Order Code RL33185
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
Updated January 30, 2006
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
Summary
This long report covers recent developments in Liberia, a small, poor West
African country. It held elections in October 2005, with a presidential run-off vote
in November — a key step in a post-conflict transition and peace-building process
that began following its second civil war in a decade. The latter war began in 1999,
escalated in 2000, and ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected
president in 1997 after Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed
anti-Taylor rebel groups. It also affected neighboring states, which accepted Liberian
refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of armed
aggression by the Taylor regime. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an economist, won the presidential election with 59.4%
of votes. Inaugurated on January 16, 2005, she became the first female president of
an African country. Her run-off opponent was George Weah, a former soccer player
whose star status and rags-to riches history make him a hero to Liberian youth. Weah
contested the election, but most election observers characterized the process as
orderly, generally well-administered, and free and fair. The election fulfilled a key
goal of an August 2003 peace accord, which ended the second civil war, leading to
an on-going, U.S.-aided post-war transition process, which is bolstered by the multi-
faceted U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It carries out diverse peacekeeping,
civilian policing, and socio-economic assistance functions. UNMIL was preceded by
the U.S.-assisted deployment in August 2003 of an Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force. Liberia’s security situation is
stable but subject to periodic volatility. Humanitarian conditions are improving.
Progress in governance under the interim government was mixed; widespread
corruption within it was widely reported. Liberia’s economy and state structures
remain devastated by war. A legal case against former president Charles Taylor, a
war crimes indictee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) who lives in exile
in Nigeria, remains unresolved. The United States is providing extensive post-war
reconstruction aid and support for security sector restructuring, which will include
the training of a newly recruited and vetted 2,000-person military.
In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia’s rebuilding and peace
building processes, Congress has shown considerable interest in the status of Charles
Taylor. It passed laws (P.L. 108-199 and P.L. 108-106) urging that SCSL indictees,
like Taylor, be transferred to the court. In May 2005, the House and Senate passed
H.Con.Res. 127 (Royce) urging the same outcome. P.L. 109-102, the FY2006 foreign
operations appropriations act, provides $13 million for the SCSL. H.Amdt. 480
(Watson) to H.R. 2601, the FY2006-FY2007 foreign relations authorization act,
would require that the United States seek the expeditious transfer of Taylor to the
SCSL for trial. Congressional interest in Liberia also focuses on immigration and
debt issues. Bills related to these ends include H.R. 257 (Jackson-Lee), H.R. 2092
(Jackson-Lee), H.R. 3450 (Patrick Kennedy), S. 656 (Reed); S.Amdt. 452 (Reed);
H.R. 1268 (Jerry Lewis); and H.R. 1130 (Waters). H.Con.Res. 327 (Eddie Bernice
Johnson) and H.Con.Res. 313 (Payne) would commend Liberia for successfully
holding elections and congratulate Sirleaf for her electoral victory.

Contents
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Transition Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2005 Post-War Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Conduct of Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Weah Election Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
New Government: Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sirleaf Policy Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Security Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Security Sector Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Humanitarian Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
HIV/AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Concession Deals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Anti-Corruption Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Charles Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S. and Congressional Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix 1: Acronyms Used in this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. Election 2005 Legislative Results by Party: Seats and Percentage
of Vote Won . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
Recent Developments
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf,1 elected with 59.4% of the vote in a November 8, 2005,
run-off election, was inaugurated on January 16, 2006, becoming the first ever
African female head of state. In her inaugural address, she laid out a detailed and
multi-faceted governance agenda emphasizing security, public and private sector-led
economic revitalization, good governance and anti-corruption efforts, regional and
international cooperation, and political reconciliation and inclusiveness based on
constitutional, democratic norms. She also vowed to give Liberian women, who she
sees as a key political constituency, “prominence in all affairs of our country.”
In late January, Sirleaf announced a financial audit of the outgoing transitional
government, which was repeatedly accused of corruption.2 She also announced a
roster of nominees for her cabinet; most are seen as well-seasoned technocrats and
professionals. Recruitment and vetting of personnel to serve in a reconstituted
Liberian military, a U.S.-funded effort, has began in late January. The Sirleaf
administration has made no immediate moves to seek the repatriation of former
president Charles Taylor from Nigeria or his transfer to the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, where he has been indicted for war crimes.3
1 While her name is widely cited as Johnson-Sirleaf, the Liberian president does not employ
a hyphenated form of her last name. See Wil Haygood, “For Liberia’s ‘Iron Lady,’
Toughness Part of Territory,” Washington Post, Dec. 16, 2005.
2 In December 2005, a U.N. sanctions monitoring panel had reported that there were large
shortfalls or related discrepancies in government accounts. In early January, the interim
government admitted to some discrepancies but contended that most of the unaccounted for
money was being transferred between government agencies.
3 This issue is discussed below. In separate interviews in January 2006, Sirleaf was quoted
as saying of seeking such a transfer that “We have to do it. We will do it. When the timing
is right, it will happen.” She said that she sees it “as a secondary issue” vis-a-vis “our
national development agenda,” although such a goal “may be an utmost concern to the
international community.” She also said that her administration is consulting “regional
leaders who managed the process of leading to his exile” and that it “will exercise a decision
that does not undermine the security” of Liberia. See Ann Curry, “Interview: Liberian
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Discusses Her Election and Plans for Liberia,” NBC News:
Today, Jan. 16 2006; Hans Nichols, “Liberian President to Ask Nigeria to Hand over
Charles Taylor to War Crimes Court,” AP, Jan. 20 2006; and Agence France-Presse,
“Taylor’s Indictment Not Immediate Priority: Sirleaf,” Jan. 27 2006.

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Background
Liberia, a small, poor West African country of about 3.4 million people, is
undergoing a post-conflict transition and peace-building process after its second civil
war within a decade. The latter conflict burgeoned in 2000, after several minor border
incursions in 1999. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997
after Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel
groups: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for
Democracy in Liberia. The war led to an extreme deterioration in political, economic,
humanitarian, and human rights conditions. It also affected neighboring states, which
accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became
targets of acts of armed aggression by the Taylor regime.4
A peace accord was signed
Liberia at a Glance
on August 18, 2003, after
Geography: Small tropical coastal West African country
months of international
about the size of Virginia
mediation. It was facilitated by
Population: 3.4 million (2005 est.)
Annual population growth rate: 2.64%
two events: Charles Taylor’s
Exchange rate adjusted Gross National Income
resignation of the presidency
(GNI): $355.18 million (2003)
and departure from Liberia on
GNI per capita: $110 (2003)
External Debt: $2.568 billion (2003)
August 11, after he was granted
Key Exports: Rubber, iron, cocoa, gold, coffee. There
political asylum in Nigeria; and
is currently a U.N. ban on timber and diamond exports
the early August deployment of
Languages: English & 29 distinct languages or dialects
Ethnic groups: 16 indigenous groups (95%) &
an Economic Community of
Americo-Liberian and former slave descendants (5%)
W e s t A f r i c a n S t a t e s
Religions: Indigenous beliefs 40%, Christian 40%,
Muslim 20%
( E C O W A S ) m i l i t a r y
Literacy: Male, 73.3%; Female, 41.6% (2003; est. vary)
i n t e r v e n t i o n force, t h e
Under-5 Mortality rate: 235 deaths/1,000 live births
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
HIV/AIDS adult infection rate: 8% - 12%
Life Expectancy, years at birth:

(ECOMIL). ECOMIL, with
Male, 46.75; Female, 48.65
extensive U.S. and United
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2005; World Bank
Nations (U.N.) assistance,
Development Indicators; Ethnologue.com; U.N. data for AIDS
rates; see below.
deployed to Liberia to end
heavy fighting and alleviate a
worsening humanitarian crisis
in the wake of a failed June
2003 cease-fire. It was tasked with monitoring and securing the cease-fire, enabling
the delivery of relief aid, and preparing the way for the U.N. Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL). UNMIL, authorized by the U.N. Security Council on September 19, 2003,
deployed to Liberia on October 1, 2003, two weeks before the National Transitional
Government of Liberia (NTGL) took office on October 14. ECOMIL was dissolved
and its military forces absorbed into UNMIL, which carries out diverse peacekeeping,
civilian policing, and socio-economic assistance functions in support of Liberia’s
transition process. UNMIL has also assumed responsibility from the U.N. Mission
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for providing a military guard force for the Special
4 This report focuses on current issues and recent events. CRS Report RL32243, Liberia:
Transition to Peace
, and CRS Report RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War
Developments, and U.S. Relations
, both by Nicolas Cook, provide in-depth background on
events in Liberia during recent decades.

