Order Code RS22276
Updated March 17, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Coastal Louisiana Ecosystem Restoration
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Jeffrey A. Zinn
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Summary
Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been
seeking congressional approval for a $1.1 billion multi-year program to both construct
five projects that would help to restore specified sites in the coastal wetland ecosystem
in Louisiana, and to continue planning several other related projects. The state of
Louisiana and several federal agencies have participated in the development of this
program. This report introduces this program and restoration options that are being
discussed in the wake of the hurricanes. It also discusses whether this program, if
completed, might have muted the impacts of these hurricanes. Congressional
consideration will also be informed by slowly emerging information about the location
and extent of change that resulted from these hurricanes. This report will be updated.
Introduction
The widespread destruction caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has altered the
congressional perspective on coastal Louisiana restoration as it considers provisions in
legislation (e.g., S. 728 and H.R. 2864) that would authorize the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) to implement numerous activities to slow the rate of coastal wetlands
loss. Both bills, developed before the hurricanes struck, would authorize funding to
implement a program that the Corps had recommended in a November 2004 feasibility
report. The Corps recommended $1.1 billion for activities to be initiated immediately and
completed over the next decade, and estimated an additional cost of $0.9 billion for future
work. As a result of the hurricanes, more expansive options, costing up to $14 billion, are
also being considered.
Of the initial $1.1 billion in the proposal being considered when the hurricanes
struck, $828 million is to complete planning and construct five projects, called “near-term
features,” where the planning process is well along, and construction could be completed
in about a decade. The remainder of this initial authorization would be spent on:
monitoring program performance; building small demonstration projects (a maximum
cost of $25 million per project); exploring options to use dredged materials to create
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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wetlands; and continued planning of 10 additional projects that would have to be
authorized at a future date. Finally, additional funding would be provided to study six
less well-defined possible program elements for the future, termed “large-scale, long-term
coastal restoration concepts.” H.R. 2864 was approved by the House on July 25, 2005,
while S. 728 was reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on
April 26, 2005. After the hurricanes struck, Congress provided $96 million in FY2006
Defense Appropriations (P.L. 106-148) for activities that would reduce threats to New
Orleans by improving coastal wetlands, leaving open the potential for a wide range of
legislative actions in the future. (For more information on the proposed Corps program,
see CRS Report RS22110, Coastal Louisiana Ecosystem Restoration: The Recommended
Corps Plan, by Jeffrey Zinn; and to track the legislative process, see CRS Issue Brief
IB10133, Water Resources Development Act (WRDA): Army Corps of Engineers
Authorization Issues in the 109th Congress, by Nicole T. Carter, coordinator.)
The National Research Council was asked to review the Corps’ recommended plan,
addressing specific questions about: (1) the scientific underpinnings of the Corps study;
(2) major questions that need to be answered to support implementation; (3) the national
benefits of the restoration; and (4) the plan as a first step toward comprehensive coastal
restoration. It commented on the proposed projects and recognized that the hurricanes,
which struck after the report was largely completed, will likely lead to reconsideration of
some plan components. It concluded that while the most of the individual projects are
sound, they do not constitute a comprehensive approach to addressing loss of wetlands
over such a large area. It calls for the development of a detailed map showing the desired
landscape of coastal Louisiana that would serve as the basis for selecting future actions.
The lack of synergy among projects in this plan is in contrast to another Corps’ large-scale
ecosystem construction and restoration program, the south Florida Everglades restoration,
where success depends on completing all the interrelated program components. The full
report, titled Drawing Louisiana’s New Map: Addressing Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana
can be downloaded at [http://www.fermat.nap.edu/catalog/11476.html].
Background
The Corps recommendations for projects to restore some wetlands and slow wetland
losses in November 2004 is the most recent of many such proposals offered over the past
four decades since a rapid rate of coastal wetlands loss was first documented. It is now
estimated that more than 1.2 million acres of wetlands, an area approximately the size of
Delaware, has been converted to open water since the 1930s. The remaining wetlands
cover about 3.5 million acres, an area slightly larger than Connecticut. The U.S.
Geological Survey estimated that an additional 448,000 acres could be lost by 2050 if no
additional restoration projects are initiated. If the Corps’ program is implemented, it
estimates that net wetland losses would be reduced to 170,000 acres by 2050. These
estimates do not appear to account for major but unpredictable hurricane events.
These losses have been caused by a combination of human activities and natural
factors that have been frequently documented by the Corps and others. Proposals to
respond to these losses have centered on rebuilding the region’s coastal wetlands in ways
that could reduce the ecological, economic, and social costs. One cost receiving far more
attention today is the reduced role that the remaining wetlands can play in absorbing storm
surges and thereby decreasing flood elevations and wave energy.

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The Corps’ recommended program includes projects centered in the wetlands south
and southwest of New Orleans. No projects are in the western portion of state where Rita
struck, and few are east of New Orleans, where Katrina’s damage to coastal development
and the environment was most concentrated. In the Corps analysis of the selected set of
options and the alternative proposals included in the November 2004 final report, there
is almost no mention of hurricanes or an analysis which compares how these proposals
might mitigate the effects of a major hurricane. In making his recommendations in the
final report, the District Engineer for New Orleans states that “I am convinced that the
LCA [Louisiana Coastal Area] Plan would begin to reverse the current trend of
degradation of Louisiana’s coastal ecosystem, support Nationally significant living
resources, provide a sustainable and diverse array of fish and wildlife habitats, reduce
nitrogen delivery to offshore gulf waters, provide infrastructure protection, and make
progress towards a more sustainable ecosystem.”1
While Congress has not yet authorized any restoration program, two prototype
projects — the wetland restorations at Davis Pond and Caernarvon Diversions — had
been initiated under existing authorities. Both restorations are located in the greater New
Orleans area along the main channel of the Mississippi River. Fresh water from this river
bearing sediment is periodically introduced into the diversion sites, which are large
receptacle areas bounded by low levees. As the water sinks into the ground or evaporates,
it leaves sediments and raises land elevation, which, in turn, provides an environment in
which wetland habitat can be reestablished. These two diversions are planned to add about
50,000 acres of wetlands over 50 years.

Effects of Recent Hurricanes on Restoration Planning
In the wake of the 2005 hurricane season, some supporters of restoration, especially
from within the state, are calling for a more substantial program than in the current
legislation. Supporters emphasize that the impacts of the hurricanes demonstrated that the
restoration would have significant national benefits, and is far greater than a state issue.
They are seeking consideration of a $14 billion restoration effort that had been laid out
in the Coast 2050 Plan, which was released in 1998. This Corps-led planning effort
resulted in recommendations for 77 “restoration strategies,” to be completed over 50
years. The strategies would be distributed along the entire length of the Louisiana’s
coastal area, but concentrated in the central coast. The anticipated result from fully
implementing these strategies was to protect or restore almost 450,000 acres of wetlands.
Congress has not considered legislation authorizing the Coast 2050 Plan. Instead,
in 2000, the Corps and the state began to develop a more modest set of proposals for
projects that could be initiated over a 10-year time period. A draft was completed in
October 2003, but never officially released. It included several options for
implementation with estimated costs that reportedly ranged between $4.3 billion and
$14.7 billion. However, the Administration, represented by the Office of Management
and Budget, reviewed these options, then reportedly directed the Corps to come up with
a less costly proposal in late 2003; that is the proposal which Congress is currently
considering.
1 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) Ecosystem Restoration Study.
Final Report. New Orleans, November 2004. p. MR 6-1.

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Effects of Recent Hurricanes on Coastal Louisiana
Documenting the full effect of the 2005 hurricane season on coastal Louisiana will
be a long process. Coastal Louisiana is an extremely flat and dynamic physical
environment where major storm events can greatly alter the surface features, especially
wetlands, beaches and barrier islands. Some portion of the losses caused by both storms
may only be temporary, as wetland vegetation was flattened by storm surge and strong
wind, and coastal beach sand and sediment was redistributed by these same forces. In
addition, in some locations where the storm deposited sediment, wetlands and beaches
may emerge. A U.S. Geological Survey summary of wetland changes, released in
February 2006, estimates that about 76,000 acres of wetlands were converted to open
water in eastern and central coastal areas. Far greater loss resulted from Katrina and was
concentrated south and east of New Orleans, with almost half the total loss from
Plaquemines Parish.
The wetlands were partially protected from ocean storms in central and eastern
portions of coastal Louisiana by a thin ribbon of coastal sand barriers and beaches along
the shoreline. These barrier systems, heavily damaged by the hurricanes, help to dampen
the full force of the storm surge. They also prevent ocean waters in the Gulf from
reaching freshwater wetland plants and disrupting the ecology of this wetlands-based
ecosystem. These barrier systems have been deteriorating for many of the same reasons,
human and natural, as the wetlands. Stabilization and restoration of them is critical to
any successful effort to restore the wetlands that they protect. It may be particularly
challenging to reestablish wetlands landward of where they were overtopped, flattened,
or bisected by new inlets because of the influx of salt water. Over time, some of these
barriers may stabilize or rebuild in new locations, but it is only slowly becoming clearer
which changes will be permanent, and which islands will recover in calmer conditions.

What If the Restoration Program Had Been Completed Before the
Hurricanes Made Landfall?
If the entire first phase of the restoration program had been completed, that is, if
Congress had authorized and the Corps had completed the 5 initial projects that it
recommended in the November 2004 Corps report, it may be that these investments would
have had little effect on the pattern or extent of flooding or other storm damage around
the city of New Orleans, with the possible exception of modifications to the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet (MRGO). These projects likely would have had some mitigating
effects on flood elevations and water flow velocities in the immediate areas around the
projects, but little effect at greater distances. The stability of the levees and floodwalls
around the city would not have been directly enhanced by any component of the
restoration program, so this investment would not have reduced the flooding in the city.
Where the most severe damage occurred to the east of the city from Hurricane Katrina and
in the western portion of the state from Hurricane Rita, the restoration program would
have had little activity. Relationships between the hurricane impacts on New Orleans and
coastal communities and the proposed restoration may help decision makers identify
future restoration priorities, as called for in the 2005 NRC report.
The potential damage from any storm event, and the role the restoration would play
in muting those damages, depends on specific characteristics of the storm event (the

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storm’s intensity, its precise track, the speed at which it is moving, and the tidal elevation
at land fall) and the components of the restoration effort. Damage generally is most
extensive along the east side of a hurricane storm track in the Gulf of Mexico, where the
wind blows from south to north and the storm surge is most pronounced. In the case of
Katrina, the storm track was just east of New Orleans, and the highest storm surge and
greatest damage was documented to the east of that track. By contrast, within 100 miles
of New Orleans west and northwest, such as in the nearby Baton Rouge area, the damage
is far less extensive.
Some scientists have offered generic support for the restoration effort by pointing out
that coastal wetlands cause friction to dampen storm surge, and estimate that for every 2.7
miles of marsh this surge passes over, its elevation is reduced by a foot. They also
estimate that storm surge is reduced by a foot in adjacent inland areas for every square
mile (640 acres) of wetlands that are restored. Other scientists caution that these general
relationships mask a wide variability, based on site specific and storm characteristics. A
possible conclusion is that some restoration projects could have a great beneficial effect
mitigating the damage to coastal Louisiana from storm events with some characteristics
and especially near the coast. However, for hurricanes with many combinations of
characteristics, this specific set of projects may have done little to reduce the storm’s
impacts in much of the greater New Orleans area.
Possible Effect of these Hurricanes on Restoration Efforts
Katrina had some adverse effects on the wetlands being created at the diversions at
Caernarvon and Davis Pond, but little detailed information has been released on its extent.
This damage may lead some to question how diversions should fit into the restoration
strategy, including where they should be located.
The hurricanes may greatly expand the range of thinking about restoration options.
One aspect of that expansion is that while all past restoration planning has been in
response to wetland losses and coastal degradation within Louisiana, neither hurricane
respected political boundaries. Katrina caused extensive damage in coastal Mississippi
and Alabama, and Rita caused less extensive damage in Texas. These distributions of
impact may lead to greater interest in considering a restoration program that includes
components that would provide damage-mitigating benefits across the central Gulf Coast.
A second aspect is renewed discussion of projects that would result in larger changes
across coastal Louisiana. The National Research Council report, for example, discusses
both the third delta and the abandonment of the current delta in the context of providing
more sediment for restoration. A third aspect is that there is a renewed interest in
determining which projects would be most effective. A January 2006 report by a group
of recognized experts, primarily from academia states that project priorities should be
based on storm damage reduction and ecosystem restoration to develop a “sustainable
coastal landscape.”2 This report endorses the development of a detailed project map that
had been recommended in the NRC report.
2 A New Framework for Planning the Future of Coastal Louisiana after the Hurricanes of 2005
(Final Draft), Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning for the Louisiana Coast.

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Notwithstanding whether the 109th Congress authorizes either the pending legislative
proposal or some larger amount for restoration, many of the physical changes on the
ground will not be in place for decades. Construction of the five projects for which
authorization is currently pending is not anticipated to be completed for about a decade
if fully funded. For diversion projects, construction of the diversion structures is but the
first step, and actual reestablishment of wetlands require many additional years. Most of
the other construction projects are much earlier in the planning process, and therefore
completion will be even further into the future. The time required for the planning and
engineering work that precedes actual construction could be extended if the engineering
and other resources of the Corps also have to address the many other needs, such as New
Orleans levee enhancements and navigation features, generated by Katrina. Under the
best of circumstances, the array of projects in a complex program like Coast 2050 could
not be completed for decades. If it is decided to follow the recommendation of the NRC,
the time line for this effort could be further extended.
In the aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes, the ecosystem restoration goals may be in
competition with other demands for federal resources in coastal Louisiana. These
demands include flood protection, economic development associated with navigation, and
housing. It may be too expensive to fully support all these goals at the same time. For
example, how will policy and program responses to the flooding in New Orleans be
viewed in relation to the restoration effort? As stated earlier, it appears that little that is
proposed in the current legislation would have had much effect on alleviating the causes
behind the levee failures or moderating the rate or pattern at which the city was
subsequently flooded. It does not appear that the many additional projects that were in
the Coast 2050 Plan would have a significant mitigating effect on the flooding associated
with Hurricane Katrina.
If Congress makes the protection or “fortification” of New Orleans its highest and
immediate priority, then some financial and agency resources may be drawn away from
other projects, such as those in the restoration efforts, that would contribute only
indirectly to protecting the city. Such a decision could reduce restoration efforts that
could have a more significant moderating effect on hurricane-related threats to
communities and resources south of the city and closer to the Gulf. If Congress wishes
to address both goals at the same time, then it may also want to consider setting priorities
among the protection activities that it authorizes and funds. At a minimum, Congress
might consider asking the Corps to examine how each of the restoration projects might
mute future storm damage, and whether there are some modifications that could be made
to pending projects that would further protect the city or other south Louisiana
communities.
Congress directed the Corps to develop a options for a post-hurricane rebuilding plan
called the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Plan. In this plan, announced in
the March 3, 2006 Federal Register, the Corps identifies 4 combinations of structural and
non structural measures that would protect coastal Louisiana against a category 5 storm.
Central issues include (1) what role(s) would restoration projects play in such a plan, (2)
how would restoration projects be integrated with structural measures, and (3) how could
projects to protect the New Orleans urban area and to restore coastal Louisiana be most
effectively integrated to minimize damage from future storm events.

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