Order Code IB95024
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia:
Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Updated February 23, 2006
Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
Post-September 11
Operations in Iraq
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Civil and Ethnic Conflict in Georgia
Economic Conditions, Blockades, and Stoppages
Democratization and Human Rights Problems
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
The South Caucasus’s External Security Context
Russian Involvement in the Region
Military-Strategic Interests
Caspian Energy Resources
The Roles of Turkey, Iran, and Others
U.S. Aid Overview
U.S. Security Assistance
U.S. Trade and Investment
Energy Resources and U.S. Policy
LEGISLATION

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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia:
Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
SUMMARY
The United States recognized the inde-
In the aftermath of the September 11,
pendence of all the former Soviet republics by
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States,
the end of 1991, including the South Caucasus
the Administration appealed for a national
states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
security waiver of the prohibition on aid to
The United States has fostered these states’
Azerbaijan, in consideration of Azerbaijan’s
ties with the West in part to end the depend-
assistance to the international coalition to
ence of these states on Russia for trade, secu-
combat terrorism. In December 2001,
rity, and other relations. The United States
Congress approved foreign appropriations for
has pursued close ties with Armenia to en-
FY2002 (P.L. 107-115) that granted the Presi-
courage its democratization and because of
dent authority to waive Section 907, renew-
concerns by Armenian-Americans and others
able each calendar year under certain
over its fate. Close ties with Georgia have
conditions. President Bush exercised the
evolved from U.S. contacts with its pro-West-
waiver most recently in February 2006.
ern leadership. The Bush Administration
supports U.S. private investment in
As part of the U.S. Global War on Ter-
Azerbaijan’s energy sector as a means of
rorism, the U.S. military in May 2002 began
increasing the diversity of world energy sup-
providing security equipment and training to
pliers and to encourage building multiple
help Georgia combat terrorist groups in its
energy pipelines to world markets. The
Pankisi Gorge area and elsewhere in the
United States has been active in diplomatic
country. Azerbaijani and Georgian troops
efforts to end conflicts in the region, many of
participate in stabilization efforts in Afghani-
which remain unresolved.
stan and Iraq, and Armenian personnel serve
in Iraq.
The FREEDOM Support Act (P.L. 102-
511) provides the major authorization for
Foreign Operations Appropriations for
assistance to the Eurasian states for humani-
FY2006 was signed into law on November 14,
tarian needs, democratization, creation of
2005 (H.R. 3057; P.L. 109-102). It calls for
market economies, trade and investment, and
$75 million in FREEDOM Support Act aid to
other purposes. Section 907 of the act pro-
Armenia ($20 million above the request), $35
hibits most U.S. government-to-government
million for Azerbaijan, and $67 million for
aid to Azerbaijan until its ceases blockades
Georgia. It calls for $12 million in Foreign
and other offensive use of force against Arme-
Military Financing for Georgia and $5 million
nia. This provision has been partly altered
each for Armenia and Azerbaijan. It also
over the years to permit humanitarian aid and
supports $750,000 in International Military
democratization aid, border security and
Education and Training aid each for Armenia
customs support to promote non-proliferation,
and Azerbaijan. The conferees (H.Rept. 109-
Trade and Development Agency aid, Overseas
265) agree that at least $3 million be provided
Private Investment Corporation insurance,
to address ongoing humanitarian needs in
Eximbank financing, and Foreign Commercial
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Service activities.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On February 15, 2006, Georgia’s legislature unanimously approved a resolution calling
for the president to revoke a 1992 agreement providing for Russian “peacekeeping” in
Georgia’s breakaway South Ossetia region, on the grounds that it is counter-productive and
an attempt by Russia to annex the region. The resolution urges greater involvement by the
international community in peacekeeping and peace settlement. Russia’s foreign ministry
denounced the resolution as “anti-Russian” and destabilizing, and its defense minister hinted
that Russia might retaliate economically if relations continue to worsen. The U.S. State
Department has urged Georgia not to abandon the existing peace process.
Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 31, 2006, rhetorically asked why Russia
should not recognize the independence of Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia
regions if some countries recognized Serbia’s Kosovo region.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
The Caucasus Region: Basic Facts
are located south of the Caucasus
Mountains that form part of Russia’s
Area: The region is slightly larger than Syria:
borders (see Figure 1). The South
Armenia is 11,620 sq. mi.; Azerbaijan is
Caucasus states served historically as a
33,774 sq. mi.; Georgia is 26,872 sq. mi.
north-south and east-west trade and
Population: 16.1 million, similar to Netherlands;
transport “land bridge” linking Europe
Armenia: 3.2 m.; Azerbaijan: 8.3 m.;
to the Middle East and Asia, over which
Georgia: 4.6 m. (Economist Intelligence
the Russian Empire and others at
Unit and regional governments, 2004
various times endeavored to gain
est.)
control. In ancient as well as more
GDP: $17.6 billion; Armenia: $3.7 b.;
recent times, oil and natural gas
Azerbaijan: $8.5 b.; Georgia: $5.4 b.
resources in Azerbaijan attracted
(EIU and regional governments, 2004
outside interest. Although Armenia and
est., market exchange rate)
Georgia can point to past autonomy or
self-government, Azerbaijan was not
independent before the 20th century. After the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, all three
states declared independence, but by early 1921 all had been re-conquered by Russia’s Red
(Communist) Army. They regained independence when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
(For background, see CRS Report RS20812, Armenia Update, by Carol Migdalovitz; CRS
Report 97-522, Azerbaijan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests; and CRS Report
97-727, Georgia: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.)
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
By the end of 1991, the United States had recognized the independence of all the former
Soviet republics. The United States pursued close ties with Armenia, because of its
profession of democratic principles, and concerns by Armenian-Americans and others over
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its fate. The United States pursued close ties with Georgia after Eduard Shevardnadze,
formerly a pro-Western Soviet foreign minister, assumed power there in early 1992. Faced
with calls in Congress and elsewhere for a U.S. aid policy for the Eurasian states, then-
President George H.W. Bush sent the FREEDOM Support Act to Congress, which was
signed with amendments into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511).
U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus states includes promoting the resolution of the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Azerbaijan’s breakaway Nagorno Karabakh (NK) region,
and Georgia’s conflicts with its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Successive U.S. Special Negotiators for NK and Eurasian Conflicts have helped in various
ways to settle these conflicts. Congressional concerns about the NK conflict led to the
inclusion of Section 907 in the FREEDOM Support Act, which prohibits U.S. government-
to-government assistance to Azerbaijan, except for non-proliferation and disarmament
activities, until the President determines that Azerbaijan has taken “demonstrable steps to
cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and NK” (on waiver
authority, see below). Provisions in FY1996, FY1998, and FY1999 legislation eased the
prohibition by providing for humanitarian, democratization, and business aid exemptions.
Some observers argue that developments in the South Caucasus are largely marginal to
global anti-terrorism and to U.S. interests in general. They urge great caution in adopting
policies that will heavily involve the United States in a region beset by ethnic and civil
conflicts. Other observers believe that U.S. policy now requires more active engagement in
the region. They urge greater U.S. aid and conflict resolution efforts to contain warfare,
crime, smuggling, and Islamic extremism and to bolster the independence of the states.
Some argue that such enhanced U.S. relations also would serve to “contain” Russian and
Iranian influence and that close U.S. ties with Azerbaijan would benefit U.S. relations with
other Islamic countries, particularly Turkey and the Central Asian states. They also point to
the prompt support offered to the United States by the regional states in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States. Some argue that energy
resources in the Caspian region are a central U.S. strategic interest, because Azerbaijani and
Central Asian oil and natural gas deliveries would lessen slightly Western energy dependency
on the Middle East (see below, Energy Resources). (See also CRS Report RL30679,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests.)
Post-September 11. In the wake of September 11, 2001, the United States obtained
quick pledges from the three South Caucasian states to support Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) in Afghanistan, including overflight rights and Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s offers of
airbase and other support. OEF was later expanded to Georgia (see below, Security
Assistance). Congressional attitudes toward Azerbaijan and Section 907 also shifted.
Presidential waiver authority was added to Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002
(H.R. 2506; P.L. 107-115). The President may use the waiver authority if he certifies that
U.S. aid supports U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, supports the operational readiness of the
armed forces, is important for Azerbaijan’s border security, and will not harm NK peace talks
or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia. The waiver may be renewed annually,
and sixty days after the exercise of the waiver, the President must report to Congress on the
nature of aid to be provided to Azerbaijan, the military balance between Armenia and
Azerbaijan and the effects of U.S. aid on that balance, the status of Armenia-Azerbaijan
peace talks, and the effects of U.S. aid on those talks. President Bush has exercised the
waiver annually, most recently on February 8, 2006.
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Operations in Iraq. Azerbaijan and Georgia were among the countries that openly
pledged to support the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), with both offering the use
of their airbases, and to assist the United States in re-building Iraq. Both countries agreed
to participate, subject to U.S. financial support, in the stabilization force for Iraq. In August
2003, both Azerbaijan (150 troops) and Georgia (69 troops) dispatched forces to Iraq. U.S.
officials reportedly asked Azerbaijan and Georgia in April 2004 to bolster their troop
contributions in the face of Spain’s troop pullout. Georgia boosted its deployment to almost
900 as of July 2005, which will tie it with Australia as the fifth highest contributor, after
Poland and Ukraine withdraw their forces. Armenia began sending personnel to Iraq in
January 2005, where 46 serve with the Polish contingent.
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
Ethnic conflicts have kept the South Caucasus states from fully partaking in peace,
stability, and economic development over the decade since the Soviet collapse, some
observers lament. The countries are faced with on-going budgetary burdens of arms races
and caring for refugees and displaced persons. Other costs of ethnic conflict include threats
to bordering states of widening conflict and the limited ability of the region or outside states
to fully exploit energy resources or trade/transport networks.
U.S. and international efforts to foster peace and the continued independence of the
South Caucasus states face daunting challenges. The region has been the most unstable part
of the former Soviet Union in terms of the numbers, intensity, and length of its ethnic and
civil conflicts. The ruling nationalities in the three states are culturally rather insular and
harbor various grievances against each other. This is particularly the case between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, where discord has led to the virtually complete displacement of ethnic
Armenians from Azerbaijan and vice versa. The main languages in the three states are
dissimilar (also, those who generally consider themselves Georgians — Kartvelians,
Mingrelians, and Svans — speak dissimilar languages). Few of the region’s borders coincide
with ethnic populations. Attempts by territorially based ethnic minorities to secede are
primary security concerns for all three states. The secessionist NK, Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia have failed to gain international recognition. NK relies on economic support from
Armenia, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Russia.
Nagorno Karabakh Conflict. Since 1988, the separatist conflict in Nagorno
Karabakh (NK) has resulted in up to 20,000 deaths, up to 1 million Azerbaijani refugees and
displaced persons, and about 300,000 Armenian refugees. The non-governmental
International Crisis Group estimates that about 13-14% of Azerbaijan’s territory, including
NK, is controlled by NK Armenian forces. The OSCE’s “Minsk Group” of concerned
member-states began talks in 1992. A U.S. presidential envoy was appointed to these talks.
A Russian-mediated cease-fire was agreed to in May 1994 and was formalized by an
armistice signed by the ministers of defense of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the commander
of the NK army on July 27, 1994 (and reaffirmed a month later). The United States, France,
and Russia co-chair meetings of the Minsk Group.
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The Minsk Group reportedly has presented four proposals as a framework for talks, but
a peace settlement has proved elusive. In late 1997, a new step-by-step peace proposal was
recognized by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia as a basis for further discussion.
This led to protests in both countries and to the forced resignation of Armenian President
Levon Ter-Petrosyan in early 1998. Heydar Aliyev in February 2001 stated that he had
“turned down” and refused to discuss a late 1998 Minsk Group proposal embracing elements
of a comprehensive settlement. The assassination of Armenian political leaders in late 1999
set back the peace process. In 2001, the two presidents attended talks in Key West, Florida,
and then met with President Bush, highlighting early Administration interest in a settlement.
In January 2003, Armenia’s President, Robert Kocharyan, proclaimed that its peace policy
rested on three pillars: a “horizontal” — instead of hierarchical — relationship between NK
and Azerbaijan; a secure land corridor through the Lachin area between Armenia and NK;
and security guarantees for NK’s populace. Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan
in October 2004 stated that the continued occupation of NK border was necessary leverage
to convince Azerbaijan to agree to NK’s status as a “common state.” Since 2005, media in
both countries have reported negotiations on a fourth “hybrid” peace plan to return most NK
border areas prior to a referendum in NK on its status. Talks in France in February 2006
between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents reportedly made little progress.

Civil and Ethnic Conflict in Georgia. Several of Georgia’s ethnic minorities
stepped up their dissidence, including separatism, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, resulting
in the loss of central government control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
President Saakashvili in his January 2004 inaugural address proclaimed his responsibility to
re-integrate these regions into Georgia. Some observers have argued that Russia’s increasing
controls over South Ossetia and Abkhazia have transformed the separatist conflicts into
essentially Russia-Georgia disputes. Most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
reportedly have been granted Russian citizenship.
South Ossetia. In 1989, the region lobbied for joining its territory with North Ossetia
in Russia or for independence. Repressive efforts by former Georgian President
Gamsakhurdia triggered conflict in 1990, reportedly leading to about 1,500 deaths. In June
1992, Russia brokered a cease-fire, and a “peacekeeping” force composed of Russian,
Georgian, and Ossetian units has been stationed in South Ossetia (reportedly numbering
around 1,000 troops, including about 530 Russians, 300 North and South Ossetians, and until
recently, 100-150 Georgians). A Joint Control Commission composed of OSCE, Russian,
Georgian, and North and South Ossetian emissaries was formed to promote a settlement of
the conflict. According to some estimates, some 25,000 ethnic Ossetians and 20,000 ethnic
Georgians reside in the now largely vacant region.
President Saakashvili increased pressure on South Ossetia in 2004 by tightening border
controls. He also reportedly sent several hundred police, military, and intelligence personnel
into the region. Georgia maintained that it was only bolstering its peacekeeping contingent
up to the limit of 500 troops, as permitted by the cease-fire agreement. Georgian guerrilla
forces also reportedly entered the region. Allegedly, Russian officials likewise assisted
several hundred paramilitary elements from Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Russia to enter.
Following inconclusive clashes, both sides by late 2004 ostensibly had pulled back most
undeclared forces. Saakashvili announced a new peace plan for South Ossetia in January
2005 that offered substantial autonomy and quotas for Ossetian representation in new federal
branches of power. In mid-July 2005, Saakashvili elaborated on this plan, calling for the
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creation of an international fund to facilitate repatriation and rebuilding. South Ossetian
“president” Eduard Kokoiti rejected the plan, asserting in October 2005 that “we [South
Ossetians] are citizens of Russia.” The plan has received U.S. and OSCE backing.
Abkhazia. In July 1992, Abkhazia’s legislature declared the region’s effective
independence from Georgia, prompting Georgian national guardsmen to attack the region.
In October 1992, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) approved the first U.N. observer
mission to a Eurasian state, termed UNOMIG, to help the parties reach a settlement. Russian
and North Caucasian “volunteer” troops that reportedly made up the bulk of Abkhaz
separatist forces routed Georgian forces, leading in April 1994 to agreement by the two sides
on a framework for a political settlement and the return of refugees. A Quadripartite
Commission (QC) was set up to discuss repatriation. Russian troops (acting as CIS
peacekeepers) were deployed in a security zone along the Inguri River that divides Abkhazia
from the rest of Georgia. The conflict resulted in about 10,000 deaths and over 200,000
displaced persons, mostly ethnic Georgians.
In late 1997, the sides agreed to set up a Coordinating Council to discuss cease-fire
maintenance and refugee, economic, and humanitarian issues. The QC meets periodically
and addresses grievances not considered by the Coordinating Council, which Abkhazia has
boycotted since 2001. These talks have been supplemented by other discussions between
Abkhaz and Georgian representatives. The U.S. Special Negotiator for NK and Eurasian
Conflicts works with the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General and other
Friends of Georgia (France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine) to facilitate
a settlement. A “New Friends of Georgia” group was formed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine in early 2005 to advocate increased EU
and NATO involvement in a settlement. Sticking points in talks have included Georgia’s
demand that displaced persons be allowed to return to Abkhazia, after which an agreement
on broad autonomy for Abkhazia would be negotiated. The Abkhazians have insisted upon
recognition of their independence as a precondition to large-scale repatriation. Since 2002,
Abkhaz authorities have refused to consider a draft negotiating document prepared by the
U.N. and the Friends of Georgia.
An unusual resolution was approved by the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in
July 2005 calling on Russia “to refrain from any actions impeding the peace process” in
Abkhazia. The resolution also called for Russian peacekeepers to facilitate the return of
refugees and for all OSCE members to “support and facilitate” the establishment of a
U.N./OSCE human rights office in the Gali district of Abkhazia (where many Georgians
formerly resided). Abkhaz officials in January 2006 refused to establish the office and
allegedly demanded that all residents of Abkhazia renounce Georgian citizenship in order to
receive mandatory identity documents. In The U.N. Security Council, Russia in late January
2006 repudiated the draft negotiating document and agreed to only a two-month extension
to UNOMIG’s mandate, raising concerns among some observers that Russia may openly
endorse “self-determination” for the region.
Economic Conditions, Blockades, and Stoppages
The economies of all three South Caucasus states greatly declined in the early 1990s,
affected by the dislocations caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, conflicts, trade
disruptions, and the lingering effects of the 1988 earthquake in Armenia. Although gross
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domestic product (GDP) began to rebound in the states in the mid-1990s, the economies
remain fragile. Investment in oil and gas resources and delivery systems has fueled
economic growth in Azerbaijan in recent years. Armenia’s GDP was about $1,160 per capita,
Azerbaijan’s about $1,020, and Georgia’s about $1,200 (Economist Intelligence Unit and
regional governments, 2004 estimates, market exchange rates). Widespread poverty and
regional conflict have contributed to high emigration from all three states, and remittances
from these emigres provide major support for the remaining populations.
Transport and communications obstructions and stoppages have severely affected
economic development in the South Caucasus and stymied the region’s emergence as an
East-West and North-South corridor. Since 1989, Azerbaijan has obstructed railways and
pipelines traversing its territory to Armenia. These obstructions have had a negative impact
on the Armenian economy, since it is heavily dependent on energy and raw materials
imports. Turkey has barred U.S. shipments of aid through its territory to Armenia since
March 1993. P.L. 104-107 and P.L. 104-208 mandated a U.S. aid cutoff (with a presidential
waiver) to any country which restricts the transport or delivery of U.S. humanitarian aid to
a third country, aimed at convincing Turkey to allow the transit to U.S. aid to Armenia.
According to the U.S. Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave “is blockaded
by neighboring Armenia.” Iran has at times obstructed bypass routes to Nakhichevan.
Georgia has cut off natural gas supplies to South Ossetia and Russia has at times cut off gas
supplies to Georgia. Georgia severely restricts traffic from South Ossetia. Russia hinders
Azerbaijan’s use of the Volga-Don Canal to reach world shipping channels.
Democratization and Human Rights Problems
The non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its annual report
for 2005 judged that the Armenian government had failed to improve its human rights record
during the year. It alleged that torture and ill-treatment in police custody remained
widespread. Authorities restricted the right to freedom of assembly, particularly in the case
of opposition rallies, and the government made little progress in combating corruption,
according to HRW. In Azerbaijan, repression and harassment of opposition parties,
pro-government media bias, and governmental control of election commissions ensured that
the 2005 legislative elections were not free and fair, according to HRW. Torture and
excessive use of force by security forces were also widespread, and the government had not
taken adequate measures to prosecute personnel committing such abuses. There continued
to be convictions of those widely considered to be political prisoners, and the government
pressured independent media by limiting their access to printing and distribution facilities
and imposing fines for alleged defamation. In Georgia, the government had an uneven
human rights record. Human rights abuses continued in many areas, according to HRW.
Although there was a reduction in reports in the capital, Tbilisi, of torture while in detention,
torture by police and security forces appeared to remain widespread outside of the capital.
The organization Freedom House considers Armenia and Georgia as somewhat more
democratic than Azerbaijan.
Armenia. Illustrating ongoing challenges to stability in Armenia, in October 1999,
gunmen entered the legislature and opened fire on deputies and officials, killing the prime
minister, the legislative speaker, and six others. The killings may have been the product of
personal and clan grievances. Political infighting led President Robert Kocharyan in mid-
2000 to appoint Andranik Margaryan as prime minister. In a February 2003 presidential
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election, none of the nine candidates received a required 50% plus one of the vote, forcing
a run-off in March by the top two candidates, Kocharyan and People’s Party head Stepan
Demirchyan (the murdered speaker’s son). OSCE and PACE observers concluded that the
election did not meet international standards for a free and fair race, because of “widespread”
ballot box stuffing, a lack of transparency in vote-counting, and other “serious” irregularities.
In a May 25, 2003, legislative election 6 out of 21 parties running passed a 5% hurdle
and won seats in the party list section of the voting (75 of 131 deputies were elected by party
lists). Margaryan’s Republican Party won about 25% of the votes, the opposition Justice bloc
won 14% (led by Demirchyan), the pro-government Land of Laws Party won 12%, pro-
government Dashnaktsutiun won 10%, the opposition National Unity Movement won 10%,
and the pro-government United Labor Party won 5%. Many seats in individual constituency
races were won by independents. The OSCE said that the election was “less flawed than the
recent presidential poll, but still fell short of international standards.” Proposed
constitutional changes also were voted on but were not approved. New constitutional
changes were drawn up for a planned November 27, 2005, popular referendum. The Venice
Commission of PACE in July 2005 stated that these proposed changes would provide a
“good basis for ensuring ... compliance ... with the European standards in the fields of respect
for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and would pave the way to further
European integration.”
Armenian officials announced that the November 2005 constitutional referendum had
been approved by 93.2% of 1.5 million voters, with a 65.4% turnout. A small delegation of
monitors from the Council of Europe (COE) reported observing ballot-box stuffing and few
voters at the polls. Opposition parties, which boycotted the referendum, alleged that the low
observed turnout placed into question whether the required one-third of the electorate had
actually voted.
Azerbaijan. Long-time ruler Heydar Aliyev suffered serious cardiac problems in April
2003 and was mostly in hospital up through the expiration of his presidential term. In what
some critics termed a move to ensure a dynastic succession, the legislature convened on
August 4 to confirm Ilkham as prime minister. In early October, the ailing Heydar Aliyev
withdrew from a scheduled October 15, 2003, presidential election in favor of his son.
Ilkham Aliyev handily won, beating seven other candidates with about 77% of the vote.
Protests alleging a rigged vote resulted in violence, and spurred arrests of hundreds of alleged
“instigators” of the violence. The State Department expressed “deep disappointment” with
“serious deficiencies” in the election and “extreme concern” about post-election violence and
“politically-motivated arrests.”
In early July 2005, PACE representatives visiting Azerbaijan raised concerns that
myriad electoral officials accused of abuses in the 2000 legislative race remained in place for
a planned November 6, 2005, legislative election. Changes to the election law, some in line
with proposals from the Venice Commission of PACE, were approved by the legislature in
June 2005, including those making it easier for people to become candidates. However, the
deputies rejected some of the most significant proposals, including a more equitable
representation of political interests on electoral commissions. In May and October 2005,
Aliyev ordered officials to abide by the electoral laws, and authorities permitted more
opposition rallies. The October decree also led legislators to approve marking hands and
permit outside-funded NGOs to monitor the election, as advocated by PACE. The U.S.
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Embassy in Azerbaijan issued a statement on December 2 praising democratization progress
in the country as evidenced by its legislative election, but urged the government to
investigate and rectify some electoral irregularities. Repeat elections are scheduled for May
2006 in eleven constituencies where alleged irregularities took place. Perhaps troubling, the
legislature approved a CEC in early February containing no opposition party representation.
(See also CRS Report RS22340, Azerbaijan’s Legislative Election, by Jim Nichol.)
Georgia. Georgia has experienced increased political instability in recent years. Polls
before a November 2, 2003 legislative race and exit polling during the race suggested that
the opposition National Movement (NM) and the United Democrats (UD) would win the
largest shares of seats in the party list vote. Instead, official results gave the largest shares
of seats to pro-Shevardnadze interests. The U.S. State Department criticized “massive vote
fraud” in several regions. Demonstrators launched a peaceful “rose revolution” that led to
Shevardnadze’s resignation on November 23. Russia and the United States appeared to
cooperate during the crisis to urge Georgians to abjure violence. UD and NM agreed to co-
sponsor NM head Saakashvili for a January 4, 2004, presidential election. He received 96%
of 2.2 million popular votes from a field of five candidates. OSCE observers judged the vote
as bringing Georgia closer to meeting democratic electoral standards. The legislature,
headed by UD co-leader Nino Burjanadze, approved constitutional amendments in February
2004 that created the post of prime minister and confirmed UD co-leader Zurab Zhvania for
the post. After Zhvania’s apparently accidental death in early 2005, his colleague Zurab
Noghaideli became prime minister (for background, see CRS Report RS21685, Coup in
Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and Implications).
President Bush visited Georgia on May 9-10, 2005, and praised its “rose revolution” for
“inspiring democratic reformers” and freedom “from the Black Sea to the Caspian and to the
Persian Gulf and beyond.” He urged the peaceful settlement of separatist conflicts and
offered to “make a phone call or two” if Saakashvili asked him to help resolve the separatist
conflicts, but stressed that the United States could not impose a solution. President
Saakashvili hailed the Bush visit as marking “final proof that Georgia is an independent state
with inviolable territory” and stressed that the U.S.-Georgian “partnership” ultimately was
based on “our shared belief in freedom” and was the reason Georgia had sent troops to Iraq
to end “enslavement” there.
The South Caucasus’s External Security Context
Russian Involvement in the Region
After Vladimir Putin became president in 1999, Russia appeared to place great strategic
importance on maintaining influence in the South Caucasus region. But although such
efforts appeared initially successful, several developments since 2003 may have altered this
assessment, including the “rose revolution” in Georgia, NATO’s increased ties with
Armenia, the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Russia’s never-ending
concerns about security in its North Caucasus regions, and Russia’s agreement to close its
remaining military bases in Georgia.
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At least until recently, Russia appeared to place the highest priority on exercising
influence in the region in the military-strategic sphere, less on influence in the economic
sphere, and a minimum on influence in the domestic political sphere. Russia has viewed
Islamic fundamentalism as a growing threat to the region, but has cooperated with Iran on
some issues to counter Turkish and U.S. influence. Russia has tried to stop ethnic
“undesirables,” drugs, weapons, and other contraband from entering its borders. It has
quashed separatism in its North Caucasus areas while seemingly backing it in the South
Caucasus. The states have responded in various ways to Russian overtures. Armenia has
close security and economic ties with Russia, given its unresolved NK conflict and
grievances against Turkey. Georgia has protested what it views as Russia’s support to
separatists. Azerbaijan has been concerned about Russia’s ties with Armenia.
Military-Strategic Interests. Russia’s armed presence in the South Caucasus has
been multifaceted, including thousands of military base personnel, “peacekeepers,” and
border troops. The first step by Russia in maintaining a military presence in the region was
the signing of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty
(CST) by Armenia, Russia, and others in 1992, which pledges the members to consult in the
event of a threat to one or several members, and to provide mutual aid if attacked (Azerbaijan
and Georgia withdrew in 1999). Russia also secured permission for two military bases in
Armenia and four in Georgia. Armenia reportedly pays Russia to help guard the Armenian-
Turkish border. The total number of Russian troops has been estimated at about 3,500 in
Armenia. Armenia has argued that its Russian bases provide for regional stability by
protecting it from attack. Another 103,000 Russian troops are stationed nearby in the North
Caucasus (The Military Balance 2004-2005). In 1993, Azerbaijan was the first Eurasian
state to get Russian troops to withdraw, except at the Gabala radar site in northern
Azerbaijan. (Giving up on closing the site, in January 2002 Azerbaijan signed a 10-year
lease agreement with Russia permitting up to 1,500 troops there.)
Azerbaijan and Georgia have raised concerns about the spillover effects of Russia’s
military operations in Chechnya. In December 1999, the OSCE agreed to Georgia’s request
to send observers to monitor its border with Chechnya (monitoring later was expanded to
nearby borders). These monitors alerted authorities about hundreds of illegal border
crossings and were regarded by many observers as providing an accurate picture of
conditions and as discouraging crossings by armed rebels who feared detection. In December
2004, Russia refused to extend the observers’ mandate, terming them “ineffective.” In April
2005, the OSCE allocated 2.6 million euros and personnel to train Georgian border guards,
which some observers criticized as an inadequate substitute for the monitoring mission.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Russia stepped up
its claims that Georgia harbored Chechen terrorists (with links to al Qaeda) who used
Georgia as a staging ground for attacks into Chechnya. The United States expressed
“unequivocal opposition” to military intervention by Russia inside Georgia. Georgia
launched a policing effort in its northern Pankisi Gorge in late 2002 that somewhat reduced
tensions over this issue. In February 2004, Saakashvili reportedly pledged during a Moscow
visit to combat “Wahabbis” (referring to Islamic extremists) in Georgia, including Chechen
terrorists hiding in the Gorge and international terrorists that Russia alleged had transited
Georgia to fight in Chechnya (for background, see CRS Report RS21319, Georgia’s Pankisi
Gorge: Russian Concerns and U.S. Interests).
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The Georgian legislature in October 2005 called on the government to certify that the
activities undertaken by Russian peacekeepers in Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetian were contributing to peace settlements. If the government was unable
to make these certifications as stipulated, then it must request that the peacekeepers leave,
according to the resolution. In January 2006, the Georgian Minister for Conflict Settlement,
Giorgi Khaindrava, indicated that he might report to the legislature that the Russian
peacekeepers have made no progress in facilitating a peace settlement. The legislature has
indicated that it will consider the government’s response in February 2006. A Georgian
National Military Strategy document released in November 2005 was blunt, terming Russian
peacekeepers and bases in Georgia security threats.
Russia’s Bases in Georgia. In 1999 Russia and Georgia agreed to provisions of the
adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty calling for Russia to reduce
weaponry at its four bases in Georgia, to close two of the bases (at Gudauta and Vaziani) by
July 2001, and to complete negotiations during 2000 on the status of the other two bases (at
Batumi and Akhalkalaki). The Treaty remains unratified by NATO signatories until Russia
satisfies these and other conditions. On July 1, 2001, Georgia reported that Russia had
turned over the Vaziani base. Russia declared in June 2002 that it had closed its Gudauta
base, but that 320 troops would remain to support Russian “peacekeepers” taking leave at
the base. Georgia objected to this stance. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated in
June 2005 that there were about 2,500 Russian troops at the bases.
The Georgian legislature in March 2005 passed a resolution calling for Russia to come
to an agreement by mid-May on closing the bases or face various restrictions on base
operations. This pressure, and perhaps the U.S. presidential visit, spurred Russia to agree
with Georgia at the end of May on setting 2008 as the deadline for closing the bases.
Reportedly, the Russian base at Akhalkalaka will be closed by the end of 2007, and the base
at Batumi will be closed during 2008. President Putin explained that Georgia had the right
to request the base closures and that his military General Staff had assured him that the bases
were Cold War-era relics of no strategic importance to Russia. The Russian Defense
Ministry announced in July that it had begun building facilities for two alpine brigades near
Georgia’s borders “to stop attempts by terrorists to penetrate Russia from Georgia.”
Caspian Energy Resources. Russia has tried to play a major role in future oil
production and transportation in the Caspian Sea region. At the May 2002 U.S.-Russia
summit, the two presidents issued a joint statement endorsing multiple pipeline routes,
implying Russia’s non-opposition to plans to build oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan to
Turkey that do not transit Russia. In March 2004, however, a Russian official stated that
Putin wanted to ensure that the greatest volume of Caspian energy flowed through Russia.
Armenia and Georgia are heavily reliant on Russian gas supplies, and Azerbaijan plans to
continue to import some Russian gas until its own gas fields are developed further (see also
below, Energy Resources and U.S. Policy).
The Roles of Turkey, Iran, and Others
The United States has generally viewed Turkey as able to foster pro-Western policies
and discourage Iranian interference in the South Caucasus states, though favoring Azerbaijan
in the NK conflict. Critics of Turkey’s larger role in the region caution that the United States
and NATO might be drawn by their ties with Turkey into regional imbroglios. Turkey seeks
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good relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia and some contacts with Armenia, while trying
to limit Russian and Iranian influence. Azerbaijan likewise views Turkey as a major ally
against such influence, and to balance Armenia’s ties with Russia. Armenia is a member of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization, along with Turkey, and the two states
have established consular relations. Obstacles to better Armenian-Turkish relations include
Turkey’s rejection of Armenians’ claims of genocide in 1915-1923 and its support for
Azerbaijan in the NK conflict. Georgia has an abiding interest in ties with the approximately
one million Georgians residing in Turkey and the approximately 50,000 residing in Iran, and
has signed friendship treaties with both states. Turkey and Russia are Georgia’s primary
trade partners. Turkey hopes to benefit from the construction of new pipelines delivering oil
and gas westward from the Caspian Sea.
Iran’s goals in the South Caucasus include discouraging Western powers such as Turkey
and the United States from gaining influence (Iran’s goal of containing Russia conflicts with
its cooperation with Russia on these interests), ending regional instability that might threaten
its own territorial integrity, and building economic links. A major share of the world’s
Azerbaijanis reside in Iran (estimates range from 6-12 million), as well as about 200,000
Armenians. Ethnic consciousness among some “Southern Azerbaijanis” in Iran has grown.
Azerbaijani elites fear Iranian-supported Islamic extremism and object to Iranian support to
Armenia. Iran has growing trade ties with Armenia and Georgia, but its trade with
Azerbaijan has declined. To block the West and Azerbaijan from developing Caspian Sea
energy, Iran long has insisted on either common control by the littoral states or the division
of the seabed into five equal sectors. Some thawing in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations occurred
in early 2005 with Ilkham Aliyev’s visit to Iran and the long-delayed opening of an
Azerbaijani consulate in Tabriz. U.S. policy aims to contain Iran’s threats to U.S. interests
(See CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses).
Among non-bordering states, the United States and European states are the most
influential in the South Caucasus in terms of aid, trade, exchanges, and other ties. U.S. and
European goals in the region are broadly compatible, involving integrating it into the West
and preventing an anti-Western orientation, opening it to trade and transport, obtaining
energy resources, and helping it become peaceful, stable, and democratic. The South
Caucasus region has developed some economic and political ties with other Black Sea and
Caspian Sea littoral states, besides those discussed above. Azerbaijan shares with Central
Asian states common linguistic and religious ties and concerns about some common
bordering powers (Iran and Russia). The South Caucasian and Central Asian states have
common concerns about ongoing terrorist threats and drug trafficking from Afghanistan.
Central Asia’s increasing energy and other trade with the South Caucasus will make it more
dependent on stability in the region.
U.S. Aid Overview
The United States is the largest bilateral aid donor by far to Armenia and Georgia, and
the two states are among the four Eurasian states that each have received more than $1
billion in U.S. aid FY1992-FY2004 (the others are Russia and Ukraine). See Table 1. U.S.
assistance has included FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) programs, food aid (U.S. Department
of Agriculture), Peace Corps, and security assistance. Armenia and Georgia have regularly
ranked among the top world states in terms of per capita U.S. aid, indicating the high level
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of concern within the Administration and Congress. Foreign Operations Appropriations for
FY1998 (P.L. 105-118) created a new South Caucasian funding category, which still exists,
to emphasize regional peace and development. Besides bilateral aid, the United States
contributes to multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank that aid the region. In perspective, cumulative EU aid to the region over 1992-
2004 has totaled about $1.4 billion. In 2004 the EU invited the South Caucasus states to
participate in a “Wider Europe” program of enhanced aid, trade, and political ties. A World
Bank/EU-sponsored donor conference that month resulted in over $1 billion in three-year
pledges for development in Georgia (the United States pledged about one-third of the total).
In January 2004, Congress authorized a major new assistance program, the Millennium
Challenge Account (Section D of P.L. 108-199). A newly established Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) announced in May 2004 that Armenia and Georgia would be among the
first states invited to apply for aid. On August 16, 2005, the MCC approved a five-year,
$295.3 million agreement (termed a “compact”) with Georgia to improve a road from
Javakheti to Samtskhe, repair a gas pipeline, create a small business investment fund, set up
agricultural grants, and improve municipal and rural water supply, sanitation, irrigation,
roads, and solid waste treatment. Reportedly, no MCC funds have been disbursed yet. On
December 19, 2005, the MCC approved a five-year, $235.65 million compact with Armenia
— to bolster rural agriculture through road-building and irrigation and marketing projects
— but raised concerns about the November 2005 constitutional referendum. Following
assurances by Foreign Minister Oskanyan that Armenia would address democratization
shortfalls, the MCC indicated that the compact would be signed.
Table 1. U.S. FY1992-FY2004 and FY2004 Budgeted Foreign
Assistance, FY2005 Estimated Aid, and FY2006 Approved Aid
(millions of dollars)
South Caucasus
FY1992-FY2004
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
Country
Budgeted Aida
Budgeted Aida
Actualc
Estimatec
Requestc
Armenia
1,487.6
89.39
86.56
81.7
58.14
Azerbaijan
500.11
79.54
56.31
47.94
40.12
Georgia
1,409.0
147.19
108.91
86.01
75.84
Total
3,417.7b
333.29
251.78
215.65
174.1
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia; State
Department, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia: FY2003 Annual Report,
January 2004.
a. FREEDOM Support Act and Agency budgets.
b. Caucasus Regional funds are included in the total.
c. FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds. Does not include Defense or Energy Department funding,
funding for exchanges, or Millennium Challenge Corporation programs in Armenia and Georgia.
U.S. Security Assistance
The United States has provided some security assistance to the region, and bolstered
such aid after September 11, 2001, though overall aid amounts to the countries did not
increase post-September 11 as they did in regard to the Central Asian “front line” states in
the war on terrorists in Afghanistan (see Table 1). In testimony to the Senate Armed
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Services Committee on March 1, 2005, Gen. James Jones, head of U.S. European Command
(EUCOM), stated that “the Caucasus is increasingly important to our interests. Its air
corridor has become a crucial lifeline between coalition forces in Afghanistan and our bases
in Europe. Caspian oil, carried through the Caucasus, may constitute as much as 25 percent
of the world’s growth in oil production over the next five years ... This region is a
geographical pivot point in the spread of democracy and free market economies to the states
of Central and Southwest Asia.” (See also CRS Report RL30679, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.)
EUCOM initiatives in the region include the Sustainment and Stability Operations
Program (SSOP) in Georgia, the South Caucasus Clearinghouse, the Caspian Guard program,
and the Caspian Hydrocarbons initiative. The 16-month SSOP was launched in early 2005
as a follow-on to the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP; see below). Funded at $64
million, SSOP is providing training for four battalions (2,000 troops), in part to support U.S.-
led coalition operations. When completed, the United States will have provided training to
a major portion of Georgia’s armed forces. However, Georgian media have reported that
many of the U.S.-trained troops are not re-enlisting. The Clearinghouse aims to facilitate
cooperation by sharing data on security assistance among both donor and recipient countries.
Gen. Jones testified that the Caspian Guard program, launched in 2003, enhances and
coordinates security assistance provided by U.S. agencies to establish an “integrated airspace,
maritime and border control regime” for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The Hydrocarbons
initiative provides maritime security and crisis response and consequence management
assistance to help the regional states protect their pipelines and other energy transport to the
West. The United States acknowledged in September 2005 that it had supplied two maritime
surveillance radars to help detect and direct interdiction of illicit weapons of mass
destruction and other trafficking in the Caspian Sea. Gen. Charles Wald, deputy head of
EUCOM, in November 2004 suggested that the Administration was exploring the
establishment of “cooperative security locations” (CSLs) — sites without a full-time U.S.
military presence that are used for refueling and short-duration deployments — in Azerbaijan
or Georgia. These CSLs could be used for operations in the region or in Afghanistan.
Azerbaijani and Georgian leaders (and Georgia’s 2005 Military Strategy report) have
stated that they want their countries to join NATO; much greater progress in military reform,
however, will be required before they are considered for membership. All three states joined
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994. Troops from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia serve as peacekeepers in NATO-led operations in Kosovo and the latter two states
support NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. There reportedly have been some fistfights
and even a murder involving Armenians and Azerbaijanis during PFP activities. NATO
cancelled a PFP exercise in Azerbaijan in September 2004, stating that Azerbaijan had
violated NATO principles of inclusiveness by refusing to host Armenian forces. The June
2004 NATO summit pledged enhanced attention to the South Caucasian and Central Asian
PFP members. A Special Representative of the NATO General Secretary was appointed to
encourage democratic civil-military relations, transparency in defense planning and
budgeting, and enhanced force inter-operability with NATO.
Until waived, Section 907 had prohibited much U.S. security aid to Azerbaijan,
including Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education &
Training (IMET). By U.S. policy, similar aid had not been provided to Azerbaijan’s fellow
combatant Armenia. From 1993-2002, both had been on the Munitions List of countries
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ineligible for U.S. arms transfers. Since the waiver provision to Section 907 was enacted,
some Members have maintained that the Armenian-Azerbaijani military balance is preserved
by providing equal amounts (parity) in IMET and FMF assistance to each country. In
FY2005, the conference report (H.Rept. 108-792) on H.R. 4818 (P.L. 108-447; Consolidated
Appropriations) directed that FMF funding for Armenia be boosted to match that for
Azerbaijan (from $2 million as requested to $8 million). The Members appeared to reject
the Administration’s assurances that the disparate aid would not affect the Armenia-
Azerbaijan military balance or undermine peace talks. Apparently in anticipation of similar
congressional calls, the Administration’s FY2006 foreign aid budget requested equal
amounts of FMF as well as IMET for each country. However, the FY2007 budget requests
more such aid for Azerbaijan than for Armenia.
A $64 million Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) was carried out in 2002-2004
that U.S. officials explained would help Georgian military, security, and border forces to
combat Chechen, Arab, Afghani, al Qaeda, and other terrorists who allegedly had infiltrated
Georgia. Some of these terrorists allegedly had fled U.S.-led coalition operations in
Afghanistan, so the GTEP was initially linked to OEF. Other reported U.S. aims include
bolstering Georgia’s ability to guard its energy pipelines and ensuring internal stability. The
program formally ended in April 2004 (see above, SSOP).
U.S. Trade and Investment
The Bush Administration and others maintain that U.S. support for privatization and the
creation of free markets directly serve U.S. national interests by opening new markets for
U.S. goods and services and sources of energy and minerals. Among U.S. economic links
with the region, bilateral trade agreements providing for normal trade relations for products
have been signed and entered into force with all three states. Bilateral investment treaties
providing national treatment guarantees have entered into force. U.S. investment is highest
in Azerbaijan’s energy sector, but rampant corruption in the three regional states otherwise
has discouraged investors. With U.S. support, in June 2000 Georgia became the second
Eurasian state (after Kyrgyzstan) to be admitted to the WTO. The application of Title IV of
the Trade Act of 1974, including the Jackson-Vanik amendment, was terminated with respect
to Georgia in December 2000, so its products receive permanent nondiscriminatory (normal
trade relations or NTR) treatment. Armenia was admitted into WTO in December 2002.
The application of Title IV was terminated with respect to Armenia in January 2005. (For
further information, see CRS Report 98-545, The Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A Survey.)
Energy Resources and U.S. Policy
The U.S. Energy Department reports estimates of 7-13 billion barrels of proven oil
reserves, and estimates of 30 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves in Azerbaijan
(Country Analysis Brief, June 2005). U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the
Central Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties
to the West, supporting U.S. private investment, breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and
gas transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia,
promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and
opposing the building of pipelines that transit Iran. These goals are reflected in the
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Administration’s May 2001 National Energy Policy report. It recommended that the
President direct U.S. agencies to support building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil
pipeline, expedite use of the pipeline by oil firms operating in Kazakhstan, support
constructing a gas pipeline to export Azerbaijani gas, and otherwise encourage the Caspian
regional states to facilitate private investment in energy development. Since September 11,
2001, the Administration has emphasized U.S. vulnerability to possible energy supply
disruptions and its commitment to Caspian energy development. Critics argue that oil from
the Caspian region will amount to less than 4% of world supplies. Senator John Kerry in late
July 2005 criticized H.R. 6, the Energy Policy Act (P.L. 109-58), by arguing that it did not
address the U.S. over-dependency on foreign oil, which was necessitating U.S. training of
security forces “to guard oil facilities around the Caspian Sea.”
The Clinton Administration launched a campaign in 1997 stressing the strategic
importance of the BTC route as part of an “Eurasian Transport Corridor.” In November
1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan signed the “Istanbul Protocol” on
construction of the 1,040-mile BTC oil pipeline. In August 2002, the BTC Company was
formed to construct, own, and operate the oil pipeline. BTC hopes to begin loading tankers
at Ceyhan in May 2006. A gas pipeline to Turkey is being built parallel to the oil pipeline.
Georgia will receive some of this gas, reducing its reliance on gas from Russia. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza in early 2006 urged Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
to consider linking up with this gas pipeline. There are objections from some in Armenia
about lack of access to these pipelines. Armenia and Iran cooperate on energy production,
including on a gas pipeline being built from Armenia to link up with Iran’s pipelines.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006. Conference Report (109-265) agreed
to in the House on November 4, 2005 and in the Senate on November 10, 2005. Signed into
law on November 14, 2005. Provides for $75 million in FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) aid
to Armenia ($20 million above the request), $35 million for Azerbaijan, and $67 million for
Georgia. It calls for $12 million in FMF for Georgia, and $5 million each for Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and supports $750,000 in IMET each for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The
conferees agree that at least $3 million in FREEDOM Support funds be provided to address
ongoing humanitarian needs in Nagorno-Karabakh.
H.R. 3103 (Schiff)
To direct the Secretary of State to submit a report outlining the steps taken and plans
made by the United States to end Turkey’s blockade of Armenia. Introduced June 29, 2005.
H.R. 3361 (Knollenberg)
To prohibit U.S. assistance to develop or promote any rail connections or railway-
related connections that traverse or connect Baku, Azerbaijan; Tbilisi, Georgia; and Kars,
Turkey, and that specifically exclude cities in Armenia. Introduced July 20, 2005.
H.Con.Res. 195 (Schiff)
Commemorating the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923. Introduced June 29, 2005. The
Committee on International Relations on September 15, 2005, ordered it to be reported.
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H.Res. 316 (Radanovich)/S.Res. 320 (Ensign)
Calling the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States take into
account issues of human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United
States record relating to the Armenian Genocide. H.Res. 316 was introduced on June 14,
2005. The Committee on International Relations on September 15, 2005, ordered it to be
reported. S.Res. 320 was introduced on November 18, 2005.
H.Res. 326 (Gallegly)/S.Res. 226 (Biden)/S.Res. 260 (Biden)
Calling for free and fair legislative elections in Azerbaijan. H.Res. 326 was introduced
June 16, 2005, and passed on July 20, 2005. S.Res. 226 was introduced on July 29, 2005.
A similar bill, S.Res. 260, was introduced September 29, 2005, and was approved in the
Senate on October 20, 2005.
S.Res. 69 (Lugar)
Expressing the sense of the Senate about the actions of Russia regarding Georgia and
Moldova. Resolves that the United States should urge Russia to live up to commitments to
close or otherwise resolve the status of its military bases in Georgia and Moldova; maintain
strong diplomatic pressure to permit an OSCE Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) in
Georgia to continue; and seek (if BMO ceases to exist) an international presence to monitor
borders between Georgia and Russia. Introduced March 3, 2005, and agreed to on March 10.
S.Res. 139 (Reid)
Expressing support for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. Introduced May
12, 2005. Passed on May 12, 2005.
S.Res. 344 (McCain)
Expressing Support for the Government of Georgia’s South Ossetian Peace Plan. Calls
for all Members of the OSCE to respect Georgia’s territorial integrity and urges the U.S.
government to play a more significant role in facilitating a peace settlement. Introduced and
approved on December 21, 2005.
Figure 1. Map of the Region
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