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Court for Sierra Leone, discussed below; UNAMSIL’s mandate ended on December
31, 2005.
Transition Process
The August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement,5 signed by the three
warring factions and 18 political parties, laid out a peace process, provided for the
creation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and allocated
leadership positions within it. The NTGL was mandated to re-establish functioning
government authority and prepare for national elections that were held in mid-
October and November 2005. A newly-elected government is slated to replace the
NTGL in late January 2006. The NTGL consisted of an executive branch, presided
over by a Chairman, Gyude Bryant, and an interim parliament, the National
Transitional Legislative Assembly. Bryant, a businessman and church layman who
leads the Liberian Action Party, oversaw the functions of the central government and
various public corporations, agencies, and commissions. The transition faced many
challenges, most related to the extremely destructive effects of many years of war in
Liberia. Others included the dominant role within the NTGL of the three former
armed factions, which were prone to internal rivalries; political discord over the
allocation of state positions and resources; very limited state capacities; and reported
public sector corruption.
2005 Post-War Elections
Peaceful Senate, House of Representatives, and presidential elections were held
on October 11, 2005, and a presidential run-off vote was held on November 8. The
22-candidate presidential poll led to a run-off race. It pitted George Manneh
“Oppong” Weah, 39 years of age, a former professional top soccer player whose star
status and rags-to riches history make him a hero to Liberian youth, against Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf, 67 years of age, a Harvard-trained economist and former
businesswoman who had served as Liberian finance minister and as a United Nations
and World Bank official. On November 15, 2005, the National Elections
Commission (NEC) declared Sirleaf the winner of the presidential race, with 59.4%
of votes against Weah’s 40.6%, making her the first-ever female president of an
African country. Despite its declaration in favor of Sirleaf, the NEC subsequently
probed and later rejected claims by Weah, discussed below, that the election was
fraudulent.
In contrast to the presidential race, election results for seats in the bicameral
legislature were disparate; no party received more than 24% of seats in either
chamber and none dominated in both the Senate and the House. The largest party in
the 64-member House of Representatives is Weah’s Congress for Democratic
Change (CDC), which won 15 seats. The Liberty Party (LP) won nine House seats,
while Sirleaf’s Unity Party (UP) and the Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL) each won eight. Seven other parties each won between one and five House
seats, and seven independent candidates each won a seat. In the 30-seat Senate,
5 Accord text available from U.S. Institute of Peace [http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html].

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COTOL won seven seats and the UP won four; all other parties won between one and
three seats.6
Table 1. Election 2005 Legislative Results by Party:
Seats and Percentage of Vote Won
Party
Senate
House
Seats
Vote (%)
Seats
Vote (%)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
3
10
15
23.4
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
7
23.3
8
12.5
(COTOL)
Liberty Party (LP)
3
10
9
14.1
Unity Party (UP)
4
13.3
8
12.5
Independent
3
10
7
10.9
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
3
10
5
7.8
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
3
10
4
6.3
All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)
1
3.3
2
3.1
Nation Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
2
6.7
1
1.6
New Deal Movement (NDM)
-
-
3
4.7
National Reformation Party (NRP)
1
3.3
1
1.6
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
-
-
1
1.6
Source: National Elections Commission of Liberia, 2005 Election Results, [http://www.necliberia.org/results].
Notable among the newly elected legislators were several former Taylor regime
officials and leaders of former armed factions or security services. These include
senators Jewel Howard-Taylor, a former wife of Charles Taylor (NPP; Bong County);
Prince Yormie Johnson (independent, Bong County); and Saye-Taayor Adolphus
Dolo (COTOL, Nimba County). Johnson is the former leader of a faction that
splintered from Taylor’s early in the first civil war and is infamous for personally
presiding over the bloody, videotaped murder of former head of state Samuel Doe.
He returned to run in the election from exile in Nigeria, where he had professed to
have become a born-again Christian evangelist. Dolo is a former pro-Taylor militia
leader, known by the nom de guerre General Peanut Butter, who reportedly
committed war-time atrocities and recruited child fighters and who is said to have
aggressively opposed UNMIL peacekeeping activities. In the House, they include
Edwin Snowe (independent, Montserrado County) and Saah Richard Gbollie (NPP,
Margibi County), and Kai G. “White Flower B-50” Farley, (CDC, Grand Gedeh
County). Snowe, who was elected speaker of the House in mid-January 2006, is a
former Taylor in-law, and the former head of the Liberian Petroleum and Refining
Corporation (LPRC), from which Taylor regime officials reportedly diverted
significant amounts of funds, some of which may have benefitted Taylor during his
6 Full election results are available online from the NEC: [http://www.necliberia.org/results].

CRS-5
exile in Nigeria.7 Gbollie is a former Taylor fighter and Taylor administration police
official accused of human rights abuses. Farley is an ex-MODEL commander and
NTGL official accused of threatening the 2003 peace accord.
Conduct of Elections. With some minor exceptions, the election was
reportedly well-administered. About 1.35 million citizens registered to vote in April
and May 2005, in a process that was marred by some minor acts and threats of
violence and localized disruptions but was generally peaceful. Attempts by some
NTGL ministers to try to run for office in the 2005 election, in violation of the 2003
peace accord, also sparked controversy. About 1.012 million registered voters
(74.9%) participated in the October elections, and over 821,000 (60.7%) voted in the
run-off poll. Registration results guided decision-making about the distribution of
polling places and electoral materials and the composition of constituencies. The
large number of presidential candidates (over 50 initial prospective candidates, of
whom 22 were ultimately registered) and registered political parties (30) reportedly
proved confusing for some voters. Key election issues included national
reconciliation and unity, corruption, jobs, general economic growth, and social
services and physical infrastructure needs.
UNMIL elections staff and U.N. agencies supported media outreach and civic
education, technical tasks, and electoral security coordination, together with the
national police. UNMIL aid for the elections reportedly totaled about $8 million, and
the European Union pledged $1 million. Most of $10 million in U.S. elections
assistance supported the programs of the nonprofit democracy strengthening
organizations IFES (elections technical assistance); the National Democratic Institute
or NDI (civic education); and the International Republican Institute or IRI (political
party training). IRI and NDI, the latter jointly with the Carter Center, deployed teams
to monitor the elections, as did the African and European Unions, the U.S. and many
other governments, and international organizations. Over 6,000 domestic observers,
including over 3,500 from civil society groups, also monitored the vote.8
Weah Election Dispute. Weah, who had claimed to have been cheated in the
first round, contested his loss in the second round. Citing alleged evidence that he
maintained had been turned over to him by “concerned citizens,” he claimed that the
election had been rigged and “not free and fair” and called for a nullification and
re-run of the vote. He pursued his claim though a number of formal channels, but
after the NEC dismissed his claim, after meeting with Sirleaf, and under heavy
international pressure, on December 21 he agreed to drop his claim and accept the
poll results. Many observers were skeptical about claims that systematic or large-
scale fraud may have marred the election. U.S. officials viewed the process as having
been orderly, largely well-administered, and free and fair, and such views were
shared by most other governments and international entities that observed the vote.
7 Coalition for International Justice, Following Taylor’s Money: A Path of War and
Destruction, May 2005.
8 The author of this report observed the election as a member of the IRI delegation. In the
county where he monitored the voting process, the election was well-run. Poll workers
appeared well trained; voting equipment and materials were distributed on time and in
sufficient quantity; and voting was peaceful and voter turnout rates high.

