Order Code RL31339
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Updated March 29, 2006
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq
remains violent and unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related
insurgency, as well as growing sectarian violence. According to its November 30,
2005, “Strategy for Victory,†the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will
remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not
serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. The Administration believes that, over
the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and
a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting casualties and costs —
and growing sectarian conflict — have intensified a debate within the United States
over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement
without completely accomplishing U.S. goals.
The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important
successes, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose
an interim and then a full-term National Assembly, a referendum that adopted a
permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security
forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi
security units, the Administration has been working to include more Sunni Arabs in
the power structure, particularly the security institutions; Sunnis were dominant
during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly
dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. The Administration believes that it has largely
healed a rift with some European countries over the decision to invade Iraq, and it
points to NATO and other nations’ contributions of training for Iraqi security forces
and government personnel.
Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in
Iraq is failing and that major new policy initiatives are required. Some believe that
U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop
commitment and that sectarian violence threatens to place U.S. forces in the middle
of a civil war in Iraq. Others believe that a U.S. move toward withdrawal might
undercut popular support for the insurgency and force compromise among Iraq’s
factions. Still others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counter-
insurgent combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of
insurgents, a plan the Administration says it is now moving toward under an
approach termed “clear, hold, and build.â€
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth
Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations,
by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign
Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and
Christopher Blanchard.
Contents
Policy in the 1990s: Emphasis on Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Major Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Kurds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr . . . 4
Smaller Shiite Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Post-September 11 Regime Change Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . 13
Bremer/Iraq Governing Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Handover of Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Interim Constitution/Transition Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate . . . . . 16
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
January 30, 2005 Elections/New Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
December 15, 2005, Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
International Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction/CERP Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Security Challenges, Responses, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Insurgent Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Sectarian Violence/Militias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
“Clear, Hold, and Buildâ€Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy†. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Immediate Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Troop Drawdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Power-Sharing Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Negotiating With the Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Focus on Local Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Partition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Anti-Saddam Factions/Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 4. Ministry of Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Table 5. Ministry of Interior (Police) Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Table 6. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958).1 Iraq had been a
province of the Ottoman empire until British forces defeated the Ottomans in World
War I and took control of what is now Iraq in 1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq
from the Ottomans in Iraq earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in
1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis (as did the
Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt
in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941, during World War II. Iraq’s first
Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who,
advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabiaâ€), led the Arab revolt
against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal
I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939.
Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was only four years old.
A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said,
a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times
during 1930-1958. Faysal II ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim
on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military
alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was
rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam’s rule. The Baath
Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq as
a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was to reduce religious and
sectarian schisms among Arabs.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
1 See Eisenstadt, Michael, and Eric Mathewson, eds, U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq:
Lessons from the British Experience. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003.
Members of the Hashemite family rule neighboring Jordan.
CRS-2
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein,
secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam’s home
town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam’s regime
became repressive of Iraq’s Shiites in the year after the February 1979 Islamic
revolution in neighboring Iran because Iran’s revolution had emboldened Iraqi Shiite
Islamist movements to try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Policy in the 1990s:
Emphasis on Containment
Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the
Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided not to militarily
overthrow Saddam Hussein in the 1991 war because the United Nations had
approved only the liberation of Kuwait, because the Arab states in the coalition
opposed an advance to Baghdad, and because the Administration feared becoming
bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.2 Within days of the war’s end
(February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurds in northern Iraq,
emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support, rebelled. The
Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni Muslim Republican
Guard forces had survived the war largely intact and they suppressed the rebels.
Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States for standing aside during Saddam’s
suppression of the uprisings. Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zoneâ€
set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and remained
autonomous thereafter.
About two months after the failure of these uprisings, President George H.W.
Bush reportedly sent Congress an intelligence finding that the United States would
try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein. The Administration
apparently believed that a coup by elements within the regime could produce a
favorable government without fragmenting Iraq. After a reported July 1992 coup
failed, there was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the Kurdish, Shiite, and other
oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.3
Support for Iraq’s opposition was one facet of broader U.S. policy to pressure
Saddam Hussein. The main elements of U.S. containment policy during the 1990s
consisted of U.N. Security Council-authorized weapons inspections, an international
economic embargo, and U.S.-led enforcement of “no fly zones†over northern and
southern Iraq. The implementation of these policies is discussed in greater detail in
2 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million. Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.†New York Times,
June 2, 1992.
CRS-3
CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights
Violations, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Major Anti-Saddam Factions
Although U.S. policy after the 1991 war emphasized containment, the United
States built ties to and progressively increased support for several of the secular and
religious opposition factions discussed below. Some of these groups field militias
that are allegedly conducting acts of sectarian reprisals in post-Saddam Iraq.
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA). In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist
groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National Congress (INC),†on a platform of human
rights, democracy, pluralism, and “federalism†(Kurdish autonomy). However, many
observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups have
authoritarian leaderships. The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad Chalabi,
a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent banking family, to run the INC on a daily
basis. Chalabi, who is about 63 years old, was educated in the United States
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. His father was
president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the 1958 military
coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American University of
Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran afoul
of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly
with some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989.4 Chalabi maintains
that the Jordanian government was pressured by Iraq to turn against him. (A table
on U.S. appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).
As an Iraqi governance structure was established, Chalabi was selected to the
Iraq Governing Council (IGC) and he was one of its nine rotating presidents
(president during September 2003). In a fallout with his former U.S. backers, U.S.-
backed Iraqi police raided INC headquarters in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing
documents as part of an investigation of various allegations, including that Chalabi
had provided intelligence to Iran.5 The case was later dropped. Since 2004, Chalabi
has tried to ally with Shiite Islamist factions; he ran on the main Shiite Islamist slate
for the January 30, 2005, elections and subsequently became one of three deputy
prime ministers, with a focus on economic issues. Despite a poor showing in the
December 15, 2005, elections, in which he ran his own slate, Chalabi briefly served
as Oil Minister in late December 2005 when that minister resigned due to the raising
of gasoline price increases in Iraq.
Another secular group, the Iraq National Accord (INA), was founded after Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but reportedly later
4 In Apr. 1992, he was convicted in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and
sentenced to 22 years in prison. The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors
a total of $400 million.
5 Risen, James, and David Johnston. “Chalabi Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code,â€
New York Times, June 2, 2004.
CRS-4
earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).6 It is led by Dr. Iyad
al-Allawi, a Baathist who purportedly helped Saddam Hussein silence Iraqi dissidents
in Europe in the mid-1970s.7 Allawi, who is about 60 years old (born 1946 in
Baghdad), fell out with Saddam in the mid-1970s, became a neurologist and presided
over the Iraqi Student Union in Europe. He survived an alleged Saddam regime
assassination attempt in London in 1978. He is a secular Shiite Muslim, but many
INA members are Sunnis. Allawi no longer considers himself a Baath Party
member, but he has not openly denounced the original tenets of Baathism.
In 1996, the fractiousness among anti-Saddam groups caused the Clinton
Administration to shift support to the INA.8 However, the INA proved penetrated by
Iraq’s intelligence services and Baghdad arrested or executed over 100 INA activists
in June 1996. In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into northern
Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from the PUK. The
incursion enabled Baghdad to also rout remaining INC and INA operatives
throughout the north.
The Kurds.9 The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups. They have a historic fear of
persecution by the Arab majority and want to, at the very least, preserve the
autonomy of the post-1991 Gulf war period. Many younger Kurds want to go
beyond autonomy to outright independence. The Kurds appear to be positioning
themselves to secure the city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds covet as a source of oil, and
possibly part of the city of Mosul. The Kurds also achieved language in the new
constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on whether Kirkuk might formally
join the Kurdish administered region.
For now, both major Kurdish factions are participating in Iraqi politics, the
PUK more so than the KDP. PUK leader Talabani was IGC president in November
2003, and the KDP’s Barzani led it in April 2004. Talabani became Iraq’s president
after the January elections and is now widely expected to continue in that post after
the December 2005 election. On June 12, 2005, the 111-seat Kurdish regional
assembly (also elected on January 30, 2005) named Barzani “president of Kurdistan.â€
Yet, Barzani participated extensively in negotiations on the new Iraqi constitution.
Shiite Islamists: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr.
Shiite Islamist organizations have emerged as the strongest factions in post-Saddam
politics; Shiites constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented
in all pre-2003 governments. Several Shiite factions cooperated with the U.S. regime
change efforts of the 1990s, but others had no contact with the United States. The
6 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,†New
York Times, June 9, 2004.
7 Hersh, Seymour. “Annals of National Security: Plan B,†The New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
8 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed,†Washington Post, June 26, 1997.
9 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.
CRS-5
undisputed Shiite religious leader in Iraq is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. He
maintained a low profile during Saddam Hussein’s regime and was not part of U.S.-
backed regime change efforts in the 1990s. As the “marja-e-taqlid†(source of
emulation) and, since 1992, as the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the
Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah†(a grouping of seminaries), he is a major political
force in post-Saddam politics.10 He has a network of agents (wakils) throughout
Iraq and in countries where there are large Shiite communities. He was instrumental
in putting together the united slate of Shiite Islamist movements in the 2005 elections
(“United Iraqi Alliance,†UIA).
Sistani, about 79 years old, was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before
relocating to Najaf at the age of 21. His mentor, the former head of the Hawza, was
Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-Khoi. Like Khoi, Sistani generally opposes a direct
role for clerics in government, but he believes in clerical supervision of political
leaders, partly explaining his involvement in major post-Saddam political decisions.
He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic culture and not become Westernized, favoring
modest dress for women and curbs on sales of alcohol and Western music and
entertainment.11 He suffers from heart problems that required treatment in the
United Kingdom in August 2004.
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). With the
Da’wa Party, it constitutes the core of the UIA. SCIRI founders were in exile in Iran
after a major crackdown in 1980 by Saddam, who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi Shiite
Islamists of trying to overthrow him. During Khomeini’s exile in Najaf (1964-1978),
he was hosted by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, father of the Hakim brothers
that founded SCIRI. The Ayatollah was then head of the Hawza. Although it was
a member of the INC in the early 1990s, SCIRI refused to accept U.S. funds,
although it did have contacts with the United States.
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric, is now SCIRI’s leader; he
served on the IGC and was number one on the UIA slate in each of the 2005 elections
but takes no formal position in government. One of his top aides, Bayan Jabr, is
Interior Minister, who runs the national police and who has been accused of packing
Iraq’s police forces with members of SCIRI’s “Badr Brigades†militia, (discussed
under “Militias,†below). Because of the criticism, it was widely reported in January
2006 that he will not likely be reappointed Interior Minister in the full-term
government being assembled. SCIRI leaders say they do not seek to establish an
Iranian-style Islamic republic, but SCIRI reportedly receives substantial amounts of
financial and other aid from Iran. SCIRI also runs several media outlets.
Da’wa Party/Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. The second major Shiite
Islamist party is the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party. During the 1990s, Da’wa did not
join the U.S.-led effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein. It does not have an organized
10 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
11 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].
CRS-6
militia and it has a lower proportion of clerics than does SCIRI.12 Its leader is
Ibrahim al-Jafari, who is about 55 years old (born in 1950 in Karbala), and who is
now Prime Minister. A Da’wa activist since 1966, he attended medical school in
Mosul and fled to Iran in 1980 to escape Saddam’s crackdown on the Da’wa. He
later went to live in London, possibly because he did not want to be seen as too
closely linked to Iran. Jafari served on the IGC;13 he was the first of the nine rotating
IGC presidents (August 2003), and he was deputy president in Allawi’s interim
government. He was number 7 on the UIA slate and, on April 7, 2005, he became
prime minister; for now he is the UIA choice to remain as prime minister in the full-
term government being assembled.
Although there is no public evidence that Jafari was involved in any terrorist
activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa allegedly committed a May 1985
attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on the
U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. Lebanese Hizballah was founded by Lebanese
clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and Khomeini, and there continue to be
personal and ideological linkages between Hizballah and Da’wa (as well as with
SCIRI). The Hizballah activists who held U.S. hostages in Lebanon during the
1980s often attempted to link release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa
prisoners held by Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s. Some Da’wa members in
Iraq are guided by Lebanon’s Shiite cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was
a student of Baqr Al Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction (“Sadristsâ€). Moqtada Al Sadr is emerging as
a major figure in Iraq. He is the lone surviving son of the revered Ayatollah
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (the Ayatollah was killed, along with his other two sons,
by regime security forces in 1999 after he began agitating against Saddam’s
government). He is viewed by the mainstream Shiite groups as a young firebrand
who lacks religious and political weight. This view first took hold on April 10, 2003,
when his supporters allegedly stabbed to death Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late
Grand Ayatollah Khoi, shortly after Khoi’s U.S.-backed arrival in Iraq.14 However,
the established Shiite factions, as well as Iranian diplomats, are building ties to him
because of his large following.
By participating fully in the December 15, 2005, elections, Sadr has distanced
himself from his more anti-U.S. activities in 2003 and 2004, although tensions
between U.S. and Sadr militia forces flared again in March 2006. During 2003-2004,
he used Friday prayer sermons in Kufa (near Najaf) and newspaper publications to
agitate for a U.S. withdrawal, and he did not join any interim Iraqi governments.
In the January 30, 2005, elections, Sadr started moving into the political process by
permitting some of his supporters to join the UIA slate, but he publicly denounced
those elections as a product of U.S. occupation. Pro-Sadr candidates also won
pluralities in several southern Iraqi provincial council elections and hold 6 seats on
12 There are breakaway factions of Da’wa, the most prominent of which calls itself Islamic
Da’wa of Iraq, but these factions are believed to be far smaller than Da’wa.
13 Salim was killed May 17, 2004, in a suicide bombing while serving as IGC president.
14 Khoi had headed the Khoi Foundation, based in London.
CRS-7
Basra’s 41-seat provincial council. It is reported that three ministers in the interim
government, including minister of transportation Salam al-Maliki, are Sadr
supporters; Maliki reputedly has tried to gain greater control of Baghdad International
Airport for Sadr militiamen.
Smaller Shiite Factions. One other Shiite grouping, called Fadilah, is part
of the UIA coalition. Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, it is a splinter group
of Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction and is perceived as somewhat more hardline (anti-U.S.
presence) than SCIRI or Da’wa. It holds some seats on several provincial councils
in the Shiite provinces. Other Shiite parties operating in southern Iraq include
fighters who challenged Saddam Hussein’s forces in the southern marsh areas,
around the town of Amara, north of Basra. One goes by the name Hizbollah-Iraq and
is headed by guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the IGC.
Hizbollah-Iraq apparently plays a major role in policing Amara and environs.
Another pro-Iranian grouping, which wields a militia, is called Thar Allah
(Vengeance of God). A smaller Shiite Islamist organization, the Islamic Amal
(Action) Organization, is headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a
moderate cleric. Its power base is in Karbala, and, operating under the SCIRI
umbrella, it conducted attacks there against regime organs in the 1980s. Modarassi’s
brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which
stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s regime in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamic Amal
won two seats in the January 30 election.
CRS-8
Table 1. Major Anti-Saddam Factions/Leaders
Iraqi National
Main recipient of U.S. aid to anti-Saddam opposition during
Congress (INC)/
1990s. Chalabi was touted by some in Bush Administration prior
Ahmad Chalabi
to 2003 war but has not proven his popularity in Iraq and fell
afoul of U.S. officials in 2003-2004. Won no seats in December
15 election.
Iraq National
Consisted of ex-Baathists and ex-military in efforts to topple
Accord
Saddam in 1990s. Allawi was interim Prime Minister (June 2004-
(INA)/Iyad al-
April 2005). Won 40 seats in January 2005 election but only 25
Allawi
in December.
Kurdistan
Two main Kurdish factions. Talabani became president of Iraq
Democratic Party
after January 2005; Barzani has tried to secure his clan’s base in
(KDP) of Masud
the Kurdish north. Control about 70,000 peshmerga militia.
Barzani/Patriotic
Their joint slate won 75 seats in January election but only 53 in
Union of
December.
Kurdistan (PUK)
of Jalal Talabani
Grand Ayatollah
Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq. No formal position
Ali al-Sistani
in government but has used his broad Shiite popularity to become
instrumental in major questions facing it and in U.S. decisions on
Iraq.
Supreme Council
Largest and best-organized Shiite Islamist party. The most pro-
for the Islamic
Iranian Shiite party, it was established in 1982 by Tehran to
Revolution in
centralize Shiite Islamist movements in Iraq. First leader,
Iraq (SCIRI)/Abd
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, killed by bomb in Najaf in August
al-Aziz Al
2003. Controls “Badr Brigades†militia. As part of United Iraqi
Hakim
Alliance (UIA- 128 total seats in December election), it has about
30 of its members in parliament. Supports formation of large
Shiite “region†composed of nine southern provinces.
Da’wa (Islamic
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957), active
Call)
against Saddam Hussein in early 1980s. Founder, Mohammad
Party/Ibrahim al-
Baqr al-Sadr, was ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and was
Jafari
hung by Saddam regime in 1980. During 1980s, Da’wa activists
committed terrorist acts in Kuwait to try to shake its support for
Iraq in Iran-Iraq war. Part of UIA, controls about 28 seats in
parliament.
Moqtada Al-Sadr
Young (about 31) relative of Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, was in
Iraq during Saddam’s reign. Inherited father’s political base in
“Sadr City,†a large (2 million population) Shiite district of
Baghdad. Mercurial, has both challenged and worked with U.S.
personnel in Iraq. Formed “Mahdi Army†militia in 2003. Now
part of UIA, controls 32 seats in incoming parliament. Also
supported by hardline Fadila (Virtue) party. Opposes formation
of Shiite “region.â€
CRS-9
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act
From the time of Iraq’s defeat of the INC and INA in northern Iraq in August
1996 until 1998, the Clinton Administration had little contact with opposition groups,
believing them too weak to topple Saddam. During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions
of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections led to growing
congressional calls to overthrow Saddam. A congressional push for regime change
began with an FY1998 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 105-174) and continued
subsequently. The sentiment was encapsulated in the “Iraq Liberation Act†(ILA,
P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). The ILA was viewed as an expression of
congressional support for the concept advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts
to promote an Iraqi insurgency with U.S. air-power. In the debate over the decision
to go to war, Bush Administration officials have cited the ILA as evidence of a bi-
partisan consensus that Saddam Hussein needed to be removed. President Clinton
signed the legislation, despite doubts about opposition capabilities. The ILA
! stated that it should be the policy of the United States to “support
efforts†to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-
November 1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime
change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Section 8
states that the act should not be construed as authorizing the use of
U.S. military force to achieve regime change.
! gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million worth of
defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting
funds, to opposition groups designated by the Administration.
! did not specifically provide for its termination after Saddam Hussein
is removed from power. Section 7 of the ILA provides for
continuing post-Saddam “transition assistance†to Iraqi parties and
movements with “democratic goals.â€
The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5,
1999, President Clinton issued a determination (P.D. 99-13) making seven
opposition groups eligible to receive U.S. military assistance under the ILA: INC;
INA; SCIRI; KDP; PUK; the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);15 and the
Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM),16 a relatively small party advocating
15 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally taken off the ILA
eligibility list.
16 In concert with a May 1999 INC visit to Washington D.C, the Clinton Administration
announced a draw down of $5 million worth of training and “non-lethal†defense articles
under the ILA. During 1999-2000, about 150 oppositionists underwent civil administration
training at Hurlburt air base in Florida, including Defense Department-run civil affairs
(continued...)
CRS-10
the return of Iraq’s monarchy. However, the Clinton Administration decided that the
opposition was not sufficiently capable to merit weapons or combat training.
Bush Administration Policy
Several senior Bush Administration officials had long been strong advocates of
a regime change policy toward Iraq, but the difficulty of that strategy remained,17 and
the Bush Administration initially continued its predecessor’s emphasis on
containment. Some accounts say that the Administration was planning, prior to
September 11, to confront Iraq militarily, but President Bush has denied this. During
its first year, Administration policy focused on strengthening containment of Iraq,
which the Administration said was rapidly eroding. The cornerstone of the policy
was to achieve U.N. Security Council adoption of a “smart sanctions†plan —
relaxing U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to Iraq of purely civilian equipment18
in exchange for improved international enforcement of the U.N. ban on exports to
Iraq of militarily-useful goods. The major features of the plan were adopted by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1409 (May 14, 2002).
Post-September 11 Regime Change Policy. Bush Administration
policy on Iraq changed significantly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
shifting to an active regime change effort. In President Bush’s State of the Union
message on January 29, 2002, given as the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda
in Afghanistan was winding down, he characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evilâ€
(with Iran and North Korea). Some U.S. officials, particularly deputy Defense
Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States needed to respond to the
September 11, 2001 attacks by “ending states,†such as Iraq, that support terrorist
groups. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in March 2002 reportedly to
consult regional countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq militarily,
although the leaders visited reportedly urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli
dispute and opposed confrontation with Iraq. Some accounts, including the book
Plan of Attack by Bob Woodward (published in April 2004), say that then Secretary
of State Powell and others were concerned about the potential consequences of an
invasion of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building a democracy after major
hostilities ended. Other accounts include reported memoranda (the “Downing Street
Memoâ€) by British intelligence officials, based on conversations with U.S. officials.
That memo reportedly said that by mid-2002 the Administration had already decided
to go to war against Iraq and that it sought to develop information about Iraq to
support that judgment. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair deny
this. (On December 20, 2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12,
16 (...continued)
training to administer a post-Saddam government. The Hurlburt trainees were not brought
into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward the
end of the major combat phase of the war.
17 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,†The New Yorker, Mar. 11, 2002.
18 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.
CRS-11
calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a “mounting threat†to the
United States.)
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering†threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate.
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials asserted the
following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to rebuild its
WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N. weapons
inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N. previous
resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of Iraq’s
WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons against its
own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying
that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD against
the United States; and (3) that Iraq could transfer its WMD to
terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in potentially catastrophic
attacks in the United States. Critics noted that, under the U.S. threat
of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S. troops in the 1991
Gulf war. The U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group, whose work formally
terminated in December 2004, determined that Iraq did not possess
active WMD programs, although it retained the intention and
capabilities to reconstitute them. (See [http://www.cia.gov/cia/
reports/iraq_wmd_2004/].)
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-1982 and was again so designated after its 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam
Hussein’s regime had a direct connection to the September 11
attacks, senior U.S. officials said there was evidence of Iraqi
linkages to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-Al
Qaeda militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq.
Although this issue is still debated, the report of the 9/11
Commission found no evidence of a “collaborative operational
linkage†between Iraq and Al Qaeda.19
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat. Although it is not
certain when the Administration decided on an invasion, in mid-2002 the
Administration began ordering a force to the region that, by early 2003, gave the
President that option. In concert, the Administration tried to build up and broaden
the Iraqi opposition and, according to the Washington Post (June 16, 2002),
authorizing stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special operations forces to
destabilize Saddam Hussein. In August 2002, the State and Defense Departments
jointly invited six major opposition groups to Washington, D.C. At the same time,
the Administration expanded its ties to several groups, particularly those composed
of ex-military officers. The Administration also began training about 5,000
19 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.
CRS-12
oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,20 although only about 70 completed training at
an air base (Taszar) in Hungary.21 They served mostly as translators during the war.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002 that the U.N. Security
Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq. The
Administration subsequently agreed to give Iraq a “final opportunity†to comply with
all applicable Council resolutions by supporting Security Council Resolution 1441
(November 8, 2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection.
Iraq reluctantly accepted it. UNMOVIC Director Hans Blix and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-Baradei subsequently briefed the
Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November 27, 2002. They
criticized Iraq for failing to pro-actively cooperate, but also noted progress and said
that Iraq might not have retained any WMD. The Bush Administration asserted that
Iraq was not cooperating with Resolution 1441 because it was not pro-actively
revealing information. (A “comprehensive†September 2004 report of the Iraq
Survey Group, known as the “Duelfer report,â€22 found no WMD stockpiles or
production but said that there was evidence that the regime retained the intention to
reconstitute WMD programs in the future. The U.S.-led WMD search ended
December 2004.23 The UNMOVIC search remains technically active.24
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion. It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if
he determines that doing so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N.
Security Council resolutions. It passed the House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and
the Senate the following day (77-23). It was signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely. The United States, along with Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria, maintained that Iraq had not fundamentally decided to disarm.
At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain, Spain, and
Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted that diplomatic options to disarm
Iraq had failed. The following evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and
20 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,â€
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 2002.
21 Williams, Daniel. “U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles,†Washington Post, Dec. 18,
2002.
22 The full text of the Duelfer report is available at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
23 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
24 For information on UNMOVIC’s ongoing activities, see [http://www.unmovic.org/].
CRS-13
his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British force assembled (a substantial
proportion of which remained afloat or in supporting roles). Some Iraqi units and
irregulars (“Saddam’s Fedayeenâ€) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional
tactics. Some post-major combat evaluation (“Cobra Two,†by Michael Gordon and
Bernard Trainor, published in 2006) suggest the U.S. military should have focused
more on combating the irregulars rather than bypassing them to take on armored
forces. No WMD was used by Iraq, although it did fire some ballistic missiles into
Kuwait; it is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than
150 km). The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein
appeared with supporters that day in Baghdad’s largely Sunni Adhamiya district.
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition
U.S. goals for Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein have changed
somewhat. Initial goals were to create a model democracy that is at peace with its
neighbors, free of WMD, and an ally of the United States. However, according to its
November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,†the U.S. goal now is to enable Iraq to
provide for its own security and not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. The
Administration believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will still become a model for
reform throughout the Middle East, but there is growing debate over whether U.S.
policy can establish a stable and democratic Iraq at an acceptable cost.25 The political
transition in post-Saddam Iraq has advanced, but insurgent violence is still
widespread, and sectarian violence has increased to the point that the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq and senior U.S. commanders say sectarian violence is now the
pre-eminent security threat in Iraq, with “potential†for all-out civil war.
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the
fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly
grounded in Administration concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major
anti-Saddam factions and not necessarily produce democracy. These concerns had
led the Administration to oppose a move by the U.S.-backed anti-Saddam groups to
declare a provisional government before the invasion. The Administration initially
tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction with a staff of U.S.
government personnel to administer Iraq’s ministries; they deployed in April 2003.
He headed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),
within the Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order.
The Administration’s immediate post-war policy did not make use of an extensive
State Department initiative, called the “Future of Iraq Project,†that spent at least a
year before the war drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam.
25 For text of President Bush’s June 28, 2005, speech on Iraq, see [http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].
CRS-14
Some Iraqis who participated are now in Iraqi government positions. The State
Department project, which cost $5 million, had 15 working groups on major issues.26
Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi regime. He and
then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (now Ambassador to Iraq) organized a
meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying ethnicities and
ideologies. A subsequent meeting of over 250 notables was held in Baghdad
(April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to
name an interim administration. However, senior U.S. officials reportedly disliked
Garner’s lax approach, including tolerating Iraqis naming themselves as local leaders.
In May 2003, the Administration named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace
Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority†(CPA), which subsumed
ORHA. The CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003).
Bremer/Iraq Governing Council. Bremer suspended Garner’s political
transition process and decided instead to appoint an Iraqi advisory body that would
not have sovereignty. On July 13, 2003, he named the 25-member “Iraq Governing
Council†(IGC). Its major figures included the leaders of the major anti-Saddam
factions, but it was perceived in Iraq as an arm of U.S. decision-making. In the
process of forming this council, new Sunni figures emerged, some of whom were in
exile during Saddam’s rule. These included Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni elder
(Shammar tribe) and president of a Saudi-based technology firm. (He is now a
deputy president.) However, many Sunnis resented the U.S. invasion and opposed
the U.S. presence and the U.S.-backed Iraqi governing bodies.
In September 2003, the IGC selected a 25-member “cabinet†to run individual
ministries, with roughly the same factional and ethnic balance of the IGC itself (a
slight majority of Shiite Muslims). The IGC began a process of “de-Baathificationâ€
— a purge from government of about 30,000 persons who held any of the four top
ranks of the Baath Party — and it authorized a war crimes tribunal for Saddam and
his associates. That function is now performed by a 323-member “Supreme
Commission on De-Baathification.â€
Handover of Sovereignty
The Bush Administration initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections for a
new government, tasks expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah
Sistani and others agitated for an early restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and for direct
elections. In response, in November 2003, the United States announced it would
return sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004, and that elections for a permanent
government would be held by the end of 2005.
26 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/].
CRS-15
Interim Constitution/Transition Roadmap. The CPA decisions on a
transition roadmap were incorporated into an interim constitution, the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), which was drafted by a committee dominated by the
major anti-Saddam factions and signed on March 8, 2004.27 It provided for the
following:
! Elections by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly. A permanent constitution would be drafted by August
15, 2005, and put to a national referendum by October 15, 2005.
National elections for a permanent government, under the new
constitution (if it passed), would be held by December 15, 2005.
The new government would take office by December 31, 2005.
! Any three provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds
majority. If that happened, a new draft was to be developed and
voted on by October 15, 2006. In that case, the December 15, 2005,
elections would have been for another interim National Assembly.
! The Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government.†They were given powers to contradict or alter the
application of Iraqi law in their provinces, and their peshmerga
militia were allowed to operate.
! Islam was designated “a source,†but not the primary source, of law,
and no law could be passed that contradicts such rights as peaceful
assembly; free expression; equality of men and women before the
law; and the right to strike and demonstrate.
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover. The TAL did not
directly address the formation of the interim government that would assume
sovereignty. Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan to select a national
assembly through nationwide “caucuses.†After considering other options, such as
the holding of a traditional assembly, the United States tapped U.N. envoy Lakhdar
Brahimi to select that government.28 The interim government, dominated by senior
faction leaders, was named on June 1, 2004, and began work immediately; the IGC
dissolved. The formal handover ceremony occurred on June 28, 2004, two days
before the advertised June 30 date, partly to confuse insurgents. The interim
government, whose powers were addressed in an addendum to the TAL, had a largely
ceremonial president (Ghazi al-Yawar) and two deputy presidents (the Da’wa’s Jafari
and the KDP’s Dr. Rowsch Shaways). Iyad al-Allawi was Prime Minister, with
executive power, and there was a deputy prime minister and 26 ministers. Six
ministers were women, and the ethnicity mix was roughly the same as in the IGC.
The key defense and interior ministries were headed by Sunni Arabs.
27 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].
28 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,†Washington Post.
Apr. 15, 2004.
CRS-16
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate. The
Administration asserts that it has consistently sought U.N. and partner country
involvement in Iraq efforts. Resolution 1483 (May 6, 2003) not only recognized the
CPA as an occupying authority but also provided for a U.N. special representative
to Iraq; and it “call[ed] on†governments to contribute forces for stabilization.
Resolution 1500 (August 14, 2003) established U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI).29 The size of UNAMI in Iraq has risen to a target level of about 300
people; it is headed by former Pakistani diplomat Ashraf Jahangir Qazi. In a further
attempt to satisfy the requirements of several major nations for greater U.N. backing
of the coalition military presence, the United States obtained agreement on
Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003), formally authorizing a “multinational force
under unified [meaning U.S.] command.â€
Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further by
endorsing the handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim
government, and spelling out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq.
It also gave the United Nations a major role in helping the interim government
prepare for the two elections in 2005, and it authorized a coalition component force
to protect U.N. personnel and facilities. Primarily because of Sistani’s opposition to
the TAL’s provision that would allow the Kurds a veto over a permanent
constitution, the Resolution did not explicitly endorse the TAL, and it stipulated that
! The Resolution “authorizes†the U.S.-led coalition to secure Iraq;
this provision is widely interpreted as giving the coalition continued
responsibility for securing Iraq. Iraqi forces are “a principal partnerâ€
in the U.S.-led coalition, and the relationship between U.S. and Iraqi
forces is spelled out in an annexed exchange of letters between the
United States and Iraq. The U.S.-led coalition retains the ability to
take prisoners.
! The coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the request of the
Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this
resolution†(or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire when
a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and that the
mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so requests.â€
The Security Council reviewed the mandate in advance of the June
8, 2005, deadline, and no alterations to it were made. However, on
November 11, 2005, in advance of the termination of the mandate,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1637 extending the
coalition military mandate to December 31, 2006, unless earlier
requested by the Iraqi government. There will also be a review of
the mandate on June 15, 2006.
! An agreement on the status of foreign forces (Status of Forces
Agreement, SOFA) in Iraq would be deferred to an elected Iraqi
government. No such agreement has been signed to date, and U.S.
29 On August 12, 2004, its mandate was renewed for one year and on Aug. 11, 2005
(Resolution 1619), for another year.
CRS-17
forces operate in Iraq and use its facilities (such as Balad air base)
under temporary memoranda of understanding. However, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld told journalists on July 27, 2005, that U.S.
military lawyers are working with the Iraqis on a SOFA or other
arrangements that would cover U.S. operations in Iraq after a
permanent government takes over.
! The interim government and the elected government could have
amended the TAL or revoked CPA decrees but they did generally
did not do so.
! There would be a 100-seat “Interim National Council†to serve as
an interim parliament. The body, selected during August 13-18,
2004,30 did not have legislative power but was able to veto
government decisions with a two-thirds majority. The council held
some televised “hearings,†including questioning ministers. Its
work ended after the National Assembly was elected in January
2005.
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq. The following were additional
consequences of the sovereignty handover, designed in part to lower the profile of
U.S. influence over post-handover Iraq.
! As of the June 28, 2004, handover of sovereignty, the state of
occupation ceased. Subsequently, a U.S. Ambassador (John
Negroponte) established U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first
time since January 1991. Negroponte’s philosophy was to generally
refrain from directly intervening in internal Iraqi debates. A U.S.
embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with about
1,100 U.S. personnel.31 Negroponte was succeeded in July 2005 by
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was previously Ambassador to
Afghanistan and who takes a more activist approach. In August
2005, Secretary of State Rice named a new State Department-based
chief coordinator for Iraq: former deputy chief of mission in post-
Saddam Baghdad James Jeffrey. (An FY2005 supplemental
appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provided $592 million of $658 million
requested to construct a new embassy in Baghdad and to fund
embassy operations. A request for FY2006 supplemental funds asks
for $1.097 billion for embassy operations for FY2006 and the first
half of FY2007.)
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB). Iraq also was given responsibility for close-out of
30 Tavernise, Sabrina. “In Climax To a Tumultuous 4-Day Debate, Iraq Chooses An
Assembly,†New York Times, Aug. 19, 2004.
31 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.
CRS-18
the “oil-for-food program.â€32 Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2004)
ended that program as of November 21, 2003.
! Reconstruction management and advising of the new Iraqi
government were taken over by the State Department through the
U.S. Embassy and a unit called the “Iraq Reconstruction and
Management Office (IRMO).†IRMO is headed since June 2005 by
Daniel Speckhard. About 150 U.S. civilian personnel work out of
four major centers around Iraq (satellites of the U.S. Embassy) —
Hilla, Basra, Kirkuk, and Mosul, and 15-20 of them report to IRMO.
A separate “Project Contracting Office (PCO),†headed by Brig.
Gen. William McCoy and now under the Army Corps of Engineers,
funds infrastructure projects such as roads, power plants, and school
renovations.
! U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-
7, CJTF-7) became a multi-national headquarters “Multinational
Force-Iraq, MNF-I,†headed by four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey.
Currently, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli is operational commander of U.S.
forces as head of the “Multinational Corps-Iraq.â€
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005
After the handover of sovereignty, the United States and Iraq began focusing on
the three national votes that would be held in 2005.
January 30, 2005 Elections/New Government. On January 30, 2005,
elections were held for a transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and
the Kurdish regional assembly. Sunnis, still resentful of the U.S. invasion, did not
participate in the vote, and no major Sunni slates were offered. This enabled the UIA
to win a slim majority (140 of the 275 seats) and to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to
dominate the government formed subsequently. (Other seat allocations are contained
in a table in CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution,
by Kenneth Katzman.) U.S. officials said publicly this government was not
sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority, even though it had a Sunni (Hajim al-
Hassani) as Assembly speaker; a Sunni deputy president (Ghazi al-Yawar); a Sunni
deputy prime minister (Abd al-Mutlak al-Jabburi); a Sunni Defense Minister
(Sadoun Dulaymi); and five other Sunni ministers. The Sunnis complained that the
ministerial slots they hold (other than Defense) are relatively unimportant, such as
the ministries of culture and of women’s affairs. The other major positions were
dominated by Shiites and Kurds, such as PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president;
Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime Minister; SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi as the
second deputy president; Bayan Jabr as Interior Minister, which controls the police
and police commando forces; and KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari as Foreign Minister.
Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch Shaways were named as the two other deputy prime
ministers. There is also one Christian and one Turkoman minister.
32 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.
CRS-19
The elected Iraqi government has received some diplomatic support, even
though most of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination
of the regime. As of late 2005, there were 46 foreign missions in Iraq, including
most European and Arab countries. Jordan has appointed an ambassador and
Kuwait has pledged to do so, but these and other diplomatic upgrades have been
largely on hold since attacks on diplomats from Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria, and
Morocco in 2005. At an Arab League meeting in late March 2006. Arab states
pledged to increase their diplomatic representation in Iraq, and to consider other help
(aid, debt relief) to bolster the Iraqi government.
Permanent Constitution. Despite Sunni opposition, the constitution was
approved on October 15, 2005; Sunni opponents achieved a two-thirds “no†vote in
two provinces but not the three needed to defeat the constitution. It takes effect after
a post-December 2005 election government is seated. The crux of Sunni opposition
to the new constitution is its provision for a weak central government (“federalismâ€).
The provision allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous
“regions†with their own regional governments, internal security forces, and a large
role in controlling revenues from any new energy discoveries. The Sunnis oppose
this concept because their region, unlike those dominated by the Kurds and the
Shiites, lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues.
As part of their efforts to forge a unified political structure, U.S. officials hope
that the constitution will be modified in 2006 to accommodate Sunni concerns on
federalism/regionalism. Under a last-minute agreement before the October 15
referendum, the incoming government is to name another constitutional commission
to propose amendments to the constitution (within four months). The amendments
require approval by an Assembly majority, and then would be put to a national
referendum to be held two months later. However, in a possible sign of difficulty,
SCIRI leader Hakim said on January 11, 2006, that he would not support major
amendments to the constitution.
December 15, 2005, Election. In this election, some anti-U.S. Sunnis
moved further into the political arena; Sunni slates were offered, including a broad
slate (“The Concord Frontâ€) led by the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), but consisting of the
Iraqi People’s General Council, headed by the elderly Adnan al-Dulaymi, and the
Sunni Endowment. Another Sunni slate was the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue,
headed by constitution negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak. The vote was mostly peaceful.
Final results were released in January 2006, and the results were court-certified on
February 10, formally setting in motion the process of forming a government. The
December 15, 2005, election and its results is discussed further in CRS Report
RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman.
The convening of the “Council of Representatives†was delayed until March
16 by wrangling over governmental positions, most notably the post of Prime
Minister. The UIA, by a narrow internal vote on February 12, has named Jafari to
continue. However, the UIA alone is well short of the two-thirds majority needed to
unilaterally form a government, and Jafari is now coming under stiff opposition from
Sunnis, the secular groupings, and the Kurds. They view him as ineffective in
securing Iraq, and the Kurds view him as insufficiently attentive to Kurdish interests.
Press reports in late March 2006, not denied by U.S. officials in Baghdad, say the
CRS-20
United States is now supporting those looking to overturn Jafari’s nomination; one
possible mechanism floated is to have the entire parliament vote to select a new
Prime Ministers.
Table 2. Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq
Ghazi al-Yawar
Yawar has cooperated with the U.S. since the invasion,
(Iraqis Party)
serving as President in the Allawi government and
deputy president in the post-January 2005 government.
Iraqi Concord Front
The Front is led by Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), headed by
(Tariq al-Hashimi and
Tariq al-Hashimi. IIP withdrew from the in January
Adnan al-Dulaymi)
2005 election but led this Sunni coalition to compete in
December 2005 elections. Critical of but accepts U.S.
presence. Includes Iraqi General People’s Council of
Adnan al-Dulaymi and the Sunni Endowment. The
Front holds 44 seats in new parliament.
Dialogue National Iraqi
Mutlak, an ex-Baathist, was chief negotiator for Sunnis
Front
on the new constitution, but was dissatisfied with the
(Saleh al-Mutlak)
outcome and now advocates major revisions to the new
constitution. Holds 11 seats in the new parliament.
Muslim Scholars
Hardline Sunni Islamist, has boycotted all post-Saddam
Association
elections. Believed to have ties to and influence over
(MSA, Harith al-Dhari
insurgent factions. Wants timetable for U.S. withdrawal
and
from Iraq.
Abd al-Salam al-Qubaysi)
Iraqi Insurgents
Numerous factions and no unified leadership, although
an overarching “Mujahedin Shura†was formed in early
2006, led by an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi).
Some groups led by ex-Saddam regime leaders, others
by Islamic extremists. Other factions include Islamic
Army of Iraq, Muhammad’s Army, and the 1920
Revolution Brigades.
Foreign Fighters/
Estimated 3,000 in Iraq, most led by Zarqawi, a
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Jordanian national. May be part of new “Mujahedin
Shura.†Advocates attacks on Iraqi Shiite civilians to
spark civil war. Related faction, which includes some
Iraqis, is Ansar al-Sunna.
CRS-21
Because of the political deadlock, the new Council did not select a speaker at
its first meeting on March 16. After it does so, under the new constitution, the body
is then to name a presidency council (with a two-thirds majority, no deadline
specified for this Council, but a 30-day time limit for the next Council), which then
has fifteen days to tap the leader of the largest bloc in the parliament as Prime
Minister. That person has 30 days to name and achieve parliamentary confirmation
of a cabinet (by a simple Assembly majority). U.S. officials, including President
Bush, have said publicly that the various factions need to resolve their differences
and form a united government as soon as possible as a means of reducing sectarian
and insurgent violence. Some Iraqis say the new government might not be fully in
place until perhaps May 2006. However, in one possible sign of progress, all factions
agreed in March 2006 to form an over-arching council on security and economic
matters, in which all factions would be represented, although the President and Prime
Minister would still have the authority to override the council’s decisions. The
council is not provided for in the new constitution.
Democracy-Building and Local Governance/FY2006 Supplemental.
The United States and its coalition partners have tried to build civil society and
democracy at the local level. U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the
past 30 years, with a free press and the ability to organize politically. According to
a State Department report to Congress in January 2006 detailing how the FY2004
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fundâ€
(IRRF) is being spent (“2207 Reportâ€): According to that report:
! About $1.034 billion has been allocated for “Democracy Buildingâ€
activities.
! About $110 million is allocated for related “Rule of Law†programs.
! About $159 million is allocated to build and secure courts and train
legal personnel.
! About $128 million is allocated for “Investigations of Crimes
Against Humanity,†primarily former regime abuses.
! $10 million for U.S. Institute of Peace democracy/civil
society/conflict resolution activities.
! $10 million for the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (which is
evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds, mainly in
Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime).
! $15 million to promote human rights, human rights education
centers.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), some of the activities funded, aside
from assistance for the various elections in Iraq in 2005, include the following.
! Several projects attempting to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
CRS-22
! Activities to empower local governments, policies that are receiving
increasing U.S. attention and additional funding allocations from the
IRRF. These programs include (1) the “Community Action
Program,†through which local reconstruction projects are voted on
by village and town representatives. About 400 such projects have
been completed thus far; (2) Provincial Reconstruction Development
Committees (PRDCs) to empower local governments to decide on
reconstruction priorities; and (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), which are local enclaves to provide secure conditions for
reconstruction, as discussed further below.
! Some of the allocated funds are for programs to empower women
and promote their involvement in Iraqi politics.
! Some funds have been used for easing tensions in cities that have
seen substantial U.S.-led anti-insurgency combat, including Fallujah,
Ramadi, Sadr City district of Baghdad, and Mosul.
In addition to what is already allocated, the FY2006 regular foreign aid
appropriations (conference report H.Rept. 109-265 on P.L. 109-102) provides $56
million for democracy promotion. It incorporates a Senate amendment (S.Amdt.
1299, Kennedy) to that legislation providing $28 million each to the International
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for democracy promotion
in Iraq. An FY2006 supplemental request asks for additional ESF to promote local
governance, including
! $675 million to assist provincial and local governments, in part
through eight “Provincial Reconstruction Teams†(PRTs, see below)
! $10 million in ESF for democracy promotion, including promotion
of civil society.
In House action on the FY2006 supplemental (H.R. 4939, passed by the House
on March 17), an amendment offered by Representative Christopher Shays designates
$10 million in the ESF for Iraq to be used to keep the Community Action Program
operating.
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance33
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, although some aspects of that effort appear to be faltering. Since September
2004, the U.S. reconstruction process has shifted resources to smaller scale projects
that could be completed quickly and employ Iraqis, such as sewer lines and city
roads. about 30,000 new businesses were registered in Iraq over the past year. On
the other hand, as discussed extensively in a January 2006 report by the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the difficult security environment
33 For more detailed information on U.S. spending and economic reconstruction, see CRS
Report RL31833, Iraq, Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
CRS-23
has slowed reconstruction. Even though economic reconstruction is incomplete, the
Administration only requested $479 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for
Iraq for FY2007, mainly to help sustain infrastructure already built with U.S. funds.
In terms of economic reconstruction, the FY2006 supplemental request asks for $355
million to sustain U.S. reconstruction projects and $287 million to protect oil,
electricity, and water supplies; as well as $125 million to assist Iraqi ministries and
$107 million to assist the Iraqi judicial system. As passed by the House on March
17, H.R. 4939 would provide almost all of the requested funds for these purposes.
The primary source of U.S. reconstruction funds is the IRRF. Total funds of
$20.912 billion for the IRRF came from two supplemental appropriations (FY2003
supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the FY2004
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 108-106, which provided about $18.44 billion).34
Of those funds, $18.669 billion has been obligated, and, of that, $13.683 billion has
been disbursed as of March 22, 2006. Other funds have been appropriated since
2004, as discussed in CRS Report RL31833, footnoted above, but are not yet
included in the IRRF. According to the State Department, the sector allocations for
the IRRF are
! $5.036 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.315 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society;
! $1.034 billion for Democracy;
! $4.22 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.735 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $465 million for Transportation and Communications;
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $739 million for Health Care;
! $805 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $410 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
The Oil Industry. As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding of the oil
industry has received substantial U.S. attention, but oil exports appear to be at a new
post-Saddam low in early 2006. Before the war, it was widely asserted by
Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those
of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction costs. The oil industry
infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led invasion (only about nine oil
wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of insurgents. They have focused
their attacks on pipelines in northern Iraq that feed the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that
34 As discussed below, the FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an
additional $5.7 billion for the Iraqi Security Forces; those funds have not been allocated yet.
CRS-24
is loaded at Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. (Iraq’s total pipeline system
is over 4,300 miles long.) The attacks, coupled with corruption and other
deterioration, has kept production and exports below expected levels, although high
world oil prices have been, at least until now, more than compensating for the output
shortfall. The United States imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude oil from
Iraq. The Iraqi government needs to import refined gasoline because it lacks
sufficient refining capacity. Lines for gasoline often last many hours, although the
government said in February 2006 it will gradually reduce gas subsidies, allowing gas
prices to rise. Because of rising prices, Oil Minister Bahr-Ulum again resigned in
January 2006 and was replaced by Hashim al-Hashimi of the pro-Sadr Fadila party.
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries. Iraq’s interim government has contracted for a study of the extent of Iraq’s
oil reserves, and it has contracted with Royal Dutch/Shell to formulate a blueprint to
develop the gas sector. Poland reportedly is negotiating with Iraq for possible
investments in Iraq’s energy sector. In December 2005, it was reported that a
Norwegian company, DNO, has contracted with the Kurdish administrative region
to explore for oil near the northern city of Zakho, raising the concerns of Iraq’s Arabs
who view this as a move by the Kurds to control some Iraqi oil revenues.
Table 3. Selected Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Exports
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Production
Production
Exports
(pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(2006
(pre-war)
war)
(2004)
(2005)
(to date)
2.05 million
$17
$23.5
$5.3
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
1.38 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
billion
(mbd)
Electricity
Baghdad
Pre-War
(hrs. per day,
(MWh)
Current
1/06)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
95,000
8.6
13.9
Other Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate (2006 anticipated by IMF)
10.6%
GDP
$18.4 billion (2002)
$29.3 billion (2005)
New Businesses Begun Since 2003 30,000
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report†dated
March 22, 2006. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the 1990
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483
(May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
CRS-25
International Donors. A World Bank estimate, released in October 2003,
said Iraq reconstruction would require about $56 billion during 2004-2007, including
$21 billion in U.S. pledges. At an October 2003 donors’ conference in Madrid,
donors pledged about $13.5 billion, including $8 billion from foreign governments
and $5.5 billion in loans from the World Bank and IMF. Of the funds pledged by
other foreign governments, about $3.2 billion has been disbursed as of December
2005, according to the January 2006 “2207 Report.†Included in that figure is about
$436 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, which were disbursed in
2004 after Iraq cleared up $81 million in Saddam-era arrears to the IMF.
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction/CERP Funds. The U.S. military
has attempted to promote reconstruction to deprive the insurgency of popular
support. A key tool in this effort is the funding of small projects to garner Iraqi
public support. Called the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), the
DOD funds are controlled and disbursed by U.S. commanders at the tactical level.
The total amount of CERP funds for Iraq available thus far are $1.218 million in
FY2005 funds and $140 million in FY2004 funds. An FY2006 supplemental asks
for a further $423 million in CERP funds for Iraq (and Afghanistan). A similar
program began in October 2004, called the Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and
Reconstruction Projects (CHHRP). About $86 million in has been allocated for this
program, mostly for water and sewage in Sunni areas.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. The Bush Administration has lifted most U.S.
sanctions on Iraq, beginning with Presidential Determinations issued under
authorities provided by P.L. 108-7 (appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11
(FY2003 supplemental):
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.) The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services.
Exports of dual use items (items that can have military applications)
are no longer subject to strict licensing procedures.35
35 A May 7, 2003, executive order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
(continued...)
CRS-26
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt, built up during Saddam’s regime, and
estimated of Saddam Hussein. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not
including reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war. On November 21, 2004,
the “Paris Club†of 19 industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39
billion Iraq owes them. However, with the exception of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf
states that supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have not to date firmly agreed to
write-off Iraq’s approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar). On December 17, 2004, the United
States signed an agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1 billion debt to
the United States; that debt consisted of principal and interest from about $2 billion
in defaults on Iraqi agricultural credits from the 1980s.36 On December 13, 2004, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession talks with Iraq.
Security Challenges,
Responses, and Options
In several speeches on Iraq since late 2005, President Bush cited successful
elections and the growth of the Iraqi security forces to assert that U.S. policy will
produce a stable Iraq, while acknowledging many of the unexpected security and
political difficulties encountered. Top U.S. military officials, including Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace, said in March 2006 that increasing sectarian-
motivated violence has now displaced the insurgency as the primary security
challenge in Iraq.
The Insurgent Challenge
The Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. and Iraqi forces has defied most
U.S. expectations in intensity and duration. Although hesitant to assess the size of
the insurgency, U.S. commanders say that insurgents probably number approximately
12,000-20,000. Some Iraqi (intelligence) officials have publicly advanced higher
estimates of about 40,000 active insurgents, helped by another 150,000 persons in
supporting roles. About 15,000 suspected insurgents are now in prison in Iraq.
Insurgent attacks numbered about 100 per day during most of 2005, but U.S.
commanders now put that number at about 75 attacks per day as of early 2006.
35 (...continued)
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
36 For more information, see CRS Report RS21765, Iraq: Debt Relief, by Martin Weiss.
CRS-27
As discussed in the Administration’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraqâ€
(November 30, 2005), many of the insurgents are motivated by opposition to
perceived U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite political dominance. Others
want to bring the Baath Party back into power, although, according to many experts,
some would settle for a larger Sunni role in governance without the Baath. Still
others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters, either foreign or Iraqi, that want to defeat the
United States and spread radical Islam throughout the region.
The insurgent groups are believed to be loosely coordinated at the city or
province level. However, in early 2006, a group of insurgent factions announced the
formation of an over-arching “Mujahedin Shura,†led by an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid
al-Baghdadi). Despite their growing organization, the insurgents have failed to
derail the political transition,37 although they have succeeded, to some extent, in
painting the Iraqi government as dependent on the United States for its survival. In
March 2006, insurgent groups conducted three separate large-scale (50 insurgents
fighters or more) attacks on police stations, in at least one case overrunning the
station and freeing prisoners from it. Other targets include not only U.S. forces and
Iraqi officials and security forces but also Iraqi civilians working for U.S. authorities,
foreign contractors and aid workers, oil export and gasoline distribution facilities,
and water, power, and other infrastructure facilities. The U.N. Security Council has
adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency — on August 4, 2005, it adopted
Resolution 1618, condemning the “terrorist attacks that have taken place in Iraq,â€
including attacks on Iraqi election workers, constitution drafters, and foreign
diplomats in Iraq. The FY2006 supplemental request aks for $1.3 million in Treasury
Department funds to disrupt insurgent financing.
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi.38 A relatively small but important component
of the insurgency are non-Iraqi fighters. A study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies released in September 2005 said that about 3,500 foreign
fighters are in Iraq, which would represent just under 20% of the overall insurgency
if the U.S. military estimate of 20,000 total insurgents is correct. According to the
study, the foreign fighters come mostly from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt, with Saudis constituting only about 350 of the 3,000 estimated
foreign fighters. The Department of Defense said on October 20, 2005, that 312
foreign fighters had been captured in Iraq since April 2005.
A major portion of the foreign insurgent contingent is commanded by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, a 40-year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan during the 1980s alongside other Arab volunteers against the Soviet
Union. Some reports say that he is a member, or perhaps even de-facto leader, of the
new “Mujahedin Shura†announced in early 2006. Zarqawi came to Iraq in late 2001,
along with several hundred associates, after escaping the U.S. war effort in
Afghanistan. He made his way to northern Iraq, after transiting Iran and Saddam-
37 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?†U.S. Institute
of Peace, Special Report 134, Apr. 2005; and Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White.
“Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency.†Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus No. 50, Dec. 2005.
38 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?, by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS-28
controlled Iraq, eventually taking refuge with a Kurdish Islamist faction called Ansar
al-Islam39 near the town of Khurmal.40 After the Ansar enclave was destroyed in OIF,
Zarqawi went to the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, naming his faction the Association of
Unity and Jihad. Since then, he has formally affiliated with Al Qaeda (through a
reputed exchange of letters) and changed his faction’s name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in
Mesopotamia.†It is named as an Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), assuming
that designation from the earlier Unity and Jihad title,41 which was designated as an
FTO in October 2004. Press reports said that U.S. forces almost caught him near
Ramadi in February 2005, and his aides posted web messages that he was seriously
wounded in a subsequent U.S. raid but then regained health.
Zarqawi’s faction has been the subject of substantial U.S. counter-efforts
because of its alleged perpetration of “terrorist†attacks — suicide and other attacks
against both combatant and civilian targets. Some of the attacks attributed to this
faction include the bombings in Baghdad of U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel
(August 19, 2003)42 and the August 2003 bombing that killed SCIRI leader
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim. The group, and related factions, have also kidnaped a
total of over 250 foreigner workers, and killed about 40 of those. Suggesting
Zarqawi sees his goals as establishing Islamist governance throughout the region,
Zarqawi’s faction reputedly committed the August 19, 2005, failed rocket attack in
the Jordanian port of Aqaba against two U.S. warships docked there, as well as the
November 10, 2005, Western-owned hotels in Amman, Jordan. Zarqawi also
believes in attacking Shiite civilians as a means of stoking a civil war in Iraq; his
group (possibly as part of the Mujahedin Shura) might have been responsible for the
February 22 attack on the Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra that sparked additional
sectarian violence. However, Zarqawi’s position on Shiite civilian attacks has caused
tensions and occasional armed clashes with Iraqi insurgent factions that oppose
attacks on purely civilian targets. U.S. forces have sought to exploit these differences
by attempting to engage Iraqi insurgent factions and persuade them to cooperate with
U.S. efforts against the foreign fighters, reportedly with some success.43
39 Ansar al-Islam originated in 1998 as a radical splinter faction of a Kurdish Islamic group
called the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK). Based in Halabja, the IMIK
publicized the effects of Baghdad’s Mar. 1988 chemical attack on that city. Ansar is named
by the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
40 Chivers, C.J. “Repulsing Attack By Islamic Militants, Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities,â€
New York Times, Dec. 6, 2002.
41 In early 2004, U.S. forces captured a letter purportedly written by Zarqawi asking bin
Laden’s support for Zarqawi’s insurgent activities in Iraq and an Islamist website broadcast
a message in October 2004, reportedly deemed authentic by U.S. agencies, that Zarqawi has
formally allied with Al Qaeda. There have also been recent press reports that bin Laden has
asked Zarqawi to plan operations outside Iraq. For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/
rls/31694.htm].
42 Among the dead in the latter bombing was the U.N. representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, and it prompted an evacuation of U.N. personnel from Iraq.
43 Filkins, Dexter and Sabrina Tavernise. U.S. Said to Meet With Insurgents, Exploiting
Rifts. New York Times, Jan. 7, 2006.
CRS-29
Outside Support. Numerous accounts have said that insurgent leaders are
using Syria as a base to funnel money and weapons to their fighters in Iraq.44 In
September 2005, U.S. ambassador Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of allowing
training camps in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to gather and train before going into Iraq.
These reports led to U.S. warnings to and imposition of additional U.S. sanctions
against Syria and to the U.S. Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of some
suspected financiers of the insurgency. Syria tried to deflect the criticism by moves
such as the February 2005 turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi to Iraqi
authorities. Since January 2006, senior U.S. commanders have said they have been
receiving increased cooperation from Syria to prevent insurgent flows across those
borders. Other assessments say the insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,45 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed in August 2005 that some explosives
from Iran had been intercepted in Iraq, although he did not assert that the shipment
was authorized by Iran’s government. He and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter
Pace asserted on March 7, 2006, that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is assisting armed
factions in Iraq with explosives and weapons. Because of Iran’s support for Shiite
militias, the United States and Iran confirmed in March 2006 that they would conduct
direct talks on the issue of stabilizing Iraq, and U.S. officials say such talks would not
expand to include bilateral U.S.-Iran issues such as Iran’s nuclear program. For more
information, see CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth
Katzman.
Others believe that outside support for the insurgency is minimal. According
to this view, the insurgents have ample supplies of arms and explosives obtained
from the nearly 250,000 tons of munitions remaining around Iraq in arms depots not
immediately secured after the regime fell.
Sectarian Violence/Militias
The security picture in Iraq has become more multi-dimensional over the past
year as an increasing amount of violence in Iraq has been sectarian — primarily
Sunni Arab against Shiite Arabs and vice versa — rather than purely Sunni Arab
(foreign and Iraqi) insurgents versus U.S. and Iraqi government forces. Since mid-
2005, there have been an increasing number of reports of attack and retaliation
between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs, including the frequent discovery of bodies
of groups of Sunni or Shiite civilians, bound and gagged, and dumped in rivers or
fields. Shiite leaders have blamed the attacks on Sunni insurgents, and as noted
above, some insurgent factions have openly advocated civilian attacks as part of a
deliberate, announced strategy to bring about civil war in Iraq.
44 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,†Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
21, 2004.
45 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.†Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates
By U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,†New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.
CRS-30
The sectarian violence is highly complicated because the Sunnis are blaming the
Shiites and Kurds for using their control over the emerging security forces — as well
as their party-based militias — to retaliate and repress Sunnis. Sunnis report that
Shiite militiamen who have joined the security forces are raiding Sunni homes or
using their arrest powers to abduct Sunnis, some of whom later show up killed.
Sunnis hold U.S. forces partly responsible for the violence because U.S. forces built
the Iraqi security forces and have allowed the Shiite and Kurdish militias to continue
to operate. To counter the Shiite-led violence, in February 2006, Sunni Arabs openly
announced formation of a militia, the Anbar Revolutionaries, to guard against Shiite
and Kurdish sectarian attacks.
The sectarian violence worsened after the February 22, 2006, bombing of the
Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra. The destruction of its dome set off a wave of
purported Shiite militia attacks on about 60 Sunni mosques and the killing of about
400 persons in sectarian attacks. (Some accounts put the death toll at more than
1,000.) According to one report, 191 bodies believed victims of sectarian violence
were discovered during March 7 - March 21, 2006. Other reports say there are now
over 25,000 internally displaced persons in Iraq (Iraqis who are fleeing their homes
in mixed neighborhoods because of threats from one sect or the other).46 The post-
Samarra violence has led U.S. commanders and diplomats to warn of the potential
for all-out civil war, although they have denied that Iraq is now in a civil war. U.S.
officials also have stepped up their efforts to persuade Iraq’s politicians to form a
unity government as quickly as possible.
The sectarian violence has heightened U.S. attention to the dangers of the
persistence of independent militias. The major Shiite militias, including SCIRI’s
“Badr Brigades†and Sadr’s Mahdi Army, particularly the latter, have been accused
of most of the anti-Sunni sectarian violence since the February 22 Samarra bombing.
Although U.S. commanders have largely tolerated the presence of militias, there may
be some indications that U.S. forces might begin to curb militia operations. In one
example, U.S. and Iraqi forces killed about 16 purported Mahdi fighters at a site in
Baghdad on March 26, 2006, although Iraq’s Shiite politicians say the site was a
mosque and those present there were unarmed. The major militias are discussed
below.
! Kurdish Peshmerga. Together, the KDP and PUK may have as
many as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of whom are
operating as unofficial security organs in northern Iraqi cities. Some
are integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and deploy in such
cities as Mosul and Baghdad. Kurdish ISF units reportedly were a
major component of the ISF forces that fought alongside U.S. forces
in offensives at Tal Affar in September 2005. Peshmerga units have
sometimes fought each other; in May 1994, the KDP and the PUK
clashed with each other over territory, customs revenues, and control
over the Kurdish regional government in Irbil.
46 Knickermeyer, Ellen. “Thousands of Iraqis Flee to Avoid Spread of Violence.â€
Washington Post, March 29, 2006.
CRS-31
! Badr Brigades. The militia of SCIRI numbers about 20,000 and is
led by Hadi al-Amiri (a member of the parliament). The Badr
Brigades were formed, trained, and equipped by Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard, politically aligned with Iran’s hardliners,
during the Iran-Iraq war, during which Badr guerrillas conducted
forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials.
Most Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners
of war held in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed SCIRI as
an Iranian puppet, and Badr operations in southern Iraq during the
1980s and 1990s did not spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi
regime. The Badr Organization registered as a separate political
entity, in addition to its SCIRI parent, for the elections in 2005.
! Badr militiamen play unofficial policing roles in Basra, Najaf, and
elsewhere in southern Iraq, and many Badr members also reputedly
are in the ISF, particularly the police, which is led by the SCIRI-
dominated Interior Ministry. A related militia, called the “Wolf
Brigade†is a Badr offshoot that is formally part of the police. It is
also led by a SCIRI activist. Sunni charges of Badr “death squadsâ€
activities first gained strength on November 16, 2005, with the
discovery by U.S. forces of a secret Ministry of Interior detention
facility. The facility, allegedly run by Badr militiamen, housed 170
Sunni Arab detainees who allegedly were tortured. At least two
other such facilities, run by the Wolf Brigade, were uncovered in
December 2005. In another example of militia strength, on August
9, 2005, Badr fighters reportedly helped SCIRI member Hussein al-
Tahaan forcibly replace Ali al-Tamimi as mayor of Baghdad.
! Mahdi Army. The size of Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia is unknown,
but it is regaining strength since U.S. military operations put down
Mahdi uprisings in April and August of 2004 in Sadr City. In each
case, fighting was ended with compromises under which Mahdi
forces stopped fighting (and in some cases traded in some of their
weapons for money) in exchange for lenient treatment or releases of
prisoners, amnesty for Sadr himself, and reconstruction aid. The
Mahdi Army has since ended active anti-U.S. combat and Sadr City
has been relatively peaceful, but Mahdi fighters, reportedly with the
tacit approval of U.S. forces, continued to patrol that district and
parts of other Shiite cities, particularly Basra. Mahdi (and Badr)
assertiveness in Basra has partly accounted for a sharp deterioration
of relations since July 2005 between Iraqi officials in Basra and the
British forces based there. About 11 British soldiers have died in
attacks in that area since then, and in October 2005, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair publicly blamed Iran for arming Iraqi groups,
particularly the Mahdi Army, responsible for the soldiers’ deaths.
In one dispute, British forces forcibly rescued British special forces
soldiers taken into official custody in Basra. Mahdi and Badr forces
have occasionally clashed as well, most recently in October 2005.
CRS-32
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security
At times, such as after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 and
after both elections in 2005, some U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the
insurgency would subside, only to see it continue. As outlined in the “National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq,†the Administration continues to try to refine its
stabilization strategy.
“Clear, Hold, and Buildâ€Strategy. The Administration is now pursuing a
strategy called “clear, hold, and build,†intended to create and expand stable
enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces and U.S. civilian reconstruction experts in areas
cleared of insurgents. The strategy is intended to prevent re-infiltration by insurgents
as well as to build hope among the Sunni population for improved conditions. In
conjunction with the new U.S. strategy, the Administration is forming Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs, adapted from a concept used in
Afghanistan, will be composed of about 70 to 100 U.S. diplomats and military
personnel to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as the provincial councils
(elected in the January 2005 elections), representatives of the Iraqi provincial
governors, and local ministry representatives. Thus far, three PRTs have been
inaugurated (Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hilla) by converting local U.S. embassy enclaves
into PRTs. A total of 16 PRTs (nearly one per province) are planned by July 2006,
and as noted above, substantial funds for the PRTs are requested in the FY2006
supplemental request ($1.075 billion requested including reconstruction funds and
monies for PRT force protection). However, as reported in the Washington Post on
January 15, 2006, the concept has run into some reported difficulty over U.S. military
objections to taking on expanded missions at a time when it is trying to draw down
its force. Despite lack of a clear U.S. military commitment to dedicate forces to the
PRTs, the Administration decided in March 2006 to move forward with nine U.S.-led
PRTs and three PRTs that might be commanded by partner countries.
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations. The Administration view
is that U.S. stabilization strategy requires continued combat operations against the
insurgency. About 133,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq (down from 160,000 there during
the December election period), with about another 50,000 troops in Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf region supporting OIF. U.S. troop levels reflect a January 4, 2006,
speech by President Bush in which he stated that U.S. troop levels would be reduced
slightly in early 2006 from the previous baseline of 138,000.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in March 2006 that Iraqi forces, not U.S.-
led international forces, would take the lead in trying to suppress any all-out civil
war. He and others have said they do not believe Iraq is now in a state of civil war.
A major focus of U.S. counter-insurgent combat remains Anbar Province, which
includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. About 40,000 U.S. troops are in Anbar
alone. In April 2004, after the city fell under insurgent control, U.S. commanders
contemplated routing insurgents from the city but, concerned about collateral
damage and U.S. casualties, they agreed to allow former Iraqi officers to patrol it.
This solution quickly unraveled and, as 2004 progressed, about two dozen other
Sunni-inhabited towns, including Baqubah, Balad, Tikrit, Mosul, Ramadi, Samarra,
CRS-33
and Tal Affar, as well as the small towns south of Baghdad, fell under insurgent
influence.
U.S. forces, joined by Iraqi forces, began operations in September 2004 to expel
insurgents. Most notable was “Operation Phantom Fury†on Fallujah (November
2004), involving 6,500 U.S. Marines and 2,000 Iraqi troops. Since then, over two
thirds of the city’s 250,000 have now returned, and some reconstruction has taken
place there. However, insurgents reportedly have re-infiltrated the city and U.S.
casualties continue in or near Fallujah. In the run-up to the December 15 elections,
U.S. (and Iraqi) forces conducted operations (for example Operations Matador,
Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and Ram) to clear
contingents of foreign fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities along the
Euphrates River. A major focus was to combat foreign fighters that entered Iraq
near the towns of Qaim, Husaybah, and Ubaydi, and had filtered down the Euphrates
valley to Ramadi, Hit and Haditha, or north into Tal Affar.
Casualties. As of March 29, 2006, about 2,326 U.S. forces and about 204
coalition partner soldiers have died in OIF, as well as over 125 U.S. civilians
working on contract to U.S. institutions in Iraq. Of U.S. deaths, about 2,180 have
occurred since President Bush declared an end to “major combat operations†in Iraq
on May 1, 2003, and about 1,823 of the U.S. deaths were by hostile action. About
2,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces, which are analyzed below, have been
killed in action, to date. On December 12, 2005, President Bush cited press accounts
that about 30,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed to date.
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)47
A major pillar of U.S. policy is to equip and train Iraqi security forces (ISF) that
could secure Iraq by themselves. President Bush stated in his June 28, 2005 speech,
“Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand
down.â€48 The conference report on the FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L.
109-13) required a Defense Department report to Congress on securing Iraq,
particularly the building of the ISF. The most recent such report, released February
2006, entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,†generally reiterates U.S.
official statements of progress in Iraq and contains details of the training of the ISF.
The tables below detail the composition of the ISF. As of March 22, there are
241,700 total ISF: 111,000 “operational†military forces under the Ministry of
Defense and 130,700 police/commando forces “trained and equipped†under the
Ministry of Interior. Those in units are organized into about 125 battalions. The total
force goal is 325,000 ISF by August 2007. However, police figures include possibly
tens of thousands (according to the GAO on March 15, 2005) who are absent-
without-leave or might have deserted. The police generally live with their families,
rather than in barracks, and are therefore hard to account for.
47 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy Sharp.
48 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/
2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].
CRS-34
The readiness of the ISF is subject to debate. ISF status, according to the
February 2006 DOD report mentioned above, is as follows:
! Battalions49 in Category One (fully independent): 0 (military only,
down from 3 reported at this level in June 2005);
! Battalions in Category Two (Iraqi unit capable of taking the lead in
operations): 71 (61 military and 10 police commando battalions);
! Battalions in Category Three: (Iraqi unit capable of fighting
alongside U.S./partner forces): 67 (49 military and 18 police
commando battalions); and
! Category Four: unit not yet formed.
By these measures, about 96,000 ISF (both military and police) are “in the
lead†or fully independent. U.S. officials and reports praise their performance in each
of the three election days in 2005, and General Casey praised the ISF’s performance
after the February 22 Samarra mosque bombing, although he did note some police
units allowed militia fighters through checkpoints to attack Sunnis. U.S.
commanders also cite as evidence of their growing confidence the September 2005
offensive in Tal Afar in which Iraqi units were in the lead, although some outside
accounts call that assessment into question. According to the State Department, U.S.
and partner forces have now turned over 33 of 111 “forward operating bases†to the
ISF, and the ISF (6th Division) control 90 square miles of Baghdad, although its
commander, Gen. Mudbar al-Dulaymi, was gunned down on March 6. In August
2005, U.S. commanders turned over full control of the city of Najaf to the ISF. On
January 26, 2006, the entire provinces of Wasit and Diwaniyah were turned over to
ISF control. Parts of southern Mosul and even parts of the “Green Zone†in Baghdad
were turned over subsequently. In March 2006, the commander of MNF-I Gen. Peter
Chiarelli said that ISF forces might control 75% of Iraqi territory by the end of 2006.
However, U.S. commanders and outside observers say that the ISF continue to
lack an effective command structure, independent initiative, or commitment to the
mission, and that it could fragment if U.S. troops draw down.50 U.S. commanders
have told journalists recently that it is common for half of an entire ISF unit to desert
or refuse to undertake a specified mission.51 A report on the Iraqi police by the
offices of the Inspector General of the State and Defense Departments, released July
15, 2005, said that many recruits are only marginally literate, and some recruits are
actually insurgents trying to infiltrate the ISF (p.3).52 As an indicator of continued
difficulties, in late December 2005, the U.S. military refused to turn over control of
central Baghdad to an ISF brigade (5th Brigade) until the Iraqi government approved
49 Each battalion has about 700 personnel. Regular police forces are not organized as
battalions and are not included in these figures.
50 Fallows, James. “Why Iraq Has No Army.†Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2005.
51 Castaneda, Antonio. “Iraqi Desertions Complicate U.S. Mission.†Associated Press,
January 31, 2006.
52 Inspectors General. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense.
Interagency Assessment of Iraqi Police Training. July 15, 2005.
CRS-35
the appointment of the (Sunni) leader of that brigade that U.S. officers considered
qualified.
Another major issue is ethnic balance; U.S. commanders have acknowledged
difficulty recruiting Sunni Arabs into the ISF and have said this is a deficiency they
are trying to correct. Most of the ISF are Shiites, with Kurdish units mainly deployed
in the north. There are few units of mixed ethnicity. As discussed above, many
Sunnis see the ISF as mostly Shiite and Kurdish instruments of repression. Sunnis
have also been recruited to rebuild police forces in Mosul and Fallujah, which
virtually collapsed in 2004.
As a result of the deficiencies of the ISF, in 2005 the U.S. military, based on
recommendations by Gen. Gary Luck, shifted up to 10,000 U.S. forces in Iraq to
embedding with Iraqi units (ten-person teams per Iraqi battalion), a trend that U.S.
officials say will continue in 2006. The embedding concept will be expanded in the
police forces in 2006, with 2,000 additional U.S. personnel to be embedded with
police commando units. The police embeds will not only promote discipline and
command abilities but help curb abuses against Sunnis.
ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy. Maj. Gen. David Petraeus first oversaw the training of the ISF as
head of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).53 On
September 8, 2005, he was replaced by Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey. The
Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this training and equipping
mission; according to the State Department, a total of $5.036 billion in IRRF funds
has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for, and in some cases
provide pay for) the ISF. Of those funds, $4.868 billion has been obligated as of
March 22, and $4.38 billion of that has been disbursed. A FY2005 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an additional $5.7 billion to equip and train the
ISF, funds to be controlled by the Department of Defense and provided to MNSTC-I.
When spent, that would bring total ISF funding to $11 billion. The FY2006
supplemental request asks for another $3.7 billion in DOD funds for the ISF. The
House-passed supplemental funding bill (H.R. 4939) provides about $3 billion of
those funds, but withholds the remaining ISF facilities construction funding.
53 For more information on this mission, see [http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/].
CRS-36
Table 4. Ministry of Defense Forces
(as of March 22, 2006)
IRRF Funds
Force
Size/Strength
Allocated
Iraqi Army
109,600. 110 battalions (about
$1.097 billion for
77,000 personnel) at top three levels
facilities; $707
of readiness. Trained for eight
million for equipment;
weeks, paid $60/month. Has mostly
$656 million for
East bloc equipment, including 77 T-
training, personnel,
72 tanks donated by Poland.
and operations
Iraqi Intervention
About 3,000 personnel, included in
Force
Army total above. Trained for 13
weeks.
Special Operations
About 1,500 divided between Iraqi
Forces
Counter-Terrorist Force (ICTF) and a
Commando Battalion. Trained for 12
weeks, mostly in Jordan.
Strategic
About 3,000 personnel in five
Infrastructure
battalions to protect oil pipelines,
Battalions
electricity infrastructure.
Mechanized Police
About 1,500. Recently transferred
Brigade
from Ministry of Interior control.
Air Force
About 600, its target size. Has 9
$28 million allocated
helicopters, 3 C-130s; 14 observation
for air fields (from
aircraft. Trained for six months.
funds for Iraqi Army,
UAE and Jordan to provide other
above)
aircraft and helos.
Navy
About 800, about the target size. Has
a Patrol Boat Squadron and a Coastal
Defense Regiment. Fields about 35
patrol boats for anti-smuggling and
anti-infiltration. Controls naval base
at Umm Qasra, Basra port, and Khor
al-Amaya oil terminals. Some
training by Australian Navy.
U.S./Other Trainers
U.S. training run by Multinational Security Transition
Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I). Training at Taji, north of
Baghdad; Kirkush, near Iranian border; and Numaniya, south
of Baghdad. All 26 NATO nations at NATO Training Mission
- Iraq (NTM-I) at Rustamiyah (300 trainers). Others trained at
NATO bases in Norway, Germany, and Italy. Jordan and
Egypt also have done training.
CRS-37
Table 5. Ministry of Interior (Police) Forces
(As of March 22, 2006)
Force
Size/Strength
IRRF Funds Allocated
Iraqi Police Service
90,900, including 1,300 person
$ 1.806 billion allocated
(IPS)
Highway Patrol. Target size is
for training and technical
135,000 by 2007. Gets eight
assistance.
weeks of training, paid $60 per
month. Not organized as
battalions.
Bureau of Dignitary
About 500 personnel
Protection
Police Commandos
About 10,000. Mostly for
counter-insurgency and
overwhelmingly Shiite. Gets
four weeks of training.
Emergency Response
About 300. Hostage rescue.
Unit
Public Order Police
About 10,000 personnel.
Brigades
Overwhelmingly Shiite.
Border Enforcement
About 18,000. Controls 258
$437 million, $3 million of
Department
border forts built or under
which is allocated to pay
construction. Has Riverine
stipends to 150 former
Police component to secure
regime WMD personnel.
water crossings.
Training
Training mostly at Jordan International Police Training
Center; Baghdad Police College and seven academies around
Iraq; and in UAE. Countries doing training aside from U.S.:
Canada, Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland, UAE, Denmark,
Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore, Belgium, and Egypt.
Facilities Protection
Technically outside MOI.
$53 million allocated for
Service
About 75,000 security guards
this service thus far.
protecting economic
infrastructure.
CRS-38
Coalition-Building and Maintenance54
Some believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient efforts to
enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that the U.S.
mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military personnel
contributions. As of March 22, 2006, 26 coalition partner forces are contributing
20,000 forces, but that total is expected to fall later in 2006. Poland and Britain lead
multinational divisions in central and southern Iraq, respectively. The UK-led force
(UK forces alone number about 8,000) is based in Basra; the Poland-led force
(Polish forces number 1,700) is based in Hilla. British leaders have confirmed that
they will draw down about 800 of those forces later in 2006. In March 2005, Poland
drew down to 1,700 from its prior force level of 2,400, and it is now reducing that
further to 900. That smaller force had been slated to leave by the end of 2006,
although a newly elected government says it might extend the mission into 2007.
The coalition in Iraq has been shrinking since Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of
its 1,300 troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004 Madrid
bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had
supported the war effort. However, Spain has said it might train Iraqi security forces
at a center outside Madrid. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
followed Spain’s withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in
July 2004 after one of its citizens was taken hostage and threatened with beheading.
On the other hand, many nations are replacing their contingents with trainers for the
ISF or financial contributions or other assistance to Iraq. Among recent changes are
the following.
! Hungary completed a pullout of its 300 forces in December 2004.
! Italy announced on March 15, 2005, that it would begin withdrawing
its force of 3,200 in September 2005; its contingent is now at about
2,600, based in the southern city of Nasiriyah. Italian officials say
that force will be halved by June 2006.
! Thailand, New Zealand, and Norway withdrew in early 2005, and
Norway’s 20 personnel were withdrawn in October 2005.
! In March 2005, the Netherlands withdrew its 1,350 troops, although
some remain. Some U.K. and Austrailian forces have taken over the
Netherlands force’s duty to help protect Japan’s forces in Samawa.
! Ukraine, which lost eight of its soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent
attack, withdrew 150 personnel from their base 25 miles south of
Baghdad in March 2005. Ukraine says it will complete its
54 For additional information on international contributions to Iraq peacekeeping and
reconstruction, see CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher
Blanchard.
CRS-39
withdrawal in early 2006, but it adds that it might give equipment to
the Iraqi military.
! In February 2004, Portugal withdrew its 127 paramilitary officers.
! Bulgaria pulled out its 360-member unit after the December 15 Iraqi
elections. However, in March 2006 it said it had sent in a 150-
person force to take over guard duties of Camp Ashraf, a base in
eastern Iraq where Iranian oppositionists are located.
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and its cabinet voted on November 21 to withdraw one-third of its
remaining 3,300 forces in late 2005, but to keep the remainder in
until the end of 2006.
! Japan’s parliament voted in mid-December 2005 to extend the
deployment of its 600-person military reconstruction contingent in
Samawah until as late as the end of 2006. However, the government
reportedly is considering ending it sooner, perhaps after the new
government is seated.
! Some countries have increased forces to compensate for
withdrawals. Singapore deployed 180 troops in November 2004
after a hiatus of several months. Azerbaijan also has increase forces.
! In February 2005, El Salvador agreed to send a replacement
contingent of 380 soldiers to replace those who are rotating out.
! In February 2005, Australia added 450 troops, bringing its
contribution to over 900.
! In March 2005, Georgia sent an additional 550 troops to Iraq to help
guard the United Nations facilities, bringing its total Iraq deployment
to 850. In March 2005, Albania increased its force by 50, giving it
about 120 troops in Iraq.
NATO/EU/Other Offers of Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO
countries have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to
contribute funds or equipment. Several NATO countries and others are offering to
train not only Iraqi security but also civilian personnel. In addition to the security
training offers discussed above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help
train Iraqi police, administrators, and judges outside Iraq. At the June 22, 2005
Brussels conference discussed above, the EU pledged a $130 million package to help
Iraq write its permanent constitution and reform government ministries; Norway
offered energy sector cooperation, and Turkey offered to conduct seminars on
democracy for Iraqis. Japan has made a similar offer on constitutional drafting, and
Malaysia has offered to train Iraqi civil servants. The FY2005 supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $99 million to set up a regional counter-
terrorism center in Jordan to train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
CRS-40
In July 2004, Secretary of State Powell said the United States would consider
a Saudi proposal for a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to perform
peacekeeping in Iraq, reportedly under separate command. However, the idea
floundered because of opposition from potential contributing countries.
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategyâ€
Some Members say that major new initiatives need to be considered to ensure
success of the U.S. mission in Iraq, and debates have emerged over several
congressional resolutions proposing an “exit strategy.†The Administration has also
adjusted U.S. goals in Iraq, now asserting that the United States is needed only until
Iraqi forces can combat the insurgency themselves, rather than until the insurgency
is ended. Some of the ideas widely circulated among Members and other policy
experts are discussed below.
Troop Increase. Some have said that the United States should increase its
troops in Iraq in an effort to prevent insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by
U.S. operations. Some experts believe the extra troops needed for such an effort
might number about 100,000.55 The Administration asserts that U.S. commanders
feel that planned force levels are sufficient to complete the mission, and that U.S.
commanders are able to request additional forces, if needed. About 700 additional
forces were sent to Iraq briefly following the February 22 Samarra bombing to help
prevent a descent into all out-civil war. Some experts believe that troop level
increases would aggravate Sunni Arabs already resentful of the U.S. intervention in
Iraq and that even many more U.S. troops would not necessarily produce stability and
would appear to deepen the U.S. commitment without a clear exit strategy. Others
believe that increasing U.S. force levels would further the impression that the Iraqi
government depends on the United States for its survival.
Immediate Withdrawal. Some Members argue that the United States should
begin to withdraw virtually immediately. Supporters of this position tend to argue
that the decision to invade Iraq and change its regime was a mistake in light of the
failure thus far to locate WMD, that a continued large U.S. presence in Iraq is
inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S.
casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Those who take this position
include the approximately 50 Members of the “Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus,â€
formed in June 2005. In November 2005, Representative John Murtha, a ranking
member and former chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, publicly
articulated a similar position, calling for an “immediate†pullout (over six months).
His resolution (H.J.Res. 73) called for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable
date†and the maintenance of an “over the horizon†U.S. presence to help the ISF.
A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written by Representative Duncan Hunter,
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), expressed the sense “that the
deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be terminated immediately;†it failed 403-3 on
November 18, 2005. Other bills, such as H.R. 3142 and H.Con.Res. 197, state that
it [should be] U.S. policy not to maintain a permanent or long-term presence in Iraq.
55 Bersia, John. “The Courage Needed to Win the War,†Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 9,
2005.
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Withdrawal Timetable. Another alternative is the setting of a timetable for
a U.S. withdrawal. This has been exemplified by H.J.Res. 55, introduced by five
House Members from both parties, which calls on the Administration to begin a
withdrawal by October 2006. In November 2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view
that the United States needs to force internal compromise in Iraq by threatening to
withdraw, introduced an amendment to S. 1042 (defense authorization bill) to
compel the Administration to work on a timetable for withdrawal (during 2006).
Reportedly, on November 10, 2005, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee John Warner reworked the Levin proposal into an amendment that
stopped short of setting a timetable for withdrawal but requires an Administration
report on a “schedule for meeting conditions†that could permit a U.S. withdrawal.
That measure, which also states in its preamble that “2006 should be a period of
significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty,†achieved bi-partisan support, passing
79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications by House conferees, in the
conference report on the bill (H.R. 1815, H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-163). Senator
Russ Feingold expressed a view similar to that of Senator Levin in August 2005
when Senator Feingold called for a withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2006.
His resolution (S.Res. 171) calls for the Administration to report to Congress on the
time frame needed for the United States to complete its mission.
Troop Drawdown. Responding to the November 2005 congressional action,
President Bush and U.S. commanders remained adamant in their stated opposition
to the setting of any timetable for troop pullouts, let alone an immediate pullout.
They maintained that the Iraqi government would collapse upon an immediate
pullout, representing a victory for such terrorist figures as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
However, as noted above, the President has announced a small drawdown in early
2006 (to about 135,000), and senior U.S. military officials said in late 2005 that there
are plans for a substantial drawdown (40,000 - 50,000 of the total contingent) later
in 2006 if there is continued political progress and the insurgency does not escalate.
On the other hand, some U.S. commanders appear to have backtracked on
discussions of a drawdown in the wake of the post-February 22 Samarra bombing
violence discussed above.
Some Members appear to favor the idea of a troop drawdown. In December
2005, Senator John Kerry said the United States should reduce its forces by “at leastâ€
100,000 by the end of 2006. Senator Joseph Biden, ranking Democrat on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, has said publicly that a drawdown is likely in early
2006. Senator Hillary Clinton wrote to constituents in late November 2005 that the
United States might begin withdrawing troops after the December 15 elections, if
those elections are successful.56
Power-Sharing Formulas. Both the Administration and its critics have
identified the need to bring more Sunni Arabs into the political process to undercut
support for the insurgency. As noted, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad has been reaching
out to Sunni groups, even some known to have ties to insurgents, and has persuaded
some Sunnis to participate openly in the political process. Some believe that a key
56 Healy, Patrick. Senator Clinton Calls for Withdrawal From Iraq to Begin in 2006. New
York Times, November 30, 2005.
CRS-42
to progress in this effort will be U.S. ability to persuade the Shiites and Kurds to
agree to major amendments to the constitution during the four month amendment
process that begins after the December 15 election. Another unknown is what
package of incentives, if any, would persuade most Sunnis to end support for the
insurgency and fully support the government. Many experts believe that the Sunnis
will only settle for a share of power that is perhaps slightly less than that wielded by
the majority Shiites, even though the Shiites greatly outnumber Sunni Arabs in Iraq.
Negotiating With the Insurgents. In addition to exploring power sharing
arrangements with moderate Sunni leaders, the Administration appears to have
adopted a recommendation by early critics of U.S. policy to negotiate with some
Sunni figures representing the insurgency (including members of the MSA) and
even with some insurgent commanders. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld confirmed
to journalists in June 2005 that such discussions had taken place. The talks
reportedly have been intended to help U.S. forces defeat Zarqawi’s foreign insurgent
faction. However, no major insurgent factions have laid down arms. The insurgents
who have attended such talks reportedly want an increased role for Sunnis in
government and a withdrawal of U.S. and ISF forces from Sunni-inhabited areas.
Some U.S. officials appear to believe that talking directly with insurgents increases
insurgent leverage and emboldens them to continue attacks.
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction. Some believe that the key to
calming Iraq is to accelerate economic reconstruction. According to this view,
accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment,
improving public services, and creating confidence in the government. This idea
appears to have been incorporated into the President’s “National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq†document and the formation of the PRTs, as discussed above. Others doubt
that economic improvement alone will produce major political results. According
to this view, the divisions among Iraq’s major factions are fundamental and resistant
to amelioration by an improved economy. In addition, the U.S. refraining from
requesting major additional reconstruction funds might indicate that the
Administration has not found this idea persuasive.
Focus on Local Security. Another idea advanced by experts, and which
appears to form the core of the Administration’s “clear, hold, and build†approach
in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, is for the United States to shift its focus
from broad counter-insurgency combat operations to local efforts to improve the
sense of security of average Iraqis. This is intended to deny the insurgents popular
support.57 At least one version of this idea, advanced by Andrew Krepinevich in the
September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,58 says that the United States
should devote substantial resources to providing security and reconstruction in
selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that would attract support and be
expanded to other areas and eventually throughout Iraq.
Partition. Some commentators believe that Iraq cannot be stabilized as one
country and should be broken up into three separate countries: one Kurdish, one
57 Pollack, Kenneth. “Five Ways to Win Back Iraq,†New York Times op-ed. July 1, 2005.
58 Krepinevich, Andrew. “How to Win in Iraq,†Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2005.
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Sunni Arab, and one Shiite Arab. However, many Middle East experts believe the
idea is unworkable because none of the three would likely be self-sufficient and
would likely fall firmly under the sway of Iraq’s powerful neighbors.
Table 6. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
War
opposition
INC
crimes
Broadcasting
activities
Total
FY1998
—
2.0
5.0 (RFE/RL
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
for “Radio Free
Iraq)
FY1999
3.0
3.0
—
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000
—
2.0
—
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in Iraq)
(INC radio)
FY2002
—
—
—
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1
—
—
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-FY2003
(about 14.5
million of this
went to INC
FY2004
—
—
—
0
0
(request)
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act†—
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conferenceâ€) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,†which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program†to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war
crimes†funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission†fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation, Apr. 2004.
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Figure 1. Map of Iraq