Order Code RL33331
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
U.S. Occupation Assistance:
Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared
March 23, 2006
Nina Serafino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick K. Nanto
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan
Compared
Summary
This report provides aggregate data on U.S. assistance to Iraq and compares it
with U.S. assistance to Germany and Japan during the seven years following World
War II. U.S. aid allocations (all grant assistance ) for Iraq appropriated from 2003
to 2006 total $28.9 billion. About $17.6 billion (62%) went for economic and
political reconstruction assistance. The remaining $10.9 billion (38%) was targeted
at bolstering Iraqi security. A higher proportion of Iraqi aid has been provided for
economic reconstruction of critical infrastructure than was the case for Germany and
Japan. Total U.S. assistance to Iraq thus far is roughly equivalent to total assistance
(adjusted for inflation) provided to Germany — and almost double that provided to
Japan — from 1946-1952.
For Germany, in constant 2005 dollars the United States provided a total of
$29.3 billion in assistance from 1946-1952 with 60% in economic grants and nearly
30% in economic loans, and the remainder in military aid. Beginning in 1949, the
Marshall Plan provided $1.4 billion with the specific objective of promoting
economic recovery. Prior to that, U.S. aid was categorized as Government and Relief
in Occupied Areas (GARIOA). Adjusting for inflation, the constant 2005 dollar total
for Marshall Plan aid was $9.3 billion, of which 84% billion was grants and 16% was
loans. (West Germany eventually repaid one-third of total U.S. assistance it
received.)
Total U.S. assistance to Japan for 1946-1952 was roughly $15.2 billion in 2005
dollars, of which 77% was grants and 23% was loans. Most of these funds were
provided through GARIOA grants. Japan repaid $490 million of the total postwar
assistance. Of the $2.2 billion in total aid, an estimated $655 million, or almost a
third, went to categories that would mostly contribute directly to economic recovery
(industrial materials, including machinery and raw goods; petroleum and products;
and transportation, vehicles, and equipment). Most of the rest went for agricultural
equipment, foodstuffs, and food supplies with smaller amounts spent on medical and
sanitary supplies, education, and clothing.
U.S. assistance to Germany and Japan largely consisted of food-related aid
because of severe war-induced shortages and the need to provide minimum
subsistence levels of nutrition. In Iraq, humanitarian aid has been a minor part of the
assistance. Expectations also have changed. Countries today have much higher
expectations of what the United States should contribute to reconstruction in Iraq
relative to what was expected following World War II. Germany and Japan also are
larger than Iraq — both population and size of their respective economies — and the
extent of war damage to each country’s industrial capacity was different. Iraq also
faces an insurgency that deliberately sabotages the economy and reconstruction
efforts, whereas there were no resistance movements in either Germany or Japan.
This report will not be updated.

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Contents
Context, Caveats, and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Post-World War II Assistance to Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Post-World War II Assistance to Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Current U.S. Assistance to Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Comparative Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
List of Figures
U.S. Assistance to Iraq (FY2003-06), Germany, and Japan (1945-52) . . . . . . . . . 2
List of Tables
Table 1. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(in Millions of Current Dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 2. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(in Millions of Current Dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 3. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(in Millions of Conant 2005 Dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 4. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(in Millions of Constant 2005 Dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany
and Japan Compared1
Some Members of Congress have questioned whether U.S. assistance to Iraq in
the wake of the military action of 2003 has been adequate, others whether it might
be excessive. Some have wondered whether one point of comparison is the
assistance that the United States provided to German and Japan during military
occupations of those countries after World War II. The following information and
attached tables provide information relevant to such comparisons.
In brief, although the context of the military occupation of Iraq is markedly
different from that of the post-World War II occupations, the total amount of U.S.
assistance allocated for Iraq in the three years since 2003 appears to be comparable
to the amount provided to Germany and double that provided to Japan for the seven
years after World War II. (This represented the overlapping periods of direct military
government and the Marshall plan assistance in Germany and the entire period of the
military occupation of Japan.)
Breakdowns for specific purposes are difficult, as the costs were covered under
different categories and in different ways. One area in which a rough approximation
is possible, however, is funding for the reconstruction and improvement of critical
economic infrastructure. This figure is particularly important to some Members as
they consider the tradeoffs between funding spent on Iraq and funding available for
similar purposes in the United States. Comparisons of funding for other purposes,
such as government, education, and humanitarian relief are difficult, as the needs
were different in each case and/or the assistance was provided in different ways that
do not facilitate comparison. This report does not attempt to compare indirect forms
of assistance, such as debt relief, and funding provided by other donors.
Aid allocations for Iraq appropriated from 2003 to 2006, all of which is grant
assistance, totaled $28.9 billion. Of this, about $11.5 billion (40%) was for the repair
and improvement of critical economic infrastructure.2 The total figure is roughly
equivalent to total assistance provided to Germany from FY1946-1952 ($29.3 billion
in 2005 dollars) and almost double that provided to Japan ($15.2 billion in 2005
dollars). U.S. funding provided specifically for economic infrastructure in Iraq
1 Research assistance for this report was provided by L.J. Cunningham and J. Michael
Donnelly, KSG-FDT, CRS.
2 As discussed below, funding of economic infrastructure in Iraq is perhaps more
comparable to the type of assistance provided Japan and Germany than is total assistance
that would encompass funds for enhancing public security and/or for governance and public
welfare.

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CRS-2
appears to be greater than the proportion provided for economic reconstruction in
both Germany and Japan.
This report will not be updated.
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Iraq (FY2003-06), Germany, and
earch Service. Data from U.S. Department of State,
Japan (1945-52), Total and for Economic Reconstruction
urces.
$Billion 2005 Dollars
35
Total Assistance
30
28.9
29.3
Economic Reconstruction
25
20
15.2
15
11.5
9.3
10
5.2
5
0
Iraq
Germany
Japan
Country
Source: Congressional Research Service. Data from U.S. Department of State,
appropriations bills, and other sources.
Context, Caveats, and Methodology
The circumstances in which the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan began
were quite different from those under which the U.S. entered Iraq in 2003. Germany
and Japan had both declared war on the United States and during at least the first year
after World War II, U.S. policymakers were inclined to provide only a survival level
of food and other assistance to its defeated enemies in order to avert starvation and
prevent massive outbreaks of disease. U.S. objectives in the post-World War II
occupations were characterized as the four “Ds”.
The United States’ primary objective in both Germany and Japan was
demilitarization. In Japan, the next two were disarmament and decentralization of
the economy through the dismantling of powerful economic groups. In Germany,
the next two were denatzification and deindustralization, the later in the expectation
that Germany could become an agricultural country. The fourth “D” in both cases

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CRS-3
was democratization, although many U.S. policymakers and occupation planners
were skeptical that the Germans and Japanese had the necessary cultural background
and psychological disposition for flourishing democracies. Both countries were
expected to be responsible for their own economic recovery. Within a few years,
however, the United States had recognized the need to provide assistance for
economic recovery and reconstruction in Germany and Japan and programs with that
objective commenced in 1948.
In Iraq, in contrast, U.S. policymakers have made economic and political
reconstruction and development priorities from the outset. Democracy-building
became the primary objective of U.S. assistance to Iraq very early in the occupation,
as no caches of biological and chemical weapons were found. Unlike the cases of
Germany and Japan, there was no massive humanitarian crisis requiring aid in Iraq.

It is impossible to precisely compare the amount of aid that the United States
has provided to post-war Iraq with the amounts spent during the occupations of
Germany and Japan. For one, there is no record of the amount spent on political and
social welfare reconstruction and development in Germany and Japan. Much of the
political and social welfare institution-building assistance that is being provided by
U.S. contractors in Iraq now was either not provided in the cases of Germany and
Japan, was paid for by those countries (which made payments to the United States
for occupation costs), or was done by occupation troops or others whose salary costs
were not calculated.3 No precise calculation of assistance for economic
reconstruction can be made in the cases of Germany and Japan without surveying the
papers from the occupations for that specific purpose, as information available in the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) data base, the standard source
for figures on U.S. government assistance, is aggregated according to accounts, not
purposes. In addition, in the case of funding for Iraq, accounts may contain a mix of
assistance types, and even specific grants may have multiple humanitarian, political,
and economic purposes. Nevertheless, very rough comparisons of assistance for
economic reconstruction are possible.
For the purposes of rough comparison, this report compared figures from the
web version of the standard source for U.S. foreign aid funding, U.S. Overseas Loans
and Grants4 as the source for figures on U.S. aid to Japan and Germany. CRS
converted these figures to constant 2005 dollars using the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) Price Index of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (These aid figures do
not reflect the net amount of U.S. assistance to these countries, as they do not offset
amounts that the conquered countries paid in reparations. Nor do they account for
the amounts paid by those countries for feeding and housing occupation troops.) The
four tables at the end of this report show these figures. In addition, further
information is supplied in the sections below from a Marshall Plan document in the
case of Germany and from occupation documents in the case of Japan.
3 The United States may also have costs in Iraq that are not calculated, such as the salaries
of U.S. government officials who have advised the Iraqi government.
4 I.e., “the Greenbook,” at http://qesdb.cdie.org. Figures in other sources are not always
consistent with these figures.

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CRS-4
Post-World War II Assistance to Germany
U.S. assistance to Germany totaled some $4.3 billion ($29.6 billion in 2005
dollars) for the years of direct military government (May 1945-May 1949) and the
overlapping Marshall Plan years (1948/1949-1952). Initial funding, primarily under
the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program was directed
primarily at humanitarian relief. (GARIOA provided funding for the basic relief
supplies necessary for “the prevention of disease and unrest prejudicial to the
occupying forces,” and was “limited to food, fertilizers, seed, and minimum
petroleum requirements.”5) GARIOA grants and loans — totaling $2.2 billion in
current dollars ($15.4 in constant 2005 dollars) — made up just over half of the total
and virtually all of the funding for about the first three years, although a small
amount of other relief aid and some military surplus property was also provided
during that period. The Marshall Plan, through which aid to Germany began in
1948/1949 and continued through 1952, provided about a third of total U.S. aid to
that country. Some military aid grants, related to the new security environment, was
provided in the last Marshall Plan years. (The West German government eventually
repaid one-third of total U.S. assistance to Germany during this period, even though
loans formally comprised only 28% of total funds provided to Germany.)6
The Marshall Plan provided the first funding for Germany with the specific
objective of promoting economic recovery. The official figure for total Marshall
Plan assistance to Germany is almost $1.4 billion in current year dollars ($9.3 billion
in 2005 dollars, of which $7.8 billion was grants and $1.5 billion was loans.).7 [This
corresponds to the categories of USAID Predecessor Grants and USAID Predecessor
Loans in the tables below.] The entire amount of Marshall Plan aid is usually
considered economic reconstruction funding, even though much of the aid provided,
in the first year particularly, was foodstuff to feed workers whose productivity was
compromised by malnourishment. (The severe winter of 1946-1947 in Europe made
hunger a greater problem at that point than it was right at the end of the war and
made apparent the need for increased food and other assistance.) The economic
effect of Marshall Plan assistance was enhanced by the Plan’s requirement that
recipients match U.S. funding with “counterpart” contributions in national currencies.
These were invested in the areas that national governments determined, in
consultation with Marshall Plan officials, would best stimulate national economies.
According to an interim report to Congress prepared by the Economic
Cooperation Agency (the agency which administered the Marshall Plan), food
5 Testimony of N. H. Collisson. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Extension of European Recovery Program. Hearings on H.R. 2362, A Bill to Amend the
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. Part I. 81st Congress, 1st Session. p. 233. February 8,
9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 1949. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1949.
6 Susan Stern. Marshall Plan 1947-1997: A German View. Accessed November 9, 2005,
through the website of the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. [http://www.germany-
info.org/relaunch/culture/history/marshall.html]
7 Table II in CRS Report RL 97-62, The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and
Relevance to the Present, by Curt Tarnoff. January 6, 1997.

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CRS-5
accounted for nearly half (i.e., 46%) of the commodities delivered in the first three-
plus years, i.e., between April 3, 1948 and June 30, 1951.8 (Deliveries during this
period accounted for perhaps 80% of total deliveries under the Marshall Plan.)
Inputs to industry, i.e., raw materials and semi-finished products, comprised 40% of
the total. Of those inputs, nearly 60% was cotton; most of the rest was metals and
chemicals. Petroleum and petroleum products accounted for 4%. About 2 ½% was
for machinery and vehicles, and 6 ½% was for miscellaneous, mostly tobacco.
Post-World War II Assistance to Japan
Total U.S. assistance to Japan for the years of the occupation, from 1946-1952
was roughly $2.2 billion ($15.2 billion in 2005 dollars), of which almost $1.7 billion
was grants and $504 million was loans. The Greenbook presents these figures as
provided under five headings. Over three-quarters (77 percent) of these funds were
provided through GARIOA grants. Most of the remainder (i.e., 23 percent) was $490
million in related funds that Japan repaid and is classified as a loan. There is no
information in the Greenbook or readily available published sources regarding how
much of this was provided for economic reconstruction, although the intent of the
occupation after 1948 was to promote economic recovery.
Figures for Japan compiled by a CRS analyst who examined occupation papers
and related documents in that country show that about 40 percent of the U.S.
assistance may well be considered as having been targeted at economic infrastructure
reconstruction, broadly defined.9 It should be noted that the total value of U.S. aid
from the occupation documents and other documents that this analyst drew on is just
slightly over $2.0 billion in current dollars — slightly lower than the Greenbook total
of $2.2 billion. This was a figure that was agreed upon in the 1960s by Japanese and
U.S. officials as part of the negotiations on the amount of U.S. assistance that Japan
would repay. (The Greenbook figure is for funds appropriated, whereas the lower
negotiated figures derives from estimates of goods actually received plus
administrative costs.) Using this as a base, the net value of the grant and loan aid as
actually received by Japan would be $1.9 billion after deducting for the
administrative expenses that the United States charged against the funds.10
Of the negotiated $2.0 billion in current year dollars ($13.4 in constant 2005
dollars), $655 million ($4.3 billion in constant dollars) or 32 percent, went to
8 This breakdown is drawn from Table B-4 of that report. U.S. Congress. House.
Thirteenth Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration for the Quarter
Ended June 30, 1951. House Document No. 249. 82nd Congress, 1st session. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Office. p. 114, in House Documents, Vol. 37, 1951.
9 From “United States Aid to Japan: A Reassessment,” by Dick K. Nanto. Unpublished
Paper. September 1977. Based on The United States’ Role in Japan’s Postwar Economic
Recovery. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1976.
10 The precise figure was $1,937,916,796. This is a net figure, i.e., the total $2,027,657,196
of total aid actually received by Japan, according to the occupation documents, minus
$89,740,400 that the U.S. deducted for administrative expenses. The $490 million repaid
to the United States by Japan at 2.5 percent interest is not deducted from the total aid figure.

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CRS-6
categories that would mostly contribute directly to economic reconstruction, i.e.,
industrial materials, including machinery and raw goods ($310 million or 15%);
petroleum, oils, and lubricants ($95 million or 5%); and transportation, vehicles, and
equipment ($249 million or 12%). It is also likely that much of the funds categorized
as payment of civilians ($67 million) and miscellaneous ($63 million ) also could be
considered as contributing to economic reconstruction, especially as Japanese labor
was provided incentives in order to encourage production.11 (The total in 2005
dollars for these payments to civilians and miscellaneous is $0.86 billion.) These
categories of aid total $785 million in current dollars and $5.2 billion in constant
dollars.
Of the remaining $1.2 billion, $1.19 billion ($7.9 billion in 2005 dollars and 59
percent of the total) went to agricultural equipment, foodstuffs, and food supplies.
This was aimed at helping to feed the Japanese population. The remainder ($49
million in current dollars, $324 million in 2005 dollars) were expenditures for
medical and sanitary supplies (under 1% of the total), education (under 1%), and
clothing, textiles and shoes (a little over 1%).
Current U.S. Assistance to Iraq
U.S. assistance to Iraq appropriated from FY2003 to FY2006 totaled some $28.9
billion.12 All of it is grant assistance. While most funds were appropriated to a
special Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF, $21 billion) and an Iraq Security
Forces Fund ($5.7 billion), additional sums from the budgets of DOD and other
agencies have been used for reconstruction purposes. The Departments of State and
Defense as well as USAID are the key entities responsible for implementing Iraq
assistance programs.
Nearly 40% of total funding, roughly $11.5 billion, was aimed at restoring
economically critical infrastructure, including airports, roads, bridges, railroads,
seaports, electric power, water and sanitation, telecommunications, and essential
buildings. Another $6.2 billion, representing about 22% of total aid, has been
allocated to assist democratization (including civil society), education and health and
the expansion of the private sector. A small amount of emergency relief and food aid
was provided, especially in the early stages of the post-U.S. invasion period.
Together, the infrastructure reconstruction assistance — which best corresponds to
the bulk of aid provided to Germany and Japan — and the social, economic, and
political development aid — which is more characteristic of current U.S. assistance
around the world — make up nearly two-thirds of total Iraq funding for economic
11 Nanto found that total assistance for industrial capital formation (rebuilding Japan’s
factories) was $1.4 million ($9.4 million in constant 2005 dollars), or some 0.07 percent of
the total aid program. This consisted of funding for industrial machinery and parts, vehicles
and motor parts, and related miscellaneous equipment and supplies.
12 Most of this funding was contained in P.L. 108-11, FY2003 emergency supplemental
appropriations (H.R. 1559); P.L. 108-106, FY2004 emergency supplemental appropriations
(H.R. 3289); P.L. 109-13, FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriations (H.R. 1268);
and P.L. 109-102, FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations (H.R. 3057).

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CRS-7
and political reconstruction to date. The remaining $10.9 billion in aid, nearly 38%
of the total, is targeted at bolstering Iraqi security. Most of it provides training and
equipment to the various security forces, including police and army, but funds are
also used to provide facilities for security and law enforcement.
Comparative Overview
While the total amount of aid to Iraq — roughly $29 billion — now appears to
be roughly the same as that spent during the occupation of Germany and double that
during the occupation of Japan, the total amounts and percentages of U.S. assistance
targeted specifically at economic infrastructure reconstruction for Germany and Japan
over the FY1949-1952 period appear to be lower than the amounts and percentages
currently directed at such reconstruction in Iraq. In constant 2005 dollars, U.S. aid
targeted at economic infrastructure reconstruction was some $9.3 billion in Germany,
or about one-third of total U.S. assistance to that country, and some $5.2 billion in
Japan, or a little under 40% of total U.S. assistance there. If one were to consider
food aid for Japanese workers as part of assistance for reconstruction there in order
to make it more comparable with Marshall Plan reconstruction aid to Germany, the
Japan figure would be considerably higher (about $13.1 billion in constant 2005
dollars).
The amount and proportion of assistance for roughly equivalent infrastructure
reconstruction in Iraq appears higher, probably about $11.5 billion. This would
indicate that the actual (adjusted) dollar amounts of U.S. aid for economic
infrastructure reconstruction in Iraq thus far is roughly a third greater than that
provided to Germany and perhaps more than double that provided to Japan. One
explanation for the difference may be that aid for economic reconstruction in
Germany and Japan consisted of financing through loans and grants in order to
enable those countries to carry out their recoveries largely on their own. In Iraq, the
United States is providing not only the material assistance, but also is paying for the
necessary labor.

For these three countries, infrastructure assistance is the most comparable
element. Other aid sectors are difficult to compare because the situations varied
greatly. A large proportion of U.S. assistance to Germany and Japan consisted of
food aid because of the humanitarian crisis which ensued after the war. Food and
housing shortages were critical in both Germany and Japan for several years after
World War II, and early U.S. assistance focused on providing a subsistence level of
nutrition. Massive humanitarian relief was necessary. In Iraq, humanitarian aid has
been a minor part of the assistance program because there was little need for food or
other immediate relief assistance for most of the population. Democracy, security,
and other governance efforts are also difficult to compare. In Germany and Japan
they were conducted by occupation forces and separate accounts were not
maintained.
Assistance in these three cases varied greatly, not only because of the conditions
in which the occupations took place. The size of the country and economy and the

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CRS-8
degree of economic development is different in each of the cases, as were the states
of the economic infrastructure at the end of and after the war.
In 1940, before the United States entered World War II, it had a population of
132.6 million and a GDP that was 2 ½ times greater than that of Germany (with a
population of 69.8 million) and about 4 ½ times greater than that of Japan (with a
population of 73 million).13 After the war, the differences were much greater: U.S.
per capita income was 1/3 higher than that of Germany in 1940 and over 4 times
higher in 1946; it was almost 2½ times higher than that of Japan in 1940 and well
over 6 times higher in 1946. At the end of the Marshall Plan period in 1952,
recovery to pre-war levels had occurred in both countries. In 1952, U.S. per capita
income was 2 1/4 times higher than that of Germany and almost 4½ times that of
Japan.14
Regarding economic infrastructure, some sectors of Germany’s infrastructure
were left surprisingly intact according to recent analyses: “At the end of the war, the
industrial capacity in the Western zones was in theory not markedly less than that of
the same territories in 1936....The coal, iron, and steel industries were relatively
lightly damaged, whereas most manufacturing was much more seriously impaired.”15
Severe damage to public utilities - especially power stations and transportation
facilities16 — slowed the restoration of production, as did malnutrition and disease.
Similarly, recent analyses of the state of Japan’s economic infrastructure showed
that, overall, industry was not demolished: “If we look at industries by sector, we can
see that although the rate of capacity in the consumer goods industries was damaged
because many factories had been converted to war production, by contrast, the
damage rate was relatively low in the heavy and chemical industries. The steel and
electric power generation industries even emerged from the war with plant capacity
above prewar levels.”17

13 The comparisons in this paragraph are based on statistics from: Angus Maddison, The
World Economy: Historical Statistics, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 2003.
14 The U.S. population grew to 141.9 million by 1946 and 157.6 million by 1952. Japan’s
population also grew by 1946 (to 77.2 million) through 1952 (to 86.5 million) due in large
part to the immigration of ethnic Japanese from other parts of Asia. Germany’s population
shrank by 1946 (to 64.7 million), but surpassed its 1940 level by 1952 (by then totaling 69.1
million), due in part to the immigration of ethnic Germans from nearby countries.
15 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress. From Shadow to Substance: 1945-1963. Cambridge:
Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989. pp. 132-133.
16 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Historical Context of Stability and
Reconstruction Operations: Germany after World War II. A report prepared under an
interagency agreement with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Commande Futures
Center. December 2005. pp. 29-31.
17 “The Postwar Japanese Economy, 1945-1973” by Yutaka Kōsai, in Michael Smitka, ed.,
Japan’s Economic Ascent: International Trade, Growth, and Postwar Reconstruction. New
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998. p. 83.

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CRS-9
Observers may note that the Iraqi people and the international community most
likely have much higher expectations of what the United States should contribute to
economic reconstruction in Iraq than what the United States was expected to
contribute to Germany and Japan, as the disparities are much greater between the
United States and Iraq than between the United States and its World War II
adversaries. The United States, with a current population of 290 million, has a GDP
more than 200 times greater than that of Iraq, population 26 million ($11,750 billion
compared to $54.4 billion, 2004 estimate). U.S. GDP per capita was almost 20 times
that of Iraq in 2004 ($40,100 compared to $2,100).18 While U.S. military action did
little damage, by design, to much of Iraq’s economic infrastructure, it did damage
Iraq’s electrical grid,19 which had an effect on the availability of water. In addition,
Iraq’s infrastructure had greatly deteriorated over the previous years. The existence
of an insurgency in Iraq which deliberately sabotages the economy and reconstruction
efforts is an important consideration in comparing Iraq’s economic reconstruction
requirements with those of post-war Germany and Japan, which had no resistance
movements.
1 8 Figures in this paragr a p h from the on-line CIA Factbook
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook], accessed November 28, 2005.
19 According to one article “damage to the electrical grid was a major post-war problem.
Despite the precision bombing of the campaign, by mid-April wartime damage and
immediate postwar looting had reduced Baghdad’s power supply to one fifth its pre-war
level, according to an internal Pentagon study. In mid-July the grid would be back to only
half its pre-war level, working on a three-hours-on, three-hours-off schedule.” James
Fallows. Blind into Baghdad. The Atlantic Monthly. January-February, 2004.

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CRS-10
Table 1. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(in Millions of Current Dollars)
GERMANY
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
TOTAL
Total Economic Grants
195.8
298.3
234.4
810.6
579.4
393.1
90.7
2,602.3
Total Economic Loans
0
0
615.9
447.0
154.0
0
16.9
1,233.8
USAID Predecessor Grants
0
0
0
406.0
290.0
402.5
75.1
1,173.6
USAID Predecessor Loans
0
0
0
200.0
0
0
16.9
216.9
Food Grants
0
0
0
0
0
0
17.5
17.5
GARIOA (grants)
192.7
297.8
232.3
404.6
289.4
-9.4
-1.9
1,405.5
GARIOLA (loans)
0
0
399.0
247.0
154.0
0
0
800.0
UNRRA & Interim Aid
3.1
0.5
2.1
0
0
0
0
5.7
(grants)
US Surplus Property (loan)
0
0
216.9
0
0
0
0
216.9
Military Aid Grants
0
0
0
0
0
259.7
202.7
462.4
TOTALS
195.8
298.3
850.3
1,257.6
733.4
652.8
310.3
4,298.5
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service). Totals may not add due to rounding.

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CRS-11
Table 2. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(in Millions of Current Dollars)
JAPAN
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
TOTAL
Total Economic Grants
82.7
291.0
375.4
388.8
283.6
225.1
49.9
1,696.5
Total Economic Loans
24.0
98.3
108.3
112.7
81.8
65.2
13.7
504.0
GARIOA (grants)
82.7
291.0
375.2
388.8
283.5
225.1
48.4
1,694.7
UNRRA & Interim Aid
0
0
0.2
0
0
0
0
0.2
(grant)
Food Grants
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.5
1.5
COG Offset to Grant (loan)
24.0
84.3
108.3
112.7
81.8
65.2
13.7
490.0
U.S. Surplus Property (loan)
0
14.0
0
0
0
0
0
14.0
Military Grants
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.1
TOTALS
106.7
389.3
483.7
501.5
365.4
290.3
63.7
2,200.6
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service). Totals may not add due to rounding.

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CRS-12
Table 3. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(in Millions of Conant 2005 Dollars)
GERMANY
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
TOTALS
Total Economic
1,575.8
2,159.9
1,605.6
5,555.1
3,939.6
2,501.1
564.8
17,901.9
Grants
Total Economic
0.0
0.0
4,218.8
3,063.3
1,047.1
0.0
105.2
8,434.5
Loans
USAID Predecessor
0.0
0.0
0.0
2,782.4
1,971.9
2,560.9
467.7
7,782.7
Grants
USAID Predecessor
0.0
0.0
0.0
1,370.6
0.0
0.0
105.2
1,475.9
Loans
Food Grants
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
109.0
109.0
GARIOA (grants)
1,550.9
2,156.3
1,591.2
2,772.8
1,967.8
-59.8
-11.8
9,967.3
GARIOLA (loans)
0.0
0.0
2,733.0
1,692.7
1,047.1
0.0
0.0
5,472.9
UNRRA & Interim
24.9
3.6
14.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
43.0
Aid (grants)
US Surplus Property
0.0
0.0
1,485.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1,485.7
(loan)
Military Aid
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1,652.3
1,262.2
2,914.6
Grants
TOTALS
1,575.8
2,159.9
5,824.3
8,618.4
4,986.7
4,153.4
1,932.3
29,250.9
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service). Totals may not add due to rounding. Current figures inflated to
2005 values using the GDP Price Index of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

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CRS-13
Table 4. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-1952
(in Millions of Constant 2005 Dollars)
JAPAN
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
TOTALS
Total Economic
665.6
2,107.0
2,571.4
2,664.5
1,928.3
1,432.2
310.7
11,679.8
Grants
Total Economic
193.2
711.8
741.8
772.3
556.2
414.8
85.3
3,475.4
Loans
GARIOA (grants)
665.6
2,107.0
2,570.0
2,664.5
1,927.7
1,432.2
301.4
11,668.4
UNRRA & Interim
0
0
1.4
0
0
0
0
1.4
Aid (grant)
Food Grants
0
0
0
0
0
0
9.3
9.3
COG Offset to
193.2
610.4
741.8
772.3
556.2
414.8
85.3
3,374.1
Grant (loan)
U.S. Surplus
0
101.4
0
0
0
0
0
101.4
Property (loan)
Military Aid
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.6
0.6
(Grants)
TOTALS
858.7
2,818.8
3,313.2
3,436.8
2,484.5
1,847.0
396.7
15,155.8
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service). Totals may not add due to rounding. Current figures inflated to
2005 values using the GDP Price Index of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

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