers for threat
objects without causing undue delays and hassles to travelers. While the TSA is
usually keeping passenger wait times below the stated objective of 10 minutes in
most airport checkpoint queues, audits of airport screening have concluded that
screener performance still needs improvement. The Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General found that screener training, screening
technology, policies and procedures, and management and supervision of screening
operations all contributed to observed deficiencies in screener performance.
Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA give priority attention
to implementing technology and procedures for screening passengers for explosives,
something not currently done routinely at screening checkpoints. To address this
recommendation, the TSA is pilot testing walk-through trace detection portals and
has implemented procedures for conducting pat-down searches of passengers for
explosives. Provisions to improve checkpoint technologies to detect explosives were
included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458, hereafter the “Terrorism Prevention Act”).
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening. A key issue in
the debate over aviation security immediately following September 11, 2001, was
whether airport security screeners should be federalized. At that time, airport
screening operations suffered from high turnover, poor supervision and training, low
wages, and a lack of regulatory oversight. All of these factors were believed to have
contributed to a poor performing and highly vulnerable screening system.
Federalizing the screener workforce was offered as a potential solution to address
these deficiencies. However, while Congress ultimately resolved to federalize the
screener workforce at most airports under ATSA, the act also set up a pilot program
using contract screeners at five airports and gave all airports the option to request
private screeners on an airport-by-airport basis starting November 19, 2004. While
several airports have expressed an interest in private screening, they are being
cautious in proceeding because the TSA has offered few details and limited guidance
on how private screening will be implemented. Another factor that has limited
airport interest in private screening has been lingering liability concerns. Language

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in the FY2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90, Section 547)
indemnifies airports from liability relating to their decisions to either request private
screeners or continue using federal screeners and from any claims that may arise due
to negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of airport security screeners,
whether they be federal or private.
Baggage Screening. While airports are, for the most part, meeting
mandated requirements to inspect checked bags with explosive detection system
(EDS) equipment 100% of the time, airports are continuing to struggle with the
daunting task of integrating these systems into baggage handling and sorting
facilities. To address these needs, Congress established (in Vision 100, P.L. 108-
176) an Aviation Security Capital Fund with a mandatory funding level of $250
million annually and a total authorized funding level of $500 million per year through
FY2007. Congress also gave the TSA the authority to issue letters of intent (LOIs)
to airports, committing future funding toward in-line EDS integration projects.
Despite these measures, efforts to integrate EDS systems at all airports is progressing
slowly, prompting the 9/11 Commission to recommend that the TSA expedite
installation of these in-line baggage screening systems. Provisions to expedite and
increase funding for in-line baggage screening were included in the Terrorism
Prevention Act. In contrast to authorization language in Vision 100 that set federal
funding levels for aviation security capital projects at 90% for large and medium
hubs and at 95% for all other airports, appropriations language (see P.L. 109-90)
limits the federal share of project costs under LOIs to 75% for medium and large
hubs, and 90% for all other airports. Meeting funding needs for airport security
projects and setting priorities amid budgetary constraints remains an ongoing
challenge for Congress.
Air Cargo Security. Some Members of Congress have voiced concerns that,
while 100% of passenger baggage is required to be screened, only a relatively small
amount of cargo carried on passenger airplanes is screened or inspected. The 9/11
Commission recommended that TSA intensify its efforts to identify, track, and screen
potentially dangerous cargo. Congress responded by increasing funding for air cargo
security operations and research to $115 million in FY2005, compared to $85 million
in FY2004, and designating funds for expanding the known shipper program for
vetting shipments on passenger aircraft; increasing oversight of cargo security; and
continuing research and development of technologies to improve air cargo security.
In FY2006 funding for air cargo security dropped back down to $55 million for
operations plus an additional $30 million set aside for three cargo screening pilot
programs that will be carried out by the S&T directorate under the new consolidation
of DHS research and development activities. Language in th FY2006 DHS
appropriations act also directs the TSA to work with other DHS components to
develop technologies that will aid in meeting the objective of screening 100% of all
cargo placed on passenger airliners. Despite the drop in funding levels compared to
FY2005, this funding provides for an additional 100 air cargo security compliance
inspectors.
The 9/11 Commission also recommended deploying at least one hardened cargo
container on each passenger airliner for carrying suspect cargo. While this
recommendation was reflected in a Terrorism Prevention Act provision mandating
a study of the proposal to deploy blast resistant cargo containers, this study has not