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The United States nevertheless called for an investigation of Weah’s claims and for
any contest of results to be carried out peacefully and through established legal
channels.
Weah’s decision to dispute the poll results spurred unrest in Monrovia.
Although he had called on his supporters to be peaceful while he contested the
election, many Liberian and international officials worried that his claims might spur
his supporters, who include a high proportion of war-affected, often illiterate youth
and many ex-combatants, to engage in violent protests. Many of them, chanting such
slogans as “No Weah! No peace!,” had protested on his behalf during the NEC
counting process, and in some cases clashed violently with U.N. peacekeepers,
including near the U.S. Embassy. Some vowed to engage in further violence if Weah
were not declared the election winner. On December 12, Weah returned to Liberia
after meeting presidents John Kufuor of Ghana and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa,
who urged him to concede his defeat with grace. Upon his return, he stated on his
King FM radio station that “I am President of this country, whether you like it or
not... One cannot have an inauguration in January when the case we are pursuing is
not resolved. ... We are seeking justice and there cannot be peace without justice.”
He was also quoted as saying that “We must fight to obtain” “revolution” and
“justice.” In the wake of these statements, CDC supporters protested violently,
causing damage to vehicles and buildings, and clashed with security forces after
police tried to break up a gathering at the CDC headquarters. The unrest, which CDC
partisans blamed on police provocation, was suppressed by UNMIL civilian and
Liberian national police, and 50 persons were arrested, but the situation in Monrovia
remained tense. There are unconfirmed reports that two NTGL officials were
involved in orchestrating the violence.9 Rhetorically volatile statements by some
officials of Weah’s CDC party initially may have provoked unrest among his
supporters and laid the groundwork for their continuing demonstrations. Some
remarks targeted NEC chairwoman Frances Johnson Morris, who labeled CDC
assertions “reckless and irresponsible,” and whom CDC officials called upon to step
down for “smearing” Weah. CDC legislators-elect also threatened to boycott
parliament if Weah’s complaints were not addressed.
New Government: Prospects
Sirleaf may face challenges in meeting high voter expectations, for instance in
relation to her election promise to provide public electricity in Monrovia within six
months of being elected, despite the complexity and great cost of such an
undertaking. Voters also are seen as unlikely to give the new government a
honeymoon period, following what many see as disappointing performance by the
transitional government. The public is likely to demand rapid improvements in social
services and the construction physical infrastructure, particularly in support of
education, healthcare, and transportation.
9 IRIN, “Liberia: Riots Erupt as Weah Claims Presidency,” Dec. 12, 2005 and Christopher
Melville, “Comment from Defeated Presidential Candidate Provokes Riots in Liberian
Capital,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, Dec. 13, 2005, inter alia.

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Sirleaf will probably not be able to govern unilaterally, as Liberia’s tradition of
winner-take all politics dominated by a historically strong executive branch allowed
past incumbents, because the electorate gave no single party a strong governing
mandate. The keenly contested 22-candidate presidential first round vote, in which
no candidate garnered more than Weah’s 28.3% of votes — necessitating a run-off
presidential poll — and the splintering of the legislature among many parties,
suggests that no party enjoys the backing of a majority of the electorate. Sirleaf’s
Unity Party does not enjoy a majority in the legislature, whereas several of the parties
that lost in the presidential election are comparatively well positioned to potentially
wield significant political power. Many observers also believe that the legislature
may take a more engaged and assertive role in policy-making than has been
traditional in Liberia. The fractionalized make-up of the legislature, however,
suggests that successful national policy decision-making will require
coalition-building and that many independents and small parties may be able to
exercise substantial bargaining power within such a process. The same features
could, however, produce political gridlock or political flux characterized by fluid, ad
hoc,
and possibly issue-specific alliances, rather than clear and unified policy-making
trends. Given the Liberian polity’s fragmented nature; the fact that Weah’s defeat has
proven a bitter outcome for his largely youthful, sometimes volatile base of support;
and because of deeply felt war-related social divisions and antagonisms, many
analysts also see a need for Sirleaf to rapidly initiate efforts to foster national
reconciliation and rebuild national unity, goals that she vowed to strongly pursue in
her inaugural address.
Sirleaf has reportedly been discussing these and other issues, including her
priorities for Liberia and the status of Charles Taylor (see section below entitled
“Charles Taylor”), with interested governments in West Africa and abroad. During
a mid-December trip to the United States, Sirleaf met with World Bank President
Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and his Africa deputy,
Cindy Courville, and was slated to meet with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
Treasury Secretary John Snow, and Members of the House and Senate, including the
Congressional Black Caucus and Majority Leader Bill Frist.10
Sirleaf Policy Agenda. In her inaugural address, Sirleaf laid out a
multi-faceted policy agenda, based on what she pledged would be “a new era of
democracy” characterized by political inclusion and toleration, non-violence, and
safe-guarding and promotion of constitutional and civil liberties and rights. She
highlighted national reconciliation as the most “urgent” and “compelling” task facing
her administration, and pledged to support and strengthen the Liberian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
Economic Renewal. Sirleaf stated that her administration, in coordination
with donors, would identify “key objectives and deliverables” during the first 150
days of her tenure. She vowed to achieve “quick and visible progress” benefitting a
geographically diverse and “significant number” of Liberians under five “major
pillars: Security, Economic Revitalization, Basic Services, Infrastructure, and Good
10 Reed Kramer, “Showered With Enthusiasm, Liberia’s President-Elect Receives
High-Level Reception in Washington,” AllAfrica.com, Dec. 11, 2005, inter alia.

