Order Code RL32540
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Proposed U.S.-Panama
Free Trade Agreement
Updated February 15, 2006
J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement
Summary
On November 16, 2003, President George W. Bush formally notified Congress
of his intention to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with Panama.
Negotiations commenced in April 2004 and nine rounds have been held, the latest
concluding on January 20, 2006, following a lengthy hiatus. Much of the text has
been agreed to, following the framework of earlier U.S. FTAs, but a tenth round will
be needed to complete the agreement. As with all free trade agreements, the U.S.-
Panama FTA cannot enter into force until Congress passes implementing legislation
and the President signs it into law.
Panama’s economy is based largely on maritime and related services industries
that developed around its transisthmian canal, once managed by the United States,
but formally returned to Panama in 1999. Canal operations account for 6% of
Panama’s GDP, with the largest and fastest growing traffic volume generated along
the U.S. East Coast-to-Asia trade route (especially U.S.-China). The canal’s total
economic impact, however, is far greater, supporting income and jobs in various
services industries including warehousing, ship registry and repair, salvage
operations, insurance, banking, and tourism.
Panama is a small U.S. trading partner, but benefits from significant U.S.
investment and unilateral trade preferences offered through the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI), which Panama seeks to make permanent in an FTA. The FTA may
also be seen as a way to reinforce Panama’s varied trade liberalization goals. The
services sector is already globally competitive, but the small manufacturing and
protected agriculture sectors are less so. Panama wants an FTA that will meet the
needs for openness in services, new export opportunities in manufacturing, and
adjustment time for agriculture to develop alternative export crops and minimize
rural dislocation.
For the United States, Panama has long held a strategic military and commercial
importance, even as a small trading partner, and an FTA with Panama fits with
broader U.S. trade policy. The United States seeks to reduce tariffs and other barriers
to U.S. industrial, agricultural, and consumer goods, and to standardize rules for
services trade, investment, government procurement, intellectual property rights, and
dispute resolution, going beyond WTO standards where possible. Textiles and
apparel are not an issue given Panama’s small production, but U.S. labor groups are
challenging Panama’s labor conditions, laws, and enforcement efforts. Panama has
responded that its labor laws and labor rights record are far superior to those of
Central America and comply with internationally recognized standards. Still to be
resolved is the treatment of sensitive agricultural products. Also pending is the U.S.
request that Panama accept USDA certification on U.S. meat and poultry exports as
adequate for immediate entry of U.S. exports into Panama. The United States has
agreed to allow a Panamanian review of the U.S. food inspection system to help
resolve the issue. This report will be updated periodically.
Related information may be found in CRS Report RL30981, Panama: Political
and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Contents
Panama’s Canal and Economic Relations with the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Early U.S.-Panama Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Canal and U.S. Trade Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Panamanian Trade Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Structure and Direction of Panamanian Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Colón Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S.-Panama Merchandise Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Status of Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Market Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Agricultural Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Maritime Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Government Procurement and Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Labor and Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Labor Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Environmental Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Trade Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix 1. Chronology of U.S.-Panama FTA Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix 2. Panama: Selected Economic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix 3. U.S.-Panama Tariff Rates for Selected Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2. Panama Direction of Trade, 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
List of Tables
Table 1. Panama’s Current Account Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 2. U.S.-Panama Merchandise Trade, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 3. U.S. Investment in Panama, Mexico, and Central America . . . . . . . . . 10
The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade
Agreement
On November 16, 2003, President George W. Bush formally notified Congress
of his intention to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with Panama.
Negotiations commenced in April 2004 and nine rounds have been held, the latest
concluding on January 20, 2006, after nearly a year’s hiatus. Nearly all the text has
been agreed to, following the framework of earlier U.S. FTAs, but there is no final
agreement pending resolution of sensitive agricultural issues.
A highly volatile issue that arose during the ninth round that remains unresolved
is the U.S. request that Panama accept United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) certification on U.S. meat and poultry exports as adequate for immediate
entry of U.S. meat exports into Panama. To help resolve the issue, the United States
has agreed to arrange for Panama to conduct an onsite review of the U.S. food
inspection system. A tenth round is likely to be needed to complete the agreement.
As with all free trade agreements, the U.S.-Panama FTA cannot enter into force until
Congress passes implementing legislation and the President signs it into law. This
report will be updated periodically.
Panama’s Canal and Economic Relations with the
United States
The United States and Panama have entered into many agreements over the past
150 years, the most prominent ones defining their relative stake in the famous canal
that traverses the Central American isthmus, bisecting Panamanian territory. (See
Figure 1.) The canal has been a critical factor influencing Panamanian domestic and
foreign affairs, and like earlier U.S.-Panama agreements, the FTA’s significance is
tied to a Panamanian economy that has formed largely around the canal.
Early U.S.-Panama Economic Relations
Since first explored by the Spanish at the turn of the sixteenth century, interest
in Panama has centered on its unique geographic characteristic: the slender distance
separating the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Because of the transit possibilities this
presented (first for Peruvian gold and other colonial trade), Panama was a natural
crossroads for the movement of commerce, a strategic position that grew as the world
became ever more traveled and integrated. In fact, Panama’s destiny became fused
to its geography and, over time, to the vagaries of foreign interests that sought to take
advantage of it, particularly the United States.
CRS-2
Figure 1. Map of Panama
Panama
C a r i b b e a n S e a
G r
Canal
e a t e r Antilles
S
Madden
AN B
C a r i b b e a n
Lake
Lago
LA
Gatun
S
Bayano
S e a
Lake
Golfo de los
COLON
Mosquitos
PANAMA
P a c i f i c
BOCAS DEL TORO
O c e a n
Bay of Panama
COLUMBIA
COCLE
CHIRIQUI
ARCHIPIELAGO
VERAGUAS
DE LAS PERLAS
Golfo de Chiriqui
G u l f o f P a n a m a
DARIEN
HERRERA
LOS SANTOS
Panama
Isla de
Coiba
International Boundary
Province Boundary
National Capital
Province Capital
San Blas is a territory (comarca).
0
25
50
75 Kilometers
N O R T H P A C I F I C O C E A N
0
25
50
75 Miles
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 7/27/04)
CRS-3
Panama was swept to independence from Spain on November 28, 1821,
becoming part of a regional group known as Gran Colombia. By this point in time,
both the United States and some European powers openly coveted the prospect of an
inter-oceanic connector. Well before construction of a canal could begin, the United
States displaced Britain as the dominant foreign influence, completing a cross-
isthmian railroad in 1855. This project was driven by the westward expansion of the
United States, which included an anticipated southern water route to the west coast.
To secure this transit system, as well as the safety of goods and people using it, the
United States resorted to armed intervention in Panama some 14 times in the 19th
century. By the time the United States sought permission to construct a canal, a
precedent had been set for military defense of U.S. interests in Panama.1
The initial U.S. effort to build a canal required a concession from Colombia
allowing the United States to complete the bankrupt French project abandoned in
1889. In early 1903, the details were set down in a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate,
but unanimously rejected by the Colombian legislature. The United States responded
by reaching out to the growing Panamanian successionist movement. On November
3, 1903, in a quick and bloodless move facilitated by the offshore presence of U.S.
warships, Panama separated from Colombia. The United States recognized Panama
immediately as an independent state, and in return, Panama signed the Hay-Bunau-
Varilla Treaty, ceding to the United States the rights to construct a canal and to
control it “in perpetuity.”2
The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 led to U.S. dominance in the
commercial and, at times, political life of Panama. Although both countries
benefitted from its operations, the relationship was far from equal, which along with
the perpetual U.S. presence, generated a nagging resentment, periodic protests, and
sometimes violence over the tangible loss of national sovereignty. This tension
remained a dominant feature of U.S.-Panamanian relations until the canal was ceded
back to Panama in 1977 under terms defined in the Panama Canal Treaty signed by
Presidents Jimmy Carter and Omar Torrijos. Although tensions flared again in 1989
with the U.S. incursion into Panama to arrest then-chief of state General Manual
Noriega on narcotics trafficking charges, the incursion proved to be a catalyst for the
return of democracy. Perhaps not coincidently, Panama’s decision to promote trade
liberalization followed soon thereafter.3
The Canal and U.S. Trade Policy
The canal solidified Panama as a maritime economy and its return to
Panamanian control raised expectations that Panama would enjoy greater economic
benefits from its ownership. The canal operations by themselves account for
1 Conniff, Michael L. Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance. Athens: the
University of Georgia Press, second edition. 2001. pp. 30-35.
2 Woodward, Ralph Lee. Central America: A Nation Divided. New York: Oxford
University Press, third edition. 1999, pp. 187-191 and ibid., pp. 63-70.
3 Conniff, Panama and the United States, pp. 134-39 and CRS Report RL30981, Panama:
Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS-4
approximately 6% of Panama’s GDP, with the largest and fastest growing traffic
volume generated along the U.S. East Coast-to-Asia trade route (especially U.S.-
China). About one-third of all cargo passing through the canal has its origin or
destination in the United States. The canal’s total economic impact, however, is far
greater, supporting income and jobs in various services industries including
warehousing, ship registry and repair, salvage operations, insurance, banking, and
tourism. The two major ports at either end of the canal have been privatized and
modernized, a portion of the canal was widened in 2001, but Panama faces a difficult
and expensive challenge to enhance the capacity of the entire canal to accommodate
much larger post-Panamax ships, increasingly the standard for global shipping in the
21st century.4
With transfer of the canal and its operations to Panama, the country also
inherited a substantial amount of land and physical assets. The conversion of these
assets to private use has been a boon to the Panamanian economy, but has required
considerable costs and investment, as well. Privatization efforts eased the
transformation of former U.S. government facilities to productive Panamanian use,
which has included refurbishing the Panamanian railroad by Kansas City Southern
Railways, transforming the former Albrook base into residential housing, and
developing a small foreign processing zone in the former Ft. Davis.5
The Panama-Pacific Special Economic Area (PPSEA) is perhaps the most
ambitious of these projects. This public-private partnership, established in law,
aspires to convert the former Howard Air Force Base into a “world class business
center,” with an emphasis on the export sector. Existing assets include housing and
office buildings, a hospital, transportation infrastructure, fiberoptic cable network,
an 8,500-foot runway, and four hanger facilities. The government offers businesses
various fiscal incentives and a streamlined regulatory process. Firms will be required
to commit to state-of-the-art practices that include adopting internationally accepted
environmental and labor standards.6
With the assistance of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World
Bank, Panama is seeking a large global financing package to cover the initial
investment needs. The project aims at developing various businesses including
computer technology, cell phone manufacturing, international call centers (Dell
already operates one on site), aeronautical industry support, and others that require
a well-trained work force. The IFC supports this project not only for its prospects as
a business venture, but because it is forward looking rather than relying on the
“maquiladora” business model common in much of the rest of the region.7
4 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Panama: Country Profile 2003. London, 2003. pp. 16-
17 and U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Panama: Country
Analysis Briefs. October 2003; and [http://www.pancanal.com].
5 Ibid.
6 Government of Panama. Panama-Pacifico Special Economic Area Agency.
7 Ibid., and discussion with IFC official.
CRS-5
At the start of the 21st century, the canal and close ties with the United States are
still the defining features of Panama’s economy, but in the past these hindered
Panama’s participation in regional integration. Although part of the Central
American Integration System, a broadly focused political arrangement, Panama has
declined to join the Central American Common Market, relying instead on the canal
and the large U.S. economy as its economic anchors. Panama has always had a fully
dollarized monetary system and is a beneficiary of U.S. unilateral trade preferences
defined in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).8 Under these circumstances, there
was little external incentive for Panama to become a more open economy. Only
since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) relatively recently in 1997 did
Panama begin to reduce tariff rates, an important step in preparing Panama for an
FTA with the United States.
Panama’s subregional independence and reliance on U.S. economic ties has
suited the United States as well, given its continuing interest in the Canal. An FTA
with Panama may be seen as one way for the United States to support long-
established commercial interests and deepen bilateral relations, particularly if
accepted as a mutually negotiated pact with reasonably balanced political and
economic outcomes. Although many ships have outgrown the canal, its locale and
prospects for enlarging the passageway continue to reinforce Panama’s historic, albeit
currently diminished, importance for the United States as a strategic trade passage.
A bilateral FTA with Panama is also part of the Bush Administration’s
“competitive liberalization” trade strategy, in which negotiations are taking place on
multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels. This multi-tiered negotiation strategy
is predicated on an expectation that gains on one level of negotiation may encourage,
if not compel, similar breakthroughs on others. Because of slow progress at the
WTO and with the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the United States has
moved ahead aggressively with bilateral talks, of which the Panama FTA is one.
Some, however, have questioned the bilateral approach for the asymmetrical
negotiation power the United States wields, the effects it may have on non-
participating countries, and the one-sided trading system that is developing around
a U.S. hub, as opposed to a truly regional or multilateral system.
For Panama, the FTA may be seen as a way to reinforce its varied trade
liberalization goals. The services sector is already globally competitive, but the
manufacturing sector is small and agricultural remains protected and uncompetitive
(see below). For Panama, the chief concern is crafting an FTA that will balance the
need to pursue openness for services, export growth and promotion for
manufacturing, and adjustment time for agriculture to become more competitive,
while minimizing social displacement. The incentive to negotiate may also be
enhanced by the desire to keep pace with other Latin American countries that have
or are negotiating FTAs with the United States.
8 Panama’s dollarized economy has been a cornerstone of its long-term economic stability.
It has safeguarded Panama against exchange rate risk, currency mismatches, and speculative
attacks experienced in other developing economies, and eliminated monetizing of deficits,
thereby reinforcing fiscal constraint and price stability. See Moreno-Villalaz, Juan Luis.
Financial Integration and Dollarization: The Case of Panama. Cato Journal, Winter 2005.
CRS-6
Panamanian Trade Relations
Panama is a country of 3.2 million people with a stable, diversified economy
that has rebounded briskly from the 2002 global economic downturn. Panama’s
gross domestic product (GDP) expanded by 4.7% in 2003, 6.0% in 2004, and an
estimated 5.9% in 2005 (see Appendix 1 for selected macroeconomic data). With
the exception of Costa Rica, Panama has the highest per capita income in the Central
American region, but income distribution is highly skewed, poverty remains a
nagging problem, especially in rural areas, and unemployment is high. These
disparities could become more contentious issues in Panama as the country debates
the costs and benefits of an FTA, particularly given the considerable public disfavor
with proposed fiscal and social security reforms. Unlike any other Latin American
country, 77% of Panama’s GDP is in services, developed around the transportation
and commerce generated by canal traffic and the Colón Free Zone (CFZ). Industry
is the second most important sector, contributing 17% to GDP followed by
agriculture at 6%.9
Structure and Direction of Panamanian Trade
Trade is an increasingly important part of this services-based economy. Exports
of goods and services compose 29% of GDP and, as seen in Table 1, Panama’s
balance of payments points to a sizeable trade deficit in goods compared to a large
services trade surplus. Panama’s merchandise trade deficits ranged from $700
million to $1.5 billion from 2001 to 2004. In each year, the merchandise deficit was
offset by a services trade surplus of between $900 million to $1.3 billion, unusual for
Latin American economies. Panama is placing a strong emphasis on increasing
exports as a driver of economic growth, pointing to the Panama Pacific Special
Economic Area, Colón Free Zone (see below), and to a lesser extent, the small export
processing zones and nontraditional agricultural products as opportunities to execute
this vision.
