Order Code RL30566
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations:
Cooperation, Friction, and Prospects for a Free
Trade Agreement (FTA)
Updated February 9, 2006
Mark E. Manyin
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation,
Friction, and Prospects for a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA)
Summary
South Korea is a major economic partner for the United States. In 2004, trade
between the two countries was over $70 billion, making South Korea the United
States’s seventh-largest trading partner — ahead of France and Italy — and its
seventh-largest export market. In 2005, the U.S. was Korea’s third-largest trading
partner, second-largest export market, and its largest supplier of foreign direct
investment (FDI).
Bilateral economic relations have advanced to the point that the two sides in
February 2006 announced their intention to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement
(FTA), which they hope to complete by 2007. The announcement followed South
Korean concessions in four areas: beef, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and “screen
quotas” limiting the amount of screen time that foreign films could be shown. The
United States had said an FTA could not be launched unless Seoul demonstrated its
ability to deliver compromises in these sectors. If an agreement is reached, it would
be the United States’s largest FTA since the completion of the North American Free
Trade Agreement. To go into effect, FTAs must be approved by Congress and the
Korean National Assembly. The FTA negotiation and ratification processes are
likely to politicize bilateral trade disputes and produce spillovers between the
economic and strategic aspects of the relationship, particularly if there are dramatic
developments in the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Increased U.S.-South Korean economic interaction has been accompanied by
numerous disagreements over trade and economic policies. The intensity of the
disputes has diminished considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part
because South Korea has enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a quid
pro quo for receiving a $58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) following the near collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. In recent
years, the United States and South Korea appear to have become more adept at
managing their trade disputes, so that they tend to be less acrimonious than they were
in the 1980s and 1990s. This is due in part to the quarterly, working-level bilateral
trade meetings that have been held since early 2001. Strategic factors, including
South Korea’s increased economic integration with North Korea, have become issues
on the bilateral U.S.-South Korea economic front. In the FTA talks, South Korean
officials have said they will try to secure preferential tariff treatment for goods made
by South Korean firms in the Kaesong industrial zone, located inside North Korea.
In 2003, China surpassed the United States as South Korea’s largest trading partner.
Many South Korean exports to China are believed to be intermediate goods that are
incorporated into products sent to the United States.
This report summarizes the main issues in U.S.-South Korean economic
relations, including South Korea’s economic prospects and economic reforms, major
bilateral economic disputes, and the pros and cons of a U.S.-South Korean FTA. The
report will be updated periodically.

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Contents
Overviews of U.S.-South Korean Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
South Korea’s Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The 1997 Financial Crisis and IMF-Directed Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Economic Events from 1999-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Economic Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Financial Sector and Chaebol Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Foreign Direct Investment Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
South Korea’s Increased Economic Integration with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Improved Inter-Korean Economic Relations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Kaesong Industrial Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Major U.S. Trade Disputes with South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Major Agriculture Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
South Korea’s Beef Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Automotive Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Pharmaceuticals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
South Korea’s “Screen Quotas” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
South Korea’s Alleged Currency Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property Rights Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Assistance to Hynix Semiconductor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
South Korea’s Performance in the Doha Development Agenda . . . . . 23
Korea’s Complaints Against U.S. Anti-Dumping and CVD
Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
U.S. Visa Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Arguments For and Against an FTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Figures
Figure 1. ROK Real GDP Growth, 1995-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 2. Foreign Direct Investment into the ROK, 1993-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 3. ROK Trade with China, U.S., and Japan, 2001-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 4. ROK Trade Balances with Major Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 5. North-South Korea Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Figure 6. Won-Dollar Exchange Rate, 1997-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Figure 7. Steel Imports from Korea, 1997-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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List of Tables
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 2. Asymmetrical Economic Interdependence (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 3. U.S.-ROK Automotive Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations:
Cooperation, Friction, and Prospects for a
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
The United States and South Korea (known formally as the Republic of Korea,
or ROK) have been allies since the United States intervened on the Korean Peninsula
in 1950 and fought to repel a North Korean takeover of South Korea. Over 33,000
U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 were wounded during the three-year
conflict. In 1954, a year after the parties to the conflict signed an armistice
agreement, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty,
which provides that if either party is attacked by a third country, the other party will
act to meet the common danger. The United States maintains about 34,000 troops
in the ROK to supplement the 650,000-strong South Korean armed forces.1 In recent
years, strategic differences between Washington and Seoul — particularly over the
optimal policies toward North Korea — have caused some in the United States to
question the benefits of the alliance.
Beginning in the 1960s, rapid economic growth in South Korea propelled it into
the ranks of the world’s largest industrialized countries. For over a decade, South
Korea has been one of the United States’s largest trading partners. Economic growth
also has helped transform the ROK into a mid-level regional power that can influence
U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, particularly the United States’s approach toward North
Korea.
Overviews of U.S.-South Korean Economic
Relations
In 2004, trade between the South Korea and the United States was over $70
billion, making South Korea the United States’s seventh-largest trading partner —
ahead of France and Italy — and its seventh-largest export market. Trades from the
first 11 months of 2005 were roughly on track to duplicate the 2004 results. (See
Table 1 and Table 2) For some western states and U.S. sectors, the South Korean
market is even more important, ranking number five for California’s exporters (in
2004), number two for Oregon’s exporters, and number four for all U.S. agricultural
exporters. Major U.S. exports to South Korea include semiconductors, machinery
(particularly semiconductor production machinery), aircraft, and agricultural
products. South Korea is among United States’s largest markets for agricultural
products and beef.
1 In October 2004, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to a phased withdrawal of 12,500 U.S.
troops in South Korea, reducing U.S. in-country troop strength from 37,000 to about 24,000
by September 2008.

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CRS-2
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
U.S.
U.S.
Trade
Total
Year
Exports
Imports
Balance
Trade
1990
14.40
18.49
-4.09
32.89
1995
25.38
24.18
1.20
49.56
2000
26.30
39.83
-13.53
66.13
2003
22.52
36.93
-14.41
59.45
2004
24.99
45.06
-20.07
70.05
Jan-Nov 2004
22.70
41.36
-18.66
64.06
Jan-Nov 2005
23.74
39.57
-15.83
63.31
Major U.S.
Semiconductor chips and manufacturing equipment;
Export Items
aircraft; corn and wheat; plastics
Major U.S.
Cellular phones; semiconductor circuits; televisions
Import Items
and flat panel screens; cars; computer parts;
construction vehicles
Sources: 1990 & 1995 data from Global Trade Information Services. 2000-
2005 data from U.S. International Trade Commission.
South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United States than the
United States is on South Korea. In 2005, the United States was Korea’s third-largest
trading partner, second-largest export market, third-largest source of imports, and its
largest supplier of foreign direct investment. In 2003, China for the first time
displaced the United States from its perennial place as South Korea’s number one
trading partner. Preliminary data from the Bank of Korea for 2005 indicates that
Japan overtook the United States to become South Korea’s second-largest trade
partner.
Table 2. Asymmetrical Economic Interdependence (2005)
Total
Export
Source of
Source
Trade
Market
Imports
of FDI
for U.S.,
#7
#7
#7
n.a.
ROK ranks
for ROK,
#3
#2
#3
#1
U.S. ranks
In 2003, China surpassed the U.S. as the ROK’s largest trading
partner. In 2005, Japan surpassed the U.S. to become the ROK’s
second-largest trading partner.
Increased economic interaction has been accompanied by numerous
disagreements over trade policies. The intensity of the disputes has diminished
considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part because South Korea has
enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a quid pro quo for receiving a
$58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the near
collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. In particular, as a result of the

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CRS-3
reforms, South Korea has opened its doors to foreign investors, ushering in billions
of dollars of foreign portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI). The result is that
foreign companies, including U.S. firms, now are significant shareholders in many
prominent industrial conglomerates (chaebol), own an estimated 40% of the value
of the shares traded on South Korea’s stock exchange, and own about one-third of
the Korean banking industry. After his election to one five-year term in 2002, South
Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said that more extensive reforms were needed to
help accomplish his goals of raising per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to
$20,000 and of transforming South Korea into a major economic hub in Northeast
Asia. Increasingly, South Koreans also are concerned about rising economic
competition from Chinese manufacturers.
The United States and South Korea appear to have become more adept at
managing their trade disputes, so that they tend to be less acrimonious than they were
in the 1980s and 1990s. This may be partly due to the quarterly, working-level “trade
action agenda” trade meetings that were initiated in early 2001. Both sides credit the
meetings, which appear to be unique to the U.S.-South Korean trade relationship,
with creating a more constructive dialogue by serving as “action-forcing” events.
U.S.-ROK economic relations have advanced to the point that the two sides on
February 2, 2006, announced their intent to launch negotiations to form a bilateral
free trade agreement (FTA). The announcement followed South Korean concessions
in four areas: beef, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and “screen quotas” limiting the
amount of screen time that foreign films could be shown. United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Robert Portman had said an FTA could not be launched
unless Seoul demonstrated its ability to deliver compromises in these sectors. If an
agreement is reached, it would be the United States’s largest FTA since the
completion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992. To go
into effect, FTAs must be approved by Congress. (For more on the U.S.-South Korea
FTA negotiations, see “U.S.-South Korea FTA Negotiations” below) At the February
2006 launch, the two sides expressed their interest in concluding negotiations by the
beginning of 2007.
South Korea’s Economy
The 1997 Financial Crisis and IMF-Directed Reforms
South Korea’s 1997 financial crisis was a seminal event in the country’s history.
During the autumn of 1997 — spurred in part by the bankruptcy of six of the
country’s top thirty industrial conglomerates (chaebol) and a sharp increase in
repayments required on short-term foreign debt — investors lost confidence in the
economy and capital fled the country. The Korean won lost half its value in the space
of a few days, tumbling from 900 to 1900 won to the dollar. In a futile attempt to
prop up the currency, the government’s foreign currency reserves dropped to $4
billion, an amount insufficient to carry the country through another day. In
December 1997, barely a year after joining the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Seoul turned to the IMF for economic
assistance. At virtually the same time, South Koreans elected longtime democracy

