Order Code RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Updated April 6, 2006 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Afghanistan’s planned political transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005, but insurgent threats to Afghanistan’s government persist. A new constitution was adopted in January 2004, and successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, followed by parliamentary elections on September 18, 2005. This completes the post-Taliban political transition roadmap established at the December 2001 international conference in Bonn, Germany. Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban. Women are participating in economic and political life, including as ministers, provincial governors, and senior levels of the new parliament. However, the insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime has conducted numerous lethal attacks since mid-2005, narcotics trafficking is rampant, and independent militias remain throughout the country, although they are being progressively disarmed. U.S. stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government and its security forces while combating insurgents. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan National Army; deploying a multinational International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to patrol Kabul and other cities; and running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs). Approximately 18,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban-led insurgency, but the United States and NATO have agreed to shift more of the security burden to NATO during 2006. That transition will permit U.S. force levels to drop to a planned level of about 16,500 by mid-2006, although the reduction has raised concerns among Afghan officials that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan is waning. To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States gave Afghanistan about $4.35 billion in FY2005, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces. Another $931 million is provided for in the conference report on the regular FY2006 aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102). In February, the Administration requested $1.1 billion in aid for FY2007 and about $2.5 billion in supplemental FY2006 funds, of which about $2.4 billion is to go to Afghan security force development and Defense Department counter-narcotics support efforts there. This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. Contents Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Taliban Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The Bonn Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Strengthening Central Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Curbing Regional Strongmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Combating Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices . . . . . 17 Advancement of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) . . . 20 International Security Force (ISAF)/NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Afghan National Army (ANA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Afghan National Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Russia, Central Asian States, and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments . . . . . . 36 FY2006 Regular and FY2006 Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 World Bank/Asian Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 International Reconstruction Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Residual Issues From Past Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Stinger Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Mine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 List of Figures Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 List of Tables Table 1. Table 2. Table 3. Table 4. Table 5. Table 6. Table 7. Table 8. Table 9. Major Security-Related Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 ISAF Contributing Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Major Factions in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Background to Recent Developments Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was a territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations often linked to neighboring nations; it was not a distinct political entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction. They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin1 (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal. Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), working closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large 1 The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.” CRS-2 network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai. On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants. The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding.2 With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders who were nominally his allies. The defectors joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.3 2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late 1991, Congress abided by the aid figures contained in the bill. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377. 3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them. CRS-3 Afghanistan at a Glance Population: Ethnic Groups: Religions: GDP: GDP per capita GDP real growth Unemployment rate External Debt: Major Exports: Oil Production Oil Consumption Oil Proven Reserves Major Imports: 28.5 million (July 2004 est.) Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%; other 4% Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1% $21.5 billion (purchasing power parity) $800 (purchasing power parity) 8% (2005) 40% (2005) $8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. said Feb. 8, 2006, that the $108 million in debt to U.S. would be forgiven. fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium none 5 million barrels per day 3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, according to Afghan government on March 15, 2006 food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles Source: CIA World Factbook, 2005, Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C. The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban4 The fall of Najibullah exposed the serious differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, became president for an initial two months (April-May 1992). Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with the understanding that he would leave office in December 1994. He refused to step down, maintaining that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently ravaged by shelling from other mujahedin factions leader, particularly Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who accused him of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar, who headed a fundamentalist faction of Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) and reportedly received a large proportion of the U.S. covert aid during the war against the Soviet Union, was nominally prime minister but never formally took office. Four years (1992-1996) of the civil war created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting. (Hikmatyar was later ousted by the Taliban from his power base around Jalalabad, despite sharing the Taliban’s ideology and Pashtun ethnicity, and he fled to Iran before returning to Afghanistan in early 2002. He is now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents; his whereabouts are unknown.) The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students, many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They were mostly practitioners of an orthodox form of 4 For an in-depth study of the Taliban and its rule, see Rashid, Ahmad. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press, 2000. CRS-4 Sunni Islam, “Wahhabism,” similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan. Taliban members viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, antiPashtun, and responsible for continued civil war. With the help of defections by sympathetic mujahedin, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994, and by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. A sense of the Senate resolution, S.Res. 275, that resolving the Afghan civil war should be a top U.S. priority passed by unanimous consent on September 24, 1996. A similar measure, H.Con.Res. 218, passed the House on April 28, 1998. Taliban Rule The Taliban was led by Mullah (Sunni Muslim cleric) Muhammad Umar, who fought (and lost an eye) in the anti-Soviet war fighting under the banner of the Hizbe-Islam (Islamic Party) of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and Commander of the Faithful, but he mostly remained in his power base in Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and adamantly opposed meeting U.S. demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar, who is about 60 years old, fled Qandahar when the Taliban surrendered it on December 9, 2001. He is still at large and reportedly in command of Taliban militants. On January 10, 2006, he issued a statement rejecting an overture to reconcile with the government. The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery or other transgressions. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, on the grounds that they represented un-Islamic idolatry. (The pro-Taliban governor of Bamiyan at the time of the destruction, Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, won election to parliament in the September 18, 2005, elections. He blamed the decision to destroy the statues on Al Qaeda influence on the Taliban.) The Clinton Administration diplomatically engaged the Taliban movement before and after it took power, but U.S. relations with the Taliban had become mostly adversarial well before the September 11, 2001, attacks. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan CRS-5 embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. During a November 1997 visit to Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called Taliban policies “despicable.” Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women. The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton Administration’s overriding bilateral agenda item with Afghanistan by 1998.5 In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban on bin Laden; it imposed U.S. sanctions and achieved adoption of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban regime (see appendix), and it undertook some reported covert actions against it.6 Clinton Administration officials say that they did not try to oust the Taliban from power through major U.S. military action or by militarily aiding Taliban opponents because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values. The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban The Taliban’s policies caused many different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition, into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Other components of the Alliance were the following: ! Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major component was the Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. Dostam was best known for his March 1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated Najibullah’s overthrow one month later. He subsequently fought against Rabbani during 1992-1995 to persuade him to yield power, but later joined Rabbani’s Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Dostam had commanded about 25,000 troops, armor, combat aircraft, and some Scud missiles, but he was unable to hold off Taliban forces, which, after several unsuccessful attempts, captured Dostam’s region in August 1998. During the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, Dostam led horse-mounted forces against dug-in Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of the city and the Taliban’s collapse. Dostam was a candidate for president in the October 9, 2004 elections; in March 5 For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman. 6 On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged bin Laden-controlled terrorist training camps in retaliation for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. CRS-6 2005 Karzai appointed him as his “chief of staff” for military affairs. ! Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other large ethnic factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller groups); it joined Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government. Hizbe-Wahdat was supported by Iran, whose population is Shiite. Hizbe-Wahdat forces occasionally retook Bamiyan city from the Taliban, but they did not hold it until the Taliban collapsed in November 2001. The most well known Hazara political leader is Karim Khalili, who led a large faction of Hizb-e-Wahdat; he is now one of Karzai’s two vice presidents. Another major Hazara figure, Mohammad Mohaqiq, ran in the October 2004 presidential election. He won a parliament seat in the September 18 election. ! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, headed a Pashtun-dominated mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. He lived many years in and is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his conservative brand of Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”). During the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet occupation, Sayyaf’s faction, along with that of Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S.