Table 1. Panama’s Current Account Balance
2001
2002
2003
2004
Balance on Merchandise Trade ($ million)
-696
-1035
-1113
-1585
Balance on Services Trade ($ million)
890
968
1254
1295
Data Source: Republic of Panamá, Controller General’s Office, 2005.
Panama is a global trader. It has completed FTAs with El Salvador (2002),
Taiwan (2004), and Singapore (2005). In addition to the United States, it is
negotiating FTAs with Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Honduras. Panama
nonetheless remains closely tied to the United States as its dominant trading partner,
which as a single country is a far larger trading partner than the world’s major regions
combined. The United States accounts for some 50% of Panamanian exports and
34% of its imports (see Figure 2). The European Union is the second largest export
market with a 24% share, but accounts for only 8% of Panamanian imports. The
9 Republic of Panamá. Controller General’s Office. 2005.
CRS-7
Latin American countries collectively are Panama’s third largest export market with
18%, but has the second largest import share at 27%.
Figure 2. Panama Direction of Trade, 2003
Panama is one of the few Latin American countries with which the United
States has a merchandise trade surplus, and although relatively small, it is by far the
largest in the region. Panama also runs a sizeable trade deficit with Latin America.
Panama’s largest Latin American trade partners are Mexico, Costa Rica, and Brazil.
Panama also imports significant quantities of oil from Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador.
Asia accounts for only 3% of Panama’s exports, but 11% of its imports, dominated
by Japan, South Korea, and more recently the fast growth in Chinese imports.
The Colón Free Zone. A distinct feature of Panama’s trade regime is the
Colón Free Zone (CFZ), which is the largest duty free zone in the world except for
Hong Kong. The vast trade volume that traverses the Panama Canal, multimodal
transportation infrastructure, modern financial sector, and Panama’s central location
in the Americas make Colón a logical place from which to operate a duty free zone.
It serves as a “one stop shop” for both Latin American buyers, and sellers from the
rest of the world, including Asia and the United States. Sellers operate showrooms
targeted at small- and medium-sized buyers, who make wholesale purchases of goods
for retail sale in their respective countries. Goods are typically repackaged in smaller
lots, priced in the local market currency, and transferred to the purchasing country
without incurring income, value added, or transfer taxes. Most CFZ trade is in
electronics, clothing, and other consumer goods.
Buyers benefit from the ability to purchase small lots, reduced travel to distant
foreign countries, economies of scale that arise from consolidating lots for shipping,
minimal transaction costs, vastly improved shipping times, and credit offered by
CRS-8
sellers. The sellers benefit from reaching smaller Latin American markets in one
location and reduced tax and transaction costs. Panama benefits from the 20,000
direct jobs the CFZ generates, including the public revenue they generate. CFZ trade
is reported as a separate component of Panama’s trade statistics and only those goods
entering the Panamanian economy are recorded as imports. In 2004, nearly $5 billion
worth of goods passed through the CFZ, with $600 million added to the Panamanian
trade balance.10
The CFZ is frequently associated with a number of illicit activities including
money laundering, illegal transshipment, trademark and other intellectual property
violations. In part, this is a reputation that Panama as a whole has been fighting since
the military dictatorship, which was widely known for its flagrant disrespect of the
law, if not outright corruption. Panama’s proximity to Colombia and headquarters
as a transshipment point helped fuel this perception. The CFZ has done much to
counter this reputation. The zone itself is an enclosed commercial area, encircled by,
and under the supervision of, customs and other law enforcement agencies of the
Republic of Panama. In addition, both the Colón Free Zone User’s Association and
the CFZ Administration have a strict code of conduct and argue that illegal activity
is also policed by individual companies because a bad reputation hurts those
dedicated to making the CFZ a world class trading center. Even the accusation of an
infraction will lead to a suspension of licence needed to operate in the zone. Cash
accounts for only 10% of transactions and there is careful monitoring of all goods
that move in and out of the zone through electronic tracking systems.11
U.S.-Panama Merchandise Trade
U.S.-Panamanian merchandise trade is small. In 2004, the United States
exported $1,835 million worth of goods and imported $316 million, producing a U.S.
trade surplus of $1,519 million, the largest in the Western Hemisphere. Still, Panama
ranked as only the 48nd largest export market for U.S. goods and 99th for imports.
Other major U.S. exports, as seen in Table 2, are mostly capital- and technology-
intensive manufactured goods such as aircraft, pharmaceuticals, machinery, medical
equipment, and motor vehicles.12
The United States imports relatively little from Panama, accounting for the
growing U.S. merchandise trade surplus. Most imports are primary products; fully
one-third is seafood, mostly fresh fish and shrimp. Repaired goods are number two
accounting for 20% of total imports from Panama.13 The United States has run a
10 U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Commercial Services. Doing Business In Panama:
A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies 2005. April 7, 2005. p. 3 and author’s
interviews with CFZ representatives, September 21, 2005.
11 Colón Free Zone User’s Association. Rules of Conduct for the Members of the Colón
Free Zone Users’ Association, 1995; and author’s interviews with representatives from
agencies mentioned.
12 Services trade data are not available for smaller U.S. trading partners, including Panama.
13 Technically classified as “products of the United States when returned after having been
(continued...)
CRS-9
merchandise trade surplus with Panama for many years, reflecting large growth in
exports relative to Panamanian imports. An interesting current trend is the 139%
increase in U.S. crude oil imports in 2004. Precious metal (mostly gold), sugar, and
coffee together account for 12.5% of total imports. Unlike the Central American
countries, where U.S. sensitivities to textile and apparel trade run high, Panama
trades little in this sector. Panama’s agricultural exports, particularly sugar, present
the more difficult negotiation issues.
Table 2. U.S.-Panama Merchandise Trade, 2004
(top ten U.S. exports and imports by $ value)
$ Value
% of
$ Value
% of
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
million
Total
million
Total
1. Oil
402.8
22.1%
1. Fish/Seafood:
97.0
30.8%
2. Aircraft
198.8
10.8%
2. Repaired Goods
63.5
20.1%
3. Machinery:
180.6
9.8%
3. Crude Oil
34.0
10.8%
- Office mach.