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CRS-4
activist Kim Dae Jung to the presidency, the first time since the early 1960s that an
opposition leader had won the country’s highest office.
After negotiating for weeks over the details, on December 4, 1997, South Korea
and the IMF agreed to a $58 billion support package. In return, Seoul agreed to
tighten its fiscal and monetary policies and engage in far-reaching, market-oriented
reforms of its financial and corporate sectors and of its labor market policies. South
Korea also agreed to open its economy further to foreign goods and investors. The
newly-elected Kim government adopted most of the structural reforms as its own.
Figure 1. ROK Real GDP Growth, 1995-
2005
Percent
15
10.9
10
8.9
9.3
6.8
6.3
5
4.6
5
4
3.1
3.1
0
-5
-6.7
-10
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005 est
Source: Bank of Korea.
Following the financial crisis, South Korea entered into a severe recession. In
1998, gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 6.7% and unemployment nearly
quadrupled, rising to 7.6% in 1998. The slowdown generated substantial anti-IMF
and anti-American sentiment among many South Koreans.
Economic Events from 1999-2005
The economy rebounded in 1999 and 2000, growing by over 10% and 9%,
respectively, and enabling the South Korean government to rapidly retire many of the
debts it incurred in 1997.2 In 2001, however, growth slowed considerably, dragged
down by a combination of internal and external developments, including a decline
in consumer and business confidence, the bursting of Korea’s stock market bubble,
rising oil prices, and a sharp falloff in exports to the United States and Japan, which
entered economic downturns of their own. The government responded by lowering
interest rates, unveiling an economic stimulus package, and easing the rules on the
use of credit cards. These measures boosted consumer spending, which helped to
2 In August 2001, Seoul paid off the last of the $19.5 billion it had borrowed from the IMF.

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CRS-5
double the growth rate from 3.1% in 2001 to 6.3% in 2002. Growth also was boosted
by rapid economic integration with China. Domestic investment, however, remained
low.
In 2003, overuse of personal credit cards led to the near-collapse of many
financial firms and a sharp slowdown in economic growth, which fell back to 3.1%.
Until the late 1990s, the consumer sector of the economy had been largely untapped,
with Korean lenders focusing on the corporate sector. Thus, when the government
liberalized financial regulations and forced Korea’s giant conglomerates to curtail
their borrowing in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, banks and other financial
institutions turned to consumers — at times recklessly — as a new source of profit.
The number of credit card holders behind in their payments increased sharply, with
an estimated 8% of the population in default in March 2004.3 In 2003 and 2004, all
eight of Korea’s specialized credit-card issuers registered massive losses that
collectively were more than double their assets. In most cases, insolvency was
avoided only through bailouts and takeovers by affiliated members of the companies’
respective chaebol groupings. Most of these moves appear to have been engineered,
regulatorally enabled, and/or encouraged by the government, which feared a collapse
of the financial system if the firms were allowed to fail. The government responded
to the household debt crisis by tightening restrictions on credit card use and issuance,
and by initiating a refinancing and forgiveness program for individual debtors.
For 2004, South Korea’s economy grew by 4.6%, below the 6% growth rate the
government had expected.4 Much of the growth was driven by a surge in exports —
particularly to China — which rose by over 30% from 2003. A sharp rise in oil
prices (South Korea imports all of its oil) and lackluster domestic demand
contributed to the slower-than-expected growth rate.
In early 2005, the government lowered its growth forecast from 5% to less than
4%, due in part to a slowdown in export growth. The government responded by
unveiling a $6.5 billion fiscal stimulus policy. Beginning in the late spring, South
Korean domestic production and demand began to increase, perhaps indicating a
resolution of the credit card problem; despite rising energy prices (South Korea
imports all of its oil), private spending rose by 3.2% in 2005, compared to a 0.5%
contraction the year before. Toward the end of the year, the South Korean stock
market and the won sharply appreciated in value, the latter against both the U.S.
dollar and the Japanese yen. Despite this trend, South Korean exports continued to
rise, albeit at a slower rate; exports rose by just over 12% in 2005, compared with a
31% growth rate in 2004. South Korea’s merchandise trade surplus in 2005 was
about $23 billion.5 For 2006, the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Bank of
Korea forecast that South Korean growth will increase to the 5% range.
3 Hye-Seung Seo, “South Korea Unveils Program To Help Ease Consumer Debt,” The Asian
Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2004.
4 Gordon Fairclough, “South Korea Forecasts Growth Of Near 6% on Export Strength,” The
Asian Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2004.
5 Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Korea Development Institute, Republic of Korea
Economic Bulletin, Volume 28, No. 1, January 2006.

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CRS-6
Economic Reforms
Financial Sector and Chaebol Reforms. Assessing Korea’s economic
reforms to date depends on one’s perspective. If the point of comparison is the
Korean economy in 1997, then the government’s progress has been impressive.
South Korea’s economy today is far more transparent, open to foreign investors, and
efficient than it was seven years ago. Progress has been particularly notable in
opening the country to foreign direct investment (see below) and in reforming the
financial sector. In the years following the crisis, the government spent about $140
billion to bail out ailing banks and mutual funds.6 This amount is approximately
25%-30% of the country’s GDP, nearly twice the level required to save Mexico’s
financial system during its crisis in 1995. Notably, predictions that the government
would have to spend substantially more funds have not come to pass, and Korea’s
banking sector as a whole has returned to profitability. By the end of 2001, non-
performing loans (loans which are unlikely to be repaid) had fallen to 2.4% of total
loans, compared with 16.4% in 1998. (In 2001, the percentage of non-performing
loans for large banks in the United States was 1.5%.)
The Roh government has accelerated South Korea’s efforts to re-privatize the
banks that were nationalized in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis. By 2000, the
nationalization program had brought about one-third of the banking industry’s assets
into government hands, and state ownership of the banking sector formed the crux
of a major trade dispute with the United States and European Union, in which state-
owned and state-controlled banks were accused of illegally subsidizing Hynix
Semiconductor Inc., the world’s third-largest producer of dynamic random access
memory (DRAM) semiconductor chips. By the spring of 2004, however, sales of
many of formerly state-owned banks had given foreign companies collectively a
major stake in South Korea’s financial sector, notwithstanding occasional statements
by Korean politicians expressing misgivings about excessive non-Korean ownership.
By 2005, foreigners owned about one-third of the assets in the Korean banking
sector, including majority stakes in four of Korea’s eight nation-wide banks.7 In
March 2004, Korea’s Financial Supervisory Commission approved a $1.7 billion bid
from Citigroup for a controlling stake in KorAm, Korea’s seventh-largest bank.
If the yardstick used to assess South Korea’s reforms is the U.S. economy,
however, it becomes clear that Seoul has far to go if it is to make the economy truly
responsive to market-oriented pressures and incentives. Progress has been
particularly difficult in the government’s attempts to pressure the chaebol to correct
the problems revealed by the 1997 crisis, including excessively high debt levels, a
heavy reliance on short-term debt, the lack of transparency, weak corporate
governance, and corporate structures dominated by individual families rather than
professional business managers. Although two of the largest chaebol — Daewoo and
Hyundai — have been dismantled and debt-equity ratios for most of the top
conglomerates have been reduced, corporate governance and cross-shareholdings
6 Francesco Guerrera, et. al., “Seoul Plans to Sell Most of Stake in Hana Bank,” Financial
Times, January 28, 2004.
7 Foreigners also are significant shareholders in many prominent chaebol and own an
estimated 40% of the value of the shares traded on South Korea’s stock exchange.

