Order Code RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Updated May 4, 2006
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Afghanistan’s planned political transition was completed with the convening of
a parliament in December 2005, but insurgent threats to Afghanistan’s government
persist and are even growing in some southern provinces. A new constitution was
adopted in January 2004, and successful presidential elections were held on October
9, 2004, followed by parliamentary elections on September 18, 2005. In April 2006,
the parliament reviewed and then confirmed 20 out of the 25 nominees to a new
Karzai cabinet. This largely completed the post-Taliban political transition roadmap
established at the December 2001 international conference in Bonn, Germany.
Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under
the Taliban. Women are participating in economic and political life, including as
ministers, provincial governors, and senior levels of the new parliament. However,
the insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime has conducted
numerous lethal attacks since mid-2005, narcotics trafficking is rampant, and
independent militias remain throughout the country, although they are being
progressively disarmed.
U.S. stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government and
its security forces while combating insurgents. The United States and other countries
are building an Afghan National Army; deploying a multinational International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to patrol Kabul and other cities; and running
regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams,
PRTs). Approximately 18,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to combat the
Taliban-led insurgency, but the United States and NATO have agreed to shift more
of the security burden to NATO during 2006. That transition will permit U.S. force
levels to drop to a planned level of about 16,500 by mid-2006, although the
reduction has raised concerns among Afghan officials that the U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan is waning. To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the
United States gave Afghanistan about $4.35 billion in FY2005, including funds to
equip and train Afghan security forces. About $931 million is provided for in the
conference report on the regular FY2006 aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102). In
February, the Administration requested $1.1 billion in aid for FY2007 and about $2.5
billion in supplemental FY2006 funds, of which about $2.4 billion is to go to Afghan
security force development and Defense Department counter-narcotics support efforts
there. Both versions (House and Senate-passed) of H.R. 4939, a bill to appropriate
the funding, provide most of the requested funds, although with some selected
reductions.
This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by Kenneth
Katzman; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.

Contents
Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Taliban Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Bonn Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Strengthening Central Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Curbing Regional Strongmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Combating Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices . . . . . 16
Advancement of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) . . . 19
Growing Responsibilities of NATO-Led International Security
Force (ISAF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Afghan National Army (ANA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Afghan National Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Russia, Central Asian States, and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments . . . . . . 35
FY2006 Regular and FY2006 Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
World Bank/Asian Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
International Reconstruction Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO
Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Residual Issues From Past Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Stinger Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Mine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Security-Related Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 3. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 5. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 6. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 8. ISAF Contributing Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 10. Major Factions in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Background to Recent Developments
Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani,
Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to
neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929)
launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won
complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi
(August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a
government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King
Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.
Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans
for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and
promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and
hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist
factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms
purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically
opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving
medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control
over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad
Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction.
They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by
redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by
Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into
Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic
militias, known as the mujahedin1 (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.
Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the
country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-
Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-
fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against
Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of
natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s
1 The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.”

CRS-2
losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the
reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the
director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai.
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva
Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15,
1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed
its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its
pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991
collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting
communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and
Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and
covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from
1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid
program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per
year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of
Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding.2
With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed
to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off
a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders who were
nominally his allies. The defectors joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad
Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin
Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the
Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern
Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.3
2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from
$300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second
half of the fiscal year. Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late
1991, Congress abided by the aid figures contained in the bill. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in
Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.

CRS-3
Afghanistan at a Glance
Population:
28.5 million (July 2004 est.)
Ethnic Groups:
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen
3%; Baluch 2%; other 4%
Religions:
Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1%
GDP:
$21.5 billion (purchasing power parity)
GDP per capita
$800 (purchasing power parity)
GDP real growth
8% (2005)
Unemployment rate
40% (2005)
External Debt:
$8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. said Feb. 8,
2006, that the $108 million in debt to U.S. would be forgiven.
Major Exports:
fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium
Oil Production
none
Oil Consumption
5 million barrels per day
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to
Afghan government on March 15, 2006
Major Imports:
food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles
Source: CIA World Factbook, 2005, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C.
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban4
The fall of Najibullah exposed the serious differences among the mujahedin
parties. The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front),
Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, became president for an initial two months
(April-May 1992). Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became
President in June 1992 with the understanding that he would leave office in
December 1994. He refused to step down, maintaining that political authority would
disintegrate without a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently subjected to shelling
by other mujahedin factions leader, particularly Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who accused
Rabbani of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar, who headed a fundamentalist faction
of Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) and reportedly received a large proportion of the
U.S. covert aid during the war against the Soviet Union, was nominally prime
minister but never formally took office. Four years (1992-1996) of the civil war
created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan
from the factional infighting. (Hikmatyar was later ousted by the Taliban from his
power base around Jalalabad, despite sharing the Taliban’s ideology and Pashtun
ethnicity, and he fled to Iran before returning to Afghanistan in early 2002. He is
now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents; his whereabouts are unknown.)
The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students,
many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued
conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic
4 For an in-depth study of the Taliban and its rule, see Rashid, Ahmad. Taliban: Militant
Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
. Yale University Press, 2000.

CRS-4
seminaries (“madrassas”). They were mostly practitioners of an orthodox form of
Sunni Islam, “Wahhabism,” similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban
was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of
Afghanistan who viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and
responsible for the civil war. With the help of defections by sympathetic mujahedin,
the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994,
and by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month
stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat
province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of
Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996,
Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to their
Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the
Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. A sense of the Senate
resolution, S.Res. 275, that resolving the Afghan civil war should be a top U.S.
priority passed by unanimous consent on September 24, 1996. A similar measure,
H.Con.Res. 218, passed the House on April 28, 1998.
Taliban Rule
The Taliban was led by Mullah (Sunni Muslim cleric) Muhammad Umar, who
fought (and lost an eye) in the anti-Soviet war fighting under the banner of the Hizb-
e-Islam (Islamic Party) of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and
“Commander of the Faithful,” but he mostly remained in the Taliban power base in
Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and
adamantly refused U.S. demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar,
who is about 60 years old. He is still at large and reportedly in command of Taliban
militants. On January 10, 2006, he issued a statement rejecting reconciliation with
the government.
The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed
strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh
punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to
enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and
dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery or other
transgressions. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the
Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, on
the grounds that they represented un-Islamic idolatry. (The pro-Taliban governor of
Bamiyan at the time of the destruction, Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, won election
to parliament in the September 18, 2005, elections. He blamed the decision to
destroy the statues on Al Qaeda influence on the Taliban.)
The Clinton Administration diplomatically engaged the Taliban movement
before and after it took power, but U.S. relations with the Taliban had become
mostly adversarial well before the September 11, 2001, attacks. The United States
withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan,
formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad
international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted
Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan

CRS-5
embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban
to end discrimination against women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups
urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in
May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to
recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton
Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan by 1998.5 In April 1998,
then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and
asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7,
1998, Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton
Administration progressively pressured the Taliban on bin Laden; it imposed U.S.
sanctions and achieved adoption of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban regime (see
appendix), and it undertook some reported covert actions against it.6 Clinton
Administration officials say that they did not try to forcibly oust the Taliban from
power because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the
Taliban’s opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values.
The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban
The Taliban’s policies caused many different Afghan factions to ally with the
ousted President Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban
opposition, into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Other components of the Alliance
were the following:
! Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major component was the Uzbek
militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. Dostam was best
known for his March 1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated
Najibullah’s overthrow one month later. He subsequently fought
against Rabbani during 1992-1995 to persuade him to yield power,
but later joined Rabbani’s Northern Alliance against the Taliban.
Dostam had commanded about 25,000 troops, armor, combat
aircraft, and some Scud missiles, but he was unable to hold off
Taliban forces, which, after several unsuccessful attempts, captured
Dostam’s region in August 1998. During the U.S.-led war against
the Taliban, Dostam led horse-mounted forces against fixed Taliban
positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the
fall of that city and the Taliban’s collapse. Dostam was a candidate
for president in the October 9, 2004 elections; in March 2005 Karzai
appointed him as his “chief of staff” for military affairs.
5 For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report
RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.
6 On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged bin Laden-controlled
terrorist training camps in retaliation for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

CRS-6
! Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims,
are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are
always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other large ethnic
factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite
grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight
smaller groups); it joined Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government. Hizb-
e-Wahdat was supported by Iran, whose population is Shiite. Hizb-
e-Wahdat forces occasionally retook Bamiyan city from the Taliban,
but they did not hold it until the Taliban collapsed in November
2001. The most well known Hazara political leader is Karim
Khalili, who led a large faction of Hizb-e-Wahdat; he is now one of
Karzai’s two vice presidents. Another major Hazara figure,
Mohammad Mohaqiq, ran in the October 2004 presidential election.
He won a parliament seat in the September 18 election.
! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, headed a
Pashtun-dominated mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for
the Liberation of Afghanistan. He lived many years in and is
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his conservative
brand of Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”). During the anti-Soviet war,
Sayyaf’s faction, along with that of Hikmatyar, was a principal
recipient of U.S.-supplied weaponry. Both criticized the U.S.-led
war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Even though his ideology is similar to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf
joined the Northern Alliance against it. He won election to the
lower house of parliament in the September 18, 2005 election but
lost his bid to become its speaker. He chairs the body’s international
relations committee.
Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the
Taliban differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy — applying
pressure short of military while retaining some dialogue with the Taliban. The Bush
Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance,
although the 9/11 Commission report says that, in the months prior to the September
11 attacks, the Administration was leaning toward such a step. That report adds that
some Administration officials wanted to also assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces and
not just the Northern Alliance; other covert options might have been under
consideration as well.7 In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush
Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan in an effort to persuade it to
end support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution
1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban
representative office in New York. However, the Taliban representative continued
to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received
Taliban foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi to discuss bilateral issues.
7 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles
Times
, May 18, 2002.