(38.6)
- Computers
(38.1)
4. Electrical mach.
151.0
8.2%
4. Gold
19.5
6.2%
5. Pharmaceuticals
120.9
6.6%
5. Coffee
10.5
3.3%
6. Optical/Medical
65.8
3.6%
6. Sugar (cane)
9.3
3.0%
Equipment
7. Vehicles
58.3
3.2%
7. Prepared Shrimp
8.9
2.8%
8. Cereals
51.8
2.8%
8. Edible Fruit
8.1
2.6%
9. Paper
51.3
2.8%
9. Aluminum
6.0
1.9%
10. Perfume
48.1
2.6%
10. Glass
5.5
1.7%
Other
506.7
27.5%
Other 53.6
16.8%
Total
1,835.3
100.0% Total
315.9
100.0%
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
Panama has no formal restrictions on capital flows, does not discriminate
between foreign and domestic investment, and maintains bilateral investment treaties
with the United States and many European countries. Critics have pointed out,
however, that the legal environment can be cumbersome and that Panama’s relatively
high labor costs (for the hemisphere) and inflexible labor laws can be a frustration
if not an impediment to U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI).14 Still, U.S. companies
are well represented in Panama, including the largest container port facility in the
region, multiple financial institutions, transportation firms, and manufacturing
facilities from various sectors. Like other countries pursuing an FTA with the United
States, Panama seeks closer ties for the continued FDI that may be generated from
having a permanent rules-based trade relationship with a large trading partner.
13 (...continued)
exported, without having been advanced in value or improved in condition by any process.”
14 U.S. Department of Commerce, Doing Business in Panama, pp. 3-4.
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U.S. FDI represents over a third of total FDI in Panama. Table 3 compares U.S.
FDI in Panama to other regional destinations. The amount of U.S. investment in
Panama exceeds that in the five Central American countries combined, although it
is a small fraction of U.S. investment in Mexico. Plans to widen and improve the
canal will likely provide an opportunity for some $5 billion of investment in the canal
itself, and perhaps related large amounts of FDI for other sectors of the economy with
a significant U.S. presence.
Table 3. U.S. Investment in Panama, Mexico, and Central
America
($ millions)
Sector
2001
2002
2003
2004
Panama
5,141
5,844 6,497
5,868
Mexico
52,544
55,724
61,526
66,554
Central America
5,093
5,255
5,585
4,448
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Survey of Current
Business. September 2004. p. 136 and BEA website. Data are stock of foreign direct investment
(FDI) presented on a historical-cost basis.
Status of Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy
Issues
Panama approached the United States for a stand-alone FTA, preferring to avoid
a direct link to the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR).15 Panama wanted to maximize the FTA’s potential to win U.S.
congressional approval by emphasizing the historical and strategic nature of the U.S.-
Panamanian relationship, while separating the negotiations from the divisive
CAFTA-DR accord. Panama’s service economy, small textile and apparel industry,
and limited integration with the Central American economies also bolstered the case
for separate negotiations.16 Another unique feature of this FTA is the Panama Canal
itself, which as an autonomous legal entity under the Panamanian Constitution, raised
issues in government procurement, labor, investment, and other areas in the proposed
FTA. The United States is the only country with which Panama has been willing to
negotiate canal issues in an FTA.
Nine rounds have taken place, the last concluding on January 20, 2006,
following a hiatus in negotiations of nearly one year. The U.S.-Panama FTA
reportedly follows closely the text framework of the CAFTA-DR. Exceptions
15 For a discussion of the CAFTA-DR and a deeper understanding of the regional economic
implications of freer trade, see CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central
America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by J. F. Hornbeck and CRS
Report RL32322, Central America and the Dominican Republic in the Context of the Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) with the United States, K. Larry Storrs, coordinator.
16 Inside U.S. Trade. Panama FTA Unlikely To Be Docked Into CAFTA as Talks Set to
Begin. April 23, 2004.
CRS-11
include details of market access rules, provisions governing treatment of business in
the Panama Canal Area, and other areas where Panama differs from the Central
American countries. The FTA, by most accounts, is nearly completed. Yet to be
resolved is the treatment of sensitive agricultural products, particularly rice and
sugar. Perhaps even more controversial is the USTR request that Panama accept
USDA certification as the basis for admitting certain meat exports from the United
States (beef and poultry). Below is a more detailed discussion of the major
negotiation areas and a description of the issues that have been of particular interest
to Congress in previous agreements. This section will be updated to reflect details
of the text and other factors as they emerge.
Market Access
The market access working group negotiates the tariff structures and rules of
origin that would govern the movement of commercial, industrial, and agricultural
goods. Specific tariff schedules are being negotiated on a product-by-product basis
defining the “staging categories” that prescribe the time that each country will be
given to reduce product-specific tariff levels to zero. Tariffs on many industrial and
commercial goods are expected to go to zero immediately, although none will likely
be extended beyond ten years. Tariff phase-outs on sensitive products would
typically be extended beyond ten years to accommodate either politically powerful
industry groups, or sectors deemed in need of more time to adjust to freer trade.
Despite political pressure exerted in both countries, the goal is to avoid excluding any
good from the negotiations.
Rules of origin define which goods would be eligible for preferential treatment
based on their content, with the intent of preventing transshipment of goods made
from materials originating in countries outside the agreement. They are particularly
pertinent to textile trade, but given Panama’s small textile production, this is unlikely
to be the volatile issue it was for the CAFTA-DR.
Panama acceded to the WTO in 1997, and part of its accession agreement
included unilateral reduction of tariff levels. Panama’s average tariff has fallen to
8%, but tariffs on agricultural products are higher, with some reaching the maximum
permitted under Panama’s commitments under the WTO. The WTO further
encouraged Panama to amend its export subsidies (tax credits), but it has delayed a
commitment to do so. In February 2004, a replacement subsidy was signed into law
that is expected to be acceptable to the WTO. Panama uses tax exemptions to attract
foreign investment in certain export-oriented industries, such as shrimp farming and
tourism, and in “export processing zones,” where imports of manufacturing inputs
are duty free as long as they are transformed for re-export.17
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) have become one of the most
controversial issues. Although understood as necessary to ensure the safety of
agricultural imports, SPS standards can be cumbersome, and are often denounced as
a veiled form of protectionism. Panama’s SPS standards, on the whole, are thought
17 Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2005 National Trade Estimate Report
on Foreign Trade Barriers. Washington, D.C. March 31, 2005. pp. 471-476.
CRS-12
to be very high and meet WTO standards. Panama, however, requires that U.S.
imports of poultry, beef, and pork, its most protected industries, come from
processing plants that have been individually inspected by Panamanian officials, a
process the United States contends is often drawn out.18
The United States seeks to have Panama recognize the USDA certification as
the acceptable standard for immediate entry into Panama of U.S. meat exports. This
issue became highly controversial during the ninth round of negotiations, when U.S.
negotiators proposed this agreement be put into a formal side letter. Panama
responded by noting that the SPS chapter had already been closed, that its meat
inspection standards are among the highest in the world, and that a last minute effort
to change SPS provisions raised sovereignty issues in Panama by potentially
requiring Panama to lower its standards in some cases. As part of the resolution,
Panama will visit the United States to review the food safety inspection system.19
Most U.S. imports from Panama, including all manufactured goods, enter duty
free under the normal trade schedule or the CBI, as amended (see Appendix 3 for
selected tariff rates). Petroleum and agricultural products face some tariffs,
particularly sugar, which is subject to a tariff rate quota. U.S. exports face tariffs,
with most falling in the range of 3-10%, plus the additional 5% transfer tax, which
applies to domestic goods as well.
Agricultural Trade. The major issue delaying closing of the FTA
negotiations is finding the proper balance for the treatment of agricultural market
access, particularly for four highly protected products: pork, poultry, rice, and sugar.
The United States is basically “offensive” on pork, poultry, and rice, expecting to
open further Panama’s markets as soon as possible. It is “defensive” on sugar,
attempting to limit any increase in the sugar quota that might disrupt operations of
the sugar program as defined in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
(the Farm Bill). Panama’s position is the opposite, pressing to delay increases in
U.S. exports of pork, poultry, and rice, and to increase its U.S. sugar quota.
In the United States, the sugar program reflects a historical commitment to
protect the income of sugar beet, sugar cane, and sugar processing firms with below-
prime-rate loans, limitations on sales in the domestic market, and tariff rate quotas
(TRQs). TRQs restrict imports with prohibitively high tariffs on imports above a
defined quota amount, as defined in WTO rules agreed to by the United States. In
2003, the above-quota tariff on sugar was 78%.20 On average, Panama harvests only
a quarter of the sugar produced by each of the five Central American countries, but
it still plays a disproportionally important role in the agricultural sector. Sugar
18 Ibid., p. 472.
19 In fact, the Panamanian Minister of Agriculture resigned in January 2006 citing a concern
over the FTA possibly forcing Panama to lower its food health standards. Inside U.S. Trade.
Dispute Over Agriculture Inspections Holding up U.S.-Panama FTA Talks. January 23,
2006. Also see USTR Press Release, February 13, 2006.
20 The economic effect is to raise the price of sugar in the United States above the world
price, increasing income to sugar related industries, but reducing it to sugar-using firms and
consumers. CRS Issue Brief IB95117, Sugar Policy Issues, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS-13
constitutes: 1) a third of Panama’s total agricultural exports, compared to less than
10% for the Central American countries, and; 2) 41% of agricultural exports to the
United States. The U.S. market consumes 76% of Panamanian sugar exports,
compared to less than 10% of sugar exports from Central America.
Given the dependence of sugar producers on the U.S. market, in part driven by
the relatively high wage rates that make it cost prohibitive to produce for the world
market, the Panamanians argue that even a relatively small quantitative increase in
their portion of the U.S. sugar quota would have a large benefit for their industry. The
U.S. sugar industry, however, continues to resist the inclusion of sugar in bilateral
FTAs, arguing that the WTO is the forum for addressing domestic support programs
and TRQs in the agricultural sector. The U.S. sugar industry fought the CAFTA-DR
to the end and has made clear its intention to do the same for other bilateral FTAs.
In Panama, pork, rice, and poultry are the most sensitive and protected products.
These are also protected by TRQs, with in-quota tariffs of 15% and out-of-quota
tariffs rising to 74%, 103%, and 273%, respectively. Pork and poultry have a special
issue related to the consumption of white versus dark meat. The United States
consumes considerably more white meat than dark, leaving a disproportional amount
of dark cuts for export, which face the highest tariffs. In Panama, as with much of
the world, dark meat is preferred. The concern revolves around U.S. producers
willing to sell dark meat cuts at a low price in foreign markets, putting downward
pressure on prices and hurting domestic producers in those countries. The
Panamanians argue that because of the relatively high profit margins on white meat
in the United States, on a cost allocation basis, U.S. producers can actually afford to
sell the dark meat at below cost. The cost accounting can be debated, but concerns
over the price effect in the Panamanian market remain unchanged. Panama’s rice
industry, which supplies over 90% of the domestic demand, is also convinced that
opening their market to U.S. subsidized rice will decimate their industry, which,
because of its protection, sells rice considerably above the world price.
Panamanian agriculture represents only 6% of GDP, but 17% of employment.
These numbers point to both an inherent inefficiency, due in part to protection, but
also the strong role agriculture plays in supporting rural employment and social
stability. In fact, agriculture’s 17% of national employment actually supports 40%
of the country’s population living in rural areas, most of whom exist at or below the
poverty line. Given the potential to dislocate much of the poor in the country, the
Panamanians argue that opening the agricultural sector too quickly to the large
production capacity of the United States would be highly detrimental to the social
structure of the rural economy, leading to increased unemployment, poverty, and
rural-urban migration. For these reasons, Panama wants a slow transition to open
markets in the agriculture sector, as well as, an increase in the sugar quota to boost
employment. This would also buy time for Panama to develop its non-traditional
export crops, such as melons, palm oil, and pineapples, which some view as the
future of this sector.
Services
Services trade is negotiated separately, including financial services, shipping,
telecommunications, and e-commerce. Panama is largely a service-based economy,
CRS-14
is competitive in many services industries, and known for its “open regulatory
environment for services.” Panama does require local licensing for many
professionals to practice in the country, which the United States wants to change.
Panama was the first country in Latin America to pass e-commerce legislation. It
recognizes the legal standing of electronic transactions and provides for the creation
of an oversight agency, but the regulatory framework has yet to be developed.21 The
United States is pressing for even greater transparency in regulatory procedures and
U.S. business groups have identified services as a critical negotiating area given U.S.
competitive advantages and the large services sector in Panama.
Insurance and other financial services are of particular interest to the United
States and the financial services industry is open to foreign banking and investment.
The United States has succeeded in winning greater access for U.S. firms to enter the
brokerage business, including majority ownership. Panama wants greater
transparency in the state financial services regulatory system to help ease the possible
opening of Panamanian banks in select U.S. states. The United States government,
however, argues that it is unable to make commitments related to state financial
services regulatory matters.
Maritime Issues. Cabotage is the transport of cargo or passengers in coastal
waters, or between two points within a country, and is defined in U.S. law in the
Jones Act and 1886 Passenger Vessel Services Act (PVSA). Under the PVSA,
passenger vessels calling on more than one consecutive U.S. port must be U.S.
flagged, crewed, and built. Foreign flag ships may call at a second U.S. port only
after touching a designated “distant foreign port.” Most Caribbean ports, including
those in Panama, are designated “nearby foreign ports” and so do not qualify.
Panama is a major flag of convenience and wanted to have its status changed in the
FTA to be designated a “distant foreign port,” in expectation that it would increase
cruise ship traffic linked to the U.S. market.22
In the United States, changes to the PVSA could benefit cruise ship companies
(many foreign owned and Panamanian flagged), U.S. ports, and some port-city
businesses that might gain from increased tourist trade, in the same way that Panama
might, if it were designated a “distant foreign port.” Opponents to such changes
include U.S. shipbuilding interests and organized labor, which have argued that they
would “lose the only advantage they enjoy over foreign flag ships” and that U.S. jobs
would be lost. Some Members of Congress conveyed this concern to the USTR and
added that passenger shipbuilding is a vital strategic interest for the United States for
the movement of troops and supplies.23
21 USTR, 2005 Foreign Trade Barriers, pp. 475-76.
22 This change would allow foreign flag cruise ships to leave one U.S. port, pass through
Panama, where they could add or disembark passengers, and return to another U.S. port,
altering Caribbean and U.S. bi-coastal non-U.S.-flag cruise line traffic. Inside U.S. Trade.
Administration Is Warned Over Maritime Services in Panama FTA. July 16, 2004.
23 Inside U.S. Trade. Administration Warned Over Maritime Services in Panama FTA and
Letters to USTR Robert Zoellick from Representatives Duncan Hunter and Ike Skelton, and
Senators Trent Lott and John Breaux. July 16, 2004. [http://www.insidetrade.com] and
(continued...)
CRS-15
The Panamanians requested that a maritime chapter be included in the FTA that
would allow Panama to be designated a “distant foreign port.” This was rejected by
the United States. In the past, the American-flag maritime industry has successfully
lobbied against including maritime issues in free trade agreements, and prevailed
again in the U.S.-Panama FTA.