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CRS-7
within chaebol groupings remain major problems. The bailouts of struggling credit
card affiliates in 2003 and 2004 seemed to many to indicate that the chaebol had not
reformed their past practices of forcing their profitable enterprises to rescue failing
ones. Also in 2003, a massive accounting scandal at SK Global, the trading unit of
the country’s fourth-largest chaebol, SK Group, revealed similar structural
problems.8
Additionally, the reckless credit card lending activities of Korean credit card
firms in 2003 and 2004 exposed the continued weaknesses in risk management and
due diligence by Korean financial interests. One of the government’s responses has
been to accelerate plans to further restructure the financial industry by passing new
laws allowing the consolidation of banking, insurance, asset management, and
brokerage services. Some critics, however, worry that this cross-sectoral
consolidation will accentuate the problem of cross-shareholding within chaebol
groupings. Also, bailouts of the two largest credit card companies, LG Card and
Samsung Card, in 2003, have raised fears that the “too big to fail” dynamic continues
to persist in South Korea.
Foreign Direct Investment Reforms. As part of its commitment to the
IMF in December 1997, Seoul pledged to eliminate most restrictions on foreign
firms’ long-term investments in local subsidiaries and controlling interests in local
companies. The government of President Kim Dae Jung, who was elected during the
nadir of Korea’s financial crisis, moved aggressively to liberalize Korea’s foreign
investment regime. Partly as a response to Kim’s reforms, and partly in response to
the lower prices of Korean assets following the 1997 crisis, FDI flows increased
markedly, soaring from $3.2 billion in 1996 to a peak of $15.7 billion in 2000. FDI
fell off significantly from 2001-2003, before rising to $12.8 billion in 2004, the same
year President Roh Moo-hyun’s government began a policy of boosting FDI as a
source of domestic growth.9 Since the 1997 crisis, FDI commitments by U.S.
companies have totaled nearly $20 billion. (See Figure 2.) A number of high-profile
Korean companies have been taken over by foreign interests, notably General
Motors’ purchase of Daewoo Motors in 2002.10 Citigroup’s $2.4 billion purchase of
KorAm Bank in March 2004 was the largest foreign direct investment in Korean
history and Citigroup’s largest investment outside North America.
8 SK Global (now SK Networks)was found to have window-dressed its financial statements
by over 7 trillion won (around $5.8 billion), for which several senior level executives,
including SK Corp’s chairman were convicted of breaching fiduciary responsibilities. The
chairman served a three-month prison term. Following SK Global’s restatement of its
earnings, SK Corp led a rescue of its subsidiary despite the objections of most of SK Corp’s
foreign shareholders, led by Dubai-based Sovereign Asset Management. SK managers
ultimately defeated Sovereign’s efforts, and in July 2005, Sovereign sold its 15% stake in
SK Corp.
9 In a March 4, 2004 speech to the American Chamber of Commerce of Korea, Minister of
Finance and Economy Lee Hun-jai announced the new policy, saying, “foreign direct
investment is important not just for short-term recovery of the Korean economy, but also for
supporting longer-term growth potential.” Andrew Ward, “Korea Moves to Win Back
Foreign Business,” Financial Times, March 5, 2004.
10 Since then, GM Daewoo has become GM’s manufacturing platform in Asia.

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CRS-8
Figure 2. Foreign Direct Investment into the ROK, 1993-2005
18.0
15.5
15.7
16.0
12.8
14.0
11.9
11.6
12.0
ns
o
8.9
9.1
10.0
illi
7.5
7.0
b
8.0
6.5
$
6.0
4.5
4.7
3.8
3.9
3.2
3.0
2.9
4.0
2.7
2.2
1.0
2.0
0.0
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
3~1996
19
199
Total FDI
U.S. FDI
Source: ROK Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy
Despite the increased openness to foreign ownership, a number of high-profile
acquisitions by foreign companies have been either delayed or cancelled, due to
nationalistic objections to the sale, disagreements over the sales price, and/or the
discovery of previously undisclosed debts owed by the target Korean company.
These delaying actions often have backfired, resulting in far lower eventual sale
prices. A case in point was the protracted sale of Daewoo Motors. In June 2000,
Daewoo Motor’s creditors, many of them government-owned or controlled, reached
a tentative agreement with Ford, which bid nearly $7 billion for the company.
Negotiations became difficult, and after discovering billions of dollars in previously
hidden liabilities (and taking a large loss from the Firestone tire recall), Ford
withdrew its offer. General Motors, which initially had bid $4 billion, remained the
only viable suitor. Negotiations with creditors and the government dragged on for
over a year and a half, however. Finally, in May 2002, GM and Daewoo’s creditors
signed an agreement, by which GM acquired a controlling stake in Daewoo Motors
for $400 million.
Many Koreans, however, have reacted with alarm to foreign investment and
there has been growing discussion of restricting the takeover of Korean companies
by foreigners. For instance, when Newbridge Capital sold its 50% stake in Korea
First Bank in early 2005 at a high profit, it was accused of being a “foreign
exploiter.” The South Korean government attempted to limit or eliminate an
investment treaty with Malaysia, Newbridge’s home, that allowed the company to
avoid paying Korean taxes on its gains. Newbridge bought Korea First Bank in 1999
and is credited in many circles with turning around the bank’s fortunes. Part of the
Korean government’s apparent ambivalence to foreign investment, particularly in the
financial sector, is that foreign multinationals often are more resistant to government
pressure. Newbridge, for instance, reportedly resisted efforts by the South Korea’s

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CRS-9
Financial Supervisory Commission to advance loans to two failing companies, Hynix
and LG Credit.11
South Korea’s Increased Economic Integration with China
As mentioned earlier, in 2003 China surpassed the United States as South
Korea’s number one trading partner (see Figure 3). South Korea has run trade
surpluses with China for a number of years, in contrast to the increasingly large trade
deficits it has run with Japan (see Figure 4). For several years, China has also been
the number one destination for South Korean overseas direct investment, by a large
margin. Many South Korean exports to China are intermediate goods used in the
production of finished goods that ultimately are exported from China to other
countries, including the United States. A growing number of Koreans are studying
the Chinese language and traveling to China, and public opinion polls show that a
growing number of Koreans have favorable views of China. These developments,
combined with a sharp decline in favorable views of the United States, have led many
American observers to worry that Chinese influence over South Korean policy is
likely to rise in the future, at the expense of the United States.
Figure 3. ROK Trade with China,
U.S., and Japan, 2001-2005
China (includes Hong Kong)
U.S.
Japan
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Sources: Korea International Trade Association, Bank of
Korea.
Many South Koreans, however, have ambivalent views of China’s growing
economic importance. The increased competitiveness of many Chinese
manufacturers has caused some consternation in some South Korean firms, pushing
them to search overseas for lower-cost production bases. There are concerns that
11 Edward Graham, “South Korea Should End its Corporate Xenophobia,” Financial Times,
August 4, 2005.

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CRS-10
jobs, particularly in the manufacturing sector, will be lost to Chinese workers as
South Korean foreign direct investment in China increases.
Figure 4. ROK Trade Balances with Major
Partners
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
China
USA
Japan
Source: Bank of Korea
Improved Inter-Korean Economic Relations
In the past three years, South Korea has emerged as North Korea’s second-most
important economic partner, after China. Inter-Korean trade has more than doubled
since 2000, to just over $1 billion in 2005 (see Figure 5).12 South Korea runs a trade
surplus with North Korea. From 1994-2004, Korea provided around $3 billion worth
of economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea, most of which has come since the
June 2000 summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and then-South Korean
President Kim Dae Jung. Since the summit, the two Koreas have reconnected inter-
Korean roads, are close to reconnecting two rail lines, have expanded a tourism site
in Mt. Kumgang (North Korea), and have completed construction of a pilot industrial
zone in Kaesong (North Korea) for South Korean companies to erect factories using
North Korean labor. For 2006, there are plans to expand the Kaesong site beyond the
15 companies currently operating there, despite previous statements by South Korean
government officials that resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis was a prerequisite
for starting any “new” inter-Korean economic programs, presumably including the
expansion of the Kaesong site beyond the pilot program. Additionally, as part of the
six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, Seoul has proposed
12 South Korean National Statistical Office; Korean Ministry of Unification.

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CRS-11
sending large amounts of electricity to North Korea, in exchange for concessions
from Pyongyang.
Figure 5. North-South Korea Trade
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Source: Unification Ministry
The Kaesong Industrial Zone. The worsened economic situation for many
South Korean small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is thought to be a major
factor propelling President Roh Moo-hyun’s economic initiatives with North Korea.
In particular, the inter-Korean industrial zone in Kaesong (also spelled “Gaesong”),
North Korea, just north of the demilitarized zone separating the two countries, is
explicitly designed for use by SMEs, over 1,000 of which reportedly have expressed
interest in participating. A pilot site at Kaesong, housing the factories of fifteen
South Korean firms, opened in 2004, and in the summer of 2005 the two Koreas
announced plans to expand the zone in 2006 and 2007.
The Kaesong industrial zone could become a contentious issue in the bilateral
FTA talks. Since the zone opened, it has been South Korean policy to request that
its FTA partners to allow exports from Kaesong to be considered “Made in Korea,”
thereby enabling these products to receive the preferential status conferred by the
FTA.13 On February 3, 2006, the Vice-Minister of South Korea’s Ministry of
Unification reportedly stated that Seoul plans to try to secure preferential tariff
13 The Korea-Singapore FTA, due to take effect in March 2006, extends duty-free treatment
to Kaesong-made goods. The Korea-EFTA (European Free Trade Association) FTA, signed
in December 2005, extends duty-free treatment to Kaesong-made goods if over 60% of their
content are materials of South Korean origin. In the discussions between South Korea and
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) over an FTA, the two sides agreed
that in principle, no tariffs will be imposed on Kaesong-made goods. Ministry of
Unification, “Goods Produced in the GIC Subject to No-Tariff in Several
FTAs,”Inter-Korean Issues Weekly, Volume33, February 10, 2006.