-supplied weaponry. Both criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Even though his ideology is similar to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance against it. He won election to the lower house of parliament in the September 18, 2005 election but lost his bid to become its speaker. He chairs the body’s international relations committee. Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the Taliban differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy — applying pressure short of military, while retaining some dialogue with the Taliban. The Bush Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance, although the 9/11 Commission report says that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, the Administration was leaning toward such a step. That report adds that some Administration officials wanted to also assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces and not just the Northern Alliance; other covert options might have been under consideration as well.7 In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan in an effort to persuade it to end support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New York. However, the Taliban representative continued 7 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002. CRS-7 to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received Taliban foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues. Fighting with only some Iranian and Russian support, the Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country and almost all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacks Masud’s charisma or undisputed authority. September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom. After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban regime when it refused a U.S. demand to immediately extradite bin Laden. The Administration decided that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces could capture Al Qaeda activists there. In Congress, S.J.Res.23 (P.L. 107-40) authorized: all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.... It passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House. Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL and provided $17 million in funding for it for FY2002. Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its Afghan opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces in the war strengthened the militias’ subsequent autonomy. The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces — the commanders of which had initially promised U.S. officials his forces would not enter the city itself — entered Kabul three days later. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun commanders, such as Hamid Karzai; he had entered Afghanistan just after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported in that effort by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts in the south after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without coordination with U.S. forces and was captured and killed by the Taliban. CRS-8 Major U.S. combat operations continued after the fall of the Taliban regime. The United States and its Afghan allies conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2 - 19, 2002, to eliminate a pocket of as many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In late March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops launched a raid on suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declared major OEF combat operations ended. Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction8 The war paved the way for the success of an eight-year-long U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government. The United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, the loya jirga. However, any U.N.-mediated ceasefires between warring factions always broke down. Non-U.N. initiatives fared no better, particularly the “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). All countries in the Six Plus Two pledged not to arm the warring factions.9 Other efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States) formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and individual Afghan exile efforts, including one from the Karzai clan and another centered on former King Zahir Shah. The Bonn Agreement. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought back (he had ended his efforts in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 was adopted on November 14, 2001, calling for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited the major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King — but not the Taliban — to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement” that ! Formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the holding in June 2002 of an emergency loya jirga, which would choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is 8 For an analysis of U.S. reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan, with a focus primarily on economic reconstruction, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Reconstruction, GAO-05-742 (July 2005). 9 In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed a ban on U.S. sales of arms to all factions in Afghanistan, a policy that had been already in place less formally. Federal Register, vol. 61, no. 125 (June 27, 1996), p. 33313. CRS-9 approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004). Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration, weighted toward the Northern Alliance with 17 out of 30 of the positions, including Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanooni). The three ethnic Tajiks, in their 40s, had been close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud. It was agreed that, in the interim, Afghanistan would abide by the constitution of 1964.10 ! Authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security, at least in Kabul. Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from Kabul. The agreement also referenced the need to cooperate with the international community to counter narcotics trafficking, crime, and terrorism. The Bonn Agreement was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001), and the international peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001).11 Hamid Karzai Hamid Karzai, about 51, was selected to lead Afghanistan because he is a credible Pashtun leader who sought factional compromise rather than intimidation of his opponents through armed force. He has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999, when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Some of his several brothers have lived in the United States, including Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election. Permanent Constitution. An “emergency” loya jirga (June 2002) put a popular imprimatur on the transition government. Former King Zahir Shah returned to Afghanistan in April 2002 for the meeting, for which 381 districts of Afghanistan chose 1,550 delegates, of which about 200 were women. At the assembly, the former King and Rabbani withdrew from leadership candidacy and Karzai was selected to remain leader until presidential elections (to be held June 2004). On its last day (June 19, 2002), the assembly approved a new cabinet, with a few changes. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October 2002, drafted the permanent constitution and unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya 10 The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate. 11 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.runiceurope.org/german/frieden/afghanistan/talks/ agreement.htm]. CRS-10 jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003 - January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes from the draft. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the presidency by setting up a prime minister-ship. Instead, significant powers were given to an elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and the ability to impeach a president. According to the permanent constitution: ! Two vice presidents run on the same election ticket as the president, and one succeeds him in the event of the president’s death. They serve a five-year term, and presidents are limited to two terms. A candidate must achieve more than 50% to avoid a run-off. ! There is a two-chamber parliament, provincial, and district councils. The lower house of parliament (Wolesi Jirga, House of People), consists of 249 seats, is to be fully elected at the same time, if possible, as presidential elections. The 102-seat upper chamber (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders) is to be selected as follows: onethird of the seats (34) are appointed by the President; another one third (34, one per province) are selected by provincial councils (which are elected, if possible, the same day as the parliamentary elections); and a final 34 are selected by the nearly 400 district councils (elected, if possible, the same day as the parliamentary elections). The constitution does not stipulate other roles for the district councils, although some believe they will ultimately acquire some power to impose local taxes and provide local services.12 ! In the elected lower house, at least 68 of those elected (an average of two per province x 34 provinces) “should” be women. That would give women about 25% of the seats in that body, a goal to be met through election rules that give seats to the top women votegetters in each province. In the upper house, 50% of the president’s appointments are women, giving women at least 17 seats (half of the president’s 34 nominees) — about 17% of that body. ! Political parties may be established so long as their charters “do not contradict the principles of Islam,” and they do not have affiliations with other countries. ! Uzbek and Turkmen languages are official languages in regions inhabited by these ethnic groups. (These provisions were not in the original draft; Pashtun leaders had wanted the final constitution to designate Pashto as the sole official language.) National Elections. The October 9, 2004 presidential voting was orderly and turnout heavy (about 8.2 million votes cast out of 10.5 million registered voters). 12 Aizenman, N.C. “Afghans Face a Rocky Road to Next Vote.” Washington Post, February 19, 2005. CRS-11 On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. He was inaugurated on December 7, 2004, with Vice President Cheney attending. Parliamentary elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. The provincial councils were elected that same day. Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the district councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, were put off until later in 2006. As an interim measure, the provincial councils chose 68 of the seats of the upper house, 34 of which are interim seats to be replaced when the district elections are held. Final results were delayed until November 12, 2005, because of the need to examine 2,000 fraud complaints. The 72 political parties registered with the Justice Ministry tried to elect candidates on a national or regional basis, but party organizations are weak relative to prominent personalities with relatively narrow followings. Karzai did not form his own formal party. Yunus Qanooni, Karzai’s main presidential election challenger, was the top figure in a loose coalition of proNorthern Alliance parliamentary candidates. Because Qanooni, Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani, and other pro-Qanooni candidates won seats in parliament, the bloc was expected to emerge as a center of opposition or criticism of Karzai in the new parliament. When the new body convened on December 18, this bloc, joined by others, selected Qanooni for speaker of the lower house over Karzai ally Abd-iRab Rasul Sayyaf. Qanooni subsequently said he would work cooperatively with Karzai; the role of “opposition leader” was subsequently taken up by Rabbani, who won a seat, although he told CRS in Kabul in March 2006 that he supports “reform” and not opposition to Karzai. The 102-seat upper house, selected by the provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution). Karzai appointed former Northern Alliance Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim to that body as a gesture of reconciliation. The leader of that body is Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, who was slightly injured in a bombing of his convoy in March 2006. More detail on the various elections are discussed in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, by Kenneth Katzman. Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition The political transition has proceeded and Karzai’s government is slowly expanding its writ, but Afghanistan continues to face challenges beyond the ongoing insurgency discussed later. Strengthening Central Government. A key part of the U.S. stabilization effort is to build the capacity of the Afghan government and keep its disparate factions working together. The cabinet inaugurated in December 2004 balanced ethnic factions but also tried to emphasize technocratic qualifications (nine have Ph.D’s) over factional allegiances. The main security ministries, Defense and Interior, were occupied by Pashtuns, which was widely seen as a move to marginalize the Northern Alliance faction. (Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a Pashtun, resigned in September 2005 purportedly because Karzai refused to remove some regional CRS-12 governors allegedly involved in corruption.) However, Karzai appointed eight Tajik ministers, including Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah. To emphasize his stated commitment to end the burgeoning narcotics trafficking problem, Karzai created a Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, headed by Habibullah Qadari. In April 2006, the new parliament began deliberations on Karzai’s proposed new cabinet (individually rather than en bloc), which his office announced on March 22, 2006. The proposed cabinet also balances Afghanistan’s ethnic factions but the the most notable proposed change was the replacement of Dr. Abdullah as Foreign Minister with a lesser known figure, Dr. Rangeen Spanta. This represents the virtual elimination of senior Northern Alliance figures in the Karzai cabinet. The United States and Afghanistan are trying to build democratic traditions at the local level. The Afghan government’s “National Solidarity Program” seeks to create local governing councils and empower them to prioritize local reconstruction projects. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected to them have been women.13 Observers in Kabul told CRS in March 2006 that the program is viewed as a success. As part of the U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration has formed the 15-person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to serve as additional advisors to the Afghan government. However, observers in Kabul say the group, now mostly focused on helping Afghanistan attract private investment, is phasing out. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, became ambassador in December 2003 and he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan government decisions.14 Ambassador Ronald Neumann replaced him in August 2005. To assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in 2004 the State Department created an Office of Afghanistan Affairs, now headed by Ambassador Maureen Quinn. As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for Karzai, the Administration has maintained a pattern of senior visits. Vice President Cheney attended Karzai’s inauguration in December 2004. In March 2005, First Lady Laura Bush visited. President Bush made his first visit on March 1, 2006. Funding Issues/Supplementals. The U.S. embassy, now housed in a new building, has expanded its personnel and facilities to help accelerate the reconstruction process. An FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided a requested $60 million for embassy Kabul operations, as well as a requested $17.1 million in non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and de-mining (NADR) funds for Karzai protection. Part of the funds were for contract security to replace U.S. marines that had guarded the compound. A requested $25 million for Kabul international airport was not 13 Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004. 14 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times, April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly a Karzai aide. CRS-13 provided,15 although the airport has now acquired equipment for instrument landing. An FY2006 supplemental request submitted February 16, 2006, asks $50 million for the State Department’s “Diplomatic and Consular Programs” for security costs of protecting U.S. facilities and personnel (provided in the House-passed and Senate version of FY2006 supplemental bill, H.R. 4939) and $16 million (FY2007 funds) for security requirements for USAID to operate in Afghanistan (not provided in the House version of H.R. 4939). Curbing Regional Strongmen. Karzai, as well as numerous private studies and U.S. official statements, cite regional and factional militias as a key threat to Afghan stability. Some of these local strongmen have been accused of past human rights abuses in a report released in July 2005 by the “Afghanistan Justice Project.16 Some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy. Others believe that easily obtained arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking profits, help to sustain the independence of local militias. Still others maintain that local militias did not interfere to any great extent in the recent Afghan elections and are not an obstacle to Afghan stability. Karzai has moved to marginalize some regional strongmen. Herat governor Ismail Khan was removed by Karzai in September 2004 and was later appointed Minister of Water and Energy. On the other hand, he was tapped by Karzai to help calm Herat after Sunni-Shiite clashes there in February 2006, clashes that some in Kabul believe were stoked by Khan himself to demonstrate his continued influence in Herat. As noted above, Dostam was appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, and in April 2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli faction. In July 2004, Karzai removed charismatic Northern Alliance commander Atta Mohammad from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area, appointing him as governor of Balkh province. Afghan parliamentarians told CRS in February 2006 that Atta had recently purged several Balkh government officials for alleged narcotics trafficking involvement. Two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad (Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts; Hazrat Ali was subsequently elected to parliament. Karzai removed Pashtun regional leader Ghul Agha Sherzai as Minister of Public Works and of Urban Development but then returned him to his prior post as governor of Qandahar, subsequently shifting him to the governorship of Nangarhar Province, east of Kabul, which has many Pashtuns. As noted above, former Defense Minister Fahim was appointed by Karzai to the upper house of parliament. The move gives him a stake in the political process and reduces his potential to activate Northern Alliance militia loyalists. Fahim has also turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces as of January 2005 (including four Scud missiles). DDR and DIAG Programs. A cornerstone of the effort to curb regionalism is a program, run by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan 15 The conference report on the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) provided $44 million for improvements to the U.S. embassy in Kabul. 16 See [http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org]. CRS-14 (UNAMA, whose mandate was extended another year by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1662 of March 23, 2006), to dismantle identified and illegal militias (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, DDR). This program is run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with participation of the United States. The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not enact mandated reforms (primarily reduction of the number of Tajiks in senior positions) by the targeted July 1, 2003, date. In September 2003, Karzai acted on the issue, replacing 22 senior Tajik Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was later dropped to just over 60,000 by Afghan officials. According to UNAMA 63,000 militia fighters identified were disarmed by the time this phase of the program ended July 8, 2005, and virtually all of those have now exercised reintegration options: training, starting small businesses, and other options. The program got a boost from the ousting of Ismail Khan as Herat governor in August 2004; he permitted many of his militiamen to enter the DDR program after his removal. Some studies have criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen in programs run by the United States and its partners.17 Part of the DDR program was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons. According to UNAMA, at least 36,000 medium and light weapons have been collected; of these, 13,400 pieces have been transferred to the ANA. In addition, about 11,000 heavy weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces) have been collected, nearly all of the heavy weapons believed controlled by militia forces. However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons have been collected and that faction leaders maintain secret caches of weapons. Since June 11, 2005, the militia disarmament effort has centered on a pool of perhaps 80,000-100,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups” — militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. However, UNAMA officials told CRS in Kabul that only “several hundred” groups (five or more fighters) are of sufficient concern to merit disarmament efforts. The program to disarm them is called the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). As of late March 2006, over 20,250 weapons had been collected from these militia fighters, according to UNAMA. Some commanders in Khost, which has sometimes been restive, agreed to disarm under the program in late March 2006. No payments are available to fighters disarmed under the program, and the program depends on persuasion and negotiation rather than direct use of force against the illegal groups. Combating Narcotics Trafficking. Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as the most significant problem facing Afghanistan. Narcotics account for about $2.7 billion in value — still nearly half of Afghanistan’s GDP, and the State 17 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament %20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf]. CRS-15 Department’s International Narcotics Strategy Report, released March 4, 2005, says that Afghanistan is “on the verge of becoming a narcotics state.” In his November 4, 2004, election victory speech and since, Karzai has called on Afghans to join a “jihad” against the opium trade, later pledging to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy fields within two years. He has also urged the Bush Administration to focus primarily on funding alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from growing, rather than on eradication or interdiction. The first evidence that some of these programs might be working was provided in a November 2005 study by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Counternarcotics Directorate; that report said that the area devoted to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had dropped 21% over the past year. However, an improved yield caused the overall opium production to decline by only 2.5%, and some are expecting a major increase in area under cultivation in 2006 because some farmers were not given the assistance promised to them in exchange for declining to grow poppies. To try to add effectiveness to the U.S. program, the U.S. military has overcome its initial reluctance to expand its mission in Afghanistan and it is now playing a greater role in attacking traffickers and their installations. The U.S. military is reportedly flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from any counter-drug operations. The Bush Administration also has taken some new legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers by indicting them and putting the legal machinery in place to have them extradited from Afghanistan if caught.18 In mid-April 2005, a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York. Another alleged Afghan trafficker, Baz Mohammad, was extradited from Afghanistan in October 2005. For a detailed discussion of the narcotics trafficking issue and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. The Bush Administration has not imposed sanctions on post-Taliban Afghanistan. It has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.19 However, the Administration also has not, to date, made a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that is required to provide more than $225 million in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan. Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation, which the U.N. International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said in February 2001 had 18 Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters, November 2, 2004. 19 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking. CRS-16 dramatically decreased cultivation.20 The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled. Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy. U.S. and Afghan officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy ravaged by war and lack of investment. U.S. economic reconstruction efforts are showing some tangible results, including roads and education and health facilities constructed. However, the United States has not met all its reconstruction targets, according to a July 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office.21 The five-year development strategy outlined in the “Afghanistan Compact” adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on Afghanistan reinforces the sectors below as priorities. ! Roads. U.S. Ambassador Neumann told CRS in February 2006 that expanding road building is a major U.S. priority to expand the writ of the Afghan government and build a viable legitimate economy. Some projects have been completed, such as the Kabul-Qandahar roadway project (Phase I, completed December 2003, and Phase II, completed November 2004). The Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, was largely completed in late 2005. U.S.