Order Code RS22097
Updated June 16, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Balkan Cooperation on War Crimes Issues
Julie Kim
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
In early May 2006, assessments of insufficient Serbian cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) led the European
Union (EU) to suspend association talks with Serbia. Later that month, the U.S.
Secretary of State withheld certification of full Serbian cooperation with ICTY, leading
to a partial suspension of U.S. bilateral assistance to Serbia. As of mid-June 2006, six
indicted suspects remained at large, including wartime Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan
Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic. Former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, whose
lengthy trial in The Hague was nearing completion, died of a heart attack on March 11,
while in custody. From late 2004 through early 2005, a combination of intensified
international pressure and deadlines associated with Euro-Atlantic integration processes
prompted a spate of transfers of indicted persons to the tribunal. Full cooperation with
ICTY is a key prerequisite to further progress toward a shared long-term goal for the
western Balkan countries: closer association with and eventual membership in the
European Union and NATO. This report will be updated as events warrant. See also
CRS Report RS21686, Conditions on U.S. Aid to Serbia, by Steven Woehrel.
Introduction and U.S. Concerns
The European Union (EU) and NATO have explicitly conditioned closer association
with the western Balkan states (mainly Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and also Croatia) on their respective levels of cooperation with ICTY. To varying
degrees, conditionality policy has held up Euro-integration processes in the western
Balkans that would otherwise likely have gone forward. This has become especially
apparent with regard to Serbia.
From late 2004 to early 2005, a steady stream of individuals charged with Balkan
war crimes turned up at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague. Factors contributing to this inflow included intensified
international pressure and deadlines associated with the European integration process.
Most of the latest transfers of indicted persons have come from Serbia or the Republika
Srpska (RS) entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, both parties with the greatest number
of suspects and the weakest cumulative record of cooperation with ICTY. Other
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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prominent surrenders have included the former Prime Minister of Kosovo’s governing
institutions and the former Bosnian Muslim (or Bosniak) Army chief. However, some
top-ranking remaining war crimes suspects, including Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko
Mladic, have eluded capture for a decade.
Meanwhile, ICTY operations are beginning to wind down after a dozen years in
operation. ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte prepared the Tribunal’s final
indictments in late 2004 and the last war crimes indictments were unsealed and made
public in March 2005. Under its “completion strategy,” ICTY had planned to conclude
all initial trials by 2008 and all court proceedings by 2010. However, due to a variety of
factors, ICTY officials have extended their estimate for a completion date by at least one
year. The ICTY President has confirmed that trials will run into 2009, depending on how
soon Karadzic and Mladic are captured.1 Tribunal officials stress that all of the remaining
fugitives, especially Karadzic and Mladic, must be brought to justice at The Hague. The
Tribunal’s most prominent case, the extended trial against Slobodan Milosevic, ended
without a verdict after Milosevic’s death on March 11, 2006, by a heart attack while in
custody.
U.S. Administration and congressional interest in Balkan cooperation with the
Tribunal stems from longstanding U.S. support for ICTY and insistence that the top-
ranking indictees be turned over to The Hague. The United States supports the region’s
Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including closer ties to and possible membership in NATO, but
U.S. officials insist that the capture and transfer of remaining indictees is necessary, long
overdue, and a pre-condition to further Euro-Atlantic integration. In annual
appropriations bills, Congress has conditioned some bilateral U.S. assistance to Serbia on
ICTY cooperation. Under an FY2006 foreign aid law (P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057), funding
for Serbia is conditional on the President’s certification that Serbia is cooperating with
ICTY, including the surrender and transfer of indictees Mladic and Karadzic. Unable to
make this certification, the Secretary of State suspended $7 million in FY2006 funds for
Serbia on May 31, 2006. The Bush Administration has also supported the Tribunal’s
completion strategy to conclude activities by 2010.
Chronology of Transfers Since Early 20052
06/10/06 — Former Bosnian Serb military police officer Dragan Zelenovic was transferred to
The Hague. He had been captured in Siberia by Russian authorities in August 2005 but only
extradited to Bosnia in June 2006.
12/10/05 — Croatian Gen. Ante Gotovina was transferred to The Hague. Spanish authorities
arrested Gotovina in the Canary Islands on December 7. Gotovina’s indictment charges him with
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war in relation to the 1995
Croatian “Storm” offensive against Croatian Serb-held territory in the Krajina region.
09/16/05 — Former Bosnian Serb paramilitary leader Sredoje Lukic was transferred to The
Hague from the RS. His indictment from 1998 charges him, his cousin Milan Lukic, and Mitar
Vasiljevic (already in custody) with war crimes committed by their paramilitary group in the
1 Address by Judge Fausto Pocar, ICTY President, to the U.N. Security Council, June 7, 2006,
available at [http://www.un.org/icty/].
2 Details of the indictments can be found at the ICTY home page [http://www.un.org/icty/].

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Visegrad area from 1992 to 1994. Milan Lukic was arrested in Buenos Aires, Argentine, on
August 8, and transferred to The Hague in February 2006.
04/25/05 — General Nebojsa Pavkovic, former Serbian Army chief of staff, arrived at The
Hague. He is the third Serbian general under the October 2003 indictment against four generals
to come into custody. He is charged with alleged crimes relating to Serbian military and police
operations in Kosovo in 1998-1999. ICTY’s provisional release of Pavkovic in September was
held up in appeal; he was eventually released pending trial on November 21.
04/14/05 — Former Bosnian Serb officer Vujadin Popovic surrendered to The Hague. He is
charged with genocide and war crimes related to the 1995 Bosnian Serb attacks on Srebrenica.
04/07/05 — Former Bosnian Serb commander Milorad Trbic arrived at The Hague and is charged
in the same indictment as Vinko Pandurevic (see 03/23).
04/04/05 — Former Serbian special police General Sreten Lukic was transferred to The Hague
from a Belgrade hospital where he had undergone vascular surgery. Lukic is charged with crimes
allegedly committed by forces under his command in Kosovo in 1999. Lukic was granted
provisional release on October 3.
04/01/05 — Former Bosnian Serb special police commander Ljubomir Borovcanin arrived at The
Hague from Belgrade. His indictment from 2002 charges him with individual and command
responsibility for crimes relating to the 1995 Bosnian Serb offensive in eastern Bosnia.
03/24/05 — Former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski was transferred to The Hague
from Croatia, where he had been incarcerated on charges unrelated to the ICTY indictment. His
ICTY indictment cites charges relating to the unlawful killing of ethnic Albanian civilians in
northern Macedonia during the 2001 conflict.
03/23/05 — Former Bosnian Serb General Vinko Pandurevic was transferred to The Hague. Gen.
Pandurevic served as a brigade commander of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and is charged with
genocide and crimes against humanity relates to the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica.
03/17/05 — Former Bosnian Serb Chief of Security Drago Nikolic arrived at The Hague. Nikolic
is charged with genocide and crimes against humanity for his alleged individual criminal role in
the 1995 Srebrenica assault.
03/16/05 — Former Macedonian police officer Johan Tarculovski arrived at The Hague. Along
with former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski, Tarculovski is charged with
unlawful attacks on civilians during the 2001 conflict.
03/14/05 — Former Bosnian Serb Chief of Police Gojko Jankovic was transferred to The Hague
from Banja Luka.3 He is charged with war crimes allegedly committed in the 1992 attack on the
Bosnian town of Foca.
03/11/05 — Former Bosnian Serb Interior Minister (MUP) Mico Stanisic was transferred to The
Hague. He is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity relating to his role in
commanding and directing Bosnian Serb police actions against non-Serb populations in Bosnia
during 1992. ICTY provisionally released Stanisic on July 22.
3 Jankovic was reportedly one of several Serbian indictees who had sought and received refuge
in Russia for years. See Ed Vulliamy, “Russians Accused of Sheltering War Crimes Suspects,”
The Guardian (U.K.), Mar. 15, 2005.

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03/09/05 — Ramush Haradinaj arrived at The Hague after resigning from his position as Kosovo
Prime Minister. The indictment against the former Kosovo Liberation Army commander and two
of his subordinates (Lahi Brahimaj and Idriz Balaj, who turned themselves in with Haradinaj)
cites charges of war crimes perpetrated against Serbs and others in Kosovo in 1998. Haradinaj
was granted provisional release, with conditions, including permissions to engage in some
political activities.
03/07/05 — General Momcilo Perisic, former Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army,
surrendered to The Hague. He is charged with 13 counts of crimes allegedly committed in
Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Srebrenica. The tribunal granted Perisic provisional release on June 9.
02/28/05 — General Radivoj Miletic, former Bosnian Serb army chief of operations, arrived at
The Hague after surrendering to Serbian government authorities. His indictment, shared with
Milan Gvero (below), relates to war crimes allegedly committed in Srebrenica in 1995. Miletic
was provisionally released on July 22.
02/28/05 — General Rasim Delic, former Chief of the General Staff of the Bosnian Army,
departed Sarajevo for The Hague, and is charged on the basis of his command authority with four
counts of violating customs of war in 1993 and 1995. Delic was granted provisional release on
May 6.
02/24/05 — Milan Gvero, a former VRS commander, arrived at The Hague from Belgrade. He
is charged with individual criminal responsibility for crimes allegedly committed in the
Srebrenica region in 1995. Gvero was provisionally released on July 22.
02/03/05 — General Vladimir Lazarevic, former commander of the Yugoslav Army Pristina
Corps, arrived at The Hague. Lazarevic is one of the four Yugoslav Army generals indicted by
ICTY in October 2003 for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo. ICTY provisionally released
Lazarevic and three other suspects on April 15.
Remaining Suspects at Large
As of mid-June 2006, six known indicted suspects remained at large. The short list
for most concerned parties comprises the top two remaining suspects: former Bosnian
Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic. The indictments against
Karadzic and Mladic charge them with genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations
of the laws or customs of war as part of the Bosnian Serb campaign in 1991 to 1995 to
control territory and drive out non-Serb populations from Srebrenica and other areas.
ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte has frequently charged that the remaining
five suspects, including Mladic and Karadzic, remain “within reach” of authorities in
Serbia and the RS.4 Throughout much of 2005 and early 2006, numerous news stories
reported possible sightings of Karadzic and Mladic and unconfirmed surrender
negotiations with local authorities. On February 21, 2006, international media reported
that Mladic had been located and in surrender negotiations. However, Serbian and
international officials immediately discounted these reports, and Mladic remains at large.
ICTY Prosecutor del Ponte recently asserted that Mladic and three other fugitives
(Tolimir, Hadzic, and Zupljanin) were in Serbia. She further charged that Serbia had
4 Serbian government officials dispute this claim. However, Belgrade authorities have revealed
that Mladic had occasionally received shelter from the Serbian military as recently as mid-2002.
Financial Times, Feb. 3, 2006.

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leads to Karadzic, even though his location remains unknown.5 The sixth fugitive is
believed to be in Russia.
Policy Implications
The United States and the European Union, often in conjunction with ICTY’s Office
of the Prosecutor, have frequently wielded explicit conditionality policies in order to
foster improved Balkan cooperation with ICTY. Securing the region in a stable and
prosperous Euro-Atlantic zone, as opposed to an area of incomplete postwar transition
susceptible to destabilizing trends or criminal elements, remains a shared goal. On the
incentive side, western officials have expressed continued support for the Euro-Atlantic
aspirations of the western Balkan states and for moving forward in these integration
processes, some of which have lagged primarily over limited ICTY cooperation. All of
the western Balkan states have made closer ties to NATO and especially the EU a key
strategic priority. At the same time, officials also emphasize that these processes cannot
be completed until the Balkan states adhere to standards on international commitments
and the rule of law, especially with regard to meeting obligations on ICTY cooperation
and overcoming the legacy of the wartime years.
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina has sought membership in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and a Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. The EU concluded an SAA Feasibility
Study for Bosnia in November 2003 and identified 16 priority reform areas that have
become a blueprint for Bosnia’s ongoing reform process. At the same time, limited
cooperation with ICTY, especially by the Republika Srpska (RS), contributed to a
slowdown in the association process. Until January 2005, RS authorities had not turned
over a single indicted suspect, and ICTY officials have since reported little effort by the
RS to locate or arrest Radovan Karadzic. The ICTY issue also provided former High
Representative Ashdown justification for removing obstructionist officials, freezing
assets, and even re-shaping governing institutions especially in the defense and security
sectors.6 The status of Karadzic will remain a key challenge for Bosnia’s authorities as
well as for the EU military force and residual NATO presence in Bosnia, whose mandates
include apprehending persons indicted for war crimes. The EU opened SAA negotiations
with Bosnia in November 2005 after Bosnia’s leaders agreed to pursue police reforms.
Bosnia is not expected to gain entry into NATO’s PfP program until Karadzic’s status is
resolved.
Croatia. Croatia’s largely positive record of cooperation with ICTY — as well as
considerable advancements in economic and institutional reforms — enabled it to
progress steadily in the EU integration process since 2001. Croatia’s one outstanding issue
pertaining to ICTY concerned the unresolved situation with indicted Gen. Ante Gotovina.
In March 2005, EU members indefinitely postponed the opening of membership talks
5 Address by Tribunal Prosecutor Carla del Ponte to the U.N. Security Council, June 7, 2006,
available at [http://www.un.org/icty/].
6 Beyond the issue of extradition, a recent achievement in Bosnia was the inauguration in March
2005 of the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is
expected eventually to take over for ICTY prosecution of war crimes in Bosnia. ICTY has begun
to refer cases to the Bosnian war crimes chamber.

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with Croatia and created a special task force to assess Croatia’s ICTY cooperation. The
Croatian government adopted an Action Plan to increase efforts to track down Gotovina.
ICTY Prosecutor del Ponte reported “full” cooperation with Zagreb on October 3, paving
the way for the EU to formally open accession negotiations with Croatia.7 Gotovina’s
subsequent capture resolved the ICTY matter for Croatia.
Serbia and Montenegro. Despite Serbia’s notable achievement of extraditing
wartime Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague in 2001, Serbia’s level of
cooperation with ICTY has been limited, according to most assessments. Beginning in
late 2004, the Kostunica government substantially increased efforts to encourage the
voluntary surrender of indicted persons, even while it did not abandon its reluctance to
make arrests. Politically, the Kostunica government is constrained to some extent because
it is supported in parliament by Milosevic’s Socialist Party (SPS) and because the SPS
and the much larger nationalist Radical Party (SRS) vehemently oppose forced indictee
transfers to The Hague. Milosevic’s recent death while in Hague custody and burial in
his Serbian hometown temporarily revived some pro-Milosevic and anti-Hague sentiment
in Serbia. Generally, however, some analysts believe that strong domestic support for EU
integration and diminishing (until recently) public opposition to Serbian cooperation with
ICTY favor meeting EU requirements. Many analysts also cite the manner in which
Croatia secured Gen. Gotovina’s arrest as a model example for Serbia.
Serbia’s cooperation with ICTY has been an intermittent sore spot in its foreign
relations. In accordance with annual foreign aid legislation, the United States suspended
portions of bilateral assistance to Serbia over war crimes issues in FY2004, FY2005, and
most recently in May 2006, affecting some FY2006 funds. Serbia and Montenegro has
been denied entry into Partnership for Peace despite having made some significant
progress in defense reforms. Serbia and Montenegro lagged behind other western Balkan
states in the EU’s Stabilization and Association process.8 In April 2005, in recognition of
Serbia’s substantial progress in cooperating with ICTY, the EU gave its approval to begin
SAA negotiations, and talks opened in October. Since December, however, ICTY and EU
officials have reported deteriorating cooperation. In March-April 2006, the EU warned
it would suspend SAA talks with Serbia if Belgrade did not “locate, arrest, and transfer”
Gen. Mladic by the end of April. After that deadline lapsed, the EU suspended SAA talks
on May 3. Brussels has expressed readiness to resume talks once full ICTY cooperation
is achieved.
7 EU officials denied that the positive decision on Croatia was made in exchange for Austria’s
acceptance of opening accession talks with Turkey, but several media commentators questioned
the “suspiciously expedient” circumstances. Del Ponte later reported that her assessment of
Croatia’s “full cooperation” came after she was given information that Croatian authorities had
located Gotovina in Spain.
8 Complications arising from the state of the Serbia and Montenegro union had also presented
some obstacles to EU integration. With the separation of Montenegro from the union in May
2006, both countries will pursue independent paths toward EU integration.

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