Order Code IB10135
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Transportation Security:
Issues for the 109th Congress
Updated June 23, 2006
David Randall Peterman, Coordinator
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Aviation Security
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach
Passenger Prescreening
Passenger Screening
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening
Baggage Screening
Air Cargo Security
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls
In-Flight Security Measures
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat
General Aviation Security
Related Legislation in the 109th Congress
Transit and Passenger Rail Security
Truck, Rail, and Marine Cargo Security
Cargo Visibility
Imported Cargo
Private Industry’s Role
Paying for Cargo Security
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program
Selected Legislation in the 109th Congress
Hazmat Cargo Security
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
Non-Mode Specific
Aviation
Transit and Passenger Rail
Surface and Marine Cargo
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Transportation Security: Issues for the 109th Congress
SUMMARY
The nation’s air, land, and marine trans-
undergo. Nevertheless, there are steps that can
portation systems are designed for accessibil-
be taken to reduce the risks and consequences
ity and efficiency, two characteristics that
of an attack. These include vulnerability
make them highly vulnerable to terrorist
assessments; emergency planning; and emer-
attack. While hardening the transportation
gency response training and drilling of transit
sector from terrorist attack is difficult, reason-
personnel, ideally in coordination with police,
able measures can be taken to deter terrorists.
fire, and emergency medical personnel, as
The focus of this issue brief is how best to
well as purchase of communication and safety
construct and finance a system of deterrence,
equipment. Additional options include in-
protection, and response that effectively re-
creasing the number of transit security person-
duces the possibility and consequences of
nel, installing video surveillance equipment in
another terrorist attack without unduly inter-
vehicles and stations, and conducting random
fering with travel, commerce, and civil liber-
inspections of platforms and trains using
ties.
bomb-sniffing dogs.
Aviation security has been a major focus
A leading issue with regard to securing
of transportation security policy following the
truck, rail, and waterborne cargo is the desire
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the
of government authorities to track a given
aftermath of these attacks, the 107th Congress
freight shipment at a particular time. Most of
moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Trans-
the attention with regard to cargo vulnerability
portation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71)
concerns the tracking of marine containers as
creating the Transportation Security Adminis-
they are trucked to and from seaports. Secu-
tration (TSA) and mandating a federalized
rity experts believe this is a particularly vul-
workforce of security screeners to inspect
nerable point in the container supply chain.
airline passengers and their baggage. The act
Debate over who should pay for cargo secu-
gave the TSA broad authority to assess vulner-
rity, government or industry, and whether
abilities in aviation security and take steps to
mandates or guidelines are the best approach
mitigate these risks. The TSA’s progress on
to ensure industry’s due diligence in protect-
aviation security has been the subject of con-
ing their supply chains are other leading is-
siderable congressional oversight over the past
sues.
four years. Aviation security policy and
programs continue to be of considerable
Hazardous materials (hazmat) transporta-
interest in the 109th Congress.
tion raises numerous security issues. Many
Members of Congress want to know whether
The July 2005 bombing of trains in
current federal policies, regulations, and
London and the bombings of commuter trains
grants could more effectively promote hazmat
and subway trains in Madrid and Moscow in
transportation security at reasonable costs.
2004 highlighted the vulnerability of passen-
There are issues regarding routing of hazmat
ger rail systems to terrorist attacks. The vol-
through urban centers, and debate persists
ume of ridership and number of access points
over the pros and cons of rerouting high-
make it impractical to subject all rail passen-
hazard shipments.
gers to the type of screening airline passengers
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On June 6, 2006, the House passed the FY2007 Department of Homeland Security
appropriations bill (H.R. 5441), which included $200 million for grants for transit, intercity
passenger rail, and freight rail security.
On May 22, 2006 the TSA and the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) for implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) at
U.S. ports. Longshoremen, port truck drivers, merchant mariners, and other maritime
workers will need to apply for a TWIC card to obtain unescorted access to port facilities or
vessels. The card will use biometric technology for positive identification and TSA will
conduct a security threat assessment on each worker before issuing a card.
The proposed sale in the spring of 2006 of some U.S. port terminal facilities by a British
company to a Dubai company raised the issue of the security implications of foreign
ownership of transportation facilities, and refocused attention on port security matters
generally. Several bills on port security were introduced, and some existing bills received
further attention.
The 9/11 Commission issued its final report on December 5, 2005, grading the federal
government’s progress in implementing its various recommendations. The Commission
issued Congress a failing grade for not allocating homeland security funds based on risk, a
grade of “B” for not fully giving the House and Senate homeland security committees
exclusive jurisdiction over all counterterrorism functions of the DHS, a “C minus” regarding
DHS’s “National Strategy for Transportation Security,” an “F” for airline passenger pre-
screening, a “C” for airline screening explosive detection, and a “D” for airline checked
baggage and cargo screening.
In September 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) delivered a classified
report to Congress on a “National Strategy for Transportation Security.” Also in September
2005, DHS announced the completion of a national strategy for maritime cargo security and
in October 2005 announced the completion of eight action plans to implement the maritime
security strategy. During committee hearings held in July 2005 on the reorganization of
DHS, Secretary Chertoff discussed a “Secure Freight” initiative that would incorporate
additional shipment documentation to better target higher risk or unknown risk marine
containers for inspection.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility
and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to attack. The difficulty and
cost of protecting the transportation sector from attack raises a core question confronting
policymakers: how much effort and resources to put towards protecting potential targets
versus pursuing and fighting terrorists. While hardening the transportation sector from
terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The focus of this issue
brief is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response
that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack without
unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties.