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Governance.” Calling high unemployment rates “a national crisis,” she vowed to
create jobs, especially for youth, who she said would need to play a central role in
national reconstruction. Many observers view the broad dissatisfaction and
economical and education disenfranchisement of Liberia’s large youth population as
having been a key structural factor facilitating Liberia’s armed conflicts. She also
promised to target post-war development toward “those areas that have received less
in the distribution of economic benefits” — though she also reiterated her campaign
promise to rapidly restore “some measure” of electricity to Monrovia, the capital, a
center of wealth and economic activity in Liberia.
Calling the task of post-war economic reconstruction “awesome” and amendable
to “no quick fix,” she said she would pursue an economic agenda emphasizing
creation of “an investment climate that gives confidence to Liberian and foreign
investors,” the exploitation of Liberia’s rich natural resources, and expanded
economic and social infrastructure rehabilitation. She called for a policy framework
and “sequential measures of structural change” aimed at achieving “sustainable
growth and development” and an allocation of resources reflecting these priorities,
which she called essential for the consolidation of peace. She laid out plans to create
a $1 billion “multi-year economic reconstruction plan tied to a Poverty Reduction
Strategy Program” to relieve Liberia “from a staggering $3.5 billion external debt”
and meet the U.N. Millennium Development Goals in Liberia, saying that details of
the plan would be presented at a “partnership meeting” in May or June 2006. She
also stressed the key role played by small farmers and marketers, noting that even
during the war, they had persevered in pursuing “self-sufficiency in economic
activity,” and said that there is a need to reform Liberia’s land tenure system “to
promote more ownership and free-holding for communities.”
Governance. Sirleaf vowed to “forcibly and effectively” fight the “debilitating
cancer of corruption” as “the major public enemy” and warned that any member of
her administration who tried to “challenge us in this regard” would “do so at his or
her personal disadvantage.” She promised that she and all members of her
administration would lead by example and that all key officials would be required to
declare their assets and follow a National Code of Conduct, passage of which she
outlined as a prospective legislative goal. She strongly endorsed and promised to
“enforce” the Governance and Economic Management Program (GEMAP, discussed
below) to deal with”serious economic and financial management deficiencies” in
Liberia and in order to achieve her policy goals and obtain foreign assistance
conditional upon implementation of GEMAP. These outcomes, along with
implementation of an “integrated capacity building initiative” and what she predicted
would be Liberia’s “competence and integrity in the management of our own
resources,” would she said, eventually obviate the need for GEMAP.
She stated that civil service agencies “lack clarity in mandate and have little or
no linkages to our national priorities, policies, and goals” and suffer from a “seriously
bloated” workforce, but also contended that civil servant pay was poor and in arrears
by about $20 million. To remedy these situations, she outlined a “Civil Service
Reform Agenda” involving a “process of rationalizing” state agencies to make them
“lean, efficient, and responsive to public service delivery.” She promised to
institutionalize a meritocractic civil service system based on “qualification,
professionalism, and performance.” She called for a redeployment of some public

CRS-9
sector workers “to areas where they can perform successfully,” in part through
“proposed alternative employment initiatives,” micro-loan programs, and through
training. In order to create “a civil service that is efficient, effective and honest,” she
promised a review of the public service wage system to ensure that pay is
commensurate with qualifications and performance and that salaries are paid on time.
Foreign Policy. Sirleaf declared peaceful regional integration and security
cooperation “based upon economic partnership” and private sector-focal regional
integration to be her guiding foreign policy goals. She also vowed to maintain strong
international bilateral and multilateral partnerships, notably within multinational
organizations and treaty frameworks to which Liberia is a party and — significantly,
given recent regional history — stated that “no inch of Liberian soil will be used to
conspire to perpetrate aggression” against neighboring countries.

Women. Paying homage to what she described as the special efforts of women
in ensuring her election and in strongly advocating peace — even in the face of war-
related “inhumanity,” “terror,” military conscription, forced labor, and rape — Sirleaf
vowed to “empower Liberian women in all areas of our national life.” In particular,
she promised to strengthen laws and law enforcement to protect women against rape
and “crimes that dehumanize them,” support the education of children, in particular
that of girls, and to provide programs to enable women to play a key role in the
economic revitalization process.
Security Conditions
Liberia’s security situation has improved markedly since August 2003 but
remains subject to periodic volatility and localized instability. Over 101,000
ex-combatants were demobilized under a disarmament program administered by
UNMIL and the NTGL that ended in late 2004. Public security has periodically been
threatened by sometimes violent political faction rivalries; criminal acts, often by
ex-combatants; and civil unrest related to socio-economic grievances, predominantly
involving students, workers, civil servants, jobless youth, and former fighters. Price
increases for rice, fuel, and cement are key sources of social dissatisfaction. U.N. and
U.S. officials and many members of Congress are concerned about persistent,
credible reports that Charles Taylor has interfered in Liberian affairs from exile in
Nigeria through a network of political, military, and business associates, which
Taylor denies. These alleged actions are seen as destabilizing and threatening to the
consolidation of peace.11
11 Liberia remains under U.N. sanctions, first imposed under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1521 (2003), that prohibit trade in arms, diamonds, and timber with Liberia, and
the travel of certain designated individuals, mostly members or associates of the Taylor
regime. The current U.N. travel ban list includes newly elected Senators, Jewel
Howard-Taylor and Adolphus Dolo and representatives Edwin Snowe and Kai Farley. Many
of the listed individuals are also subject to financial asset freezes mandated by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1532 (2004). For more detail, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia:
Transition to Peace
, by Nicolas Cook.

CRS-10
Security Sector Reform. With U.S. assistance, Liberia has begun to create
a new military made up of an initial 2,000 recruits. Selection and vetting of volunteer
enlistees, for purposes of screening out human rights abusers, began in late January
2006. The State Department is administering the overall military training program
through two contractors: DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers
(PAE), in coordination with U.S. military trainers. DynCorp is helping to vet, recruit,
and provide basic training for the new force. PAE will provide specialized advanced
training, equipment, logistics, and base services. The training package is currently
projected to cost about $95 million, according to the State Department, prospectively
to be drawn from a mix of FY2004 through FY2007 International Disaster and
Famine Assistance, Regional Peacekeeping, and Foreign Military Assistance funds.
Training is slated to begin in February 2006. Military restructuring was hindered by
a need to demobilize and verify the severance pay eligibility of over13,000 irregular
forces and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldiers. Funds for this purpose have been
scarce, but over 8,000 irregular forces have been demobilized, and many of over
4,000 regular AFL soldiers have been demobilized. Top officers comprise the final
category slated to be decommissioned, a goal that is seen as needing to be
accomplished prior to inauguration of the new government to avoid any potential
sources of military disgruntlement during the succession of state power. Total
demobilization cost estimates vary between $15 million and $18 million.
The United States also is providing Liberia with UNMIL-administered civilian
police (CIVPOL) training assistance, which includes the deployment, as members of
UNMIL, of about 20 U.S. CIVPOL advisors, as well as equipment and contractor-
based logistical support. The Special Security Service (SSS), a roughly 1,252-
member presidential protection unit that under the NTGL continued to provide
executive branch and VIP close protection functions, is being restructured. About 600
SSS officers are receiving general UNMIL police training and will continue to
provide VIP protection services. The remaining SSS members are slated to be
decommissioned, but there is no current funding for this purpose. U.S. aid also
supports the rehabilitation of the judicial and penal systems.
Humanitarian Conditions
Humanitarian conditions are steadily improving, though from a base of severe
and widespread post-war need, and poverty remains endemic. Liberia continues to
receive substantial international food aid, with about 708,000 persons receiving food
assistance each month, and is highly donor-dependent. International assistance is,
however, increasingly supporting resettlement and socio-economic recovery, rather
than emergency humanitarian needs. By late August 2005, over 207,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and over 87,000 refugee returnees had been resettled in
permanent places of residence. There remained about 314,000 IDPs as of mid-
September 2005. The United Nations has reported a lack of funds to resettle about
20% of this population. Most IDPs and over 37,000 refugee returnees have received
resettlement aid, usually consisting of basic non-food items, transport aid, and two
months of food supplies. U.N. agencies, together with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and NTGL ministries have implemented a wide range of
reconstruction and capacity building projects relating to nutrition, water and
sanitation, primary healthcare services, and transport infrastructure. Numerous
schools have re-opened nation-wide, with extensive assistance from UNICEF.