Government Procurement and Intellectual Property Rights
These two areas are of particular interest to the United States and a bilateral
FTA is seen as an opportunity to remedy deficiencies in rules that limit the
opportunities of U.S. companies, and to set the pace for standardized practice in the
region. In the area of government procurement, Panamanian laws require
transparency in the bidding process, a practice generally followed, but concerns have
been raised by U.S. firms not only with respect to the bidding on contracts, but also
the appeals process as well. Panama has not acceded to the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement, which the United States would like to encourage in the
FTA.24 Transparency in the bidding process for government contracts was listed as
one of the most important issues by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Panama.25
Government procurement is an important negotiation area for the United States
given the prospects for large long-term investments to expand the canal and related
facilities. The Panama Canal Authority operates independently of the national
government and negotiators have yet to finalize separate government procurement
and investment rules for the canal area. The Panamanians argue that the procurement
system in the Canal Authority is the most modern in the country with an effective
dispute settlement system, both of which grew out of treaty commitments to keep the
canal functioning without interruption. Panama negotiated to maintain the canal
authority dispute settlement system within the FTA. Panama is also negotiating to
keep small business set aside provisions for Panamanian firms with respect to canal
maintenance and operations.
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are a U.S. priority. The objective is to have
Panama’s standards approximate more closely those of the United States. The USTR
reports that Panama’s IPR laws and institutional support have improved through
courts dedicated specifically to IPR cases. Panama updated its patent law in 1996
and has a law governing trademark protection. Panama signed on to the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and
Phonographs Treaty. The 1994 copyright law improved protection and increased the
options to prosecute violators. The United States is negotiating for Panama to sign
23 (...continued)
Letter from the Transportation Institute to USTR Robert Zoellick, June 10, 2004.
24 USTR, 2005 Foreign Trade Barriers, pp. 472-473.
25 Panamcham. Issues of Importance in the U.S.-Panama FTA Negotiations, March 12,
2004. [http://www.panamcham.com/business_center/FTA.asp].
CRS-16
additional IPR treaties. Piracy is carefully monitored, but remains a challenge
because Panama is such a high-volume transshipment point.26
Investment
Panama has actively encouraged foreign direct investment, has a well-developed
financial services industry to support the flow of capital, and is a regional financial
center in its own right. U.S. firms are heavily invested in Panama relative to other
Latin American countries. Panama signed a bilateral investment treaty with the
United States in 1991, the first in the region, which includes investor-state provisions
and further guarantees of the free flow of transfers under a 1998 law. Although the
Panamanian government has been responsive to U.S. foreign investment interests,
concerns have arisen in particular cases involving investment in highly regulated
industries. Resolution of these concerns facilitated proceeding with the FTA.27
There is potential for further significant foreign investment in Panama,
including the reverted areas of the former canal zone and the Panama canal expansion
project needed to accommodate the post-Panamax ships. This, in turn, could spur
investment in related services industries. How government procurement and
investment rules, yet to be completed, are treated in the FTA negotiations will affect
the U.S. competitive position in Panama’s investment future.
Labor and Environment
Labor and environment provisions are often highly contentious issues in trade
agreements, and there is considerable disagreement in Congress and elsewhere over
how aggressive language in trade agreements should be in accommodating these
concerns. From an economic perspective, labor and environment advocates in the
United States argue that developing countries may have an “unfair” competitive
advantage because their lower standards are a basis for their lower costs, which in
turn are reflected in lower prices for goods that compete with those produced in
developed countries.28 It follows from this argument that the difference in costs is
an inducement to move U.S. investment and jobs abroad.
On the other hand, studies suggest that these cost differentials are usually not
high enough to determine business location alone, and that productivity is the more
important factor.29 Further, many economists view trade liberalization as part of the
26 USTR, 2005 Foreign Trade Barriers, pp. 474.
27 Ibid., p. 475.
28 The difference is that in most developing countries, the social costs associated with
environmental degradation, pollution, and poor working conditions may not be captured in
the market price of goods (so-called external costs). Through legal and regulatory measures,
developed countries require that businesses correct for many of these social costs, thereby
internalizing them to the business, where they are then reflected in the final (relatively
higher) price of the good in the market place.
29 See CRS Report 98-742, Trade with Developing Countries: Effects on U.S. Workers, by
(continued...)
CRS-17
overall development process that, in and off itself, can promote improved social and
economic conditions.30 Developing countries are concerned with the loss of
sovereignty should specific standards be defined in trade agreements, as well as, with
the possibility that such provisions can be misused as a disguised form of
protectionism.
Labor Issues. The labor chapter is reportedly identical to that of the CAFTA-
DR. At issue for the U.S. Congress is disagreement over language covering inclusion
of International Labor Organization (ILO) fundamental labor rights and the extent to
which the dispute settlement provisions are effective in ensuring that countries are
held to these standards.31 The debate also centers on how well bilateral trade
agreements are perceived to meet these congressionally defined trade negotiating
objectives outlined in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation. Those who
support tougher standards argue that the CAFTA-DR provisions are a step backward
from those allowing for the suspension of trade benefits found in the U.S. unilateral
trade arrangements like the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and CBI,
which currently apply to much of the U.S. trade with Latin America. Opponents note
that suspension of trade benefits has not been done often and that these provisions
may be less effective and less desirable in a bilateral trade agreement where all
parties, including the United States, may be subject to such treatment.
Specifically, there are three provisions in the CAFTA-DR given different
weight: 1) the effective enforcement of domestic labor laws; 2) the reaffirmation of
commitments to ILO basic principles; and 3) “non-derogation” from domestic
standards (not weakening or reducing protections to encourage trade and investment).
In the CAFTA-DR, failure to enforce domestic labor laws can be formally challenged
under the agreement’s dispute resolution chapter. In the case of the other two
provisions, which are supported in principle, such recourse is not available and labor
advocates argue that unless all three are fully enforceable, an FTA does not provide
a meaningful trade discipline.32
29 (...continued)
J.F. Hornbeck. September 2, 1998. Productivity and wage levels are highly correlated,
suggesting that lower productivity jobs gravitate toward countries with a relative abundance
of low-skilled (and hence low-wage) workers. Rodrik, Dani. Sense and Nonsense in the
Globalization Debate. Foreign Policy. Summer 1997. pp. 30-33.
30 Some broader evidence suggests that FTAs have not “forced a race to the bottom of
regulatory standards,” but rather to the contrary, that policy convergence is affected more
by countries agreeing to “norms of governance” via cooperation through international
agreements. See Drezner, Daniel W. Globalization and Policy Convergence. International
Studies Review. Vol. 3, Issue 1, Spring 2001. pp. 75 and 78.
31 The 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work identifies four
fundamental principles and rights: freedom of association and the right to bargain
collectively; abolition of forced labor; equal opportunity and treatment in employment; and
elimination of child labor. ILO. Promoting Better Working Conditions: A Guide to the
International Labor Standards System. Washington, D.C. 2003. pp. 33-34.
32 Lee, Thea M. Assistant Director for International Economics, AFL-CIO. Comments on
the Proposed U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement, before the USTR Trade Policy
(continued...)
CRS-18
In addition, for labor and environmental issues, the dispute resolution process
in other FTAs has operated differently than for commercial issues. In the CAFTA-
DR, for example, if a commercial dispute remains unsettled, the country faces the
possibility of suspension of benefits under the FTA “of equivalent effect” (Article
20.16), resulting in the raising of tariffs or payment of a monetary assessment (fine)
equal to 50% of what a dispute panel determines is “of equivalent effect.” This
article does not apply to the disputable labor (or environmental) provision. The
difference is that the option for failing to resolve a labor dispute is an annual fine that
would be capped at $15 million per violation, with recourse to an equivalent dollar
value of suspended benefits (higher tariffs) if the fine is not paid. The fine would
also be paid by the government into a government fund and expended for
“appropriate labor initiatives.” Critics charge that by capping the assessment at $15
million and having it paid into a fund in the offending country, the labor provisions
are rendered ineffective. The USTR argues that for small countries, such a fine
levied annually for each violation would be significant relative to the dollar value of
the trade benefits it would receive.33
In recently passed bilateral FTAs, Congress has agreed to adopt the
implementing legislation largely because a majority of Members have been
reconciled to the labor issues by assurances that the labor laws of the countries in
question cover basic ILO commitments and are being reasonably enforced.
Additional measures to monitor progress or assist these countries in enforcing labor
rights also helped win approval. The exception so far has been CAFTA-DR, which
passed by only a single vote and drew the ire of many Members of Congress over the
perceived inadequacy of language covering labor laws and their enforcement.
Panama has higher wage rates, stronger labor laws, and fewer impediments to
union formation compared to the region. In fact, the business community, including
U.S. firms operating in Panama, argue that the labor laws are too generous with
respect to firing or downsizing the labor force, which can actually encourage
unintended responses by business, such as extended use of temporary workers. In
1970, Panama created the Tripartite Council on Union Freedom and Participation in
Economic and Social Development with representatives from the government, labor,
and business. Its primary function is to oversee that worker rights are being observed
in Panama.
The U.S. Department of State has pointed out problems, however, such as the
widespread use of temporary workers in general and child labor in rural areas. Also,
in the Canal Area workers are prohibited from striking.34 The Colón Free Zone and
32 (...continued)
Committee, November 19, 2002.
33 Ibid and USTR, CAFTA’s Labor Provisions: World Class, Best Ever.
[http://www.ustr.gov].
34 U.S. Department of State. Panama: Country Report on Human Rights Practices - 2004.
Washington, D.C. February 28, 2005, the Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report -
Panama. London, June 2004. p. 14, and American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Panama: Labor Rights and Child Labor Reports.
(continued...)
CRS-19
the small export processing zones, however, are all subject to national labor laws.
Although the Canal Zone has separate statues governing labor, they tend to be more
generous with respect to workers rights and compensation, and jobs in the Canal
Zone are highly coveted. Workers may organize and exercise their rights to
collective bargaining, but the prohibition on striking goes to Panama’s commitments
under the Panama Canal Treaties, which stipulate that the canal must be operated
without interruption.35
It is unclear how Congress will receive the Panama FTA with respect to labor
rights. Many Members may still disagree with the formulation of the chapter, even
though it can be argued that it follows the TPA guidelines. The comfort level with
Panama’s labor code and efforts to enforce it may be another determining factor in
the overall congressional approval of this FTA.
Environmental Issues. For environment advocates, major goals in FTAs
include protecting and assuring strong enforcement of existing domestic
environmental standards, ensuring that multilateral environmental agreements are not
undermined by trade rules, promoting strong environmental initiatives to evaluate
and raise performance, developing a systematic program of capacity-building
assistance, and assuring that environmental provisions in FTAs are subject to the
same dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms as are other aspects of the
agreements.36
Environmental provisions in the U.S.-Panama FTA are likely to be similar to
those in the CAFTA-DR. These emphasize: 1) encouraging high levels of
environmental protection; 2) not failing “to enforce environmental laws,” and 3)
recognizing that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce protections as an
encouragement for trade and investment. The CAFTA-DR also provides for formal
cooperation among governments on environmental issues and a dispute resolution
mechanism.37
Advocates raise the issue of the environmental effects of trade, particularly in
developing countries that may have weak laws and lax enforcement mechanisms.
Some of these same advocates, however, have agreed that thus far trade agreements
have not led to catastrophic pollution nor encouraged a “regulatory race to the
bottom.” There has also been a certain acknowledged degree of success in having
environmental issues addressed in the body of FTAs, in side agreements on
34 (...continued)
Washington, D.C. August 9, 2004. p. 3.
35 Panama Legislative Assembly. Law No. 19 — “Whereby the Panama Canal Authority is
Organized.” Chapter V — Personnel Administration and Labor Relations. June 11, 1997.
36 See [http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/fasttrack/letter.asp], Principles for Environmentally
Responsible Trade. Another important issue for the United States is ensuring that its higher
environmental standards defined in law and regulation not be compromised by challenges
of protectionism. See CRS Report RL31638, Foreign Investor Protection Under NAFTA
Chapter 11, by Robert Meltz.
37 The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States-Free Trade Agreement. Chapter
17. Environment.
CRS-20
environmental cooperation, and through technical assistance programs, the latter of
which developing countries can use to respond to specific problems. Advocates still
note that much can be improved, such as tightening enforcement language and
ensuring that the United States allocates financial resources to back up promises of
technical assistance.38
As required under TPA, the USTR conducted an environmental review of the
potential environmental effects possibly attributable to the FTA. It noted that
Panama “faces a number of challenges in protecting its environment as it supports
its economic and population growth.” Deforestation, land degradation, loss of
wildlife, threats to water quality and wetlands, among other problems are serious
issues for Panama. The Panama Canal also places severe water use requirements on
the country. Panama has responded through the public policy process, establishing
environmental standards in law and entering into international and U.S. bilateral
environmental cooperation agreements.39 These issues were already factors in
Panama’s development process prior to the negotiation of the FTA. Thus, the
environmental review maintains that the marginal effects of the FTA on
environmental standards would be small, whether in terms of projected impacts on
the United States or on Panama.
The environmental review further notes that Panama’s service-oriented economy
and the small trade volume with the United States are unlikely to be greatly affected
by the proposed FTA and so will change marginal production and trade little. The
FTA, however, may have both positive and negative effects. The negative effects of
pollution, environmental degradation, and endangering wildlife would come mostly
from increased agricultural trade and production, which might be addressed with
increased environmental oversight and policies. The positive effect of the FTA could
include improvements in environmental standards that may be encouraged by the
provisions of the agreement and the consultative and cooperation agreements
attached to the FTA.40 Panama’s environmental regulatory agency (Autoridad
Nacional de Ambiente — ANAM) points out that Panama is increasingly using
environmental impact studies, but realizes it has enforcement capacity issues that
may require time to remedy, which could be accommodated in the FTA.
Trade Capacity Building
The FTA would likely include a Committee on Trade Capacity Building (TCB),
designed to assist Panama with the transition to freer trade with the United States.
In general, the committee’s mission includes providing technical assistance and
financing to accelerate the transition period in hopes of increasing the gains of trade
while minimizing the adjustment costs. The TCB Committee would help coordinate
38 See Audley, John. Environment and Trade: The Linchpin to Successful CAFTA
Negotiations? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, D.C. July 2003.
39 Office of the United States Trade Representative. Interim Environmental Review: U.S.-
Panama Free Trade Agreement. June 2004. pp. 7-9.
40 Ibid., pp. 15-20.
CRS-21
technical assistance provided by U.S., regional, and multilateral agencies in helping
Panama meet its obligations under the FTA.
Panama prioritized TCB needs in its national trade capacity building strategy.
The overriding goal is to formulate a strategy that would allow Panama to assume all
the commitments under the FTA, in the context of meeting the country’s
development needs. The National TCB Strategy places strong emphasis on sectoral
adjustment strategies, recognizing that some industries are already competitive by
international standards (e.g. financial services), whereas others will need
considerable assistance when faced with increased competition from the United
States (e.g. agriculture). Emphasis is also placed on supporting existing and
potentially new micro, small, and medium-sized businesses, which may need the
most assistance and constitute a significant portion of the Panamanian economy, as
well as government capacity to administer trade-related activities.41
The major goals identified include inter-sectoral coordination, increasing
exports to the United States, enhancing the investment climate, better integrating
education and innovation into the business community, and improving government
trade facilitation (processing imports and exports.) The strategy identifies 18 action
plans covering major trade and trade-related issues, ranging from market access and
rules of origin, to labor, environment, transparency, and trade agreement
administration. In each case, the status of Panama’s commitments under the
proposed FTA is identified along with action items that may need to be pursued to
improve capacity in the respective area. Successfully implementing the strategy,
however, will require resources and coordinated assistance among international and
U.S. agencies.
Outlook
Panama, because of its unique economic structure, presents an unusually clear
example of the difficult choices countries face in pursuing free trade agreements. Its
highly dominant services sector, poised to take advantage of increasing trade
liberalization, may be juxtaposed against its much smaller and far less efficient
manufacturing and agricultural sectors, which will struggle under freer trade.
Panama has weighed the substantial overall benefits of trade opening, with the
economic and social transition costs that the agriculture sector, in particular, would
bear. This inherent conflict is one reason the negotiations were interrupted in 2005.
Panama wants to achieve what it considers a “balanced” agreement that will meet its
long-term development goals for the entire economy. This has proven to be at odds
with U.S. priorities, particularly acceleration of agricultural market access.
Panama has held firm on the agriculture negotiations because the political and
social stakes are high, as expressed in two very different Panamanian visions of the
country’s economic future. One sees protected Panamanian crops overwhelmed by
41 Government of Panama. Ministry of Trade and Industry. Panama’s National Strategy
for Trade Capacity Building (TCB) in Light of the Free Trade Agreement with the United
States. Panama, March 4, 2005. pp. 20-23.
CRS-22
large U.S. producers, leading to either a “slow or quick death,” depending on the
speed of market access. Such a scenario doubts the likelihood of a successful
adjustment for products like rice, anticipating increased rural unemployment,
poverty, and rural-urban migration pressures.
An alternative vision expresses the possibility for a “balanced” FTA easing
Panama further into the globalized economy. With sufficient time and resources, the
agriculture sector would be able to apply more modern production technologies,
continue to develop alternative export crops, and minimize displacement in the rural
sector. The result could be a revitalized and growing agricultural sector, with
increased employment and income that would contribute to long-term development,
rather than relying on traditional farming techniques and work patterns that may be
reinforcing entrenched rural poverty. This scenario relies on negotiating a lengthy
transition period with effective trade capacity building assistance in recognition of
the important role that the small agriculture sector plays in maintaining rural stability.
In fact, the economic tradeoffs implied in these contrasting visions are well
understood. It is the nature of freer trade to challenge inefficient sectors to either
change or be replaced, at least in part, if long-term development is to occur. Lower
cost agricultural imports would surely be a net gain for the poor, particularly in urban
areas where there is no related adjustment costs. Minimizing the displacement that
can occur in rural areas, however, is a critical issue for Panama. It may be more
difficult to win popular support for an FTA that appears to threaten the livelihoods
of rural workers. It is still unclear what balance will be struck, but the details of the
final agreement will be important, not only for getting it passed by the respective
legislatures, but in setting the tone for the two countries’ overall relationship in the
21st century.
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Appendix 1. Chronology of U.S.-Panama FTA
Negotiations
Date
Milestone
November 18, 2003
The USTR notifies Congress of President George W.
Bush’s intent to enter into negotiations on a free trade
agreement (FTA) with the Republic of Panama.
April 26-29, 2004
First round of negotiations occurs in Panama City.
June 11-15, 2004
Second round of negotiations takes place in Los Angeles.
July 12-16, 2004
Third round of negotiations held in Panama City.
August 9-12, 2004
Fourth round of negotiations held in Tampa.
October 18-22, 2004
Fifth round of negotiations takes place in Panama City.
December 6-10, 2004
Sixth round of negotiations held in Washington, D.C.
January 10-15, 2005
Seventh round of negotiations held in Washington, D.C.
Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 2005
Eighth round of negotiations occurs in Washington, D.C.
Jan. 17-20, 2006
Ninth round of negotiations held in Washington, D.C.
CRS-24
Appendix 2. Panama: Selected Economic
Indicators
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
GDP Growth (%)
2.7
0.7
2.1
4.7
6.2
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)
1.8
-1.1
0.2
2.8
4.1
Urban Unemployment Rate (%)
15.2
17.0
16.5
15.6
—
Inflation (%)
0.7
0.0
1.9
1.5
2.5
Current Account Balance (% GDP)
-5.9
-1.5
-0.8
-3.2
-0.3
Terms of Trade (Indices, 1997=100)
96.5
99.1
98.1
93.8
92.0
Foreign Direct Investment ($ mil)*
700
405
78
792
467
Source: United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. Preliminary
Overview of the Economies of Latin American and the Caribbean, 2004. December 2004. pp. 148-63.
*Net investment = direct foreign investment in Panama minus Panamanian direct investment abroad.
CRS-25
Appendix 3. U.S.-Panama Tariff Rates for Selected
Products
(% of total dollar value)
NTR
Free
Major U.S.
% of
Tariff
Major U.S.
% of
Tariff
under
Exportsa
Total
Rate
Importsa
Total
Rateb
CBIc
Oil (2710)
22.1
5%d
Fish/Seafood
30.8 Free
(0302)
Aircraft (8802)
10.8
10%
Repaired
20.1
Free
Goods (9801)
Machinery
9.8
Precious
6.2
Free
- ADP (8473)
(2.0)
3%
Metals (7112)
- computers (8471)
(1.8)
5%
- gold/scrap
- gas turbines
(0.5)
3%
Electrical
8.2
5%
Oil (2710)
10.8
Machinery (8517)
- gasoline
.525/bbl
- crude
.105/bbl
Pharmaceuticals
6.6
Free
Sugar (1701)
3.0
(3004)
- under quota
0
- over quota
78%
(avg. 2003)
Optical/Medical
3.6
10%
Coffee
3.3
Free
Instruments
- cameras (9006)
(0.8)
5%
- parts (9009)
(0.7)
15%
- medical (9018)
(0.5)
10%
Cereals
2.8
Fruit
2.6
Free
- corn (1005)
(1.8)
- bananas
under
- under quota
3%
- papaya
CBI
- over quota
58%
- watermelon
and
- mesline (1001)
Free
GSP
- rice (1006)
(1.0)
- under quota
15%
- over quota
(0.2)
103%
Other
34.2
Other 22.8
Total
100%
Total
100%
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note: all Panamanian imports are subject to a 5% transfer tax, which is also collected on domestic
products. This tax is considered similar to a nondiscriminatory sales or value added tax (VAT.
a. By HTS number = Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
b. NTR is the general or normal tariff rates (also known as most favored nation rates) applied to
products not given preferential tariff treatment.
c. CBI = Caribbean Basin Initiative, which provides unilateral preferential tariff treatment to selected
Caribbean and Central American country products as amended most recently in the Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA). P.L. 106-200.
d. Tariffs on oil vary depending on end use. Discussions with U.S. Department of Commerce officials
suggest most U.S. oil exports to Panama (for automotive use) face a 5% tariff. Some oil for
maritime use has tariffs as high as 30%.