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For all modes of transportation, one can identify four principle policy objectives that
would support a system of deterrence and protection: (1) ensuring the trustworthiness of the
passengers and the cargo flowing through the system, (2) ensuring the trustworthiness of the
transportation workers who operate and service the vehicles, assist the passengers, or handle
the cargo, (3) ensuring the trustworthiness of the private companies that operate in the
system, such as the carriers, shippers, agents, and brokers, and (4) establishing a perimeter
of security around transportation facilities and vehicles in operation. The first three policy
objectives are concerned with preventing an attack from within a transportation system, such
as occurred on September 11, 2001. The concern is that attackers could once again disguise
themselves as legitimate passengers (or shippers or workers) to get in position to launch an
attack. The fourth policy objective is concerned with preventing an attack from outside a
transportation system. For instance, terrorists could ram a bomb-laden speed boat into an oil
tanker, as they did in October 2002 to the French oil tanker Limberg, or they could fire a
shoulder-fired missile at an airplane taking off or landing, as they attempted in November
2002 against an Israeli charter jet in Mombasa, Kenya. Achieving all four of these
objectives is difficult, at best, and in some modes, is practically impossible. Where limited
options exist for preventing an attack, policymakers are left with evaluating options for
minimizing the consequences from an attack.
A narrower set of policy questions consider how to tailor a security strategy that
corresponds with the service requirements of each particular mode. For instance, while
prescreening all airline or cruise ship passengers is possible, pre-screening all transit riders
is practically impossible. Likewise, inspecting 100% of imported marine cargo is practically
impossible, so inspectors rely heavily on shipment documentation to select which shipments
to examine more closely. The issue for policymakers is deciding whether ensuring the
trustworthiness of the passengers and cargo flowing through each mode of transportation can
be reasonably achieved and, if so, how best to achieve it without impeding travel and
commerce. Another issue is ensuring the trustworthiness of the companies that operate in
the system. The TSA’s “known shipper” program for cargo carried aboard passenger planes
and Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) “Trade Partnership Against Terrorism” (C-
TPAT) program for cargo imported by all modes are initiatives designed to ensure the
trustworthiness of the companies that operate in the system. These two programs essentially
require the companies that routinely operate in their respective transportation systems to
vouch for the trustworthiness of each other and to alert authorities when they spot any
anomalies or suspicious activity. A point of contention is to what extent government can rely
on the transportation industry to exercise due diligence in protecting their operations from
terrorist attack. In addition to the integrity of transportation companies, there is also the issue
of the trustworthiness of their employees. As requested by Congress, the TSA is developing
a universal biometric transportation worker ID card that is intended to restrict access to
sensitive areas within transportation facilities. One unresolved issue is deciding what should
disqualify a transportation worker from obtaining a card. What sort of background would
make someone a “security risk?”
The 109th Congress is debating other areas of disagreement with regard to transportation
security. It is debating whether the nation is doing enough, and is acting in a timely fashion,
to secure transportation systems, particularly for non-aviation modes of transportation. It is
debating financial issues, such as what level of spending will buy what level of security and
who should pay for security: federal taxpayers, state and local governments, system users,
or some sort of cost share arrangement among all of the above. How federal security dollars
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should be allocated across the country is a focal point of the debate. In its oversight role,
Congress continues to examine the effectiveness of DHS initiatives to strengthen
transportation security, including the degree of coordination among agencies within DHS
towards that effort.
Aviation Security
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these attacks, the 107th Congress
moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71)
creating the TSA and mandating a federalized workforce of security screeners to inspect
airline passengers and their baggage. The act gave the TSA broad authority to assess
vulnerabilities in aviation security and take steps to mitigate these risks. The TSA’s progress
on aviation security has been the subject of considerable congressional oversight over the
past four years. Aviation security policy and programs continue to be of considerable interest
in the 109th Congress and funding authorization for the TSA’s aviation security functions is
set to expire at the end of FY2006.
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach. Aviation security policy since
September 11, 2001, consists of two basic principles: a risk-based approach for allocating
limited security resources to where they are considered most needed, and a multi-layered
strategy that establishes redundancies to thwart a potential terrorist attack.
The risk-based approach implemented by the TSA has been criticized by some who
believe that an overemphasis on allocating resources to screening airline passengers has left
the system vulnerable to attacks in other areas — namely air cargo operations; airport access
controls; protecting airliners from shoulder-fired missiles; and the security of general
aviation aircraft. In essence, these critics argue that the implementation of aviation security
policy since September 11, 2001, has focused too heavily on protecting aircraft from past
attack scenarios — such as suicide hijackings and luggage bombs carried out by airline
passengers — and has not given enough attention to other potential vulnerabilities.
Given the emphasis on protecting against bombings and suicide hijackings, the multi-
layered concept for aviation security is most apparent in the protection of passenger airliners.
Passengers undergo prescreening to check their names against lists of known and suspected
terrorists, then passengers and their carry-on items are screened and checked baggage is
passed through explosive detection systems (EDS) prior to aircraft boarding. Once on board,
security measures such as air marshals, hardened cockpit doors, and armed pilots provide
added layers of security to thwart an attempted hijacking. The principle objectives of these
measures are to prevent aircraft bombings and hijackings by terrorist passengers. However,
the effectiveness of the TSA’s implementation of virtually all of these security layers has
been brought into question by some or at some time over the past four years.
Passenger Prescreening. Efforts to improve passenger prescreening have been
impacted by concerns over the adequacy of measures to protect fliers’ personal information
and not infringe upon their civil rights. Critics argued that the TSA’s ever-expanding vision
for prescreening was to include data mining of commercial and government databases to look
for indicators that someone may pose a threat, and searches of notoriously inaccurate
criminal databases. These concerns were spurred by vague statements issued by the TSA as
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to how it might authenticate passenger identity and check for possible links to terrorism
along with media reports linking passenger prescreening to controversial proposals such as
the Department of Defense’s Total Information Awareness program to detect terrorists by
mining personal data. This controversy ultimately led the TSA to scrap its proposed
enhanced passenger prescreening system, the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening II
(CAPPS II), in August 2004, and pursue enhanced prescreening capabilities under a new
system called Secure Flight. While Secure Flight is touted to be a significantly scaled down
approach to prescreening compared to CAPPS II, concerns over data protections and redress
procedures for passengers falsely identified by the system have also delayed its deployment.
Provisions in the FY2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90) prohibit the
TSA from fully deploying the Secure Flight program until these ongoing concerns are
adequately addressed and also prohibit the use of commercial data or the transfer of
passenger data to a non-federal entity. While commercial databases have potential to
authenticate the identity of passengers, concerns have been raised about TSA’s past handling
of passenger data in a manner that was not fully explained to the public, leading to this
restriction on the transfer of personal data between the government and private entities other
than the initial exchange of passenger name records from the airlines.
The TSA is also evaluating trials of a Registered Traveler (RT) program designed to
speed the passage through security checkpoints of frequent fliers who voluntarily submit
background information and biometric identifiers. The RT trials concluded in October 2005,
but the TSA has indicated that a nationwide RT program should be up and running by early
summer 2006. According to the TSA, it will be up to individual airports to determine if they
wish to participate in the future RT program. Trials of a public-private partnership similar
to the RT program are still ongoing at Orlando International Airport and this pilot program
is expected to continue through mid-2006. About 20 airports are expected to be part of the
initial roll out of the nationwide RT program. However, as TSA moves forward with RT,
the airline industry, which once backed this program as a means to reduce hassles for
frequent fliers, now characterizes the manner in which it is being implemented as having
limited and questionable benefit.
Passenger Screening. With regard to screening passengers, the TSA has struggled
to strike a balance between effectively screening passengers for threat objects without
causing undue delays and hassles to travelers. While the TSA is usually keeping passenger
wait times below the stated objective of 10 minutes in most airport checkpoint queues, audits
of airport screening have concluded that screener performance still needs improvement. The
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General found that screener training,
screening technology, policies and procedures, and management and supervision of screening
operations all contributed to observed deficiencies in screener performance. Furthermore,
the 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA give priority attention to implementing
technology and procedures for screening passengers for explosives, something not currently
done routinely at screening checkpoints. To address this recommendation, the TSA is pilot
testing walk-through trace detection portals and has implemented procedures for conducting
pat-down searches of passengers for explosives. Provisions to improve checkpoint
technologies to detect explosives were included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, hereafter the “Terrorism Prevention Act”).
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening. A key issue in the
debate over aviation security immediately following September 11, 2001, was whether
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airport security screeners should be federalized. At that time, airport screening operations
suffered from high turnover, poor supervision and training, low wages, and a lack of
regulatory oversight. All of these factors were believed to have contributed to a poor
performing and highly vulnerable screening system. Federalizing the screener workforce
was offered as a potential solution to address these deficiencies. However, while Congress
ultimately resolved to federalize the screener workforce at most airports under ATSA, the
act also set up a pilot program using contract screeners at five airports and gave all airports
the option to request private screeners on an airport-by-airport basis starting November 19,
2004. While several airports have expressed an interest in private screening, they are being
cautious in proceeding because the TSA has offered few details and limited guidance on how
private screening will be implemented. Another factor that has limited airport interest in
private screening has been lingering liability concerns. Language in the FY2006 Homeland
Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90, Section 547) indemnifies airports from liability
relating to their decisions to either request private screeners or continue using federal
screeners and from any claims that may arise due to negligence or intentional wrongdoing
on the part of airport security screeners, whether they be federal or private.
Baggage Screening. While airports are, for the most part, meeting mandated
requirements to inspect checked bags with explosive detection system (EDS) equipment
100% of the time, airports are continuing to struggle with the daunting task of integrating
these systems into baggage handling and sorting facilities. To address these needs, Congress
established (in Vision 100, P.L. 108-176) an Aviation Security Capital Fund with a
mandatory funding level of $250 million annually and a total authorized funding level of
$500 million per year through FY2007. Congress also gave the TSA the authority to issue
letters of intent (LOIs) to airports, committing future funding toward in-line EDS integration
projects. Despite these measures, efforts to integrate EDS systems at all airports is
progressing slowly, prompting the 9/11 Commission to recommend that the TSA expedite
installation of these in-line baggage screening systems. Provisions to expedite and increase
funding for in-line baggage screening were included in the Terrorism Prevention Act. In
contrast to authorization language in Vision 100 that set federal funding levels for aviation
security capital projects at 90% for large and medium hubs and at 95% for all other airports,
appropriations language (see P.L. 109-90) limits the federal share of project costs under LOIs
to 75% for medium and large hubs, and 90 percent for all other airports. Meeting funding
needs for airport security projects and setting priorities amid budgetary constraints remains
an ongoing challenge for Congress.
Air Cargo Security. Some Members of Congress have voiced concerns that, while
100% of passenger baggage is required to be screened, only a relatively small amount of
cargo carried on passenger airplanes is screened or inspected. The 9/11 Commission
recommended that TSA intensify its efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially
dangerous cargo. Congress responded by increasing funding for air cargo security operations
and research to $115 million in FY2005, compared to $85 million in FY2004, and
designating funds for expanding the known shipper program for vetting shipments on
passenger aircraft; increasing oversight of cargo security; and continuing research and
development of technologies to improve air cargo security. In FY2006 funding for air cargo
security dropped back down to $55 million for operations plus an additional $30 million set
aside for three cargo screening pilot programs that will be carried out by the S&T directorate
under the new consolidation of DHS research and development activities. Language in th
FY2006 DHS appropriations act also directs the TSA to work with other DHS components
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to develop technologies that will aid in meeting the objective of screening 100% of all cargo
placed on passenger airliners. Despite the drop in funding levels compared to FY2005, this
funding provides for an additional 100 air cargo security compliance inspectors.
The 9/11 Commission also recommended deploying at least one hardened cargo
container on each passenger airliner for carrying suspect cargo. While this recommendation
was reflected in a Terrorism Prevention Act provision mandating a study of the proposal to
deploy blast resistant cargo containers, this study has not yet been funded or commenced.
While hardened containers are designed to mitigate the threat of a terrorist bomb carried in
a cargo shipment or luggage, some policymakers believe that the only effective way to
mitigate such a threat is to screen all cargo placed on passenger aircraft as is currently done
for checked baggage. The TSA, however, has cautioned that such an approach is not
technically and logistically feasible at the present time without unduly impacting cargo
operations on passenger aircraft. The TSA has instead proposed a strategic plan calling for
the use of risk-based prescreening techniques to identify cargo for targeted inspection or
exclusion from carriage on passenger aircraft and a threefold increase in random inspections.
In addition to improving the screening of cargo placed on passenger aircraft, improvements
in security programs for all-cargo operations are planned to protect against unauthorized
access to large all-cargo aircraft. While the TSA has issued a proposed regulatory framework
for the implementation and oversight of security at air cargo and air freight forwarding
facilities, these regulations have not been finalized despite a statutory requirement in the
Terrorism Prevention Act to do so by September 2005.
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls. While ATSA mandated background
checks for all workers with unescorted access to passenger aircraft and secured areas of
airports, concerns over the adequacy of security measures for these workers have been raised
because, in some cases, airport workers are permitted to bypass airport screening
checkpoints. Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress called for the physical screening
of all workers with access to aircraft or secured areas. ATSA also called for the TSA to
explore the use of biometrics and other identification technologies for credentialing transport
workers and the use of biometrics for airport access controls. The Terrorism Prevention Act
required the TSA to issue guidance on the use of biometrics for airport access controls and
the use of biometric technology to verify the identity of law enforcement officers authorized
to carry firearms on passenger airliners.
In-Flight Security Measures. Existing in-flight security measures consist primarily
of federal air marshals, armed pilots on some flights, and hardened cockpit doors. The
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was greatly expanded under ATSA and air marshals
are required on all high risk flights. In November 2003, the Federal Air Marshal program
was taken out of the TSA and realigned with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). However, the DHS Second Stage Review (2SR), issued in June 2005,
proposed that the FAMS be placed back in the TSA, a proposal that Congress agreed to in
report language accompanying the FY2006 DHS appropriations act.
Despite the administration’s initial reservations over allowing airline pilots to be armed,
airline pilots may receive training allowing them to serve as armed federal flight deck
officers under provisions set forth in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296).
Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) expanded the program to include all-cargo pilots and other flight
crew members such as flight engineers. Congress appropriated $27 million for FY2006 to
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administer the program and conduct initial and recurrent training and qualification to pilots
that volunteer to participate in the program. However, there are lingering concerns that the
procedures to apply for the program are too cumbersome and the training site is too remote
to accommodate many pilots interested in participating in the program and that restrictive
policies over carrying guns outside the cockpit potentially limit the program’s effectiveness.
ATSA mandated the implementation of hardened cockpit doors and stringent controls
regarding access to the flight deck. The Terrorism Prevention Act contains a provision to
study the use of secondary flight deck barriers — a concept United Airlines is moving
forward with on its own initiative — to overcome the vulnerability introduced when a
hardened cockpit door is opened in flight for meal service or when a pilot needs to access the
aircraft lavatory.
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat. Concerns have also been raised over the
potential threat to civil aircraft posed by shoulder-fired missiles (also known as Man-Portable
Air Defense Systems or MANPADS). Appropriations language in FY2003 directed the DHS
to establish a program evaluating the feasibility of adopting military aircraft anti-missile
systems for use on passenger jets. This program is still ongoing. Two contract teams, led
by Northrop-Grumman and BAE Systems, are developing prototype anti-missile systems,
and a evaluation of the prototype systems is expected to be completed by January 2006.
Language in the Terrorism Prevention Act calls for the FAA to implement an expedited
process to certify the safety of aircraft-based counter-MANPADS systems and also includes
language directing the administration to urgently pursue international arms-control
agreements to limit the proliferation of MANPADS. FY2006 DHS appropriations (P.L. 109-
90) provided $110 million for the continued evaluation and refinement of these aircraft-based
countermeasures, but do not set aside any of this funding for exploring alternative
technologies as proposed by the House. However, in April 2006, the DHS issued a
solicitation seeking alternative counter-MANPADS technologies for a demonstration project.
General Aviation Security. While some policymakers have expressed concern that
security measures for general aviation aircraft are, in their estimation, weak and practically
non-existent, general aviation operators have countered that they have been overburdened
by unnecessary airspace and airport restrictions. General aviation restrictions are most
prevalent in the Washington, DC area, where the city is encircled by a 15-mile radius flight
restricted zone in which general aviation operations are significantly limited, and a larger
air defense identification zone where pilots must strictly adhere to special air traffic control
procedures. In August 2005, the DHS implemented a security plan permitting certain general
aviation flights — mostly large charter and corporate operations — to resume at Washington
Reagan National Airport (DCA) which is located at the center of the flight restricted area.
At various times, flight restrictions have also been put in place over New York City,
Chicago, and elsewhere. General aviation pilots have been restricted from flying over
Disney and other theme parks, and over stadiums during major sporting events, leading some
general aviation advocates to question whether special interests were using the umbrella of
security concerns to curtail unwanted advertising overflights. Securing general aviation
operations continues to be a significant challenge because of the diversity of operations,
aircraft, and airports. Measures put in place thus far, such as the Airport Watch program and
TSA’s general aviation security guidelines, rely heavily on the vigilance of the pilot
community to detect and report suspicious activity. In the area of flight training, flight
training providers are engaged in verifying citizenship or confirming that background checks
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have been properly completed before providing training to foreign nationals. A provision
in the Terrorism Prevention Act would allow aircraft leasing and charter companies to
voluntarily provide the TSA with names of prospective customers for prescreening against
the consolidated terrorist watchlist. Also, the FY2006 DHS appropriations act (P.L. 109-90)
requires the DHS to assess security vulnerabilities from general aviation aircraft and identify
steps that can be taken to enhance the security of general aviation aircraft and airports.
Related Legislation in the 109th Congress. Several aviation security-related
measures are under consideration in the 109th Congress. A Senate bill (S. 1052)
reauthorizing the TSA through FY2009 was reported in the Senate on February 27, 2006.
While the bill does not propose substantial changes to funding levels for aviation security
and focuses primarily on security initiatives for surface and maritime transportation, it
proposes to improve aviation security by establishing an internship pilot program intended
to improve recruitment and retention of airport screeners, and by revising deadlines for the
TSA to issue regulations regarding the security of aircraft repair stations and to conduct
security reviews of foreign repair stations that were mandated under the Terrorism
Prevention Act. The bill would also require the TSA to study alternative means for
collecting security fees from airline passengers, and implement any alternative fee collection
systems deemed feasible. Also, the bill proposes to require the TSA to issue rules and
submit any proposed changes for congressional review before increasing the security fees
paid directly by the air carriers (the aviation security infrastructure fees or ASIF).
While the House has not considered a formal TSA reauthorization bill per se, the
Transportation Security Administration Reorganization Act of 2005 (H.R. 4439) is widely
regarded as a key bill that proposes to restructure the aviation security screening functions
of the TSA, increase passenger security fees, and establish an optional airport security fee
to fund security-related projects. While the bill — introduced by Representative Lungren on
December 6, 2005 and amended by the House Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity on March 16, 2006 — would increase passenger
security fees, it proposes to eliminate the fees paid directly by the airlines for aviation
security (the ASIF). Addressing organizational issues, H.R. 4439 seeks management reform
within the TSA by establishing an Airport Screening Organization (ASO) to increase
efficiency, make better use of new technologies, reduce costs, and respond more effectively
to the needs of the traveling public while enhancing aviation security. The proposed ASO
would be responsible for day-to-day federal screening operations at airports and would be
accountable for meeting annual performance goals in areas such as improving screening
efficiency, increasing system capacity, reducing passenger inconvenience, reducing costs,
and accelerating the advancement and deployment of new screening equipment and
technologies. Additionally, H.R. 4439 seeks to improve the oversight and implementation
of private screening alternatives under the so-called opt-out provision for airports by:
ensuring that funding for airport screening is allocated to airports according to a set formula
without regard to whether federal or private screeners are used; establishing standard
operating procedures for security screening under the TSA’s Screening Partnership Program
(SPP) with private screening entities; requiring that the TSA set performance goals for
private screening operations; and allowing the TSA to establish incentive awards for private
screening entities that meet or exceed performance goals. The amended bill as agreed to by
the subcommittee would also reauthorize the Aviation Security Capital Fund, intended
primarily to fund in-line EDS projects, and would increase mandatory funding levels for this
fund from $250 million to $600 million (see CRS Report RS22375, Reauthorizing and
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Restructuring the Transportation Security Administration's Aviation Security Functions:
Legislative Issues and Approaches).
While H.R. 4439 seeks to expand the use of private screeners largely by offering
additional incentives to airports that propose using private screeners, the Passenger Security
Act of 2005 (H.R. 3172), on the contrary, seeks to repeal the opt-out provision. While some
policymakers argue that aviation security is a critical homeland security function that should
be provided by the federal government, to date airports with federal screeners have not
demonstrated any significant interest in shifting to private screeners anyway. Nevertheless,
the policy debate over whether private screeners should be part of the overall strategy for
homeland security remains highly contentious.
Other legislation has been introduced in the 109th Congress addressing more specific
aviation security issues. For example, Representative Markey has offered the Strengthen
Aviation Security Act (H.R. 2649) which endeavors to improve aviation security by:
phasing-in 100% screening of cargo carried on passenger airplanes; establishing no-fly zones
around sensitive nuclear and chemical facilities during periods of heightened terror alert; and
requiring vulnerability assessments and security enhancements at general aviation airports.
The bill also would: require installing cockpit doors and partitions on all-cargo aircraft;
provide for training of law enforcement officers who travel armed on commercial flights;
require enhanced background checks and physical screening of airport workers; and establish
whistleblower protections for aviation security workers. Representative Markey also
introduced the Air Cargo Security Act (H.R. 2044) which would require regular inspections
of shipping facilities and security training for cargo handlers. Additionally, Representative
Oberstar introduced the Airport Screener Technology Improvement Act of 2005 (H.R. 1818)
which would create a Checkpoint Screening Security Fund for deploying next generation
checkpoint screening technologies and would significantly increase the funding levels for the
Aviation Security Capital Fund. Also, Representative Israel has introduced the Commercial
Airline Missile Defense Act (H.R. 2780) which calls for equipping all air carrier passenger
jets with electronic systems to protect against shoulder-fired missiles. In July 2005,
Representative Sweeney introduced the General Aviation Security Act of 2005 (H.R. 3397)
that would require all general aviation airports to implement specific security plans and
specific security procedures that would be reviewed by the DHS every three years. (CRS
contact: Bart Elias)
Transit and Passenger Rail Security
The bombings of transit trains and a bus in London in July 2005, like the bombings of
commuter trains and subway trains in Madrid and Moscow in 2004, highlighted the
vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems — primarily
subway systems — in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day
as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed
primarily for easy access. The increased security efforts around air travel have led to
concerns that terrorists may turn their attention to ‘softer’ targets, such as transit or passenger
rail. A key challenge Congress faces is balancing the desire for increased rail passenger
security with the efficient functioning of transit systems, with the potential costs of an attack,
and with other federal priorities.
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The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to subject all
rail passengers to the type of screening airline passengers undergo (though the New York
City subway system is now conducting random voluntary searches of passengers’ bags).
Consequently, transit security measures tend to emphasize managing the consequences of an
attack. Nevertheless, there are steps that can be taken to reduce the risks, as well as the
consequences, of an attack. These include conducting vulnerability assessments; emergency
planning; and emergency response training and drilling of transit personnel, ideally in
coordination with police, fire, and emergency medical personnel. Additional options include
increasing the number of transit security personnel, installing video surveillance equipment
in vehicles and stations, and conducting random inspections of platforms and trains using
bomb-sniffing dogs.
The challenges of securing rail passengers are dwarfed by the challenge of securing bus
passengers. There are some 76,000 buses carrying 19 million passengers each weekday in
the United States. Some transit systems have installed video cameras on their buses, and
Congress has provided grants for security improvements to intercity buses. But the number
and operation characteristics of transit buses make them all but impossible to secure.
There are no independent assessments of transit security needs and costs. The
Department of Homeland Security provides grants for transit, passenger rail, and freight rail
security under the Urbanized Areas Security Initiative program. Congress provided $150
million for these grants in FY2005 and in FY2006. The House-passed FY2007 DHS
appropriations bill (H.R. 5441) would provide $200 million for these grants. The transit
community has requested $5.2 billion in federal funding for security-related capital
improvements, and $800 million annually in security-related operating assistance. The ability
of the transit community to pay these costs themselves is limited; transit agencies run
operating deficits and require government assistance just to maintain their operations. In
light of current and projected federal deficits, federal activities potentially face constrained
budgets. Given limited resources, some argue that the federal government could better
enhance domestic security, at less cost, through strengthening the anti-terrorist efforts of
intelligence-gathering and law-enforcement agencies rather than funding security
improvements to the many potential domestic targets. (CRS contact: David Randall
Peterman)
Truck, Rail, and Marine Cargo Security
Cargo Visibility. A leading issue with regard to securing truck, rail, and waterborne
cargo is to what extent government authorities need the capability to track a given shipment
at a particular time. One can envision a scenario where government authorities receive
intelligence that a terrorist weapon or terrorists themselves are being smuggled in a particular
shipment. Authorities would then want to locate that shipment immediately as well as any
other possible shipments that were suspect based on having similar shipment particulars.
Currently, outside the parcel industry, authorities would have limited capabilities to locate
such shipments quickly. Some trucking firms have outfitted their trucks with Global
Positioning System (GPS) technology. However, this capability is generally limited to large
trucking firms which have a large enough fleet to make tracking equipment commercially
worthwhile, in addition to having the financial resources to afford such technology. Smaller
trucking firms, which carry a significant portion of freight, have not invested in this
technology. Railroads have outfitted their cars with Automatic Equipment Identification
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(AEI) technology, but this technology only allows tracking where a reader has been installed,
such as at terminals and rail yards. Thus most railcars can be tracked at certain points but
not in real-time.
Most of the attention with regard to cargo visibility concerns the tracking of marine
shipping containers. Marine containers are not currently outfitted with tracking devices, but
it is common practice to seal container doors with tamper-evident fixtures. Security officials
are concerned that a particularly vulnerable stage in the container shipping process occurs
when containers are trucked to the overseas port of loading or when they are trucked from
the U.S. port of unloading to their final U.S. destination. A sensor or tracking device could
help ensure the integrity of container shipments during these vulnerable stages. Since the
September 11, 2001 attack, there has been rapid development of palm-sized tracking devices
and sensors that could be inserted on an interior wall of a container. However, while this so-
called “smart-box” technology is being tested in selected routes, it has not been resolved
whether and how best to deploy it on a widespread basis. In the near term, shippers and
carriers favor using the best container seals currently in use rather than moving to the more
costly sensor and tracking devices.
Imported Cargo. Of particular concern is ensuring the integrity of imported cargo.
Over 11 million marine containers from all corners of the globe arrive at U.S. seaports
annually, while 11 million truckloads and over 2 million railcars arrive at U.S. land border
crossings. Since the September 11, 2001 attack, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
issued new requirements requiring freight carriers to report cargo manifests (shipment
information) before they reach U.S. borders. Container ships must report shipment details
on each container 24 hours before it is loaded at a foreign port. Truckers from Canada and
Mexico must report their trailers’ contents from 30 minutes to an hour prior to border arrival
and railroads must report this information two hours prior to border arrival. CBP analyzes
the cargo manifests and other intelligence to select which cargo units to physically inspect.
CBP’s selection process is thus critical in keeping terrorists and their weapons from being
smuggled into the country. In its oversight role, Congress is scrutinizing CBP’s cargo
inspection process. A GAO investigation found significant shortcomings with current
marine container inspection procedures and made recommendations for improving them.
Private Industry’s Role. Because most surface and marine freight transportation
assets are owned by private industry, and because there are too many shipments for
government to monitor on its own, government officials have to rely extensively on private
industry to tighten control over their supply chains. Industry has taken steps to protect their
operations from terrorist infiltration. The Association of American Railroads has conducted
a security risk assessment that prioritizes the industry’s assets and lists countermeasures to
be taken at different alert levels. Railroads have also created a “Railway Alert Network” that
is designed to make sure individual railroads receive timely threat information. Barge
operators have created a “Model Vessel Security Plan” through their industry association, the
American Waterways Operators. The American Trucking Associations has expanded a
“Highway Watch” program to include training for drivers on how to spot suspicious activity.
Intermodal (container) shippers have created a “Smart and Secure Trade Lanes” program to
evaluate anti-tampering and tracking devices for marine containers. An issue for
policymakers is determining the best approach for ensuring private industry’s cooperation
and due diligence over the long term. For example, policymakers are evaluating which
security measures should be mandated versus which ones should be issued as guidelines or
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“best practices.” How to validate that the agreed upon security measures are in fact being
carried out by industry is also an issue.
Paying for Cargo Security. Freight carriers and shippers are private, for-profit
corporations, which raises the issue of whether they or general taxpayers should pay for
security improvements. Advocates for public funding argue that homeland security is a
national concern and therefore a federal government responsibility that should be paid for
from the general Treasury. Others argue that carriers and shippers are the direct beneficiaries
of improved cargo security. They argue that it is in their own economic interest to protect
their assets from terrorist attack, that additional security measures also deter cargo theft
which is costly to the freight industry, and that therefore they should bear the cost of security
improvements. Several legislative efforts to establish a security fee paid by industry to
generate funds for a federal port security grant program have failed in Congress. Meanwhile,
some ports and freight carriers are beginning to add security surcharges to their freight
invoices while other carriers are presumably incorporating extra security-related costs in their
freight rates.
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program. On May 22, 2006
the TSA and the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for
implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) at U.S. ports
(Federal Register, v. 71, no. 98, May 22, 2006, pp. 29396-29462). Longshoremen, port truck
drivers, merchant mariners, and other maritime workers will need to apply for a TWIC card
to obtain unescorted access to port facilities or vessels. The card will use biometric
technology for positive identification and TSA will conduct a security threat assessment on
each worker before issuing a card. The security threat assessment will use the same
procedures and standards established by TSA for truck drivers carrying hazardous materials.
These standards examine criminal history, immigration status, mental capacity, and terrorist
activity to determine whether a worker poses a security threat. A worker will pay a fee of
between $95 to $149 depending on the type of worker, and that is intended to cover the cost
of administering the cards. Port facility operators will be responsible for deploying card
readers at the gates to their facilities. TSA is considering whether to incorporate the TWIC
system into all modes of transportation.
Selected Legislation in the 109th Congress. In the aftermath of the controversy
over the Dubai Ports World deal, numerous bills related to port security were introduced and
some existing bills received further Congressional action. S. 1052, which was reported by
the Senate Commerce Committee, would impose a deadline of January 1, 2007 for
transportation worker credentialing regulations to be issued, require performance standards
for marine container seals and locks, require a feasibility study on the creation of a port
security user fee, and advance the timing that maritime importers submit customs entry data.
S. 2008 and S. 2459, the Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act, and H.R. 4954, The
SAFE Port Act, would offer the benefit of reduced port inspections to shippers that agreed
to adopt certain security measures to protect their shipments from terrorist infiltration. (CRS
contact: John Frittelli)
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Hazmat Cargo Security
Hundreds of thousands of trucks and railroad tank cars transport tons of hazardous
materials (hazmat) daily. These shipments can be used as instruments or targets of terror.
There is a virtually unlimited number of ways that the hazmat transportation system is at risk
from terrorists. For example, tank trucks can be attacked, drivers can be killed, and loads can
be hijacked and released during shipment. Simply put, there are too many points of
vulnerability to ensure security during hazmat transportation. A major challenge is to cost
effectively increase the security of these shipments, especially those that pose the most
danger to the public, while still meeting, to the extent possible, the transportation
requirements of commerce.
Industry and government are gradually implementing a “layered” system of measures
affecting shippers, carriers, and drivers to reduce associated security risks. This system
involves incident prevention, preparedness, and response. The Departments of
Transportation (DOT) and Homeland Security (DHS) have taken actions to enhance the
security of hazmat transportation. For example, DOT requires shippers and carriers to
implement security plans regarding specified hazmat transportation. DOT grants encourage
state and some local governmental personnel to conduct hazmat inspections and to plan and
train for spills of these materials. Also, this Department has contacted thousands of
companies that are seeking to improve their security programs, and has established
communication links with industry.
DHS conveys threat information to law enforcement and industry, and conducts
vulnerability assessments. DHS administers a grant that provides for the training and
communications infrastructure which truck drivers, highway workers, and others use to
report potential security threats and safety concerns on the Nation’s roads. DHS seeks to
determine whether specified commercial drivers pose a security threat necessitating denial
of the hazmat endorsement of their commercial drivers license. Whether the pace of these
actions is adequate or not is subject to debate. It is widely recognized that more could be
done to promote hazmat transportation security, but additional costs would be incurred and
tradeoffs would need to be considered.
There remain many issues associated with hazmat transportation security. Many
Members of Congress want to know whether current federal policies, regulations, and grants
could more effectively promote hazmat transportation security at reasonable costs. There are
issues regarding routing of hazmat through urban centers and debate persists over the pros
and cons of rerouting high hazard shipments. H.R. 153 and H.R. 1109 include a provision
that would require the DHS to prepare a vulnerability assessment of freight rail transportation
and to identify security risks that are specific to the transportation of hazmats by rail. H.R.
153 would provide grants to address threats pertaining to the security of hazmat
transportation by rail. H.R. 909 would establish a research program intended to advance
security measures for hazmat transportation. H.R. 5604 would limit the variety of hazardous
materials which commercial truck drivers would have to undergo screening to transport. S.
1052 would require the development of security-training guidelines for employees of short-
term truck leasing companies and encourage the development of tracking devices for hazmat
shipments. SAFETEA (P.L. 109-59) which was enacted in August 2005, includes a
provision intended to ensure that Mexican- and Canadian-domiciled truck drivers
transporting specified hazmat loads in the United States are subject to a background check
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similar to that required of U.S. drivers. Other options include increased security awareness
training for state truck inspectors and certain employees of truck leasing companies, and
requiring enhanced security plans and communication systems for carriers of high hazard
materials shipments beyond those now required. Each of these options poses costs that need
to be evaluated within the context of other investments. (CRS Contact: John Frittelli)
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
Non-Mode Specific.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Proposed Reorganization
of the Department of Homeland Security, July 19, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Department of
Homeland Security — Second Stage Review, July 14, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. The Secretary’s Second-Stage Review. July 14,
2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Proposed FY2006 Budget: Integrating
Homeland Security Screening Operations. March 2, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. TSA Budget Proposal for
FY2006. February 15, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Department of
Homeland Security: The Road Ahead. January 26, 2005.
Aviation.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The Future of Registered Traveler.
November 3, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Improving Management of the Aviation
Screening Workforce. July 28, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Leveraging Technology to Improve
Aviation Security - Part II, July 19, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Leveraging Technology to Improve
Aviation Security, July 13, 2005.
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House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Registered Traveler Program, Part
II. June 16, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Registered Traveler Program. June
9, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. General Aviation Security
and Operations. June 9, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. TSA’s Screening of Airline Pilots: Sound
Security Practice or Waste of Resources. May 13, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. TSA Budget Proposal for
FY2006. April 26, 2005.
GAO Report GAO-05-457. Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance
Measurement Strengthened but More Work Remains. Released May 2, 2005.
Transit and Passenger Rail.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Highways,
Transit, and Pipelines. Transit and Over-the-Road Bus Security. March 29, 2006.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The London Bombings: Protecting
Civilian Targets from Terrorist Attacks - Part II. October 20, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. After the London
Attacks: What Lessons Have Been Learned to Secure U.S. Transit Systems?. September
21, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. The London Bombings: Protecting
Civilian Targets from Terrorist Attacks. September 7, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology. The London Attacks: Training to Respond in a Mass Transit
Environment. July 26, 2005.
Surface and Marine Cargo.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Reforming HAZMAT Trucking Security.
November 1, 2005.
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Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Domestic Passenger and
Freight Rail Security. October 20, 2005.
House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. Homeland Security Missions of the Post-
9/11 Coast Guard. June 8, 2005.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The Container
Security Initiative and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: Securing the
Global Supply Chain or Trojan Horse?. May 26, 2005.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Port Security. May 17,
2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Highways,
Transit, and Pipelines. Background Check Process for Truckers’ Hazmat
Endorsements. May 11, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Railroads. New
Technologies for Rail Safety and Security. April 28, 2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Subcommittee. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Implementation. April 20,
2005.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Subcommittee. FY2006 Budget for the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Programs; H.R. 889, The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Act of 2005. March 3, 2005.
Inspector General Report OIG-05-10. Review of the Port Security Grant Program. January
2005.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Report RL33194, Securing General Aviation, by Bart Elias.
CRS Report RL32022, Air Cargo Security, by Bartholomew Elias.
CRS Report RS21920, Detection of Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendation of
the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues, by Dana Shea and Daniel Morgan.
CRS Report RS22234, Homeland Security: Protecting Airspace in the National Capital
Region, by Bart Elias.
CRS Report RL32625, Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues, by David Randall
Peterman.
CRS Report RL33383, Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime
Security, by John F. Frittelli.
CRS Report RS21293, Terrorist Nuclear Attack on Seaports: Threat and Response, by
Jonathan Medalia.
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CRS Report RS21997, Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack
Using Oil Tankers, by Jonathan Medalia.
CRS Report RS21125, Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations — Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
CRS Report RS22041, Legal Issues Concerning State and Local Authority to Restrict the
Transportation of Hazardous Materials by Rail, by Todd B. Tatelman.
CRS Report RL32740, Security Threat Assessments for Hazmat Drivers, by Paul F.
Rothberg.
CRS Report RL32851, Hazardous Materials Transportation Security: Highway and Rail
Modes, by Paul F. Rothberg.
CRS Report RL33048, Marine Security of Hazardous Chemical Cargo, by Paul W.
Parformak and John Frittelli.
CRS Report RL32073, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Issues for
Congress, by Paul W. Parformak.
CRS Report RL32863, Homeland Security Department: FY2006 Appropriations, by
Jennifer E. Lake and Blas Nuñez-Neto.

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