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yet been funded or commenced. While hardened containers are designed to mitigate
the threat of a terrorist bomb carried in a cargo shipment or luggage, some
policymakers believe that the only effective way to mitigate such a threat is to screen
all cargo placed on passenger aircraft as is currently done for checked baggage. The
TSA, however, has cautioned that such an approach is not technically and logistically
feasible at the present time without unduly impacting cargo operations on passenger
aircraft. The TSA has instead proposed a strategic plan calling for the use of risk-
based prescreening techniques to identify cargo for targeted inspection or exclusion
from carriage on passenger aircraft and a threefold increase in random inspections.
In addition to improving the screening of cargo placed on passenger aircraft,
improvements in security programs for all-cargo operations are planned to protect
against unauthorized access to large all-cargo aircraft. Under new cargo security
rules set to take effect in the fall of 2006, secured areas of airports will be expanded
to include cargo operations areas thus requiring criminal background checks and
security threat assessments for an estimated 50,000 additional airport workers. The
new regulations would also impose requirements on freight forwarders that ship by
air and require security threat assessments for workers with access to cargo including
an estimated 51,000 off-airport employees of freight forwarding companies. Also,
under the pending regulations, an industry-wide database of known shippers would
be established and maintained by TSA to allow freight forwarders and airlines to vet
cargo shipments.
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls. While ATSA mandated
background checks for all workers with unescorted access to passenger aircraft and
secured areas of airports, concerns over the adequacy of security measures for these
workers have been raised because, in some cases, airport workers are permitted to
bypass airport screening checkpoints. Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress
called for the physical screening of all workers with access to aircraft or secured
areas. ATSA also called for the TSA to explore the use of biometrics and other
identification technologies for credentialing transport workers and the use of
biometrics for airport access controls. The Terrorism Prevention Act required the
TSA to issue guidance on the use of biometrics for airport access controls and the use
of biometric technology to verify the identity of law enforcement officers authorized
to carry firearms on passenger airliners.
In-Flight Security Measures. Existing in-flight security measures consist
primarily of federal air marshals, armed pilots on some flights, and hardened cockpit
doors. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was greatly expanded under ATSA
and air marshals are required on all high risk flights. In November 2003, the Federal
Air Marshal program was taken out of the TSA and realigned with the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However, the DHS Second Stage
Review (2SR), issued in June 2005, proposed that the FAMS be placed back in the
TSA, a proposal that Congress agreed to in report language accompanying the
FY2006 DHS appropriations act. FAMS is once again part of the TSA. Recently,
FAMS has been criticized by some current and former air marshals for procedures
– such as dress codes and check-in procedures – that, they assert, compromise the
covert mission of FAMS and place marshals and the traveling public at risk.

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Despite the administration’s initial reservations over allowing airline pilots to
be armed, airline pilots may receive training allowing them to serve as armed federal
flight deck officers under provisions set forth in the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-296). Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) expanded the program to include all-cargo
pilots and other flight crew members such as flight engineers. Congress appropriated
$27 million for FY2006 to administer the program and conduct initial and recurrent
training and qualification to pilots that volunteer to participate in the program.
However, there are lingering concerns that the procedures to apply for the program
are too cumbersome and the training site is too remote to accommodate many pilots
interested in participating in the program and that restrictive policies over carrying
guns outside the cockpit potentially limit the program’s effectiveness.
ATSA also mandated the implementation of hardened cockpit doors and
stringent controls regarding access to the flight deck. The Terrorism Prevention Act
contains a provision to study the use of secondary flight deck barriers — a concept
United Airlines is moving forward with on its own initiative — to overcome the
vulnerability introduced when a hardened cockpit door is opened in flight for meal
service or when a pilot needs to access the aircraft lavatory.
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat. Concerns have also been raised over
the potential threat to civil aircraft posed by shoulder-fired missiles (also known as
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems or MANPADS). Appropriations language in
FY2003 directed the DHS to establish a program evaluating the feasibility of
adopting military aircraft anti-missile systems for use on passenger jets. This
program is still ongoing. Two contract teams, led by Northrop-Grumman and BAE
Systems, are developing prototype anti-missile systems. Language in the Terrorism
Prevention Act calls for the FAA to implement an expedited process to certify the
safety of aircraft-based counter-MANPADS systems and also includes language
directing the administration to urgently pursue international arms-control agreements
to limit the proliferation of MANPADS. FY2006 DHS appropriations (P.L. 109-90)
provided $110 million for the continued evaluation and refinement of these aircraft-
based countermeasures, but do not set aside any of this funding for exploring
alternative technologies as proposed by the House. However, in April 2006, the DHS
issued a solicitation seeking alternative counter-MANPADS technologies for a
demonstration project.
General Aviation Security. While some policymakers have expressed
concern that security measures for general aviation aircraft are, in their estimation,
weak and practically non-existent, general aviation operators have countered that they
have been overburdened by unnecessary airspace and airport restrictions. General
aviation restrictions are most prevalent in the Washington, DC area, where the city
is encircled by a 15-mile radius flight restricted zone in which general aviation
operations are significantly limited, and a larger air defense identification zone
where pilots must strictly adhere to special air traffic control procedures. In August
2005, the DHS implemented a security plan permitting certain general aviation
flights — mostly large charter and corporate operations — to resume at Washington
Reagan National Airport (DCA) which is located at the center of the flight restricted
area. At various times, flight restrictions have also been put in place over New York
City, Chicago, and elsewhere. General aviation pilots have been restricted from
flying over Disney and other theme parks, and over stadiums during major sporting

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events, leading some general aviation advocates to question whether special interests
were using the umbrella of security concerns to curtail unwanted advertising
overflights. Securing general aviation operations continues to be a significant
challenge because of the diversity of operations, aircraft, and airports. Measures put
in place thus far, such as the Airport Watch program and TSA’s general aviation
security guidelines, rely heavily on the vigilance of the pilot community to detect and
report suspicious activity. In the area of flight training, flight training providers are
engaged in verifying citizenship or confirming that background checks have been
properly completed before providing training to foreign nationals. A provision in the
Terrorism Prevention Act would allow aircraft leasing and charter companies to
voluntarily provide the TSA with names of prospective customers for prescreening
against the consolidated terrorist watchlist. Also, the FY2006 DHS appropriations
act (P.L. 109-90) requires the DHS to assess security vulnerabilities from general
aviation aircraft and identify steps that can be taken to enhance the security of general
aviation aircraft and airports.
Related Legislation in the 109th Congress. Several aviation security-
related measures are under consideration in the 109th Congress. A Senate bill (S.
1052) reauthorizing the TSA through FY2009 was reported in the Senate on February
27, 2006. While the bill does not propose substantial changes to funding levels for
aviation security and focuses primarily on security initiatives for surface and
maritime transportation, it proposes to improve aviation security by establishing an
internship pilot program intended to improve recruitment and retention of airport
screeners, and by revising deadlines for the TSA to issue regulations regarding the
security of aircraft repair stations and to conduct security reviews of foreign repair
stations that were mandated under the Terrorism Prevention Act. The bill would also
require the TSA to study alternative means for collecting security fees from airline
passengers, and implement any alternative fee collection systems deemed feasible.
Also, the bill proposes to require the TSA to issue rules and submit any proposed
changes for congressional review before increasing the security fees paid directly by
the air carriers (the aviation security infrastructure fees or ASIF).
While the House has not considered a formal TSA reauthorization bill per se,
the Transportation Security Administration Reorganization Act of 2005 (H.R. 4439)
is widely regarded as a key bill that proposes to restructure the aviation security
screening functions of the TSA, increase passenger security fees, and establish an
optional airport security fee to fund security-related projects. While the bill —
introduced by Representative Lungren on December 6, 2005 and amended by the
House Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cybersecurity on March 16, 2006 — would increase passenger security fees, it
proposes to eliminate the fees paid directly by the airlines for aviation security (the
ASIF). Addressing organizational issues, H.R. 4439 seeks management reform
within the TSA by establishing an Airport Screening Organization (ASO) to increase
efficiency, make better use of new technologies, reduce costs, and respond more
effectively to the needs of the traveling public while enhancing aviation security.
The proposed ASO would be responsible for day-to-day federal screening operations
at airports and would be accountable for meeting annual performance goals in areas
such as improving screening efficiency, increasing system capacity, reducing
passenger inconvenience, reducing costs, and accelerating the advancement and
deployment of new screening equipment and technologies. Additionally, H.R. 4439

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seeks to improve the oversight and implementation of private screening alternatives
under the so-called opt-out provision for airports by: ensuring that funding for airport
screening is allocated to airports according to a set formula without regard to whether
federal or private screeners are used; establishing standard operating procedures for
security screening under the TSA’s Screening Partnership Program (SPP) with
private screening entities; requiring that the TSA set performance goals for private
screening operations; and allowing the TSA to establish incentive awards for private
screening entities that meet or exceed performance goals. The amended bill as
agreed to by the subcommittee would also reauthorize the Aviation Security Capital
Fund, intended primarily to fund in-line EDS projects, and would increase mandatory
funding levels for this fund from $250 million to $600 million (see CRS Report
RS22375, Reauthorizing and Restructuring the Transportation Security
Administration’s Aviation Security Functions: Legislative Issues and Approaches).
While H.R. 4439 seeks to expand the use of private screeners largely by offering
additional incentives to airports that propose using private screeners, the Passenger
Security Act of 2005 (H.R. 3172), on the contrary, seeks to repeal the opt-out
provision. While some policymakers argue that aviation security is a critical
homeland security function that should be provided by the federal government, to
date airports with federal screeners have not demonstrated any significant interest in
shifting to private screeners anyway. Nevertheless, the policy debate over whether
private screeners should be part of the overall strategy for homeland security remains
highly contentious.
Other legislation has been introduced in the 109th Congress addressing more
specific aviation security issues. For example, Representative Markey has offered
the Strengthen Aviation Security Act (H.R. 2649) which endeavors to improve
aviation security by: phasing-in 100% screening of cargo carried on passenger
airplanes; establishing no-fly zones around sensitive nuclear and chemical facilities
during periods of heightened terror alert; and requiring vulnerability assessments and
security enhancements at general aviation airports. The bill also would: require
installing cockpit doors and partitions on all-cargo aircraft; provide for training of
law enforcement officers who travel armed on commercial flights; require enhanced
background checks and physical screening of airport workers; and establish
whistleblower protections for aviation security workers. Representative Markey also
introduced the Air Cargo Security Act (H.R. 2044) which would require regular
inspections of shipping facilities and security training for cargo handlers.
Additionally, Representative Oberstar introduced the Airport Screener Technology
Improvement Act of 2005 (H.R. 1818) which would create a Checkpoint Screening
Security Fund for deploying next generation checkpoint screening technologies and
would significantly increase the funding levels for the Aviation Security Capital
Fund. Also, Representative Israel has introduced the Commercial Airline Missile
Defense Act (H.R. 2780) which calls for equipping all air carrier passenger jets with
electronic systems to protect against shoulder-fired missiles. In July 2005,
Representative Sweeney introduced the General Aviation Security Act of 2005 (H.R.
3397) that would require all general aviation airports to implement specific security
plans and specific security procedures that would be reviewed by the DHS every
three years. (CRS contact: Bart Elias)

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Transit and Passenger Rail Security
The bombings of transit trains and a bus in London in July 2005, like the
bombings of commuter trains and subway trains in Madrid and Moscow in 2004,
highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger
rail systems — primarily subway systems — in the United States carry about five
times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of
track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. The increased
security efforts around air travel have led to concerns that terrorists may turn their
attention to ‘softer’ targets, such as transit or passenger rail. A key challenge
Congress faces is balancing the desire for increased rail passenger security with the
efficient functioning of transit systems, with the potential costs of an attack, and with
other federal priorities.
The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to
subject all rail passengers to the type of screening airline passengers undergo (though
the New York City subway system is now conducting random voluntary searches of
passengers’ bags). Consequently, transit security measures tend to emphasize
managing the consequences of an attack. Nevertheless, there are steps that can be
taken to reduce the risks, as well as the consequences, of an attack. These include
conducting vulnerability assessments; emergency planning; and emergency response
training and drilling of transit personnel, ideally in coordination with police, fire, and
emergency medical personnel. Additional options include increasing the number of
transit security personnel, installing video surveillance equipment in vehicles and
stations, and conducting random inspections of platforms and trains using bomb-
sniffing dogs.
The challenges of securing rail passengers are dwarfed by the challenge of
securing bus passengers. There are some 76,000 buses carrying 19 million passengers
each weekday in the United States. Some transit systems have installed video
cameras on their buses, and Congress has provided grants for security improvements
to intercity buses. But the number and operation characteristics of transit buses make
them all but impossible to secure.
There are no independent assessments of transit security needs and costs. The
Department of Homeland Security provides grants for transit, passenger rail, and
freight rail security under the Urbanized Areas Security Initiative program. Congress
provided $150 million for these grants in FY2005 and in FY2006. The House-passed
FY2007 DHS appropriations bill (H.R. 5441) would provide $200 million for these
grants. S. 1052, which was reported in the Senate on February 27, 2006, would
authorize funding for passenger (and freight) rail security activities. The transit
community has requested $5.2 billion in federal funding for security-related capital
improvements, and $800 million annually in security-related operating assistance.
The ability of the transit community to pay these costs themselves is limited; transit
agencies run operating deficits and require government assistance just to maintain
their operations. In light of current and projected federal deficits, federal activities
potentially face constrained budgets. Given limited resources, some argue that the
federal government could better enhance domestic security, at less cost, through
strengthening the anti-terrorist efforts of intelligence-gathering and law-enforcement

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agencies rather than funding security improvements to the many potential domestic
targets. (CRS contact: David Randall Peterman)
Truck, Rail, and Marine Cargo Security
Cargo Visibility. A leading issue with regard to securing truck, rail, and
waterborne cargo is to what extent government authorities need the capability to track
a given shipment at a particular time. One can envision a scenario where government
authorities receive intelligence that a terrorist weapon or terrorists themselves are
being smuggled in a particular shipment. Authorities would then want to locate that
shipment immediately as well as any other possible shipments that were suspect
based on having similar shipment particulars. Currently, outside the parcel industry,
authorities would have limited capabilities to locate such shipments quickly. Some
trucking firms have outfitted their trucks with Global Positioning System (GPS)
technology. However, this capability is generally limited to large trucking firms
which have a large enough fleet to make tracking equipment commercially
worthwhile, in addition to having the financial resources to afford such technology.
Smaller trucking firms, which carry a significant portion of freight, have not invested
in this technology. Railroads have outfitted their cars with Automatic Equipment
Identification (AEI) technology, but this technology only allows tracking where a
reader has been installed, such as at terminals and rail yards. Thus most railcars can
be tracked at certain points but not in real-time.
Most of the attention with regard to cargo visibility concerns the tracking of
marine shipping containers. Marine containers are not currently outfitted with
tracking devices, but it is common practice to seal container doors with tamper-
evident fixtures. Security officials are concerned that a particularly vulnerable stage
in the container shipping process occurs when containers are trucked to the overseas
port of loading or when they are trucked from the U.S. port of unloading to their final
U.S. destination. A sensor or tracking device could help ensure the integrity of
container shipments during these vulnerable stages. Since the September 11, 2001
attack, there has been rapid development of palm-sized tracking devices and sensors
that could be inserted on an interior wall of a container. However, while this so-
called “smart-box” technology is being tested in selected routes, it has not been
resolved whether and how best to deploy it on a widespread basis. In the near term,
shippers and carriers favor using the best container seals currently in use rather than
moving to the more costly sensor and tracking devices.
Imported Cargo. Of particular concern is ensuring the integrity of imported
cargo. Over 11 million marine containers from all corners of the globe arrive at U.S.
seaports annually, while 11 million truckloads and over 2 million railcars arrive at
U.S. land border crossings. Since the September 11, 2001 attack, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has issued new requirements requiring freight carriers to
report cargo manifests (shipment information) before they reach U.S. borders.
Container ships must report shipment details on each container 24 hours before it is
loaded at a foreign port. Truckers from Canada and Mexico must report their trailers’
contents from 30 minutes to an hour prior to border arrival and railroads must report
this information two hours prior to border arrival. CBP analyzes the cargo manifests
and other intelligence to select which cargo units to physically inspect. CBP’s
selection process is thus critical in keeping terrorists and their weapons from being

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smuggled into the country. In its oversight role, Congress is scrutinizing CBP’s
cargo inspection process. A GAO investigation found significant shortcomings with
current marine container inspection procedures and made recommendations for
improving them.3
Private Industry’s Role. Because most surface and marine freight
transportation assets are owned by private industry, and because there are too many
shipments for government to monitor on its own, government officials have to rely
extensively on private industry to tighten control over their supply chains. Industry
has taken steps to protect their operations from terrorist infiltration. The Association
of American Railroads has conducted a security risk assessment that prioritizes the
industry’s assets and lists countermeasures to be taken at different alert levels.
Railroads have also created a “Railway Alert Network” that is designed to make sure
individual railroads receive timely threat information. Barge operators have created
a “Model Vessel Security Plan” through their industry association, the American
Waterways Operators. The American Trucking Associations has expanded a
“Highway Watch” program to include training for drivers on how to spot suspicious
activity. Intermodal (container) shippers have created a “Smart and Secure Trade
Lanes” program to evaluate anti-tampering and tracking devices for marine
containers. An issue for policymakers is determining the best approach for ensuring
private industry’s cooperation and due diligence over the long term. For example,
policymakers are evaluating which security measures should be mandated versus
which ones should be issued as guidelines or “best practices.” How to validate that
the agreed upon security measures are in fact being carried out by industry is also an
issue.
Paying for Cargo Security. Freight carriers and shippers are private, for-
profit corporations, which raises the issue of whether they or general taxpayers
should pay for security improvements. Advocates for public funding argue that
homeland security is a national concern and therefore a federal government
responsibility that should be paid for from the general Treasury. Others argue that
carriers and shippers are the direct beneficiaries of improved cargo security. They
argue that it is in their own economic interest to protect their assets from terrorist
attack, that additional security measures also deter cargo theft which is costly to the
freight industry, and that therefore they should bear the cost of security
improvements. Several legislative efforts to establish a security fee paid by industry
to generate funds for a federal port security grant program have failed in Congress.
Meanwhile, some ports and freight carriers are beginning to add security surcharges
to their freight invoices while other carriers are presumably incorporating extra
security-related costs in their freight rates.
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program. On May
22, 2006 the TSA and the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
3 United States Government Accountability Office, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing
Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and
Inspection Efforts, GAO-05-557, April 2005. See also Cargo Container Inspections:
Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting
System, GAO-06-591T, March 30, 2006.

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(NPRM) for implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) at U.S. ports.4 Longshoremen, port truck drivers, merchant mariners, and
other maritime workers will need to apply for a TWIC card to obtain unescorted
access to port facilities or vessels. The card will use biometric technology for
positive identification and TSA will conduct a security threat assessment on each
worker before issuing a card. The security threat assessment will use the same
procedures and standards established by TSA for truck drivers carrying hazardous
materials. These standards examine criminal history, immigration status, mental
capacity, and terrorist activity to determine whether a worker poses a security threat.
A worker will pay a fee of between $95 to $149 depending on the type of worker, and
that is intended to cover the cost of administering the cards. Port facility operators
will be responsible for deploying card readers at the gates to their facilities. TSA is
considering whether to incorporate the TWIC system into all modes of transportation.
Selected Legislation in the 109th Congress. In the aftermath of the
controversy over the Dubai Ports World deal, numerous bills related to port security
were introduced and some existing bills received further Congressional action. S.
1052, which was reported by the Senate Commerce Committee, would impose a
deadline of January 1, 2007 for transportation worker credentialing regulations to be
issued, require performance standards for marine container seals and locks, require
a feasibility study on the creation of a port security user fee, and advance the timing
that maritime importers submit customs entry data. S. 2008 and S. 2459, the Green
Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act, and H.R. 4954, The SAFE Port Act, would offer
the benefit of reduced port inspections to shippers that agreed to adopt certain
security measures to protect their shipments from terrorist infiltration. (CRS contact:
John Frittelli)
Hazmat Cargo Security
Hundreds of thousands of trucks and railroad tank cars transport tons of
hazardous materials (hazmat) daily. These shipments can be used as instruments or
targets of terror. There is a virtually unlimited number of ways that the hazmat
transportation system is at risk from terrorists. For example, tank trucks can be
attacked, drivers can be killed, and loads can be hijacked and released during
shipment. Simply put, there are too many points of vulnerability to ensure security
during hazmat transportation. A major challenge is to cost effectively increase the
security of these shipments, especially those that pose the most danger to the public,
while still meeting, to the extent possible, the transportation requirements of
commerce.
Industry and government are gradually implementing a “layered” system of
measures affecting shippers, carriers, and drivers to reduce associated security risks.
This system involves incident prevention, preparedness, and response. The
Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Homeland Security (DHS) have taken
actions to enhance the security of hazmat transportation. For example, DOT requires
shippers and carriers to implement security plans regarding specified hazmat
transportation. DOT grants encourage state and some local governmental personnel
4 Federal Register, v. 71, no. 98, May 22, 2006, pp. 29396-29462.

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to conduct hazmat inspections and to plan and train for spills of these materials.
Also, this Department has contacted thousands of companies that are seeking to
improve their security programs, and has established communication links with
industry.
DHS conveys threat information to law enforcement and industry, and conducts
vulnerability assessments. DHS administers a grant that provides for the training and
communications infrastructure which truck drivers, highway workers, and others use
to report potential security threats and safety concerns on the Nation’s roads. DHS
seeks to determine whether specified commercial drivers pose a security threat
necessitating denial of the hazmat endorsement of their commercial drivers license.
Whether the pace of these actions is adequate or not is subject to debate. It is widely
recognized that more could be done to promote hazmat transportation security, but
additional costs would be incurred and tradeoffs would need to be considered.
There remain many issues associated with hazmat transportation security. Many
Members of Congress want to know whether current federal policies, regulations, and
grants could more effectively promote hazmat transportation security at reasonable
costs. There are issues regarding routing of hazmat through urban centers and debate
persists over the pros and cons of rerouting high hazard shipments. H.R. 153 and
H.R. 1109 include a provision that would require the DHS to prepare a vulnerability
assessment of freight rail transportation and to identify security risks that are specific
to the transportation of hazmats by rail. H.R. 153 would provide grants to address
threats pertaining to the security of hazmat transportation by rail. H.R. 909 would
establish a research program intended to advance security measures for hazmat
transportation. H.R. 5604 would limit the variety of hazardous materials which
commercial truck drivers would have to undergo screening to transport. S. 1052
would require the development of security-training guidelines for employees of short-
term truck leasing companies and encourage the development of tracking devices for
hazmat shipments. SAFETEA (P.L. 109-59) which was enacted in August 2005,
includes a provision intended to ensure that Mexican- and Canadian-domiciled truck
drivers transporting specified hazmat loads in the United States are subject to a
background check similar to that required of U.S. drivers. Other options include
increased security awareness training for state truck inspectors and certain employees
of truck leasing companies, and requiring enhanced security plans and
communication systems for carriers of high hazard materials shipments beyond those
now required. Each of these options poses costs that need to be evaluated within the
context of other investments. (CRS Contact: John Frittelli)
Congressional Hearings, Reports, and Documents
Non-Mode Specific
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Proposed
Reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security, July 19, 2005.

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Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Department
of Homeland Security — Second Stage Review, July 14, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. The Secretary’s Second-Stage Review.
July 14, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Proposed FY2006 Budget:
Integrating Homeland Security Screening Operations. March 2, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. TSA Budget
Proposal for FY2006. February 15, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The
Department of Homeland Security: The Road Ahead. January 26, 2005.
Aviation
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The Future of Registered Traveler.
November 3, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Improving Management of the
Aviation Screening Workforce. July 28, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Leveraging Technology to
Improve Aviation Security - Part II, July 19, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Leveraging Technology to
Improve Aviation Security, July 13, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Registered Traveler
Program, Part II. June 16, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Registered Traveler
Program. June 9, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. General Aviation
Security and Operations. June 9, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Screening of Airline Pilots:
Sound Security Practice or Waste of Resources. May 13, 2005.

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Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. TSA Budget
Proposal for FY2006. April 26, 2005.
GAO Report GAO-05-457. Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance
Measurement Strengthened but More Work Remains. Released May 2, 2005.
Transit and Passenger Rail
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on
Highways, Transit, and Pipelines. Transit and Over-the-Road Bus Security.
March 29, 2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The London Bombings: Protecting
Civilian Targets from Terrorist Attacks - Part II. October 20, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. After the
London Attacks: What Lessons Have Been Learned to Secure U.S. Transit
Systems?. September 21, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The London Bombings: Protecting
Civilian Targets from Terrorist Attacks. September 7, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology. The London Attacks: Training to
Respond in a Mass Transit Environment. July 26, 2005.
Surface and Marine Cargo
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Reforming HAZMAT Trucking
Security. November 1, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Domestic Passenger
and Freight Rail Security. October 20, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Homeland Security Missions of
the Post- 9/11 Coast Guard. June 8, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Container
Security Initiative and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: Securing
the Global Supply Chain or Trojan Horse?. May 26, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Port Security. May
17, 2005.

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House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on
Highways, Transit, and Pipelines. Background Check Process for Truckers’
Hazmat Endorsements. May 11, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Railroads.
New Technologies for Rail Safety and Security. April 28, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Subcommittee. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Implementation.
April 20, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Subcommittee. FY2006 Budget for the Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Programs; H.R. 889, The Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2005. March 3, 2005.
Inspector General Report OIG-05-10. Review of the Port Security Grant Program.
January 2005.
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RL33194, Securing General Aviation, by Bart Elias.
CRS Report RL32022, Air Cargo Security, by Bartholomew Elias.
CRS Report RS21920, Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers:
Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues, by Dana Shea and
Daniel Morgan.
CRS Report RS22234, Homeland Security: Protecting Airspace in the National
Capital Region, by Bart Elias.
CRS Report RL32625, Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues, by David
Randall Peterman.
CRS Report RL33383, Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and
Maritime Security, by John F. Frittelli.
CRS Report RS21293, Terrorist Nuclear Attack on Seaports: Threat and Response,
by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS Report RS21997, Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear
Attack Using Oil Tankers, by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS Report RS21125, Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations — Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RS22041, Legal Issues Concerning State and Local Authority to
Restrict the Transportation of Hazardous Materials by Rail, by Todd B.
Tatelman.
CRS Report RL32740, Security Threat Assessments for Hazmat Drivers, by Paul F.
Rothberg.
CRS Report RL32851, Hazardous Materials Transportation Security: Highway and
Rail Modes, by Paul F. Rothberg.
CRS Report RL33048, Marine Security of Hazardous Chemical Cargo, by Paul W.
Parformak and John Frittelli.

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CRS Report RL32073, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Issues
for Congress, by Paul W. Parformak.
CRS Report RL32863, Homeland Security Department: FY2006 Appropriations, by
Jennifer E. Lake and Blas Nuñez-Neto.

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