CRS-11
HIV/AIDS. The threat of HIV/AIDS in Liberia is gaining increasing attention.
While no reliable national prevalence tests have been completed recently — though
such efforts are underway — Liberia is estimated to have an HIV infection rate of
between 5.9% and 8.2%, though some observers believe that the rate could be as high
as 12% in some population sub-groups.12 The UNMIL HIV/AIDS Adviser’s Office
is supporting public education-related AIDS prevention and national planning efforts
focused on care of orphans and vulnerable children, among other activities. The
World Health Organization, in coordination with other U.N. agencies and the NTGL,
is developing project proposals to fight AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and build health
system capacity. The U.N. Population Fund supports several AIDS awareness and
prevention programs. Liberia receives Global Fund assistance, but its application for
further assistance under the Fund’s recent Round 5 funding project assessment
process was reportedly rejected.13 USAID implements several AIDS-related programs
in Liberia on behalf of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC).
These include the first post-war demographic health survey, in partnership with other
donors, which includes HIV surveillance; targeted behavior change efforts focusing
on youth and other groups; and support for home-based care and related assistance.
In her inaugural speech, in which she cited the 12% infection rate, President Sirleaf
vowed to “tackle this national scourge by updating and reinvigorating our HIV/AIDS
policy within our first 150 days [and...] reconstitute and empower, along with our
development partners, the National Commission on HIV/AIDS.”
Governance
Progress in governance has been mixed. Although the NTGL carried out most
basic functions, the restoration of state authority and the rehabilitation of state
institutions under its authority were hampered by central government ministry
inefficiencies, widespread resource constraints, and lack of institutional and financial
system capacities and trained manpower. Progress has been reported in recent
months, however. Many revenue, customs, immigration, and local officials have been
deployed to sites outside Monrovia, and regional Central Bank offices have opened,
permitting salary payments without recourse to time-consuming travel to Monrovia.
USAID is supporting the rehabilitation of administrative buildings in several key
counties.
Among the most challenging issues facing recent governance capacity-building
efforts were persistent reports of corruption within the NTGL, in some cases on a
large scale, notably in the context of import-export transactions, government
contracts, and the issuance of commodity marketing or concession rights. The U.N.
Secretary-General reported in mid-March 2005 that there was a “lack of [NTGL]
transparency in the collection and use of revenues and the resistance of some
government and public corporation officials to reforms and audits aimed at fighting
corruption” (S/2005/177). The World Bank and bilateral donors made similar
12 IRIN PLUSNEWS, “Youth Not Putting HIV Prevention Lessons into Practice,” Oct. 27,
2005 and USAID, Health Profile: West Africa-HIV/AIDS, n.d.
13 For background on the Global Fund, see CRS Report RL31712, The Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Background and Current Issues
, by Raymond W. Copson
and Tiaji Salaam.

CRS-12
observations and called for transparency measures. National fiscal and budget
obligation mechanisms and voucher record-keeping systems are described as chaotic
and subject to manipulation in some cases by key officials. The agency miscellaneous
expense budget account category “Other” was reportedly extremely large in many
cases, and expenditures of such funds were said to have been carried out in a highly
ad hoc manner. Actions by the transitional legislature either to appropriate for
private use or pay very nominal lease fees for expensive vehicles that each legislator
was given drew local and foreign condemnation. In November 2005, the U.S.
Embassy in Monrovia stated that the U.S. government was
shocked and disappointed by the recent incidents of transfers of Liberian
Government property and resources into private ownership. This drains vital
government resources that could otherwise be used for critical developmental
programs, and sends the wrong signal to international donors who finance such
programs. It also perpetuates the culture of abuse of public trust and impunity
that has contributed to two decades of decline in Liberia. The U.S. Embassy
considers these transfers unscrupulous, irresponsible, and contrary to the public
interest of the people of Liberia. Liberian government resources are for the
benefit of the Liberian people and should not be misappropriated for private
use.14
Citing a 2004 presidential proclamation, it stated that Liberian government officials
who engage in “violations of the public trust”and persons who abet such actions
might — along with their families — will be ineligible for U.S.-funded programs and
services, including consideration for Diversity Visa, Immigrant Visa, and other visa
services.15 Liberia is not eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
benefits, “largely for reasons related to its poor record on economic reform, rule of
law, corruption, human rights, and regional destabilization,” according to the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).16
Concession Deals. Natural resource and land concession contract deals also
drew attention during the NTGL’s tenure because of their financial significance and
potential long-term effects on national development. U.N. experts and donor
governments questioned the propriety of a March 2005 monopsony diamond
concession deal with a previously unknown firm, which was later cancelled.17 Some
14 See U.S. Embassy-Monrovia, “U.S. Embassy Shocked and Disappointed at Abuse Of
Public Trust,” Press Release, Nov. 18, 2005 and IRIN, “Liberia: Scramble for Goodies
Ahead of Political Handover,” Nov. 21 2005.
15 See Proclamation by the President, To Suspend Entry as Immigrants or Non-immigrants
of Persons Engaged in or Benefitting From Corruption
, Jan. 12, 2004.
16 USTR, 2005 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward
Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act
.
17 Diamond deposits in Liberia are predominantly alluvial, i.e., found on or near the surface
after having been deposited by water flows, often distant from their point of origin. In
January 2006, however, the firm Diamond Fields International (DFI) Ltd. announced that
it had discovered strong indications of a kimberlite, or pipe of igneous, volcanic, often
diamond-bearing material, in Grand Cape County. DFI is also involved in gold exploration
in Liberia. See DFI, “Diamond Fields Announces the Discovery of Kimberlite in Liberia and
(continued...)

CRS-13
observers also questioned the NTGL’s award of offshore oil exploration permits to
three relatively obscure firms just prior to elections.
The NTGL signed two major long-term natural resource concession deals. One,
with the Firestone group of companies, extends and amends a previous series of
concession agreements, first signed in 1926, giving Firestone rights to large
plantation areas for the cultivation of rubber.18 The contract was amended, in part,
because Firestone contends that it was unable to exploit its holdings due to fighting
over the last decade and a half, and in order to boost foreign investment in Liberia.
The deal gives the Firestone group surface rental and other rights to nearly 200
square miles of active or proposed rubber plantation land for 36 years in exchange
for $.50 per acre per year and various investments, tax payments, social and
infrastructure development outputs, and various other commitments. It may be
extended for another 50 years after renegotiation. The other deal, with
Netherlands-based Mittal Steel Holdings, provides for the rehabilitation or
construction of diverse mining, administrative support, processing, and transport
infrastructure intended to support the extraction and shipment of iron ore from
northern Liberia. It gives Mittal a variety of surface rental, mineral license, iron ore
extraction, transport infrastructure construction, and other rights in exchange for
diverse capital investments, totaling about $900 million, and royalty, lump sum, tax,
and other payments to the government. The initial term of 25 years is extendable for
additional 25-year terms, if certain criteria are met.
Both deals have drawn criticism from some civil society groups that have
contended that the NTGL lacks a legal mandate to negotiate long-term concessions,
that such functions should only be carried out by a duly elected government, and that
such deals should be negotiated in a manner more favorable to Liberian economic
and other national interests.19 The contracts were also politically controversial. The
17 (...continued)
Progress with Gold Exploration,” Jan 9, 2006. Several other firms are involved in diamond
explorations in various counties. Diamond exports are presently banned under a U.N.
Security Council resolution, as previously discussed. The Liberian government is attempting
to set up structures and processes required to comply with the Kimberley Process, an
international regime to regulate trade in rough diamonds, which is a precondition for the
lifting of the diamond embargo. As part of such efforts, it has suspended issuance of
diamond mining licenses, all of which expired at the end of December 2005; diamond
mining is thus effectively illegal at present.
18 The agreement is between the government of Liberia and Firestone Natural Rubber
Company, a U.S. limited liability firm that is an affiliate of Bridgestone-Firestone North
American Tire, and its Liberian subsidiary, Firestone Plantations Company.
19 A coalition of Liberian human rights groups unsuccessfully petitioned the Liberian
Supreme Court to halt execution of the two contracts on such grounds and contended that
the deals had been made without public input. The complainants reportedly may seek to re-
file their case after the formation of the new elected government. See Morrison O.G. Sayon,
“Supreme Court Places ‘Stay Order’, Firestone, Mittal Steel Agreements,” The Inquirer
(Monrovia), Nov. 7, 2005; John Walsh, “Supreme Court Issues Stay Order On NTGL;
Ja’neh Appears Today,” FrontPageAfrica, Nov. 7, 2005; George Bardue, “Supreme Court
Stops Budget Execution and Summons NTGL Officials,” The News (Monrovia), Nov. 7,
(continued...)