-funded ($2.7 million) work began on March 15, 2005 for a road out of the Panjshir Valley. On September 27, 2005, a $20 million road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, built by U.S. military personnel, was inaugurated. A new U.S. focus is a Khowst-Gardez road and roads in Badakhshan Province. ! Education and Health. According to U.S. officials, five million Afghan children are now in school — up from only 900,000 in 2001 — and girls’ attendance is up sharply. About 525,000 girls were enrolled in school during 2005, according to UNAMA. Additional work is being conducted on school and health clinic rebuilding (278 schools and 326 clinics have been built thus far, according to Ambassador Quinn on September 22, 2005). About $152 million in U.S. funds were programmed for Afghanistan education during FY2003-FY2005 (of which $85 million was appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106). Press reports say that some projects are going uncompleted; a Washington Post report of November 20, 2005, says that of 1,000 U.S.-funded health clinics and schools to be built by the end of 2004 at a cost of $73 million, only about 150 have been completed by November 2005, mostly refurbishments of existing buildings. 20 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New York Times, February 7, 2001. 21 Numerous other examples of U.S. economic reconstruction initiatives are analyzed in a General Accounting Office (GAO) report: Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals, GAO Report GAO-05-742, July 2005. CRS-17 ! Agriculture. According to the director of the USAID mission at U.S. Embassy Kabul in December 2005, USAID has helped Afghanistan double its agricultural output over the past four years. Afghan officials say agricultural assistance and development should be a top U.S. priority as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation. ! Electricity. The Afghanistan Compact states that by 2010, the goal is for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas. The FY2006 supplemental request asks for $32 million in funds mostly for a key electricity transmission project (Northeast Transmission Project). The House-passed bill (H.R. 4939) defers $28 million for that project but provides $5 million for the Northwest Kabul Power turbine generator. The Senate version provides full funding. Funding/FY2005 Supplemental/FY2006. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) appropriated $1.086 billion in ESF out of the $2 billion requested for all civilian reconstruction projects. The conference report says the amount “assumes full funding” for health programs and provincial reconstruction team (PRTs, discussed below) expenses. Among projects not funded were refurbishment of Kabul Airport, venture capital funding, industrial park funding, higher education including costs of a new law school in Kabul, and various long-term construction projects (power plants, industrial parks, and courthouses). The FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102) contained about $630 million for civilian sector reconstruction. Of that amount, according to USAID, a total of $405.8 million is budgeted for FY2006 for the sectors discussed above (infrastructure, agriculture, health, and education). Funding for reconstruction (power projects) requested in the FY2006 supplemental is discussed above. The requested $11 million to write off Afghanistan’s debt is also deferred in the Housepassed version of H.R. 4939, but funded in the Senate version. Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices. Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban. The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, but there are also abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism and arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders, according to the State Department report on human rights practices for 2005 (released March 8, 2005).22 According to the report, “The lack of an effective police force, poor infrastructure and communications, instability, and insecurity hampered investigations of unlawful killings, bombings, or civilian deaths...” The State Department International Religious Freedom report for 2005 (released November 8, 2005) supports accounts of progress but says there continues to be discrimination against the Shiite (Hazara) minority. 22 For text, see [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61704.htm]. CRS-18 Some observers say that the government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law.23 Some have blamed the restrictions on chief justice of the Afghan Supreme Court, Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative who was appointed in late November 2001 by Rabbani (who was temporarily in charge in Kabul before Karzai took office). On October 23, 2005, Afghanistan’s Supreme Court convicted a male journalist Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s Rights” magazine) of blasphemy and sentenced him to two years in prison for his articles about apostasy. A Kabul court reduced his sentence to time served and he was freed in December 2005, easing concerns. Another human rights/religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006, at about the same time that Karzai reappointed Shinwari chief justice, although Karzai appointed eight others to the Supreme Court who are said to be more moderate. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy — his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure that the trial would undercut the new Afghan constitution’s commitment to international standards of human rights protections, President Karzai apparently prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him on March 29, 2006; he subsequently went to Italy and sought asylum there. His release came the same day the House passed H.Res. 736 calling on the Afghan government to protect Afghan converts from prosecution. U.S. programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction; many of these programs are conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial reform. The United States has trained over 500 judges, according to USAID, and it trains prosecutors and court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court. The conference report on the FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) did not specifically appropriate the requested $25 million for court administration, a law school, and other rule of law programs. An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) has been formed to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. It is headed by former Women’s Affairs minister Sima Samar. The conference report on P.L. 109-102 earmarked another $2 million for this body; it had been receiving about $5 million per year, in line with what was authorized by the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). Funding Issues. As noted above, USAID has budgeted $280 million for democracy and rule of law programs for FY2006. The funding includes support for the new parliament, civil society programs, media, and rule of law programs. 23 Shea, Nina. “Sharia in Kabul?” National Review, October 28, 2002. CRS-19 Advancement of Women.24 The government is widely considered to be promoting the advancement of women, although numerous abuses continue to be reported by the State Department, primarily resulting from Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. The first major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights. That ministry involved more Afghan women in business ventures, and it has promoted interpretations of the Quran that favor participation of women in national affairs. Three ministers in the 2004-2006 cabinet are women: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal is Minister of Women’s Affairs; Sediqa Balkhi is Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled; and Amina Afzali is Minister of Youth. However, there is only one (Minister of Women’s Affairs Soraya Sobhrang) in the new cabinet proposed in March 2006. In March 2005 Karzai appointed a former Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted above, the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament, and several prominent women have won seats in the new parliament, including some who would have won even if there were no set-aside for women. Three women are in the cabinet. Women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, 25 including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. The Administration and Congress are taking a continued interest in the treatment of women in Afghanistan, and U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights. After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women. Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs. Funding Issues. Recent congressional action includes the following: ! On November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the Office of the President a $40 billion Emergency Response Fund to 24 See also CRS Report RS21865, Assistance to Afghan and Iraqi Women: Issues for Congress, by Febe Armanios and Rhoda Margesson. 25 Amanpour, Christiane. CNN special report on Afghanistan. Broadcast November 2, 2003. CRS-20 respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks)26 to fund educational and health programs for Afghan women and children. ! The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per year, for FY2003-2006, for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. ! The FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) appropriated $60 million for programs to assist Afghan women and girls, and expresses the sense of Congress that the United States seek (in Afghanistan and Iraq) to promote high level participation of women in legislative bodies and ministries and ensure their rights in new institutions. ! The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation, P.L. 108-447, provides $50 million for Afghan women and girls, of which $7.5 million is to go to small grants to women’s businesses. Another $6 million is appropriated in that law for maternal and child health care in Afghanistan. The conference report on P.L. 109-13, an FY2005 supplemental, recommends $5 million be used for women’s organizations’ capacity building. ! The conference report on the FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102 recommends $50 million in funding for programs benefitting women and girls, including $7.5 million to train and equip Afghan women-run NGOs. Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building The top security priority of the Administration has been to prevent Al Qaeda from regrouping there and to reduce security threats to the Afghan government. The pillars of the U.S. security effort are (1) combat operations by U.S. and other coalition forces in Afghanistan; (2) peacekeeping by a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) U.S. and NATO expansion of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs); and (4) the equipping and training of an Afghan National Army and a police force. Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 18,000 troops in Afghanistan. In conjunction with the assumption of greater NATO/ISAF responsibility, U.S. force levels in Afghanistan will drop to about 16,500 in 2006, according to U.S. officials. Nineteen coalition countries are contributing another approximately 2,000 combat troops to OEF. These include forces from Britain (several hundred); Australia (300); France (200, as well as French combat aircraft flying strikes from Bagram air base north of Kabul, Tajikistan, and Qatar); Romania; Canada; the Netherlands; Italy; New Zealand; and Germany. Additional assistance 26 For more information on how the appropriated funds were distributed and used, see CRS Report RL31173, Combating Terrorism: First Emergency Supplemental AppropriationsDistribution of Funds to Departments and Agencies, by James R. Riehl. CRS-21 comes from Japanese naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea. The commander of U.S.