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CRS-12
treatment for Kaesong-made goods in FTAs with the United States and Canada.14
When questioned about this policy during the February 2, 2006 launch of the FTA,
USTR Portman stated that the FTA would cover only products made in South Korea.
At an economic press roundtable in Seoul on February 8, 2006, an unnamed official
with the U.S. embassy said, “...the provisions of the FTA in our view will apply to
goods originating within the territories of the two parties....what qualifies as an
originating good is something that will be settled in the chapter [of the FTA] called
Rules of Origin.”15 The latter half of the statement appears to indicate that the Bush
Administration may feel there is room for negotiation on this point.
Some analysts worry that improved inter-Korean economic relations are
undermining the Bush Administration’s policy of constricting the inflows of foreign
currency that are thought to go to the North Korean elite, providing a critical base of
support for North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Alternatively, coordinated U.S. and
South Korean policies could use economic leverage to pressure North Korea. In
broad terms, the Bush Administration has stated that it supports South Korea’s
economic engagement with North Korea, including the Kaesong industrial zone.16 In
2004 and 2005, the United States approved several export controls clearances that
were required by U.S. law for South Korean firms to bring items — such as computer
and telecommunications equipment — to Kaesong.17
Major U.S. Trade Disputes with South Korea
Given the disparities in size and economic dependence, it is not surprising that
the United States typically sets the agenda of U.S.-ROK trade talks. Since the 1997
financial crisis, these complaints have tended to be directed at regulations
promulgated by “domestic” ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare,
the Korean Food and Drug Administration, and the Ministry of Environment, that
traditionally have had little contact with foreign governments or firms. One element
of the U.S. strategy toward Korea appears to be attempting to raise the pressure on
these ministries by pushing for the Korean Cabinet to focus on the issue.
In general, U.S. exporters and trade negotiators identify the lack of transparency
of Korea’s trading and regulatory systems as the most significant barriers to trade
with Korea, in almost every major product sector. In 2004, the transparency issue
became a stand-alone item in the quarterly trade action agenda meetings. Many U.S.
government officials also complain that Seoul continues to use government
regulations and standard-setting powers to discriminate against foreign firms in
14 Ibid.
15 US Embassy in Korea, “Questions and Answers from Economic Press Roundtable with
Embassy Official,” February 8, 2006.
16 See, for instance, Joint Declaration on the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace on the Korean
Peninsula, White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2005.
17 US Embassy in Korea, “Questions and Answers from Economic Press Roundtable with
Embassy Official,” February 8, 2006; January and February 2006 conversations with
officials familiar with the Kaesong export control discussions.

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CRS-13
politically sensitive industries, such as automobiles and telecommunications.
Another major cross-sectoral complaint is that restrictions in the Korean labor
market, such as mandatory severance pay, raise the cost of investing and doing
business. Finally, the United States and other countries have pressed South Korea
to open further its agricultural market, which is among the most closed in the
OECD.18
Below are brief descriptions of several major sector-specific disputes between
the U.S. and South Korea.
Major Agriculture Issues
Despite South Korea’s place as one of the top destinations for U.S. agricultural
exports, U.S. government and agricultural industry officials contend that Seoul
retains a number of tariff and non-tariff barriers that have stunted U.S. bilateral
exports. South Korean agricultural tariffs are particularly high compared to the
United States and most OECD members; according to USTR, South Korea’s average
applied agricultural tariffs are 52%, more than four times the U.S.’s average.19 The
completion of a comprehensive FTA therefore is to dramatically expand U.S.
agricultural exporters’ access to the Korean market; by one estimate, U.S. agricultural
exports will increase by more than 200% within four years after a hypothetical FTA
is implemented.20 South Korea’s farmers, while shrinking in terms of population and
contribution to GDP, remain a politically powerful force in South Korea. At the
February 2006 launch of the FTA, ROK Hyun-chong Kim said Seoul plans to spend
over $100 million in adjustment assistance to South Korean farmers over the coming
decade.
In recent years, the number and intensity of agricultural disputes on the U.S.
trade agenda with South Korea appear to have diminished, as manufacturing and
service sector issues have been emphasized. Two of the most contentious
agricultural trade disputes over the past two years have involved beef and rice.
South Korea’s Beef Ban. South Korea, along with Japan and other
countries, banned U.S. beef imports in late December 2003, after the United States
reported the discovery of a cow with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or
“mad cow disease”). South Korea formerly was the third-largest foreign buyer of
U.S. beef; the United States exported nearly $800 million worth of beef to South
Korea in 2003.21 Throughout 2004, USTR official said that FTA negotiations were
18 OECD, Economic Survey - Korea 2004.
19 USTR, FTA: United States & Republic of Korea Economic & Strategic Benefits, February
2, 2006.
20 United States International Trade Commission (ITC), U.S.-Korea FTA: The Economic
Impact of Establishing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between the United States and the
Republic of Korea, (Washington, DC, 2001), p. 5-1 - 5-2.
21 USTR, FTA: United States and Republic of Korea Opportunities for Agriculture, February
(continued...)

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CRS-14
unlikely to begin with South Korea while the ban was in place. During bilateral talks
in January 2006, South Korea agreed to partially lift its ban. “Toward the end of
March” 2006, South Korea will allow imports of U.S. boneless beef from cattle less
than 30 months old. Boneless beef constituted about half of U.S. bilateral beef
exports in 2003. Korean negotiators reportedly backed down from their desire to
limit imports to boneless beef from cattle less than 20 months old. While welcoming
the agreement, USTR Portman also said he was “extremely disappointed” that Korea
did not fully open its market to all U.S. beef products.22 The U.S.-ROK agreement
came a month after Japan agreed in December 2005 to partially lift its ban. A week
after the South Korean decision, Japan reimposed its ban after prohibited bone
material was found in beef shipments from the United States. South Korea has not
taken this step.
Rice. The South Korean government controls the purchase, distribution, and
end-use of all imported rice. During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations (1986-1993), South Korea was granted a 10-year grace period before
opening its rice market to imports. In return for receiving this concession, South
Korea agreed to allow minimum access for rice through the use of quotas. The grace
period ended on the last day of 2004. Prior to that date, South Korea notified the
WTO that it wished to extend the minimum access quota system rather than convert
to tariffs. Under the Uruguay Round agreement, Seoul could do this only if it
obtained the consent of other WTO members, which could demand concessions to
expand their quota. The United States availed itself of this right, and on December
30, 2004, U.S. and South Korean officials announced an agreement, under which
Korea will double the amount of rice it imports over the next 10 years, provide
guaranteed access for 50,000 MT of U.S. rice each year, and make imported rice
available directly to Korean consumers. In November 2005, after months of delay
and acrimonious debate, the Korean National Assembly ratified the rice deal. China
and Thailand, two other parties to the rice negotiations, reportedly wished to see an
end of the quota system in favor of tariffication, which presumably would be more
advantageous to lower-cost rice producers such as themselves. In 2003, U.S.
exporters sold 55,000 metric tons (MT) of rice — or about 28% of the 200,000 MT
minimum access quota — to South Korea, behind China’s exports of 115,000 MT.23
21 (...continued)
2006.
22 USDA Press Release No. 0004.06, “Johanns and Ustr Portman Welcome Progress to
Reopen Korean Market to U.S. Beef,” January 13, 2006; “U.S. Applauds Korea Beef Deal
as First Step, Signals Additional Talks” Inside US Trade, January 20, 2006.
23 Inside US Trade, “Fight over Korean Rice Market Pits China Against U.S., Australia,”
June 11, 2004.

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CRS-15
Other Issues
Automotive Trade.24 Automotive trade is perennial issue in trade talks
between the United States and South Korea, the world’s fourth-largest producer of
automobiles. For years, U.S. officials have argued that Korean tax and “Korea
unique” certification practices discriminate against imports. In 2005, USTR Portman
included automobiles in his list of four sectors that on which the United States would
seek concessions from South Korea before agreeing to begin FTA negotiations. In
announcing the intent to launch talks, Portman alluded to the South Korean Ministry
of the Environment’s decision in the fall of 2005 to grant auto makers with a low
share of the Korean market an exemption, until 2009, from Korea’s regulations on
ultra-low emissions. Previously, the regulations would have applied in January 2007.
South Korean imports of foreign automobiles totaled fewer than 31,000 in 2005
— including about 5,800 U.S. vehicles — just over 3% of the South Korean market,
up from less than 0.5% five years earlier (see Table 3). Most of the foreign cars sold
in South Korea are luxury models. In contrast, South Korean auto manufacturers
exported over 730,000 cars to the United States in 2005, capturing over 4% of the
U.S. market. Nearly all of these vehicles were produced by Hyundai Motors,
including vehicles produced by its subsidiary Kia, formerly Korea’s second-largest
independent manufacturer. USTR is pushing South Korea to lower its 8% tariff,
which is more than three times the U.S. level of 2.5% on imported cars. Moreover,
the United States continues to protest that South Korea’s tariff, tax and regulatory
structure unfairly penalize automobiles with larger-sized engines. Specifically, the
Bush Administration has called on Korea to move from engine displacement taxation
to a value-based taxation system, because the former assesses higher taxes on larger
vehicles.25 Periodically, some Members of Congress have introduced legislation
calling on South Korea to end the practices that impede foreign market access and
requesting various U.S. executive agencies to monitor Korea’s progress on this issue.
Two initiatives were H.Con.Res. 144 and S.Con.Res. 43, introduced in the 107th
Congress, in May 2001.
For much of the post-Korean War era, South Korea’s market was closed to the
import of automobiles. It banned all automobile imports prior to 1989, and the ban
on importation of automobiles from Japan was eliminated only in 1999. Gradually,
the industry has opened up to foreign investment, though almost all cars sold in
Korea are still locally produced.
In its October 1997 Super 301 report to Congress, the Clinton Administration
designated Korea as a “Priority Foreign Country” for its barriers to foreign motor
vehicles.26 USTR subsequently initiated an investigation under Section 301 of the
24 This section written with Stephen Cooney, CRS Industry Analyst. For more on the United
States auto industry, see CRS Report RL32883, U.S. Automotive Industry: Recent History
and Issues.
25 USTR, 2004 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, p.313.
26 Super 301 (Section 310 of the 1974 Trade Act) requires the USTR to report to congress
(continued...)

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CRS-16
U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and issued a call for bilateral consultations to
provide fair market access for foreign autos in Korea.27 In 1998, the United States
and South Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on foreign access
to Korea’s auto market, which led the USTR to terminate the Section 301
investigation. Under the MOU, Seoul agreed to reduce its tariffs on motor vehicles
from 80% to 8%, proactively address instances of anti-import activity in Korea, lower
or eliminate many automobile taxes, create a new financing system to make it easier
to purchase automobiles, and streamline its standards and certification procedures.
Many of these steps — including lowering tariffs — have been implemented.
Furthermore, Seoul has largely abandoned its policy of allowing only
Korean-owned auto companies to operate in South Korea. With Hyundai’s purchase
of Kia, Korea’s second-largest producer, there is now only one Korean-owned motor
vehicle manufacturer left, although it is dominant in the home market. In 2002,
General Motors purchased the Daewoo Motor Company from the bankrupt Daewoo
conglomerate. Two other smaller vehicle producers, Samsung and Ssangyong, have
also come under the control of foreign investors.
26 (...continued)
on “priority foreign countries” that practice unfair trade and “priority practices” that have
the greatest effect on restricting U.S. exports. If agreement is not reached on the priority
practices, the USTR is required to initiate a Section 301 case (see the following footnote).
For more information, see Wayne Morrison, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, CRS
Report 98-454.
27 Section 301 (sections 301-309 of the Trade Act of 1974) authorize the USTR to initiate
investigations of foreign trade practices that allegedly discriminate against U.S. commerce.
If a settlement with the foreign country is not reached following the initiation of the
investigation, the USTR decides whether or not to retaliate, usually in the form of 100%
tariffs on selected imports from the offending country. See CRS Report 98-454, Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended: Its Operation and Issues Involving its Use by the
United States, by Wayne Morrison.

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CRS-17
Table 3. U.S.-ROK Automotive Trade
Vehicular Units, including Light Trucks
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Korean Auto
Companies’ Sales in
473,400
618,300
650,300
637,700
688,670
730,863
the U.S.
Market Share
2.7%
3.6%
3.9%
3.8%
4.1%
4.3%
Total Foreign Auto
Companies’ Sales in
4,400
7,700
16,100
19,500
23,345
30,901
Korea*
Market Share
0.3%
0.5%
1.3%
1.9%
2.1%
3.3%
U.S. Auto Companies’
1,700
2,000
4,700
4,100
5,415
5,795
Sales in Korea*
Market Share
0.1%
0.1%
0.4%
0.4%
0.5%
0.7%
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce
* Figures for foreign and U.S. companies’ sales in South Korea do not include the sales of GM
Daewoo Automotive Technologies, which has captured between 12% and 13% (104,000 -
128,000) of the Korean market since GM took over Daewoo in 2002.
Meanwhile, Korea’s top automotive manufacturer has renewed an earlier effort
to build cars in North America, as well as to import them. In May 2005, Hyundai
Motors opened a new $1.1 billion plant in Montgomery, Alabama. The facility is
expected to produce 300,000 vehicles annually and will employ approximately 2,000
workers. The plant’s suppliers are expected to employ approximately 5,500
workers.28 Hyundai’s subsidiary Kia also is reported to be planning to open a U.S.
production facility.
Pharmaceuticals. Korea is ranked in the world’s top 15 pharmaceutical
markets, with annual sales in the $4 billion range. In 2001, imports comprised
approximately 30% of the total market, compared with an average of 50%-70% for
other countries that do not have a significant research-based domestic industry.
Korea’s expenditures on pharmaceutical products is about $115 per person per year,
less than half the $240 average for OECD countries.29 The country has a nationalized
health insurance system, which began to experience a negative cash flow in 1995.
For years, the U.S. government has complained that a number of Korea’s
pharmaceutical policies are designed to protect the domestic Korean industry, which
predominantly produces generic drugs.
Criticisms have mounted since 2001, when the Korean government
implemented a series of emergency measures to fill the national health insurance
fund’s mounting deficit, estimated at the time to be over 4 trillion won ($3.3 billion).
Recent complaints include the lack of transparency of the Korean Ministry of Health
28 May 20, 2005 letter from Hyundai Motor Co.’s Washington, DC office.
29 American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, Improving Korea’s Business Climate 2002,
p. 148.

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CRS-18
and Welfare, particularly the Ministry’s allegedly poor record on consulting with and
notifying companies about regulatory changes; the reimbursement scheme of the
health insurance system, which allegedly gives price incentives for doctors to
prescribe and patients to use Korean-made products; poor protection of intellectual
property rights for medical patents; and the discriminatory nature of Seoul’s
requirements that foreign drugs must be retested on Koreans living in Korea, rather
than on other ethnic Asians, as the United States has insisted. In a sign of
pharmaceuticals’ growing importance on the bilateral trade agenda, in January 2002,
the two sides established a bilateral private sector health care reform working group.
In 2005, USTR Portman said FTA negotiations would not be launched without
progress on pharmaceutical issues. At the October 2005 trade action agenda meeting,
the South Korean government agreed that no new drug reimbursement pricing
policies would be introduced in the near future, agreed to set up an independent
mechanism under which drug reimbursement decisions could be appealed, and
clarified the reasons the Korean Food and Drug Administration was requiring drug
manufacturers to submit large amounts of proprietary data as part of the drug
approval process.
South Korea’s “Screen Quotas”. Since 1966, South Korea has sought to
protect its domestic film industry by mandating that movie theaters devote at least
146 days per year (or 40% of the calendar year) to showing domestic films. The
issue was a major reason the United States and South Korea were unable to finalize
negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which were initiated in the late
1990s but were suspended in 1999.30 Each country’s motion picture industry has
significant political clout; during South Korea’s 2002 presidential elections, Roh was
backed by several prominent South Korean actors. Nonetheless, for years Roh’s
administration pledged that it would reduce, if not eliminate, the quotas. For U.S.
trade officials, the issue became a symbol of the Roh government’s ability and
capacity to make the difficult political concessions that would also come in FTA
negotiations. On January 26, 2006, the day after the beef ban was partially lifted,
South Korea’s Prime Minister announced that the screen quotas would be cut in half,
to 73 days a year. The following week, the two countries announced their intent to
launch FTA talks. The growing popularity — both in South Korea and abroad — of
South Korean films undoubtedly made Roh’s concession more palatable.
South Korea’s Alleged Currency Manipulation. In recent years, South
Korea has been criticized for intervening in foreign currency markets by purchasing
U.S. dollar assets to artificially lower the value of the Korean won against the U.S.
dollar in order to boost exports. As of the end of November 2005, South Korea was
the seventh largest foreign holder of U.S. treasury securities, holding 66.5 billion.31
30 BITs are designed to improve the climate for foreign investors — typically by committing
the signatories to prohibit discrimination against foreign investors — by establishing dispute
settlement procedures and by protecting foreign investors from performance requirements,
restrictions on transferring funds, and arbitrary expropriation. The United States has signed
over 30 BITs, primarily with countries undergoing significant economic reforms.
31 Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, “Major Foreign Holders of
Treasury Securities,” [http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt]. Japan held $683 billion in U.S.
(continued...)

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CRS-19
As Figure 4 shows, the won generally has been appreciating against the dollar since
2001. The won’s rise was particularly marked in late 2005 and early 2006, when it
reached levels not seen since before the 1997 financial crisis. During the same
period, the won has risen even more precipitously against the Japanese yen. This is
particularly worrisome to many Korean exporters because they compete directly
against more Japanese than U.S. companies and because many Korean manufacturers
rely upon imports of intermediate goods from Japan.
Since the won began its gradual ascent in 2001, South Korean authorities have
intervened episodically to slow the won’s rise, though the scale of the intervention
has been far less than Japan and China’s. The United States made currency
intervention a major issue at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Finance
Ministers and G-7 Finance Ministers meetings in September 2003. Shortly thereafter,
South Korea appeared to ease off large-scale interventionist policies; South Korean
government officials say that since early 2004, they have engaged in only minor
intervention to “smooth” excessive currency volatility.32 In response to the won’s
spike since late 2005, although some Korean officials have said that their currency
is overvalued, as of early 2006 they appear not to have intervened in currency
markets in a large-scale way. Indeed, in early February 2006, South Korean Finance
Ministry officials said they would like to loosen restrictions on won-denominated
transactions overseas in order to make the won more widely traded.33
Figure 6. Won-Dollar Exchange Rate, 1997-2006
Source: Bank of Korea, Average Basic Rate. Y-Axis is Inverted.
900
951
984
1000
1,023
1,024
1,041
1100
1,131
1,145
1,190
1,192
1200
1,251
1,291
1300
1,399
1400
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Nov
Dec
Jan
05
05
06
31 (...continued)
treasury securities, China $250 billion, and the United Kingdom $223billion.
32 Charles Roth, “South Korea to Use Reserves For Local Asset Management,” The Asian
Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2005.
33 Laura Santini, “Won Bulls see Korean Currency as a Proxy for Asia’s Growth,” The
Asian Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2006.

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CRS-20
In the future, the U.S. dollar and the market for U.S. Treasury securities could
be affected by the South Korean government’s launch of the Korean Investment
Corporation (KIC) to manage a portion of South Korea’s foreign exchange reserves,
in July 2005. The KIC initially is managing $20 billion, and is expected to
eventually manage $100 billion by 2012. The stated goals of the program are to
invest South Korean foreign currency holdings more effectively. The program also
aims to boost President Roh Moo-hyun’s efforts to turn Korea into a major financial
and commercial hub in Northeast Asia by helping boost Korea’s asset management
industry.
Some members of Congress have criticized Korea’s currency policy. A “Fair
Currency Act” (Lieberman) was introduced in Senate the last two Congresses (S. 377
in the 109th Congress and S. 1592 in the 108th Congress). If passed, they would
require the U.S. government to monitor and take action against specific countries,
including South Korea, that are “engaged most egregiously in currency
manipulation.”
Intellectual Property Rights Issues. Bilateral tensions often have arisen
over U.S. allegations that Korea does not sufficiently protect intellectual property
rights (IPRs). Since becoming a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in
1994, USTR has moved Korea back and forth between the Special 301 “priority
watch list” and the “watch list.”34 Most recently, in January 2005, USTR
downgraded Korea to the “watch list” because of “significant steps” Seoul had taken
to strengthen its IPR regime. USTR has cited South Korea’s increased protection for
recordings transmitted over the internet and the launch in May 2004 of a
“Pan-Government Comprehensive Plan For IPR Protection” headed by a Han Duk-
soo, a prominent official who has a Cabinet portfolio to promote the initiative.
USTR also lists several items, such as copyright protection and DVD piracy, on
which it would like to see Korea make additional progress.35
Telecommunications. In recent years, telecommunications has emerged as
one of the most contentious trade issues between the United States and South Korea.
With one of the world’s highest rates of Internet usage, South Korea is often used as
a market for telecommunications companies to test cutting-edge wireless products
and technologies. The Roh government has designated next-generation mobile
communications as one of ten “new growth engines” that will help Korea reach
President Roh’s 2003 goal of nearly doubling per capita GDP to $20,000 by the end
34 “Special 301” refers to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974. Since the start of the
Special 301 provision in 1989, the USTR has issued annually a three-tier list of countries
judged to have inadequate regimes for IPR protection, or to deny access: 1) priority foreign
countries are deemed to be the worst violators, and are subject to Section 301 investigations
and possible trade sanctions; 2) priority watch list countries are considered to have major
deficiencies in their IPR regime, but do not currently warrant a Section 301 investigation;
and 3) watch list countries, which maintain IPR practices that are of particular concern, but
do not yet warrant higher level designations. See Wayne Morrison, Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, CRS Report 98-454.
35 USTR, 2005 Special 301 Report, April 29, 2005.

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CRS-21
of the decade. Perhaps to this end, the Korean government has attempted to set
mandatory, single-technology standards for wireless telecommunications services.
These efforts led USTR in April 2004 to name South Korea as a “key country of
concern” in its annual report under Section 1377, which requires USTR to assess
U.S. trading partners’ compliance with international telecommunication agreements.
Specifically, for two years, USTR negotiated with the South Korean government
over the Ministry of Information and Communication’s (MoIC) plan to require all
cell phone services to use only the so-called wireless Internet platform for
interoperability (WIPI) for downloading information from the Internet. WIPI is a
new platform developed by a Korean association funded by Electronics and
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), a government-funded institute. The
requirement would have excluded users and developers of other operability
platforms, such as the platform developed by San Diego-based Qualcomm, which is
used by a leading Korean cellular service provider. In April 2004, Seoul and
Washington announced they had reached a compromise that allows MoIC to
implement WIPI, but also permits cellular phones to be made compatible with other
standards.36
A similar dispute is over MoIC’s issuance of a mandatory standard — to be
located in the 2.3 gigahertz (GHz) bandwidth spectrum — for a new portable
broadband Internet system used to transmit information from the Internet to laptops
and other wireless equipment. USTR and U.S. companies charged that, under the
influence of ETRI, the original, domestically-designed standard was designed to
deliberately exclude foreign companies in favor of Samsung.37 In June 2004, the
Korean government announced that all license holders would have to use one of the
several technologies compatible with a standard designed by the International
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. USTR has criticized the decision
as excluding companies that have developed other systems. USTR also has asked the
Korean government to revise its restrictions on foreign ownership in the
telecommunications sector.38
36 “U.S., Korea Reach Deal on Single Standard for Cell Phone Technology,” Inside US
Trade, April 30, 2004.
37 USTR, “Results of 2004 Section 1377 Review of Telecommunications Trade
Agreements,” p. 5.
38 USTR, 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE), p. 394-
95.

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CRS-22
Steel.39 From 1998 through 2003,
Figure 7. Steel Imports from
South Korean steel exports to the
Korea, 1997-2004
Millions of Metric Tons
United States were one of the most
politically charged items on the bilateral 3
2.9
2.7
economic agenda, particularly since the
2.4
1997 Asian financial crisis. From 1997
to 1998, Korean shipments of steel to
2
2
the U.S. nearly doubled, vaulting South
1.7
1.5
1.
1 5
Korea into the top five U.S. sources of
1.5
steel imports. In 2003, imports from
1.1
1
South Korea declined below pre-crisis
levels, helping to defuse the issue. In
the preceding five years, a number of
anti-dumping cases were initiated 0
against South Korean exporters, and
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Presidents Clinton and Bush each Source: U.S. Census Bureau
* January - November
granted safeguard relief (under Section
201 of the Trade Act of 1974) for U.S.
steel producers.40 Korea and other countries challenged both Section 201 actions at
the World Trade Organization, which ultimately ruled that the actions were
inconsistent with global trading rules. In December 2003, President Bush terminated
the safeguard tariffs he had established in March 2002.41 In 2000, Korea also won
a major WTO case involving anti-dumping duties the United States imposed against
Korean exports of stainless steel plate in coils and stainless steel sheet and strip.
Korea remains one of the leading exporters of steel to the United States by volume,
at about 1.5 million metric tons annually in 2004-2005, but is now well behind the
three leading Western Hemisphere suppliers (Canada, Mexico, Brazil), as well as
China. The rise in steel prices since 2003 has to some extent defused this issue.
Assistance to Hynix Semiconductor. In 2001, a major trade dispute
erupted between the United States and South Korea over allegations that the Seoul
government was propping up Hynix Semiconductor, presently the world’s third-
largest producer of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semiconductor chips.
In 2001 and 2002, Hynix’s leading creditors — most of which were owned by the
39 This section written with Stephen Cooney, CRS Industry Analyst. For more, see CRS
Report RL31748, The American Steel Industry: A Changing Profile.
40 Section 201 relief, often referred to as “safeguard” or “escape clause” relief, is defined
in sections 201-204 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2251-2254).
Safeguard relief provides for temporary duties, quotas, or other restrictions on imports that
may be traded fairly, but that enter in such quantities as to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to a domestic industry. The relief is intended to give the domestic industry an
opportunity to adjust to the new competition and remain competitive. Within six months
after a Section 201 petition has been filed with the International Trade Commission, the ITC
must conduct an investigation, determine if relief is warranted, and recommend appropriate
remedial action from a specified range of options. The President then decides whether to
implement the recommended measure, apply an alternative measure, or take no action at all.
41 For more on the steel Section 201 case, see CRS Report RL32333, Steel: Price and
Availability Issues, by Stephen Cooney.

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CRS-23
Korean government — orchestrated a series of rescue packages that kept Hynix in
business by enabling it to restructure its 8.6 trillion won (over $7 billion) in debt. In
the United States, Micron Technology, the Idaho-based second largest producer of
DRAMs, led a campaign against the support packages, arguing that they amounted
to government-sponsored bailouts that allow Hynix to export at low prices and that
they were a prime cause of the drastic plunge in global chip prices in 2001 and 2002.
Micron, the last U.S.-based DRAM producer, eventually filed a countervailing duty
case, which it won, resulting in a 44% punitive tariff being assessed against Hynix’s
exports to the United States. In a similar case, the European Union imposed a 34%
countervailing duty against Hynix. Korea challenged both rulings in the WTO. A
WTO panel was formed and in February 2005 ruled that the United States had failed
to “properly demonstrate” that the Korean government had subsidized Hynix. The
United States appealed in June 2005, the WTO’s Appellate Body reversed the ruling,
in part by using a definition of what government actions constitute a subsidy that is
broader than the definition used by the panel.42 Because Appellate Body decisions
cannot be appealed, the United States’s punitive tariffs will remain in place.
Meanwhile, Hynix has sold many of its non-semiconductor assets, introduced
a program to upgrade its efficiency, completed its debt-workout program, and has
overtaken Idaho-based Micron to become the world’s second-largest chipmaker.
South Korea’s Performance in the Doha Development Agenda. In
the current round of multilateral trade talks, the Doha Development Agenda, USTR
officials consistently have praised South Korea for attempting to bridge the
differences between the developed and developing countries, particularly on non-
agricultural market access issues such as industrial tariffs and services. Seoul also
has been criticized consistently for resisting agricultural liberalization in the
negotiations. Korea’s tariffs on agricultural products, except rice, average 66%,
compared with a 7.5% average for tariffs on industrial products.43
Korea’s Complaints Against U.S. Anti-Dumping and CVD Practices.
For over a decade, South Korea has chafed at the United States’s use of anti-dumping
and countervailing duty (CVD) laws to raise tariffs on Korean exports. According
to one study, in July 2000 the five CVD and 18 anti-dumping orders against South
Korean exports covered approximately $2.5 billion, or over 7%, of U.S. imports from
South Korea in 1999. Moreover, these tariff hikes have tended to be concentrated in
a handful of Korean industries — semiconductors, steel, televisions, and
telecommunications equipment — that have considerable political influence in Seoul.
During the Uruguay Round (1986-1993) of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT, the WTO’s predecessor organization), Korea was one of several
countries demanding revisions to global anti-dumping rules, changes the United
States opposed because of concerns that they would constrain U.S. anti-dumping
42 “WTO Appellate Body Finds U.S. Can Keep Duties on Korean DRAMS,” Inside US
Trade, July 1, 2005.
43 USTR, 2004 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, p.290.

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CRS-24
investigators. South Korea, joined most prominently by Japan, has taken up this
issue again in the Doha Development Agenda talks, against U.S. opposition.44
In recent years, Seoul has become more assertive in using the WTO to challenge
United States’s trade practices. In 1999 and 2000, Seoul took the U.S. to the WTO
over allegedly discriminatory U.S. anti-dumping duties placed on Korean exports of
steel and semiconductors. Korea won both of the steel cases it initiated.
U.S. Visa Policies. South Koreans’ complaints about U.S. visa policies tend
to fall into two categories.45 First, some Korean government officials, Korean
businesses, the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, and Korean-Americans
have questioned why South Korea is not a participant in the U.S. Visa Waiver
Permanent Program, under which foreigners traveling from certain countries are
permitted to travel to the United States for up to ninety days without having the
immigration documents normally required for entry.46 Among the statutory
requirements for countries to participate in the U.S. visa waiver program is that the
country must have a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for two years — averaging
no more than 2% over both years and not exceeding 2.5% in any one year.
According to State Department officials, South Korea’s visa refusal rates have
consistently been over this threshold. According to one report, in 2005 the rate was
slightly below 4%.47 U.S. State Department officials attribute the rise in Korea’s
refusal rates since 1997 to the increased number of Koreans illegally seeking to find
work in the United States. Since the United States put in place new visa procedures
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, all South Koreans who want to visit
the United States must interview for a visa at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Reportedly,
the U.S. consular section in Seoul has become the busiest largest U.S. nonimmigrant
visa processing post in the world, processing an average of almost 2,000 visas per
day.48 During his November 2005 summit with President Roh in South Korea,
President Bush announced that the United States would work with Seoul to develop
a “roadmap to assist Korea in meeting the requirements for membership” in the visa
waiver program, a move that has been supported by a number of groups in the United
States.49
44 In his address at the December 2005 Doha Development Round ministerial in Hong Kong,
South Korean Trade Minister Kim said that a “tangible outcome” in anti-dumping was
“indispensable” for South Korea. Statement by Mr Hyun Chong Kim Minister for Trade,
World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference Sixth Session Hong Kong,
WT/MIN(05)/ST/19 14 December 2005 (05-5992).
45 For more on U.S. visa policies, see CRS Report RL31512, Visa Issuances: Policy, Issues,
and Legislation, by Ruth Wasem.
46 For more on the visa waiver program, see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program,
by Alison Siskin.
47 Balbina Y. Hwang, “Including South Korea in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program,” Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder #1872, July 25, 2005.
48 Ibid.
49 “Joint Declaration on the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” White
House Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2005.

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CRS-25
The second category of complaints is lodged against U.S. visa policies
implemented since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States,
particularly requirements for mandatory interviews, fingerprinting, and greater
scrutiny of business travelers for possible technology transfer risks. Like citizens of
many other countries, Koreans particularly have objected to the fingerprinting, which
some Koreans have likened to requirements imposed upon them during Japan’s
thirty-five-year occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the first half of the 20th
Century.
A U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement?
Beginning in 2004, the South Korean Foreign Ministry began proposing the idea
of a U.S.-ROK FTA. At first, the Bush Administration reportedly was cool to the
idea. In late 2004, presentations by South Korean Trade Minister Hyun-chong Kim
apparently made an impression on key U.S. policymakers, particularly then-USTR
Robert Zoellick, such that in January 2005 the two sides began a six-month bilateral
process of the logistics, benefits, and risks of an FTA. At the end of this review, in
June 2005, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Portman reportedly told Trade
Minister Hyun-chong Kim that it was premature to launch actual negotiations until
key outstanding issues were resolved. These included South Korea’s alleged barriers
to imports of automobiles and pharmaceuticals, its ban on imports of U.S. beef, and
its “screen quotas” that served to restrict the showing of foreign films.”50 Many U.S.
officials said that Korea’s action on these issues was a litmus test for whether Seoul
is politically capable of making the compromises the United States will expect in an
FTA agreement. By the end of January 2006, South Korea had offered concessions
in all four sectors, paving the way for the two sides to announce their intention to
launch FTA talks the following month.
As part of President Roh’s goal of transforming South Korea into an economic
hub, and in an effort to keep pace with Japan and China — which have initiated
several bilateral and regional trading arrangements — Seoul has pursued a number
of FTAs and similar arrangements, signing FTAs with Chile (signed in 2003),
Singapore (2005), the European Free Trade Association51 (2005), and a framework
economic agreement with ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(2005). Thailand has opted out of ROK-ASEAN agreement, due to South Korea’s
continuation of its restrictions on imports of rice. Additionally, South Korea has
launched FTA talks with Japan (though these have been stalled since late 2004) and
Canada. Joint FTA studies are underway with Mexico, India, and the Mercosur
countries (the Mercado Común del Sur consists of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay).
Arguments For and Against an FTA. A U.S.-ROK FTA is championed
by the American business community in Korea, and many Korean businesses
50 “Portman Says U.S. Not Ready to Launch FTA Talks with Korea,” Inside US Trade, June
10, 2005.
51 EFTA is comprised of Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.

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CRS-26
operating in the United States. The National Association of Manufacturers has
identified South Korea as a one of the “top five candidate countries” for a future trade
agreement. In previous Congresses, Senator Max Baucus introduced legislation (S.
944 in the 107th Congress and S. 1869 in 106th Congress) authorizing FTA
negotiations with Seoul. No legislative action was taken on either attempt. On
September 8, 2005, following a meeting of the Congressional Oversight Group that
consults with USTR, House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas reportedly said
that the possibility of an FTA with Korea is “exciting,” and noted many of the
economic reforms Seoul has carried out in recent years.52 A number of Members of
Congress from both parties spoke during the February 2006 launch of the FTA on
Capitol Hill and expressed their support for an FTA.
On the economic front, the biggest beneficiaries of an FTA likely would be
those export industries in both countries that currently face relatively high initial
trade barriers to their products. In a 2001 study undertaken at the request of the
Senate Finance Committee, the International Trade Commission (ITC) estimated that
within four years after implementation of a hypothetical FTA, U.S. bilateral
agricultural exports would increase by more than 200%. For Korea, the ITC
projected that textiles and apparel exporters would see their shipments to the U.S.
rise by 125%.53 Thus, the report implied that the FTA’s potential benefits would be
greatly diluted if these politically sensitive sectors were excluded.54 After four years,
U.S. exports to Korea were estimated to increase by 54% while South Korean exports
to the U.S. would rise by 21%. Overall, an FTA would raise U.S. GDP by a
projected 0.2%, while Korean GDP would rise by 0.7%.55 An earlier study by the
Institute for International Economics (IIE), found similar effects for the U.S.
economy, but had a wider band for the increase on Korean GDP, which was projected
in the 0.4%-2.0% range.
As in the ITC study, the IIE report found that most of the benefits to U.S. firms
would derive from increased access to Korea’s market. In contrast, the IIE projected
that most of Korea’s gains from an FTA would stem not from preferential access to
the U.S. market but from improvements in the allocative efficiency of the Korean
economy brought about by the trade reforms required by an FTA.56 The figures cited
from both studies derived from “static” models that focused on the effects of tariff
liberalization, rather than the more dynamic (but harder to quantify) aftereffects.
Thus, some economists say these numbers underestimate the likely gains to both
sides; one of the major long-term benefits from an FTA may be less the rise in
52 “Thomas Endorses Korea, Egypt FTAs,” Inside US Trade, September 9, 2005.
53 United States International Trade Commission (ITC), U.S.-Korea FTA: The Economic
Impact of Establishing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between the United States and the
Republic of Korea, (Washington, DC, 2001), p. 5-1 - 5-2.
54 For a similar argument, see Choi and Schott, Free Trade, p.80.
55 ITC, U.S.-Korea FTA, p. x-xi.
56 See Choi and Schott, Free Trade, p. 79-82.

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CRS-27
bilateral trade itself, and more the gains realized from further accelerating and
cementing South Korea’s market-oriented reform process.57
Many proponents of a U.S.-ROK FTA contend that an agreement will boost
U.S. strategic interests. Some have called for an FTA as a way to reinforce the U.S.-
South Korea alliance, which many believe to be under significant stress due to
differences over how to deal with North Korea and the size and role of the U.S. troop
presence in South Korea.58 A related argument is that an FTA with South Korea will
help counter China’s growing economic and political influence in South Korea
particularly, and in East Asia generally, developments which some believe are
hampering U.S. interests. Some — including Senator Baucus — have coupled this
contention with criticism of the Bush Administration’s trade policy of negotiating
FTAs with politically important but relatively economically insignificant countries
and of neglecting U.S. economic relations with Asia.59
Opposition to a prospective U.S.-ROK FTA is expected to come from U.S.
import-competing groups, particularly clothing manufacturers, that have benefitted
from relatively high trade barriers. U.S. industries and companies that allege trade
barriers have made it difficult to penetrate the Korean market, such as U.S.
automobile manufacturers, also are expected to cast doubt on the wisdom of
concluding an FTA with South Korea. On the day the FTA was launched,
Representative Sander Levin issued a statement that the Bush Administration “must
stand up” for the U.S. auto industry in the FTA talks.60 On the issue of agriculture,
at the February 2006 press conference announcing the intent to launch FTA talks,
USTR Portman said the FTA would be “comprehensive” — a euphemism referring
to the inclusion of agriculture. Trade Minister Kim said that although there is no pre-
agreement to exclude sensitive agricultural sectors, he also said that all FTAs include
some exceptions or staged implementation periods on sensitive sectors.61
FTA negotiations are expected to be complicated by the expiration of trade
promotion authority (TPA), also known as “fast track negotiating authority,” in June
57 Presentation by Edward M. Graham at Sustaining the Alliance U.S.-Korean Relations in
the New Asia, February 1, 2006 conference, American Enterprise Institute.
58 Balbina Y. Hwang and Anthony B. Kim, “Beyond the U.S. — South Korea Alliance:
Reinvigorating Economic Relations,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1853, May
18, 2005.
59 Senate Committee on Finance Press Release, “Speech of U.S. Senator Max Baucus at the
First Annual Asia Forum ‘Toward a Strong Asia Trade Policy,’” September 21, 2004. For
more on the Bush Administration’s pursuit of FTAs, see CRS Report RL31356, Free Trade
Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, by William
Cooper, and CRS Report RS21657, U.S. Trade Policy and Changing Domestic and Foreign
Priorities: A Historical Overview, by Ray Ahearn.
60 February 2, 2006 Press Release, “In Negotiating a Korean Trade Agreement Bush
Administration Must Stand up for U.S. Automotive Sector.”
61 “U.S., Korea Announce FTA, Hope to Complete Talks by End of Year,” Inside US Trade
February 3, 2006.

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CRS-28
2007.62 If negotiations are not finalized by this date and TPA is not renewed, the
implementing legislation for a U.S.-Korea FTA could be considered under normal
congressional procedures, potentially giving Congress greater scope to review and
ask for changes in specific portions of an agreement.
Skepticism, at times mixed with outright opposition, may also come from U.S.
companies and trade experts contending that South Korea has a mixed record at best
in implementing previous agreements due in part to staunch resistance by South
Korean import-competing industries. Indeed, disagreements between the United
States and South Korea prevented the two countries from finalizing negotiations over
a bilateral investment treaty (BIT)63 The major stumbling block is Korea’s so-called
“screen quotas.” If the two countries could not conclude a BIT, which is far less
comprehensive than an FTA, many skeptics wonder if they will realistically be able
to complete an FTA.
One danger of launching FTA talks is that differences over strategic issues —
particularly in dealing with North Korea — could negatively affect the negotiations
or the consideration of the agreement in Congress and/or the National Assembly.
South Korea’s policy of emphasizing bilateral reconciliation with North Korea
generally has meant that Seoul has not supported U.S. actual and rhetorical efforts
to pressure North Korea. As mentioned above, although the U.S. has supported the
Kaesong industrial zone project inside North Korea, South Korea’s attempts to allow
Kaesong-made products to have preferential tariff status into the United States could
be contentious. The interplay between the FTA talks and developments with North
Korea also could bring greater scrutiny to the relationship between South Korean
firms and North Korean enterprises. For instance, many South Korean banks
reviewed their connections to Banco Delta Asia following the September 2005
decision by the U.S. Treasury Department to warn U.S. financial institutions not to
deal with the Macau bank because of its alleged laundering counterfeit U.S. currency
produced in North Korea. Since the fall of 2005, North Korea has said it will not
return to the six-party talks unless these “sanctions” are lifted. North Korea’s human
rights abuses also could become intertwined with the FTA talks if human rights
advocates decide to criticize the dealings of South Korean firms with North Korean
enterprises.

Additionally, if the FTA talks fail or become exceptionally bitter, they could
damage the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Many observers believe that in recent years
the economic side of the relationship has been the alliance’s strong suit, for four
62 Under TPA, Congress agrees to consider trade agreements which the President has
negotiated, on a fast-track basis - without amendment and with limited debate. For more,
see CRS Report RS22237, Trade Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority in the Trade Act of
2002, by Lenore Sek.
63 BITs are designed to improve the climate for foreign investors — typically by committing
the signatories to prohibit discrimination against foreign investors — by establishing dispute
settlement procedures and by protecting foreign investors from performance requirements,
restrictions on transferring funds, and arbitrary expropriation. The United States has signed
over 30 BITs, primarily with countries undergoing significant economic reforms. The U.S.
and South Korea last held formal negotiations in 1999.

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CRS-29
reasons. First, the creation of a robust dispute resolution body in the WTO in the
mid-1990s has helped depoliticize many bilateral disputes. Second, the economic
reforms pursued by South Korean since the 1997 economic crisis have helped
resolved some of the two countries’ systemic disputes and on many disputes have
given the United States allies at the top of South Korea’s government. Third, as
mentioned earlier, the two sides have become more adept at managing disputes.
Finally, the economic relationship has benefitted from the good fortune of few, if
any, transcendent economic disputes over the past five years.
The launch of the FTA is likely to change three of these four factors, at least
while the agreement is being negotiated and then debated in Congress and the
National Assembly. The WTO dispute resolution system likely will retain its
depoliticizing role, but many interests in the United States are likely to shine a
spotlight on the incomplete areas of South Korea’s reforms, rather than the areas of
progress. The quarterly working-level trade meetings that have helped stabilize the
economic relationship are likely to be superseded by the FTA talks. Lastly, by
definition, the FTA is likely to politicize nearly every aspect of the bilateral
relationship, particularly if the agreement reaches the ratification stage in the two
countries’ legislatures. The South Korean media and National Assembly often
carefully and publicly scrutinize their government’s economic negotiations with the
United States for signs that Korean officials compromised too heavily. In early 2005,
for instance, the National Assembly launched a corruption investigation of
individuals who negotiated the deals with the United States and other countries to
allow greater imports of foreign rice into South Korea. Due to the size of the Korean
market, U.S. companies may demand more concessions than they have in other
recent FTA negotiations, such as those with Australia and Thailand. If so, this is
likely to be perceived as unfair inside South Korea.

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