CRS-14
Mittal deal was the subject of rival bids by the large mining firms Global
Infrastructural Holdings Limited (GIHL), BHP Billington and Real Tito, and its
ratification was contested legally and in parliament. Some civil society critics have
alleged that the deals were not undertaken in a transparent manner. Mittal has denied
that charge, and maintains that the contract was won in a “transparent and
competitive bid process” and will bring significant foreign investment and
infrastructure development to Liberia.20 The former U.S. Ambassador to Liberia John
Blaney reportedly pushed for requirements that, regardless of what firm was awarded
mining rights, a major railroad that would be rehabilitated under such a deal be made
a multi-use railroad.21
The Firestone contract has drawn attention for other reasons. Some Firestone
plantation workers have complained about poor working conditions and high
production quotas. Some environmental advocacy groups and residents living near
Firestone rubber processing facilities have alleged that chemicals used in latex
processing are polluting wells, rivers, and water life. The Firestone group also is the
subject of a class action suit brought in California by the International Labor Rights
Fund, an advocacy organization that says its goal is to counter child, forced, and other
abusive labor practices internationally, including through litigation. The suit alleges
that Firestone employs children, practices forced labor, involuntary servitude, and
negligent employment practices. Firestone categorically denies these charges,
describing the suit as “outrageous” and “completely without merit.” It maintains that
its operations comply fully with Liberian law, and asserts that its workers are all
adults of legal working age, are union-represented, are paid well above prevailing
wages, and are provided with social services, and that Firestone is bringing much
needed investment to Liberia.22
19 (...continued)
2005.
20 Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia Minister Wants Mittal Iron Ore Deal Revised,” Reuters, Sept.
14, 2005; D. Moses Wantu, “Mittal Steel Hearing Backfires,” The Analyst (Monrovia), Sept.
6, 2005; Economist Intelligence Unit, “Liberia: A steel?,” Country Monitor, Aug. 29, 2005;
Steve Swindells, “Mittal Steel Defends Pursuit of Liberian Iron Ore Concession,” June 14,
2005 Metal Bulletin News Alert Service; The Analyst (Monrovia), “Bryant, Mittal Steel
Flout Law,” June 13, 2005; The Analyst (Monrovia), “NTGL Sued in U.S. District Court -
Over LIMINCO Bidding,” June 13, 2005, inter alia.
21 A smaller former mine railroad between Monrovia and Bong County has been
rehabilitated by AmLib, a mineral exploration firm, and put into use as a multi-use transport
line. It has reportedly contributed to a several-fold drop in charcoal prices in Monrovia, and
is increasing the supply of other farm products to the capital. Charcoal is the main cooking
fuel in Liberia.
22 Femi Oke, “Is Bridgestone/Firestone Exploiting Liberian Workers?,” Inside Africa, CNN
International, Nov. 12, 2005; Joe Bavier, “Firestone Lease an Issue in Liberia Election
Campaign,” VOA News, Sept. 14, 2005; Gary Gentile, “Firestone Accused of Using Slave
Labor,” Associated Press, Nov. 17, 2005; and Reuters, “Labor Group Sues Bridgestone on
Liberia Plantation,” Nov. 17, 2005, inter alia.

CRS-15
Anti-Corruption Efforts. The NTGL took some steps to halt corrupt
practices. It established a Task Force on Corruption and a Cash Management
Committee and attempted to eliminate bribe-taking in relation to commodity imports,
notably by better managing Monrovia’s port, of which UNMIL took temporary
control in late April 2005. In addition, the National Transitional Legislative
Assembly (NTLA) created a committee to investigate allegations of administrative
and financial irregularities by its leadership, which eventually led to the removal of
key NTLA leaders. Some observers, however, saw the NTGL Task Force as lacking
the capacity or political will to achieve significant results, and some Liberian officials
resisted donor and ECOWAS-backed transparency and audit measures. An African
Development Bank loan was reportedly not disbursed in 2005 because Liberia failed
to provide required fiscal data, and an ECOWAS-sponsored auditing mission was
opposed by Liberian auditors and certain government officials, who cited concern
over a violation of Liberian sovereignty, despite the publicly-stated support of
Chairman Bryant for the audit. In July 2005, Chairman Bryant suspended two
officials over their alleged diversion of funds paid by the satellite communications
firm Inmarsat to several Liberian state entities, and the NTGL suspended three
Bureau of Maritime Affairs officials, including the Commissioner, and Liberia’s
International Maritime Organization representative for fraud.
Concerns over transparency produced a sometimes halting and highly
conditional provision to Liberia by donors of pledged aid, as well as some reticence
to offer new funding. This negatively affected the scale and pace of resettlement,
reintegration, and socio-economic rehabilitation. Nonetheless, a network of national,
international, U.N., and private development and relief organizations has made
considerable progress in these areas. Most of them participate in an inter-sectoral,
U.N.-coordinated initiative, the Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF).
An April 2005 NTGL/U.N./World Bank assessment of the RFTF found that it has
been effective in “addressing short-term, stabilization priorities,” but that medium
to long-term post-transition institutional and reconstruction development will require
a more robust, coherent, and comprehensive strategy.
There are some indications that Liberian-donor government relations may
improve under Sirleaf. In late January 2006, she announced a financial audit of the
outgoing transitional government, which was repeatedly accused of corruption, and
has reportedly suggested that she may seek a review of some public contracts or
concession deals granted by the NTGL. She has also expressed strong support for
the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), an
agreement agreed to and signed in September 2005 by the NTGL and the
International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), an international policy coordinating
group of donor and regional governments and multinational institutions. GEMAP
provides for contract-based management of the revenue and expenditure flows of key
public sector entities, notably the main port, airport, and fuel refining firm, among
others, in order to strictly enforce central government controls over state revenues
and to improve public fiscal capacities. It also supports diverse economic governance
and judicial capacity-building measures for the government aimed at
institutionalizing the good governance and management capacity-building goals and
reforms envisaged under GEMAP. Elements of GEMAP that call for an external
management role were initially opposed by some in Liberia as an intrusion on
national sovereignty, but donor governments, including the United States, pushed for