-led combat forces in Afghanistan is Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry (as of May 3, 2005, replacing Lt. Gen David Barno), who heads the “Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A),” headquartered at Camp Eggers, near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The operational commander is Maj. Gen. Jason Kamiya. U.S. forces along with Afghan troops continue on the offensive against insurgents, although the frequency and intensity of such missions appears to be diminishing as insurgent tactics have shifted somewhat to greater use of suicide attacks rather than small-unit operations. The United States and Afghanistan conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche,” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar; “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan (October 2005). U.S. commanders believe that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, is defeating the insurgency, although insurgents attacks escalated somewhat after April 2005. Since then, Taliban and Hikmatyar insurgents, apparently mimicking suicide and roadside bombing tactics used in the Iraq insurgency, have stepped up their operations in Afghanistan and threaten to increase attacks when the mountain snows melt and roads open up in spring 2006. Some believe the insurgents will also step up attacks on the NATO countries assuming greater responsibility in the south, as discussed below. Afghan, U.S., and UNAMA officials, in conversations with CRS in Kabul in February 2006, attributed the stepped-up attacks to a reinforcement of the Taliban insurgents by Al Qaeda militants who cross the border from Pakistan. Recent insurgent attacks have focused on aid workers, U.S. and Afghan soldiers and police, Afghan teachers whose classes contain girls, pro-Karzai clerics, and politicians. Seven parliamentary candidates were assassinated during the campaign. Of the most significant recent terrorist-type attacks, on June 1, 2005, a mosque in Qandahar was bombed, killing 40 Afghans, including Kabul’s police chief. On September 28, 2005, a suicide bomber killed nine Afghan soldiers. A suicide bomber killed ten Afghans at a provincial market in Uruzgan province, not far from where Ambassador Neumann was meeting. Two Swedish international peacekeepers (ISAF, see below) were killed in the normally quiet city of Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2005. The Taliban insurgent command structure apparently is still intact. As noted above, Mullah Umar remains active. Some top aides have been captured, but others, such as Jalaludin Haqqani (who some believe heads a completely separate insurgent faction), Mullah Akhtar Usmani, and Mullah Dadullah are still at large. In addition, in April 2005 Taliban remnants started a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” suggesting the movement still has substantial resources. On the other hand, in early October 2005, Pakistan arrested and subsequently extradited to Afghanistan the Taliban’s chief “spokesman,” Abdul Latif Hakimi. Some experts believe that Taliban and other insurgents have incited recent riots against the United States and NATO-led forces. Such riots took place in January and CRS-22 February 2006 over the Danish publication of cartoons unflatteringly depicting the Prophet Mohammad. In one such demonstration on February 21, Afghan students demonstrating in Jalalabad shouted support for Osama bin Laden. Several Taliban militants have renounced their past and joined the political process under Karzai’s offers of amnesty. According to press reports, about 50-60 militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the reconciliation process, headed by Mojadeddi. In January 2005, U.S. forces in Afghanistan released 81 detained Taliban fighters at Karzai’s request. Another Taliban figure, its former ambassador to Pakistan, was released by U.S. forces in September 2005. As noted above, several Taliban figures, including its foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, ran in the parliamentary elections. Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would not be eligible for amnesty. The Hunt for Al Qaeda and Other Militants. U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan) continue to hunt for bin Laden and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001.27 The two are now widely believed to be on Pakistan’s side of the border. Another target of OEF is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization,” but it is included in the section on “other terrorist groups” in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004, released April 2005. Some accounts suggest that a Special Operations team ambushed in June 2005 might have searching for Hikmatyar; a U.S. helicopter sent to rescue the team was apparently shot down, killing the 16 aboard. Longer Term U.S. Military Presence. Even if the Taliban insurgency is defeated completely, it appears that the United States will maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan, an outcome that Afghan leaders say they want. President Karzai told visiting Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on April 13, 2005, that Afghanistan would ask President Bush for a long-term security pact with the United States that might include permanent bases, although Rumsfeld reportedly was non-committal. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a national consultation in Kabul on the proposal to allow permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan; delegates reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai his requested increased control over facilities used by the U.S. forces, over 27 For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman. CRS-23 U.S. operations, or over the disposition of prisoners taken in the course of operations. Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that are used in support of OEF, and numbers of troops in surrounding countries (as of November 2005, according to Defense Department figures provided to CRS), include the following. 28 ! Bagram Air Base. This base, north of Kabul, is the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.28 About 500 U.S. military personnel are based there. Bagram, along with thirteen other airfields in Afghanistan, handles the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in the country and substantial infrastructure is being added to it. A hospital is being constructed on the facility; one of the first permanent structures to be built there. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides a total of about $52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center. The Senate version of H.R. 4939, the FY2006 supplemental appropriation, does not fully fund the Administration request for funds for construction at Bagram because NATO will be using it in conjunction with increased NATO security responsibilities in Afghanistan, and the Senate Appropriations Committee first wants to see a plan for NATO to share costs there. ! Qandahar Airfield. This airfield, just outside Qandahar, bases about 500 U.S. military personnel. The FY2005 supplemental provides $16 million for an ammunition supply facility at Qandahar. ! Shindand Air Base. This base is 20 miles from the Iranian border. It has been used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, whose forces controlled the facility. ! Karshi-Khanabad Airbase. This Uzbekistan base housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) in supply missions to Afghanistan. In July 2005, following U.S. criticism of the May 2005 crackdown on unrest in the city of Andijon, Uzbekistan formally demanded that the United States discontinue use of the base within six months. U.S. forces have ceased using it. ! Peter Ganci Base. This base at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan has about 1,100 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President Askar Akayev, but Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Rice reportedly received assurances about continued U.S. use of the base during their visits to Kyrgyzstan in July 2005 and October 2005, respectively. However, Harris, Kent. “Buildings Going Up at Bagram Air Base as U.S. Forces Dig In for the Long Haul.” Stars and Stripes, March 15, 2005. CRS-24 in February 2006, Kyrgyzstan’s president Kurmanbek Bakiyev said the United States should pay $200 million per year to use the facility instead of the $2 million it now pays. ! Persian Gulf Bases. Several bases in the Persian Gulf are used to support the Afghanistan mission, including Al Dhafra in the UAE (about 1,800 U.S. military personnel in UAE) and Al Udeid in Qatar (10,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar). P.L. 109-13 appropriates $1.4 million to upgrade Al Dhafra. Military facilities in Bahrain house U.S. naval command headquarters from which CENTCOM, along with several partner countries reporting to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, patrol the Arabian Sea to prevent the movement of Al Qaeda and other militants, as well as contraband such as narcotics, across those waters. (About 5,100 U.S. military personnel are in Bahrain.) ! Incirlik Air Base. On April 21, 2005, Turkey said it would extend for another year an agreement allowing the United States to use Incirlik air base to supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. (About 2,100 U.S. military personnel are in Turkey.) OEF Costs and Casualties. As of April 4, 2006, 279 U.S. military personnel have been killed in OEF, of which 222 (plus one DOD civilian) have died in or around Afghanistan. In 2005, 90 U.S. soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, double the 2004 number. The others died in other theaters of the war, such as in Africa and the Middle East. No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be relatively stable at about $900 million per month. Supplemental FY2005 funds for Afghanistan combat were provided in P.L. 108-287 and P.L. 109-13, and additional military operations funds were requested in the FY2006 supplemental request. For information on U.S. military costs and funding requests for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Enhanced Base Security Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco. International Security Force (ISAF)/NATO.29 In 2006, international forces will be assuming from the United States a greater share of the security burden, although other NATO nations see their role primarily as peacekeeping and promoting reconstruction. The Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) created an international peacekeeping force for Afghanistan: the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).30 ISAF was initially limited to Kabul but broadened with NATO’s takeover of command of ISAF (August 2003) and NATO/ISAF’s assumption of control over additional provincial 29 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF. 30 Its mandate was extended on September 13, 2005, until October 2006 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623). CRS-25 reconstruction teams (PRTs) in northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1 in 2004 and Stage 2 in 2005, respectively).31 That process will continue in 2006 as NATO/ISAF takes over additional PRTs and, along with that, some of the combat mission, in southern Afghanistan (by July 2006). As part of this Stage 3, a British/Canadian/Dutch-led 6,000 person “Regional Command South” will be formed, with U.S. participation (and U.S. forces serving under NATO/ISAF command). The new command was held up over opposition in the Dutch parliament to their country’s deployment, but the parliament voted on February 3, 2006, to permit the move. In conjunction with the restructuring, NATO/ISAF force levels will increase to about 15,000, from the current level of about 12,000. NATO is expected to announce a timetable for the NATO/ISAF takeover of eastern Afghanistan (Stage 4) at the NATO summit in November 2006. U.S. military officials in Kabul told CRS in February 2006 that once the transition is completed, OEF might technically cease and CFC-A might close. (During 2002-2004, ISAF’s force was about 6,400 troops from all 26 NATO countries, plus 10 non-NATO nations.) Table 7 lists each contributing country to ISAF and the approximate number of forces contributed. The expansion agreement represents a quieting of the initial opposition of European NATO nations to mixing reconstruction-related peacekeeping with antiinsurgent combat. The differences began to resolve in late 2005 when NATO agreed on a formula under which a deputy commander of ISAF would be “dual-hatted” — commanding the OEF combat mission as well reporting to the ISAF command structure. In December 2005, NATO adopted rules of engagement that will allow NATO/ISAF forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as aggressively as the combat conducted by the U.S.-led OEF forces. The United States currently contributes a small amount of force to ISAF (89 troops), primarily to coordinate U.S. assistance to ISAF. The core of NATO/ISAF is the Kabul Multinational Brigade (4,400 personnel), which was headed by Canada until August 2004, then by the “Eurocorps,” a rapid response force composed of forces from France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Turkey took over the lead force role in February 2005, and Italy became lead in August 2005. The overall commander of ISAF in Afghanistan is Italian Gen. Mauro Del Vecchio. Britain is slated to take over the lead (“ISAF 9") in May 2006 as head of an “Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.” At the headquarters level, there are 600 personnel from 15 contributing nations. ISAF coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul International Airport (where Dutch combat aircraft also are located). U.S. officials have tried to reassure Afghan leaders that U.S. forces will still be operating in sectors controlled by NATO/ISAF and available to conduct combat 31 In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003) formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul. CRS-26 missions. One source of the official Afghan nervousness about the transition is that NATO has had chronic personnel and equipment shortages for the Afghanistan mission. Those shortages eased somewhat in December 2003 when NATO identified additional equipment for ISAF operations, including 12 helicopters from Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey; and aircraft and infantry from various nations. Britain will be bringing additional equipment, including Apache attack helicopters, when it becomes lead force in NATO/ISAF in 2006, and the Netherlands will be deploying additional Apache helicopter and F-16 aircraft to help protect its forces in the south. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). NATO/ISAF expansion in Afghanistan builds on a U.S. initiative to use its military presence to promote reconstruction. That effort, inaugurated in December 2002, is the establishment of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) — military-run enclaves that provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs focus mostly on counter-insurgency. Each U.S.-run PRT is composed of U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. Many U.S. PRTs in restive regions are “co-located” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops. Plans are to eventually establish PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.32 However, other relief groups do not want to associate with any military force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Partner countries now run eleven PRTs, but that will increase to 13 in conjunction with the formation of the “Regional Command South.” Some other countries, including Turkey, are considering taking over other PRTs, and U.S. officials in Kabul told CRS in February 2006 that there is a move to turn over the lead in the PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or USAID officials. That process began in early 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-run PRT in the Panjshir Valley. In August 2005, in preparation for the NATO/ISAF move into the south, Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. Canada will eventually have about 2,200 troops at that PRT under the transition plan. The Netherlands is to take over the PRT at Tarin Kowt, capital of restive Uruzgan Province, home province of Mullah Umar. It will have about 1,700 troops there, an addition of about 1,100 from current levels in Afghanistan. The ongoing violence in Uruzgan is what caused the Dutch parliament to balk at the depolyment. British forces will take over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province, sending about 3,000 forces there, a major increase over its approximately 500 troops now in northern Afghanistan. As 32 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003. CRS-27 noted above, Italy (with Spain), through their PRTs, now have primary control for western Afghanistan. Germany (with Turkey and France) is taking over the PRTs and the leadership role in the north from Britain as Britain deploys to the south. The list of existing PRTs is shown in Table 8. (One U.S.-run PRT is under NATO auspices.) U.S. funds support PRT reconstruction projects. USAID spent about $98 million on PRTs (and DDR operations) in FY2005. USAID has allocated $37 million for these operations in FY2006. Afghan National Army (ANA). U.S. forces (“Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan,” OSC-A), in partnership with French, British, and other forces, are training the new ANA. As of February 2006, the ANA numbers about 29,000 troops in 40 battalions, (5 Corps) of which 24 are combat battalions. That is close to half its total target strength of 70,000 that it is expected to reach by 2010. The target level was reiterated in the Afghanistan Compact adopted in London on February 1, 2006. U.S. officers in Afghanistan say the ANA is beginning to become a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city. In December 2005, Gen. Eikenberry highlighted the fact that the ANA had deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. The United States has built four regional bases for the ANA, in Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers. Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. A June 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office cites progress but also notes problems such as ANA equipment shortages.33 There have been personnel problems that likely continue as well. At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better pay and more involvement by U.S. Special Forces, as well as the appointment of additional Pashtuns in senior Defense Ministry positions.34 The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns. To provide ethnic balance, the chief of staff is Gen. Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander; Khan visited the United States in October 2005. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Fully trained recruits are paid about $70 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that 33 Government Accountability Office Report GAO-05-575. “Afghanistan Security.” June 2005. Available at [http://www.gao.gov]. 34 Gall, Carlotta. “In a Remote Corner, an Afghan Army Evolves From Fantasy to Slightly Ragged Reality,” New York Times, January 25, 2003. CRS-28 ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking. An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. Russia overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain. In May 2005, representatives of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said the United States is considering obtaining for Afghanistan additional transport planes and helicopters, although the equipment might not necessarily be U.S. equipment, according to DSCA. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. ANA Armament. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the ANA, according to U.S. commanders and outside observers. Thus far, weaponry for the ANA has come primarily from Defense Ministry weapons stocks — with the concurrence of former Defense Minister Fahim who controlled those stocks — from international donors, primarily from the former East bloc35 and from the DDR program discussed above. In October 2005, Russia announced it would give the ANA four helicopters and other non-lethal military aid and equipment; it has already provided about $100 million in military aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan. In May 2005, Egypt delivered 16,000 weapons to the ANA. According to a GAO report of June 2005, the United States drew down $287 million worth of defense articles (including M-113 armored personnel carriers) and services for the ANA during FY2002-FY2004, plus $11 million worth of military trucks and armored personnel vehicles. On June 16, 2005, the President authorized an additional draw-down of $161.5 million. In FY2006, Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Afghan National Police. Some Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important as building the ANA. Some Afghans do not believe the ANA should have a role in maintaining internal security, and that this should be the role of the police. The United States and Germany are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force. The U.S. effort has been led by State Department/INL, primarily through a contract with DynCorp, but the Defense Department is beginning to play a role in that effort, particularly in “police reform.” About 62,000 ANP are on duty, including 3,000 in training, approximately the target size of the force. They are trained by the United States and Germany (senior levels). There are seven police training centers around Afghanistan, which includes training in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts. However, the ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local factional or ethnic disputes. The June 2005 GAO report, cited above, notes 35 Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July 22, 2003. CRS-29 progress and continued problems, including the continued influence of local leaders on the national police. The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces (which are included in the figures cited above). Security Forces Funding. According to the June 2005 GAO report, the United States provided about $4.1 billion during FY2002-FY2005 to support the ANA and ANP. U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover ANA salaries. ($20 million in such funds was provided in FY2004; $23.8 million will be provided for FY2005, and $18 million for FY2006). In recent appropriations, ! An FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) provided $287 million in foreign military financing (FMF) to accelerate ANA development. ! The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) earmarked $400 million in FMF for the ANA. An FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided $1.285 billion in DOD funding to train and equip the ANA and ANP. (The account shifted to DOD funds instead of assistance funds controlled by the State Department.) Of that amount, $290 million is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already obligated to train and equip the Afghan forces. ! The regular FY2006 appropriation (P.L. 109-102) provides $235 million for INL Afghanistan operations (including narcotics-related), meaning the Administration request for about $60 million to train the ANP is almost fully funded. ! The FY2006 supplemental requested in February 2006 asks $2.197 billion in additional DOD funding to equip and train the Afghan security forces, including ANA and ANP. The House-passed FY2006 supplemental (H.R. 4939) provides $1.851 billion for this purpose but withholds $346 million for construction of police facilities. The Senate version provides $1.908 billion for this purpose. ! International donors have furnished $120 million in cash for the ANP and provided another $126 million in equipment and training. CRS-30 Table 1. Major Security-Related Indicators (April 2006) Force current level target level U.S. Forces (OEF) 18,000 16,500 (June 2006) OEF Partner Forces 2,000 no announced change NATO/ISAF 12,000 15,000 (July 2006) Afghan National Army (ANA) 29,000 70,000 (2010) Afghan National Police (ANP) 62,000 (including 3,000 in training) 62,000 Legally Armed Fighters 0 (Disarmed by DDR program by June 2005) 0 DIAG/Weapons Collected from Illegal Armed Groups “Several hundred” significant illegal groups (five or more fighters) remain, but 20,250 weapons collected thus far goal is no remaining illegal groups by 2010 Security Forces Funding $1.685 billion (FY2005 regular $2.197 FY2006 supplemental and supplemental) request plus $60 million in regular FY2006 appropriation for ANP training Regional Context Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) on December 23, 2002. Pakistan36 Afghan officials are trying to normalize relations with Pakistan, but relations were set back in March 2006 when Afghan leaders openly asserted that Pakistan has failed to prevent Taliban remnants from operating there. Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf retorted that Afghanistan’s information on Taliban suspects operating in Pakistan is old and unreliable. Some Afghan leaders continue to resent Pakistan because it was the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power, viewing it as an instrument with which to build an Afghan central government strong enough to prevent fragmentation of Afghanistan while at the same time sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival India. Afghan officials say that officials in Pakistan’s military and security services continue to harbor ambitions of returning the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. Pakistan was one of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 36 For further discussion, see Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.” Foreign Affairs, November-December 1999. CRS-31 are the others) to formally recognize it as the legitimate government. Pakistan publicly ended its support for the Taliban in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. For its part, Pakistan is wary that any Afghan government might fall under the influence of India, which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents. Pakistan says it is too difficult to distinguish Afghan Taliban from Pakistani nationals. On July 19, 2005, Pakistan arrested five suspected senior Taliban leaders, including a deputy to Mullah Umar, and, as noted above, in October 2005 it arrested and turned over to Afghanistan Taliban spokesman Hakimi. The United States has praised Pakistan for its efforts against Al Qaeda. After the September 11 attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Pakistan also has arrested over 550 Al Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh September 11, 2002; top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and most recently a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). A U.S. Predator drone-launched January 13, 2006, strike on Damadola village in Pakistan targeted Zawahiri, according to U.S. officials, but his subsequent video appearance proved that the strike did not succeed. It also caused anti-U.S. demonstrations in Pakistan because some civilians apparently were killed in the strike; press sources say up to four Al Qaeda militants were hit in it. Following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against President Musharraf, Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other indirect support. Pakistan now has approximately 74,000 forces poised near the north Waziristan area of Pakistan, and the U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that it is training Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.37 Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition). As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan. 37 Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” New York Times, April 27, 2005. CRS-32 Iran Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iranian firms are also profiting from reconstruction work in western Afghanistan, in some cases to the detriment of Afghan firms. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, although it did not arrest him. Since then, the Bush Administration criticism of Iranian “meddling” has lessened as the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance has been marginalized in the government. For his part, Karzai has said that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan. Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan in September 2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the Shindand air base.38 Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society. Even though Iran’s position in Afghanistan has waned since 2004, it is still greatly enhanced from the time of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition,39 and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran has confirmed that it offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. India The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the reverse of those of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Afghanistan from providing “strategic depth” to Pakistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s. According to Indian officials, Pakistan wants to have the option of installing another pro-Pakistan government there.40 India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts 38 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2004. 39 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15, 1997. 40 These views were expressed by Indian officials during a visit to India in December 2004. CRS-33 of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India. India is currently considering co-financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan. In other signs of cooperation, in January 2005 India, among other joint projects announced, promised to help Afghanistan’s struggling Ariana national airline and it has begun India Air flights between Delhi and Kabul. It has also renovated the well known Habibia High School in Kabul and committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. Russia, Central Asian States, and China Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF. Russia. During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.41 Russia, which is also still stung by its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, apparently views Northern Alliance figures as instruments with which to rebuild Russian influence in Afghanistan. In October 2005, Russia announced it would supply the ANA with helicopters. Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, more recently Russia has sought to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn alKhattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only government in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed. Central Asian States. During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.42 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.43 41 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998. 42 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000. 43 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, pp. 14, 92. CRS-34 These countries generally supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban; Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that Alliance, as discussed above. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group issued a statement in early July 2005, reiterated by a top official of the group in October 2005, that the United States should set a timetable for ending its military presence in Central Asia. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their pledges of facility support to OEF. (Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.) In July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see below). The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No OEF forces have been based in Turkmenistan. China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition, China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China. Saudi Arabia During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but IranianSaudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, CRS-35 but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that he could become a rallying point for opposition to the regime. According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized. U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan Afghanistan’s economy and society are reemerging after decades of warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. In addition to 3.6 million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war44 another 500,000 Afghans were displaced internally before U.S. military action began, according to Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001, report. Since January 2002, more than 3.5 million Afghan refugees have returned. Despite robust economic growth since the war ended, the return of some international investors, and new construction such as the Serena luxury hotel that opened in November 2005, the Afghan government lacks large revenue sources, and international donors, U.N. agencies, and NGOs are required to provide international assistance to Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government — monies were provided through recognized NGOs and relief organizations. Between 1985-1994, the United States did have a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was distributed in Afghanistan via U.S. aid workers in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering a cross-border program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in late 2001. Post-Taliban U.S. Aid Totals. Since the beginning of FY2002 (which began just before Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in October 2001) — and including funds appropriated in the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriation — the United States has provided $3.793 billion in civilian-related reconstruction and other 44 About 1.5 million Afghan refugees were in Iran; 2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia; 17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states. CRS-36 civilian assistance, and $4.416 billion in military/security-related assistance. This latter category is defined as funds for training and equipping the ANA and ANP, counter-narcotics operations, Karzai protection, and de-mining/anti-terrorism. Table 2 breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program, and the other tables cover FY2003FY2005. A history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998) is in Table 6.45 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments. A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized U.S. aid. The total authorization, for all categories for all years, is over $3.7 billion. For the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations. However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated. ISAF expansion has been funded by contributing nations, not U.S. appropriations. It authorized the following: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006); $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005); $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY20032006 to the National Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan); $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for FY2003-FY2006); $300 million for an Enterprise Fund; $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand ISAF if such an expansion takes place. A subsequent bill (S. 2845, P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), that implemented the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contains a subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction — an amendment to the report required in the original law; (2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. 45 In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured. The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency Response Fund. CRS-37 The law also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and new initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking. The law did not specify dollar amount authorizations for FY2005 and FY2006. FY2006 Regular and FY2006 Supplemental. For FY2006, the Administration requested a total of $920 million in regular appropriations for Afghanistan, as follows: ! ! ! ! ! ! $43 million for child survival and health $430 million in Economic Support Funds $260 million for State Department counter-narcotics $18 million for Karzai protection (NADR) $18 million for peacekeeping operations $150 million for Development Assistance (DA). The conference report on H.R. 3057 appropriates $931.4 million, more than fully funding the Administration request. According to State Department budget documents, approximately these amounts are being provided for each category of aid to Afghanistan. FY2006 Supplemental. As noted above, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan said in a press interview in December 2005 that the FY2006 funds appropriated — of which about $630 million are for civilian reconstruction — are insufficient to accomplish U.S. goals. To address continuing needs, on February 16, 2006, the Administration submitted a supplemental FY2006 request, including about $2.5 billion in funds for Afghanistan activities as follows: ! As noted, $2.197 billion in Department of Defense funds for an “Afghan Security Forces Fund” to continue the effort to equip and train the ANA and ANP. The House-passed H.R. 4939 provides $1.851 billion, deferring $346 million in police facilities construction, whereas the Senate version provides $1.908 billion; ! $192.8 million in Defense Department funds for U.S. military assistance to U.S. and Afghan counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The House-passed H.R. 4939 provides $156.8 million; the Senate version provides $102.9 million; ! $43 million in ESF for Afghanistan, including $11 million for the subsidy cost to forgive the $108 million in Afghan debt to the United States and $32 million for emergency power sector projects needed for a larger “Northeast Transmission Project” that will supply electricity to Kabul and other northern cities and reduce Afghanistan’s need to import diesel fuel. The House-passed H.R. 4939 provides $5 million for Kabul power generation. The Senate version provides the full $43 million requested, but earmarks $5 million of the electricity funding for agriculture development; CRS-38 ! $16 million for FY2007 security requirements for USAID to operate in Afghanistan (deferred by H.R. 4939); ! $3.4 million in “Migration and Refugee Assistance” to support shelter for Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan. The House version of H.R. 4939 funds the request while the Senate version provides $7.4 million, more than requested; and ! $50 million for the State Department’s “Diplomatic and Consular Programs” for security costs of protecting U.S. facilities and personnel (provided by both versions of H.R. 4939). FY2007. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizes funding through FY2006. On December 2, 2005, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ron Neumann signed an agreement with the Afghan Finance Minister under which the United States pledges to provide Afghanistan with $5.5 billion in aid over the next five years. The U.S. aid plan is reportedly programmed for education, health care, and economic and democratic development. It is not clear whether the purported figures include funding for the ANA, the national police, counter-narcotics, and other securityrelated programs. On February 6, 2006, the Administration released its budget for FY2007, which included a request for the following for Afghanistan: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! $42.8 million for Child Survival and Health (CSH); $150 million in Development Assistance (DA); $610 million in ESF (an increase of about $190 million over what is being provided in ESF for FY2006); $297 million for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for counter-narcotics operations (an increase of about $60 million over what is being provided for FY2006); $1.2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET); no funds specifically requested for Karzai protection (NADR) or Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and a total request of about $1.1 billion, in line with the Administration pledge at the February 1, 2006, “London Conference.” Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance. Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, and another $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. These funds were used for currency stabilization; mostly gold held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Together with its allies, over $350 million in frozen funds were released to the Afghan government. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has made available total investment credits of $100 million. The United States also successfully pressed the International Air Transport Association to pay Afghanistan $20 million in overflight fees that were withheld because of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban. CRS-39 World Bank/Asian Development Bank. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance, and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90 million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan. In December 2004, the Bank approved an additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections of the road system. International Reconstruction Pledges. Afghan leaders said that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. At donors conferences in 2002 (Tokyo), Berlin (April 2004), and Kabul (April 2005), about $9.5 billion in non-U.S. contributions were pledged. However, only about half has been received as of January 2006. At the London conference in February 2006, another $6 billion (non-U.S.) in pledges was made for the next five years. Of the new pledges, Britain pledged about $900 million. The London conference also leaned toward the view of Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be channeled through the Afghan government rather than directly by the donor community. In exchange, the Afghan government is promising greater financial transparency and international (United Nations) oversight to ensure that international contributions are used wisely and effectively. The government is trying to generate a growing portion of its budget domestically. In concert with efforts to weaken regional leaders and force customs revenue to be remitted to the central government, Kabul now raises domestically over one-third of its $600 million annual budget. Karzai also has sought to reassure international donors by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Promoting Long-Term Economic Development. In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian problems, the United States has tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over the long term. During 1996-98, the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), which is now estimated to cost $3.7 billion to construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.46 The deterioration in 46 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably (continued...) CRS-40 U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, and all three continued to express support for the project at a February 2006 meeting of their oil ministers, although financing for the project is unclear. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan. Afghanistan’s prospects also appeared to brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-sufficient in energy and possibly able to provided some exports to its neighbors. Some Afghan leaders believe the government needs to better develop other resources such as copper and coal mines that have gone unused. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO Membership. The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound. Following a meeting with Karzai on June 15, 2004, President Bush announced the United States and Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan. Residual Issues From Past Conflicts A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict. Stinger Retrieval. Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.47 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and 46 (...continued) receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3. 47 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001. CRS-41 presumably pose less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold to terrorists for use against civilian airliners. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.48 In late January 2005, the Afghan intelligence service began a new push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.49 In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers. The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.50 It was a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s have been discovered in Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces, most recently in December 2002. Mine Eradication. Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates by outside organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by land mines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002 (Table 2), the U.S. de-mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%. 48 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002. 49 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005. 50 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999. CRS-42 Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 ($ in millions) U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and USAID Food For Peace (FFP), via World Food Program(WFP) State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) via UNHCR and ICRC State Department/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) State Department/HDP (Humanitarian Demining Program) Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (through various NGOs) FY2000 FY2001 42.0 worth of wheat (100,000 metric tons under “416(b)” program. 16.95 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and to assist their repatriation 7.0 to various NGOs to aid Afghans inside Afghanistan 68.875 for 165,000 metric tons. (60,000 tons for May 2000 drought relief) 131.0 (300,000 metric tons under P.L.480, Title II, and 416(b)) 198.12 (for food commodities) 14.03 for the same purposes 22.03 for similar purposes 136.54 (to U.N. agencies) 6.68 for drought relief and health, water, and sanitation programs 3.0 18.934 for similar programs 113.36 (to various U.N. agencies and NGOs) 2.8 7.0 to Halo Trust/other demining 2.615 5.44 (2.789 for health, training Afghan females in Pakistan 6.169, of which $3.82 went to similar purposes Counter-Narcotics USAID/ Office of Transition Initiatives Dept. of Defense 5.31 for similar purposes 1.50 0.45 (Afghan women in Pakistan) Foreign Military Financing Anti-Terrorism Economic Support Funds (E.S.F) Peacekeeping Totals FY2002 (Final) FY1999 76.6 113.2 182.6 63.0 24.35 for broadcasting/ media 50.9 ( 2.4 million rations) 57.0 (for Afghan national army) 36.4 105.2 24.0 815.9 CRS-43 Table 3. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003 ($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 2) From the FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7) Development/Health 90 Food Aid 47 Peacekeeping 10 Disaster Relief 94 ESF 50 Non-Proliferation, Demining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR) 5 Refugee Relief 55 Military aid 21 Total from this law: 372 From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11) Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road) 100 PRTs (ESF) 10 Afghan government support (ESF) 57 Military Aid (FMF) (to train Afghan national army) Anti-terrorism/de-mining (NADR) 170 28 Total from this law: 365 Total for FY2003 737 CRS-44 Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 ($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables) From the FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR program) 30 Support to Afghan government 70 Elections/governance 69 Roads 181 Schools/Education 95 Health Services/Clinics 49 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 58 Private Sector/Power Generation 95 Water Projects 23 Counter-narcotics/police training (INCLE) 220 Afghan National Army (FMF) 364 Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection (NADR) Total from this law: 64 1,320 From the FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199) Development/Health 171 Disaster Relief 35 Refugee Relief 72 Afghan women (ESF) 5 Judicial reform commission (ESF) 2 Reforestation (ESF) 2 Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF) 2 Other reconstruction (ESF) 64 Military Assistance 50 Total from this law: Total for FY2004 403 1,723 CRS-45 Table 5. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 ($ in millions) From the FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447) Assistance to Afghan governing institutions (ESF) 225 Train and Equip ANA (FMF) 400 Assistance to benefit women and girls Agriculture, private sector investment, environment, primary education, reproductive health, and democracy-building 50 300 Reforestation 2 Child and maternal health 6 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 2 Total from this law 985 From Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13) DOD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces DOD counter-narcotics operations Reconstruction and democracy and governance, including alternative livelihoods (ESF) 1,285 242 1,086 Counter-narcotics (INCLE) 260 Karzi protection (NADR funds) 17.1 Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), mostly for counter-narcotics 34 DEA operations in Afghanistan 7.7 Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul 60 Total from this law 2,992 Total from all FY2005 laws 3,976 CRS-46 Table 6. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 ($ in millions) Fiscal Year Devel. Assist. Econ. Supp. (ESF) P.L. 480 (Title I and II) Other (Incl. Regional Military Refugee Aid) 1978 4.989 — 5.742 0.269 0.789 11.789 1979 3.074 — 7.195 — 0.347 10.616 1980 — (Soviet invasion - December 1979) — — 1981 — — — — — — 1982 — — — — — — 1983 — — — — — — 1984 — — — — — — 1985 3.369 — — — — 3.369 1986 — — 8.9 — — 8.9 1987 17.8 12.1 2.6 — — 32.5 1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 — — 74.9 1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 — — 77.6 1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 — — 88.1 1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 — — 80.1 1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 — — 81.4 1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 — 30.2 68.2 1994 3.4 2.0 9.0 — 27.9 42.3 1995 1.8 — 12.4 — 31.6 45.8 1996 — — 16.1 — 26.4 42.5 1997 — — 18.0 — 31.9a 49.9 1998 — — 3.6 — 49.14b 52.74 Total Source: U.S. Department of State. a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics. b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for counternarcotics. CRS-47 Table 7. ISAF Contributing Nations (as of March 2006) NATO Countries Non-NATO Partner Nations Belgium 616 Albania 22 Bulgaria 37 Austria 3 Canada 2,200 Czech Republic 17 Denmark 122 Estonia 10 France 742 Germany 2,200 Azerbaijan Croatia 22 45 Finland 61 Macedonia 20 Ireland 10 Sweden 85 Greece 171 Switzerland 4 Hungary 159 New Zealand 5 Iceland 20 Italy 9 Lithuania 9 Luxemburg 10 Netherlands 600 (increasing to 1,700) Poland 313 5 Portugal 21 Romania 72 Slovakia 16 Slovenia 27 Spain Turkey United Kingdom United States 12,528 2,100 Latvia Norway Total ISAF force 1,400 825 461 (to increase to about 2,000) 89 Note: See NATO’s Afghanistan page at [http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan]. CRS-48 Table 8. Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRT Location Province Lead Force/Country Gardez Paktia U.S. Ghazni Ghazni U.S. Parwan Parwan U.S./South Korea Jalalabad Nangarhar U.S. Khost Khost U.S. Qalat Zabol U.S. Asadabad Kunar U.S. Tarin Kowt Uruzgan U.S. (Netherlands to assume in mid-2006, with by 200 Australian forces) Lashkar Gah Helmand U.S. (Britain to assume) Sharana Paktika U.S. Mehtarlam Laghman U.S. Meydan Shahr Wardak U.S. (Turkey may assume) Jabal o-Saraj Panjshir Province U.S. (State Department lead) Nuristan Nuristan U.S. NATO/ISAF and Partner-Run PRTs Qandahar Qandahar (as of 9/05) NATO/Canada Herat Herat NATO/Italy (with Spain) Farah Farah NATO/Italy (with Spain) Mazar-e-Sharif Balkh NATO/Britain (Germany to take lead in 2006) Konduz Konduz NATO/Germany Faizabad Badakhshan NATO/Germany Meymaneh Faryab NATO/Norway and Finland Chaghcharan Ghowr NATO/Lithuania Qalah-ye Now Badghis NATO/Spain (with Italy) Pol-e-Khomri Baghlan NATO/Netherlands Bamiyan Bamiyan New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF) CRS-49 Table 9. Major Factions in Afghanistan Party/Commander Taliban Leader Ideology/ Ethnicity Mullah ultra-orthodox (Islamic cleric) Islamic, Pashtun Muhammad Umar Regional Base Small insurgent groups, mostly in the south and east. No official presence in government. Islamic Society (dominant Burhannudin party in the “Northern Rabbani, Yunus Alliance”) Qanooni, and Muhammad Fahim moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul. Ismail Khan (part of Islamic Society/Northern Alliance) Tajik Herat Province and environs; Khan removed as Herat governor in September 2004 National Islamic Abdul Rashid Movement of Afghanistan Dostam (now in central government) secular, Uzbek Mazar-e-Sharif, Shebergan, and environs. Hizb-e-Wahdat Karim Khalili (Vice President) Shiite, Hazara tribes Bamiyan province. Pashtun Leaders Various regional governors; central government led by Karzai. Moderate Islamic, Pashtun Southern, eastern Afghanistan, including Jalalabad and Qandahar. Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG) Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar orthodox Islamic, Pashtun Small groups around Jalalabad and in the southeast. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Islamic Union Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf orthodox Islamic, Pashtun Paghman (west of Kabul) Ismail Khan CRS-50 Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted. ! On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464]. ! On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 9672; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. ! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan. ! On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush. ! On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986 proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan. ! On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, CRS-51 reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. ! On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999 declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Talibancontrolled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan. ! U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana), and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to the Taliban. ! P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, 9/11 Commission recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright, completing a pre-Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1992, he had issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.) CRS-52 Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan