Order Code RL31339
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security
Updated April 26, 2006
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq
remains violent and unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related
insurgency, as well as growing sectarian violence. According to its November 30,
2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will
remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not
serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. President Bush has said he believes that,
over the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle
East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting U.S. casualties
and financial costs — and growing sectarian conflict — have intensified a debate
within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down
U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals.
The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important
successes, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose
an interim and then a full-term parliament and government, a referendum that
adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s
security forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train
Iraqi security units, the Administration has been working to include more Sunni
Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security institutions; Sunnis were
dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the
newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. The Administration believes that it has
largely healed a rift with some European countries over the decision to invade Iraq,
and it points to NATO and other nations’ contributions of training for Iraqi security
forces and government personnel.
Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in
Iraq is failing and that major new policy initiatives are required. Some believe that
U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop
commitment and that sectarian violence threatens to place U.S. forces in the middle
of a civil war in Iraq. Others believe that a U.S. move to withdraw might undercut
popular support for the insurgency and force compromise among Iraq’s factions.
Still others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counter-insurgent
combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents,
a plan the Administration says it is now moving toward under an approach termed
“clear, hold, and build.”
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth
Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations,
by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign
Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and
Christopher Blanchard.

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Contents
Policy in the 1990s: Emphasis on Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Major Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Kurds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr . . . 4
Smaller Shiite Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Post-September 11 Regime Change Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Occupation Period, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
and Ambassador Paul Bremer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Handover of Sovereignty and Transition Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate . . . . . 16
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
January 30, 2005, Elections/New Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
December 15, 2005, Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
International Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction/CERP Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Security Challenges, Responses, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Insurgent Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Sectarian Violence/Militias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams . 31
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Immediate Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Troop Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Power-Sharing Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

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Negotiating With the Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Partition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Internationalization Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Anti-Saddam Factions/Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 4. Ministry of Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Table 5. Ministry of Interior (Police) Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Table 6. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

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Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958).1 Iraq had been a
province of the Ottoman empire until British forces defeated the Ottomans in World
War I and took control of what is now Iraq in 1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq
from the Ottomans in Iraq earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in
1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis (as did the
Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt
in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941, during World War II. Iraq’s first
Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who,
advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt
against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal
I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939.
Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was only four years old.
A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said,
a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times
during 1930-1958. Faysal II ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim
on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military
alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was
rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam’s rule. The Baath
Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq as
a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was to reduce religious and
sectarian schisms among Arabs.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
1 See Eisenstadt, Michael, and Eric Mathewson, eds, U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq:
Lessons from the British Experience. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003.
Members of the Hashemite family rule neighboring Jordan.

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CRS-2
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein,
secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam’s home
town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam’s regime
became repressive of Iraq’s Shiites in the year after the February 1979 Islamic
revolution in neighboring Iran because Iran’s revolution had emboldened Iraqi Shiite
Islamist movements to try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Policy in the 1990s:
Emphasis on Containment
Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the
Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided not to militarily
overthrow Saddam Hussein in the 1991 war because the United Nations had
approved only the liberation of Kuwait, because the Arab states in the coalition
opposed an advance to Baghdad, and because the Administration feared becoming
bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.2 Within days of the war’s end
(February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurds in northern Iraq,
emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support, rebelled. The
Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni Muslim Republican
Guard forces had survived the war largely intact and they suppressed the rebels.
Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States for standing aside during Saddam’s
suppression of the uprisings. Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone”
set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and remained
autonomous thereafter.
About two months after the failure of these uprisings, President George H.W.
Bush reportedly sent Congress an intelligence finding that the United States would
try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein. The Administration
apparently believed that a coup by elements within the regime could produce a
favorable government without fragmenting Iraq. After a reported July 1992 coup
failed, there was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the Kurdish, Shiite, and other
oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.3
Support for Iraq’s opposition was one facet of broader U.S. policy to pressure
Saddam Hussein. The main elements of U.S. containment policy during the 1990s
consisted of U.N. Security Council-authorized weapons inspections, an international
economic embargo, and U.S.-led enforcement of “no fly zones” over northern and
southern Iraq. The implementation of these policies is discussed in greater detail in
2 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million. Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times,
June 2, 1992.

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CRS-3
CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights
Violations, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Major Anti-Saddam Factions
Although U.S. policy after the 1991 war emphasized containment, the United
States built ties to and progressively increased support for several of the secular and
religious opposition factions discussed below. Some of these groups now field
militias that are allegedly conducting acts of sectarian reprisals in post-Saddam Iraq.
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA). In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist
groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National Congress (INC),” on a platform of human
rights, democracy, pluralism, and “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy). However, many
observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups have
authoritarian leaderships. The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad Chalabi,
a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent banking family, to run the INC on a daily
basis. Chalabi, who is about 63 years old, was educated in the United States
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. His father was
president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the 1958 military
coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American University of
Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran afoul
of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly
with some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989.4 (A table on U.S.
appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).
As an Iraqi governance structure was established, Chalabi was one of the
rotating presidents of the Iraq Governing Council (IGC, president during September
2003). In a fallout with his former U.S. backers, U.S.-backed Iraqi police raided INC
headquarters in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing documents as part of an
investigation of various allegations, including provision of U.S. intelligence to Iran.5
The case was later dropped. Since 2004, Chalabi has tried to ally with Shiite
Islamist factions; he ran on the main Shiite Islamist slate for the January 30, 2005,
elections and subsequently became one of three deputy prime ministers, with a focus
on economic issues. Chalabi briefly served as Oil Minister in late December 2005,
and he continues to play a large role in oil decisions.
Another secular group, the Iraq National Accord (INA), was founded after Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but reportedly later
earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).6 It is led by Dr. Iyad
4 In Apr. 1992, he was convicted in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and
sentenced to 22 years in prison. The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors
a total of $400 million.
5 Risen, James, and David Johnston. “Chalabi Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code,”
New York Times, June 2, 2004.
6 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New
(continued...)

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al-Allawi, a Baathist who purportedly helped Saddam Hussein silence Iraqi dissidents
in Europe in the mid-1970s.7 Allawi, who is about 60 years old (born 1946 in
Baghdad), fell out with Saddam in the mid-1970s, became a neurologist and presided
over the Iraqi Student Union in Europe. He survived an alleged Saddam regime
assassination attempt in London in 1978. He is a secular Shiite Muslim, but many
INA members are Sunnis.
In 1996, the fractiousness among anti-Saddam groups caused the Clinton
Administration to shift support to the INA.8 However, the INA proved penetrated by
Iraq’s intelligence services and Baghdad arrested or executed over 100 INA activists
in June 1996. In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into northern
Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from the PUK. The
incursion enabled Baghdad to also rout remaining INC and INA operatives
throughout the north.

The Kurds.9 The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups. They have a historic fear of
persecution by the Arab majority and want to, at the very least, preserve the
autonomy of the post-1991 Gulf war period. Many younger Kurds want to go
beyond autonomy to outright independence. The Kurds appear to be positioning
themselves to secure the city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds covet as a source of oil, and
possibly part of the city of Mosul. The Kurds achieved language in the new
constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on whether Kirkuk might formally
join the Kurdish administered region.
For now, both major Kurdish factions are participating in Iraqi politics, the
PUK more so than the KDP. PUK leader Talabani was IGC president in November
2003, and the KDP’s Barzani led it in April 2004. Talabani is Iraq’s president. On
June 12, 2005, the 111-seat Kurdish regional assembly (also elected on January 30,
2005) named Barzani “president of Kurdistan.” Yet, Barzani participated extensively
in negotiations on the new Iraqi constitution.
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr.
Shiite Islamist organizations have emerged as the strongest factions in post-Saddam
politics; Shiites constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented
in all pre-2003 governments. Several Shiite factions cooperated with the U.S. regime
change efforts of the 1990s, but others had no contact with the United States. The
undisputed Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, maintained a low
profile during Saddam Hussein’s regime and was not part of U.S.-backed regime
change efforts in the 1990s. As the “marja-e-taqlid” (source of emulation) and,
6 (...continued)
York Times, June 9, 2004.
7 Hersh, Seymour. “Annals of National Security: Plan B,” The New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
8 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.
9 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.

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since 1992, as the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the Najaf-based
“Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of seminaries), he is a major political force in post-
Saddam politics.10 He has a network of agents (wakils) throughout Iraq and in
countries where there are large Shiite communities. He was instrumental in putting
together the united slate of Shiite Islamist movements in the 2005 elections (“United
Iraqi Alliance,” UIA).
Sistani, about 79 years old, was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before
relocating to Najaf at the age of 21. His mentor, the former head of the Hawza, was
Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-Khoi. Like Khoi, Sistani generally opposes a direct
role for clerics in government, but he believes in clerical supervision of political
leaders, partly explaining his involvement in major post-Saddam political decisions.
He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic culture and not become Westernized, favoring
modest dress for women and curbs on sales of alcohol and Western music and
entertainment.11 He suffers from heart problems that required treatment in the
United Kingdom in August 2004.
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Within
the UIA, SCIRI shares power with the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party and the faction of
Moqtada Al Sadr. SCIRI founders were in exile in Iran after a major crackdown in
1980 by Saddam, who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi Shiite Islamists of trying to
overthrow him. During Khomeini’s exile in Najaf (1964-1978), he was hosted by
Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, father of the Hakim brothers that founded SCIRI.
The Ayatollah was then head of the Hawza. Although it was a member of the INC
in the early 1990s, SCIRI refused to accept U.S. funds, although it did have contacts
with the United States.
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric, is now SCIRI’s leader; he
served on the IGC and has been elected to parliament at the top of the UIA slate in
each of the 2005 elections, but he has taken no government position. One of his top
aides, Bayan Jabr, is Interior Minister, who runs the national police and who has been
accused of packing Iraq’s police forces with members of SCIRI’s “Badr Brigades”
militia, (discussed under “Militias,” below). Because of the criticism, it he will not
likely be reappointed Interior Minister in the full-term government being assembled.
SCIRI leaders say they do not seek to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but
SCIRI reportedly receives substantial amounts of financial and other aid from Iran.
SCIRI also runs several media outlets.
Da’wa Party/Ibrahim al-Jafari and Jawad al-Maliki. Another major
Shiite Islamist party is the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party. It did not join the U.S.-led
effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein during the 1990s. Its leader is Ibrahim al-Jafari,
who is about 55 years old (born in 1950 in Karbala), and who is now Prime Minister.
A Da’wa activist since 1966, he attended medical school in Mosul and fled to Iran
10 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
11 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].

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CRS-6
in 1980 to escape Saddam’s crackdown on the Da’wa. He later went to live in
London, possibly because he did not want to be seen as too closely linked to Iran.
Jafari served on the IGC;12 he was the first of the nine rotating IGC presidents
(August 2003), and he was deputy president in Allawi’s interim government. He was
number 7 on the UIA slate and, on April 7, 2005, he became prime minister. He was
the UIA’s first choice to remain as prime minister in the full-term government being
assembled, but opposition from Sunnis and Kurds caused him to withdraw and be
replaced as Prime Minister designate by the number two Da’wa leader, Jawad al-
Maliki, who is now attempting to assemble a cabinet. Maliki spent most of his exile
period in Syria.
Although there is no public evidence that Jafari or Maliki were involved in any
terrorist activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa allegedly committed a May 1985
attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on the
U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. Lebanese Hizballah was founded by Lebanese
clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and Khomeini, and there continue to be
personal and ideological linkages between Hizballah and Da’wa (as well as with
SCIRI). The Hizballah activists who held U.S. hostages in Lebanon during the
1980s often attempted to link release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa
prisoners held by Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s. Some Da’wa members in
Iraq are guided by Lebanon’s Shiite cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was
a student of Baqr Al Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction (“Sadrists”). Moqtada Al Sadr is emerging as
a major figure in Iraq. He is the lone surviving son of the revered Ayatollah
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (the Ayatollah was killed, along with his other two sons,
by regime security forces in 1999 after he began agitating against Saddam’s
government). He is viewed by the mainstream Shiite groups as a young firebrand
who lacks religious and political weight. This view first took hold on April 10, 2003,
when his supporters allegedly stabbed to death Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late
Grand Ayatollah Khoi, shortly after Khoi’s U.S.-backed arrival in Iraq.13 However,
the established Shiite factions, as well as Iranian diplomats, are building ties to him
because of his large following.
By participating fully in the December 15, 2005, elections, Sadr has distanced
himself from his more anti-U.S. activities in 2003 and 2004, although tensions
between U.S. and Sadr militia forces flared again in March 2006. During 2003-2004,
he used Friday prayer sermons in Kufa (near Najaf) and newspaper publications to
agitate for a U.S. withdrawal, and he did not join any interim Iraqi governments.
In the January 30, 2005, elections, Sadr started moving into the political process by
permitting some of his supporters to join the UIA slate, but he publicly denounced
those elections as a product of U.S. occupation. Pro-Sadr candidates also won
pluralities in several southern Iraqi provincial council elections and hold 6 seats on
Basra’s 41-seat provincial council. It is reported that three ministers in the interim
government, including minister of transportation Salam al-Maliki, are Sadr
supporters; Maliki reputedly has tried to gain greater control of Baghdad International
12 Salim was killed May 17, 2004, in a suicide bombing while serving as IGC president.
13 Khoi had headed the Khoi Foundation, based in London.

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Airport for Sadr militiamen. Sadr’s backing led to the selection of Da’wa Party
leader Jafari, later replaced by Jawad al-Maliki, as Prime Minister designate.
Smaller Shiite Factions. One other Shiite grouping, called Fadilah, is part
of the UIA coalition. Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, it is a splinter group
of Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction and is perceived as somewhat more hardline (anti-U.S.
presence) than SCIRI or Da’wa. It holds some seats on several provincial councils
in the Shiite provinces. Other Shiite parties operating in southern Iraq include
fighters who challenged Saddam Hussein’s forces in the southern marsh areas,
around the town of Amara, north of Basra. One goes by the name Hizbollah-Iraq and
is headed by guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the IGC.
Hizbollah-Iraq apparently plays a major role in policing Amara and environs.
Another pro-Iranian grouping, which wields a militia, is called Thar Allah
(Vengeance of God). A smaller Shiite Islamist organization, the Islamic Amal
(Action) Organization, is headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a
moderate cleric. Its power base is in Karbala, and, operating under the SCIRI
umbrella, it conducted attacks there against regime organs in the 1980s. Modarassi’s
brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which
stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s regime in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamic Amal
won two seats in the January 30 election.

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CRS-8
Table 1. Major Anti-Saddam Factions/Leaders
Iraqi National
Main recipient of U.S. aid to anti-Saddam opposition during
Congress (INC)/
1990s. Chalabi was touted by some in Bush Administration prior
Ahmad Chalabi
to 2003 war but has not proven his popularity in Iraq and fell afoul
of U.S. officials in 2003-2004. Won no seats in December 15
election.
Iraq National
Consisted of ex-Baathists and ex-military in efforts to topple
Accord
Saddam in 1990s. Allawi was interim Prime Minister (June 2004-
(INA)/Iyad al-
April 2005). Won 40 seats in January 2005 election but only 25 in
Allawi
December.
Kurds/KDP and
Two main Kurdish factions. Talabani became president of Iraq
PUK
after January 2005 and remains so. Barzani has tried to secure his
clan’s base in the Kurdish north. Control up to 100,000
peshmerga militia. Their joint slate won 75 seats in January
election but only 53 in December.
Grand
Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq. No formal position
Ayatollah Ali
in government but has used his broad Shiite popularity to become
al-Sistani
instrumental in major questions facing it and in U.S. decisions on
Iraq. Helped forge UIA and brokered compromise over the
selection of a Prime Minister nominee in April 2006.
Supreme
Best-organized and most pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist party. It was
Council for the
established in 1982 by Tehran to centralize Shiite Islamist
Islamic
movements in Iraq. First leader, Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim,
Revolution in
killed by bomb in Najaf in August 2003. Controls 5,000 fighter
Iraq
“Badr Brigades” militia. As part of United Iraqi Alliance (UIA-
(SCIRI)/Abd al-
128 total seats in December election), it has about 30 of its
Aziz Al Hakim
members in parliament. Supports formation of large Shiite
“region” composed of nine southern provinces.
Da’wa (Islamic
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957), active
Call) Party
against Saddam Hussein in early 1980s. Founder, Mohammad
Baqr al-Sadr, was ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and was hung
by Saddam regime in 1980. Does not have an organized militia.
Has a lower proportion of clerics than does SCIRI. Part of UIA,
controls about 28 seats in parliament.
Moqtada Al-
Young (about 31) relative of Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, was in Iraq
Sadr
during Saddam’s reign. Inherited father’s political base in “Sadr
City,” a large (2 million population) Shiite district of Baghdad.
Mercurial, has both challenged and worked with U.S. personnel in
Iraq. Formed “Mahdi Army” militia in 2003 with as many as
20,000 fighters. Now part of UIA, controls 32 seats in new
parliament. Also supported by hardline Fadila (Virtue) party.
Opposes formation of Shiite “region.”

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CRS-9
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act
From the time of Iraq’s defeat of the INC and INA in northern Iraq in August
1996 until 1998, the Clinton Administration had little contact with opposition groups,
believing them too weak to topple Saddam. During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions
of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections led to growing
congressional calls to overthrow Saddam. A congressional push for regime change
began with an FY1998 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 105-174) and continued
subsequently. The sentiment was encapsulated in the “Iraq Liberation Act” (ILA,
P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). This law, signed by President Clinton despite
doubts about opposition capabilities, was viewed as an expression of congressional
support for the concept advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts to promote an
Iraqi insurgency with U.S. air-power. In the debate over the decision to go to war,
Bush Administration officials have cited the ILA as evidence of a bi-partisan
consensus that Saddam Hussein needed to be removed. The ILA
! stated that it should be the policy of the United States to “support
efforts” to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-
November 1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime
change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Section 8
states that the act should not be construed as authorizing the use of
U.S. military force to achieve regime change.
! gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million worth of
defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting
funds, to opposition groups designated by the Administration.
! did not specifically provide for its termination after Saddam Hussein
is removed from power. Section 7 of the ILA provides for
continuing post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi parties and
movements with “democratic goals.”
The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5,
1999, President Clinton issued a determination (P.D. 99-13) making seven opposition
groups eligible to receive U.S. military assistance under the ILA: INC; INA; SCIRI;
KDP; PUK; the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);14 and the Movement
for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM),15 a relatively small party advocating the return
14 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally taken off the ILA
eligibility list.
15 In concert with a May 1999 INC visit to Washington D.C, the Clinton Administration
announced a draw down of $5 million worth of training and “non-lethal” defense articles
under the ILA. During 1999-2000, about 150 oppositionists underwent civil administration
training at Hurlburt air base in Florida, including Defense Department-run civil affairs
(continued...)

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CRS-10
of Iraq’s monarchy. However, the Clinton Administration decided that the
opposition was not sufficiently capable to merit weapons or combat training.
Bush Administration Policy
Several senior Bush Administration officials had long been strong advocates of
a regime change policy toward Iraq, but the difficulty of that strategy remained,16 and
the Bush Administration initially continued its predecessor’s emphasis on
containment. Some accounts say that the Administration was planning, prior to
September 11, to confront Iraq militarily, but President Bush has denied this. During
its first year, Administration policy focused on strengthening containment of Iraq,
which the Administration said was rapidly eroding. The cornerstone of the effort was
achieving U.N. Security Council adoption (Resolution 1409, May 14, 2002) of a
“smart sanctions” plan — relaxing U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to Iraq of
purely civilian equipment17 in exchange for improved international enforcement of
the U.N. ban on exports to Iraq of militarily-useful goods.
Post-September 11 Regime Change Policy. Bush Administration policy
on Iraq changed to an active regime change effort after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. In President Bush’s State of the Union message on January 29,
2002, given as the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was
winding down, he characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North
Korea). Some U.S. officials, particularly deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz,
asserted that the United States needed to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks
by “ending states,” such as Iraq, that support terrorist groups. Vice President Cheney
visited the Middle East in March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about
the possibility of confronting Iraq militarily, although the leaders visited reportedly
urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed confrontation
with Iraq. Some accounts, including the book Plan of Attack by Bob Woodward
(published in April 2004), say that then Secretary of State Powell and others were
concerned about the potential consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the
difficulties of building a democracy after major hostilities ended. Other accounts
include reported memoranda (the “Downing Street Memo”) by British intelligence
officials, based on conversations with U.S. officials. That memo reportedly said that
by mid-2002 the Administration had already decided to go to war against Iraq and
that it sought to develop information about Iraq to support that judgment. President
Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this. (On December 20, 2001, the
House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N.
weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.)
15 (...continued)
training to administer a post-Saddam government. The Hurlburt trainees were not brought
into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward the
end of the major combat phase of the war.
16 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, Mar. 11, 2002.
17 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.

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CRS-11
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate.
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials, including President
Bush, particularly in an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, asserted
the following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to
rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
previous resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of
Iraq’s WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons
against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors
(Iran), implying that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from
using WMD against the United States; and (3) that Iraq could
transfer its WMD to terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in
potentially catastrophic attacks in the United States. Critics noted
that, under the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD
against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war. The U.S.-led Iraq Survey
Group, whose work formally terminated in December 2004,
determined that Iraq did not possess active WMD programs,
although it retained the intention and capabilities to reconstitute
them. (See [http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/].)
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-1982 and was again so designated after its 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam
Hussein’s regime had a direct connection to the September 11
attacks, senior U.S. officials asserted that Saddam’s regime was
linked to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-Al Qaeda
militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq. Although
this issue is still debated, the report of the 9/11 Commission found
no evidence of a “collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq
and Al Qaeda.18
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat. Although it is not
certain when the Administration decided on an invasion, in mid-2002 the
Administration began ordering a force to the region that, by early 2003, gave the
President that option. In concert, the Administration tried to build up and broaden
the Iraqi opposition and, according to the Washington Post (June 16, 2002),
authorizing stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special operations forces to
destabilize Saddam Hussein. In August 2002, the State and Defense Departments
jointly invited six major opposition groups to Washington, D.C. At the same time,
the Administration expanded its ties to several groups, particularly those composed
of ex-military officers. The Administration also began training about 5,000
18 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.

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CRS-12
oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,19 although only about 70 completed training at
an air base (Taszar) in Hungary.20 They served mostly as translators during the war.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly (September 12, 2002) that the U.N. Security
Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq. The
Administration subsequently agreed to give Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with
all applicable Council resolutions by supporting Security Council Resolution 1441
(November 8, 2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection.
Iraq reluctantly accepted it. UNMOVIC Director Hans Blix and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-Baradei subsequently briefed the
Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November 27, 2002. They
criticized Iraq for failing to actively cooperate but also noted progress and said that
Iraq might not have retained any WMD. The Bush Administration asserted that Iraq
was not cooperating with Resolution 1441 because it was not pro-actively revealing
information. (A “comprehensive” September 2004 report of the Iraq Survey Group,
known as the “Duelfer report,”21 found no WMD stockpiles or production but said
that there was evidence that the regime retained the intention to reconstitute WMD
programs in the future. The U.S.-led WMD search ended December 2004.22 The
UNMOVIC search remains technically active.23)
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion. It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if
he determines that doing so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N.
Security Council resolutions. It passed the House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and
the Senate the following day (77-23). It was signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely. The United States, along with Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria, maintained that Iraq had not fundamentally decided to disarm.
At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain, Spain, and
Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted that diplomatic options to disarm
Iraq had failed. The following evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and
19 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,”
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 2002.
20 Williams, Daniel. “U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles,” Washington Post, Dec. 18,
2002.
21 The full text of the Duelfer report is available at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
22 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
23 For information on UNMOVIC’s ongoing activities, see [http://www.unmovic.org/].

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CRS-13
his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British-led 30-country24 “coalition of the
willing” force assembled, a substantial proportion of which remained afloat or in
supporting roles. Of the invasion force, Britain contributed 45,000, and U.S. troops
constituted the bulk of the remaining 335,000 forces. Some Iraqi units and irregulars
(“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional tactics.
Some post-major combat evaluation (“Cobra Two,” by Michael Gordon and Bernard
Trainor, published in 2006) suggest the U.S. military should have focused more on
combating the irregulars rather than bypassing them to take on armored forces. No
WMD was used by Iraq, although it did fire some ballistic missiles into Kuwait; it
is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than 150 km).
The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein appeared
with supporters that day in Baghdad’s largely Sunni Adhamiya district.
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition
Initial U.S. goals for post-Saddam Iraq were to create a model democracy that
is at peace with its neighbors, free of WMD, and an ally of the United States.
However, according to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the U.S. goal
now is to enable Iraq to provide for its own security and not serve as a host for
radical Islamic terrorists. The Administration believes that, over the longer term, Iraq
will still become a model for reform throughout the Middle East, but there is growing
debate over whether a stable and democratic Iraq can be established at an acceptable
U.S. cost.25 The political transition in post-Saddam Iraq has advanced, but insurgent
violence is still widespread, and sectarian violence has increased to the point that
senior U.S. officials say that such violence is now the pre-eminent security threat in
Iraq, with “potential” for all-out civil war.
Occupation Period, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and
Ambassador Paul Bremer. After the fall of the regime, the United States set up
an occupation structure, reportedly grounded in Administration concerns that
immediate sovereignty would favor major anti-Saddam factions and not necessarily
produce democracy. These concerns had led the Administration to oppose a move
by these factions to declare a provisional government before the invasion. The
Administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction with
a staff of U.S. government personnel to administer Iraq’s ministries; they deployed
in April 2003. He headed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA), within the Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive
24 Many of the thirty countries listed in the coalition did not contribute forces to the combat.
A subsequent State Department list released on March 27, 2003 listed 49 countries in the
coalition of the willing. The 49 country list can be found in the Washington Post, March
27, 2003, p.A19.
25 For text of President Bush’s June 28, 2005, speech on Iraq, see [http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].

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CRS-14
order. The Administration’s immediate post-war policy did not make use of an
extensive State Department initiative, called the “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent
at least a year before the war drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of
Saddam. Some Iraqis who participated are now in Iraqi government positions. The
State Department project, which cost $5 million, had 15 working groups on major
issues.26
Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi regime. He and
then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (now Ambassador to Iraq) organized a
meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying ethnicities and
ideologies. A subsequent meeting of over 250 notables was held in Baghdad
(April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to
name an interim administration. However, senior U.S. officials reportedly disliked
Garner’s lax approach, including tolerating Iraqis naming themselves as local leaders.
In May 2003, the Administration named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace
Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which subsumed
ORHA. The CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003).
Bremer suspended Garner’s political transition process and decided instead to
appoint an Iraqi advisory body that would not have sovereignty. On July 13, 2003,
he named the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). Its major figures
included the leaders of the major anti-Saddam factions, but it was perceived in Iraq
as an arm of U.S. decision-making. In the process of forming this council, new Sunni
figures emerged, some of whom were in exile during Saddam’s rule. These included
Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni elder (Shammar tribe) and president of a Saudi-based
technology firm. (He is now a deputy president.) However, many Sunnis resented
the U.S. invasion and opposed the U.S. presence and the U.S.-backed Iraqi governing
bodies. In September 2003, the IGC selected a 25-member “cabinet” to run
individual ministries, with roughly the same factional and ethnic balance of the IGC
itself (a slight majority of Shiite Muslims). The IGC began a process of “de-
Baathification” — a purge from government of about 30,000 persons who held any
of the four top ranks of the Baath Party — and it authorized a war crimes tribunal for
Saddam and his associates. That function is now performed by a 323-member
“Supreme Commission on De-Baathification.”
Handover of Sovereignty and Transition Roadmap
The Bush Administration initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections for a
new government, tasks expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah
Sistani and others agitated for an early restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and for direct
elections. In response, in November 2003, the United States announced it would
return sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004 and that elections for a permanent
government would be held by the end of 2005.
26 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/].

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CRS-15
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The CPA decisions were
incorporated into an interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL), which was drafted mostly by the major anti-Saddam factions (signed on
March 8, 2004).27 It provided a roadmap for political transition, as follows:
! Elections by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly. A permanent constitution would be drafted by August
15, 2005, and put to a national referendum by October 15, 2005.
National elections for a permanent government, under the new
constitution (if it passed), would be held by December 15, 2005.
The new government would take office by December 31, 2005.
! Any three provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds
majority. If that happened, a new draft was to be developed and
voted on by October 15, 2006. In that case, the December 15, 2005,
elections would have been for another interim National Assembly.
! The Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government.” They were given powers to contradict or alter the
application of Iraqi law in their provinces, and their peshmerga
militia were allowed to operate.
! Islam was designated “a source,” but not the primary source, of law,
and no law could be passed that contradicts such rights as peaceful
assembly; free expression; equality of men and women before the
law; and the right to strike and demonstrate.
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover. The TAL did not
directly address the formation of the interim government that would assume
sovereignty. Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan to select a national
assembly through nationwide “caucuses.” After considering other options, such as
the holding of a traditional assembly, the United States tapped U.N. envoy Lakhdar
Brahimi to select that government.28 The interim government, dominated by senior
faction leaders, was named on June 1, 2004, and began work immediately. The
formal handover ceremony occurred on June 28, 2004, two days before the advertised
June 30 date, partly to confuse insurgents. The interim government, whose powers
were addressed in a TAL addendum, had a largely ceremonial president (Ghazi al-
Yawar) and two deputy presidents (the Da’wa’s Jafari and the KDP’s Dr. Rowsch
Shaways). Iyad al-Allawi was Prime Minister, with executive power, and there was
a deputy prime minister and 26 ministers. Six ministers were women, and the
ethnicity mix was roughly the same as in the IGC. The key defense and interior
ministries were headed by Sunni Arabs.
27 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].
28 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,” Washington Post.
Apr. 15, 2004.

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CRS-16
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate. The
Administration asserts that it has consistently sought U.N. and partner country
involvement in Iraq efforts. Resolution 1483 (May 6, 2003) recognized the CPA as
an occupying authority, provided for a U.N. special representative to Iraq, and “called
on” governments to contribute forces for stabilization. Resolution 1500 (August 14,
2003) established U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).29 The size of
UNAMI in Iraq has increased to a few hundred, headed by former Pakistani diplomat
Ashraf Jahangir Qazi. In a further attempt to satisfy the requirements of several
major nations for greater U.N. backing of the coalition military presence, the United
States obtained agreement on Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003), formally
authorizing a “multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.] command.”
Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further by
endorsing the handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim
government, and spelling out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq.
It also gave the United Nations a major role in helping the interim government
prepare for the two elections in 2005, and it authorized a coalition component force
to protect U.N. personnel and facilities. Primarily because of Sistani’s opposition to
the TAL’s provision that would allow the Kurds a veto over a permanent
constitution, the Resolution did not explicitly endorse the TAL. The Resolution
! “authorizes” the U.S.-led coalition to secure Iraq, a provision
interpreted as giving the coalition responsibility for securing Iraq.
Iraqi forces are “a principal partner” in the U.S.-led coalition, and
the relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is spelled out in an
annexed exchange of letters between the United States and Iraq. The
U.S.-led coalition retains the ability to take prisoners.
! stipulates that the coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the
request of the government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of
this resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire
when a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and
that the mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so
requests.” The Security Council reviewed the mandate in advance
of the June 8, 2005, deadline, and no alterations to it were made.
However, on November 11, 2005, in advance of the termination of
the mandate, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1637
extending the coalition military mandate to December 31, 2006,
unless earlier requested by the Iraqi government. The mandate is
also to be reviewed on June 15, 2006.
! defers the issue of the status of foreign forces (Status of Forces
Agreement, SOFA) to an elected Iraqi government. No SOFA has
been signed to date, and U.S. forces operate in Iraq and use its
facilities (such as Balad, Tallil, and Al Asad air bases) under
temporary memoranda of understanding. However, Secretary of
29 On August 12, 2004, its mandate was renewed for one year and on Aug. 11, 2005
(Resolution 1619), for another year.

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CRS-17
Defense Rumsfeld told journalists on July 27, 2005, that U.S.
military lawyers are working with the Iraqis on a SOFA or other
arrangements that would cover U.S. operations in Iraq after a
permanent government takes over.
! establishes a 100-seat “Interim National Council” to serve as an
interim parliament. The body, selected during August 13-18, 2004,30
did not have legislative power but was able to veto government
decisions with a two-thirds majority. The council held some
televised “hearings,” including questioning ministers. Its work
ended after the National Assembly was elected in January 2005.
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq. The following were additional
consequences of the sovereignty handover, designed in part to lower the profile of
U.S. influence over post-handover Iraq.
! As of the June 28, 2004, handover, the state of occupation ceased.
Subsequently, a U.S. Ambassador (John Negroponte) established
U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first time since January 1991.
A U.S. embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with
about 1,100 U.S. personnel.31 Negroponte was succeeded in July
2005 by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was previously
Ambassador to Afghanistan and who takes a more activist approach.
In August 2005, Secretary of State Rice named a new State
Department-based chief coordinator for Iraq: former deputy chief of
mission in post-Saddam Baghdad James Jeffrey. (An FY2005
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provided $592 million of
$658 million requested to construct a new embassy in Baghdad and
to fund embassy operations. The large new embassy complex, with
21 buildings on 104 acres, is under construction. A request for
FY2006 supplemental funds asks for $1.097 billion for embassy
operations for FY2006 and the first half of FY2007. The House
version of H.R. 4939 provides $1.116 billion for these purposes,
with slight modifications; the Senate version provides the amount
requested.
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB). Iraq also was given responsibility for close-out of
the “oil-for-food program.”32 Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2004)
ended that program as of November 21, 2003.
30 Tavernise, Sabrina. “In Climax To a Tumultuous 4-Day Debate, Iraq Chooses An
Assembly,” New York Times, Aug. 19, 2004.
31 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.
32 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.

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CRS-18
! Reconstruction management and advising of the new Iraqi
government were taken over by the State Department through the
U.S. Embassy and a unit called the “Iraq Reconstruction and
Management Office (IRMO).” IRMO, headed since June 2005 by
Daniel Speckhard, has about 150 U.S. civilian personnel working
out of four major centers around Iraq (satellites of the U.S.
Embassy) — Hilla, Basra, Kirkuk, and Mosul, and 15-20 of them
report to IRMO. (These satellite embassies, with the exception of
Basra, have now been converted to Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, or PRTs, discussed further below.) A separate “Project
Contracting Office (PCO),” headed by Brig. Gen. William McCoy
and now under the Persian Gulf division of the Army Corps of
Engineers, funds infrastructure projects such as roads, power plants,
and school renovations.
! U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-
7, CJTF-7) became a multi-national headquarters “Multinational
Force-Iraq, MNF-I,” headed by four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey.
Currently, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli is operational commander of U.S.
forces as head of the “Multinational Corps-Iraq.”
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005
After the handover of sovereignty, the United States and Iraq began focusing on
the three national votes that would be held in 2005. These votes and resulting
governments are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections,
Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman.
January 30, 2005, Elections/New Government. On January 30, 2005,
elections were held for a transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and
the Kurdish regional assembly. Sunnis, still resentful of the U.S. invasion, did not
participate in the vote, and no major Sunni slates were offered. This enabled the UIA
to win a slim majority (140 of the 275 seats) and to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to
dominate the government formed subsequently. PUK leader Jalal Talabani was
named president; Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister; SCIRI’s
Adel Abd al-Mahdi was second deputy president; and Bayan Jabr was Interior
Minister, which controls the police and related forces. U.S. officials said publicly
this government was not sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority, even though
it had a Sunni (Hajim al-Hassani) as Assembly speaker; a Sunni deputy president
(Ghazi al-Yawar); a Sunni deputy prime minister (Abd al-Mutlak al-Jabburi); a
Sunni Defense Minister (Sadoun Dulaymi); and five other Sunni ministers.
The elected Iraqi government received some diplomatic support, even though
most of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination of the
regime. As of early 2006, there are 46 foreign missions in Iraq, including most
European and Arab countries. Jordan has appointed an ambassador and Kuwait has
pledged to do so, but these and other diplomatic upgrades have been largely on hold
since attacks on diplomats from Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco in 2005. At
an Arab League meeting in late March 2006. Arab states pledged to increase their

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CRS-19
diplomatic representation in Iraq, and to consider other help (aid, debt relief) to
bolster the Iraqi government.
Permanent Constitution. Despite Sunni opposition, the constitution was
approved on October 15, 2005; Sunni opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in
two provinces but not the three needed to defeat the constitution. The crux of Sunni
opposition to it is its provision for a weak central government (“federalism”): it
allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous “regions” with their
own regional governments, internal security forces, and a large role in controlling
revenues from any new energy discoveries. The Sunnis oppose this concept because
their region, unlike those dominated by the Kurds and the Shiites, lacks oil and they
depend on the central government for revenues.
As part of their efforts to forge a unified political structure, U.S. officials hope
that the constitution will be modified in 2006 to accommodate these Sunni concerns.
Under a last-minute agreement before the October 15 referendum, the incoming
government is to name another constitutional commission to propose amendments
to the constitution (within four months). The amendments require approval by an
Assembly majority, and then would be put to a national referendum to be held two
months later.
December 15, 2005, Election. In this election, some anti-U.S. Sunnis
moved further into the political arena; Sunni slates were offered, including a broad
slate (“The Concord Front”) led by the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), but consisting of the
Iraqi People’s General Council, headed by the elderly Adnan al-Dulaymi, and the
Sunni Endowment. Another Sunni slate was the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue,
headed by constitution negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak. The vote was mostly peaceful.
Final results were released in January 2006, and the results were court-certified on
February 10, formally setting in motion the process of forming a government.
The convening of the “Council of Representatives” was delayed until March
16 by wrangling over governmental positions, most notably the post of Prime
Minister. The UIA, by a narrow internal vote on February 12, named Jafari to
continue as Prime Minister. With the UIA alone well short of the two-thirds majority
needed to unilaterally form a government, Jafari came under stiff opposition from
Sunnis, the secular groupings, and the Kurds. In mid-April, Jafari stepped aside, and
his top Da’wa aide, Jawad al-Maliki, was named Prime Minister designate by the
Council on April 22. Talabani was selected to continue as president, and a Council
leadership team was selected as well. Maliki has until May 21 to name a cabinet and
achieve its confirmation. U.S. officials are calling for a unified cabinet with security
ministries headed by figures not associated with militias. Maliki has made pledges
of non-sectarianism and unity, but Sunni and Kurdish suspicions linger that he is a
Shiite hardliner who will try to monopolize power for the UIA, his own Da’wa Party,
and Da’wa ally Moqtada Al-Sadr. On the other hand, Maliki was in exile in Syria
during Saddam’s rule and is perceived as less pro-Iranian than is Jafari. In another
sign of progress toward factional comity, all factions agreed in March 2006 to form
an over-arching council on security and economic matters, in which all factions
would be represented, although the President and Prime Minister would still have the
authority to override the council’s decisions. The council is not provided for in the
new constitution.

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CRS-20
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq
Ghazi al-Yawar
Yawar has cooperated with the U.S. since the invasion,
(Iraqis Party)
serving as President in the Allawi government and
deputy president in the post-January 2005 government.
Iraqi Concord Front
The Front is led by Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), headed by
(Tariq al-Hashimi and
Tariq al-Hashimi. IIP withdrew from the in January
Adnan al-Dulaymi)
2005 election but led this Sunni coalition to compete in
December 2005 elections. Critical of but accepts U.S.
presence. Includes Iraqi General People’s Council of
Adnan al-Dulaymi and the Sunni Endowment. The
Front holds 44 seats in new parliament. Hashimi named
a deputy president on April 22.
Dialogue National Iraqi
Mutlak, an ex-Baathist, was chief negotiator for Sunnis
Front
on the new constitution, but was dissatisfied with the
(Saleh al-Mutlak)
outcome and now advocates major revisions to the new
constitution. Holds 11 seats in the new parliament.
Muslim Scholars
Hardline Sunni Islamist, has boycotted all post-Saddam
Association
elections. Believed to have ties to and influence over
(MSA, Harith al-Dhari
insurgent factions. Wants timetable for U.S. withdrawal
and
from Iraq.
Abd al-Salam al-Qubaysi)
Iraqi Insurgents
Numerous factions and no unified leadership, although a
multi-group “Mujahedin Shura” was formed in early
2006, led by an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi).
Some groups led by ex-Saddam regime leaders, others
by Islamic extremists. Major factions outside mujahedin
shura include Islamic Army of Iraq, Muhammad’s Army,
and the 1920 Revolution Brigades.
Foreign Fighters/
Estimated 3,000 in Iraq, most led by Zarqawi, a
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Jordanian national. His faction is part of new
Mujahedin Shura. Advocates attacks on Iraqi Shiite
civilians to spark civil war. Related foreign fighter
faction, which includes some Iraqis, is Ansar al-Sunna,
but this group is not in the Mujahedin Shura.

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CRS-21
Democracy-Building and Local Governance/FY2006 Supplemental.
The United States and its coalition partners have tried to build civil society and
democracy at the local level. U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the
past 30 years, with a free press and the ability to organize politically. According to
a State Department report to Congress in April 2006 detailing how the FY2004
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund”
(IRRF) is being spent (“2207 Report”): According to the 2207 report:
! About $1.014 billion is allocated for “Democracy Building.”
! About $71 million is allocated for related “Rule of Law” programs.
! About $159 million is allocated to build and secure courts and train
legal personnel.
! About $128 million is allocated for “Investigations of Crimes
Against Humanity,” primarily former regime abuses.
! $10 million for U.S. Institute of Peace democracy/civil
society/conflict resolution activities.
! $10 million for the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (which is
evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds, mainly in
Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime).
! $15 million to promote human rights, human rights education
centers.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), some of the democracy and rule of
law building activities conducted with these funds, aside from assistance for the
various elections in Iraq in 2005, include the following:
! several projects attempting to increase the transparency of the justice
system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and lawyers,
develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws, promote
legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent constitution.
! activities to empower local governments, policies that are receiving
increasing U.S. attention and additional funding allocations from the
IRRF. These programs include (1) the “Community Action
Program” (CAP) through which local reconstruction projects are
voted on by village and town representatives. About 1,800
community associations have been established thus far; (2)
Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs) to
empower local governments to decide on reconstruction priorities;
and (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are local
enclaves to provide secure conditions for reconstruction, as
discussed further later in this paper. (In House action on the FY2006
supplemental (H.R. 4939, passed by the House on March 17, an
amendment offered by Representative Christopher Shays designates
$10 million in requested ESF for Iraq to be used to keep the CAP
operating. The Senate version recommends $75 million for the
CAP.)

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CRS-22
! programs to empower women and promote their involvement in
Iraqi politics.
! programs to promote independent media.
! some funds have been used for easing tensions in cities that have
seen substantial U.S.-led anti-insurgency combat, including Fallujah,
Ramadi, Sadr City district of Baghdad, and Mosul.
In addition to what is already allocated, the FY2006 regular foreign aid
appropriations (conference report H.Rept. 109-265 on P.L. 109-102) provides $56
million in FY2006 funds for democracy promotion. It incorporated a Senate
amendment (S.Amdt. 1299, Kennedy) to that legislation providing $28 million each
to the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for
democracy promotion in Iraq. An FY2006 supplemental request asks for additional
ESF to promote local governance, including
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance33
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, although some aspects of that effort appear to be faltering. As discussed
extensively in a January 2006 report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR), the difficult security environment has slowed reconstruction,
particularly in the restive areas of Iraq. Since September 2004, the U.S.
reconstruction process has shifted resources to smaller scale projects that could be
completed quickly and employ Iraqis, such as sewer lines and city roads.
The primary vehicle for reconstruction funding is the IRRF. Total funds of
$20.912 billion for the IRRF came from two supplemental appropriations (FY2003
supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the FY2004
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 108-106, which provided about $18.44 billion).
Of those funds, $18.9 billion has been obligated, and, of that, $14.115 billion has
been disbursed as of April 19, 2006. Other reconstruction funds have been
appropriated ($1.3 billion total for the Commanders Emergency Response Fund, $5.7
billion in FY2005 for Iraqi security forces, and other much smaller appropriations)
but are not included in the IRRF. According to State Department reports, the sector
allocations for the IRRF are
! $5.036 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.315 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society;
! $1.033 billion for Democracy;
! $4.22 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.735 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $465.5 million for Transportation and Communications;
33 For more detailed information on U.S. spending and economic reconstruction, see CRS
Report RL31833, Iraq, Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.

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CRS-23
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $739 million for Health Care;
! $805 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $410 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
FY2006 Supplemental. Even though economic reconstruction is incomplete,
the Administration requested $479 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for
Iraq for FY2007, mainly to help sustain infrastructure already built with U.S. funds.
The FY2006 supplemental request asks $1.6 billion for reconstruction activities. The
House-passed version of H.R. 4939 cuts $25 million from the request; the Senate
committee bill matches the request.
The Oil Industry. As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding of the oil
industry has received substantial U.S. attention. Before the war, it was widely
asserted by Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only
to those of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction costs. The oil
industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led invasion (only about
nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of insurgents. They have
focused their attacks on pipelines in northern Iraq that feed the Iraq-Turkey oil
pipeline that is loaded at Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. (Iraq’s total
pipeline system is over 4,300 miles long.) The attacks, coupled with corruption and
other deterioration, has kept production and exports below expected levels, although
high world oil prices have been, at least until now, more than compensating for the
output shortfall. The United States imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude
oil from Iraq. The Iraqi government needs to import refined gasoline because it lacks
sufficient refining capacity. Lines for gasoline often last many hours, although the
government said in February 2006 it will gradually reduce gas subsidies, allowing gas
prices to rise.
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries. Iraq’s interim government has contracted for a study of the extent of Iraq’s
oil reserves, and it has contracted with Royal Dutch/Shell to formulate a blueprint to
develop the gas sector. Poland reportedly is negotiating with Iraq for possible
investments in Iraq’s energy sector. In December 2005, it was reported that a
Norwegian company, DNO, has contracted with the Kurdish administrative region
to explore for oil near the northern city of Zakho, raising the concerns of Iraq’s Arabs
who view this as a move by the Kurds to control some Iraqi oil revenues.

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CRS-24
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Exports
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Production
Production
Exports
(pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(2006
(pre-war)
war)
(2004)
(2005)
(to date)
2.05 million
$17
$23.5
$7.6
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
1.55 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
billion
(mbd)
Electricity
Baghdad
Pre-War
(hrs. per day,
(MWh)
Current
1/06)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
90,000
4.1
10.9
Other Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate (2006 anticipated by IMF)
10.6%
GDP
$18.9 billion (2002)
$33.1 billion (2005)
New Businesses Begun Since 2003 30,000
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
April 19, 2006. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the 1990
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483
(May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
International Donors. A World Bank estimate, released in October 2003,
said Iraq reconstruction would require about $56 billion during 2004-2007, including
$21 billion in U.S. pledges. At an October 2003 donors’ conference in Madrid,
donors pledged about $13.5 billion, including $8 billion from foreign governments
and $5.5 billion in loans from the World Bank and IMF. Of the funds pledged by
other foreign governments, about $3.5 billion has been disbursed as of December
2005, according to the April 2006 “2207 Report.” Included in that figure is about
$436 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, which were disbursed in
2004 after Iraq cleared up $81 million in Saddam-era arrears to the IMF.
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction/CERP Funds. The U.S. military
has attempted to promote reconstruction to deprive the insurgency of popular
support. A key tool in this effort is the funding of small projects to garner Iraqi
public support. Called the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), the
DOD funds are controlled and disbursed by U.S. commanders at the tactical level.
The total amount of CERP funds for Iraq made available thus far are $1.3 billion ,
according to the State Department, including FY2004, 2005, and 2006 funds. The
FY2006 supplemental asks for a further $423 million in CERP funds for Iraq (and
Afghanistan). A similar program began in October 2004, called the Commander’s
Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Projects (CHHRP). About $86 million in
has been allocated for this program, mostly for water and sewage in Sunni areas.

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CRS-25
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. The Bush Administration has lifted most U.S.
sanctions on Iraq, beginning with Presidential Determinations issued under
authorities provided by P.L. 108-7 (appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11
(FY2003 supplemental):
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.) The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services.
Exports of dual use items (items that can have military applications)
are no longer subject to strict licensing procedures.34
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt, built up during Saddam’s regime, and
estimated of Saddam Hussein. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not
including reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war. In 2004, the “Paris Club”
of 19 industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes
them. However, with the exception of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf states that supported
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have not to date firmly agreed to write-off Iraq’s
approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar). On December 17, 2004, the United States signed an
agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1 billion debt to the United States;
that debt consisted of principal and interest from about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi
agricultural credits from the 1980s.35 On December 13, 2004, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession talks with Iraq.
34 A May 7, 2003, executive order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
35 For more information, see CRS Report RS21765, Iraq: Debt Relief, by Martin Weiss.

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CRS-26
Security Challenges,
Responses, and Options
In several speeches on Iraq since late 2005, President Bush cited successful
elections and the growth of the Iraqi security forces to assert that U.S. policy will
produce a stable Iraq, while acknowledging many of the unexpected security and
political difficulties encountered. Congress has mandated two major periodic
Administration reports on progress in stabilizing Iraq. A Defense Department
quarterly report, which DOD has titled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,”
was required by an FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13). Another
Administration report, and the first iteration of which was issued April 6, 2006
(“1227 Report”), was required by Section 1227 of the Defense Authorization Act for
FY2006 (P.L. 109-163).
The Insurgent Challenge
The Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. and Iraqi forces has defied most
U.S. expectations in intensity and duration. Although hesitant to assess the size of
the insurgency, U.S. commanders say that insurgents probably number approximately
12,000-20,000. Some Iraqi (intelligence) officials have publicly advanced higher
estimates of about 40,000 active insurgents, helped by another 150,000 persons in
supporting roles. About 15,000 suspected insurgents are now in prison in Iraq.
Insurgent attacks numbered about 100 per day during most of 2005, but U.S.
commanders now put that number at about 75 attacks per day.
As discussed in the Administration’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq”
(November 30, 2005), many of the insurgents are motivated by opposition to
perceived U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite political dominance. Others
want to bring the Baath Party back into power, although, according to many experts,
some would settle for a larger Sunni role in governance without the Baath. Still
others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters, either foreign or Iraqi, that want to defeat the
United States and spread radical Islam throughout the region.
The insurgent groups are believed to be loosely coordinated at the city or
province level. However, in early 2006, a group of five insurgent factions announced
the formation of an over-arching “Mujahedin Shura,” led by an Iraqi, Abdullah
Rashid al-Baghdadi. This Mujahedin Shura grouping consists mostly of Iraqi
factions but includes foreign fighters led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Despite their
growing organization, the insurgents have failed to derail the political transition,36
although they have succeeded, to some extent, in painting the Iraqi government as
ineffective. In March 2006, insurgent groups conducted three separate large-scale
(50 insurgents fighters or more) attacks on police stations, in at least one case
overrunning the station and freeing prisoners from it. Other targets include not only
36 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?” U.S. Institute
of Peace, Special Report 134, Apr. 2005; and Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White.
“Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus No. 50, Dec. 2005.

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CRS-27
U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security forces but also Iraqi civilians working for
U.S. authorities, foreign contractors and aid workers, oil export and gasoline
distribution facilities, and water, power, and other infrastructure facilities. The U.N.
Security Council has adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency — on August
4, 2005, it adopted Resolution 1618, condemning the “terrorist attacks that have
taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on Iraqi election workers, constitution drafters,
and foreign diplomats in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental request aks for $1.3
million in Treasury Department funds to disrupt insurgent financing.
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi.37 A relatively small but important component
of the insurgency is non-Iraqi fighters. A study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies released in September 2005 said that about 3,500 foreign
fighters are in Iraq, which would represent just under 20% of the overall insurgency
if the U.S. military estimate of 20,000 total insurgents is correct. According to the
study, the foreign fighters come mostly from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt, with Saudis constituting only about 350 of the 3,000 estimated
foreign fighters. The Department of Defense said on October 20, 2005, that 312
foreign fighters had been captured in Iraq since April 2005.
A major portion of the foreign fighters is commanded by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, a 40-year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in Afghanistan during
the 1980s alongside other Arab volunteers against the Soviet Union. He reportedly
is a member, or perhaps even de-facto leader, of the new “Mujahedin Shura”
announced in January 2006. Zarqawi came to Iraq in late 2001, along with several
hundred associates, after escaping the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. He made his
way to northern Iraq, after transiting Iran and Saddam-controlled Iraq, eventually
taking refuge with a Kurdish Islamist faction called Ansar al-Islam38 near the town
of Khurmal.39 After the Ansar enclave was destroyed in OIF, Zarqawi went to the
Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, naming his faction the Association of Unity and Jihad.
Since then, he has formally affiliated with Al Qaeda (through a reputed exchange of
letters) and changed his faction’s name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in Mesopotamia.” It is
named as an Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), assuming that designation from
the earlier Unity and Jihad title,40 which was designated as an FTO in October 2004.
Press reports said that U.S. forces almost caught him near Ramadi in February 2005,
and his aides posted web messages that he was seriously wounded in a subsequent
37 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?, by Kenneth Katzman.
38 Ansar al-Islam originated in 1998 as a radical splinter faction of a Kurdish Islamic group
called the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK). Based in Halabja, the IMIK
publicized the effects of Baghdad’s Mar. 1988 chemical attack on that city. Ansar is named
by the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
39 Chivers, C.J. “Repulsing Attack By Islamic Militants, Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities,”
New York Times, Dec. 6, 2002.
40 In early 2004, U.S. forces captured a letter purportedly written by Zarqawi asking bin
Laden’s support for Zarqawi’s insurgent activities in Iraq and an Islamist website broadcast
a message in October 2004, reportedly deemed authentic by U.S. agencies, that Zarqawi has
formally allied with Al Qaeda. There have also been recent press reports that bin Laden has
asked Zarqawi to plan operations outside Iraq. For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/
rls/31694.htm].

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CRS-28
U.S. raid but then regained health. He appeared in a video released on April 25,
2006, claiming that the insurgents were winning against the United States.
Zarqawi’s faction has been the subject of substantial U.S. counter-efforts
because of its alleged perpetration of “terrorist” attacks — suicide and other attacks
against both combatant and civilian targets. Some of the attacks attributed to this
faction include the bombings in Baghdad of U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel
(August 19, 2003)41 and the August 2003 bombing that killed SCIRI leader
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim. The group, and related factions, have also kidnaped a
total of over 250 foreigner workers, and killed about 40 of those. Suggesting
Zarqawi sees his goals as establishing Islamist governance throughout the region,
Zarqawi’s faction reputedly committed the August 19, 2005, failed rocket attack in
the Jordanian port of Aqaba against two U.S. warships docked there, as well as the
November 10, 2005, Western-owned hotels in Amman, Jordan. Zarqawi also
believes in attacking Shiite civilians as a means of stoking a civil war in Iraq; his
group might have been responsible for the February 22 attack on the Askariya Shiite
mosque in Samarra that sparked significant sectarian violence. However, Zarqawi’s
position on Shiite civilian attacks has caused tensions and occasional armed clashes
with Iraqi insurgent factions that oppose attacks on purely civilian targets. U.S.
forces have sought to exploit these differences by attempting to engage Iraqi
insurgent factions and persuade them to cooperate with U.S. efforts against the
foreign fighters, reportedly with some success.42
Outside Support. Numerous accounts have said that insurgent leaders are
using Syria as a base to funnel money and weapons to their fighters in Iraq.43 In
September 2005, U.S. ambassador Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of allowing
training camps in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to gather and train before going into Iraq.
These reports led to U.S. warnings to and imposition of additional U.S. sanctions
against Syria and to the U.S. Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of some
suspected financiers of the insurgency. Syria tried to deflect the criticism by moves
such as the February 2005 turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi to Iraqi
authorities. Since January 2006, senior U.S. commanders have said they have been
receiving increased cooperation from Syria to prevent insurgent flows across those
borders. Other assessments say the insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,44 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
41 Among the dead in the latter bombing was the U.N. representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, and it prompted an evacuation of U.N. personnel from Iraq.
42 Filkins, Dexter and Sabrina Tavernise. U.S. Said to Meet With Insurgents, Exploiting
Rifts. New York Times, Jan. 7, 2006.
43 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
21, 2004.
44 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.” Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates
By U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,” New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.

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Defense Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed in August 2005 that some explosives
from Iran had been intercepted in Iraq, although he did not assert that the shipment
was authorized by Iran’s government. He and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter
Pace asserted on March 7, 2006, that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is assisting armed
factions in Iraq with explosives and weapons. Because of Iran’s support for Shiite
militias, the United States and Iran confirmed in March 2006 that they would conduct
direct talks on the issue of stabilizing Iraq, and U.S. officials say such talks would not
expand to include bilateral U.S.-Iran issues such as Iran’s nuclear program. No talks
have been held, to date. For more information, see CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s
Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman.
Others believe that outside support for the insurgency is minimal. According
to this view, the insurgents have ample supplies of arms and explosives obtained
from the nearly 250,000 tons of munitions remaining around Iraq in arms depots not
immediately secured after the regime fell.
Sectarian Violence/Militias
The security picture in Iraq has become multi-dimensional over the past year as
an increasing amount of violence in Iraq has been sectarian. Sunni Arabs are
increasingly fighting Shiite Arabs and vice versa, in addition to fighting U.S. and
Iraqi government forces. Top officials, including Secretary of State Rice, have said
recently that sectarian-motivated violence has now displaced the insurgency as the
primary security challenge in Iraq. On virtually every day, bodies of Sunni or Shiite
civilians are discovered, bound and gagged, and dumped in rivers, facilities, vehicles,
or fields. Shiite leaders have blamed attacks on Sunni insurgents, and as noted
above, some insurgent factions have openly advocated civilian attacks as part of a
deliberate, announced strategy to bring about civil war in Iraq.
The sectarian violence is highly complicated because the Sunnis are blaming the
Shiites and Kurds for using their control over the emerging security forces — as well
as their party-based militias — to retaliate and repress Sunnis. Sunnis report that
Shiite militiamen who have joined the security forces are raiding Sunni homes or
using their arrest powers to abduct Sunnis, some of whom later show up killed.
Sunnis hold U.S. forces partly responsible for the violence because U.S. forces built
the Iraqi security forces and have allowed the Shiite and Kurdish militias to continue
to operate. To counter the Shiite-led violence, in February 2006, Sunni Arabs openly
announced formation of a militia, the Anbar Revolutionaries, to guard against Shiite
and Kurdish sectarian attacks.
The sectarian violence worsened after the February 22, 2006, bombing of the
Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra. The destruction of its dome set off a wave of
purported Shiite militia attacks on about 60 Sunni mosques and the killing of about
400 persons in the first days after the sectarian attacks. Some accounts say that well
over 1,000 Iraqis have been killed in sectarian violence since then. Iraqi officials said
in mid-April there are now over 60,000 internally displaced persons in Iraq (Iraqis
who are fleeing their homes in mixed neighborhoods because of threats from one sect

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CRS-30
or the other).45 The post-Samarra violence has led U.S. commanders and diplomats
to warn of the potential for all-out civil war, although they have denied that Iraq is
now in a civil war.
Press reports in April 2006 discussed the potential for Shiite-Kurdish clashes
in Kirkuk, the city the Kurds believe is theirs historically. On April 25, the
Washington Post reported that several Shiite militias are moving into Kirkuk vowing
to fight any Kurdish attempt to annex the city (and province) to the Kurdish
administered region.
The sectarian violence has caused U.S. officials to assert that the new
government must move to control or dismantle the eleven independent militias
identified by Iraqi officials. Although U.S. commanders have, to date, mostly
tolerated the presence of militias, there are indications that U.S. forces are moving
to curb them, with or without direct Iraqi government assistance. In one example,
U.S. and Iraqi forces killed about 16 purported Mahdi fighters at a site in Baghdad
on March 26, 2006, although Iraq’s Shiite politicians say the site was a mosque and
those present there were unarmed. The three major militias are discussed below.
! Kurdish Peshmerga. Together, the KDP and PUK may have as
many as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of whom are
operating as unofficial security organs in northern Iraqi cities. Some
are integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and deploy in such
cities as Mosul and Baghdad. Kurdish ISF units reportedly were a
major component of the ISF forces that fought alongside U.S. forces
in offensives at Tal Affar in September 2005. Peshmerga units have
sometimes fought each other; in May 1994, the KDP and the PUK
clashed with each other over territory, customs revenues, and control
over the Kurdish regional government in Irbil.
! Badr Brigades. The militia of SCIRI numbers about 5,000 - 10,000
and is led by Hadi al-Amiri (a member of the parliament). The Badr
Brigades were formed, trained, and equipped by Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard, politically aligned with Iran’s hardliners,
during the Iran-Iraq war, during which Badr guerrillas conducted
forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials.
Most Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners
of war held in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed SCIRI as
an Iranian puppet, and Badr operations in southern Iraq during the
1980s and 1990s did not spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi
regime. The Badr Organization registered as a separate political
entity, in addition to its SCIRI parent, for the elections in 2005.
! Badr militiamen play unofficial policing roles in Basra, Najaf, and
elsewhere in southern Iraq, and many Badr members also reputedly
are in the ISF, particularly the police, which is led by the SCIRI-
45 Knickermeyer, Ellen. “Thousands of Iraqis Flee to Avoid Spread of Violence.”
Washington Post, March 29, 2006.

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CRS-31
dominated Interior Ministry. A related militia, called the “Wolf
Brigade” is a Badr offshoot that is formally part of the police. It is
also led by a SCIRI activist. Sunni charges of Badr “death squads”
activities first gained strength on November 16, 2005, with the
discovery by U.S. forces of a secret Ministry of Interior detention
facility. The facility, allegedly run by Badr militiamen, housed 170
Sunni Arab detainees who allegedly were tortured. At least two
other such facilities, run by the Wolf Brigade, were uncovered in
December 2005. In another example of militia strength, on August
9, 2005, Badr fighters reportedly helped SCIRI member Hussein al-
Tahaan forcibly replace Ali al-Tamimi as mayor of Baghdad.
! Mahdi Army. U.S. officials say Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia has now
grown to about 20,000 fighters, representing a regaining of its
strength since U.S. military operations put down Mahdi uprisings
in April and August of 2004 in Sadr City. In those cases, fighting
was ended with compromises under which Mahdi forces stopped
fighting (and in some cases traded in some of their weapons for
money) in exchange for lenient treatment or releases of prisoners,
amnesty for Sadr himself, and reconstruction aid. The Mahdi Army
has since ended active anti-U.S. combat and Sadr City has been
relatively peaceful, but Mahdi fighters, reportedly with the tacit
approval of U.S. forces, continued to patrol that district and parts of
other Shiite cities, particularly Basra. Mahdi (and Badr)
assertiveness in Basra has partly accounted for a sharp deterioration
of relations since July 2005 between Iraqi officials in Basra and the
British forces based there. About 11 British soldiers have died in
attacks in that area since then, and in October 2005, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair publicly blamed Iran for arming Iraqi groups,
particularly the Mahdi Army, responsible for the soldiers’ deaths.
In one dispute, British forces forcibly rescued British special forces
soldiers taken into official custody in Basra. Mahdi and Badr forces
have occasionally clashed as well, most recently in October 2005.
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security
At times, such as after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 and
after all three elections in 2005, some U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the
insurgency would subside, only to see it continue. As outlined in the “National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the Administration continues to try to refine its
stabilization strategy.
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
The Administration is now pursuing a strategy called “clear, hold, and build,”
intended to create and expand stable enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces and U.S.
civilian reconstruction experts in areas cleared of insurgents. The strategy,
apparently based partly on an idea advanced by Andrew Krepinevich in the

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September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,46 says that the United States
should devote substantial resources to preventing insurgent re-infiltration and
promoting reconstruction in selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that
would attract support and be expanded to other areas and eventually throughout Iraq.
In conjunction with the new U.S. strategy, the Administration is forming Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), adapted from a concept used in Afghanistan. Each
PRT will be civilian led, composed of about 70 to 100 U.S. State Department
officials and contract personnel, to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as
the provincial councils (elected in the January 2005 elections), representatives of the
Iraqi provincial governors, and local ministry representatives. As reported in the
Washington Post on January 15, 2006, the concept ran into some reported difficulty
over U.S. military objections to taking on expanded missions at a time when it is
trying to draw down its force. The internal debate has apparently been resolved with
an agreement by DOD to provide security to the U.S.-run PRTs.
Thus far, four PRTs have been inaugurated: in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, and
Baghdad. Plans are for four more U.S. led PRTs and four partner-run PRTs. To date,
Britain has agreed to establish a PRT in Basra, and Italy has agreed to form one in
Dhi Qar province.
PRT Funding. The FY2006 supplemental request asks for $400 million for
operational costs for the PRTs as well as $675 million for development grants to be
distributed by them. Both versions of H.R. 4939 contain some cuts to the operational
portion of the Administration request for this function.
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations. The Administration view
is that U.S. stabilization strategy requires continued combat operations against the
insurgency. About 133,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq (down from 160,000 there during
the December election period), with about another 50,000 troops in Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf region supporting OIF. U.S. troop levels reflect a January 4, 2006,
speech by President Bush in which he stated that U.S. troop levels would be reduced
slightly in early 2006 from the previous baseline of 138,000.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in March 2006 that Iraqi forces, not U.S.-
led international forces, would take the lead in trying to suppress any all-out civil
war. He and others have said they do not believe Iraq is now in a state of civil war.
A major focus of U.S. counter-insurgent combat remains Anbar Province, which
includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. About 40,000 U.S. troops are in Anbar
alone. In April 2004, after the city fell under insurgent control, U.S. commanders
contemplated routing insurgents from the city but, concerned about collateral
damage and U.S. casualties, they agreed to allow former Iraqi officers to patrol it.
This solution quickly unraveled and, as 2004 progressed, about two dozen other
Sunni-inhabited towns, including Baqubah, Balad, Tikrit, Mosul, Ramadi, Samarra,
and Tal Affar, as well as the small towns south of Baghdad, fell under insurgent
influence.
46 Krepinevich, Andrew. “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2005.

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U.S. forces, joined by Iraqi forces, began operations in September 2004 to expel
insurgents. Most notable was “Operation Phantom Fury” on Fallujah (November
2004), involving 6,500 U.S. Marines and 2,000 Iraqi troops. Since then, over two
thirds of the city’s 250,000 have now returned, and some reconstruction has taken
place there. However, insurgents reportedly have re-infiltrated the city and U.S.
casualties continue in or near Fallujah. In the run-up to the December 15 elections,
U.S. (and Iraqi) forces conducted operations (for example Operations Matador,
Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and Ram) to clear
contingents of foreign fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities along the
Euphrates River. A major focus was to combat foreign fighters that entered Iraq
near the towns of Qaim, Husaybah, and Ubaydi, and had filtered down the Euphrates
valley to Ramadi, Hit and Haditha, or north into Tal Affar.
Casualties. As of April 26, 2006, 2,395 U.S. forces and about 204 coalition
partner soldiers have died in OIF, as well as over 125 U.S. civilians working on
contract to U.S. institutions in Iraq. Of U.S. deaths, 2,250 have occurred since
President Bush declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003,
and about 1,880 of the U.S. deaths were by hostile action. About 2,000 members of
the Iraqi Security Forces, which are analyzed below, have been killed in action, to
date. On December 12, 2005, President Bush cited press accounts that about 30,000
Iraqi civilians have been killed to date.
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)47
A major pillar of U.S. policy is to equip and train Iraqi security forces (ISF) that
could secure Iraq by themselves. President Bush stated in his June 28, 2005 speech,
“Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand
down.”48 The most recent DOD “Measuring Stability” report, released February
2006, generally reiterates U.S. official statements of progress in Iraq and contains
details of the training of the ISF.
The tables below detail the composition of the ISF and provide Administration
assessments of force readiness. As of April 19, there are 250,000 total ISF: 115,100
“operational” military forces under the Ministry of Defense and 134,900
police/commando forces “trained and equipped” under the Ministry of Interior. The
total force goal is 325,000 ISF by August 2007. However, police figures include
possibly tens of thousands (according to the GAO on March 15, 2005) who are
absent-without-leave or might have deserted. The police generally live with their
families, rather than in barracks, and are therefore hard to account for.
By Administration measures, about 45,000 ISF (both military and police) are
“in the lead” on operations, but none is currently rated as “fully independent.” U.S.
officials and reports praise their performance in each of the three election days in
2005, and General Casey praised the ISF’s performance after the February 22
47 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy Sharp.
48 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/
2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].

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CRS-34
Samarra mosque bombing, although he did note some police units allowed militia
fighters through checkpoints to attack Sunnis. U.S. commanders also cite as
evidence of their growing confidence the September 2005 offensive in Tal Afar in
which Iraqi units were in the lead, although some outside accounts call that
assessment into question. According to the State Department, U.S. and partner forces
have now turned over 33 of 111 “forward operating bases” to the ISF, and the ISF (6th
Division) controls 90 square miles of Baghdad, although its commander, Gen.
Mudbar al-Dulaymi, was gunned down on March 6. In August 2005, U.S.
commanders turned over full control of the city of Najaf to the ISF. On January 26,
2006, the entire provinces of Wasit and Qadissiyah were turned over to ISF control.
Parts of southern Mosul and even parts of the “Green Zone” in Baghdad were turned
over subsequently. In March 2006, the commander of MNF-I Gen. Peter Chiarelli
said that ISF forces might control 75% of Iraqi territory by the end of 2006.
However, U.S. commanders and outside observers say that the ISF continue to
lack an effective command structure, independent initiative, or commitment to the
mission, and that it could fragment if U.S. troops draw down.49 U.S. commanders
have told journalists recently that it is common for half of an entire ISF unit to desert
or refuse to undertake a specified mission.50 A report on the Iraqi police by the
offices of the Inspector General of the State and Defense Departments, released July
15, 2005, said that many recruits are only marginally literate, and some recruits are
actually insurgents trying to infiltrate the ISF (p.3).51 As an indicator of continued
difficulties, in late December 2005, the U.S. military refused to turn over control of
central Baghdad to an ISF brigade (5th Brigade) until the Iraqi government approved
the appointment of the (Sunni) leader of that brigade that U.S. officers considered
qualified.
Another major issue is ethnic balance; U.S. commanders have acknowledged
difficulty recruiting Sunni Arabs into the ISF and have said this is a deficiency they
are trying to correct. Most of the ISF are Shiites, with Kurdish units mainly deployed
in the north. There are few units of mixed ethnicity. As discussed above, many
Sunnis see the ISF as mostly Shiite and Kurdish instruments of repression. Sunnis
have also been recruited to rebuild police forces in Mosul and Fallujah, which
virtually collapsed in 2004.
49 Fallows, James. “Why Iraq Has No Army.” Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2005.
50 Castaneda, Antonio. “Iraqi Desertions Complicate U.S. Mission.” Associated Press,
January 31, 2006.
51 Inspectors General. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense.
Interagency Assessment of Iraqi Police Training. July 15, 2005.

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Table 4. Ministry of Defense Forces
(as of April 19, 2006)
IRRF Funds
Force
Size/Strength
Allocated
Iraqi Army
113,700 total; goal is 131,000. Forces in units are
$1.097 billion
in 102 battalions (about 70,000 personnel), with
for facilities;
62 battalions (about 40,000) able to lead
$707 million
operations. 49 battalions (about 35,000) control
for equipment;
their own “battle space.” Trained for eight weeks,
$656 million
paid $60/month. Has mostly East bloc equipment,
for training,
including 77 T-72 tanks donated by Poland.
personnel, and
operations
Iraqi
About 3,000 personnel, included in Army total
Intervention
above. Trained for 13 weeks.
Force
Special
About 1,500 divided between Iraqi Counter-
Operations
Terrorist Force (ICTF) and a Commando
Forces
Battalion. Trained for 12 weeks, mostly in Jordan.
Strategic
About 3,000 personnel in five battalions to protect
Infrastructure
oil pipelines, electricity infrastructure.
Battalions
Mechanized
About 1,500. Recently transferred from Ministry
Police
of Interior control.
Brigade
Air Force
About 600, its target size. Has 9 helicopters, 3 C-
$28 million
130s; 14 observation aircraft. Trained for six
allocated for
months. UAE and Jordan to provide other aircraft
air fields (from
and helos.
funds for Iraqi
Army, above)
Navy
About 800, about the target size. Has a Patrol
Boat Squadron and a Coastal Defense Regiment.
Fields about 35 patrol boats for anti-smuggling
and anti-infiltration. Controls naval base at Umm
Qasra, Basra port, and Khor al-Amaya oil
terminals. Some training by Australian Navy.
Totals
115,100
U.S./Other
U.S. training, including embedding with Iraqi units, involves about
Trainers
10,000 U.S. forces, run by Multinational Security Transition
Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I). Training at Taji, north of Baghdad;
Kirkush, near Iranian border; and Numaniya, south of Baghdad. All
26 NATO nations at NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) at
Rustamiyah (300 trainers). Others trained at NATO bases in
Norway, Germany, and Italy. Jordan and Egypt also have done
training.

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CRS-36
Table 5. Ministry of Interior (Police) Forces
(As of April 19, 2006)
Force
Size/Strength
IRRF Funds Allocated
Iraqi Police Service
95,500, including 1,300 person
$ 1.806 billion allocated
(IPS)
Highway Patrol. Target size is
for training and technical
135,000 by 2007. Gets eight
assistance.
weeks of training, paid $60 per
month. Not organized as
battalions.
Center for Dignitary
About 500 personnel
Protection
National Police
About 20,600, comprising
“Police Commandos,” Public
Order Police,” and
“Mechanized Police.”
Organized into 27 battalions, 7
of which (about 5,000) are able
to lead counter-insurgency
operations. Overwhelmingly
Shiite, but U.S. is attempting to
recruit more Sunnis. Gets four
weeks of training.
Emergency Response
About 300, able to lead
Unit
operations. Hostage rescue.
Public Order Police
About 10,000 personnel.
Brigades
Overwhelmingly Shiite.
Border Enforcement
About 18,000. Controls 258
$437 million, $3 million of
Department
border forts built or under
which is allocated to pay
construction. Has Riverine
stipends to 150 former
Police component to secure
regime WMD personnel.
water crossings.
Totals (all forces)
134,900. Goal is 195,000
Training
Training by 2,000 U.S. personnel as embeds and partners.
Pre-operational training mostly at Jordan International Police
Training Center; Baghdad Police College and seven
academies around Iraq; and in UAE. Countries doing training
aside from U.S.: Canada, Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland,
UAE, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore, Belgium, and Egypt.
Facilities Protection
Technically outside MOI.
$53 million allocated for
Service
About 75,000 security guards
this service thus far.
protecting economic
infrastructure.

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CRS-37
ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy. Maj. Gen. David Petraeus first oversaw the training of the ISF as
head of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).52 On
September 8, 2005, he was replaced by Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey. The
Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this training and equipping
mission; according to the State Department, a total of $5.036 billion in IRRF funds
has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for, and in some cases
provide pay for) the ISF. Of those funds, about $4.887 billion has been obligated as
of April 19, and $4.435 billion of that has been disbursed. A FY2005 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an additional $5.7 billion to equip and train the
ISF, funds to be controlled by the Department of Defense and provided to MNSTC-I.
(When spent, that would bring total ISF funding to $11 billion.) The FY2006
supplemental request asks for another $3.7 billion in DOD funds for the ISF. The
House-passed supplemental funding bill (H.R. 4939) provides about $3 billion of
those funds, but withholds the remaining ISF facilities construction funding. The
Senate Committee version matches the request.
Coalition-Building and Maintenance53
Some believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient efforts to
enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that the U.S.
mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military personnel
contributions. As of April 19, 2006, 26 coalition partner forces are contributing
20,000 forces, but that total is expected to fall later in 2006. Poland and Britain lead
multinational divisions in central and southern Iraq, respectively. The UK-led force
(UK forces alone number about 8,000) is based in Basra; the Poland-led force
(Polish forces number 1,700) is based in Hilla. British leaders have confirmed that
they will draw down about 800 of those forces later in 2006. In March 2005, Poland
drew down to 1,700 from its prior force level of 2,400, and it has now reduced that
further to 900 focused mainly on training Iraqi forces. The smaller force has been
slated to leave by the end of 2006, although a newly elected government says it might
extend the mission into 2007.

The coalition in Iraq has been shrinking since Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of
its 1,300 troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004 Madrid
bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had
supported the war effort. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
followed Spain’s withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in
July 2004 after one of its citizens was taken hostage and threatened with beheading.
On the other hand, many nations are replacing their contingents with trainers for the
ISF or financial contributions or other assistance to Iraq. Among other changes are
the following.
52 For more information on this mission, see [http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/].
53 For additional information on international contributions to Iraq peacekeeping and
reconstruction, see CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.

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! Hungary completed a pullout of its 300 forces in December 2004.
! Italy has reduced its force from 3,200 in September 2005 to about
2,600 currently, based in the southern city of Nasiriyah (Dhi Qar
Province). Italian officials have planned to halve that number by
June 2006, and new Prime Minister Romano Prodi indicated during
his election campaign that he wants to pull Italy’s troops out entirely.
! Thailand, New Zealand, and Norway withdrew in early 2005, and
Norway’s 20 personnel were withdrawn in October 2005.
! In March 2005, the Netherlands withdrew almost all of its 1,350
troops. Austrailian forces subsequently took over the Netherlands
force’s duty to help protect Japan’s forces in Samawa.
! Ukraine, which lost eight of its soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent
attack, completed withdrawal of its remaining 1,500 forces after the
December 2005 elections.
! Bulgaria pulled out its 360-member unit after the December 15 Iraqi
elections. However, in March 2006 it said it had sent in a 150-
person force to take over guard duties of Camp Ashraf, a base in
eastern Iraq where Iranian oppositionists are located.
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and its cabinet voted on November 21 to withdraw one-third of its
remaining 3,300 forces in late 2005, but to keep the remainder in
until the end of 2006.
! Japan’s parliament voted in mid-December 2005 to extend the
deployment of its 600-person military reconstruction contingent in
Samawah until as late as the end of 2006. However, the government
reportedly is considering ending it sooner, perhaps after the new
government is seated.
! Some countries have increased forces to compensate for
withdrawals. Singapore deployed 180 troops in November 2004
after a hiatus of several months. Azerbaijan also has increase forces.
! In February 2005, El Salvador agreed to send a replacement
contingent of 380 soldiers to replace those who are rotating out.
! In February 2005, Australia added 450 troops, bringing its
contribution to over 900.
! In March 2005, Georgia sent an additional 550 troops to Iraq to help
guard the United Nations facilities, bringing its total Iraq deployment
to 850. In March 2005, Albania increased its force by 50, giving it
about 120 troops in Iraq.

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CRS-39
NATO/EU/Other Offers of Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO
countries have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to
contribute funds or equipment. Several NATO countries and others are offering to
train not only Iraqi security but also civilian personnel. In addition to the security
training offers discussed above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help
train Iraqi police, administrators, and judges outside Iraq. At the June 22, 2005
Brussels conference discussed above, the EU pledged a $130 million package to help
Iraq write its permanent constitution and reform government ministries; Norway
offered energy sector cooperation, and Turkey offered to conduct seminars on
democracy for Iraqis. Japan has made a similar offer on constitutional drafting, and
Malaysia has offered to train Iraqi civil servants. The FY2005 supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $99 million to set up a regional counter-
terrorism center in Jordan to train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
In July 2004, then Secretary of State Powell said the United States would
consider a Saudi proposal for a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to
perform peacekeeping in Iraq, reportedly under separate command. However, the
idea floundered because of opposition from potential contributing countries.
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy”
Some Members say that major new initiatives need to be considered to ensure
success of the U.S. mission in Iraq, and debates have emerged over several
congressional resolutions proposing an “exit strategy.” Some of the ideas widely
circulated among Members and other policy experts are discussed below.
Troop Increase. Some have said that the United States should increase its
troops in Iraq in an effort to prevent insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by
U.S. operations. Some experts believe the extra troops needed for such an effort
might number about 100,000.54 The Administration asserts that U.S. commanders
feel that planned force levels are sufficient to complete the mission, and that U.S.
commanders are able to request additional forces, if needed. About 700 additional
forces were sent to Iraq briefly following the February 22 Samarra bombing to help
prevent a descent into all out-civil war. Some experts believe that troop level
increases would aggravate Sunni Arabs already resentful of the U.S. intervention in
Iraq and that even many more U.S. troops would not necessarily produce stability and
would appear to deepen the U.S. commitment without a clear exit strategy. Others
believe that increasing U.S. force levels would further the impression that the Iraqi
government depends on the United States for its survival.
Immediate Withdrawal. Some Members argue that the United States should
begin to withdraw virtually immediately. Supporters of this position tend to argue
that the decision to invade Iraq and change its regime was a mistake in light of the
failure thus far to locate WMD, that a continued large U.S. presence in Iraq is
inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S.
casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Those who take this position
54 Bersia, John. “The Courage Needed to Win the War,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 9,
2005.

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include the approximately 50 Members of the “Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus,”
formed in June 2005. In November 2005, Representative John Murtha, a ranking
member and former chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, publicly
articulated a similar position, calling for an “immediate” pullout (over six months).
His resolution (H.J.Res. 73) called for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable
date” and the maintenance of an “over the horizon” U.S. presence to help the ISF.
A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written by Representative Duncan Hunter,
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), expressed the sense “that the
deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be terminated immediately;” it failed 403-3 on
November 18, 2005. Other bills, such as H.R. 3142 and H.Con.Res. 197, state that
it [should be] U.S. policy not to maintain a permanent or long-term presence in Iraq.
Withdrawal Timetable. Another alternative is the setting of a timetable for
a U.S. withdrawal. This has been exemplified by H.J.Res. 55, introduced by five
House Members from both parties, which calls on the Administration to begin a
withdrawal by October 2006. In November 2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view
that the United States needs to force internal compromise in Iraq by threatening to
withdraw, introduced an amendment to S. 1042 (defense authorization bill) to
compel the Administration to work on a timetable for withdrawal (during 2006).
Reportedly, on November 10, 2005, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee John Warner reworked the Levin proposal into an amendment that
stopped short of setting a timetable for withdrawal but requires an Administration
report on a “schedule for meeting conditions” that could permit a U.S. withdrawal.
That measure, which also states in its preamble that “2006 should be a period of
significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty,” achieved bi-partisan support, passing
79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications by House conferees, in the
conference report on the bill (H.R. 1815, H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-163). Senator
Russ Feingold expressed a view similar to that of Senator Levin in August 2005
when Senator Feingold called for a withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2006.
His resolution (S.Res. 171) calls for the Administration to report to Congress on the
time frame needed for the United States to complete its mission.
Troop Reduction. Responding to the November 2005 congressional action,
President Bush and U.S. commanders remained adamant in their stated opposition
to the setting of any timetable for troop pullouts, let alone an immediate pullout.
They maintained that the Iraqi government would collapse upon an immediate
pullout, representing a victory for terrorists such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and those
of Al Qaeda. However, as noted above, the President announced a small drawdown
in early 2006 (to about 135,000), and senior U.S. military officials said in late 2005
that there are plans for a substantial drawdown (40,000 - 50,000 of the total
contingent) later in 2006 if there is continued political progress and the insurgency
does not escalate. Subsequently, talk of a reduction diminished in the wake of the
post-February 22 Samarra bombing violence discussed above. However, on April
26, 2006, CNN reported that senior U.S. commanders are again indicating planning
for a reduction of about 30,000 U.S. forces (5 brigades fewer than the 15 currently
in Iraq) later in 2006, if security conditions permit.
Power-Sharing Formulas. Both the Administration and its critics have
identified the need to bring more Sunni Arabs into the political process to undercut
support for the insurgency. As noted, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad has been reaching

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out to Sunni groups, with some success, and some believe that a key to progress in
this effort will be U.S. ability to persuade the Shiites and Kurds to agree to major
amendments to the constitution during the four month amendment process that
begins after a new government is seated. An unknown is what package of
incentives, if any, would persuade most Sunnis to end support for the insurgency and
fully support the government. Many experts believe that the Sunnis will only settle
for a share of power that is perhaps slightly less than that wielded by the majority
Shiites, even though the Shiites greatly outnumber Sunni Arabs in Iraq.
Negotiating With the Insurgents. In addition to exploring power sharing
arrangements with moderate Sunni leaders, the Administration appears to have
adopted a recommendation by early critics of U.S. policy to negotiate with some
Sunni figures representing the insurgency (including members of the MSA) and
even with some insurgent commanders. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld confirmed
to journalists in June 2005 that such discussions had taken place. The talks
reportedly have been intended to help U.S. forces defeat Zarqawi’s foreign insurgent
faction. However, no major insurgent factions have laid down arms. The insurgents
who have attended such talks reportedly want an increased role for Sunnis in
government and a withdrawal of U.S. and ISF forces from Sunni-inhabited areas.
Some U.S. officials appear to believe that talking directly with insurgents increases
insurgent leverage and emboldens them to continue attacks.

Accelerating Economic Reconstruction. Some believe that the key to
calming Iraq is to accelerate economic reconstruction. According to this view,
accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment,
improving public services, and creating confidence in the government. This idea
appears to have been incorporated into the President’s “National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq” document and the formation of the PRTs, as discussed above. Others doubt
that economic improvement alone will produce major political results. According
to this view, the divisions among Iraq’s major factions are fundamental and resistant
to amelioration by an improved economy. In addition, the U.S. refraining from
requesting major additional reconstruction funds might indicate that the
Administration has not found this idea persuasive.
Partition. Some commentators believe that Iraq cannot be stabilized as one
country and should be broken up into three separate countries: one Kurdish, one
Sunni Arab, and one Shiite Arab. However, many Middle East experts believe the
idea is unworkable because none of the three would likely be self-sufficient and
would likely fall firmly under the sway of Iraq’s powerful neighbors. Another
version of this idea is to form three autonomous regions, dominated by each of the
major communities, perhaps with an international organization tapped to distribute
Iraq’s oil revenues equitably among the regions.
Internationalization Options. Some observers believe that the United
States needs to recruit international help in stabilizing Iraq. One idea is to identify
a high-level international mediator to negotiate with Iraq’s major factions. In a
possible move toward this option, in March 2006 President Bush appointed former
Secretary of State James Baker to head a congressionally recruited “Iraq Study
Group” to formulate options for U.S. policy in Iraq. However, there is no public
discussion, to date, that Baker himself might be such a mediator, and most experts

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believe that a mediator, if selected, would likely need to come from a country that is
viewed by all Iraqis as neutral on internal political outcomes in Iraq. Another idea
is to form a “contact group” of major countries and Iraqi neighbors to prevail on
Iraq’s factions to compromise.
Table 6. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
War
opposition
INC
crimes
Broadcasting
activities
Total
FY1998
—
2.0
5.0 (RFE/RL
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
for “Radio Free
Iraq)
FY1999
3.0
3.0
—
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000
—
2.0
—
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in Iraq)
(INC radio)
FY2002
—
—
—
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1
—
—
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-FY2003
(about 14.5
million of this
went to INC
FY2004
—
—
—
0
0
(request)
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war
crimes” funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation, Apr. 2004.

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Figure 1. Map of Iraq

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