CRS-16
strict conditionality for future assistance to Liberia. The United States has sent
several Treasury Department advisors to Liberia in the areas of budget and tax policy,
management, and administration; central bank operations and fiscal policy and
regulation; and has assessed Liberia’s financial enforcement (financial crime and
corruption) capacity. A resident U.S. legal advisor and a temporary duty team of
prosecution experts are slated to be deployed to Liberia soon to assist in building
Liberia’s judicial capacity.
Charles Taylor
The future status of Charles Taylor, an indictee of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) for his alleged involvement in war crimes in Sierra Leone, remains
in question.23 The SCSL would like Nigeria, where Taylor is in exile, to transfer him
to SCSL custody. However, when Nigeria, under U.S. and other international
pressure, provided him with refuge it stated that it was doing so to aid the Liberian
peace process and would not countenance later pressure to extradite Taylor. Nigeria
also, however, required him to disengage from Liberian politics, either directly or
through proxies. Taylor has reportedly extensively violated these conditions. Many
human rights groups, therefore, assert that Nigeria has good reason to surrender him,
and that his continued asylum perpetuates a “culture of impunity” for human rights
abusers in Africa. Others argue that Taylor’s asylum in Nigeria remains the best way
to ensure continued stability in Liberia.24 In mid-November 2005, ECOWAS peace
mediator Abdulsalami Abubakar rejected a call by the European Union, a major
donor to Liberia, for the Sirleaf government to call for Taylor’s transfer. He also
suggested that any decision on Taylor’s status was “beyond the scope of the
23 On Taylor’s alleged actions and his departure from Liberia and political power, see CRS
Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by Nicolas Cook. It also discusses Taylor’s
alleged involvement in illicit diamond trading and links with Al Qaeda, along with CRS
Report RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S.
Relations
, and CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and
Legislation
, both by Nicolas Cook. In April 2005, the Treasury Department designated
Viktor Bout, an accused international arms trafficker, and four associates, including his
alleged U.S.-based chief financial officer, Richard Chichakli, as “Specially Designated
Nationals” (SDNs) under Executive Order 13348. The action expanded the list of SDNs
under the order, which prohibits financial transactions between U.S. persons and these
SDNs and freezes the assets of SDNs within U.S. jurisdiction. Executive Order 13348 was
issued in order to halt the unlawful depletion, removal from Liberia, and “secreting” of
Liberian resources, funds, and property, actions that it stated were undermining “Liberia’s
transition to democracy and the orderly development of its political, administrative, and
economic institutions and resources.” Treasury accused Bout of supplying arms to Taylor’s
regime and the Sierra Leone rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front, in exchange for
funds from Liberia’s international ship registry, diamonds, and other allegedly illegally
acquired goods. Treasury Dept., “Treasury Designates Viktor Bout’s International Arms
Trafficking Network,” Apr. 26, 2005.
24 For further background on issues surrounding the Taylor case, see section entitled “Status
of Charles Taylor,” CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by Nicolas Cook.

CRS-17
European Union” and that such a suggestion “does not meet the support of
ECOWAS.”25
U.S. relations with the SCSL have been mixed. Although the SCSL has received
$22 million in U.S. funding and may receive $13 million in FY2006,26 some State
Department officials have questioned the political advisability of actions taken by
former SCSL Prosecutor, David Crane, including his unsealing of an indictment
against Taylor during peace talks in June 2003, and the accuracy of his claim that
Taylor sponsored the January 2005 attempted assassination of President Lasana
Conté of Guinea. Such skepticism may, in part, explain the SCSL’s failure to obtain
authority under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which would oblige U.N. member
states to cooperate with the SCSL. However, on November 11, 2005, the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 1638, which authorizes UNMIL to arrest Taylor
if he returns to Liberia.
On May 5, 2005, President Bush and Nigerian president Olesegun Obasanjo met
and discussed the status of Taylor, among other issues. Though few details of the
their exchange were reported, prior to the meeting, White House spokesman Scott
McClellan called for Taylor “to be held to account for the crimes he has committed,”
and stated that the United States and Nigeria are “engaged” in the question of how
“to address the matter”(White House Press Briefing, May 5, 2005). He also expressed
appreciation to Nigeria for facilitating Taylor’s departure from Liberia in 2003,
which he said had helped bring peace in Liberia. He did not describe the engagement.
His remarks mirrored State Department statements on the issue during the past two-
plus years. State Department officials have often called for Taylor to “face justice,”
but have generally offered few specific suggestions on how this might be
accomplished.27 The U.S. position may be changing, however. During a reported
telephone call to congratulate Sirleaf on her electoral victory, President Bush
25 U.N. IRIN, “Liberia: Peace Supremo Rejects EU Demand to Hand Over Taylor,” Nov. 17,
2005, inter alia.
26 The conference agreement accompanying H.R. 3057 (Kolbe), which became P.L. 109-102,
the FY2006 foreign operations appropriation, designates $13 million in Economic Support
Funds for the SCSL. P.L. 109-102 states that these funds “should” be made available for
a U.S. contribution to the SCSL.
27 See, e.g., State Department, Daily Press Briefing, May 5, 2005. At least one State
Department official has publicly called on Nigeria to hand Taylor over to the SCSL directly.
See Daniel Balint-Kurti, “Wanted for War Crimes, Liberia’s Ex-president Hunkers down
in Nigerian Exile,” Associated Press, May 31, 2005. Some sources suggest that National
Security Council policy makers on Africa have been reticent to advise that Taylor be
transferred to the SCSL because such a transfer could be a potential source of instability for
both Sierra Leone and Liberia. A second factor may have been the U.S. commitment to
Nigeria to honor the latter’s conditions for accepting Taylor after President Bush stated in
2003 that “Taylor must go” (Press Conference of the President, “President Bush Discusses
Top Priorities for the U.S.,” July 30, 2003, inter alia), and deference to Nigeria’s views on
the matter, given its central role as a regional peacekeeping and political mediating power.
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations during a hearing
entitled Confronting War Crimes in Africa on June 9, 2004, Howard F. Jeter, former U.S.
ambassador to Nigeria, testified that “President Obasanjo acted with our full knowledge and
concurrence.”

CRS-18
reportedly expressed support for bringing Taylor to justice so that “he can no longer
threaten the people of Liberia and the region of West Africa.”28 His reported remarks
did not, however, specify a venue where such a goal could be achieved.
Sirleaf has stated that her administration will eventually seek the repatriation of
former president Charles Taylor from Nigeria or his transfer to the SCSL under
certain conditions. These include a successful outcome to consultations with
“regional leaders who managed the process leading to his exile,” accommodation for
certain unspecified timing considerations, and a transfer process that will “not
undermine the security” of Liberia.29 Some observers believe that Sirleaf does not
in general support prosecuting those who committed war time atrocities during the
1989-2003 civil wars.30 Sirleaf has stated that Liberia cannot alone decide whether
Taylor should be turned over to the SCSL and that the international community
would “have to be a part of such a decision because they were part of the
arrangement that saw Taylor leave for Nigeria.” She has reportedly stated that any
solution would have to have the specific concurrence of the European Union, the
African Union, and West African leaders, with whom she met during a regional pre-
inauguration consulting tour, in part to address “certain national and regional
sensitivities.” Her statements are significant because Nigeria has stated that it would
only turn Taylor over to an elected Liberian government at the latter’s request. In
July, the Mano River Union, comprised of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, issued
a joint communique suggesting that Nigeria should review the terms of Taylor’s
asylum or refer consideration of his status to the ECOWAS Heads of State.31
28 State Department, “Bush Congratulates Liberian President-Elect,” Washington File, Nov.
30, 2005.
29 Hans Nichols, “Liberian President to Ask Nigeria...” and Agence France-Presse,
“Taylor’s Indictment...,” op. cit.
30 See Jeremy I. Levitt and J. Peter Pham, “Liberia Must Confront its Past If It Wants a
Brighter Future,” The Baltimore Sun, December 8, 2005, which quotes Sirleaf as stating
consistently that she does “not support any war crime tribunal in Liberia,” because such
tribunals might reignite old antagonisms and conflict. Such statements, along with Sirleaf’s
short-lived support for Taylor’s rebellion for several months in 1990, which was cited by
her political opponents during the 2005 presidential campaign, has also prompted periodic
speculation that she might not seek his transfer to the SCSL. Sirleaf, who ran against Taylor
in 1997, dismisses claims that she might be biased toward Taylor. Sirleaf asserts that
months after the start of Taylor’s effort to topple then-president Samuel Doe, whose regime
had twice imprisoned Sirleaf, she halted her support for it when it became clear that
Taylor’s armed movement was responsible for widespread human rights abuses. She also
maintains that she opposed Taylor’s regime and has not spoken to him for about seven years.
See Wil Haygood, “For Liberia’s ‘Iron Lady,’...,” op. cit., inter alia.
31 See SAPA-DPA , “Sirleaf Addresses Taylor War Crimes Issue,” Nov. 20, 2005; BBC
News, “Liberian Taylor’s Fate Discussed,” Nov. 30 2005; and AFP, “Backed by Neighbors,
Liberia Requests Taylor Handover to SLeone War Court,” July 29, 2005.

CRS-19
U.S. and Congressional Focus
U.S. First Lady Laura Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, among
other prominent U.S. guests, attended Sirleaf’s inauguration. Their presence, Sirleaf
stated in her inaugural speech, “manifests a renewal and strengthening of the long-
standing historic special relations which bind our two countries and peoples.” She
also stated that it “reflects a new partnership with the United States based on shared
values” and that Liberians are “confident that we can continue to count on the
assistance of the United States [...] in the urgent task of rebuilding of our nation.”
Congress has shown considerable interest in the status of Charles Taylor and has
generally, with a few exceptions, shown strong support for the SCSL. It passed laws
(P.L. 108-199 and P.L. 108-106) urging that SCSL indictees, like Taylor, be
transferred to the court, and in May 2005, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res.
127 (Royce), which urges the same outcome.32 P.L. 109-102, the FY2006 Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill, reaffirms congressional support for the court. It
would limit some types of assistance under certain conditions for countries in which
SCSL indictees are “credibly alleged to be living” unless such countries cooperate
with the SCSL, including by transferring such indictees to the SCSL. It also requires
U.S. support for that goal within the U.N. Security Council. It specifically would,
after a period, bar assistance to Nigeria unless the President reports to the
Committees on Appropriations on steps taken in FY2003 through FY2005 to obtain
Nigeria’s cooperation in surrendering Taylor to the SCSL and a strategy and time line
for achieving that purpose. H.Amdt. 480 (Watson) to H.R. 2601, the FY2006 -
FY2007 foreign relations authorization act, would require the Administration to seek
the expeditious transfer of Taylor to the SCSL for trial.
Congress also provided substantial support for Liberia’s rebuilding and peace
building processes.33 U.S. assistance is summarized on Ttable 2. Other congressional
interest in Liberia focuses on Liberia-related immigration and debt issues. H.R. 257
(Jackson-Lee), H.R. 2092 (Jackson-Lee), H.R. 3450 (Patrick Kennedy), and S. 656
(Reed) would give permanent U.S. residence status to qualified Liberians resident in
the United States, among other measures, as would S.Amdt. 452 (Reed) to H.R. 1268
(Jerry Lewis). H.R. 1130 (Waters) would enact various measures intended to reduce
the national debts of certain poor countries, including Liberia, and encourage their
governments to fund social services. Two concurrent resolutions, H.Con.Res. 327
(Eddie Bernice Johnson) and H.Con.Res. 313 (Payne), would commend Liberia for
successfully conducting elections and congratulate Sirleaf for her electoral victory.
32 The European Parliament passed a similar resolution in February 2005.
33 An Administration Economic Support Fund (ESF) FY2006 budget request for $75 million
for Liberia, however, was not included in P.L. 109-102 (formerly H.R. 3057, Kolbe, the
FY2006 foreign operations appropriations bill). Any ESF funding for Liberia is likely to be
drawn from $88 million in general ESF funding designated for Africa under P.L. 109-102.
This public law also mandates special congressional notification for the expenditure of
funds used to assist Liberia.

CRS-20
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-2006
($ millions; errors due to rounding)
Account
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
Actual
Estimate
Request*
Child Survival and Health Program (CSH)
2.82
4.47
2.90
Development Assistance (DA)
-
6.85
7.86
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
-
24.80
75.00
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
-
2.98
2.00
International Disaster & Famine Assistance
200.00
-
-
(IDFA)-Supplemental
Int. Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INL)
-
5.00
2.00
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related
0.16
-
-
Projects-Small Arms &Light Weapons (NADR-SALW)
Africa Regional Peacekeeping (PKO; estimates)
NA
25.00
20.00
P.L. 480, Title II [emerg. Food aid]a
21.53
22.50b
NAa
USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
23.60
9.71b
NAa
Assistance (OFDA) [emerg. humanitarian aid]a
Transition Initiatives
3.1
2.53
4.6
State Dept., Bureau of Population,
22.80
28.19 (est.)c
NAa
Refugees & Migration (PRM)[refugee, IDP aid]a/c
Totals - Bilateral Aid
274.01
132.03
114.36
U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)/
290.34
129.00d
159.21
Contribs. to Int. Peacekeeping Account (CIPA)
Totals - All Funding
564.35
261.03
273.57
Sources: State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2006 and
other fiscal years; USAID, Congressional Budget Justification, FY2006 and other fiscal years; and
information from USAID/OFDA, State/PRM, and State/Political-Military Affairs officials.
*P.L. 109-102, the foreign operations FY2006 appropriation act, which was signed into law on
November 14, 2005, does not specify aid levels for Liberia, though it requires that the Committees on
Appropriations be notified if funds appropriated under the act are used to assist Liberia. Specific
assistance levels for Liberia will be finalized pursuant to requirements in the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 and the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations regarding Administration aid allocation
decisions, and through executive-congressional consultations.
No

tes
a. These figures reflect appropriated levels, but some accounts, such as P.L. 480, Title II, OFDA, and
PRM levels, often increase during a given fiscal year because they are appropriated in a lump sum
and allocated throughout the year in response to emergent needs.
b. Levels to date.
c. The State/PRM $28.19 million FY2005 figure is an estimate. In general, State/PRM funding is
difficult to break out by Liberia-only levels because PRM funds refugee camps in third countries that
may house people of different nationalities, including Liberians. The table data are the closest
estimates PRM can provide for Liberia-specific spending.
d. UNMIL FY2005 CIPA Budget: $229.716 million; bills received as of Sept 8, 2005 were $129
million.

CRS-21
Appendix 1: Acronyms Used in this Report
AFL:
Armed Forces of Liberia
AGOA:
African Growth and Opportunity Act
CDC:
Congress for Democratic Change, Liberian political party
CIPA:
Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account
CIVPOL:
Civilian police
COTOL:
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia, Liberian political
party
CSH:
Child Survival and Health Program Fund
DA:
Development Assistance Account
ECOMIL:
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOWAS:
Economic Community of West African States
ESF:
Economic Support Fund
FMF:
Foreign Military Financing Account
GEMAP:
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
GIHL:
Global Infrastructural Holdings Limited
ICGL:
International Contact Group on Liberia
IDFA:
International Disaster & Famine Assistance Account
IDP:
Internally displaced person
IFES:
Elections technical assistance organization formerly known
as the International Foundation for Election Systems
INL:
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement
IRI :
International Republican Institute
LP:
Liberty Party, Liberian political party
NADR-SALW:
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Projects-Small Arms and Light Weapons
NDI :
National Democratic Institute
NEC:
National Elections Commission (of Liberia)
NGO:
Non-governmental organization
NTGL:
National Transitional Government of Liberia
NTLA:
National Transitional Legislative Assembly
OFDA:
USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGAC:
U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator
P.L. :
Public law
P.L. 480, Title II : Humanitarian food aid
PKO :
Regional Peacekeeping Account
PRM:
Population, Refugees & Migration Bureau, State Department
RFTF:
Results-Focused Transitional Framework
SCSL:
Special Court for Sierra Leone
SDN:
Specially Designated National
SSS:
Special Security Service (of Liberia)
TI:
Transition Initiatives Account
U.N.:
United Nations
UNAMSIL:
U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone
UNICEF:
U.N. Children’s Fund
UNMIL:
U.N. Mission in Liberia

CRS-22
UP:
Unity Party, Liberian political party
USAID:
U.S. Agency for International Development
USTR:
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative