Order Code RL31339
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-Saddam Governance
Updated February 9, 2006
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and
Post-Saddam Governance
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq
remains violent and unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related
insurgency, as well as increasing sectarian violence. According to its November 30,
2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will
remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not
serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. The Administration believes that, over
the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and
a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting casualties and costs
have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion
and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S.
goals.
The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important
successes, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose
an interim and then a full-term National Assembly, a referendum that adopted a
permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security
forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi
security units, the Administration has been working with the new Iraqi government
to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure; Sunnis were dominant during
the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant
Shiite Arabs and Kurds. The Administration believes that it has largely healed a rift
with some European countries over the decision to invade Iraq, and it points to
NATO and other nations’ contributions of training for Iraqi security forces and
government personnel.
Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in
Iraq is failing and that major new policy initiatives are required. Some believe that
U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop
commitment. Others believe that a U.S. move toward withdrawal might undercut
popular support for the insurgency and force compromise among Iraq’s factions.
Still others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counter-insurgent
combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents,
a plan the Administration says it is now moving toward under an approach termed
“clear, hold, and build.”
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth
Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations,
by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign
Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and
Christopher Blanchard.
Contents
Major Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Kurds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Shiite Islamist Leaders and Organizations: Ayatollah Sistani,
SCIRI, Da’wa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Others . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Post-September 11 Regime Change Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . 13
Iraq Governing Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Handover of Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Interim Constitution/Transition Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate . . . . . 15
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
January 30, 2005 Elections/New Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
December 15, 2005, Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
International Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction/CERP Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Security Challenges, Responses, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Insurgent Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Sectarian Violence/Militias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
ISF Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Immediate Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Troop Drawdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Power-Sharing Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Negotiating With the Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Focus on Local Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
List of Tables
Table 1. Some Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 2. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and
Post-Saddam Governance
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958).1 Iraq had been a
province of the Ottoman empire until British forces defeated the Ottomans in World
War I and took control of what is now Iraq in 1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq
from the Ottomans in Iraq earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in
1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis, ran into
repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British
uprising in 1941, during World War II. Iraq’s first Hashemite king was Faysal bin
Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E
Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire
during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his
son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his
son, Faysal II, who was only four years old. A major figure under the British
mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said, a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni
Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times during 1930-1958. Faysal II ruled
until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was
ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the
Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was rivalry between the Syrian and
Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam’s rule. The Baath Party was founded in the 1940s
by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq as a socialist, pan-Arab movement,
the aim of which was to reduce religious and sectarian schisms among Arabs.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein,
secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam’s home
1 See Eisenstadt, Michael, and Eric Mathewson, eds, U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq:
Lessons from the British Experience. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003.
Members of the Hashemite family rule neighboring Jordan.
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town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam’s regime
became repressive of Iraq’s Shiites in the year after the February 1979 Islamic
revolution in neighboring Iran because Iran’s revolution had emboldened Iraqi Shiite
Islamist movements to try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Major Anti-Saddam Factions
The factions that dominate post-Saddam Iraq had been active against Saddam
Hussein for decades. Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991, of Operation Desert
Storm to reverse Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W.
Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided
not to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein in the course of the 1991 war because
the United Nations had approved only the liberation of Kuwait, because the Arab
states in the coalition opposed an advance to Baghdad, and because it feared
becoming bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.2 Within days of the war’s
end (February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurdish factions in
northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support,
launched significant rebellions. The Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the
mostly Sunni Muslim Republican Guard forces had survived the war largely intact
and they suppressed the rebels. Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States for
standing aside during Saddam’s suppression of the uprisings. Iraq’s Kurds,
benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out
of much of northern Iraq and remained autonomous thereafter.
About two months after the failure of these uprisings, President George H.W.
Bush reportedly sent Congress an intelligence finding that the United States would
try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein. The Administration
apparently believed that a coup by elements within the regime could produce a
favorable government without fragmenting Iraq. After a reported July 1992 coup
failed, there was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the Kurdish, Shiite, and other
oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.3 The following section
discusses these organizations and personalities, almost all of which are major features
of post-Saddam politics. Several of these groupings have militias that are
increasingly conducting acts of sectarian-based violence.
2 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million. Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times,
June 2, 1992.
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Major Anti-Saddam Factions/Leaders
Iraqi National Congress
Main recipient of U.S. aid to anti-Saddam opposition
(INC)/ Ahmad Chalabi
during 1990s. Chalabi was touted by some in Bush
Administration prior to 2003 war but has not proven his
popularity in Iraq and fell afoul of U.S. officials in
2003-2004. Won no seats in December 15 election.
Iraq National Accord
Consisted of ex-Baathists and ex-military in efforts to
(INA)/Iyad al-Allawi
topple Saddam in 1990s. Allawi was interim Prime
Minister (June 2004-April 2005). Won 40 seats in
January 2005 election but only 25 in December.
Kurdistan Democratic
Two main Kurdish factions. Talabani became president
Party (KDP) of Masud
of Iraq after January 2005; Barzani has tried to secure
Barzani/Patriotic Union of
his clan’s base in the Kurdish north. Control about
Kurdistan of Jalal Talabani
70,000 peshmerga militia. Both won 75 seats in
January election but only 53 in December.
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq. No
Sistani
formal position in government but has used his broad
Shiite popularity to become instrumental in major
questions facing it and in U.S. decisions on Iraq.
Supreme Council for the
Largest and best-organized Shiite Islamist party. The
Islamic Revolution in Iraq
most pro-Iranian Shiite party, it was established in 1982
(SCIRI)/Abd al-Aziz Al
by Tehran to centralize Shiite Islamist movements in
Hakim
Iraq. First leader, Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, killed
by bomb in Najaf in August 2003. Controls “Badr
Brigades” militia. As part of United Iraqi Alliance
(UIA- 128 total seats in December election), it has
about 30 of its members in parliament. Supports
formation of large Shiite “region” composed of nine
southern provinces.
Da’wa (Islamic Call)
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957),
Party/Ibrahim al-Jafari
active against Saddam Hussein in early 1980s.
Founder, Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr, was ally of Iran’s
Ayatollah Khomeini and was hung by Saddam regime
in 1980. During 1980s, Da’wa activists committed
terrorist acts in Kuwait to try to shake its support for
Iraq in Iran-Iraq war. Part of UIA, controls about 28
seats in parliament.
Moqtada Al-Sadr
Young (about 31) relative of Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr,
was in Iraq during Saddam’s reign. Inherited father’s
political base in “Sadr City,” a large (2 million
population) Shiite district of Baghdad. Mercurial, has
both challenged and worked with U.S. personnel in
Iraq. Formed “Mahdi Army” militia in 2003. Now part
of UIA, controls 32 seats in incoming parliament. Also
supported by hardline Fadila (Virtue) party. Opposes
formation of Shiite “region.”
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Secular Groups: Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA). In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist
groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National Congress (INC),” on a platform of human
rights, democracy, pluralism, and “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy). However, many
observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups have
authoritarian leaderships. The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad Chalabi,
a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent banking family, to run the INC on a daily
basis. Chalabi, who is about 62 years old, was educated in the United States
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. His father was
president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the 1958 military
coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American University of
Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran afoul
of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly
with some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989.4 Chalabi maintains
that the Jordanian government was pressured by Iraq to turn against him. (A table
on U.S. appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).
As an Iraqi governance structure was established, Chalabi was selected to the
Iraq Governing Council (IGC) and he was one of its nine rotating presidents
(president during September 2003). In a fallout with his former U.S. backers, U.S.-
backed Iraqi police raided INC headquarters in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing
documents as part of an investigation of various allegations, including that Chalabi
had provided intelligence to Iran.5 The case was later dropped. Since 2004, Chalabi
has tried to ally with Shiite Islamist factions; he was number 10 on Ayatollah
Sistani’s “United Iraqi Alliance” slate for the January 30, 2005 elections. He is now
one of three deputy prime ministers, with a focus on economic and legal issues (trial
of former regime members), and he is still pressing aggressive de-Baathification.
Despite a poor showing in the December 15, 2005 elections, in which he ran his own
slate, Chalabi was briefly appointed Oil Minister in late December 2005 when the
minister resigned due to the raising of gasoline price increases in Iraq, but the
minister was reinstated in January 2006.
Another secular group, the Iraq National Accord (INA), was founded after Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but reportedly later
earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).6 It is led by Dr. Iyad
al-Allawi, a Baathist who purportedly helped Saddam Hussein silence Iraqi dissidents
in Europe in the mid-1970s.7 Allawi, who is about 60 years old (born 1946 in
Baghdad), fell out with Saddam in the mid-1970s, became a neurologist and presided
over the Iraqi Student Union in Europe. He survived an alleged Saddam regime
4 In Apr. 1992, he was convicted in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and
sentenced to 22 years in prison. The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors
a total of $400 million.
5 Risen, James, and David Johnston. “Chalabi Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code,”
New York Times, June 2, 2004.
6 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New
York Times, June 9, 2004.
7 Hersh, Seymour. “Annals of National Security: Plan B,” The New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
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assassination attempt in London in 1978. He is a secular Shiite Muslim, but many
INA members are Sunnis. Allawi no longer considers himself a Baath Party
member, but he has not openly denounced the original tenets of Baathism.
In 1996, the fractiousness among anti-Saddam groups caused the Clinton
Administration to shift support to the INA.8 However, the INA proved penetrated by
Iraq’s intelligence services and Baghdad arrested or executed over 100 INA activists
in June 1996. In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into northern
Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from the PUK. The
incursion enabled Baghdad to also rout remaining INC and INA operatives
throughout the north.
The Kurds.9 The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups. They have a historic fear of
persecution by the Arab majority and want to, at the very least, preserve the
autonomy of the post-1991 Gulf war period. Some indications in 2005 suggested
that the main parties might want to go beyond autonomy to quasi or outright
independence, particularly if factional strife continues in Iraq. Some reports say that
the Kurds are positioning themselves to secure the city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds
covet as a source of oil, and possibly part of the city of Mosul. The Kurds also
achieved language in the new constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on
whether Kirkuk might formally join the Kurdish administered region.
For now, both major Kurdish factions are participating in Iraqi politics, the PUK
more so than the KDP. PUK leader Talabani was IGC president in November 2003,
and the KDP’s Barzani led it in April 2004. The two factions offered a joint slate
in the January 30 and December 15 elections. Talabani became Iraq’s president after
the January elections and is now being nominated to continue in that post after the
December election. On June 12, 2005, the 111-seat Kurdish regional assembly (also
elected on January 30, 2005) named Barzani “president of Kurdistan.” Yet, Barzani
did participate extensively in the final negotiations on the new Iraqi constitution.
Barzani visited Washington, D.C., in October 2005 and met with President Bush.
Shiite Islamist Leaders and Organizations: Ayatollah Sistani,
SCIRI, Da’wa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Others. Shiite Islamist
organizations have emerged as the strongest factions in post-Saddam politics. Shiite
Muslims constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented in every
Iraqi government. Several factions cooperated with the U.S. regime change efforts
of the 1990s, but others had no contact with the United States.
The undisputed Shiite religious leader in Iraq is Grand Ayatollah Sistani. He
maintained a low profile during Saddam Hussein’s regime and was not part of U.S.-
backed regime change efforts in the 1990s. As the “marja-e-taqlid” (source of
emulation) and, since 1992, as the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the
8 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.
9 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.
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Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of seminaries), he is a major political
force in post-Saddam politics.10 He has a network of agents (wakils) throughout
Iraq and in countries where there are large Shiite communities. He was instrumental
in putting together the united slate of Shiite Islamist movements in the 2005 elections
(“United Iraqi Alliance,” UIA).
Sistani, about 77 years old, was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before
relocating to Najaf at the age of 21. His mentor, the former head of the Hawza, was
Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-Khoi. Like Khoi, Sistani generally opposes a direct
role for clerics in government, but he believes in clerical supervision of political
leaders, partly explaining his involvement in major post-Saddam political decisions.
He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic culture and not become Westernized, favoring
modest dress for women and curbs on sales of alcohol and Western music and
entertainment.11 He suffers from heart problems that required treatment in the
United Kingdom in August 2004.
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). With the
Da’wa Party, it constitutes the core of the UIA election coalition. SCIRI founders
were in exile in Iran after a major crackdown in 1980 by Saddam, who accused pro-
Khomeini Iraqi Shiite Islamists of trying to overthrow him. During Khomeini’s exile
in Najaf (1964-1978), Khomeini was hosted by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim,
father of the Hakim brothers that founded SCIRI. The Ayatollah was then head of
the Hawza. Although it was a member of the INC in the early 1990s, SCIRI refused
to accept U.S. funds, although it did have contacts with the United States during this
period.
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric, is now SCIRI’s leader; he
served on the IGC (he was IGC president during December 2003) and was number
one on the UIA slate in each of the 2005 elections, but took no formal position in
government. One of his top aides, Bayan Jabr, is Interior Minister, who runs the
national police and who has been accused of packing police forces with members of
SCIRI’s “Badr Brigades” militia, which are discussed under “Militias,” below.
Because of the criticism, it has been widely reported in January 2006 that he will not
likely be reappointed Interior Minister in the full-term government soon to be
assembled. SCIRI leaders say they do not seek to establish an Iranian-style Islamic
republic, but SCIRI reportedly receives substantial amounts of financial and in-kind
assistance from Iran. SCIRI also runs a television station.
Da’wa Party/Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. The second major Shiite
Islamist party is the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party. During the 1990s, Da’wa did not
join the U.S.-led effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Da’wa does not have an
10 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
11 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].
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organized militia and it has a lower proportion of clerics than does SCIRI.12 Its
leader is Ibrahim al-Jafari, who is about 55 years old (born in 1950 in Karbala), and
who is now Prime Minister. A Da’wa activist since 1966, he attended medical
school in Mosul and fled to Iran in 1980 to escape Saddam’s crackdown on the
Da’wa. He later went to live in London, possibly because he did not want to be seen
as too closely linked to Iran. Jafari previously served on the IGC;13 he was the first
of the nine rotating IGC presidents (August 2003). He was deputy president in
Allawi’s interim government. He was number 7 on the UIA slate and, on April 7,
2005, he became prime minister; he is a leading candidate to remain as prime
minister in the full-term government being negotiated now.
Although there is no public evidence that Jafari was involved in any terrorist
activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa allegedly committed a May 1985
attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on the
U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. Lebanese Hizballah was founded by Lebanese
clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and Khomeini, and there continue to be
personal and ideological linkages between Hizballah and Da’wa (as well as with
SCIRI). The Hizballah activists who held U.S. hostages in Lebanon during the
1980s often attempted to link release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa
prisoners held by Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s. Some Da’wa members in
Iraq are guided by Lebanon’s Shiite cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was
a student of Baqr Al Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction (“Sadrists”). The 31-year-old Moqtada Al Sadr
(born in 1974) is emerging as a major figure in Iraq. He is the lone surviving son of
the revered Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (the Ayatollah was killed, along
with his other two sons, by regime security forces in 1999 after he began agitating
against Saddam’s government). He is viewed by the mainstream Shiite groups as
a young firebrand who lacks religious and political weight. This view first took hold
on April 10, 2003, when his supporters allegedly stabbed to death Abd al-Majid
Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi, shortly after Khoi’s U.S.-backed
arrival in Iraq.14 However, the established Shiite factions, as well as Iranian
diplomats, are building ties to him because of his large following.
By participating fully in the December 15, 2005, elections, Sadr has further
distanced himself from his more anti-U.S., anti-establishment activities in 2003 and
2004. During that time, he used Friday prayer sermons in Kufa (near Najaf) and
newspaper publications to agitate for a U.S. withdrawal, and he did not seek to join
the IGC or the interim government. He formed the “Mahdi Army” militia in 2003,
as discussed below under “Militias.” In the January 30, 2005, elections, Sadr started
moving into the political process by permitting some of his supporters to join the
UIA slate, even though he publicly denounced those elections as a product of U.S.
occupation. Pro-Sadr candidates also won pluralities in several southern Iraqi
12 There are breakaway factions of Da’wa, the most prominent of which calls itself Islamic
Da’wa of Iraq, but these factions are believed to be far smaller than Da’wa.
13 Salim was killed May 17, 2004, in a suicide bombing while serving as IGC president.
14 Khoi had headed the Khoi Foundation, based in London.
CRS-8
provincial council elections and hold 6 seats on Basra’s 41-seat provincial council.
It is reported that three ministers in the interim government, including minister of
transportation Salam al-Maliki, are Sadr supporters.
Other Shiite Organizations. A smaller Shiite Islamist organization, the
Islamic Amal (Action) Organization, is headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi
Modarassi, a relatively moderate Shiite cleric. Islamic Amal’s power base is in
Karbala, and, operating under the SCIRI umbrella, it conducted attacks there against
regime organs in the 1980s. Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s
regime in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamic Amal won two seats in the January 30
election. Another Shiite grouping, called Fadilah, is part of the UIA coalition.
Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, it is a splinter group of Moqtada al-Sadr’s
faction and is perceived as somewhat more hardline (anti-U.S. presence) than SCIRI
or Da’wa. It holds some seats on several provincial councils in the Shiite provinces.
Other Shiite parties are operating in southern Iraq. One such grouping is derived
from the fighters who challenged Saddam Hussein’s forces in the southern marsh
areas, around the town of Amara, north of Basra. It goes by the name Hizbollah-Iraq
and it is headed by guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the
IGC. Hizbollah-Iraq apparently plays a major role in policing Amara and environs.
Another pro-Iranian grouping, which wields a militia, is called Thar Allah
(Vengeance of God).
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act
From the time of Iraq’s defeat of the INC and INA in northern Iraq in August
1996 until 1998, the Clinton Administration had little contact with opposition groups,
believing them too weak to topple Saddam. During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions
of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections led to growing
congressional calls to overthrow Saddam. A congressional push for regime change
began with an FY1998 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 105-174) and continued
subsequently. The sentiment was encapsulated in the “Iraq Liberation Act” (ILA,
P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). The ILA was viewed as an expression of
congressional support for the concept, advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts,
of promoting an Iraqi insurgency using U.S. air-power. In the debate over the
decision to go to war, Bush Administration officials have cited the ILA as evidence
of a bi-partisan consensus that Saddam Hussein needed to be removed. President
Clinton signed the legislation, despite doubts about opposition capabilities. The ILA
! stated that it should be the policy of the United States to “support
efforts” to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-
November 1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime
change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Section 8
states that the act should not be construed as authorizing the use of
U.S. military force to achieve regime change.
! gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million worth of
defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting
funds, to opposition groups designated by the Administration.
CRS-9
! did not specifically provide for its termination after Saddam Hussein
is removed from power. Section 7 of the ILA provides for
continuing post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi parties and
movements with “democratic goals.”
The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5,
1999, President Clinton issued a determination (P.D. 99-13) making the following
seven opposition groups eligible to receive U.S. military assistance: INC; INA;
SCIRI; KDP; PUK; the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);15 and the
Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM),16 a relatively small party advocating
the return of Iraq’s monarchy. However, the Clinton Administration decided that the
opposition was not sufficiently capable to merit weapons or combat training.
Bush Administration Policy
Even though several senior Bush Administration officials had been strong
advocates of a regime change policy, many of the long-standing questions about the
difficulty of that strategy remained.17 The Bush Administration initially did not alter
its predecessor’s decision not to provide lethal aid. Some accounts say that the
Administration was planning, prior to September 11, to confront Iraq militarily, but
President Bush has denied this. During its first year, Administration policy focused
on strengthening containment of Iraq, which the Administration said was rapidly
eroding. The cornerstone of the policy was to achieve U.N. Security Council
adoption of a “smart sanctions” plan — relaxing U.N.-imposed restrictions on
exports to Iraq of purely civilian equipment18 in exchange for improved international
enforcement of the U.N. ban on exports to Iraq of militarily-useful goods. The major
features of the plan were adopted by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1409 (May
14, 2002).
Post-September 11 Regime Change Policy. Bush Administration Iraq
policy changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The shift
15 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally taken off the ILA
eligibility list.
16 In concert with a May 1999 INC visit to Washington D.C, the Clinton Administration
announced a draw down of $5 million worth of training and “non-lethal” defense articles
under the ILA. During 1999-2000, about 150 oppositionists underwent civil administration
training at Hurlburt air base in Florida, including Defense Department-run civil affairs
training to administer a post-Saddam government. The Hurlburt trainees were not brought
into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward the
end of the major combat phase of the war.
17 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, Mar. 11, 2002.
18 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.
CRS-10
to an active regime change effort followed President Bush’s State of the Union
message on January 29, 2002. In that speech, given as the U.S.-led war on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down, he characterized Iraq as
part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North Korea). Some U.S. officials,
particularly deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States
needed to respond to the September 11, 2001, attacks by “ending states” that support
terrorist groups, including Iraq. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in
March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the possibility of
confronting Iraq militarily, although the leaders visited reportedly urged greater U.S.
attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed confrontation with Iraq. Some
accounts, including the book Plan of Attack, by Bob Woodward (published in April
2004) say that then Secretary of State Powell and others were concerned about the
potential consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building
a democracy after major hostilities ended. Other accounts include reported
memoranda (the “Downing Street Memo”) by British intelligence officials, based on
conversations with U.S. officials. That memo reportedly said that by mid-2002 the
Administration had already decided to go to war against Iraq and that it sought to
develop information about Iraq to support that judgment. President Bush and British
Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this. (On December 20, 2001, the House passed
H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons
inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.)
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate. The Administration added that regime change
would yield the further benefit of liberating the Iraqi people from a brutal dictator
and promoting democracy in the heart of the Middle East.
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials asserted the
following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to rebuild its
WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N. weapons
inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of Iraq’s
WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons against its
own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying
that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD against
the United States; and (3) that Iraq could transfer its WMD to
terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in potentially catastrophic
attacks in the United States or elsewhere. Critics noted that, under
the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S.
troops in the 1991 Gulf war. The U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group,
whose work formally terminated in December 2004, determined that
Iraq did not possess active WMD programs, although it retained the
intention and capabilities to reconstitute them. (See the CIA website
at [http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/].)
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was a designated state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-82, and was again designated after the 1990 invasion of
Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam Hussein’s regime
CRS-11
had a direct connection to the September 11 attacks or the October
2001 anthrax mailings, senior U.S. officials said there was evidence
of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-
Al Qaeda militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq.
The final report of the 9/11 Commission found no evidence of a
“collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq and Al Qaeda.19
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat. Although it is not
certain when the Administration decided on an invasion, in mid-2002 the
Administration began ordering a force to the region that, by early 2003, clearly gave
the President an invasion option. In concert, the Administration tried to build up and
broaden the Iraqi opposition. On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that,
in early 2002, President Bush authorized stepped up covert activities by the CIA and
special operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein. In August 2002, the State
and Defense Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups to Washington,
D.C. At the same time, the Administration expanded its ties to several groups,
particularly those composed of ex-military officers. The Administration also began
training about 5,000 oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,20 although only about 70
completed training at an air base (Taszar) in Hungary.21 They served mostly as
translators during the war.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002 that the U.N. Security
Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq. The
Administration subsequently agreed to give Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with
all applicable Council resolutions by supporting Security Council Resolution 1441
(November 8, 2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection.
Iraq reluctantly accepted it. UNMOVIC Director Hans Blix and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-Baradei subsequently briefed the
Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November 27, 2002. They
criticized Iraq for failing to pro-actively cooperate, but also noted progress and said
that Iraq might not have retained any WMD. The Bush Administration asserted that
Iraq was not cooperating with Resolution 1441 because it was not pro-actively
revealing information to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. (A “comprehensive” September
2004 report of the Iraq Survey Group, known as the “Duelfer report,”22 found no
WMD stockpiles or production but said that there was evidence that the regime
retained the intention to reconstitute WMD programs in the future. The U.S.-led
19 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.
20 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,”
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 2002.
21 Williams, Daniel. “U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles,” Washington Post, Dec. 18,
2002.
22 The full text of the Duelfer report is available at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
CRS-12
WMD search ended December 2004.23 The UNMOVIC search remains technically
active.24)
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion. It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if
he determines that doing so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N.
Security Council resolutions. It passed the House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and
the Senate the following day (77-23). It was signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely. The United States, along with Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria, maintained that Iraq had not fundamentally decided to disarm.
At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain, Spain, and
Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted that diplomatic options to disarm
Iraq had failed. The following evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and
his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British force assembled (a substantial
proportion of which remained afloat or in supporting roles). Some Iraqi units and
irregulars (“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional
tactics. No WMD was used, although Iraq did fire some ballistic missiles into
Kuwait; it is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than
150 km). The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein
appeared publicly with supporters that day in the Adhamiya district of Baghdad.
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition
U.S. goals for Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein have changed
somewhat. U.S. goals initially were to create a model democracy that is at peace
with its neighbors, free of WMD, and an ally of the United States. However,
according to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Administration goal
now is to create an Iraq that can provide for its own security and does not serve as a
host for radical Islamic terrorists. The Administration believes that, over the longer
term, Iraq will still become a model for reform throughout the Middle East, but there
is growing debate over whether U.S. policy can establish a stable and democratic Iraq
at an acceptable cost.25 The political transition in post-Saddam Iraq has advanced,
but insurgent violence is still widespread and sectarian violence is increasing.
23 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
24 For information on UNMOVIC’s ongoing activities, see [http://www.unmovic.org/].
25 For text of President Bush’s June 28, 2005, speech on Iraq, see [http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].
CRS-13
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the
fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly
grounded in Administration concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major
anti-Saddam factions and not necessarily produce democracy. These concerns had
led the Administration to oppose a move by the U.S.-backed anti-Saddam groups to
declare a provisional government before the invasion. The Administration initially
tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction with a staff of U.S.
government personnel to administer Iraq’s ministries; they deployed in April 2003.
He headed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),
within the Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order.
The Administration’s immediate post-war policy did not make use of an extensive
State Department initiative, called the “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent at least a
year before the war drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam.
Some Iraqis who participated are now in Iraqi government positions. The State
Department project, which cost $5 million, had 15 working groups on major issues.26
Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi regime. He and
then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (now Ambassador to Iraq) organized a
meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying ethnicities and
ideologies. A subsequent meeting of over 250 notables was held in Baghdad
(April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to
name an interim administration. However, senior U.S. officials reportedly disliked
Garner’s lax approach, including tolerating Iraqis naming themselves as local leaders.
In May 2003, the Administration named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace
Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which subsumed
ORHA. The CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003). Bremer suspended Garner’s political transition
process and decided instead to appoint a 25- to 30-member Iraqi advisory body that
would not have sovereignty.
Iraq Governing Council. On July 13, 2003, Bremer named the 25-member
Iraq Governing Council (IGC). Its major figures included the leaders of the major
anti-Saddam factions, but it was perceived in Iraq as an arm of U.S. decision-making.
Some emergent figures were on it, including Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni elder
(Shammar tribe) and president of a Saudi-based technology firm. (He is now a
deputy president.) In September 2003, the IGC selected a 25-member “cabinet” to
run individual ministries, with roughly the same factional and ethnic balance of the
IGC itself (a slight majority of Shiite Muslims). The IGC began a process of “de-
Baathification” — a purge from government of about 30,000 persons who held any
of the four top ranks of the Baath Party — and it authorized a war crimes tribunal for
Saddam and his associates. That function is now performed by a 323-member
“Supreme Commission on De-Baathification.” The IGC dissolved on June 1, 2004,
when an interim government (of Iyad al-Allawi) was named.
26 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/].
CRS-14
The Handover of Sovereignty
The Bush Administration initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections for a
new government, tasks expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah
Sistani and others agitated for an early restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and for direct
elections for a new government. In response, in November 2003, the United States
announced it would return sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004, and that elections
for a permanent government would be held by the end of 2005.
Interim Constitution/Transition Roadmap. The CPA decisions on
transition roadmap were incorporated into an interim constitution, the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), which was drafted by a committee dominated by the
major anti-Saddam factions and signed on March 8, 2004.27 It provided for the
following:
! Elections by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly, with election laws aimed to have “women constitute no
less than 25% of the members of the National Assembly.” A
permanent constitution would be drafted by August 15, 2005, and
put to a national referendum by October 15, 2005. National
elections for a permanent government, under the new constitution (if
it passed), would be held by December 15, 2005. The new
government would take office by December 31, 2005.
! Any three provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds
majority. If that happened, a new draft was to be developed and
voted on by October 15, 2006. In that case, the December 15, 2005,
elections would have been for another interim National Assembly.
! The Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government.” They were given powers to contradict or alter the
application of Iraqi law in their provinces, and their peshmerga
militia were allowed to operate.
! Islam was designated “a source,” but not the primary source, of law,
and no law could be passed that contradicts such rights as peaceful
assembly; free expression; equality of men and women before the
law; and the right to strike and demonstrate.
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover. The TAL did not
directly address the formation of the interim government that assumed sovereignty.
Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan to select a national assembly
through nationwide “caucuses,” not elections. After considering other options, such
as the holding of a traditional assembly, the United States tapped U.N. envoy
27 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].
CRS-15
Lakhdar Brahimi to select that government,28 but maneuvering by senior politicians
led to their domination of it. The interim government was named on June 1, 2004,
and began work immediately; the IGC dissolved. The formal handover of
sovereignty occurred on June 28, 2004, two days before the advertised June 30 date,
partly to confound insurgents. The interim government, whose powers were
addressed in an addendum to the TAL, had a largely ceremonial president (Ghazi al-
Yawar) and two deputy presidents (the Da’wa’s Jafari and the KDP’s Dr. Rowsch
Shaways). Iyad al-Allawi was Prime Minister, with executive power, and there was
a deputy prime minister and 26 ministers. Six ministers were women, and the
ethnicity mix was roughly the same as in the IGC. The key defense and interior
ministries were headed by Sunni Arabs.
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate. The
Administration asserts that it has consistently sought international backing for its
Iraq efforts, and it has supported an increase in the U.N. role since late 2003.
Resolution 1483 (May 6, 2003) recognized the CPA as an occupying authority;
provided for a U.N. special representative to Iraq; and it “call[ed] on” governments
to contribute forces for stabilization. Resolution 1500 (August 14, 2003) established
U.N. Assistance Mission - Iraq (UNAMI).29 The size of UNAMI in Iraq is rising to
a target level of about 300 people. In a further attempt to satisfy the requirements of
several major nations for greater U.N. backing of the coalition military presence, the
United States obtained agreement on Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003), formally
authorizing a “multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.] command.”
Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further by
endorsing the handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim
government, and spelling out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq.
It also gave the United Nations a major role in helping the interim government
prepare for the two elections in 2005, and it authorized a coalition component force
to protect U.N. personnel and facilities. Primarily because of Sistani’s opposition to
the TAL’s provision that would allow the Kurds a veto over a permanent
constitution, the Resolution did not explicitly endorse the TAL. The Resolution
also stipulated the following:
! U.S. officials would no longer have final authority on non-security
issues. The interim government and the elected government could
have amended the TAL or revoked CPA decrees, but they did so on
only a few occasions.
! The coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the request of the
Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this
resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire when
a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and that the
mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so requests.”
28 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,” Washington Post.
Apr. 15, 2004.
29 On August 12, 2004, its mandate was renewed for one year and on Aug. 11, 2005
(Resolution 1619), for another year.
CRS-16
The Security Council reviewed the mandate in advance of the June
8, 2005 deadline, and no alterations to it were made. However, on
November 11, 2005, in advance of the termination of the mandate,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1637 extending the
coalition military mandate to December 31, 2006, unless earlier
requested by the Iraqi government. There will also be a review of
the mandate on June 15, 2006.
! The relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is “coordination and
partnership,” as spelled out in an annexed exchange of letters
between the United States and Iraq. The Iraqi government does not
have a veto over coalition operations, and the coalition retains the
ability to take prisoners. Iraqi forces are “a principal partner in the
multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified [American]
command pursuant to the provisions of [Resolution 1511] and any
subsequent resolutions.”
! An agreement on the status of foreign forces (Status of Forces
Agreement, SOFA) in Iraq would be deferred to an elected Iraqi
government. No such agreement has been signed, to date, and U.S.
forces operate in Iraq and use its facilities (such as Balad air base)
under temporary memoranda of understanding. However, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld told journalists on July 27, 2005, that U.S.
military lawyers are working with the Iraqis on a SOFA or other
arrangements that would cover U.S. operations in Iraq after a
permanent government takes over.
! There would be a 100-seat “Interim National Council” to serve as
an interim parliament. The body, selected during August 13-18,
2004,30 did not have legislative power but was able to veto
government decisions with a 2/3 majority. The council held some
televised “hearings,” including questioning ministers. Its work
ended after the National Assembly was elected in January 2005.
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq. The following were additional
consequences of the sovereignty handover, designed in part to lower the profile of
U.S. influence over post-handover Iraq.
! As of the June 28, 2004, handover of sovereignty, the state of
occupation ceased. Subsequently, a U.S. Ambassador (John
Negroponte) established U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first
time since January 1991. Negroponte’s philosophy was to generally
refrain from directly intervening in internal Iraqi debates. A U.S.
embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with about
30 Tavernise, Sabrina. “In Climax To a Tumultuous 4-Day Debate, Iraq Chooses An
Assembly,” New York Times, Aug. 19, 2004.
CRS-17
1,100 U.S. personnel.31 Negroponte was succeeded in July 2005 by
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was previously Ambassador to
Afghanistan and who takes a more activist approach. (An FY2005
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provided $592 million of
$658 million requested to construct a new embassy in Baghdad and
to fund embassy operations.) In August 2005, Secretary of State
Rice named a new State Department-based chief coordinator for
Iraq; former deputy chief of mission in post-Saddam Baghdad,
James Jeffrey.
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB). Iraq also was given responsibility for close-out of
the “oil-for-food program.”32 Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2004)
ended that program as of November 21, 2003.
! Reconstruction management and advising of the new Iraqi
government were taken over by the State Department through the
U.S. Embassy and a unit called the “Iraq Reconstruction and
Management Office (IRMO).” IRMO is headed since June 2005 by
Daniel Speckhard, About 150 U.S. civilian personnel work out of
four major centers around Iraq (satellites of the U.S. Embassy) —
Hilla, Basra, Kirkuk, and Mosul, and 15-20 of them report to IRMO.
A separate “Project Contracting Office (PCO),” headed by Brig.
Gen. William McCoy and is now under the Army Corps of
Engineers, funds infrastructure projects such as roads, power plants,
and school renovations.
! U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-
7, CJTF-7) became a multi-national headquarters “Multinational
Force-Iraq, MNF-I,” headed by four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey.
As of January 2006, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli is operational
commander of U.S. forces as head of the “Multinational Corps-
Iraq.”
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005
After the handover of sovereignty, the United States and Iraq began focusing on
the three national votes that would be held in 2005.
January 30, 2005 Elections/New Government. On January 30, 2005,
elections were held for a transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and
the Kurdish regional assembly. Sunnis, still resentful of the U.S. invasion, did not
participate in the vote, and no major Sunni slates were offered. This enabled the UIA
31 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.
32 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.
CRS-18
to win a slim majority (140 of the 275 seats) and to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to
dominate the government formed subsequently. (Other seat allocations are contained
in a table in CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution,
by Kenneth Katzman.) U.S. officials said publicly this government was not
sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority, even though it had a Sunni (Hajim al-
Hassani) as Assembly speaker; a Sunni deputy president (Ghazi al-Yawar); a Sunni
deputy prime minister (Abd al-Mutlak al-Jabburi); a Sunni Defense Minister
(Sadoun Dulaymi); and five other Sunni ministers. The Sunnis complained that the
ministerial slots they hold (other than Defense) are relatively unimportant, such as
the ministries of culture and of women’s affairs. The other major positions were
dominated by Shiites and Kurds, such as PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president;
Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime Minister; SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi as the
second deputy president; Bayan Jabr as Interior Minister, which controls the police
and police commando forces; and KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari as Foreign Minister.
Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch Shaways were named as the two other deputy prime
ministers. There is also one Christian and one Turkoman minister.
The Iraqi government has received some diplomatic support, even though most
of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination of the regime.
As of late 2005, there were 46 foreign missions in Iraq, including most European and
Arab countries. At a June 22, 2005, international conference on Iraq held in
Brussels, Jordan and Egypt pledged to appoint ambassadors to Baghdad. Perhaps in
an effort to derail that effort, on July 2, insurgents kidnaped and killed Egypt’s top
diplomat in Baghdad; he was to be appointed the ambassador there. Jordan
nonetheless did go forward with appointing an ambassador. On July 5, insurgents
attacked and wounded Bahrain’s top diplomat in Iraq. In late July, insurgents
captured and killed Algeria’s two highest ranking envoys in Iraq, prompting Algeria
to pull out. In November, two Moroccan embassy employees were killed and
Oman’s embassy was shot at. In September 2005, Kuwait pledged to re-establish
full diplomatic relations with the new government.
Permanent Constitution. The drafting and adoption on October 15, 2005,
of the constitution, along with its major provisions, is discussed further in CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth
Katzman. The crux of Sunni opposition to the new constitution is its provision for
a weak central government (“federalism”). The provision, placed in the constitution
at the insistence of the Kurds and Shiites, whose regions have substantial oil reserves,
allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous “regions” with their
own regional governments, internal security forces, and a large role in controlling
revenues from any new energy discoveries. The Sunnis oppose this concept because
their region lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues.
Despite Sunni opposition, the constitution was approved on October 15; Sunni
opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in two provinces but not the three needed
to defeat the constitution. It takes effect after a new government is seated following
the December 15 election.
U.S. officials hope that the constitution will be modified in 2006 to
accommodate Sunni concerns on federalism/regionalism. Under a last-minute
agreement before the October 15 referendum, the government to be formed after the
December 2005 elections is to name another constitutional commission to propose
CRS-19
amendments to the constitution within four months of the seating of that government.
The amendments require approval by an Assembly majority, and then would be put
to a national referendum to be held two months later. However, in a possible sign of
difficulty, SCIRI leader Hakim said on January 11, 2006, that he would not support
major amendments to the constitution.
December 15, 2005, Election. In this election, some anti-U.S. Sunnis
moved further into the political arena. That vote was also mostly peaceful, and, in
contrast to the January elections, Sunni slates were offered, including a broad slate
(“The Concord Front”) led by the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) but consisting of the
Conference of Iraqi People, headed by the elderly Adnan al-Dulaymi, and the Sunni
Endowment. Another Sunni slate was the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, headed
by constitution negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak. Because Sunnis voted in large numbers
(over 50% Sunni turnout), the Concord slate won 44 seats and the Dialogue slate
picked up 11. Final results were released in January 2006, but the results still must
be court-certified to be final; that certification is expected by February 10. The
December 15, 2005, election is discussed further in CRS Report RS21968, Iraq:
Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman.
Once the “Council of Representatives” convenes, it will (within fifteen days)
name a speaker. The body will then name a presidency council (with a two-thirds
majority), which then has fifteen days to tap the leader of the largest bloc in the
parliament as Prime Minister. That person has 30 days to name and achieve
parliamentary confirmation of a cabinet (by a simple Assembly majority). On the
basis of final results, the UIA won 128 seats and the Kurds 53, leaving them just
short of the two-thirds of seats needed to reconstitute their bilateral governing
alliance. However, minor Kurdish and Shiite blocs could put them over that
threshhold. Together, the Sunni slates mentioned above hold 55 seats, still not
necessarily enough to win Sunnis the most senior positions in government. It is
therefore unclear whether the election, and Sunni participation in it, will reduce
Sunni resentment and insurgency.
Democracy-Building and Local Governance. The United States and its
coalition partners have also been trying to build civil society and democracy at the
local level. U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the past 30 years,
with a free press and the ability to organize politically. According to a State
Department report to Congress in January 2006 detailing how the FY2004
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund”
(IRRF) is being spent (“2207 Report”): According to that report:
! About $1.034 billion has been allocated for “Democracy Building”
activities.
! About $110 million is allocated for related “Rule of Law” programs.
! About $159 million is allocated to build and secure courts and train
legal personnel.
! About $128 million is allocated for “Investigations of Crimes
Against Humanity,” primarily former regime abuses.
! $10 million for U.S. Institute of Peace democracy/civil
society/conflict resolution activities.
CRS-20
! $10 million for the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (which is
evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds, mainly in
Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime).
! $15 million to promote human rights, human rights education
centers.
In addition to what is already allocated, the FY2006 regular foreign aid
appropriations (conference report H.Rept. 109-265 on P.L. 109-102) provides $56
million for democracy promotion. It incorporates a Senate amendment (S.Amdt.
1299, Kennedy) to that legislation providing $28 million each to the International
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for democracy promotion
in Iraq.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), some of the activities funded, aside
from assistance for the various elections in Iraq in 2005, include the following.
! Several projects attempting to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
! Activities to empower local governments, policies that are receiving
increasing U.S. attention and additional funding allocations from the
IRRF. These programs include (1) the “Community Action
Program,” through which local reconstruction projects are voted on
by village and town representatives. About 400 such projects have
been completed thus far; (2) Provincial Reconstruction Development
Committees (PRDCs) to empower local governments to decide on
reconstruction priorities; and (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), which are local enclaves to provide secure conditions for
reconstruction, as discussed further below.
! Some of the allocated funds are for programs to empower women
and promote their involvement in Iraqi politics.
! Some funds have been used for easing tensions in cities that have
seen substantial U.S.-led anti-insurgency combat, including Fallujah,
Ramadi, Sadr City district of Baghdad, and Mosul.
CRS-21
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance33
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, although some aspects of that effort appear to be faltering. Since September
2004, the U.S. reconstruction process has shifted resources to smaller scale projects
that could be completed quickly and employ Iraqis, such as sewer lines and city
roads. about 30,000 new businesses were registered in Iraq over the past year. On
the other hand, as discussed extensively in a January 2006 report by the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the difficult security environment
has slowed reconstruction. Even though economic reconstruction is incomplete, the
Administration only requested $479 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for
Iraq for FY2007, mainly to help sustain infrastructure already built with U.S. funds.
The Administration says that, from now on, Iraq needs to rely more on foreign
donations and Iraqi government revenues to continue reconstruction work.
The primary source of U.S. reconstruction funds is the IRRF. Total funds of
$20.912 billion for the IRRF came from two supplemental appropriations (FY2003
supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the FY2004
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 108-106, which provided about $18.44 billion).
Of those funds, $17.975 billion has been obligated, and, of that, $12.944 billion has
been disbursed as of February 1, 2006. According to the State Department, the sector
allocations (for the FY2004 supplemental fund of $18.44 billion) are
! $5.05 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.251 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society;
! $1.034 billion for Democracy;
! $4.31 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.723 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $470.5 million for Transportation and Communications;
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $739 million for Health Care;
! $800 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $383 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
As noted above, the conference report on the FY2006 foreign aid appropriation
provides $56 million in democracy promotion funds and an additional $5 million.
(As discussed below, the FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided
an additional $5.7 billion for the Iraqi Security Forces; those funds have not been
allocated yet.)
33 For more detailed information on U.S. spending and economic reconstruction, see CRS
Report RL31833, Iraq, Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
CRS-22
The Oil Industry. As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding of the oil
industry has received substantial U.S. attention, but oil exports appear to be at a new
post-Saddam low in early 2006. Before the war, it was widely asserted by
Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those
of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction costs. The oil industry
infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led invasion (only about nine oil
wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of insurgents. Insurgents have
particularly focused their attacks on pipelines in northern Iraq; those lines feed the
Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that is loaded at Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
This has kept production and exports below expected levels, although high world oil
prices have been, at least until now, more than compensating for the output shortfall.
The United States imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude oil from Iraq. The
Iraqi government needs to import refined gasoline because it lacks sufficient refining
capacity. Lines for gasoline often last many hours, although the government said in
February 2006 it will gradually reduce gas subsidies, allowing gas prices to rise.
Because of rising prices, Oil Minister Bahr-Ulum again resigned in January 2006 and
was replaced by Hashim al-Hashimi of the pro-Sadr Fadila party.
Table 1. Some Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Export
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Production
Production
Exports
s (pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(2006
(pre-war)
war)
(2004)
(2005)
(to date)
1.43 million
$17
$23.5
$1.4
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
0.92 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
billion
(mbd)
Electricity
Pre-War
Baghdad (hrs.
(MWh)
Current
per day, 1/06)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
88,000
5.1
9.3
Other Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate (2006 anticipated by IMF)
10.6%
GDP
$18.4 billion (2002)
$29.3 billion (2005)
New Businesses Begun Since 2003 30,000
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
February 1, 2006. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the
1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
CRS-23
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries. Iraq’s interim government has contracted for a study of the extent of Iraq’s
oil reserves, and it has contracted with Royal Dutch/Shell to formulate a blueprint to
develop the gas sector. Poland reportedly is negotiating with Iraq for possible
investments in Iraq’s energy sector. In December 2005, it was reported that a
Norwegian company, DNO, has contracted with the Kurdish administrative region
to explore for oil near the northern city of Zakho, raising the concerns of Iraq’s Arabs
who view this as a move by the Kurds to control some Iraqi oil revenues.
International Donors. A World Bank estimate, released in October 2003,
said Iraq reconstruction would require about $56 billion during 2004-2007, including
$21 billion in U.S. pledges. At an October 2003 donors’ conference in Madrid,
donors pledged about $13.5 billion, including $8 billion from foreign governments
and $5.5 billion in loans from the World Bank and IMF. Of the funds pledged by
other foreign governments, about $3.2 billion has been disbursed as of December
2005, according to the January 2006 “2207 Report.” Included in that figure is about
$436 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, which were disbursed in
2004 after Iraq cleared up $81 million in Saddam-era arrears to the IMF.
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction/CERP Funds. The U.S. military
has attempted to promote reconstruction to deprive the insurgency of popular
support. A key tool in this effort is the funding of small projects to promote trust
among the population. Called the Commanders Emergency Response Program
(CERP), the DOD funds are controlled and disbursed by U.S. commanders at the
tactical level. The total amount of CERP funds for Iraq available thus far are $718
million in FY2005 funds and $140 million in FY2004 funds. The FY2006 Defense
appropriation (P.L. 109-148) provides up to another $500 million in CERP funds.
A similar program began in October 2004, called the Commander’s Humanitarian
Relief and Reconstruction Projects (CHHRP). About $86 million in IRRF funds has
been allocated for this program, mostly for water and sewage repairs in Sunni areas.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. The Bush Administration has lifted most U.S.
sanctions on Iraq, beginning with Presidential Determinations issued under
authorities provided by P.L. 108-7 (appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11
(FY2003 supplemental):
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.) The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.
CRS-24
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services.
Exports of dual use items (items that can have military applications)
are no longer subject to strict licensing procedures.34
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt built up during the regime of Saddam
Hussein. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not including reparations
dating to the first Persian Gulf war. On November 21, 2004, the “Paris Club” of 19
industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes them.
However, with the exception of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf states that supported Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war have not to date firmly agreed to write-off Iraq’s
approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar). On December 17, 2004, the United States signed an
agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1 billion debt to the United States;
that debt consisted of principal and interest from about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi
agricultural credits from the 1980s.35 On December 13, 2004, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession talks with Iraq.
Security Challenges,
Responses, and Options
In a series of speeches in late 2005, President Bush cited successful elections
and the growth of the Iraqi security forces to assert that U.S. policy will produce a
stable Iraq. However, the insurgency continues apparently unabated, and increasing
sectarian-motivated violence is adding complexity to the security challenges facing
U.S. Iraq policy.
The Insurgent Challenge
The Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. and Iraqi forces has defied most
U.S. expectations in intensity and duration. Although hesitant to assess the size of
the insurgency, U.S. commanders say that insurgents probably number approximately
34 A May 7, 2003, executive order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
35 For more information, see CRS Report RS21765, Iraq: Debt Relief, by Martin Weiss.
CRS-25
12,000-20,000. Some Iraqi (intelligence) officials have publicly advanced higher
estimates of about 40,000 active insurgents, helped by another 150,000 persons in
supporting roles. About 15,000 suspected insurgents are now in prison in Iraq.
Insurgent attacks numbered about 100 per day during most of 2005, but some U.S.
commanders say that number has fallen to about 65 attacks per day in early 2006.
As discussed in the Administration’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq”
(November 30, 2005), many of the insurgents are motivated by opposition to
perceived U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite rulership. Others want to
bring the Baath Party back into power, although, according to many experts, some
might settle for a large Sunni role in governance with or without the Baath. Still
others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters, either foreign or Iraqi, that want to defeat the
United States and spread radical Islam throughout the region. The following are
some major Iraqi (not foreign) insurgent factions:
! The Islamic Army of Iraq. An Iraqi group that conducts a wide
range of attacks and has captured several Western hostages.
! Muhammad’s Army. This faction is said to be led by radical Sunni
cleric Abdullah al-Janabi, who is from Fallujah.
! The Al Haq Army. Active in and around Ramadi.
! The 1920 Revolution Brigades. Has seized some foreign hostages.
The insurgent groups, believed to be loosely coordinated at the city or province
level, have failed to derail the political transition.36 However, they have succeeded,
to some extent, in painting the Iraqi government as dependent on the United States
for its survival. Targets include not only U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security
forces but also Iraqi civilians working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors and
aid workers, oil export and gasoline distribution facilities, and water, power, and
other infrastructure facilities. U.S. officials testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on February 8, 2006, that insurgents attacks had caused major
disruption to the U.S. economic reconstruction effort and kept most indicators of
reconstruction progress (water, power, oil, etc) below pre-war levels. The U.N.
Security Council has adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency — on August
4, 2005, it adopted Resolution 1618, condemning the “terrorist attacks that have
taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on Iraqi election workers, constitution drafters,
and foreign diplomats in Iraq.
Sunni Clerics and Political Relations with the Insurgency. Many Iraqi
insurgents appear to have contacts with a network of Sunni Islamist clerics or
politicians that oppose the U.S. presence and have not participated in any governing
structures. These clerics belong to an organization called the Muslim Scholars
(MSA), which claims to represent 3,000 Sunni mosques countrywide. The MSA is
led by Harith al-Dhari, who heads the large Umm al-Qura mosque in Baghdad, and
Abd al-Salam al-Qubaysi, leader of the Abu Hanifa mosque in Baghdad. The MSA
36 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?” U.S. Institute
of Peace, Special Report 134, Apr. 2005; and Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White.
“Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Focus No. 50, Dec. 2005.
CRS-26
has, on occasion, succeeded in persuading insurgent groups to release Western or
other hostages. It urged a boycott of the January 2005 elections and a “no” vote on
the constitution, although it did not urge a Sunni boycott of the December 15
election. In a sign of possible moderation, Dhari and Qubaysi attended the
November 2005 Conference on Iraq in Cairo with other Iraqi factions, although they
achieved inclusion in the conference final communique the assertion that “resistance
is legitimate” and a call for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal.37 On the other hand,
suggesting that the MSA is actively assisting insurgents, U.S. forces raided the Umm
al-Qura mosque in early January 2006 reportedly investigating allegations that
terrorist attacks were being planned there.
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi.38 A relatively small but important component
of the insurgency are non-Iraqi fighters. A study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies released in September 2005 said that about 3,500 foreign
fighters are in Iraq, which would represent just under 20% of the overall insurgency
if the U.S. military estimate of 20,000 total insurgents is correct. According to the
study, the foreign fighters come mostly from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt, with Saudis constituting only about 350 of the 3,000 estimated
foreign fighters. The Department of Defense said on October 20, 2005, that 312
foreign fighters had been captured in Iraq since April 2005.
A major portion of the foreign insurgent contingent is commanded by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, a 40-year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan during the 1980s alongside other Arab volunteers against the Soviet
Union. Zarqawi came to Iraq in late 2001, along with several hundred associates,
after escaping the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. He made his way to northern Iraq,
after transiting Iran and Saddam-controlled Iraq, eventually taking refuge with a
Kurdish Islamist faction called Ansar al-Islam39 near the town of Khurmal.40 His
group occasionally clashed with PUK fighters around nearby Halabja. After the
Ansar enclave was destroyed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Zarqawi fled to the Sunni
Arab areas of Iraq and began using other organizational names, including the
Association of Unity and Jihad. Since then, as he has affiliated with bin Laden, he
has changed his organization’s name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in Mesopotamia.” It is
named as an Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), assuming that designation from
the earlier Unity and Jihad organizational title,41 which was designated as an FTO in
37 Text of final statement of the conference is online at [http://www.almendhar.com/english_
7873?news.aspx].
38 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?, by Kenneth Katzman.
39 Ansar al-Islam originated in 1998 as a radical splinter faction of a Kurdish Islamic group
called the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK). Based in Halabja, the IMIK
publicized the effects of Baghdad’s Mar. 1988 chemical attack on that city. Ansar is named
by the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
40 Chivers, C.J. “Repulsing Attack By Islamic Militants, Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities,”
New York Times, Dec. 6, 2002.
41 In early 2004, U.S. forces captured a letter purportedly written by Zarqawi asking bin
Laden’s support for Zarqawi’s insurgent activities in Iraq and an Islamist website broadcast
(continued...)
CRS-27
October 2004. Press reports said that U.S. forces almost caught him near Ramadi in
February 2005, and his aides posted web messages that he was seriously wounded in
a subsequent U.S. raid but then regained health.
Zarqawi’s faction has been the subject of substantial U.S. counter-efforts
because of its alleged perpetration of “terrorist” attacks — suicide and other attacks
against both combatant and civilian targets. Some of the attacks attributed to this
faction include the bombings in Baghdad of U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel
(August 19, 2003)42 and the August 2003 bombing that killed SCIRI leader
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim. The group, and related factions, have also kidnaped a
total of over 250 foreigner workers, and killed about 40 of those. There is some
speculation that Zarqawi’s faction, or a related group, might have committed the
August 19, 2005, failed rocket attack in the Jordanian port of Aqaba against two U.S.
warships docked there, as well as the November 10, 2005, Western-owned hotels in
Amman, Jordan. Increasingly, the group has been targeting Iraqi Shiite festivals and
ceremonies, most likely hoping to provoke civil conflict between Sunnis and Shiites;
in September 2005, Zarqawi declared war on Iraq’s Shiites, according to a website
attributed to his followers. However, this tactic reportedly has caused tensions and
occasional armed clashes with Iraqi insurgent factions that oppose attacks on purely
civilian targets. U.S. forces have sought to exploit these differences by attempting
to engage Iraqi insurgent factions and persuade them to cooperate with U.S. efforts
against the foreign fighters, reportedly with some success.43
An offshoot of Zarqawi’s group is called “Ansar al-Sunna,” or Partisans of the
Traditions [of the Prophet]. This group reportedly blends both foreign volunteers and
Iraqi insurgents. Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for the December 21, 2004,
attack on Camp Marez in Mosul that killed 22, including 14 U.S. soldiers, and has
been responsible for several subsequent attacks particularly in the Mosul area.
Outside Support. Numerous accounts say that insurgent leaders are using
Syria as a base to funnel money and weapons to their fighters in Iraq.44 In September
2005, U.S. ambassador Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of allowing training camps
in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to gather and train before going into Iraq. These reports
have led to U.S. warnings to and imposition of additional U.S. sanctions against
Syria and to the U.S. Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of some suspected
financiers of the insurgency. Syria has tried to deflect the criticism by moves such
41 (...continued)
a message in October 2004, reportedly deemed authentic by U.S. agencies, that Zarqawi has
formally allied with Al Qaeda. There have also been recent press reports that bin Laden has
asked Zarqawi to plan operations outside Iraq. For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/
rls/31694.htm].
42 Among the dead in the latter bombing was the U.N. representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, and it prompted an evacuation of U.N. personnel from Iraq.
43 Filkins, Dexter and Sabrina Tavernise. U.S. Said to Meet With Insurgents, Exploiting
Rifts. New York Times, Jan. 7, 2006.
44 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
21, 2004.
CRS-28
as the February 2005 turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi to Iraqi
authorities. Other assessments say the insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,45 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
On the other hand, in January 2006 senior U.S. commanders said they had been
receiving increased cooperation from Syria and Saudi Arabia to prevent insurgent
flows across those borders.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed in August 2005 that some explosives
from Iran had been intercepted in Iraq, although he did not assert that the shipment
was authorized by Iran’s government. Others believe that outside support is minimal
and that the insurgents have ample supplies of arms and explosives obtained from the
nearly 250,000 tons of munitions remaining around Iraq in arms depots not
immediately secured after the regime fell. For more information, see CRS Report
RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman.
Sectarian Violence/Militias
The security picture in Iraq has become more multi-dimensional. Increasingly,
violence in Iraq is sectarian — primarily Sunni Arab against Shiite Arabs and vice
versa — rather than purely Sunni Arab (foreign and Iraqi) insurgents versus U.S. and
Iraqi government forces. This has led some experts to assert that Iraq is already
experiencing a low level civil war.
Since mid-2005, there are an increasing number of reports of attack and
retaliation between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs. On numerous occasions recently,
bodies of groups of Sunni or Shiite civilians have been found in various locations,
bound and gagged, and dumped in rivers or fields. Shiite leaders have blamed the
attacks on Sunni insurgents, and as noted above, the foreign insurgent factions (who
are Sunnis) have openly used civilian attacks as part of a deliberate, announced
strategy to oppose the United States and the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government.
The sectarian violence is highly complicated because the Sunnis are blaming the
Shiites and Kurds for using their control over the emerging security forces — as well
as their party-based militias — to retaliate and repress Sunnis. Sunnis report that
Shiite militiamen who have joined the security forces are raiding Sunni homes or
using their arrest powers to abduct Sunnis, some of whom later show up killed.
Sunnis hold U.S. forces partly responsible for the violence because U.S. forces built
the Iraqi security forces and have allowed the Shiite and Kurdish militias to continue
to operate. On February 8, 2006, SCIRI leader Hakim called on the security forces
to pay more consideration to human rights, an apparent nod to Sunni complaints.
Some, but not all, Sunni leaders have spoken out against Sunni insurgent
violence against Shiite civilians. To counter the Shiite-led violence, Sunni Arabs
openly announced formation of a militia, the Anbar Revolutionaries, to guard against
45 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.” Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates
By U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,” New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.
CRS-29
Shiite and Kurdish sectarian attacks. In some cases, Sunni insurgents have even
assassinated Sunni politicians who have negotiated with Shiite leaders or urged
joining the political process. One such politician, the leader of the Fallujah city
council, was gunned down on February 7, 2006.
The major Shiite militia that is believed to be carrying out anti-Sunni violence
is SCIRI’s “Badr Brigades.” The Kurds’ peshmerga and Sadr’s Mahdi Army have
also been accused of some sectarian violence and human rights abuses.
! Kurdish Peshmerga. Together, the KDP and PUK may have as
many as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of whom are
operating as unofficial security organs in northern Iraqi cities. Some
are integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and deploy in such
cities as Mosul and Baghdad. Kurdish ISF units reportedly were a
major component of the ISF forces that fought alongside U.S. forces
in offensives at Tal Affar in September 2005. Peshmerga units have
sometimes fought each other; in May 1994, the KDP and the PUK
clashed with each other over territory, customs revenues, and control
over the Kurdish regional government in Irbil.
! Badr Brigades. The militia of SCIRI numbers about 20,000 and is
led by Hadi al-Amiri (a member of the National Assembly). The
Badr Brigades were formed, trained, and equipped by Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard, politically aligned with Iran’s hardliners,
during the Iran-Iraq war, during which Badr guerrillas conducted
forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials.
Most Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners
of war held in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed SCIRI as
an Iranian puppet, and Badr operations in southern Iraq during the
1980s and 1990s did not spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi
regime. The Badr Organization registered as a separate political
entity, in addition to its SCIRI parent, for the January 30 election and
the December 15 election.
! Badr militiamen play unofficial policing roles in Basra, Najaf, and
elsewhere in southern Iraq, and many Badr members also reputedly
are in the ISF, particularly the police, which is led by the SCIRI-
dominated Interior Ministry. A related militia, called the “Wolf
Brigade” is a Badr offshoot that is formally part of the police. It is
also led by a SCIRI activist. Sunni charges of Badr “death squads”
activities gained strength on November 16, 2005, with the discovery
by U.S. forces of a secret Ministry of Interior detention facility. The
facility, allegedly run by Badr militiamen, housed 170 Sunni Arab
detainees who allegedly were tortured. At least two other such
facilities, run by the Wolf Brigade, were uncovered in December
2005. In another example of militia strength, on August 9, 2005,
Badr fighters reportedly helped SCIRI member Hussein al-Tahaan
forcibly replace Ali al-Tamimi as mayor of Baghdad.
CRS-30
! Mahdi Army. The size of Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia is unknown,
but it is re-gaining strength since U.S. military operations put down
Mahdi uprisings in April 2004 and August 2004 in Sadr City. In
each case, fighting was ended with compromises under which Mahdi
forces stopped fighting (and in some cases traded in some of their
weapons for money) in exchange for lenient treatment or releases of
prisoners, amnesty for Sadr himself, and reconstruction aid. The
Mahdi Army has since ended active anti-U.S. combat and Sadr City
has been relatively peaceful, but Mahdi fighters, reportedly with the
tacit approval of U.S. forces, continue to patrol that district and parts
of other Shiite cities, particularly Basra. Mahdi (and Badr)
assertiveness in Basra has partly accounted for a sharp deterioration
of relations since July 2005 between Iraqi officials in Basra and the
British forces based there. About 11 British soldiers have died in
attacks in that area since then, and in October 2005, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair publicly blamed Iran for arming Iraqi groups,
particularly the Mahdi Army, responsible for the soldiers’ deaths.
In one dispute, British forces forcibly rescued British special forces
soldiers taken into official custody in Basra. Mahdi and Badr forces
have occasionally clashed as well, most recently in October 2005.
U.S. Efforts to Restore Security
At times, such as after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 and
after both elections in 2005, some U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the
insurgency would subside, only to see it continue. As outlined in the “National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the Administration continues to try to refine its
stabilization strategy. As part of that refinement, the Administration is increasingly
focused on bringing Sunnis into the political process.
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy. The Administration is now pursuing a
strategy called “clear, hold, and build,” intended to create and expand stable
enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces and U.S. civilian reconstruction experts in areas
cleared of insurgents. The strategy is intended to prevent re-infiltration by insurgents
as well as to build hope among the Sunni population for improved conditions. In
conjunction with the new U.S. strategy, the Administration is forming Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs, adapted from a concept used in
Afghanistan, will be composed of about 70 to 100 U.S. diplomats and military
personnel to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as the provincial councils
(elected in the January 2005 elections), representatives of the Iraqi provincial
governors, and local ministry representatives. Thus far, three PRTs have been
inaugurated (Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hilla) by converting local U.S. embassy enclaves
into PRTs. A total of 16 PRTs (nearly one per province) are planned by July 2006.
However, as reported in the Washington Post on January 15, 2006, the concept has
run into some reported difficulty over U.S. military objections to taking on expanded
missions at a time when it is trying to draw down its force. Recommendations on
how to proceed with the PRTs are expected to be forwarded from U.S. Ambassador
Khalilzad and the senior U.S. commander in Iraq, General George Casey, to
Administration officials in Washington, D.C. in February 2006.
CRS-31
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations. The U.S. stabilization
strategy requires continued combat operations against the insurgency. About
138,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq (down from 160,000 there during the December
election period), with about another 50,000 troops in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf
region supporting OIF, and another 21,000 coalition partner forces in Iraq from 26
other countries. In a January 4, 2006, speech, President Bush confirmed reports that
U.S. troop levels would be reduced in early 2006 to about 135,000. Parts of two U.S.
brigades will not deploy.
A major focus of U.S. combat remains Anbar Province, which includes the
cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. About 40,000 U.S. troops are in Anbar alone. In
April 2004, after the city fell under insurgent control (it was run by a “mujahedin
shura,” or council of insurgents), U.S. commanders contemplated routing insurgents
from the city but, concerned about collateral damage and U.S. casualties, they agreed
to allow former Iraqi officers to patrol it. This solution quickly unraveled and, as
2004 progressed, about two dozen other Sunni-inhabited towns, including Baqubah,
Balad, Tikrit, Mosul, Ramadi, Samarra, and Tal Affar, as well as the small towns
south of Baghdad, fell under insurgent influence.
U.S. forces, joined by Iraqi forces, began operations in September 2004 to expel
insurgents. Most notable was “Operation Phantom Fury” on Fallujah (November
2004), involving 6,500 U.S. Marines and 2,000 Iraqi troops. Since then, over two
thirds of the city’s 250,000 have now returned, and some reconstruction has taken
place there. However, insurgents reportedly have re-infiltrated the city and U.S.
casualties continue in or near Fallujah. In the run-up to the December 15 elections,
U.S. (and Iraqi) forces conducted operations (for example Operations Matador,
Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and Ram) to clear
contingents of foreign fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities along the
Euphrates River. A major focus was to combat foreign fighters that entered Iraq
near the towns of Qaim, Husaybah, and Ubaydi, and had filtered down the Euphrates
valley to Ramadi, Hit and Haditha, or north into Tal Affar.
Casualties. As of February 8, 2006, about 2,260 U.S. forces and about 200
coalition partner soldiers have died in OIF, as well as over 100 U.S. civilians
working on contract to U.S. institutions in Iraq. Of U.S. deaths, about 2,120 have
occurred since President Bush declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq
on May 1, 2003, and about 1,780 of the U.S. deaths were by hostile action. About
2,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces, which are analyzed below, have been
killed in action, to date. On December 12, 2005, President Bush cited press accounts
that about 30,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed to date.
CRS-32
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)46
A major pillar of U.S. policy is to equip and train Iraqi security forces (ISF) that
could secure Iraq by themselves. President Bush stated in his June 28, 2005 speech,
“Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand
down.”47 The conference report on the FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L.
109-13) required a Defense Department report to Congress on securing Iraq,
particularly the building of the ISF. The most recent such report, released October
2005, entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” generally reiterates U.S.
official statements of progress in Iraq and contains details of the training of the ISF.
The Department of Defense reports that, as of February 1, 2006, there are
227,300 total members of the ISF: 106,900 “operational” military forces under the
Ministry of Defense and 120,400 police/commando forces “trained and equipped”
under the Ministry of Interior. Those in units are organized into about 125 battalions.
The total force goal is 325,000 ISF by August 2007. However, police figures include
possibly tens of thousands (according to the GAO on March 15, 2005) who are
absent-without-leave or might have deserted. The police generally live with their
families, rather than in barracks, and are therefore hard to account for.
The readiness of the ISF are subject to debate. In October 2005, U.S.
commanders clarified their assessments of readiness of these forces as follows (each
battalion has about 700 personnel):
! Battalions in Category One (fully independent): 1 (military only,
down from 3 reported at this level in June 2005);
! Battalions in Category Two (Iraqi unit capable of taking the lead in
operations): 45 (43 military and 2 police commando battalions);
! Battalions in Category Three: (Iraqi unit capable of fighting
alongside U.S./partner forces): 80 (54 military and 26 police
battalions); and
! Category Four: unit not yet formed.
By these measures, about 35,000 ISF (both military and police) are “in the
lead” or fully independent. U.S. officials and reports praise their performance in each
of the three election days in 2005. U.S. commanders also cite as evidence of their
growing confidence the September 2005 offensive in Tal Afar in which Iraqi units
were in the lead, although some outside accounts call that assessment into question.
According to the State Department, U.S. and partner forces have now turned over 33
of 111 “forward operating bases” to the ISF, and the ISF control 90 square miles of
Baghdad. In August 2005, U.S. commanders turned over full control of the city of
Najaf to the ISF. On January 26, 2006, the entire provinces of Wasit and Diwaniyah
were turned over to ISF control. Parts of southern Mosul and even parts of the
“Green Zone” in Baghdad were turned over subsequently.
46 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy Sharp.
47 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/
2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].
CRS-33
However, U.S. commanders and outside observers say that the ISF continue to
lack an effective command structure, independent initiative, or commitment to the
mission, and that it could fragment if U.S. troops draw down.48 U.S. commanders
have told journalists recently that it is common for half of an entire ISF unit to desert
or refuse to undertake a specified mission.49 U.S. commanders said in October 2005
that the ISF is still 18 months to two years away from being able to operate
independently. A report on the Iraqi police by the offices of the Inspector General
of the State and Defense Departments, released July 15, 2005, said that many recruits
are only marginally literate, and some recruits are actually insurgents trying to
infiltrate the ISF (p.3).50 As an indicator of continued difficulties, in late December
2005, the U.S. military refused to turn over control of central Baghdad to an ISF
brigade (5th Brigade) until the Iraqi government approved the appointment of the
(Sunni) leader of that brigade that U.S. officers considered qualified.
Another major issue is ethnic balance; U.S. commanders have acknowledged
difficulty recruiting Sunni Arabs into the ISF and have said this is a deficiency they
are trying to correct. Most of the ISF are Shiites, with Kurdish units mainly deployed
in the north of Iraq. Almost all Iraqi units are of a single ethnicity, and there are few
integrated units. As discussed above, many Sunnis see the ISF as mostly Shiite and
Kurdish instruments of repression. Partly in an attempt to address that perception,
during 2004, the United States and Iraq conducted some “emergency recruitment” of
former Saddam military units, mostly Sunni ex-Baathists. These units, one of which
— a police commando brigade — is led by Saddam-era air force intelligence officer
Adnan Thabit, have stiffened some security operations but have also provoked threats
by Shiite and Kurdish leaders, who fear a future Ba’th coup. Sunnis have also been
recruited to rebuild police forces in Mosul and Fallujah, which virtually collapsed in
2004.
As a result of the deficiencies of the ISF, in 2005 the U.S. military, based on
recommendations by Gen. Gary Luck, shifted up to 10,000 U.S. forces in Iraq to
embedding with Iraqi units (ten-person teams per Iraqi battalion), a trend that U.S.
officials say will continue in 2006. The embedding concept will be expanded in the
police forces as well in 2006, with 2,000 additional U.S. personnel to be embedded
with police commando units. The police embeds will not only promote discipline
and command abilities but help curb abuses against Sunnis and other human rights
abuses.
ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy. Maj. Gen. David Petraeus first oversaw the training of the ISF as
head of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).51 On
September 8, 2005, he was replaced by Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey. The
48 Fallows, James. “Why Iraq Has No Army.” Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2005.
49 Castaneda, Antonio. “Iraqi Desertions Complicate U.S. Mission.” Associated Press,
January 31, 2006.
50 Inspectors General. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense.
Interagency Assessment of Iraqi Police Training. July 15, 2005.
51 For more information on this mission, see [http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/].
CRS-34
Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this training and equipping
mission; according to the State Department, a total of $5.05 billion in IRRF funds
has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for, and in some cases
provide pay for) the ISF. Of those funds, $4.79 billion has been obligated as of
February 1, and $4.18 billion of that has been disbursed. As noted above, the
FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an additional $5.7 billion
to equip and train the ISF, funds to be controlled by the Department of Defense and
provided to MNSTC-I. When spent, that would bring total ISF funding to $11
billion. The IRRF funds have been allocated thus far as follows:
ISF Components. The following, based on Administration reports from May
2005, are the status of the major Iraqi security institutions.52
Ministry of Defense/Military Forces. The following forces are considered
military forces, under the control of the Ministry of Defense.
! Iraqi Army. The CPA formally disbanded the former Iraqi army
following Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad; the outcome of that move is
still being debated. There are about 105,600 Army personnel,
organized as nine infantry divisions and one mechanized division.
They comprise 80 battalions, or about 55,000 personnel, at the first
three levels of readiness (capable of operating alongside U.S. forces
or better). The remaining 50,000 are not in formed units yet.
Recruits are paid $60 per month and receive eight weeks of training.
Of IRRF funds, $1.097 billion is allocated for Army facilities; $707
million is for equipment; and $656 million for training, personnel,
and operations.
! The Iraqi Intervention Force, another military force, is divided into
four brigades (perhaps about 3,000 personnel, included in “Army”
total ) trained and equipped. Recruits receive thirteen weeks of basic
and urban operations training.
! Special Operations Forces. These forces, included in “Army” total,
consist of “Iraqi Counter Terrorist Forces” (ICTF) and a
“Commando Battalion.” The forces are given 12 weeks of training,
mostly by Jordanian officers in Jordan. The Defense Department
says that there are 1,300 of these forces as of October 2005.
! In the fall of 2005, MNSTC-I formed four “Strategic Infrastructure
Battalions” (about 3,000 personnel) to protect oil pipelines,
electricity infrastructure, and other facilities.
! Air Force. Personnel has largely reached its goal of 500, manning
four squadrons. Because the Saddam-era air force was destroyed in
52 Most of the information in this section comes from State Department weekly summaries
on Iraq. Numbers of some ISF categories are openly reported, but some specific categories
are classified and can only be estimated from open sources.
CRS-35
the various wars with the United States, the new Air Force only flies
nine helicopters, three C-130s, and 14 propeller observation aircraft.
The UAE has said it would supply the Iraqi Air Force with some
additional unspecified combat aircraft, and Jordan is considering
providing 12 UH-1 helicopters. About $28 million in IRRF funds
was allocated for Iraqi Air Force airfields (of those funds for the
Iraqi Army, above). Pilots undergo up to six months of training.
! Navy. This service has 800 operational personnel, roughly its target
size. It has a “Patrol Boat Squadron” and a “Coastal Defense
Regiment.” It is equipped with five patrol boats, with six more to be
delivered, 24 Fast Aluminum Boats to patrol Iraq’s waterways (out
to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf) to
prevent smuggling and infiltration. In March 2005, it took control
of its own naval base at Umm Qasr and, as of July 2005, U.S. Navy
personnel have turned over responsibility for Iraq’s Basrah port and
Khor Al Amaya oil terminals. The Royal Australian Navy is
training some of the Iraqi navy personnel.
! Military Training.53 U.S. training takes place at Taji, north of
Baghdad; Kirkush, near the Iranian border; and Numaniya, southeast
of Baghdad. All 26 NATO countries are participating in the NATO
Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I),54 which open a new headquarters in
September 2005 at Rustamiya, near Baghdad. As of September
2005, 151 NATO trainers are in Iraq, according to NATO officials
in Baghdad, with the goal of 300 trainers eventually. About 1,000
Iraqi officers are to be trained there each year. Additional Iraqi
officers are being trained (under NTM-I) at NATO facilities in
Norway, Germany, and Italy. Other countries performing training
under bilateral agreements are Jordan (1,500 Iraqi officers trained
at Zarqa Military College), Egypt (146 officers), and Poland. A
number of other countries, such as Spain, Turkey, France (police),
Malaysia, and Morocco, have offered military training, but the offers
were not responded to by Iraq.
! Equipment. Iraqi military forces are poorly equipped because much
of Iraq’s arsenal was destroyed in OIF. The new military is being
supplied with U.S. and other donated equipment and some repaired
Iraqi equipment. NATO countries from the former East bloc are
donating tanks and other mostly Russian-made equipment
compatible with the Soviet-era equipment used by the former
53 For information on foreign contributions to the training of the ISF, see CRS Report
RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and
Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.
54 France, Belgium, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, and Germany had previously declined to
send troops to Iraq to participate in the NTM-I, although some of these countries were
providing bilateral training outside Iraq.
CRS-36
regime. In November 2005, 77 T-72 tanks donated by Poland
arrived in Iraq, giving the new army its first modern battle tanks.
! On November 21, 2003, the Bush Administration issued a
determination repealing a U.S. ban on arms exports to Iraq so that
the United States can supply weapons to the ISF; authority to repeal
this ban was granted in an FY2003 emergency supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 108-11), subject to a determination that sales to
Iraq are “in the national interest.” On July 21, 2004, the
Administration determined that Iraq would be treated as a friendly
nation in evaluating U.S. arms sales to Iraqi security forces and that
such sales would be made in accordance with the Foreign Assistance
Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
Ministry of Interior/Police Forces. The following are police forces under
the Ministry of Interior, which is advised by the Civilian Police Assistance Training
Team (CPATT). However, many of these police forces are being trained to perform
counter-insurgency missions rather than traditional policing.
! Iraqi Police Service (IPS). There are 82,400 IPS personnel, divided
primarily into provincial police departments, trained and equipped
thus far. This number includes the 1,300 person Highway Patrol.
The goal of the police force is 135,000 by February 2007. New
police receive eight weeks of training, are paid $60 per month, and
must pass a background check ensuring they do not have a record of
human rights violations or criminal activity. They are recruited
locally, making them susceptible to intimidation by insurgents in
restive areas. Of IRRF funds, $1.806 billion has been allocated for
police training and technical assistance.
! Other Police Forces. There are a number of other “police” forces,
focused on counter-insurgency missions and organized into
battalions. They are (1) the Bureau of Dignitary Protection,
designed to protect Iraqi leaders, with about 500 personnel; (2) the
Special Police Commandos, counter-insurgency units with about
10,000 personnel. It receives four weeks of training; (3) the
Emergency Response Unit (ERU), a 300-person hostage rescue
force; the Mechanized Police, which has about 1,200 personnel; and
Public Order Police, with a total of about 7,000 personnel.
! Border Enforcement. This force is also included in the MOI forces.
Intended to prevent cross-border infiltration, it has about 17,000
personnel. It now controls 258 border forts (built or under
construction) all along Iraq’s frontiers to keep out insurgent fighters.
It also has a Riverine Police component to secure water crossings
(Shatt al-Arab, dividing Iran and Iraq). Members of these forces
receive four weeks of training. Of IRRF funds, $437 million is
allocated for this force. Another $3 million is allocated to prevent
proliferation of Iraqi WMD expertise by paying regular stipends to
CRS-37
150 key Iraqi weapons development personnel that worked for the
Saddam regime.
! Police Training and Funding. Police training is taking place mostly
in Jordan (Jordan International Police Training Center, JIPTC); Iraq
(Baghdad Police College and seven regional academies; and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE). The countries contributing police
instructors in these locations include United States, Canada, Britain,
Australia, Sweden, Poland, UAE, Denmark, Austria, Finland, the
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore,
and Belgium. Also, Egypt trained 258 officers in Egypt in August
2004. Several countries, such as France and Belgium, as well as
most of the countries discussed above under “military training,”
have offered to train Iraqi police forces.55
! Facilities Protection Service. This is a force that consists of the
approximately 75,000 security guards that protect installations such
as oil pumping stations, electricity substations, and government
buildings. This force is not counted in U.S. totals for Iraq’s forces
because it is not controlled by either the Ministry of Interior or
Ministry of Defense. Of IRRF funds, $53 million has been allocated
for this service.
Coalition-Building and Maintenance56
Some believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient efforts to
enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that the U.S.
mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military personnel
contributions. As of February 1, 2006, 26 coalition partner forces are contributing
21,000 forces, but that total is expected to fall later in 2006. Poland and Britain lead
multinational divisions in central and southern Iraq, respectively. The UK-led force
(UK forces alone number about 8,000) is based in Basra; the Poland-led force (Polish
forces number 1,700) is based in Hilla. British leaders are openly discussing a
drawdown later in 2006, although no timetable or determination has been made. In
March 2005, Poland drew down to 1,700 from its prior force level of 2,400, and it
is now reducing that further to 900. That smaller force had been slated to leave by
the end of 2006, although a newly elected government says it might extend the
mission into 2007.
The coalition in Iraq has been shrinking since Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of
its 1,300 troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004 Madrid
bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had
supported the war effort. However, Spain has said it might train Iraqi security forces
55 France has offered to train Iraqi police forces in Qatar.
56 For additional information on international contributions to Iraq peacekeeping and
reconstruction, see CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher
Blanchard.
CRS-38
at a center outside Madrid. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
followed Spain’s withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in
July 2004 after one of its citizens was taken hostage and threatened with beheading.
On the other hand, many nations are replacing their contingents with trainers for the
ISF or financial contributions or other assistance to Iraq. Among recent changes are
the following.
! Hungary completed a pullout of its 300 forces in December 2004.
! Italy announced on March 15, 2005, that it would begin withdrawing
its force of 3,200 in September 2005; its contingent is now at about
2,600, based in the southern city of Nasiriyah. Italian officials say
that force will be halved by June 2006.
! Thailand, New Zealand, and Norway withdrew in early 2005, and
Norway’s 20 personnel were withdrawn in October 2005.
! In March 2005, the Netherlands withdrew its 1,350 troops, although
some remain. Some U.K. and Austrailian forces have taken over the
Netherlands force’s duty to help protect Japan’s forces in Samawa.
! Ukraine, which lost eight of its soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent
attack, withdrew 150 personnel from their base 25 miles south of
Baghdad in March 2005. Ukraine says it will complete its
withdrawal in early 2006, but it adds that it might give equipment to
the Iraqi military.
! In February 2004, Portugal withdrew its 127 paramilitary officers.
! Bulgaria completed the pullout of its 360-member unit after the
December 15 Iraqi elections. However, in January 2006 it said it
would send a120-person force to take over guard duties of Camp
Ashraf, a base in eastern Iraq where Iranian oppositionists are
located.
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and its cabinet voted on November 21 to withdraw one-third of its
remaining 3,300 forces in late 2005, but to keep the remainder in
until the end of 2006.
! Japan’s parliament voted in mid-December 2005 to extend the
deployment of its 600-person military reconstruction contingent in
Samawah until as late as the end of 2006. However, the government
reportedly is considering ending it sooner, perhaps in May.
! Some countries have increased forces to compensate for
withdrawals. Singapore deployed 180 troops in November 2004
after a hiatus of several months. Azerbaijan also has increase forces.
CRS-39
! In February 2005, El Salvador agreed to send a replacement
contingent of 380 soldiers to replace those who are rotating out.
! In February 2005, Australia added 450 troops, bringing its
contribution to over 900.
! In March 2005, Georgia sent an additional 550 troops to Iraq to help
guard the United Nations facilities, bringing its total Iraq deployment
to 850. In March 2005, Albania increased its force by 50, giving it
about 120 troops in Iraq.
NATO/EU/Other Offers of Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO
countries have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to
contribute funds or equipment. Several NATO countries and others are offering to
train not only Iraqi security but also civilian personnel. In addition to the security
training offers discussed above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help
train Iraqi police, administrators, and judges outside Iraq. At the June 22, 2005
Brussels conference discussed above, the EU pledged a $130 million package to help
Iraq write its permanent constitution and reform government ministries; Norway
offered energy sector cooperation, and Turkey offered to conduct seminars on
democracy for Iraqis. Japan has made a similar offer on constitutional drafting, and
Malaysia has offered to train Iraqi civil servants. The FY2005 supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $99 million to set up a regional counter-
terrorism center in Jordan to train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
In July 2004, Secretary of State Powell said the United States would consider
a Saudi proposal for a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to perform
peacekeeping in Iraq, reportedly under separate command. However, the idea
floundered because of opposition from potential contributing countries.
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy”
Some Members say that major new initiatives need to be considered to ensure
success of the U.S. mission in Iraq, and debates have emerged over several
congressional resolutions proposing an “exit strategy.” At the same time, the
Administration is planning to reduce the U.S troop commitment to Iraq somewhat in
2006. The Administration has also adjusted U.S. goals in Iraq, now asserting that the
United States is needed only until Iraqi forces can combat the insurgency themselves,
rather than until the insurgency is ended. Some of the ideas widely circulated among
Members and other policy experts are discussed below.
Troop Increase. Some have said that the United States should increase its
troops in Iraq in an effort to prevent insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by
U.S. operations. Some experts believe the extra troops needed for such an effort
might number about 100,000.57 The Administration asserts that U.S. commanders
feel that planned force levels are sufficient to complete the mission, and that U.S.
57 Bersia, John. “The Courage Needed to Win the War,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 9,
2005.
CRS-40
commanders are able to request additional forces, if needed, but have not done so.
Some experts believe that troop level increases would aggravate Sunni Arabs already
resentful of the U.S. intervention in Iraq and that even many more U.S. troops would
not necessarily produce stability and would appear to deepen the U.S. commitment
without a clear exit strategy. Others believe that increasing U.S. force levels would
further the impression that the Iraqi government depends on the United States for its
survival.
Immediate Withdrawal. Some Members argue that the United States should
begin to withdraw virtually immediately. Supporters of this position tend to argue
that the decision to invade Iraq and change its regime was a mistake in light of the
failure thus far to locate WMD, that a continued large U.S. presence in Iraq is
inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S.
casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Those who take this position
include the approximately 50 Members of the”Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus,”
formed in June 2005. In November 2005, Representative John Murtha, a ranking
member and former chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, publicly
articulated a similar position, calling for an “immediate” pullout (over six months).
His resolution (H.J.Res. 73) called for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable
date” and the maintenance of an “over the horizon” U.S. presence to help the ISF.
A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written by Representative Duncan Hunter,
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), expressed the sense “that the
deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be terminated immediately;” it failed 403-3 on
November 18, 2005. Other bills, such as H.R. 3142 and H.Con.Res. 197, state that
it [should be] U.S. policy not to maintain a permanent or long-term presence in Iraq.
Withdrawal Timetable. Another alternative is the setting of a timetable for
a U.S. withdrawal. This has been exemplified by H.J.Res. 55, introduced by five
House Members from both parties, which calls on the Administration to begin a
withdrawal by October 2006. In November 2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view
that the United States needs to force internal compromise in Iraq by threatening to
withdraw, introduced an amendment to S. 1042 (defense authorization bill) to
compel the Administration to work on a timetable for withdrawal (during 2006).
Reportedly, on November 10, 2005, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee John Warner reworked the Levin proposal into an amendment that
stopped short of setting a timetable for withdrawal but requires an Administration
report on a “schedule for meeting conditions” that could permit a U.S. withdrawal.
That measure, which also states in its preamble that “2006 should be a period of
significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty,” achieved bi-partisan support, passing
79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications by House conferees, in the
conference report on the bill (H.R. 1815, H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-163). Senator
Russ Feingold expressed a view similar to that of Senator Levin in August 2005
when Senator Feingold called for a withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2006.
His resolution (S.Res. 171) calls for the Administration to report to Congress on the
time frame needed for the United States to complete its mission.
Troop Drawdown. Responding to the November 2005 congressional action,
President Bush and U.S. commanders remained adamant in their stated opposition
to the setting of any timetable for troop pullouts, let alone an immediate pullout.
They maintained that the Iraqi government would collapse upon an immediate
CRS-41
pullout, representing a victory for such terrorist figures as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
However, as noted above, the President has announced a small drawdown in early
2006 (to about 135,000), and senior U.S. military officials said in late 2005 that there
are plans for a substantial drawdown (40,000 - 50,000 of the total contingent) later
in 2006 if there is continued political progress and the insurgency does not escalate.
On the other hand, it might be difficult to withdraw that large a proportion of the
U.S. force without producing major insurgent advances.
Some Members appear to favor the idea of a troop drawdown. In December
2005, Senator John Kerry said the United States should reduce its forces by “at least”
100,000 by the end of 2006. Senator Joseph Biden, ranking Democrat on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, has said publicly that a drawdown is likely in early
2006. Senator Hillary Clinton wrote to constituents in late November 2005 that the
United States might begin withdrawing troops after the December 15 elections, if
those elections are successful.58
Power-Sharing Formulas. Both the Administration and its critics have
identified the need to bring more Sunni Arabs into the political process to undercut
support for the insurgency. As noted above, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad has been
reaching out to Sunni groups, even some known to have ties to insurgents, and has
persuaded some Sunnis to participate openly in the political process. Some believe
that a key to progress in this effort will be U.S. ability to persuade the Shiites and
Kurds to agree to major amendments to the constitution during the four month
amendment process that begins after the December 15 election. Another unknown
is what package of incentives would persuade most Sunnis to end support for the
insurgency and fully support the government. Many experts believe that the Sunnis
will only settle for a share of power that is perhaps slightly less than that wielded by
the majority Shiites, even though the Shiites greatly outnumber Sunni Arabs in Iraq.
Negotiating With the Insurgents. In addition to exploring power sharing
arrangements with moderate Sunni leaders, the Administration appears to have
adopted a recommendation by early critics of U.S. policy to negotiate with some
Sunni figures representing the insurgency and with insurgent commanders. These
include members of the MSA. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has confirmed to
journalists (June 2005) that such discussions had been taking place and some of these
talks reportedly are intended to help U.S. forces defeat Zarqawi’s foreign insurgent
faction. However, these talks do not appear to have resulted in major insurgent
factions laying down their arms. The insurgent leaders who have attended such talks
reportedly want not only an increased role for Sunnis in government but also a
withdrawal of mostly Sunni or Kurdish ISF forces from Sunni-inhabited areas and
a U.S. withdrawal. Some U.S. officials appear to believe that talking directly with
insurgents would increase insurgent leverage and embolden them to continue violent
attacks.
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction. Some believe that the key to
calming Iraq is to accelerate economic reconstruction. According to this view,
58 Healy, Patrick. Senator Clinton Calls for Withdrawal From Iraq to Begin in 2006. New
York Times, November 30, 2005.
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accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment,
improving public services, and creating confidence in the government. This idea
appears to have been incorporated into the President’s “National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq” document and the formation of the PRTs, as discussed above. Others doubt
that economic improvement alone will produce major political results. According
to this view, the divisions among Iraq’s major factions are fundamental and resistant
to amelioration by an improved economy. In addition, the U.S. refraining from
requesting major additional reconstruction funds might indicate that the
Administration has not found this idea persuasive.
Focus on Local Security. Another idea advanced by experts, and which
appears to form the core of the Administration’s “clear, hold, and build” approach
in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, is for the United States to shift its focus
from broad counter-insurgency combat operations to local efforts to improve the
sense of security of average Iraqis, which would deny the insurgents popular
support.59 At least one version of this idea, advanced by Andrew Krepinevich in the
September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,60 says that the United States
should devote substantial resources to providing security and reconstruction in
selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that would attract support and be
expanded to other areas and eventually throughout Iraq.
59 Pollack, Kenneth. “Five Ways to Win Back Iraq,” New York Times op-ed. July 1, 2005.
60 Krepinevich, Andrew. “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2005.
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Table 2. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
War
opposition
INC
crimes
Broadcasting
activities
Total
FY1998
—
2.0
5.0 (RFE/RL
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
for “Radio
Free Iraq)
FY1999
3.0
3.0
—
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000
—
2.0
—
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in Iraq)
(INC radio)
FY2002
—
—
—
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1
—
—
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-
(about 14.5
FY2003
million of
this went to
INC
FY2004
—
—
—
0
0
(request)
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war
crimes” funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation, Apr. 2004.
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Figure 1. Map of Iraq