CRS-7
Fighting with only some Iranian and Russian support, the Northern Alliance
continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the
September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country and almost
all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on
September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah
Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists.
He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but
who lacks Masud’s charisma or undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom. After the
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused to immediately extradite bin Laden. The Administration
decided that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under
which U.S. forces could capture Al Qaeda activists there. In Congress, S.J.Res.23
(P.L. 107-40) authorized:
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or
persons
.
It passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House. Another law
(P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing
$17 million in funding for it for FY2002.
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on
October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda
forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S.
special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance
and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines)
moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of
the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between
U.S. and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its
Afghan opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan
militia forces in the war strengthened the militias’ subsequent autonomy.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November
9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially
promised U.S. officials they would not enter the city — entered Kabul on November
12. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun
commanders, such as Hamid Karzai; he had entered Afghanistan just after the
September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported in that
effort by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts in the south after
Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001, without
coordination with U.S. forces, and was captured and hung by the Taliban. The end
of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban
surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Omar fled the city, leaving it under tribal law
administered by Pashtun leaders such as the Bashir Noorzai brothers. Subsequently,
U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against as many as 800

CRS-8
Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided
suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1,
2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declared an end to “major combat operations.”
Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction8
The war paved the way for the success of a decade-long U.N. effort to form a
broad-based Afghan government. The United Nations was viewed as a credible
mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation.
During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many
of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a
traditional assembly, the loya jirga. However, any U.N.-mediated ceasefires between
warring factions always broke down. Non-U.N. initiatives fared no better,
particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in
1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran,
China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). All countries in the Six
Plus Two pledged not to arm the warring factions.9 Other efforts included a “Geneva
group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and individual Afghan exile efforts,
including one from the Karzai clan and another centered on former King Zahir Shah.
The Bonn Agreement. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former
U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought back (he had ended his efforts in
frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted
on November 14, 2001, calling for a “central” role for the United Nations in
establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send
peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in
November 2001, the United Nations invited the major Afghan factions, most
prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King — but not the Taliban
— to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the
“Bonn Agreement” that
! Formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the
holding in June 2002 of an emergency loya jirga, which would
choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is
approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004).
Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration,
weighted toward the Northern Alliance with 17 out of 30 of the
positions, including Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanooni). The three ethnic Tajiks,
in their 40s, had been close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud. It was
8 For an analysis of U.S. reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan, with a focus primarily on
economic reconstruction, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan
Reconstruction,
GAO-05-742 (July 2005).
9 In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed a ban on U.S. sales of arms to all
factions in Afghanistan, a policy that had been already in place less formally. Federal
Register
, vol. 61, no. 125 (June 27, 1996), p. 33313.

CRS-9
agreed that, in the interim, Afghanistan would abide by the
constitution of 1964.10
! Authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security,
at least in Kabul. Northern Alliance forces were directed to
withdraw from Kabul. The agreement also referenced the need to
cooperate with the international community to counter narcotics
trafficking, crime, and terrorism.
The Bonn Agreement was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385
(December 6, 2001), and the international peacekeeping force was authorized by
Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001).11
Hamid Karzai
Hamid Karzai, about 51, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he is a credible
Pashtun leader who sought factional compromise rather than intimidation of his
opponents through armed force. He has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani
Pashtuns since 1999, when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in
Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister
in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the
Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses
unfolded and forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern
Alliance. Some of his several brothers have lived in the United States, including
Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election.
Permanent Constitution. An “emergency” loya jirga (June 2002) put a
popular imprimatur on the transition government. Former King Zahir Shah returned
to Afghanistan in April 2002 for the meeting, for which 381 districts of Afghanistan
chose 1,550 delegates, of which about 200 were women. At the assembly, the
former King and Rabbani withdrew from leadership candidacy and Karzai was
selected to remain leader until presidential elections (to be held June 2004). On its
last day (June 19, 2002), the assembly approved a new cabinet, with a few changes.
Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October
2002, drafted the permanent constitution and unveiled in November 2003. It was
debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya
jirga
(CLJ)” during December 13, 2003 - January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by
Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, ended with approval of the constitution with only minor
changes from the draft. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance
factions and their allies did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the
10 The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a
constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that
gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.
11 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.runiceurope.org/german/frieden/afghanistan/talks/
agreement.htm].

CRS-10
presidency by setting up a prime minister-ship. Instead, significant powers were
given to an elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees
and the ability to impeach a president. The major election-related provisions of the
constitution are discussed in CRS Report RS21922: Afghanistan: Elections,
Constitution, and Government
, by Kenneth Katzman.
National Elections. The October 9, 2004 presidential voting was orderly and
turnout heavy (about 8.2 million votes cast out of 10.5 million registered voters).
On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his
seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. Parliamentary and
provincial council elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until
September 18, 2005. Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls
and determining district boundaries, elections for the district councils, each of which
will have small and contentious boundaries, were put off until later in 2006.
Parliamentary results were delayed until November 12, 2005, because of the
need to examine 2,000 fraud complaints. Even though many believe the Karzai
supporters are a slight majority of the parliament, when it convened on December 18,
the Northern Alliance bloc, joined by others, engineered selection of former Karzai
presidential election rival Qanooni for speaker of the lower house. Qanooni
subsequently said he would work cooperatively with Karzai; the role of “opposition
leader” was subsequently taken up by Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani,
who won a seat, although Rabbani told CRS in Kabul in March 2006 that he supports
“reform” and not opposition to Karzai. The 102-seat upper house, selected by the
provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known figures, as well
as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution).
Karzai appointed former Northern Alliance Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim to
that body as a gesture of reconciliation. The leader of that body is Sibghatullah
Mojadeddi, who was slightly injured in a bombing of his convoy in March 2006.
The new parliament asserted itself in the process of confirming a post-election
cabinet, deciding to confirm each nominee individually. Karzai proposed his new
cabinet on March 22, 2006. After much debate, the parliament confirmed 20 out of
the 25 nominated on April 20, 2006, voting down fewer than many believed would
be declined. The new cabinet is somewhat more heavily weighted toward the
Pashtuns than were the previous cabinets. In particular, the long-serving Northern
Alliance figure, Dr. Abdullah, has been replaced as foreign minister with Dr.
Rangeen Spanta. The five not confirmed were those perceived as at odds with
Islamic conservatives in the new parliament or those who had been perceived as poor
performers as incumbents. One of those defeated was Karzai’s only female
nominee, Women’s Affairs minister-designate Soraya Sobrang. Karzai can re-
nominate those voted down or select new nominees for parliamentary confirmation.

CRS-11
Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition
The political transition has proceeded and Karzai’s government is slowly
expanding its writ, but Afghanistan continues to face challenges beyond the ongoing
insurgency discussed later.
Strengthening Central Government. A key part of the U.S. stabilization
effort is to build the capacity of the Afghan government and keep its disparate
factions working together. The commander of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, Gen.
Carl Eikenberry, has tried to extend government authority by conducting visits to the
provinces along with Afghan ministers to determine local needs and demonstrate the
ability of the central government to act and improve lives. Zalmay Khalilzad, an
American of Afghan origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, became
ambassador in December 2003, and he reportedly had significant influence on
Afghan government decisions and factional reconciliation.12 Ambassador Ronald
Neumann replaced him in August 2005. To assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and
coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in 2004 the State Department created an
Office of Afghanistan Affairs, now headed by Ambassador Maureen Quinn.
The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to build
democratic traditions at the local level. The Afghan government’s “National
Solidarity Program” seeks to create local governing councils and empower them to
prioritize local reconstruction projects. Elections to these local councils have been
held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected to them have been
women.13 Observers in Kabul told CRS in March 2006 that the program is viewed
as a success.
As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for Karzai, the Administration
has maintained a pattern of senior visits. Vice President Cheney attended Karzai’s
inauguration in December 2004. In March 2005, First Lady Laura Bush visited.
President Bush made his first visit on March 1, 2006.
As part of a 2003 U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush
Administration formed a 15-person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed
within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to serve as additional advisors to the Afghan
government. However, observers in Kabul say the group, now mostly focused on
helping Afghanistan attract private investment, is phasing out.
Funding Issues/Supplementals. The U.S. embassy, now housed in a
newly constructed building, has expanded its personnel and facilities to help
accelerate the reconstruction process. The tables at the end of this paper discuss U.S.
funding for Embassy operations and Karzai protection, which is now led by Afghan
forces. An FY2006 supplemental request submitted February 16, 2006, asks $50
12 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times,
April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly
a Karzai aide.
13 Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.”
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004.

CRS-12
million for the State Department’s “Diplomatic and Consular Programs” for security
costs of protecting U.S. facilities and personnel (provided in the House- and Senate-
passed versions of the FY2006 supplemental bill, H.R. 4939) and $16 million
(FY2007 funds) for security requirements for USAID to operate in Afghanistan (not
provided in the House version of H.R. 4939).
Curbing Regional Strongmen. Karzai, as well as numerous private studies
and U.S. official statements, cite regional and factional militias as a key threat to
Afghan stability. Some of these local strongmen have been accused of past human
rights abuses in a report released in July 2005 by the “Afghanistan Justice Project.14
Some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy. Others
believe that easily obtained arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking
profits, help to sustain the independence of local militias. Still others maintain that
local militias did not interfere to any great extent in the recent Afghan elections and
are not an obstacle to Afghan stability.
Karzai has moved to marginalize some regional strongmen. Herat governor
Ismail Khan was removed by Karzai in September 2004 and was later appointed
Minister of Water and Energy. On the other hand, he was tapped by Karzai to help
calm Herat after Sunni-Shiite clashes there in February 2006, clashes that some in
Kabul believe were stoked by Khan himself to demonstrate his continued influence
in Herat. As noted above, Dostam was appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, and
in April 2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli faction. In July 2004,
Karzai removed charismatic Northern Alliance commander Atta Mohammad from
control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area, appointing him as governor of Balkh
province. Afghan parliamentarians told CRS in February 2006 that Atta had purged
several Balkh government officials for alleged narcotics trafficking involvement.
Two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad
(Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts; Hazrat Ali was
subsequently elected to parliament. Karzai removed Pashtun regional leader Ghul
Agha Sherzai as Minister of Public Works and of Urban Development but then
returned him to his prior post as governor of Qandahar, subsequently shifting him to
the governorship of Nangarhar Province, east of Kabul, which has many Pashtuns.
As noted above, former Defense Minister Fahim was appointed by Karzai to the
upper house of parliament. The move gives him a stake in the political process and
reduces his potential to activate Northern Alliance militia loyalists. Fahim has also
turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces as of January
2005 (including four Scud missiles).
DDR and DIAG Programs. A cornerstone of the effort to curb regionalism
is a program, run by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
(UNAMA, whose mandate was extended until March 2007 by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1662 of March 23, 2006), to dismantle identified and illegal militias. The
program is called the “DDR” program: Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration. This program is run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada,
14 See [http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org].

CRS-13
with participation of the United States. The program got off to a slow start because
the Afghan Defense Ministry did not enact mandated reforms (primarily reduction
of the number of Tajiks in senior positions) by the targeted July 1, 2003, date. In
September 2003, Karzai acted on the issue, replacing 22 senior Tajik Defense
Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.
The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters,
although that figure was later dropped to just over 60,000 by Afghan officials.
According to UNAMA, 63,000 militia fighters identified were disarmed by the time
this phase of the program ended July 8, 2005, and virtually all of those have now
exercised reintegration options: training, starting small businesses, and other
options. The program got a boost from the ousting of Ismail Khan as Herat governor
in August 2004; he permitted many of his militiamen to enter the DDR program after
his removal. Some studies have criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent
a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the
rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United States and its partners.15
The program was funded with about $140 million from various donors, including the
United States. See the aid tables below.
Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons.
According to UNAMA, at least 36,000 medium and light weapons have been
collected; of these, 13,400 pieces have been transferred to the ANA. In addition,
about 11,000 heavy weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces)
have been collected, nearly all of the heavy weapons believed controlled by militia
forces. However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons have been
collected and that faction leaders maintain secret caches of weapons.
Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program
called “DIAG” for Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups. This program seeks to
disarm, by the end of 2007, a pool of perhaps 80,000-100,000 members of 1,800
different “illegal armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local
forces and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. However, UNAMA
officials told CRS in Kabul in March 2006 that only “several hundred” groups (five
or more fighters) are of sufficient concern to merit disarmament efforts. The program
to disarm them is called the (DIAG). As of late March 2006, over 20,250 weapons
had been collected from these militia fighters, according to UNAMA.
Kapisa Province is considered a model for the program because 38 commanders
believed receptive to disarmament attended a ceremony to formally inaugurate the
DIAG program on May 1, 2006. Other provinces believed receptive are Takhar and
Herat; some commanders in Khost, which has sometimes been restive, agreed to
disarm under the program in late March 2006. No payments are available to fighters
disarmed under the program, and the program depends on persuasion and negotiation
rather than direct use of force against the illegal groups. DIAG is not as well funded
as is DDR: thus far the program has received $11 million in operating funds, and
15 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization
and Rearmament?
, June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament
%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf].

CRS-14
Japan has donated $15 million for development projects where illegal groups have
disarmed.
Combating Narcotics Trafficking. Narcotics trafficking is regarded by
some as the most significant problem facing Afghanistan. Narcotics account for
about $2.7 billion in value — still nearly half of Afghanistan’s GDP, and the State
Department’s International Narcotics Strategy Report, released March 4, 2005, says
that Afghanistan is “on the verge of becoming a narcotics state.” In his November
4, 2004, election victory speech and since, Karzai has called on Afghans to join a
“jihad” against the opium trade, later pledging to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy fields
within two years. He has also urged the Bush Administration to focus primarily on
funding alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from growing, rather than
on eradication or interdiction. The first evidence that some of these programs might
be working was provided in a November 2005 study by the U.N. Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Counternarcotics Directorate; that report said
that the area devoted to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had dropped 21%
over the past year. However, an improved yield caused the overall opium production
to decline by only 2.5% and some are expecting a major increase in area under
cultivation in 2006 because some farmers were not given the assistance promised to
them in exchange for declining to grow poppies.
To try to add effectiveness to the U.S. program, the U.S. military has overcome
its initial reluctance to expand its mission in Afghanistan and it is now playing a
greater role in attacking traffickers and their installations. The U.S. military is
reportedly flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement
Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from
any counter-drug operations. The Bush Administration also has taken some new
legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers by indicting them and putting
the legal machinery in place to have them extradited from Afghanistan if caught.16
In mid-April 2005, a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan
narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York.
Another alleged Afghan trafficker, Baz Mohammad, was extradited from
Afghanistan in October 2005. For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the
issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.
The Bush Administration has not imposed economic sanctions on post-Taliban
Afghanistan. It has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of countries that have
“failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-
narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S.
law.17 However, the Administration also has not, to date, made a required
certification of full Afghan cooperation that is required to provide more than $225
million in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan (FY2006 funds). Narcotics trafficking
16 Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters,
November 2, 2004.
17 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every
year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug
trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.

CRS-15
control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much of the
international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation,
which the U.N. International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said in February 2001
had dramatically decreased cultivation.18 The Northern Alliance did not issue a
similar ban in areas it controlled.
Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy. U.S. and Afghan
officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy
ravaged by war and lack of investment. U.S. economic reconstruction efforts are
showing some tangible results, including roads and education and health facilities
constructed. However, the United States has not met all its reconstruction targets,
according to a July 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office.19 The
five-year development strategy outlined in the “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at the
January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan reinforces the
sectors below as priorities, and funding for these purposes is shown in the tables at
the end of this paper.
! Roads. U.S. Ambassador Neumann told CRS in February 2006 that
expanding road building is a major U.S. priority to expand the writ
of the Afghan government and build a viable legitimate economy.
Some projects have been completed, such as the Kabul-Qandahar
roadway project (Phase I, completed December 2003, and Phase II,
completed November 2004). The Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded
by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, was largely
completed in late 2005. U.S.-funded ($2.7 million) work began on
March 15, 2005 for a road out of the Panjshir Valley. On September
27, 2005, a $20 million road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, built by
U.S. military personnel, was inaugurated. A new U.S. focus is a
Khowst-Gardez road and roads in Badakhshan Province.
! Education and Health. According to U.S. officials, five million
Afghan children are now in school — up from only 900,000 in 2001
— and girls’ attendance is up sharply. About 525,000 girls were
enrolled in school during 2005, according to UNAMA. Additional
work is being conducted on school and health clinic rebuilding (278
schools and 326 clinics have been built thus far, according to
Ambassador Quinn on September 22, 2005). About $152 million
in U.S. funds were programmed for Afghanistan education during
FY2003-FY2005. Press reports say that some projects are going
uncompleted; a Washington Post report of November 20, 2005, says
that of 1,000 U.S.-funded health clinics and schools to be built by
the end of 2004 at a cost of $73 million, only about 150 have been
18 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New
York Times
, February 7, 2001.
19 Numerous other examples of U.S. economic reconstruction initiatives are analyzed in a
General Accounting Office (GAO) report: Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some
Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement
of U.S. Goals
, GAO Report GAO-05-742, July 2005.

CRS-16
completed by November 2005, mostly refurbishing existing
buildings.
! Agriculture. According to the director of the USAID mission at
U.S. Embassy Kabul in December 2005, USAID has helped
Afghanistan double its agricultural output over the past four years.
Afghan officials say agricultural assistance and development should
be a top U.S. priority as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate
alternatives to poppy cultivation.
! Electricity. The Afghanistan Compact states that by 2010, the goal
is for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25%
in rural areas. The FY2006 supplemental request asks for $32
million in funds mostly for a key electricity transmission project
(Northeast Transmission Project). The House-passed bill (H.R.
4939) defers $28 million for that project but provides $5 million for
the Northwest Kabul Power turbine generator. The Senate version
provides full funding.
Funding/FY2005 Supplemental/FY2006. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L.
109-13) appropriated $1.086 billion in ESF out of the $1.3 billion in ESF requested
for reconstruction projects. The conference report says the amount “assumes full
funding” for health programs and provincial reconstruction team (PRTs, discussed
below). Among projects not funded were refurbishment of Kabul Airport, venture
capital funding, industrial park funding, higher education including costs of a new
law school in Kabul, and various long-term construction projects (power plants,
industrial parks, and courthouses).
The FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102) contained about
$620 million for civilian sector reconstruction. Of that amount, according to
USAID, a total of $405.8 million is budgeted for FY2006 for infrastructure,
agriculture, health, and education. The requested $11 million to write off
Afghanistan’s debt is deferred in the House-passed version of H.R. 4939, but funded
in the Senate version.

Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices.
Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban.
The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to
meet and organize freely, but there are also abuses based on ethnicity or political
factionalism and arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders, according to the
State Department report on human rights practices for 2005 (released March 8,
2006).20 According to the report, “The lack of an effective police force, poor
infrastructure and communications, instability, and insecurity hampered
investigations of unlawful killings, bombings, or civilian deaths...” The State
Department International Religious Freedom report for 2005 (released November 8,
2005) supports accounts of progress but says there continues to be discrimination
against the Shiite (Hazara) minority.
20 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61704.htm].

CRS-17
On the other hand, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
said in a report released in May 2006 that there is rising religious persecution, a
judgment that is consistent with observations of other experts. Some observers have
noted that the government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions that characterized
Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law.21
Some have blamed the restrictions on chief justice of the Afghan Supreme Court,
Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative who was appointed in late November
2001 by Rabbani (who was temporarily in charge in Kabul before Karzai took
office). In March 2006, Karzai reappointed Shinwari chief justice, although Karzai
appointed eight others to the Supreme Court who are said to be more moderate. On
October 23, 2005, Afghanistan’s Supreme Court convicted a male journalist Ali
Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s Rights” magazine) of blasphemy and
sentenced him to two years in prison for his articles about apostasy. A Kabul court
reduced his sentence to time served and he was freed in December 2005, easing
concerns.
Another human rights/religious freedom case earned congressional attention in
March 2006. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity
16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned
and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert back
to Islam. Facing international pressure that the trial would undercut the new Afghan
constitution’s commitment to international standards of human rights protections,
President Karzai apparently prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him on
March 29, 2006; he subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His release
came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government
to protect Afghan converts from prosecution.
U.S. programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system,
including police training and court construction; many of these programs are
conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial
reform. The United States has trained over 500 judges, according to USAID, and it
trains prosecutors and court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of
the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court.
An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) has been formed
to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department
reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. It is headed by former Women’s
Affairs minister Sima Samar.
Funding Issues. The tables at the end of the paper show earmarks for the
AIHC and related functions; appropriations have been relatively consistent with
authorizations in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327).
USAID has budgeted $280 million for democracy and rule of law programs for
FY2006. The funding includes support for the new parliament, civil society
programs, media, and rule of law programs.
21 Shea, Nina. “Sharia in Kabul?” National Review, October 28, 2002.

CRS-18
Advancement of Women.22 The government is widely considered to be
promoting the advancement of women, although numerous abuses continue to be
reported by the State Department, primarily resulting from Afghanistan’s
conservative traditions. The first major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan
was the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving
women’s rights. That ministry involved more Afghan women in business ventures,
and it has promoted interpretations of the Quran that favor participation of women
in national affairs. There were three female ministers in the 2004-2006 cabinet:
former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal was Minister of Women’s Affairs;
Sediqa Balkhi was Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled; and Amina Afzali was
Minister of Youth. However, Karzai proposed only one (Minister of Women’s
Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the new cabinet; she was voted down by opposition from
Islamist conservatives in parliament. In March 2005 Karzai appointed a former
Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province,
inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted above, the constitution reserves for women
at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament, and several prominent
women have won seats in the new parliament, including some who would have won
even if there were no set-aside for women.
More broadly, women are performing some jobs, such as construction work,
that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, 23
including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly
learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it
than was the case a few years ago.
The Administration and Congress are taking a continued interest in the
treatment of women in Afghanistan, and U.S. officials have had some influence in
persuading the government to codify women’s rights. After the Karzai government
took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan
Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s
visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United
States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women,
including women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs.
Funding Issues. Recent congressional action includes the following:
! On November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House
unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children
Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The law (signed
December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of
supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the
22 See also CRS Report RS21865, Assistance to Afghan and Iraqi Women: Issues for
Congress
, by Febe Armanios and Rhoda Margesson.
23 Amanpour, Christiane. CNN special report on Afghanistan. Broadcast November 2,
2003.

CRS-19
Office of the President a $40 billion Emergency Response Fund to
respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks)24 to fund educational
and health programs for Afghan women and children.
! The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327)
authorized $15 million per year, for FY2003-2006, for the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs.
! Subsequent appropriations for programs for women and girls are
contained in the tables at the end of this paper. Recent
appropriations have required that about $50 million per year, from
various accounts, be used specifically to support programs and
organizations that benefit Afghan women and girls.
Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building
The top security priority of the Administration has been to prevent Al Qaeda and
Taliban from regrouping there and to reduce security threats to the Afghan
government. The pillars of the U.S. security effort are (1) combat operations by U.S.
and other coalition forces in Afghanistan; (2) peacekeeping by a NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) U.S. and NATO expansion of
“provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs); and (4) the equipping and training of an
Afghan National Army and a police force.
Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 18,000
troops in Afghanistan. In conjunction with the assumption of greater NATO/ISAF
responsibility, U.S. force levels in Afghanistan will drop to about 16,500 in 2006,
according to U.S. officials. Nineteen coalition countries are contributing another
approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF. These include forces from Britain
(several hundred); Australia (300); France (200, as well as French combat aircraft
flying strikes from Bagram air base north of Kabul, Tajikistan, and Qatar); Romania;
Canada; the Netherlands; Italy; New Zealand; and Germany. Additional assistance
comes from Japanese naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea. The
commander of U.S.-led combat forces in Afghanistan is Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry
(as of May 3, 2005, replacing Lt. Gen David Barno), who heads the “Combined
Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A),” headquartered at Camp Eggers, near the
U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The operational commander is Maj. Gen. Benjamin
Freakley.
U.S. forces along with Afghan troops continue on the offensive against
insurgents, although insurgent tactics have shifted somewhat to greater use of suicide
attacks rather than small-unit operations. The United States and Afghanistan
conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche,”
(December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban
24 For more information on how the appropriated funds were distributed and used, see CRS
Report RL31173, Combating Terrorism: First Emergency Supplemental Appropriations-
Distribution of Funds to Departments and Agencies
, by James R. Riehl.

CRS-20
remnants in and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar;
“Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation
Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan (October 2005).
U.S. commanders believe that the combat, coupled with overall political and
economic reconstruction, has weakened the insurgency, but insurgents attacks have
escalated somewhat since mid- 2005. Since then, Taliban and Hikmatyar insurgents,
apparently mimicking suicide and roadside bombing tactics used in the Iraq
insurgency, have stepped up their operations in Afghanistan and have increased their
attacks now that mountain snows are melting and roads are opening up in spring
2006. The insurgents, most active in Uruzgan, Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol
Provinces, are purportedly preparing to step up attacks on the NATO countries that
are about to assume responsibility for security in the south, as discussed below.
Some Afghan, U.S., and UNAMA officials, in conversations with CRS in Kabul in
February 2006, attribute the stepped-up attacks to a reinforcement of the Taliban
insurgents by Al Qaeda militants who cross the border from Pakistan.
Recent insurgent attacks have focused on aid workers, U.S. and Afghan soldiers
and police, Afghan teachers whose classes contain girls, pro-Karzai clerics, and
politicians. Seven parliamentary candidates were assassinated during the campaign.
Of the most significant terrorist-type attacks, on June 1, 2005, a mosque in Qandahar
was bombed, killing 40 Afghans, including Kabul’s police chief. On September 28,
2005, a suicide bomber killed nine Afghan soldiers. A suicide bomber killed ten
Afghans at a provincial market in Uruzgan province, not far from where
Ambassador Neumann was meeting. Two Swedish international peacekeepers
(ISAF, see below) were killed in generally quiet Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2005.
The Taliban insurgent command structure apparently is still intact. As noted
above, Mullah Umar remains active. Some top aides have been captured, but others,
such as Jalaludin Haqqani (who some believe heads a completely separate insurgent
faction), Mullah Akhtar Usmani, and Mullah Dadullah are still at large. In addition,
in April 2005 Taliban remnants started a clandestine radio station, “Voice of
Shariat,” suggesting the movement still has substantial resources. On the other hand,
in early October 2005, Pakistan arrested and subsequently extradited to Afghanistan
the Taliban’s chief “spokesman,” Abdul Latif Hakimi.
Some experts believe that Taliban and other insurgents have incited recent riots
against the United States and NATO-led forces. Such riots took place in January and
February 2006 over the Danish publication of cartoons unflatteringly depicting the
Prophet Mohammad. In one such demonstration on February 21, Afghan students
demonstrating in Jalalabad shouted support for Osama bin Laden.
Several Taliban militants have renounced their past and joined the political
process under Karzai’s offers of amnesty. According to press reports, about 50-60
militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the
reconciliation process, headed by Mojadeddi. In January 2005, U.S. forces in
Afghanistan released 81 detained Taliban fighters at Karzai’s request. Another
Taliban figure, its former ambassador to Pakistan, was released by U.S. forces in
September 2005. As noted above, several Taliban figures, including its foreign

CRS-21
minister Wakil Mutawwakil, ran in the parliamentary elections. Karzai has said
about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would not be eligible for amnesty.
The Hunt for Al Qaeda and Other Militants. U.S. Special Operations
Forces in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan) continue to hunt for bin Laden and his close
ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive
against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December
2001.25 The two are now widely believed to be on Pakistan’s side of the border.
Another target of OEF is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG)
allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. On February 19, 2003, the U.S.
government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global
Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial
and other U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist
Organization,” but it is included in the section on “other terrorist groups” in the State
Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004, released April 2005. Some
accounts suggest that a Special Operations team ambushed in June 2005 might have
searching for Hikmatyar; a U.S. helicopter sent to rescue the team was apparently
shot down, killing the 16 aboard.
Longer Term U.S. Military Presence. Even if the Taliban insurgency is
defeated completely, it appears that the United States will maintain a long-term
presence in Afghanistan, an outcome that Afghan leaders say they want. President
Karzai told visiting Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on April 13, 2005, that Afghanistan
would ask President Bush for a long-term security pact with the United States that
might include permanent bases, although Rumsfeld reportedly was non-committal.
On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a national consultation
in Kabul on the proposal to allow permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan; delegates
reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain
security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and
President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access
to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international
terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give
Karzai his requested increased control over facilities used by the U.S. forces, over
U.S. operations, or over the disposition of prisoners taken in the course of operations.
Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that are used in support of
OEF, and numbers of troops in surrounding countries (as of November 2005,
according to Defense Department figures provided to CRS), include the following.
25 For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report
RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.

CRS-22
! Bagram Air Base. This base, north of Kabul, is the operational hub
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.26 About 500 U.S. military personnel
are based there. Bagram, along with thirteen other airfields in
Afghanistan, handles the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters)
in the country and substantial infrastructure is being added to it. A
hospital is being constructed on the facility; one of the first
permanent structures to be built there. The FY2005 supplemental
(P.L. 109-13) provides a total of about $52 million for various
projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower
and an operations center. The Senate version of H.R. 4939, the
FY2006 supplemental appropriation, does not fully fund the
Administration request for funds for construction at Bagram because
NATO will be using it in conjunction with increased NATO security
responsibilities in Afghanistan, and the Senate Appropriations
Committee first wants to see a plan for NATO to share costs there.
! Qandahar Airfield. This airfield, just outside Qandahar, bases about
500 U.S. military personnel. The FY2005 supplemental provides
$16 million for an ammunition supply facility at Qandahar.
! Shindand Air Base. This base is 20 miles from the Iranian border.
It has been used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft since October
2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, whose
forces controlled the facility.
! Karshi-Khanabad Airbase. This Uzbekistan base housed about
1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450
civilian) in supply missions to Afghanistan. In July 2005, following
U.S. criticism of the May 2005 crackdown on unrest in the city of
Andijon, Uzbekistan formally demanded that the United States
discontinue use of the base within six months. U.S. forces have
ceased using it.
! Peter Ganci Base. This base at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan has
about 1,100 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo
aircraft. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an
uprising against President Askar Akayev, but Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Rice reportedly received assurances
about continued U.S. use of the base during their visits to
Kyrgyzstan in July 2005 and October 2005, respectively. However,
in February 2006, Kyrgyzstan’s president Kurmanbek Bakiyev said
the United States should pay $200 million per year to use the facility
instead of the $2 million it now pays, and U.S.-Kyrgyz disputes over
U.S. payments for the use of the facility have continued to cause
occasional threats by Bakiyev to discontinue U.S. access to it.
26 Harris, Kent. “Buildings Going Up at Bagram Air Base as U.S. Forces Dig In for the
Long Haul.” Stars and Stripes, March 15, 2005.

CRS-23
! Persian Gulf Bases. Several bases in the Persian Gulf are used to
support the Afghanistan mission, including Al Dhafra in the UAE
(about 1,800 U.S. military personnel in UAE) and Al Udeid in Qatar
(10,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar). P.L. 109-13 appropriates $1.4
million to upgrade Al Dhafra. Military facilities in Bahrain house
U.S. naval command headquarters from which CENTCOM, along
with several partner countries reporting to the U.S. Fifth Fleet,
patrol the Arabian Sea to prevent the movement of Al Qaeda and
other militants, as well as contraband such as narcotics, across those
waters. (About 5,100 U.S. military personnel are in Bahrain.)
! Incirlik Air Base. On April 21, 2005, Turkey said it would extend
for another year an agreement allowing the United States to use
Incirlik air base to supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(About 2,100 U.S. military personnel are in Turkey.)
OEF Costs and Casualties. As of May 4, 2006, 281 U.S. military
personnel have been killed in OEF, of which 224 (plus one DOD civilian) have died
in or around Afghanistan. In 2005, 90 U.S. soldiers were killed in Afghanistan,
double the 2004 number. The others died in other theaters of the war, such as in
Africa and the Middle East. No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan
civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths.
Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be relatively
stable at about $1 billion per month. Supplemental FY2005 funds for Afghanistan
combat were provided in P.L. 108-287 and P.L. 109-13, and additional military
operations funds were asked for in the FY2006 supplemental request, which is
pending (H.R. 4939). For information on U.S. military costs and funding requests
for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Enhanced Base Security Since 9/11
, by Amy Belasco.
Growing Responsibilities of NATO-Led International Security Force
(ISAF).27 In 2006, international forces will be assuming from the United States a
greater share of the security burden, although many NATO nations see their role
primarily as peacekeeping and promoting reconstruction. The Bonn Agreement and
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) created an international
peacekeeping force for Afghanistan: the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF).28 ISAF was initially limited to Kabul but broadened with NATO’s takeover
of command of ISAF (August 2003) and NATO/ISAF’s assumption of control over
additional provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in northern and western
27 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to
OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF.
28 Its mandate was extended on September 13, 2005, until October 2006 (U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1623).

CRS-24
Afghanistan (Stage 1 in 2004 and Stage 2 in 2005, respectively).29 That process will
continue in 2006 as NATO/ISAF takes over additional PRTs and, along with that,
some of the combat mission, in southern Afghanistan (by July 2006). As part of this
Stage 3, a British/Canadian/Dutch-led 6,000 person “Regional Command South” will
be formed, with U.S. participation (and U.S. forces serving under NATO/ISAF
command). The new command was held up over opposition in the Dutch parliament
to their country’s deployment, but the parliament voted on February 3, 2006, to
permit the move. In conjunction with the restructuring, NATO/ISAF force levels
will increase to about 15,000, from the current level of about 12,000. NATO is
expected to announce a timetable for the NATO/ISAF takeover of eastern
Afghanistan (Stage 4) at the NATO summit in November 2006. U.S. military
officials in Kabul told CRS in February 2006 that once the transition is completed,
OEF might technically cease and CFC-A might close. (During 2002-2004, ISAF’s
force was about 6,400 troops from all 26 NATO countries, plus 10 non-NATO
nations.) Table 8 lists each contributing country to ISAF and the approximate
number of forces contributed.
The expansion agreement represents a quieting of the initial opposition of
European NATO nations to mixing reconstruction-related peacekeeping with anti-
insurgent combat. The differences began to resolve in late 2005 when NATO agreed
on a formula under which a deputy commander of ISAF would be “dual-hatted” —
commanding the OEF combat mission as well reporting to the ISAF command
structure. In December 2005, NATO adopted rules of engagement that will allow
NATO/ISAF forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as
aggressively as the combat conducted by the U.S.-led OEF forces. The United States
currently contributes a small amount of force directly to ISAF (89 troops), primarily
to coordinate U.S. assistance to ISAF.
U.S. officials have tried to reassure Afghan leaders that U.S. forces will still be
operating in sectors controlled by NATO/ISAF and available to conduct combat
missions. One source of the official Afghan nervousness about the transition is that
NATO has had chronic personnel and equipment shortages for the Afghanistan
mission. Those shortages eased somewhat in December 2003 when NATO identified
additional equipment for ISAF operations, including 12 helicopters from Germany,
the Netherlands, and Turkey; and aircraft and infantry from various nations. Britain
will be bringing additional equipment, including Apache attack helicopters, when it
becomes lead force in NATO/ISAF in 2006, and the Netherlands will be deploying
additional Apache helicopter and F-16 aircraft to help protect its forces in the south.
The core of NATO/ISAF is the Kabul Multinational Brigade (4,400 personnel),
which was headed by Canada until August 2004, then by the “Eurocorps,” a rapid
response force composed of forces from France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and
Luxembourg. Turkey took over the lead force role in February 2005, and Italy has
29 In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities,
contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after
Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the
city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003)
formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul.

CRS-25
been lead since August 2005. The overall commander of ISAF in Afghanistan is
Italian Gen. Mauro Del Vecchio. Britain is taking over the lead (“ISAF 9”) in May
2006 as head of an “Allied Rapid Reaction Corps,” and a British commander will
become lead of ISAF. At the headquarters level, there are 600 personnel from 15
contributing nations. ISAF coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF
forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in
the operation of Kabul International Airport (where Dutch combat aircraft also are
located).
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). NATO/ISAF expansion in
Afghanistan builds on a U.S. initiative to use its military presence to promote
reconstruction. That effort, inaugurated in December 2002, is the establishment of
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) — military-run enclaves that provide safe
havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the
writ of the Kabul government. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes
to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs focus
mostly on counter-insurgency. Each U.S.-run PRT is composed of U.S. forces (50-
100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers;
representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan
government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by
partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in
restive regions are “co-located” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S.
combat troops. Plans are to eventually establish PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program
began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.30 However, other
relief groups do not want to associate with any military force because doing so might
taint their perceived neutrality.
Partner countries now run eleven PRTs, but that will increase to 13 in
conjunction with the formation of the “Regional Command South.” Some other
countries, including Turkey, are considering taking over other PRTs, and U.S.
officials in Kabul told CRS in February 2006 that there is a move to turn over the
lead in the PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State
Department or USAID officials. That process began in early 2006 with the
establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley.
In August 2005, in preparation for the NATO/ISAF move into the south, Canada
took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. Canada will eventually have about
2,200 troops at that PRT under the transition plan. In early May 2006, British forces
formally took over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province, and
Britain will soon send about 3,000 forces there, a major increase over its
approximately 500 troops now in northern Afghanistan. The Netherlands is to take
over the PRT at Tarin Kowt, capital of restive Uruzgan Province, home province of
Mullah Umar. It will have about 1,700 troops there, an addition of about 1,100 from
current levels in Afghanistan. The ongoing violence in Uruzgan, perhaps
Afghanistan’s most restive province, is what caused the Dutch parliament to balk at
30 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times,
April 11, 2003.

CRS-26
the Dutch deployment. As noted above, Italy (with Spain), through their PRTs, now
have primary control for western Afghanistan. Germany (with Turkey and France)
is taking over the PRTs and the leadership role in the north from Britain as Britain
deploys to the south. The list of existing PRTs is shown in Table 9. (One U.S.-run
PRT is under NATO auspices.)
U.S. funds support PRT reconstruction projects. USAID spent about $98
million on PRTs (and DDR operations) in FY2005. USAID has allocated $37
million for these operations in FY2006. Appropriations for this function are noted
in the tables at the end of this paper.
Afghan National Army (ANA). U.S. forces (“Office of Security Cooperation
Afghanistan,” OSC-A), in partnership with French, British, and other forces, are
training the new ANA. As of April 2006, the ANA numbers about 29,000 troops in
40 battalions, (5 Corps) of which 24 are combat battalions. That is close to half its
total target strength of 70,000 that it is expected to reach by 2010. The target level
was reiterated in the Afghanistan Compact adopted in London on February 1, 2006.
U.S. officers in Afghanistan say the ANA is beginning to become a major force in
stabilizing the country and a national symbol. The ANA deployed to Herat in March
2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response
to Dostam’s militia movement into that city. The ANA deployed outside
Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan
earthquake. The United States has built four regional bases for it (Herat, Gardez,
Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif). The ANA now has at least some presence in most
of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded
U.S. trainers. Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy
brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul.
A June 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office cites progress but
also notes problems such as ANA equipment shortages.31 There have been
personnel problems that likely continue as well. At the time the United States first
began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures reportedly weighted
recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in
reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan
say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better pay and more
involvement by U.S. Special Forces, as well as the appointment of additional
Pashtuns in senior Defense Ministry positions.32 The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul
Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions
among Pashtuns (he remains in that position in the cabinet confirmed April 2006).
To provide ethnic balance, the chief of staff is Gen. Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was
a Northern Alliance commander; Khan visited the United States in October 2005.
U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home
towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long
absence. Fully trained recruits are paid about $70 per month. The FY2005 foreign
31 Government Accountability Office Report GAO-05-575. “Afghanistan Security.” June
2005. Available at [http://www.gao.gov].
32 Gall, Carlotta. “In a Remote Corner, an Afghan Army Evolves From Fantasy to Slightly
Ragged Reality,” New York Times, January 25, 2003.

CRS-27
aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that ANA recruits be
vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug
trafficking.
An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior
to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has
about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. Russia
overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain. In
May 2005, representatives of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said
the United States is considering obtaining for Afghanistan additional transport planes
and helicopters, although the equipment might not necessarily be U.S. equipment,
according to DSCA. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. Afghanistan is
seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in
Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan.
ANA Armament. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue
to plague the ANA, according to U.S. commanders and outside observers. Thus far,
weaponry for the ANA has come primarily from Defense Ministry weapons stocks
— with the concurrence of former Defense Minister Fahim who controlled those
stocks — from international donors, primarily from the former East bloc33 and from
the DDR program discussed above. In October 2005, Russia announced it would
give the ANA four helicopters and other non-lethal military aid and equipment; it has
already provided about $100 million in military aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan. In
May 2005, Egypt delivered 16,000 weapons to the ANA.
Afghan National Police. Some Afghan officials believe that building up a
credible and capable national police force is at least as important as building the
ANA. Some Afghans do not believe the ANA should have a role in maintaining
internal security, and that this should be the role of the police. The United States and
Germany are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force. The U.S. effort has
been led by State Department/INL, primarily through a contract with DynCorp, but
the Defense Department is beginning to play a role in that effort, particularly in
“police reform.” About 62,000 ANP are on duty, including 3,000 in training,
approximately the target size of the force. They are trained by the United States and
Germany (senior levels). There are seven police training centers around Afghanistan,
which includes training in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts.
However, the ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them
in local factional or ethnic disputes. The June 2005 GAO report, cited above, notes
progress and continued problems, including the continued influence of local leaders
on the national police.
The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry
to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities.
According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the
first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police
33 Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July
22, 2003.

CRS-28
of Afghanistan. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol
forces (which are included in the figures cited above).
U.S. Security Forces Funding. According to the June 2005 GAO report,
the United States provided about $4.1 billion during FY2002-FY2005 to support the
ANA and ANP. U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO funds)
are used to cover ANA salaries. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are
contained in the tables at the end of this paper. As noted in the table, the security
forces funding has shifted to DOD funds instead of assistance funds controlled by the
State Department. In addition,
! The FY2006 supplemental requested in February 2006 asks $2.197
billion in additional DOD funding to equip and train the Afghan
security forces, including ANA and ANP. The House-passed
FY2006 supplemental (H.R. 4939) provides $1.851 billion for this
purpose but withholds $346 million for construction of police
facilities. The Senate-passed version provides $1.908 billion for this
purpose.
! According to a GAO report of June 2005, in addition to direct
funding, the United States drew down $287 million worth of defense
articles (including M-113 armored personnel carriers) and services
for the ANA during FY2002-FY2004, plus $11 million worth of
military trucks and armored personnel vehicles. On June 16, 2005,
the President authorized an additional draw-down of $161.5 million.
In FY2006, Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant Excess Defense
Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
International donors have furnished $120 million in cash for the
ANP and provided another $126 million in equipment and training.
Table 1. Major Security-Related Indicators
(May 2006)
Force
current level
target level
U.S. Forces (OEF)
18,000
16,500 (June 2006)
OEF Partner Forces
2,000
no announced change
NATO/ISAF
12,000
15,000 (July 2006)
Afghan National Army (ANA) 29,000
70,000 (2010)
Afghan National Police (ANP) 62,000 (including 3,000 in
62,000
training)
Legally Armed Fighters
0
0
(Disarmed by DDR program
by June 2005)
DIAG/Weapons Collected
“Several hundred” significant
goal is no remaining illegal
from Illegal Armed Groups
illegal groups (five or more
groups by 2010
fighters) remain, but 20,250
weapons collected thus far

CRS-29
Regional Context
Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban
has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments
are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though
six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration)
on December 23, 2002. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
Pakistan34
Afghan officials are trying to normalize relations with Pakistan, but relations
were set back in March 2006 when Afghan leaders openly asserted that Pakistan had
was exerting insufficient efforts to prevent Taliban remnants from operating there.
Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf retorted that Afghanistan’s information on
Taliban suspects operating in Pakistan is old and unreliable. Some Afghan leaders
continue to resent Pakistan because it was the most public defender of the Taliban
movement when it was in power (one of only three countries to formally recognize
it as the legitimate government.; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the
others). Pakistan purportedly viewed (and according to some Afghan leaders, still
views) the Taliban as an instrument with which to build an Afghanistan sufficiently
friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival India. Pakistan
ended its public support for the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
For its part, Pakistan is wary that any Afghan government might fall under the
influence of India, which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in
Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents. Pakistan says it is too
difficult to distinguish Afghan Taliban from Pakistani nationals. On July 19, 2005,
Pakistan arrested five suspected senior Taliban leaders, including a deputy to Mullah
Umar, and, as noted above, in October 2005 it arrested and turned over to
Afghanistan Taliban spokesman Hakimi.
The United States has praised Pakistan for its efforts against Al Qaeda. After
the September 11 attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with requested access
to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Pakistan also has
arrested over 550 Al Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them
over to the United States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide
Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al
Shibh September 11, 2002; top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March
2003); and most recently a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). A U.S.
Predator drone-launched January 13, 2006, strike on Damadola village in Pakistan
targeted Zawahiri, according to U.S. officials, but his subsequent video appearance
proved that the strike did not succeed. It also caused anti-U.S. demonstrations in
Pakistan because some civilians apparently were killed in the strike; press sources say
up to four Al Qaeda militants were hit in it.
34 For further discussion, see Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.”
Foreign Affairs, November-December 1999.

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Following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against President
Musharraf, Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas
who are suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani
forces began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the
Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other
indirect support. Pakistan now has approximately 74,000 forces poised near the
north Waziristan area of Pakistan, and the U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005
that it is training Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.35
Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the
“Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893,
separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan
after the 1947 partition). As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees
have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees
remain in Pakistan.
Iran
Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional
influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the
Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iranian firms, which
have invested about $200 million in Afghanistan since the Taliban collapse, are also
profiting from reconstruction work in western Afghanistan, in some cases to the
detriment of Afghan firms. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President Bush
warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S.
criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar,
although it did not arrest him. Since then, the Bush Administration criticism of
Iranian “meddling” has lessened as the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance has been
marginalized in the government. For his part, Karzai has said that Iran is an
important neighbor of Afghanistan. Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of
Iran ally Ismail Khan in September 2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent
U.S. use of the Shindand air base.36 Iran is said to be helping Afghan law
enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border. About 300,000 Afghan refugees
have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly
integrated into Iranian society.
Even though Iran’s position in Afghanistan has waned since 2004, it is still
greatly enhanced from the time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its
interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western
province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer
to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and
35 Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” New York Times, April
27, 2005.
36 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall
Street Journal
, October 18, 2004.

CRS-31
ammunition,37 and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. In September 1998, Iranian
and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of
its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern
Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the
crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene
on behalf of the Taliban. Iran has confirmed that it offered search and rescue
assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also
allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the reverse of
those of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Afghanistan from providing “strategic
depth” to Pakistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in
the mid-1990s. India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to
India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in
Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some
of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India. For its part,
Pakistan accuses India of using its nine consulates in Afghanistan to spread Indian
influence there.
India is becoming a major investor in and donor to Afghanistan. It is co-
financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in
northern Afghanistan. In January 2005, India promised to help Afghanistan’s
struggling Ariana national airline and it has begun India Air flights between Delhi
and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known Habibia High School in Kabul and
committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house
for Afghanistan’s parliament. Numerous other India-financed reconstruction projects
are under way throughout Afghanistan.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan
stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF.
Russia. During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt
Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.38 Russia, which is also still stung by
its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, apparently views Northern
Alliance figures as instruments with which to rebuild Russian influence in
Afghanistan. In October 2005, Russia announced it would supply the ANA with
helicopters. Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, more recently
37 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997.
38 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July
27, 1998.

CRS-32
Russia has sought to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears
of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when
Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-
Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban
government was the only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence,
and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been
captured or killed.
Central Asian States. During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian
leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving
safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous
February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is
linked to Al Qaeda.39 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed
while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas
have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.40
These countries generally supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban;
Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that
Alliance, as discussed above. In 1996, several of these states banded together with
Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to
limit U.S. influence in the region, the group issued a statement in early July 2005,
reiterated by a top official of the group in October 2005, that the United States should
set a timetable for ending its military presence in Central Asia. Despite the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all,
for now, holding to their pledges of facility support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows
access primarily to French combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities
in case of emergency.) In July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some
Russian officers would train some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose
to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly
viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical
Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov,
saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see below). The September 11 events stoked
Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly
supported the U.S.-led war. No OEF forces have been based in Turkmenistan.
China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China
has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see
map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda
39 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in
September 2000.
40 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, pp. 14, 92.

CRS-33
to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern
China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led
war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing China’s
increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with
Mullah Umar. China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action
against the Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of
strategic considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition,
China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi
Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the
Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government.
The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-
Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor
in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan
during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to
suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that
Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi
Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime.
Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed,
but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to
decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an
offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that
he could become a rallying point for opposition to the regime.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not
publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September
2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of
U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch
strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to
allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized.

CRS-34
U.S. and International Aid
to Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s economy and society are reemerging after decades of warfare that
left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan
children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. In addition
to 3.6 million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war41 another 500,000
Afghans were displaced internally before U.S. military action began, according to
Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001, report. Since January 2002, more than
3.5 million Afghan refugees have returned. Despite robust economic growth since
the war ended, the return of some international investors, and new construction such
as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005, the Afghan government
lacks large revenue sources, and international donors, U.N. agencies, and NGOs are
required to provide international assistance to Afghanistan. The U.N. High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan
refugee camps in Pakistan.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of
assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to
that government — monies were provided through recognized NGOs and relief
organizations. Between 1985-1994, the United States did have a cross-border aid
program for Afghanistan, through which aid was distributed in Afghanistan via U.S.
aid workers in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering a cross-border
program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994
until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in late 2001.
Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals. Since the beginning of FY2002 (which
began just before Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in October 2001) — and
including funds appropriated in the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriation — the
United States has provided $3.793 billion in civilian-related reconstruction and other
civilian assistance, and $4.416 billion in military/security-related assistance. This
latter category is defined as funds for training and equipping the ANA and ANP,
counter-narcotics operations, Karzai protection, and de-mining/anti-terrorism. Table
2
breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program, and the other tables cover FY2003-
FY2006. A history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998) is in
Table 7.42
41 About 1.5 million Afghan refugees were in Iran; 2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia;
17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states.
42 In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured.
The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds
were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency
Response Fund.

CRS-35
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments. A key
post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized U.S. aid. The
total authorization, for all categories for all years, is over $3.7 billion. For the most
part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets
authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations.
However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated. ISAF expansion has been
funded by contributing nations, not U.S. appropriations. It authorized the following:
! $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $30 million in assistance for political development, including
national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for
FY2003-FY2005);
! $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights
oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-
2006 to the National Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan);
! $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per
year for FY2003-FY2006);
! $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
! $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for
Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for
$300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by
P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and
! $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand
ISAF if such an expansion takes place.
A subsequent bill (S. 2845, P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), that
implemented the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contains a subtitle
called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle
mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and
requires additional Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term
U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction — an amendment to the report required
in the original law; (2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to
persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State
and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.
The law also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more
rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and counter-narcotics initiatives. The law
did not specify dollar amount authorizations for FY2005 and FY2006.
FY2006 Regular and FY2006 Supplemental. For FY2006, the regular
appropriation provides $931.4 million (P.L. 109-102) as noted in the table below.
In response to an Administration judgement that the regular FY2006 funds for
civilian reconstruction were inadequate, on February 16, 2006, the Administration
submitted a supplemental FY2006 request, including about $2.5 billion in funds for
Afghanistan activities as follows:

CRS-36
! As noted, $2.197 billion in Department of Defense funds for an
“Afghan Security Forces Fund” to continue the effort to equip and
train the ANA and ANP. The House-passed H.R. 4939 provides
$1.851 billion, deferring $346 million in police facilities
construction, whereas the Senate-passed version provides $1.908
billion;
! $192.8 million in Defense Department funds for U.S. military
assistance to U.S. and Afghan counter-narcotics efforts in
Afghanistan. The House version provides $156.8 million; the
Senate version provides $102.9 million;
! $43 million in ESF for Afghanistan, including $11 million for the
subsidy cost to forgive the $108 million in Afghan debt to the United
States and $32 million for emergency power sector projects needed
for a larger “Northeast Transmission Project” that will supply
electricity to Kabul and other northern cities and reduce
Afghanistan’s need to import diesel fuel. The House version
provides $5 million for Kabul power generation. The Senate version
provides the full $43 million requested, but earmarks $5 million of
the electricity funding for agriculture development;
! $16 million for FY2007 security requirements for USAID to operate
in Afghanistan (deferred by H.R. 4939);
! $3.4 million in “Migration and Refugee Assistance” to support
shelter for Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan. The House
version of H.R. 4939 funds the request while the Senate version
provides $7.4 million, more than requested; and
! $50 million for the State Department’s “Diplomatic and Consular
Programs” for security costs of protecting U.S. facilities and
personnel (provided by both versions of H.R. 4939).
FY2007. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizes funding through
FY2006. On December 2, 2005, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ron Neumann
signed an agreement with the Afghan Finance Minister under which the United States
pledges to provide Afghanistan with $5.5 billion in aid over the next five years. The
U.S. aid plan is reportedly programmed for education, health care, and economic and
democratic development. It is not clear whether the purported figures include
funding for the ANA, the national police, counter-narcotics, and other security-
related programs. On February 6, 2006, the Administration released its budget for
FY2007, which included a request for the following for Afghanistan:
! $42.8 million for Child Survival and Health (CSH);
! $150 million in Development Assistance (DA);
! $610 million in ESF (an increase of about $190 million over what is
being provided in ESF for FY2006);

CRS-37
! $297 million for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) for counter-narcotics operations (an increase of about $60
million over what is being provided for FY2006);
! $1.2 million in International Military Education and Training
(IMET);
! no funds specifically requested for Karzai protection (NADR) or
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and a
! total request of about $1.1 billion, in line with the Administration
pledge at the February 1, 2006, “London Conference.”
Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance. Since the fall of the Taliban, the
U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) has unblocked
over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities that were
frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, and another $17 million
in privately-owned Afghan assets. These funds were used for currency stabilization;
mostly gold held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back up
Afghanistan’s currency. Together with its allies, over $350 million in frozen funds
were released to the Afghan government. The Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) has made available total investment credits of $100 million. The
United States also successfully pressed the International Air Transport Association
to pay Afghanistan $20 million in overflight fees that were withheld because of U.N.
sanctions on the Taliban.
World Bank/Asian Development Bank. In May 2002, the World Bank
reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced
a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World
Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the
telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in
Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in
Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in
project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned
Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance,
and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90
million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy
sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from
Qandahar to the border with Pakistan. In December 2004, the Bank approved an
additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections of the road system.
International Reconstruction Pledges. Afghan leaders said that
Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. At donors
conferences in 2002 (Tokyo), Berlin (April 2004), and Kabul (April 2005), about
$9.5 billion in non-U.S. contributions were pledged. However, only about half has
been received as of January 2006. At the London conference in February 2006,
another $6 billion (non-U.S.) in pledges was made for the next five years. Of the
new pledges, Britain pledged about $900 million. The London conference also
leaned toward the view of Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be
channeled through the Afghan government rather than directly by the donor
community. In exchange, the Afghan government is promising greater financial
transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that international
contributions are used wisely and effectively.

CRS-38
The government is trying to generate a growing portion of its budget
domestically. Its efforts to weaken regional leaders and force customs revenue to be
remitted to the central government are generating revenue, as is tax revenue from
such growing Afghan companies as Roshan and Afghan Wireless (cellphone
service). Kabul now raises domestically over one-third of its $600 million annual
budget. Some of Karzai also has sought to reassure international donors by
establishing a transparent budget and planning process.
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development. In an effort to find a
long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian problems, the United States
has tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan
living standards and political stability over the long term. During 1996-98, the
Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through
western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A
consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion
Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), which is now estimated to cost $3.7 billion to
construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through
Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.43 The deterioration in
U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while
the Taliban was in power.
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit
meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of
the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a
series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, and all
three continued to express support for the project at a February 2006 meeting of their
oil ministers, although financing for the project is unclear. Some U.S. officials view
this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India,
transiting Pakistan.
Afghanistan’s prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in
March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of
gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan
relatively self-sufficient in energy and possibly able to provided some exports to its
neighbors. Some Afghan leaders believe the government needs to better develop
other resources such as copper and coal mines that have gone unused.
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO
Membership. The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war
economic rebound. Following a meeting with Karzai on June 15, 2004, President
Bush announced the United States and Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade
and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen
as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement. On
43 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the
government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably
receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3.

CRS-39
December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start
membership talks with Afghanistan.
Residual Issues From Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict.
Stinger Retrieval. Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate,
the Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft
missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft.
Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates
suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates
put the number below 100.44 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001
U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at
U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the
anti-Taliban war are likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and
presumably pose less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining
Stingers could be sold to terrorists for use against civilian airliners. In February
2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of
Stingers.45 In late January 2005, the Afghan intelligence service began a new push
to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.46
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the
United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a
premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported
on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was
competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA
would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On
March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a
fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers.
The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran
bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some
reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a
Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in
Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.47 It was
a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by
Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against
an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their
44 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
45 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters,
February 4, 2002.
46 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
47 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.

CRS-40
targets. SA-7s have been discovered in Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces, most recently
in December 2002.
Mine Eradication. Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute
one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that
5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates
by outside organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have
been killed or wounded by land mines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and
commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid
table for FY1999-FY2002 (Table 2), the U.S. de-mining program was providing
about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the amount increased to about $7
million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a
British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The
Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the
goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by
70%.

CRS-41
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY2002
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
(Final)
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for
131.0
198.12 (for
Agriculture (DOA)
wheat
165,000 metric
(300,000
food
and USAID Food For
(100,000
tons. (60,000
metric tons
commodities)
Peace (FFP), via
metric tons
tons for May
under P.L.480,
World Food
under
2000 drought
Title II, and
Program(WFP)
“416(b)”
relief)
416(b))
program.
State/Bureau of
16.95 for
14.03 for the
22.03 for
136.54 (to
Population, Refugees
Afghan
same purposes
similar
U.N. agencies)
and Migration (PRM)
refugees in
purposes
via UNHCR and
Pakistan and
ICRC
Iran, and to
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for
18.934 for
113.36 (to
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
drought relief
similar
various U.N.
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
and health,
programs
agencies and
(OFDA)
Afghanistan
water, and
NGOs)
sanitation
programs
State
2.615
3.0
2.8
7.0 to Halo
Department/HDP
Trust/other
(Humanitarian
demining
Demining Program)
Aid to Afghan
5.44 (2.789
6.169, of
5.31 for
Refugees in Pakistan
for health,
which $3.82
similar
(through various
training -
went to similar
purposes
NGOs)
Afghan
purposes
females in
Pakistan
Counter-Narcotics
1.50
63.0
USAID/
0.45 (Afghan
24.35 for
Office of Transition
women in
broadcasting/
Initiatives
Pakistan)
media
Dept. of Defense
50.9 ( 2.4
million
rations)
Foreign Military
57.0 (for
Financing
Afghan
national army)
Anti-Terrorism 36.4
Economic Support
105.2
Funds (E.S.F)
Peacekeeping
24.0
Totals
76.6 113.2 182.6
815.9

CRS-42
Table 3. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003
($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 2)
From the FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)
Development/Health
90
Food Aid
47
Peacekeeping
10
Disaster Relief
94
ESF
50
Non-Proliferation, Demining,
5
Anti-Terrorism (NADR)
Refugee Relief
55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train
21
and equip (FMF)
Total from this law:
372
From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction
100
(ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
10
(ESF)
Afghan government support (ESF)
57
ANA train and equip (FMF)
170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining (NADR,
28
some for Karzai protection)
Total from this law:
365
Total for FY2003
737

CRS-43
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)
From the FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106)
Disarmament and Demobilization (DDR program) (ESF)
30
Afghan government (ESF) $10 million for customs collection
70
Elections/democracy and governance (ESF)
69
Roads (ESF)
181
Schools/Education (ESF)
95
Health Services/Clinics (ESF)
49
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
58
Private Sector/Power sector rehabilitation
95
Water Projects
23
Counter-narcotics/police training/judiciary training (INCLE).
170
Defense Dept. counter-narcotics support operations
73
Afghan National Army (FMF)
287
Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR)
35
U.S. Embassy expansion and security/AID operations
92
Total from this law: (of which $60 million is to benefit Afghan
1,327
women and girls)
From the FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199)
Development/Health
171
Disaster Relief
35
Refugee Relief
72
Afghan women (ESF)
5
Judicial reform commission (ESF)
2
Reforestation (ESF)
2
Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF)
2
Other reconstruction (ESF)
64
ANA train and equip (FMF)
50
Total from this law:
403
Total for FY2004
1,727

CRS-44
Table 5. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005
($ in millions)
From the FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447)
Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF)
225
Train and Equip ANA (FMF)
400
Assistance to benefit women and girls
50
Agriculture, private sector investment,
environment, primary education, reproductive
300
health, and democracy-building
Reforestation
2
Child and maternal health
6
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
2
Total from this law
985
From Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13)
Other ESF: Health programs, PRT programs,
agriculture, alternative livelihoods, government
capacity building, training for parliamentarians,
1,073.5
rule of law programs (ESF).
Aid to displaced persons (ESF)
5
Families of civilian victims of U.S. combat ops
2.5
(ESF)
Women-led NGOs (ESF)
5
DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security
forces. Of the funds, $34 million may go to
Afghan security elements for that purpose. Also,
1,285
$290 million of the funds is to reimburse the U.S.
Army for funds already obligated for this purpose.
DOD counter-narcotics support operations
242
Counter-narcotics (INCLE)
220
Training of Afghan police (INCLE)
400
Karzi protection (NADR funds)
17.1
DEA operations in Afghanistan
7.7
Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul
60
Total from this law
3,317
Total from all FY2005 laws
4,302

CRS-45
Table 6. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2006
($ in millions)
From the FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102
ESF for reconstruction, governance, democracy-building
430
(ESF over $225 million subject to certification that
Afghanistan is cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics
efforts.)
Counter-narcotics (INCLE). Of the funds, $60 million is to
235
train the ANP.
Peacekeeping (ANA salaries)
18
Karzai protection (NADR funds)
18
Child Survival and Health (CSH)
43
Reforestation
3
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
2
Aid to civilian victims of U.S. combat operations
2
Programs to benefit women and girls
50
Development Assistance
130.4
Total from this law:
931.4

CRS-46
Table 7. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Econ.
Other
Fiscal
Devel.
Supp.
P.L. 480
(Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
(Title I and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978
4.989

5.742
0.269
0.789
11.789
1979
3.074

7.195

0.347
10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion - December 1979)


1981






1982






1983






1984






1985
3.369




3.369
1986


8.9


8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6


32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9


74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6


77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1


88.1
1991
30.0
30.0
20.1


80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4


81.4
1993
10.0
10.0
18.0

30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0

27.9
42.3
1995
1.8

12.4

31.6
45.8
1996


16.1

26.4
42.5
1997


18.0

31.9a
49.9
1998


3.6

49.14b
52.74
Source: U.S. Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and
$1.54 for counternarcotics.

CRS-47
Table 8. ISAF Contributing Nations
(as of May 2006)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partner Nations
Belgium
616
Albania
22
Bulgaria
37
Austria
3
Canada
2,200
Azerbaijan
22
Czech
Croatia
17
45
Republic
Denmark
122
Finland
61
Estonia
10
Macedonia
20
France
742
Ireland
10
Germany
2,200
Sweden
85
Greece
171
Switzerland
4
Hungary
159
New Zealand
5
Iceland
20
Total ISAF force
12,528
Italy
2,100
Note: See NATO’s Afghanistan page at
Latvia
9
[http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan].
Lithuania
9
Luxemburg
10
Netherlands 600
(increasing to 1,700)
Norway
313
Poland
5
Portugal
21
Romania
72
Slovakia
16
Slovenia
27
Spain
1,400
Turkey
825
United
461
Kingdom
(to increase to about 3,000)
United States
89

CRS-48
Table 9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Country
Gardez
Paktia
U.S.
Ghazni
Ghazni
U.S.
Parwan
Parwan
U.S./South Korea
Jalalabad
Nangarhar
U.S.
Khost
Khost
U.S.
Qalat
Zabol
U.S.
Asadabad
Kunar
U.S.
Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan
U.S. (Netherlands to
assume in mid-2006, with
by 200 Australian forces)
Sharana
Paktika
U.S.
Mehtarlam
Laghman
U.S.
Meydan Shahr
Wardak
U.S. (Turkey may assume)
Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province
U.S. (State Department
lead)
Nuristan
Nuristan
U.S.
NATO/ISAF and Partner-Run PRTs
Qandahar
Qandahar (as of 9/05)
NATO/Canada
Lashkar Gah
Helmand
Britain (as of May 2006)
Herat
Herat
NATO/Italy (with Spain)
Farah
Farah
NATO/Italy (with Spain)
Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh
NATO/Britain (Germany
to take lead in 2006)
Konduz
Konduz
NATO/Germany
Faizabad
Badakhshan
NATO/Germany
Meymaneh
Faryab
NATO/Norway and
Finland
Chaghcharan
Ghowr
NATO/Lithuania
Qalah-ye Now
Badghis
NATO/Spain (with Italy)
Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan
NATO/Netherlands
Bamiyan
Bamiyan
New Zealand (not
NATO/ISAF)

CRS-49
Table 10. Major Factions in Afghanistan
Ideology/
Party/Commander
Leader
Ethnicity
Regional Base
Taliban
Mullah
ultra-orthodox
Small insurgent
(Islamic cleric)
Islamic, Pashtun
groups, mostly in
Muhammad Umar
the south and east.
No official
presence in
government.
Islamic Society (dominant Burhannudin
moderate
Much of northern
party in the “Northern
Rabbani, Yunus
Islamic, mostly
and western
Alliance”)
Qanooni, and
Tajik
Afghanistan,
Muhammad
including Kabul.
Fahim
Ismail Khan (part of
Ismail Khan
Tajik
Herat Province and
Islamic Society/Northern
environs; Khan
Alliance)
removed as Herat
governor in
September 2004
National Islamic
Abdul Rashid
secular, Uzbek
Mazar-e-Sharif,
Movement of Afghanistan Dostam (now in
Shebergan, and
central
environs.
government)
Hizb-e-Wahdat Karim
Khalili
Shiite, Hazara
Bamiyan province.
(Vice President)
tribes
Pashtun Leaders
Various regional
Moderate
Southern, eastern
governors;
Islamic, Pashtun
Afghanistan,
central
including
government led
Jalalabad and
by Karzai.
Qandahar.
Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin
Mujahedin party
orthodox
Small groups
(HIG)
leader Gulbuddin
Islamic, Pashtun
around Jalalabad
Hikmatyar
and in the
southeast. Allied
with Taliban and
Al Qaeda.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul
orthodox
Paghman (west of
Sayyaf
Islamic, Pashtun Kabul)

CRS-50
Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the
Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
! On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making
Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products.
Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive
Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of
Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464].
! On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of
agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls
were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the
Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of
Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-
72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that
Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This
opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the
U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to
Afghanistan.
! On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President
Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided
for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and
suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of
negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a
non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the
United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United
States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the
Taliban, by President Bush.
! On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to
the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986
proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437)
that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for
Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations
for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President
to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status
for Afghanistan.
! On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22
C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government,
reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of
countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports

CRS-51
of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had
also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had
been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with
U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
! On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999
declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with
respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton
determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked
Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade
with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these
sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana
assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S.
citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Taliban-
controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when
the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no
territory within Afghanistan.
! U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October
15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution
1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al
Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267
banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana),
and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets.
Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice
to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of
Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel
by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors
in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was
provided to the Taliban.
! P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright,
completing a pre-Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to
restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had
issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer
a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not
implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank
guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the
1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition,
Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because
the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize
for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)


CRS-52
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan