Order Code RL33185
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
Updated March 21, 2006
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
Summary
This report covers recent developments in Liberia, a small, poor West African
country. Liberia held elections in October 2005, with a presidential run-off in
November — a key step in a post-conflict transition and peace-building process that
began following its second civil war in a decade. The latter war began in 1999,
escalated in 2000, and ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected
president in 1997 after Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed
anti-Taylor rebel groups. It also affected neighboring states, which accepted Liberian
refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of armed
aggression by the Taylor regime. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an economist, won the presidential election with 59.4%
of votes. She took office on January 16, 2005, becoming the first female president of
an African country. Her run-off opponent was George Weah, a former star soccer
player seen as a hero by many Liberian youth. Weah contested the election, but most
election observers characterized the process as orderly, generally well-administered,
and free and fair. The election fulfilled a key goal of an August 2003 peace accord,
which ended the second civil war, leading to an on-going, U.S.-aided post-war
transition process, which is bolstered by the multi-faceted U.N. Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL). It carries out diverse peacekeeping, civilian policing, and socio-economic
assistance functions. UNMIL was preceded by the U.S.-assisted deployment in
August 2003 of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
military intervention force. Liberia’s security situation is stable but subject to
periodic volatility. Humanitarian conditions are improving. Progress in governance
under the interim government was mixed; widespread corruption within it was
widely reported. Liberia’s economy and state structures remain devastated by war.
President Sirleaf has reportedly requested that former president Charles Taylor be
extradited from Nigeria, where he lives in exile, to face a Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) war crimes indictment. The United States is providing extensive post-
war reconstruction aid and support for security sector restructuring, which will
include the training of a newly recruited and vetted 2,000-person military.
In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia’s rebuilding and peace
building processes, Congress has shown continuing interest in the status of Charles
Taylor. It passed laws (P.L. 108-199 and P.L. 108-106) urging that SCSL indictees,
like Taylor, face trial at the court. In May 2005, Congress passed H.Con.Res. 127
(Royce) urging the same outcome. H.Amdt. 480 (Watson) to H.R. 260 (Smith) would
require that the United States seek the expeditious transfer of Taylor to the SCSL for
trial. P.L. 109-102 provides $13 million for the SCSL. Congressional interest in
Liberia includes immigration and debt issues: H.R. 257 (Jackson-Lee), H.R. 2092
(Jackson-Lee), H.R. 3450 (Patrick Kennedy), S. 656 (Reed); S.Amdt. 452 (Reed);
H.R. 1268 (Jerry Lewis); and H.R. 1130 (Waters). H.Con.Res. 327 (Eddie Bernice
Johnson) and H.Con.Res. 313 (Payne) would commend Liberia for successfully
holding elections and congratulate Sirleaf for her electoral victory. S. 779 (Dorgan)
would designate Liberia as a tax haven country. The House version of H.R. 4939
(Jerry Lewis) would provide $63.8 million in FY2006 supplemental aid for Liberia.

---

Contents
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Transition Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2005 Post-War Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Conduct of Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Weah Election Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
New Government: Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sirleaf Policy Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Security Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Security Sector Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Humanitarian Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Health Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Concession Deals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
NTGL Anti-Corruption Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Anti-Corruption Prospects Under Sirleaf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Status of Charles Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Sirleaf: Views and Actions on Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U.S. and Congressional Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix 1: Acronyms Used in this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Tables
Table 1. Election 2005 Legislative Results by Party: Seats and Percentage of Vote
Won . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

---

Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
Recent Developments
On March 16, the House passed H.R. 4939 (Jerry Lewis), the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Hurricane Recovery, 2006, as amended. As reported by the House Appropriations
Committee and reflected in H.Rept. 109-388, H.R. 4939 would provide $50 million
in Economic Support Funds and $13.8 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance
funds for Liberia. During floor consideration of H.R. 4939 on March 16, 2006,
Representative Jim Kolbe stated that newly elected Liberian President Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf1 had informed Representative Nita Lowey and himself that she had requested
that Nigeria extradite former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who faces war
crimes charges in Sierra Leone. Sirleaf later repeated the same information to the
United Nations Security Council (on the Taylor case, see below). Representative
Kolbe’s remarks were made one day after President Sirleaf, who is slated to meet
with President Bush on March 21, 2006, had addressed a joint session of Congress.
President Sirleaf, elected with 59.4% of the vote in a November 8, 2005, run-off
election, took office on January 16, 2006, becoming the first-ever African female
head of state. In her inaugural address, she laid out a detailed, multi-faceted
governance agenda (see below). In late January, Sirleaf announced the first of
several nominees to her cabinet. Though most are seen as well-seasoned technocrats
and professionals, several have proved controversial. She also announced a financial
audit of the outgoing transitional government, which was repeatedly accused of
corruption, and dismissed all transitional government political appointees.2 In early
February, she fired the entire staff of the Finance Ministry, though her administration
later stated that merit system employees could retain their positions, pending the
outcome of a screening of their qualifications and probity. Soon after she took office,
in an action seen as a sign of faith in her presidency, the European Commission
pledged $80 million dollars to Liberia to support the rehabilitation or construction
of a public water and electricity delivery systems, as well as education, development,
and humanitarian needs. Recruitment and vetting of personnel to serve in a
reconstituted Liberian military, a U.S.-funded effort, also began in late January.
1 While her name is widely cited as Johnson-Sirleaf, the Liberian president does not employ
a hyphenated form of her last name. See Wil Haygood, “For Liberia’s ‘Iron Lady,’
Toughness Part of Territory,” Washington Post, Dec. 16, 2005.
2 In Dec. 2005 a U.N. sanctions monitoring panel had reported that there were large
shortfalls or related discrepancies in government accounts. In early January, the interim
government admitted to some discrepancies but contended that most of the unaccounted for
money was being transferred between government agencies.

---

CRS-2
Background
Liberia at a Glance
Geography: Small tropical coastal West African country
Liberia, a small, poor West
about the size of Virginia
Population: 3.4 million (2005 est.)
African country of about 3.4
Annual population growth rate: 2.64%
million people, is undergoing a
Exchange rate adjusted Gross National Income
post-conflict transition and
(GNI): $355.18 million (2003)
GNI per capita: $110 (2003)
peace-building process after its
External Debt: $2.568 billion (2003)
second civil war within a decade.
Key Exports: Rubber, iron, cocoa, gold, coffee. There is
The latter conflict burgeoned in
currently a U.N. ban on timber and diamond exports
Languages: English & 29 distinct languages or dialects
2000, after several minor border
Ethnic groups: 16 indigenous groups (95%) &
incursions in 1999. It pitted the
Americo-Liberian and former slave descendants (5%)
forces of Charles Taylor, elected
Religions: Indigenous beliefs 40%, Christian 40%,
Muslim 20%
president in 1997 after Liberia’s
Literacy: Male, 73.3%; Female, 41.6% (2003; est. vary)
first civil war (1989-1997),
Under-5 Mortality rate: 235 deaths/1,000 live births
against two armed anti-Taylor
HIV/AIDS adult infection rate: 8%-12%
Life Expectancy, years at birth:
rebel groups: Liberians United
Male, 46.75; Female, 48.65
f o r R e c o n c i l i a t i o n a n d
Democracy and the Movement
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2005; World Bank
Development Indicators; Ethnologue.com; U.N. data for AIDS
for Democracy in Liberia. The
rates; see below.
war led to an extreme
deterioration in political,
economic, humanitarian, and
human rights conditions. It also affected neighboring states, which accepted Liberian
refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of acts of
armed aggression by the Taylor regime.3
A peace accord was signed on August 18, 2003, after months of international
mediation. It was facilitated by two events: Charles Taylor’s resignation of the
presidency and departure from Liberia on August 11, after he was granted political
asylum in Nigeria; and the early August deployment of an Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force, the ECOWAS Mission
in Liberia (ECOMIL). ECOMIL, with extensive U.S. and United Nations (U.N.)
assistance, deployed to Liberia to end heavy fighting and alleviate a worsening
humanitarian crisis in the wake of a failed June 2003 cease-fire. It was tasked with
monitoring and securing the cease-fire, enabling the delivery of relief aid, and
preparing the way for the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL, authorized by
the U.N. Security Council on September 19, 2003, deployed to Liberia on October
1, 2003, two weeks before the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL)
took office on October 14.4 ECOMIL was dissolved and its military forces absorbed
3 This report focuses on current issues and recent events. CRS Report RL32243, Liberia:
Transition to Peace, and CRS Report RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War
Developments, and U.S. Relations, both by Nicolas Cook, provide in-depth background on
events in Liberia during recent decades.
4 UNMIL has a current authorized force strength of 15,250 military troops and 1,115 police.
As of February 2006, it had a total force size of 16,098. As of early Mar. 2006, U.S.
uniformed personnel in UNMIL included two troops, seven military observers, and 37
civilian police. U.S. funding for UNMIL is covered in Table 2, below. In Sept. 2005, the
(continued...)

---

CRS-3
into UNMIL, which carries out diverse peacekeeping, civilian policing, and
socio-economic assistance functions in support of Liberia’s transition process.
UNMIL has also assumed responsibility from the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL) for providing a military guard force for the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, discussed below; UNAMSIL’s mandate ended on December 31, 2005.
Transition Process
The August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement,5 signed by the three
warring factions and 18 political parties, laid out a peace process, provided for the
creation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and allocated
leadership positions within it. The NTGL was mandated to re-establish functioning
government authority and prepare for national elections that were held in mid-
October and November 2005. A newly-elected government is slated to replace the
NTGL in late January 2006. The NTGL consisted of an executive branch, presided
over by a Chairman, Gyude Bryant, and an interim parliament, the National
Transitional Legislative Assembly. Bryant, a businessman and church layman who
leads the Liberian Action Party, oversaw the functions of the central government and
various public corporations, agencies, and commissions. The transition faced many
challenges, most related to the extremely destructive effects of many years of war in
Liberia. Others included the dominant role within the NTGL of the three former
armed factions, which were prone to internal rivalries; political discord over the
allocation of state positions and resources; very limited state capacities; and reported
public sector corruption.
2005 Post-War Elections
Peaceful Senate, House of Representatives, and presidential election were held
on October 11, 2005, and a presidential run-off vote was held on November 8. The
22-candidate presidential poll led to a run-off race. It pitted George Manneh
“Oppong” Weah, 39 years of age, a former professional top soccer player whose star
status and rags-to riches history make him a hero to Liberian youth, against Ellen
4 (...continued)
Security Council requested that UNMIL leaders recommend a force drawdown plan for
UNMIL, including specific benchmarks and a planned schedule in a Mar. 2006 report. It
is expected to be released soon. UNMIL has implemented measures to prevent, monitor for,
investigate, and sanction acts of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), in line with recent
reforms and renewed U.N.-wide regulations regarding sexual conduct, following abuses in
several U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world, including in Liberia. U.N. Resolution
1626 (2005) bars SEA, and UNMIL has created a mission conduct and discipline team and
investigatory capacity to ensure adherence to these rules. Between June 2004 and Feb.
2006, two civilians and 16 military personnel had been repatriated or dismissed for SEA
abuses, and three civilians had been suspended. In mid-March 2006, five crew members of
a UN contractor, who had been under investigation for alleged rapes and the assault of
Liberian police officers, left Liberia after being released on bond. According to UNMIL,
their departure “is highly regretted and the matter is being brought to the attention of the
authorities of the country concerned.” See UNMIL, “Statement on the departure from
Liberia of five crew members, employees of a UN contractor,” Mar. 14, 2006.
5 Accord text available from U.S. Institute of Peace [http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html].

---

CRS-4
Johnson Sirleaf, 67 years of age, a Harvard-trained economist and former
businesswoman who had served as Liberian finance minister and as a United Nations
and World Bank official. On November 15, 2005 the National Elections Commission
(NEC) declared Sirleaf the winner of the presidential race, with 59.4% of votes
against Weah’s 40.6%, making her the first-ever female president of an African
country. Despite its declaration in favor of Sirleaf, the NEC subsequently probed and
later rejected claims by Weah, discussed below, that the election was fraudulent.
In contrast to the presidential race, election results for seats in the bicameral
legislature were disparate; no party received more than 24% of seats in either
chamber and none dominated in both the Senate and the House. The largest party in
the 64-member House of Representatives is Weah’s Congress for Democratic
Change (CDC), which won 15 seats. The Liberty Party (LP) won nine House seats,
while Sirleaf’s Unity Party (UP) and the Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL) each won eight. Seven other parties each won between one and five House
seats, and seven independent candidates each won a seat. In the 30-seat Senate,
COTOL won seven seats and the UP won four; all other parties won between one and
three seats.6
Table 1. Election 2005 Legislative Results by Party:
Seats and Percentage of Vote Won
Senate
House
Party
Seats
Vote (%)
Seats
Vote (%)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
3
10
15
23.4
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
7
23.3
8
12.5
(COTOL)
Liberty Party (LP)
3
10
9
14.1
Unity Party (UP)
4
13.3
8
12.5
Independent
3
10
7
10.9
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
3
10
5
7.8
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
3
10
4
6.3
All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)
1
3.3
2
3.1
Nation Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
2
6.7
1
1.6
New Deal Movement (NDM)
-
-
3
4.7
National Reformation Party (NRP)
1
3.3
1
1.6
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
-
-
1
1.6
Source: National Elections Commission of Liberia, 2005 Election Results,
[http://www.necliberia.org/results].
Notable among the newly elected legislators were several former Taylor regime
officials and leaders of former armed factions or security services. These include
senators Jewel Howard-Taylor, a former wife of Charles Taylor (NPP; Bong County);
6 Full election results are available online from the NEC: [http://www.necliberia.org/results].

---

CRS-5
Prince Yormie Johnson (independent, Bong County); and Saye-Taayor Adolphus
Dolo (COTOL, Nimba County). Johnson is the former leader of a faction that
splintered from Taylor’s early in the first civil war, and is infamous for personally
presiding over the bloody, videotaped murder of former head of state Samuel Doe.
He returned to run in the election from exile in Nigeria, where he had professed to
have become a born-again Christian evangelist. Dolo is a former pro-Taylor militia
leader, known by the nom de guerre General Peanut Butter, who reportedly
committed war-time atrocities and recruited child fighters, and who is said to have
aggressively opposed UNMIL peacekeeping activities. In the House, they include
Edwin Snowe (independent, Montserrado County) and Saah Richard Gbollie (NPP,
Margibi County), and Kai G. “White Flower B-50" Farley, (CDC, Grand Gedeh
County). Snowe, who was elected speaker of the House in mid-January 2006, is a
former Taylor in-law, and the former head of the Liberian Petroleum and Refining
Corporation (LPRC), from which Taylor regime officials reportedly diverted
significant amounts of funds, some of which may have benefitted Taylor during his
exile in Nigeria.7 Gbollie is a former Taylor fighter and Taylor administration police
official accused of human rights abuses. Farley is an ex-MODEL commander and
NTGL official accused of threatening the 2003 peace accord.
Conduct of Elections. With some minor exceptions, the election was
reportedly well-administered. About 1.35 million citizens registered to vote in April
and May 2005, in a process that was marred by some minor acts and threats of
violence and localized disruptions but was generally peaceful. Attempts by some
NTGL ministers to try to run for office in the 2005 election, in violation of the 2003
peace accord, also sparked controversy. About 1.012 million registered voters
(74.9%) participated in the October elections, and over 821,000 (60.7%) voted in the
run-off poll. Registration results guided decision-making about the distribution of
polling places and electoral materials and the composition of constituencies. The
large number of presidential candidates (over 50 initial prospective candidates, of
whom 22 were ultimately registered) and registered political parties (30) reportedly
proved confusing for some voters. Key election issues included national
reconciliation and unity, corruption, jobs, general economic growth, and social
services and physical infrastructure needs.
UNMIL elections staff and U.N. agencies supported media outreach and civic
education, technical tasks, and electoral security coordination, together with the
national police. UNMIL aid for the elections reportedly totaled about $8 million, and
the European Union pledged $1 million. Most of $10 million in U.S. elections
assistance supported the programs of the nonprofit democracy strengthening
organizations IFES (elections technical assistance); the National Democratic Institute
or NDI (civic education); and the International Republican Institute or IRI (political
party training). IRI and NDI, the latter jointly with the Carter Center, deployed teams
to monitor the elections, as did the African and European Unions, the U.S. and many
7 Coalition for International Justice, “Following Taylor’s Money: A Path of War and
Destruction,” May 2005.

---

CRS-6
other governments, and international organizations. Over 6,000 domestic observers,
including over 3,500 from civil society groups, also monitored the vote.8
Weah Election Dispute. Weah, who had claimed to have been cheated in
the first round, contested his loss in the second round. Citing alleged evidence that
he maintained had been turned over to him by “concerned citizens,” he claimed that
the election had been rigged and “not free and fair” and called for a nullification and
re-run of the vote. He pursued his claim though a number of formal channels, but
after the NEC dismissed his claim, after meeting with Sirleaf, and under heavy
international pressure, on December 21 he agreed to drop his claim and accept the
poll results. Many observers were skeptical about claims that systematic or large-
scale fraud may have marred the election. U.S. officials viewed the process as
having been orderly, largely well-administered, and free and fair, and such views
were shared by most other governments and international entities that observed the
vote. The United States nevertheless called for an investigation of Weah’s claims
and for any contest of results to be carried out peacefully and through established
legal channels.
In Monrovia, the capital, Weah’s claims spurred political unrest and some
political street violence, largely attributed to Weah supporters, who chanted such
slogans as “No Weah! No peace!” While he called on his supporters to protest
peacefully, he also made volatile statements on several occasions. In mid-December
12, for instance, after returning to Liberia following meeting presidents John Kufuor
of Ghana and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, who urged him to concede his defeat
with grace, Weah was quoted as stating on his King FM radio station that “I am
President of this country, whether you like it or not ... One cannot have an
inauguration in January when the case we are pursuing is not resolved. ... We are
seeking justice and there cannot be peace without justice.”
New Government: Prospects
Sirleaf may face challenges in meeting high voter expectations, for instance in
relation to her election promise to provide public electricity in Monrovia within six
months of being elected, despite the complexity and great cost of such an
undertaking. Voters also are seen as unlikely to give the new government a
honeymoon period, following what many see as disappointing performance by the
transitional government. The public is likely to demand rapid improvements in
social services and the construction physical infrastructure, particularly in support of
education, healthcare, and transportation.
Past incumbents were the beneficiaries of a long tradition of concentrated
executive branch power and strong ruling party power. Sirleaf may not be able to
govern as unilaterally as they did, because the electorate gave no single party a strong
governing mandate. In the 22-candidate presidential first round vote, no candidate
8 The author of this report observed the election as a member of the IRI delegation. In the
county where he monitored the voting process, the election was well-run. Poll workers
appeared well trained; voting equipment and materials were distributed on time and in
sufficient quantity; and voting was peaceful and voter turnout rates high.

---

CRS-7
garnered more than Weah’s 28.3% of votes, necessitating a run-off presidential poll.
That keenly contested election and the splintering of the legislature among many
parties suggests that no party enjoys the backing of a majority of the electorate.
Sirleaf’s Unity Party does not enjoy a majority in the legislature, whereas several of
the parties that lost in the presidential election are comparatively well positioned to
potentially wield significant political power. Many observers also believe that the
legislature may take a more engaged and assertive role in policy-making than has
been traditional in Liberia. The fractionalized make-up of the legislature, however,
suggests that successful national policy decision-making will require coalition-
building and that many independents and small parties may be able to exercise
substantial bargaining power within such a process. The same features could,
however, produce political gridlock or political flux characterized by fluid, ad hoc,
and possibly issue-specific alliances, rather than clear and unified policy-making
trends. Given the Liberian polity’s fragmented nature; the fact that Weah’s defeat has
proven a bitter outcome for his largely youthful, sometimes volatile base of support;
and because of deeply felt war-related social divisions and antagonisms, many
analysts also see a need for Sirleaf to rapidly initiate efforts to foster national
reconciliation and rebuild national unity, goals that she vowed to strongly pursue in
her inaugural address.
Sirleaf Policy Agenda. In her inaugural address, Sirleaf laid out a
multi-faceted policy agenda, based on what she pledged would be “a new era of
democracy” characterized by political inclusion and toleration, non-violence, and
safe-guarding and promotion of constitutional and civil liberties and rights. She
highlighted national reconciliation as the most “urgent” and “compelling” task facing
her administration, and pledged to support and strengthen the Liberian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In late February 2006, Sirleaf inaugurated the
TRC, which was created by the transitional legislature in 2005. It has a mandate to
investigate crimes and human rights abuses committed from 1979 until 2003.9
Economic Renewal. Sirleaf vowed to achieve “quick and visible
progress”during the first 150 days of her tenure, in coordination with donors, under
five “major pillars: Security, Economic Revitalization, Basic Services, Infrastructure,
and Good Governance.” She laid out plans to create a $1 billion “multi-year
economic reconstruction plan tied to a Poverty Reduction Strategy Program” to
relieve Liberia “from a staggering $3.5 billion external debt” and meet the U.N.
Millennium Development Goals in Liberia, saying that details of the plan would be
presented at a “partnership meeting” in May or June 2006. She said she would
pursue an economic agenda emphasizing the creation of “an investment climate that
gives confidence to Liberian and foreign investors,” the exploitation of Liberia’s rich
natural resources, land tenure reform focused on increasing agricultural production,
and expanded economic and social infrastructure rehabilitation. She vowed to make
youth and reconstruction-focused job creation a high priority and to target aid toward
9 While many Liberians and international human rights advocates have praised the creation
of the TRC, some have criticized Sirleaf’s nomination of Kabineh Janneh, the transitional
government’s justice minister and a former leading member of the LURD rebel group, as
a Supreme Court Justice. Critics see Janneh as responsible, in part, for violence committed
by LURD fighters against civilians during the Liberian war.

---

CRS-8
historically economically marginalized areas. Many observers view the broad
dissatisfaction, extremely high jobless rates, and economic and education
disenfranchisement of Liberia’s large youth population as having been a key
structural factor facilitating Liberia’s armed conflicts.
Governance. Sirleaf vowed to “forcibly and effectively” fight the
“debilitating cancer of corruption” as “the major public enemy” and warned that any
member of her administration who tried to “challenge us in this regard” would “do
so at his or her personal disadvantage.” She promised that she and all members of
her administration would lead by example, and that all key officials would be
required to declare their assets, and follow a National Code of Conduct, passage of
which she outlined as a prospective legislative goal. She strongly endorsed and
promised to “enforce” the Governance and Economic Management Program
(GEMAP, discussed below) to deal with “serious economic and financial
management deficiencies” in Liberia and to achieve her policy goals and obtain
foreign assistance conditional upon implementation of GEMAP. She said that these
outcomes, along with the implementation of an “integrated capacity building
initiative” and what she predicted would be Liberia’s “competence and integrity in
the management of our own resources,” would eventually obviate the need for
GEMAP. She also vowed to undertake a wholesale overhaul of the civil service, the
agencies of which she said “lack clarity in mandate and have little or no linkages to
our national priorities, policies, and goals” and suffer from a “seriously bloated”
workforce, but also contended that civil servant pay was poor and in arrears by about
$20 million. She promised to institutionalize a meritocractic civil service system
based on “qualification, professionalism, and performance.”
Foreign Policy. Sirleaf declared peaceful regional integration and security
cooperation “based upon economic partnership” and private sector-focal regional
integration to be her guiding foreign policy goals. She also vowed to maintain strong
international bilateral and multilateral partnerships, notably within multinational
organizations and treaty frameworks to which Liberia is a party and significantly,
given recent regional history, stated that “no inch of Liberian soil will be used to
conspire to perpetrate aggression” against neighboring countries.

Women. Paying homage to what she said were the special efforts of women
in securing her election and the peace that made it possible, even in the face of war-
related “inhumanity,” “terror,” military conscription, forced labor, and rape, Sirleaf
vowed to “empower Liberian women in all areas.” She promised to strengthen laws
and law enforcement to protect women against rape, support the education of
children, notably of girls, and to provide programs to enable women to play a key
role in the economic revitalization process. Sirleaf has nominated women to head
the ministries of justice, finance, commerce, and youth and sports, and the national
police force, the auditing bureau, and a commission on refugees repatriation and
resettlement.
Security Conditions
Liberia’s security situation has improved markedly since August 2003 but
remains subject to periodic volatility and localized instability. Over 101,000
ex-combatants (22% women and 10.8% children), were demobilized under a

---

CRS-9
disarmament program administered by UNMIL and the NTGL that ended in late
2004. Public security has periodically been threatened by sometimes violent political
faction rivalries; criminal acts, often by ex-combatants; and civil unrest related to
socio-economic grievances, predominantly involving students, workers, civil
servants, jobless youth, and former fighters. Price increases for rice, fuel, and cement
are key sources of social dissatisfaction. The presence of ex-combatants, some
armed, on several rubber plantations has also been a source of insecurity, including
periodic violence relating to control of plantations. Rubber workers and local
residents report that former fighters rob them and coerce them into selling rubber
latex at sub-market prices.
U.N. and U.S. officials and many members of Congress have been concerned
about persistent, credible reports that Charles Taylor has periodically interfered in
Liberian affairs from exile in Nigeria through a network of political, military, and
business associates, which Taylor denies. These alleged actions are seen as
destabilizing and threatening to the consolidation of peace (see section on Taylor
below). There had been some speculation that former Taylor administration officials
would make large gains in the 2005 elections and that he would be able to use them
as proxies to influence the new government. There was no such general outcome, but
several close Taylor associates were elected (see “2005 Post-War Elections,”above).10
Although there are no specific publicly reported threats against Sirleaf, the United
States has provided her with a personal State Department Diplomatic Security team.
Security Sector Reform. With U.S. assistance, Liberia has begun to create
a new military made up of an initial 2,000 recruits.11 Selection and vetting of
volunteer enlistees, for purposes of screening out human rights abusers, began in late
January 2006. The State Department is administering the overall military training
program through two contractors: DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and
Engineers (PAE), in coordination with U.S. military trainers. DynCorp is helping to
vet, recruit, and provide basic training for the new force. PAE will provide
specialized advanced training, equipment, logistics, and base services. The training
package is projected to cost about $95 million, prospectively to be drawn from a mix
10 Liberia remains under U.N. sanctions, first imposed under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1521 (2003). These prohibit trade in arms, diamonds, and timber with Liberia,
and the travel of certain designated individuals, mostly members or associates of the Taylor
regime. The current U.N. travel ban list includes several newly elected legislators: Jewel
Howard-Taylor, Adolphus Dolo, Edwin Snowe, and Kai Farley. Many of the listed
individuals are also subject to financial asset freezes mandated by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1532 (2004). For more detail, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to
Peace, by Nicolas Cook.
11 In mid-February, stating that “our country currently lacks the technical and tactical
capacities and proficiency to provide for its own defense and national security,” President
Sirleaf appointed Major-General Luka Yusuf, a Nigerian UNMIL officer, to be Liberia’s
military Chief of Staff heading the rebuilding of the armed forces. This action drew criticism
from former Liberian military elements, who called it unconstitutional and an insult to
Liberia’s national pride. She also said that she would seek the appointment of a U.S. military
advisor. See AFP, “Liberian Leader Names Nigerian to Head Military,” February 13, 2006
and Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia Leader Gets Flak for Hiring Nigeria General,” Reuters,
February 14, 2006.

---

CRS-10
of FY2004 through FY2007 International Disaster and Famine Assistance, Regional
Peacekeeping, and Foreign Military Assistance funds. Training is slated to begin in
February 2006. Military restructuring was hindered by a need to demobilize and
verify the severance pay eligibility of over13,000 irregular forces and Armed Forces
of Liberia (AFL) soldiers. Funds for this purpose were scarce, but most irregular and
regular forces have been demobilized. Total demobilization cost estimates vary
between $15 million and $18 million. The United States also is providing Liberia
with UNMIL-administered civilian police (CIVPOL) training assistance, which
includes the deployment, of about 20 U.S. CIVPOL advisors as members of UNMIL,
as well as equipment and contractor-based logistical support. The Special Security
Service (SSS), a roughly 1,252-member presidential protection unit that under the
NTGL continued to provide executive branch and VIP close protection functions, is
being restructured. About 600 SSS officers are receiving general UNMIL police
training and will continue to provide VIP protection services. The remaining SSS
members are slated to be decommissioned, but there is no current funding for this
purpose. U.S. aid also supports the rehabilitation of the judicial and penal systems.
Humanitarian Conditions
Humanitarian conditions are steadily improving, although from a base of severe
and widespread post-war need, and poverty remains endemic. Liberia continues to
receive substantial international food aid and is highly donor-dependent.
International assistance is, however, increasingly supporting resettlement and
socio-economic recovery, rather than emergency humanitarian needs. According to
a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) briefing note, about 200,000
Liberian refugees returned home since August 2003, including more than half of
340,000 registered refugees in third countries in late 2003, had repatriated by
mid-February 2006. In mid-March, UNMIL reported that more than 306,000
internally displaced persons (IDPs), including 59,015 families, had received
resettlement assistance, usually consisting of basic non-food items, transport aid, and
two months of food supplies. About 17,500 IDPs remained in two official IDP
camps. U.N. agencies, together with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
NTGL ministries have implemented a wide range of reconstruction and capacity
building projects relating to nutrition, water and sanitation, primary healthcare
services, and transport infrastructure. Numerous schools have re-opened nation-wide,
with extensive assistance from UNICEF. Nearly all child ex-combatants have
reportedly been reintegrated into their communities of origin, and most are receiving
follow-up aid in the form of social services.
Health Issues. Liberia faces substantial public health challenges. Malaria is
endemic, water-born stomach illnesses are common, tuberculosis cases often go
uncured, and there are periodic outbreaks of diseases like Yellow Fever, measles, and
cholera, but Liberia lacks an adequate health infrastructure for combating such
illnesses.12 Medical supplies and trained staff are in chronic short supply. A number
12 War-related psycho-social trauma is also seen as widespread. The preliminary findings
of a September 2005 WHO/Liberian government sexual and gender-based violence survey
found that 91.7% of women and girls interviewed had been the victims of multiple violent
(continued...)

---

CRS-11
of donor-backed initiatives help improve health care capacity, however. UNICEF is
aiding the reopening of health clinics nation-wide, and a UNICEF/WHO polio
vaccination campaign that began in October 2004 has reached some 1.2 million
children. WHO is coordinates a U.N./government/NGO/USAID technical group that
is working to improve the national health system, notably regarding HIV/AIDS,
malaria and tuberculosis (see below). WHO and FAO are also helping the
government to create an avian flu surveillance and response plan.
AIDS. The threat of HIV/AIDS in Liberia is gaining increasing attention.
Although no reliable national prevalence tests have been completed recently —
though such efforts are underway — Liberia is estimated to have an HIV infection
rate of between 5.9% and 8.2%, though some observers believe that the rate could be
as high as 12% in some population sub-groups.13 The UNMIL HIV/AIDS Adviser’s
Office is supporting public education-related AIDS prevention and national planning
efforts focused on care of orphans and vulnerable children, among other activities.
The World Health Organization, in coordination with other U.N. agencies and the
NTGL, is developing project proposals to fight AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and build
health system capacity. The U.N. Population Fund supports several AIDS awareness
and prevention programs. Liberia receives Global Fund assistance, but its application
for further assistance under the Fund’s recent Round 5 funding project assessment
process was reportedly rejected.14 USAID implements several AIDS-related
programs in Liberia on behalf of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator
(OGAC). These include the first post-war demographic health survey, in partnership
with other donors, which includes HIV surveillance; targeted behavior change efforts
focusing on youth and other groups; and support for home-based care and related
assistance. In her inaugural speech, in which she cited the 12% infection rate,
President Sirleaf vowed to “tackle this national scourge by updating and
reinvigorating our HIV/AIDS policy within our first 150 days [and...] reconstitute
and empower, along with our development partners, the National Commission on
HIV/AIDS.” At a February 2006 House International Relations Committee hearing
on Liberia (see below), Members suggested to USAID Assistant Administrator for
the Bureau for Africa Lloyd O. Pierson that Liberia be considered for U.S. assistance
under the Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in South Africa (PEPFAR),
a consideration that Mr. Pierson stated he would raise with appropriate
Administration officials.
12 (...continued)
acts during Liberia’s war (Security Council, S/2005/764, Dec. 7, 2005). The transitional
legislature made all rape illegal in December 2005 (only gang rape had previously been
illegal) and laid out punishments for rape-relation violations, but activists say increased
sexual violence-related law enforcement is needed. See IRIN, “Liberia: Sexual Abuse of
Children Still Rampant, Report Says,” Feb. 22, 2006, inter alia.
13 IRIN PLUSNEWS, “Youth Not Putting HIV Prevention Lessons into Practice,” Oct. 27,
2005 and USAID, Health Profile: West Africa-HIV/AIDS, n.d.
14 For background on the Global Fund, see CRS Report RL31712, The Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Background and Current Issues, by Raymond W. Copson
and Tiaji Salaam.

---

CRS-12
Governance
Progress in governance under the NTGL was mixed. Although it carried out
most basic functions, the restoration of state authority and the rehabilitation of state
institutions under its authority were hampered by central government ministry
inefficiencies, widespread resource constraints, and lack of institutional and financial
system capacities and trained manpower. Progress was reported in the last half of the
transitional government’s tenure, however. Many revenue, customs, immigration, and
local officials were deployed to sites outside Monrovia, and regional Central Bank
offices opened, permitting salary payments without recourse to time-consuming
travel to Monrovia. USAID is supporting the rehabilitation of administrative
buildings in several key counties.
Among the most challenging issues facing governance capacity-building efforts
were persistent reports of corruption within the NTGL, in some cases on a large
scale. Alleged acts were particularly notable in the context of import-export
transactions, government contracts and budgeting, and the issuance of commodity
marketing or land, natural resource, and associated concession rights.15 The U.N.
Secretary-General reported in mid-March 2005 that there was a “lack of [NTGL]
transparency in the collection and use of revenues and the resistance of some
government and public corporation officials to reforms and audits aimed at fighting
corruption” (S/2005/177). The World Bank and bilateral donors made similar
observations and called for transparency measures. National fiscal and budget
obligation mechanisms and voucher record-keeping systems are described as chaotic
and subject to manipulation in some cases by key officials. The agency miscellaneous
expense budget account category “Other” was reportedly extremely large in many
cases, and expenditures of such funds were said to have been carried out in a highly
ad hoc manner. Actions by the transitional legislature either to appropriate for
private use or pay very nominal lease fees for expensive vehicles that each legislator
was given drew local and foreign condemnation. In November 2005, the U.S.
Embassy in Monrovia stated that the U.S. government was
shocked and disappointed by the recent incidents of transfers of Liberian
Government property and resources into private ownership. This drains vital
government resources that could otherwise be used for critical developmental
programs, and sends the wrong signal to international donors who finance such
programs. It also perpetuates the culture of abuse of public trust and impunity
that has contributed to two decades of decline in Liberia. The U.S. Embassy
considers these transfers unscrupulous, irresponsible, and contrary to the public
interest of the people of Liberia. Liberian government resources are for the
benefit of the Liberian people and should not be misappropriated for private
use.16
15 See, for instance, The Analyst, “NTGL’s Past Haunts Bryant, Others,” Mar. 9, 2006,
regarding Liberian parliamentary investigations into the transitional government’s budget
and EU audits of key Liberian parastatals, available via FrontPage Africa
[http://www.frontpageafrica.com].
16 See U.S. Embassy-Monrovia, “U.S. Embassy Shocked and Disappointed at Abuse Of
Public Trust,” Press Release, Nov. 18, 2005, and IRIN, “Liberia: Scramble for Goodies
(continued...)

---

CRS-13
Citing a 2004 presidential proclamation, it stated that Liberian government officials
who engage in “violations of the public trust”and persons who abet such actions
might — along with their families — will be ineligible for U.S.-funded programs and
services, including consideration for Diversity Visa, Immigrant Visa, and other visa
services.17
Liberia is not eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
benefits, “largely for reasons related to its poor record on economic reform, rule of
law, corruption, human rights, and regional destabilization,” according to the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).18 However, in late February 2006, the
U.S. Trade Representative’s Office (USTR) announced that President Bush had
reinstated duty-free Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) trade benefits for
Liberia. USTR said that the action was intended to provide “strong support to
recently elected President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s efforts to increase employment,
diversify exports, and stabilize society.” It was made, according to the USTR,
because Sirleaf had repealed a decree prohibiting strikes and invited the International
Labor Organization (ILO) to help Liberia to conform with ILO obligations, thus
making “improving worker rights a high priority.”19
Concession Deals. Natural resource and land concession contract deals
drew notable attention during the NTGL’s tenure because of their financial
significance and potential long-term effects on national development. U.N. experts
and donor governments questioned the propriety of a March 2005 monopsony
diamond concession deal with a previously unknown firm, which was later
cancelled.20 Some observers also questioned the NTGL’s award of offshore oil
exploration permits to three relatively obscure firms just prior to elections.
16 (...continued)
Ahead of Political Handover,” Nov. 21 2005.
17 See Proclamation by the President, To Suspend Entry as Immigrants or Non-immigrants
of Persons Engaged in or Benefitting From Corruption, Jan. 12, 2004.
18 USTR, 2005 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward
Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.
19 USTR, “U.S. Reinstates Trade Preference Benefits for Liberia,” Feb. 22, 2006.
20 Diamond deposits in Liberia are mostly alluvial, i.e., found on or near the surface after
having been deposited by water flows, often far from their point of origin. In January 2006,
however, the firm Diamond Fields International (DFI) Ltd. announced that it had discovered
strong indications of a kimberlite, or pipes of igneous, volcanic, often diamond-bearing
material, in Grand Cape County. DFI is also involved in gold exploration in Liberia. See
DFI, “Diamond Fields Announces the Discovery of Kimberlite in Liberia and Progress with
Gold Exploration,” Jan 9, 2006. Several other firms are involved in diamond explorations
in various counties. Diamond exports are presently banned under a U.N. Security Council
resolution, as discussed above. The Liberian government is attempting to set up structures
and processes required to comply with the Kimberley Process, an international regime to
regulate trade in rough diamonds, a precondition for removal of the diamond embargo. As
part of such efforts, it has suspended issuance of diamond mining licenses, all of which
expired at the end of December 2005; diamond mining is thus effectively illegal at present.

---

CRS-14
The NTGL also signed two major long-term natural resource concession deals.
One, with the Firestone group of companies, extends and amends a previous series
of concession agreements, first signed in 1926, giving Firestone rights to large
plantation areas for the cultivation of rubber.21 The contract was amended, in part,
because Firestone contended that it was unable to exploit its holdings due to fighting
over the last decade and a half, and in order to boost foreign investment in Liberia.
The deal gave the Firestone group surface rental and other rights to nearly 200 square
miles of active or proposed rubber plantation land for 36 years in exchange for $.50
per acre per year and various investments, tax payments, social and infrastructure
development outputs, and various other commitments. It may be extended for another
50 years after renegotiation. Another deal, with Netherlands-based Mittal Steel
Holdings, provides for the rehabilitation or construction of diverse mining,
administrative support, processing, and transport infrastructure intended to support
the extraction and shipment of iron ore from northern Liberia. It gives Mittal a
variety of surface rental, mineral license, iron ore extraction, transport infrastructure
construction, and other rights in exchange for diverse capital investments, totaling
about $900 million, and royalty, lump sum, tax, and other payments to the
government. The initial term of 25 years is extendable for additional 25-year terms,
if certain criteria are met.
Both deals drew criticism from some civil society groups that contended that the
NTGL lacked a legal mandate to negotiate long-term concessions, that such functions
could only be carried out by a duly elected government, and that such deals should
be negotiated in a manner more favorable to Liberian economic and other national
interests.22 The contracts were also politically controversial. The Mittal deal was the
subject of rival bids by the large mining firms Global Infrastructural Holdings
Limited (GIHL), BHP Billington and Real Tito, and its ratification was contested
legally and in parliament. Some civil society critics have alleged that the deals were
not undertaken in a transparent manner. Mittal has denied that charge, and maintains
that the contract was won in a “transparent and competitive bid process” and will
bring significant foreign investment and infrastructure development to Liberia.23 The
21 The agreement is between the government of Liberia and Firestone Natural Rubber
Company, a U.S. limited liability firm that is an affiliate of Bridgestone-Firestone North
American Tire, and its Liberian subsidiary, Firestone Plantations Company.
22 A coalition of Liberian human rights groups unsuccessfully petitioned the Liberian
Supreme Court to halt execution of the two contracts on such grounds and contended that
the deals had been made without public input. The complainants reportedly may seek to re-
file their case after the formation of the new elected government. See Morrison O.G. Sayon,
“Supreme Court Places ‘Stay Order’, Firestone, Mittal Steel Agreements,” The Inquirer
(Monrovia), Nov. 7, 2005; John Walsh, “Supreme Court Issues Stay Order On NTGL;
Ja’neh Appears Today,” FrontPageAfrica, Nov. 7, 2005; George Bardue, “Supreme Court
Stops Budget Execution and Summons NTGL Officials,” The News (Monrovia), Nov. 7,
2005.
23 Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia Minister Wants Mittal Iron Ore Deal Revised,” Reuters, Sept.
14, 2005; D. Moses Wantu, “Mittal Steel Hearing Backfires,” The Analyst (Monrovia), Sept.
6, 2005; Economist Intelligence Unit, “Liberia: A steel?,” Country Monitor, Aug. 29, 2005;
Steve Swindells, “Mittal Steel Defends Pursuit of Liberian Iron Ore Concession,” June 14,
2005 Metal Bulletin News Alert Service; The Analyst (Monrovia), “Bryant, Mittal Steel
(continued...)

---

CRS-15
former U.S. Ambassador to Liberia John Blaney reportedly pushed for requirements
that, regardless of what firm was awarded mining rights, a major railroad that would
be rehabilitated under such a deal be made a multi-use railroad.24
The Firestone contract drew attention for other reasons. Some Firestone
plantation workers have complained about poor working conditions and high
production quotas. Some environmental advocacy groups and residents living near
Firestone rubber processing facilities have alleged that chemicals used in latex
processing are polluting wells, rivers, and water life. The Firestone group also is the
subject of a class action suit brought in California by the International Labor Rights
Fund, an advocacy organization that says its goal is to counter child, forced, and other
abusive labor practices internationally, including through litigation. The suit alleges
that Firestone employs children, practices forced labor, involuntary servitude, and
negligent employment practices. Firestone categorically denies these charges,
describing the suit as “outrageous” and “completely without merit.” It maintains that
its operations comply fully with Liberian laws and asserts that its workers are all
adults of legal working age, are union-represented, are paid well above prevailing
wages, are provided with social services, and that Firestone is bringing much needed
investment to Liberia.25
NTGL Anti-Corruption Efforts. The NTGL took some steps to halt corrupt
practices. It established a Task Force on Corruption and a Cash Management
Committee and attempted to eliminate bribe-taking in relation to commodity imports,
notably by better managing Monrovia’s port, of which UNMIL took temporary
control in late April 2005. In addition, the National Transitional Legislative
Assembly (NTLA) created a committee to investigate allegations of administrative
and financial irregularities by its leadership, which eventually led to the removal of
key NTLA leaders. Some observers, however, saw the NTGL Task Force as lacking
the capacity or political will to achieve significant results, and some Liberian officials
resisted donor and ECOWAS-backed transparency and audit measures. An African
Development Bank loan was reportedly not disbursed in 2005 because Liberia failed
to provide required fiscal data, and an ECOWAS-sponsored auditing mission was
opposed by Liberian auditors and certain government officials, who cited concern
over a violation of Liberian sovereignty, despite the publicly-stated support of
Chairman Bryant for the audit. In July 2005, Chairman Bryant suspended two
23 (...continued)
Flout Law,” June 13, 2005; The Analyst (Monrovia), “NTGL Sued in U.S. District Court -
Over LIMINCO Bidding,” June 13, 2005, inter alia.
24 A smaller former mine railroad between Monrovia and Bong County has been
rehabilitated by AmLib, a mineral exploration firm, and put into use as a multi-use transport
line. It has reportedly contributed to a several-fold drop in charcoal prices in Monrovia, and
is increasing the supply of other farm products to the capital. Charcoal is the main cooking
fuel in Liberia.
25 Femi Oke, “Is Bridgestone/Firestone Exploiting Liberian Workers?,” Inside Africa, CNN
International, Nov. 12, 2005; Joe Bavier, “Firestone Lease an Issue in Liberia Election
Campaign,” VOA News, Sept. 14, 2005; Gary Gentile, “Firestone Accused of Using Slave
Labor,” Associated Press, Nov. 17, 2005; and Reuters, “Labor Group Sues Bridgestone on
Liberia Plantation,” Nov. 17, 2005, inter alia.

---

CRS-16
officials over their alleged diversion of funds paid by the satellite communications
firm Inmarsat to several Liberian state entities, and the NTGL suspended three
Bureau of Maritime Affairs officials, including the Commissioner, and Liberia’s
International Maritime Organization representative for fraud.
Concerns over transparency produced a sometimes halting and highly
conditional provision to Liberia by donors of pledged aid, as well as some reticence
to offer new funding. This negatively affected the scale and pace of resettlement,
reintegration, and socio-economic rehabilitation. Nonetheless, a network of national,
international, U.N., and private development and relief organizations has made
considerable progress in these areas. Most of them participate in an inter-sectoral,
U.N.-coordinated initiative, the Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF).
An April 2005 NTGL/U.N./World Bank assessment of the RFTF found that it has
been effective in “addressing short-term, stabilization priorities,” but that medium
to long-term post-transition institutional and reconstruction development will require
a more robust, coherent, and comprehensive strategy.
Anti-Corruption Prospects Under Sirleaf. There are indications that
Liberian-donor government relations may improve under Sirleaf, in large part due to
her strong policy emphasis on anti-corruption efforts. In late January 2006, she
announced a financial audit of the outgoing transitional government, which had
repeatedly been accused of corruption. In early February, Sirleaf adopted the
recommendations of the Liberian Forest Concession Review Committee, an entity
comprised of Liberian civil society, government agency, UNMIL, and donor
government representatives. It reviewed the legality and propriety of logging
concession contracts and recommended diverse logging sector reforms. Her action
canceled all existing logging concessions and created a Forestry Reform Monitoring
Committee to regulate future concession contracts. Her move is seen as a key step
in meeting requirements for the potential lifting of U.N. timber sanctions.26 Sirleaf
26 The NGO monitoring group Global Witness, which has long investigated corruption and
diverse labor, legal, and war-related security sector and human rights abuses within the
forestry sector and pressed for reforms, praised the move, but called for “greater support”
by UNMIL “to the Forestry Development Authority ... to ensure that it is able to operate in
a secure environment” prior to the removal of timber sanctions (“Global Witness Welcomes
President Sirleaf’s Decision to Cancel All Forest Concession Agreements,” Feb. 9, 2006).
The Forestry Reform Monitoring Committee is tasked with carrying out its functions by
applying or creating for implementation land-use planning principles; a timber production
and export chain of custody tracking system; a market value-based tax system timber tax
system defined by “equitable sharing of the benefits with local communities;” revised
contract requirements; transparent forest concession allocation procedures based on the
Public Procurement and Concession Act of 2005 allowing suspension of participants who
abet civil disturbances or default on their financial obligations; a regulatory and law
enforcement aimed at countering financial and tax fraud, human rights abuses, economic
sabotage, and violations of labor and other laws relating to the misuse and mismanagement
of forest resources; and an Environmental Impact Assessment process. It was also given the
tasks of advising on implementation of GEMAP in the Liberian Forestry Development
Authority, ensuring the full and transparent participation of communities and civil society
in forest management, conducting a full review of the forestry laws and regulations, and
recommending legislation to implement forestry reforms. See “Liberia, Forest Sector
(continued...)

---

CRS-17
has also suggested that she may seek a review of other public contracts and
concession deals granted by the NTGL.27
Sirleaf has expressed strong support for the Governance and Economic
Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), an agreement agreed to and signed in
September 2005 by the NTGL and the International Contact Group on Liberia
(ICGL), an international policy coordinating group of donor and regional
governments and multinational institutions. GEMAP provides for contract-based
management of the revenue and expenditure flows of key public sector entities,
notably the main port, airport, and fuel refining firm, among others, in order to
strictly enforce central government controls over state revenues and to improve
public fiscal capacities. It also supports diverse economic governance and judicial
capacity-building measures for the government aimed at institutionalizing the good
governance and management capacity-building goals and reforms envisaged under
GEMAP.28 Elements of GEMAP that call for an external management role were
initially opposed by some in Liberia as an intrusion on national sovereignty, but
donor governments, including the United States, pushed for strict conditionality for
future assistance to Liberia. The United States has sent several Treasury Department
advisors to Liberia in the areas of budget and tax policy, management, and
administration; central bank operations and fiscal policy and regulation; and has
assessed Liberia’s financial enforcement (financial crime and corruption) capacity.
A resident U.S. legal advisor and a temporary duty team of prosecution experts have
been deployed to Liberia soon to assist in building Liberia’s judicial capacity.
Status of Charles Taylor
Charles Taylor, an indictee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) for
his alleged involvement in war crimes in Sierra Leone, remains outside of the custody
of the SCSL. The SCSL would like Nigeria, where Taylor lives in political exile, to
transfer him to SCSL custody. However, when Nigeria, under U.S. and other
international pressure, provided him with refuge, it stated that it was doing so to aid
the Liberian peace process and would not countenance later pressure to extradite
Taylor. Nigeria also, however, required him to disengage from Liberian politics,
either directly or through proxies. Taylor has reportedly extensively violated these
26 (...continued)
Reform (Executive Order #1), Feb. 7, 2006 [http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp
?id=3051].
27 Katharine Houreld, “Liberian Leader Says to Review Govt Contracts,” Reuters, Feb. 20,
2006.
28 International fiscal monitoring experts have reportedly assumed duties at the Central Bank
of Liberia and on the Cash Management Committee, a Ministry of Finance-led body that
manages all government funds. Similar personnel are expected to fill positions in key
ministries and revenue-earning sources, including ports, airports, customs offices and the
forestry sector. GEMAP is overseen by an Economic Governance Steering Committee
(EGSC) chaired by President Sirleaf, assisted by representatives of the United States, the
European Union, the African Union, ECOWAS, and the International Monetary, World
Bank and U.N. agencies. See IRIN, “Liberia: Foreign nationals step into government
positions to combat graft,” Mar. 3, 2006, inter alia.

---

CRS-18
conditions. Many human rights groups, therefore, assert that Nigeria has good reason
to surrender him, and that his continued asylum perpetuates a “culture of impunity”
for human rights abusers in Africa. Others argue that Taylor’s asylum in Nigeria
remains the best way to ensure continued stability in Liberia.29
The United States strongly supports the court’s mandate to try those responsible
for war crimes. The court is also seen as providing an alternative institutional model
to the International Criminal Court and as a smaller, leaner organization compared
to the more administratively extensive and costly international criminal tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Congress has appropriated $22 million in funding for the
SCSL, which receive up to $13 million in FY2006.30 There has been some friction,
however, between the Administration and the SCSL with regard to the effect that
some of the court’s actions have had on political events and U.S. policy goals in
West Africa. Some State Department officials have in private, for instance,
questioned the political prudence of actions taken by former SCSL Prosecutor, David
Crane, including his unsealing of an indictment against Taylor during peace talks in
June 2003, and have questioned the accuracy of claims he made that Taylor
sponsored the January 2005 attempted assassination of President Lasana Conté of
Guinea and that Taylor had traveled outside of Nigeria while in exile. Such
reservations may, in part, explain the SCSL’s failure to obtain authority under
Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which would oblige U.N. member states to cooperate
with the SCSL. However, on November 11, 2005, the U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 1638, which authorizes UNMIL to arrest Taylor if he returs to Liberia.
On May 5, 2005, President Bush and Nigerian president Olesegun Obasanjo met
and discussed the status of Taylor, among other issues. Though few details of the
29 Further background and debate on the case against Taylor are contained in CRS Report
RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by Nicolas Cook. The report provides information
on the alleged actions that led to Taylor’s indictment; issues pertaining to his departure from
Liberia and political power; and his alleged involvement in illicit diamond trading and links
with Al Qaeda. The latter issues are also covered in CRS Report RL30933, Liberia:
1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations, and CRS Report
RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation, both by Nicolas
Cook. In Apr. 2005, the Treasury Department designated Viktor Bout, an accused
international arms trafficker, and four associates, including his alleged U.S.-based chief
financial officer, Richard Chichakli, as “Specially Designated Nationals” (SDNs) under
Executive Order 13348. The action expanded the list of SDNs under the order, which
prohibits financial transactions between U.S. persons and these SDNs and freezes the assets
of SDNs within U.S. jurisdiction. Executive Order 13348 was issued in order to halt the
unlawful depletion, removal from Liberia, and “secreting” of Liberian resources, funds, and
property, actions that it stated were undermining “Liberia’s transition to democracy and the
orderly development of its political, administrative, and economic institutions and
resources.” Treasury accused Bout of supplying arms to Taylor’s regime and the Sierra
Leone rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front, in exchange for funds from Liberia’s
international ship registry, diamonds, and other allegedly illegally acquired goods. Treasury
Department, “Treasury Designates Viktor Bout’s International Arms Trafficking Network,”
Apr. 26, 2005.
30 The conference agreement accompanying P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057/Kolbe), the FY2006
foreign operations appropriation, designates $13 million in Economic Support Funds for the
SCSL. P.L. 109-102 states that these funds “should” be made available for the SCSL.

---

CRS-19
their exchange were reported, prior to the meeting, White House spokesman Scott
McClellan called for Taylor “to be held to account for the crimes he has committed,”
and stated that the United States and Nigeria are “engaged” in the question of how
“to address the matter” (White House Press Briefing, May 5, 2005) but did not
describe the engagement. He also expressed appreciation to Nigeria for facilitating
Taylor’s departure from Liberia in 2003, which he said had helped bring peace in
Liberia. His remarks mirrored State Department statements on the issue in 2004 and
2005, when State Department officials called for Taylor to “face justice,” but
generally offered few specific suggestions on how to accomplish this end.31
The United States now appears to be pursuing this goal more strongly,
explicitly, and directly. During a reported telephone call to congratulate Sirleaf on
her electoral victory, President Bush reportedly expressed support for bringing Taylor
to justice so that “he can no longer threaten the people of Liberia and the region of
West Africa,” though he did not specify a venue where such a goal could be
achieved.32 At a February 8, 2006, House Committee on International Relations
hearing on Liberia entitled The Impact of Liberia’s Election on West Africa, State
Department Assistant Secretary for Africa Jendayi Frazer stated that “the U.S.
Government has consistently maintained that Taylor must be brought to justice
before the Special Court” and has relayed that message to the Sirleaf administration.
She later added that the time for his extradition “is now,” following the establishment
of a duly-elected Liberian government. However, she also portrayed Taylor as a
largely spent political force. At a February 16, 2006, House Committee on
International Relations Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2007 International Affairs Budget,
Secretary of State Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice portrayed him as representing
a more pressing potential threat. She stated that
we believe very strongly that he ought to be brought to justice and that he ought
to be brought to justice as soon as possible. We will work with all parties
concerned to see that happen. He is a danger. He needs to be brought to justice
[...] not just for reasons of reconciliation and justice, but because we don’t want
him in a capacity or a capability to come back. And so I think there’s a very
strong interest and there should be a very strong interest in the Liberian
government — also the African states that helped to arrange his ouster — to see
this resolved. And so you can be sure that it is the policy of the United States to
pursue that.
31 See, e.g., State Department, Daily Press Briefing, May 5, 2005. However, in 2005, at least
one State Department official did publicly call on Nigeria to hand Taylor over to the SCSL
directly (Daniel Balint-Kurti, “Wanted for War Crimes, Liberia’s Ex-president Hunkers
down in Nigerian Exile,” Associated Press, May 31, 2005). Some had suggested that the
United States should honor Nigeria’s conditions for accepting Taylor after President Bush
stated in 2003 that “Taylor must go” [Press Conference of the President, “President Bush
Discusses Top Priorities for the U.S.,” July 30, 2003] and defer to Nigeria’s views on the
matter, given its central role as a regional peacekeeping and political mediating power.
Howard F. Jeter, former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, stated that “President Obasanjo acted
with our full knowledge and concurrence” in testimony before the House Committee on
International Relations at a hearing entitled Confronting War Crimes in Africa on June 9,
2004.
32 State Department, “Bush Congratulates Liberian President-Elect,” Washington File, Nov.
30, 2005.

---

CRS-20
Some in Congress have suggested that if Liberia is to continue to receive substantial
continued U.S. support for post-war reconstruction, Sirleaf must seek obtain Taylor’s
extradition.33
Sirleaf: Views and Actions on Taylor. Prior to her mid-March 2006 visit
to the United States, Sirleaf had stated that her administration would eventually seek
the repatriation of former president Charles Taylor from Nigeria or his transfer to the
SCSL under certain conditions. These included consultations with and the assent of
“regional leaders who managed the process of leading to his exile;” accommodation
for certain unspecified timing considerations; and a transfer process that would “not
undermine the security” of Liberia. She also reportedly said that she did not view it
as an immediate priority. She specifically stated that any solution would have to
have the concurrence of the European Union, the African Union, and West African
leaders, with whom she met during a regional pre-inauguration consulting tour, in
part aimed at addressing “certain national and regional sensitivities.” Her statements
were significant because Nigeria has stated that it would only turn Taylor over to an
elected Liberian government at the latter’s request.34
Notwithstanding these statements, in early March 2006, there were several press
reports that the Sirleaf administration was in talks with the Nigerian government
regarding Taylor’s possible extradition from Nigeria and that President Sirleaf had
made a formal request toward that end to the Nigerian government. Her government,
however, publicly denied that a formal extradition letter had been given to the
33 During the Feb. 8, 2006, House Committee on International Relations hearing on Liberia
after outlining diverse reasons why Taylor should be promptly extradited, Representative
Royce stated that “[t]his friend of Liberia has very little interest in providing more [U.S.
assistance] money to rebuild Liberia until its President brings Taylor — a known force for
destruction — one step closer to justice by calling on Nigeria’s President to send him to the
Special Court.” He voiced similar sentiments during consideration of H.R. 4939;
(Congressional Record (House), Mar, 16, 2006, p. H1097). Royce introduced H.Con.Res.
127, passed in May 2005, which urges that Nigeria transfer Taylor to the SCSL.
34 Nigeria, speaking on behalf of ECOWAS has also contended that any decision relating
to Taylor’s extradition must involve governments in the region. In mid-2005, at least three
members of ECOWAS, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, had formally urged that such
consultations occur. In July 2005, the three countries, acting in their capacity as the
constituent members of the Mano River Union, issued a joint communiqué suggesting that
Nigeria should review the terms of Taylor’s asylum or refer consideration of his status to
the ECOWAS Heads of State. See Agence France-Presse, “Backed by Neighbors, Liberia
Requests Taylor Handover to Sleone War Court,” July 29, 2005. The role of non-African
members of the international community regarding Taylor’s case has been contested by
some. In mid-November 2005, ECOWAS peace mediator and former Nigerian head of state
Abdulsalami Abubakar rejected a call by the European Union, a major donor to Liberia, for
the Sirleaf government to call for Taylor’s transfer. He stated that any decision on Taylor’s
status was “beyond the scope of the European Union” and that such a proposition “does not
meet the support of ECOWAS.” See Hans Nichols, “Liberian President to Ask Nigeria to
Hand over Charles Taylor to War Crimes Court,” AP, Jan. 20, 2006; Agence France-Presse,
“Taylor’s Indictment Not Immediate Priority: Sirleaf,” Jan. 27, 2006; SAPA-DPA , “Sirleaf
Addresses Taylor War Crimes Issue,” Nov. 20, 2005; BBC News, “Liberian Taylor’s Fate
Discussed,” Nov. 30, 2005; and Ann Curry, “Interview: Liberian President Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf Discusses Her Election and Plans for Liberia,” NBC News: Today, Jan. 16, 2006.

---

CRS-21
Nigerian government, but Liberian Information Minister Johnny McClain confirmed
the existence of a “briefing note” on this topic.35 However, on March 16, 2006,
Representative Jim Kolbe stated on the House floor that Sirleaf had verifiably
informed Representative Nita Lowey and him that she had requested that Nigeria
extradite former Liberian president Charles Taylor.36 The following day, using
language similar to that which she had used in her address to Congress on March 15,
Sirleaf informed the U.N. Security Council that she had “asked the President of
Nigeria to consult with colleagues in the sub-region and the international community
on the resolution” of “the case of former President Charles Taylor, who was
presently in exile in Nigeria ... in conformity with the requirements of the United
Nations and the international community.”37 In a subsequent press conference, she
used more direct language to state that it was her position that Mr. Taylor should be
made to face his SCSL indictment. She also said that this should happen promptly,
given the fragility of Liberia’s peace and the potentially significant influence of
Taylor in Liberia, and that any decision taken by the international community “must
ensure that the safety of the Liberian people and the stability of our nation is not
undermined.” She also observed that “Taylor was not indicted in a Liberian court …
he was indicted in the [SCSL] supported by the United Nations. This is why we say
the resolution of this must be in accordance with the United Nations and the
international community.”38 She further stated that international pressure
“constraining our effort to ... raise the resources that we need for our development”
had, in part, motivated her to request that Nigeria extradite Taylor. She said,
however, that such pressure had been “unfair” and that the Nigerian government and
international community should have resolved the issue “long before” her
administration took office.39 An Irish UNMIL quick reaction unit has reportedly been
placed on standby to arrest Taylor if he is flown to Liberia, in accordance with U.N.
35 Tom Ashby and Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia denies asking Nigeria to extradite Taylor,”
Reuters, Mar. 13, 2006.
36 Congressional Record (House), pp. H1097-H1098, Mar. 16, 2006. Nigeria has
acknowledged the request as well. See Nico Colombant, “Nigeria Confirms Liberia Request
for Taylor’s Extradition,” VOA, Mar. 17, 2006, inter alia.
37 Security Council, “Addressing Security Council, President of Liberia Expresses
Determination to Confront Painful Past to Enable Nation to Move Forward,” SC/8666, Mar.
17, 2006. At the meeting, many Security Council members praised Sirleaf’s decision to seek
a resolution of the Taylor case.
38 Some observers, including the Special Assistant to the SCSL Prosecutor and human rights
activists, have stated that there is no need for Nigeria to consult African Union or Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) leaders regarding Taylor’s potential
extradition, as the Nigerian government has contended is necessary. See Robyn Dixon,
“Liberia Seeks Extradition of Indicted Ex-Leader,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 2006.
39 U.N., “Press Conference by Liberia’s President,” Mar. 17, 2006. Some have echoed
Sirleaf’s views, criticizing what they see as the unfair conditioning of assistance to Liberia
on the Sirleaf government’s request for Taylor’s extradition, given that the Sirleaf
administration was not a party to Taylor’s indictment or to the arrangements leading to his
exile in Nigeria. Interview with Emira Woods, Institute for Policy Studies, BBC World
News, Mar. 17, 2006.

---

CRS-22
Security Council Resolution 1638, which authorizes UNMIL to arrest Taylor if he
is present in Liberia.40
U.S. and Congressional Focus
U.S. First Lady Laura Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, among
other prominent U.S. guests, attended President Sirleaf’s inauguration. Their
presence, Sirleaf stated in her inaugural speech, “manifests a renewal and
strengthening of the long-standing historic special relations which bind our two
countries and peoples.” She also stated that it “reflects a new partnership with the
United States based on shared values” and that Liberians are “confident that we can
continue to count on the assistance of the United States [...] in the urgent task of
rebuilding of our nation.”
Sirleaf undertook an official visit to the United States, beginning the week of
March 13, 2006, during which she addressed a joint session of Congress on March
1541 and met with president Bush on March 21. She has reportedly closely consulted
with U.S. officials regarding her priorities for Liberia and the status of Charles
Taylor. During a pre-inaugural December 2005 trip to the United States, Sirleaf met
with National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and his Africa deputy, Cindy
Courville, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Treasury Secretary John Snow, and
Members of the House and Senate, including the Congressional Black Caucus and
Majority Leader Bill Frist, as well as World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz (former
Deputy Secretary of Defense).42
Congress has long monitored developments in Liberia. Most recently, on
February 8, 2006, the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and
International Operations of the House Committee on International Relations held a
hearing on Liberia entitled The Impact of Liberia’s Election on West Africa. Congress
has shown continuing interest in the status of Charles Taylor and has generally, with
a few exceptions, shown strong support for the SCSL. It passed laws (P.L. 108-199
and P.L. 108-106) urging that SCSL indictees, like Taylor, be transferred to the court,
and in May 2005, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 127 (Royce), which urges
the same outcome.43 P.L. 109-102, the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations
bill, reaffirms congressional support for the court. It would limit some types of
assistance under certain conditions for countries in which SCSL indictees are
40 Don Lavery, “Irish Troops Braced to Arrest Former Leader,” Irish Independent, Mar. 20,
2006.
41 Congressional Record (House), pp. H996-H998, Mar. 15, 2006.
42 Reed Kramer, “Showered With Enthusiasm, Liberia’s President-Elect Receives
High-Level Reception in Washington,” AllAfrica.com, Dec. 11, 2005, inter alia. During a
Mar. 20 appearance with Sirleaf, World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz reportedly
announced that the World Bank would provide $25 million for a road-building fund for
Liberia and stated that he was seeking debt forgiveness for Liberia by the World Bank, the
IMF, and the African Development Bank. See VOA, “World Bank Commits $25 Million
to Liberian Infrastructure Fund,” Mar. 21, 2006.
43 The European Parliament passed a similar resolution in Feb. 2005.

---

CRS-23
“credibly alleged to be living” unless such countries cooperate with the SCSL,
including by transferring such indictees to the SCSL. It also requires U.S. support
for that goal within the U.N. Security Council. It specifically would, after a period,
bar assistance to Nigeria unless the President reports to the Committees on
Appropriations on steps taken in FY2003 through FY2005 to obtain Nigeria’s
cooperation in surrendering Taylor to the SCSL and a strategy and time line for
achieving that purpose. H.Amdt. 480 (Watson) to H.R. 2601, the FY2006 - FY2007
foreign relations authorization act, would require the Administration to seek the
expeditious transfer of Taylor to the SCSL for trial.
Congress also provided substantial support for Liberia’s rebuilding and peace
building processes.44 U.S. assistance is summarized in Table 2.45 Other
congressional interest in Liberia focuses on Liberia-related immigration and debt
issues. H.R. 257 (Jackson-Lee), H.R. 2092 (Jackson-Lee), H.R. 3450 (Patrick
Kennedy), and S. 656 (Reed) would give permanent U.S. residence status to qualified
Liberians resident in the United States, among other measures, as would S.Amdt. 452
(Reed) to H.R. 1268 (Jerry Lewis).46 H.R. 1130 (Waters) would enact various
measures intended to reduce the national debts of certain poor countries, including
Liberia, and encourage their governments to fund social services. Two concurrent
resolutions, H.Con.Res. 327 (Eddie Bernice Johnson) and H.Con.Res. 313 (Payne),
would commend Liberia for successfully conducting elections and congratulate
Sirleaf for her electoral victory. S. 779 (Dorgan), A Bill to Amend the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 to Treat Controlled Foreign Corporations Established in Tax
Havens as Domestic Corporations, would designate Liberia as a “tax-haven country,”
allowing the Internal Revenue Code to treat certain foreign corporations created or
organized under Liberian law as U.S. domestic corporations for tax purposes.
44 An Administration Economic Support Fund (ESF) FY2006 budget request for $75 million
for Liberia, however, was not included in P.L. 109-102 (formerly H.R. 3057, Kolbe, the
FY2006 foreign operations appropriations bill). Any ESF funding for Liberia is likely to be
drawn from $88 million in general ESF funding designated for Africa under P.L. 109-102.
P.L. 109-102 also mandates special congressional notification for the expenditure of funds
used to assist Liberia.
45 At a March 8, 2006, markup hearing on President Bush’s FY2006 Emergency
Supplemental request for other humanitarian assistance, the House Appropriations
Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by Rep. Jesse Jackson that would
provide $50 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance for Liberia. These funds
are contained in the House-passed version of H.R. 4939 (Jerry Lewis), along with $13.8
million in Migration and Refugee Assistance funds for Liberia. The Committee
recommended that of the ESF funds, $30 million be used for emergency employment
activities to strengthen security and build roads; $10 million be used to establish an
electricity grid; and $10 million be used for demobilization and reintegration of
ex-combatants. H.R. 4939 passed the House on March 16.
46 In August 2005, the Department of Homeland Security extended the designation of
Liberia for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) by 12 months, from October 1, 2005, until
October 1, 2006. TPS is a temporary “safe harbor”immigration status granted to qualified
nationals of some countries affected by ongoing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other
difficulties. See CRS Report RS20844, Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth
Ellen Wasem and Karma Ester.

---

CRS-24
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-FY2007
($ millions; errors due to rounding)
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Account
Actual
Actual
Estimated
Request
Child Survival and Health Program (CSH)
2.82
3.97
3.16
3
Development Assistance (DA)
-
6.85
23.93
29.5
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
-
24.8
42.72
40
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
-
2.98
1.98
1.6
International Disaster & Famine Assistance
200
-
-
-
(IDFA)-Supplemental
IDFA Regularb
-
9.71
-
Int. Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INL)
0
5
0.99
0.8
Int. Military Education and Training (IMET)
0
0
0.2
0.25
Nonprolif., Antiterrorism, Demining & Related
Projects-Small Arms &Light Weapons
0.16
-
-
-
(NADR-SALW)
Africa Regional Peacekeeping (PKO)
-
25
20
14.8
P.L. 480, Title II [Emerg. Food Aid]b
22.5
22.55
5.96a
-
Transition Initiatives (TI)
4.1
2.53
5.6e
-
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)b
27.89
28.19
-
-
Democracy and Human Rights Fund
-
.05
-
-
Special Self-Help Fund
-
.07
-
-
Totals - Bilateral and Emergency Aid
257.47
131.69
104.54
89.95
U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)/
290.34
230.06
157.18
150
Contribs. to Int. Peacekeeping Account (CIPA)
Totals - All Funding
547.81
361.75
261.72
239.95
Sources: State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, and
International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request, FY2007 and other fiscal years; and information
from USAID/OFDA, State/PRM, and State/Political-Military Affairs officials.
a. Levels to date.
b. Funding under some accounts, such as P.L. 480, Title II, IDFA, and MRA, often rises during a
given fiscal year because these accounts are appropriated in a lump sum and allocated
throughout the year in response to emergent needs.
c. UNMIL FY2005 figure reflects payments to date; assessments from the U.N. total $235.42 million;
the amount for FY2006 reflects the appropriated level.
d. P.L. 109-102, the foreign operations FY2006 appropriation act, which was signed into law on
November 14, 2005, does not specify aid levels for Liberia, though it requires that the
Committees on Appropriations be notified if funds appropriated under the act are used to assist
Liberia. FY2006 assistance levels for Liberia have not yet been finalized pursuant to
requirements in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 relating to Administration aid allocation
decisions, which are arrived at, in part, through consultations between the executive branch and
congressional appropriators.
e. FY2006 budget is $5.6 million; as of mid-March 2006, OTI had spent $2.7 million in TI.

---

CRS-25
Figure 1. Map of Liberia

---

CRS-26
Appendix 1: Acronyms Used in this Report
AFL:
Armed Forces of Liberia
AGOA:
African Growth and Opportunity Act
CDC:
Congress for Democratic Change, Liberian political party
CIPA:
Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account
CIVPOL:
Civilian police
COTOL:
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia, Liberian political party
CSH:
Child Survival and Health Program Fund
DA:
Development Assistance Account
ECOMIL:
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOWAS:
Economic Community of West African States
ESF:
Economic Support Fund
FMF:
Foreign Military Financing Account
GEMAP:
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
GIHL:
Global Infrastructural Holdings Limited
ICGL:
International Contact Group on Liberia
IDFA:
International Disaster & Famine Assistance Account
IDP:
Internally displaced person
IFES:
Elections technical assistance organization formerly known as the
International Foundation for Election Systems
INL:
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement
IRI :
International Republican Institute
LP:
Liberty Party, Liberian political party
NADR-SALW:
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Projects-
Small Arms and Light Weapons
NDI :
National Democratic Institute
NEC:
National Elections Commission (of Liberia)
NGO:
Non-governmental organization
NTGL:
National Transitional Government of Liberia
NTLA:
National Transitional Legislative Assembly
OFDA:
USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGAC:
U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator
P.L. :
Public law
P.L. 480, Title II :
Humanitarian food aid
PKO :
Regional Peacekeeping Account
PRM:
Population, Refugees & Migration Bureau, State Department
RFTF:
Results-Focused Transitional Framework
SCSL:
Special Court for Sierra Leone
SDN:
Specially Designated National
SSS:
Special Security Service (of Liberia)
TI:
Transition Initiatives Account
U.N.:
United Nations
UNAMSIL:
U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone
UNICEF:
U.N. Children’s Fund
UNMIL:
U.N. Mission in Liberia
UP:
Unity Party, Liberian political party
USAID:
U.S. Agency for International Development
USTR:
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

---