Order Code RL32862
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions:
Background and Congressional Action on
Civilian Capabilities
Updated January 26, 2006
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Martin A. Weiss
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background
and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities
Summary
The State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) is intended to address longstanding concerns, both within
Congress and the broader foreign policy community, over the perceived lack of the
appropriate capabilities and processes to deal with transitions from conflict to
sustainable stability. These capabilities and procedures include adequate planning
mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, efficient interagency
coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate
civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required. Effectively
distributing resources among the various executive branch actors, maintaining clear
lines of authority and jurisdiction, and balancing short- and long-term objectives are
major challenges for designing, planning, and conducting post-conflict operations.
Established in July 2004, S/CRS has moved rapidly to establish the concepts,
mechanisms, and capabilities necessary to carry out such operations. Currently
working with a staff of under 40, most detailed from other agencies, S/CRS has taken
steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts, to develop the first phase of a rapid-
response crisis management capability, to improve interagency and international
coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help State Department
regional bureaus develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.
The first session of the 109th Congress has moved cautiously in funding S/CRS
and its activities. Congress first funded S/CRS in the spring of 2005 in action on
FY2005 supplemental appropriations. It provided $7.7 million of the requested $17.2
million (H.R. 1268, P.L. 109-13, signed into law May 11, 2005). The
Administration’s FY2006 budget request included $24.1 million for the creation of
54 new S/CRS positions and the establishment of a 100-person ready-response cadre.
The House Appropriations Committee report earmarked $7.7 million for S/CRS,
allowing 33 new positions, in State Department appropriations (H.R. 2862, H.Rept.
109-118), but the conference version (H.Rept. 109-272, P.L. 109-108) did not
designate specific funding, leaving the decision on the funding level up to the State
Department.
Congress has not approved the Administration’s request for the creation of a
new $100 million Conflict Response Fund in both FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-
13, above) and in FY2006 foreign operations appropriations (H.R. 3057, H.Rept.
109-265, P.L. 109-102). Instead, conferees on the foreign operations appropriations
legislation requested that the State Department provide “a comprehensive, disciplined
and coherent strategy” for S/CRS coordination of U.S. responses to post-conflict
contingencies. Funding authority for the purposes of the Conflict Response Fund
was provided through transfer authority in the DOD authorization act (Section 1207,
H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163).

---

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Evolving Perceptions of Post-Conflict Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Calls for Change and Initial Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
President Bush’s Directive to Promote Interagency Coordination . . . . 7
Proposals for New Civilian Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
S/CRS’ Mission and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Mandates and Endorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Current Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Monitoring and Planning for Potential Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Developing a Rapid-Response Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Developing Interagency Training Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Other Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Bush Administration FY2005 and FY2006 Funding Requests and
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FY2006 Annual Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appropriations Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appropriations for Science, the Department of State and Commerce
for FY2006 (P.L. 109-108, H.R. 2862) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102,
H.R. 3057) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authorization Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Department of Defense FY2006 Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163,
H.R. 1815/S. 1042) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for FY2006-FY2007 (S. 600) . . . . 16
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2006 and FY2007
(H.R. 2601) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
List of Tables
Table 1. FY2006 Civilian Capabilities Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

---

Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions:
Background and Congressional Action on
Civilian Capabilities
Introduction
President Bush’s pledge, articulated in his February 2, 2005, State of the Union
address, “to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with
governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures” casts the
once-discredited concept of building or rebuilding government institutions,
economies, and civic cultures in a new light. During the 1990s, many policymakers
considered the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries to be an overly
expensive, if not futile exercise. The use of U.S. military forces for such activities,
particularly in the first half of the decade, was troubling to many Members. Now,
however, the Bush Administration, in response to concerns about the threats posed
by weak and fragile states, has reframed both U.S. security and international
development policy and undertaken dramatic corresponding changes in U.S.
governmental structures and practices. These changes, it argues will enable the
United States to perform such tasks more efficiently and at a lesser cost, particularly
in transitions from conflict and in post-conflict situations.
A key component of these changes is the establishment and reinforcement of
new civilian structures and forces. Recently, the Bush Administration has made
new civilian entities a prominent feature in two new initiatives: the National Security
Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) of December 2005 on the management of
interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations and the “transformational
diplomacy” reorganization of State Department personnel and practices.
These initiatives are intended to enhance the United States’ ability to function
effectively on the world scene in the post-9/11 environment. In that environment,
according to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s January 2006 remarks
introducing transformational diplomacy, the greatest threats to U.S. security often
emerge within states that are either too weak to police their domain or lack the
political will or capacity to do so. To deal with that environment, Secretary Rice
outlined a new U.S. foreign policy strategy focusing on the “intersections of
diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security”
and involving extensive changes in government to carry that strategy out.1 State-
1 Remarks at Georgetown School of Foreign Service, January 18, 2006. Available at
[http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm]. This theme was reiterated by Stephen
Krasner, director of Policy Planing at the State Department. Remarks at the Center for
Global Development, January 20, 2006. Available at [http://www.cgdev.org/doc/

---

CRS-2
building (or nation-building as it is often called) is at the center of this strategy. Both
initiatives reinforced the important role that the Bush Administration has given the
new State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS) in policymaking and implementation dealing with conflict transitions and
weak and fragile states.
The 109th Congress faces a number of issues regarding the strengthening of
civilian capabilities for peacekeeping and post-conflict operations. This report will
provide background on these issues and track Congressional proposals and action
related to them.
The first is whether to fund fully and put into permanent law the State
Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
and its operations. Created in mid-2004, S/CRS was tasked with designing, and in
some cases establishing, the new structures within the State Department and
elsewhere that would allow civilian agencies to develop effective policies, processes,
and personnel to build stable and democratic states.
The second issue is whether to authorize and fund two new mechanisms that
would “operationalize” the State Department, i.e., transform it from an institution
devoted to diplomacy to one that would effect change through “on-the-ground”
personnel and programs dedicated to promoting security and stability in transitions
from conflict and post-conflict situations.
Background
Evolving Perceptions of Post-Conflict Needs2
The creation of S/CRS in July 2004 responded to increasing calls for the
improvement of U.S. civilian capabilities to plan and carry out post-conflict state-
building operations. Several factors have combined since 9/11 to substantively
change views on desirability and relative costs of such operations, as well as on the
need to create new and improve existing civilian institutions to carry them out.
Foremost among these factors is the widespread perception since 9/11 that global
instability directly threatens U.S. security and that it is a vital U.S. interest to
transform weak and failing states into stable, democratic ones. Related to this is the
expectation that responding to the threat of instability will require the United States
and the international community to intervene periodically in foreign conflicts with
1 (...continued)
event%20docs/Krasner%20Transcript.pdf]
2 Parts of this Background section and the following section on S/CRS are drawn from a
now archived CRS Report RS22031, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities” The
State Department’s Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, by Nina M. Serafino and
Martin A. Weiss. This report is available from the author.

---

CRS-3
“peacekeeping”3 and “stabilization” forces at about the same intensive pace as it has
done since the early 1990s. Because that pace has stressed the U.S. military, many
policymakers believe that the United States must create and enhance civilian
capabilities to carry out the peacebuilding tasks that are widely viewed as necessary
for stability and reconstruction in fragile, conflict-prone, and post-conflict states.
Finally, numerous analyses distilling the past decade and a half of experience with
multifaceted peacekeeeping and peacebuilding operations have raised hopes that
rapid, comprehensive, and improved peacebuilding efforts can significantly raise the
possibilities of achieving sustainable peace.

Post-conflict operations are complex undertakings, usually involving the
participation of several United Nations departments and U.N. system agencies, the
international financial institutions and a plethora of non-governmental humanitarian
and development organizations, as well as the military and other departments or
ministries of the United States and other nations.4 The United States developed its
contributions to the earliest international “peacekeeping” operations of the 1990s on
an ad hoc basis, with little interagency planning and coordination, and often with the
U.S. military in the lead. The military was called upon to perform such missions not
only for its extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency
could match the military’s superior planning and organizational capabilities. In
addition, because of its manpower, the military carried out most of the U.S.
humanitarian and nation-building contribution, even though some believed that
civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks, especially those involving
cooperation with humanitarian NGOs.
3 “Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad
hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or
enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election
observers, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those
countries, organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring
and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in
conflict. (Many of these activities are often also referred to as “nation-building”; a better
term, some analysts suggest, is “state-building.”) As used here, the term encompasses both
“peace enforcement” operations, sent to enforce an international mandate to establish peace,
and “peacebuilding” activities. Peacebuilding activities, usually undertaken in a post-
conflict environment, are designed to strengthen peace and prevent the resumption or spread
of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of
refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions, election-monitoring, and
promotion of political participation and human rights.
4 The term “post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization” is broad but is usually understood
to encompass tasks and missions to promote security and encourage stable, democratic
governance and economic growth following major hostilities. In the past, many of the
“stabilization” activities were loosely labeled “peacekeeping.” (See footnote 1.)
Reconstruction involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to
support long-term economic growth and development. This infrastructure can be physical
(e.g., roads and schools), or institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems) For additional
background on various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and assistance, see CRS Issue
Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military
Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino; and CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations
Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne.

---

CRS-4
During the 1990s, many analysts began to perceive the need to improve and
increase civilian contributions to peacekeeping operations, especially for those
activities related to planning and conducting operations and to establishing a secure
environment. An important Clinton Administration initiative was the May 1997
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled The Clinton Administration’s
Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations. According to the white
paper explaining it, PDD 56 sought to address interagency planning and coordination
problems through new planning and implementing mechanisms.5 Due to what some
analysts describe as internal bureaucratic resistance, PDD 56’s provisions were never
formally implemented, although some of its practices were informally adopted. (In
December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD) 44, which replaced PDD-56. For more information, see below.) The
Clinton Administration also attempted to remedy the shortage of one critical nation-
building tool, international civilian police forces, through PDD 71, which a white
paper describes as outlining policy guidelines for strengthening criminal justice
systems in support of peace operations.6 While never implemented by the Clinton
Administration, PDD 71 has been partially put into force by the Bush
Administration.7
Improvements in the provision of social and economic assistance are also
viewed as crucial to successful outcomes. Post-conflict populations need “safety net”
and poverty alleviation programs, as well as technical assistance and advice on
monetary and fiscal policy and debt management in order to create an environment
conducive to democratization and economic growth.8 While the popular image of
U.S. post-conflict assistance is the post-World War II Marshall Plan, through which
the United States provided the foreign assistance needed for Europe’s post-conflict
reconstruction, multilateral institutions became increasingly important during the
1990s, when small, regional conflicts proliferated following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. International organizations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund now play crucial roles, working with the U.S.
government to provide economic assistance and technical advice on rebuilding post-
conflict economies. (Nevertheless, although the United States has provided some
funding for economic reconstruction multilaterally for the recent Afghanistan and
Iraq operations, most U.S. funding for post-conflict operations is provided
bilaterally.) Many analysts now judge that multilateral assistance is more effective
5 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations:
Presidential Decision Directive. May 1997. [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm].
6 U.S. Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations. February 24,
2000 [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm], hereafter referred to as PDD-71
White Paper; and U.S. Text: Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 71,
[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm].
7 See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations:
Problems and Proposed Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.
8 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,”
World Bank Working Paper, Oct. 2002.

---

CRS-5
for the recipient country than bilateral aid for two reasons.9 First, disbursing funds
multilaterally through U.N. agencies or international organizations gives greater
assurance that it will reach recipients than providing aid bilaterally with direct
payments to individual governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In
addition, analysts find that bilateral aid is more likely to be apportioned according to
the donor’s foreign policy priorities rather than the economic needs of the recipient
country.10

For many analysts and policymakers, the ongoing Iraq operation illustrates a
U.S. government need for new planning and coordination arrangements that would
provide a leadership role for civilians in post-conflict phases of military operations
and new civilian capabilities to augment and relieve the military as soon as possible,
and greater international coordination. The perception of a continuing need for such
operations, and the perceived inefficiencies of the still largely ad hoc U.S. responses
have reinvigorated calls for planning and coordination reform. The Bush
Administration’s reluctance to use military forces for nation-building tasks and the
extreme stresses placed on the military by combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan have
pushed those calls in a new direction, to the development of adequate civilian
capabilities to perform those tasks.
Calls for Change and Initial Responses
The perception that international terrorism can exploit weak, unstable states has
convinced many policymakers of the need to strengthen U.S. and international
capabilities to foster security, good governance and economic development,
especially in post-conflict situations. The 9/11 Commission and the Commission
on Weak States and U.S. National Security11 have judged weak states, as well as
unsuccessful post-conflict transitions, to pose a threat to U.S. security. Such states
often experience economic strife and political instability that make them vulnerable
to drug trafficking, human trafficking and other criminal enterprises, and to linkage
with non-state terrorist groups (such as the links between the previous Taliban
government in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda terrorist network). Weak states also
are unprepared to handle major public health issues, such as HIV/AIDS, that can
generate political and economic instability.12 These commissions argued for
assistance to the governments of weak states and of post-conflict transitions regimes
9 Milner, Helen, “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal Agent
Problems,” available at [http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/milner.pdf], and
Schiavo-Campo, S., “Financing and Aid Arrangements In Post-Conflict Situations,” World
Bank Working Paper, May 2003.
10 Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” NBER
Working Paper No. w6612, Jun. 1998.
11 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004, and On the
Brink: A Report of the Commission on Weak States and US National Security, sponsored by
the Center for Global Development, May 2004.
12 Prins, Gwyn, “AIDS and Global Security,” International Affairs, vol. 80, Issue 5, 2004.

---

CRS-6
to help them control their territories, meet their citizens’ basic needs, and create
legitimate governments based on effective, transparent institutions.
These and other studies recognize a need to enhance U.S. government structures
and capabilities for conducting post-conflict operations.13 Although differing in
several respects, the studies largely agree on five points: (1) the current ad hoc
system needs to be replaced with a permanent mechanism for developing contingency
plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations led by civilians; (2)
mechanisms to rapidly deploy U.S. civilian government and government-contracted
personnel need to be put in place; (3) preventive action needs to be considered; (4)
the U.S. government needs to enhance multinational capabilities to carry out post-
conflict security tasks and to better coordinate international aid; and (5) flexible
funding arrangements are needed to deal with such situations. In addition, some urge
substantial amounts of funding for flexible U.S. and international accounts.14
Some analysts have questioned the utility of S/CRS and of the rationale that
underlines its creation and the adoption of the transformational diplomacy strategy
more broadly. Two think-tank studies published in January 2006 dispute the concept
that weak and failed states are per se among the most significant threats to the United
States. They point out that weak states are not the only locations where terrorists
have found recruits or sought safe-haven as they have exploited discontent and
operated in developed countries as well. A report of the Center for Global
Development states that many factors beyond the weakness or lack of government
institutions — demographic, political, religious, cultural, and geographic —
contribute to the development of terrorism.15 As a result, an emphasis on weak and
failed states can lead the United States to give short shrift to more tangible threats
and to areas of greater U.S. interest. The CATO Institute study worries that Secretary
13 The reports are (1) Play to Win: The Final Report of the Bi-partisan Commission on Post-
Conflict Reconstruction, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the
Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), 2003 (a book-length version was published in mid-
2004, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Robert
C. Orr, ed.); (2) Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt
M. Campbell, principal authors. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era Phase I Report, CSIS, Mar. 2004; (3) Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson,
eds. Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, National Defense
University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Apr. 2004, (4) On the
Brink: Weak States and US National Security, Center for Global Development, May 2004;
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities, Dec.
2004; and In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Washington,
D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force, July 2005.
14 The July 2005 Council on Foreign Relations report recommends the establishment of a
conflict response fund of $500 million, a five-fold increase over the amount requested by
the Bush Administration for FY2006. In addition, the report recommends establishing a
new $1 billion standing multilateral reconstruction trust fund under the auspices of the
Group of Eight industrialized nations. This trust fund would be modeled on existing post-
conflict trust funds located at the United Nations and the World Bank.
15 Patrick Stewart. Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers.”
Working Paper No. 73, Center for Global Development, January 2006.

---

CRS-7
Rice’s focus on promoting “responsible sovereignty” as an underpinning of
transformational diplomacy may provide potential justification for eroding the
current international norm of respect for national sovereignty, leading the United
States into fruitless interventions.16 In addition, some analysts are skeptical that the
problems of weak and failed states can be most dealt with through military and
political interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions. The
effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the criteria
for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve
success.
President Bush’s Directive to Promote Interagency Coordination.
In response to proposals to clarify and institutionalize the responsibilities for conflict
response and related for stabilization and reconstruction activities, on December 7,
2005, President Bush issued a presidential directive intended to improve conflict-
response coordination among executive branch agencies. This document, National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, is entitled “Management of Interagency
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” NSPD-44 supersedes PDD-56
(referred to above).
Under NSPD-44, the Secretary of State has the lead responsibility for, “and may
direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to assist the Secretary”
in developing a civilian response for conflict situations and related reconstruction and
stabilization activities, including the development of “a strong civilian response
capability.” The Secretary of State is also responsible for, and may delegate to the
Coordinator, coordination of the interagency processes to identify states at risk, to
lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and to develop detailed
contingency plans for stabilization and reconstruction operations, as well as for
identifying appropriate issues for resolution or action through the National Security
Council interagency process as outlined in President Bush’s first National Security
Policy Directive (NSPD-1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,”
signed February 1, 2001). In addition, NSPD-44 establishes a Policy Coordination
Committee (NSC/PPC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.17
16 Justin Logan and Christopher Preble. Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against
a Standing Nation-Building Office. CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute,
January 11, 2006. The authors make substantial reference to a Fall 2004 paper by Stephen
Krasner, State Department Director of Policy Planning, that challenged the conventional
sovereignty norms. Krasner argues that these norms are outmoded and an obstacle to
dealing with the international threats caused by weak and unstable states. He argues for
granting international acceptance to new norms of shared-sovereignty (more than one
country) or international trusteeships following successful interventions, Stephen Krasner,
“Sharing Sovereignty,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 5-43.
17 NSPD-1 established 17 NSC/PPCs to “be the main day-to-day fora for interagency
coordination of national security policy,” providing policy analysis for more senior
committees (the NSC Principals Committee and the NSC Deputies Committee) and
ensuring timely responses to presidential decisions. Membership on the NSC/PCC is to
consist of representatives from the departments of State, Defense, Justice and the Treasury,
and the Office of Management and Budget, the offices of the President and Vice President,
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NSC. Representatives
(continued...)

---

CRS-8
Under NSPD-44, the Secretary of State is also responsible for coordinating
stabilization and reconstruction efforts with the Secretary of Defense “to ensure
harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the
spectrum of conflict” and to integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency
plans with military contingency plans. NSPD-44 leaves it up to those secretaries to
develop a framework for coordinating S&R activities and military operations as
appropriate. It specifies that lead and supporting responsibilities for individual
operations will be established using the NSC mechanism outlined in NSPD-1.
Proposals for New Civilian Forces. In its FY2006 budget request, the
Bush Administration’s budget proposed funding for S/CRS to establish a 100-person
ready-response cadre of government employees. A prominent feature of several of
the recent reports on stabilization and reconstruction operations was a
recommendation to develop rapidly-deployable civilian forces to undertake state-
building functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities
had ceased. Many analysts view the early deployment of rule of law personnel as
essential to providing security from the outset of an operation, which they argue will
enhance the possibilities for long-term stability and democracy in an intervened or
post-conflict country. Many view the development of civilian groups to do so as
permitting the earlier withdrawal of military personnel than would otherwise be
possible.
Six recent studies have endorsed the creation of cohesive, rapidly-deployable
units of civilian experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations.18
! The November 2003 report of the National Defense University
(NDU) recommended the concurrent deployment of civilian
“stabilization and reconstruction” personnel with combat forces, in
order to expedite the transfer of nation-building responsibilities to
civilians. The report recommends the creation of a standing
interagency stabilization and reconstruction team within the
government, and the development of an “on-call” civilian crisis
management corps of medical, legal, language, and law enforcement
personnel from state and local governments and the private sector.19
! The March 2004 report of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) recommended the establishment of an Agency for
Stability Operations reporting directly to the Secretary of State. The
17 (...continued)
from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, are to participate when issues pertain to their responsibilities.
18 An earlier recommendation was contained in the Clinton Administration’s 2000 PDD-71
on strengthening criminal justice systems in peace operations, which identified such an
initiative as a high priority according to the PDD 71 White Paper. That white paper states
that PDD 71 instructed that “programs must be developed that enable the U.S. to respond
quickly to help establish rudimentary judicial and penal capacity during peace operations
and complex contingencies.” PDD-71 White Paper, op.cit., p 6.
19 Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, op.cit.

---

CRS-9
agency would be responsible for preparing for such operations, as
well as the management and deployment of Civilian Stability
Operations Corps of 200-300 U.S. government civilians, who are
organized, trained and equipped for conducting such operations, and
of a Civilian Stability Operations Reserve of an unspecified number
of non-government civilians with related expertise who would be
on-call for rapid deployment.20
! The April 2004 report of the U.S. Institute of Peace on the rule of
law component of building civilian capacity recommends the
creation of a reserve corps as well as of a separate office in the
Office of the Secretary of State that would have authority to recruit,
deploy, and manage constabulary police units, judges, attorneys, and
other legal professionals.21
! A U.S. Institute of Peace analyst has recommended the creation of
a “U.S. Stability Force” comprised of (1) robust military forces, (2)
civilian constabulary units, (3) civilian police, and (4) rule of law
professionals (lawyers, judges, and corrections experts) that would
deploy concurrently in order to provide the needed security from the
outset.22
! The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on transitions from
hostilities recommends that the Department of State “develop and
maintain a portfolio of detailed and adaptable plans and capabilities
for the civilian roles in reconstruction operations” and that it
“prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of the reconstruction
missions....” The study finds that the civilian police, judges, civil
administrators, and technical advisors are needed to help build new
institutions after a military intervention.23
The establishment of such a corps would be a substantial change from current
practices. The United States deploys Civilian Police (contracted separately for each
operation) to international peacekeeping and stabilization operations through the
State Department’s CivPol program, run by the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INL). The United States currently deploys other rule of law
personnel, with experience in justice and corrections systems, through Department
of Justice contracts, funded by INL. (The State Department’s civilian police program
20 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report,
op.cit. See pp 64-65.
21 Robert M. Perito, Michael Dziedzic and Beth C. DeGrasse, Building Civilian Capacity
for U.S. Stability Operations. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, Special
Report 118, April 2004.
22 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for
a Postconflict Stability Force. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press,
2004. See pp 323-337 for an extensive discussion of this proposal.
23 Transition to and From Hostilities, op.cit., p 58.

---

CRS-10
requests contractors to identify such personnel in an effort to create a capability
within the CivPol to deploy them.)
To many analysts, however, the current system does not provide the full range
of necessary personnel in a timely manner. A major shortage if the role of the
military is to shift at the end of major combat operations from combat to providing
perimeter security is the lack of constabulary units which would take responsibility
for internal security, either military or civilian. The availability of personnel for rapid
deployment may well depend on the arrangements under which they are recruited.
If, as with the U.S. military reserve component, law enforcement and rule of law
personnel are to commit to deploy immediately when called, they may require the
type of benefits (e.g., pension, salaries for regular training) such as members of the
U.S. military reserve component receive. Some also argue the need for
improvements in the U.S. CivPol system.24
S/CRS’ Mission and Activities
Mandates and Endorsements
Congress first endorsed the creation of S/CRS in 2004 as part of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447, signed into
law December 8, 2004). Section 408, Division D defined six responsibilities for the
office, the first five of which respond to the first need — to create a readily-
deployable crisis response mechanism — stated above. As legislated by P.L. 108-
447, S/CRS’ functions are (1) to catalogue and monitor the non-military resources
and capabilities of executive branch agencies, state and local governments, and
private and non-profit organizations “that are available to address crises in countries
or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife”; (2) to
determine the appropriate non-military U.S. response to those crises, “including but
not limited to demobilization, policy, human rights monitoring, and public
information efforts”; (3) to plan that response; (4) to coordinate the development of
interagency contingency plans for that response; (5) to coordinate the training of
civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities in response
to crises in such countries or regions”; and (6) to monitor political and economic
instability worldwide to anticipate the need for U.S. and international assistance.
At a speech given to the International Republican Institute on May 18, 2005,
President Bush stressed the importance of S/CRS and said that the needs perceived
during the start-up of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq influenced the office’s
development.25 His national security policy directive on the management of
24 For more discussion on issues regarding CivPols, constabulary police, and rule of law
personnel, see CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability
Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.
25 “Many fine civilian workers from almost every department of the government volunteered
to serve in Iraq,” noted the President. “But the process of recruiting and staffing the
Coalition Provisional Authority was lengthy and difficult.” Remarks by the President at
(continued...)

---

CRS-11
interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations (NSPD-44), enacted several
months later, underscored the important role conferred on S/CRS but somewhat
expanded its activities beyond those conferred by the Congressional mandate. As
mentioned in the discussion of NSPD-44, above, the Secretary of State may delegate
to S/CRS her responsibilities in the identification of conflict areas and coordination
of conflict prevention and mitigation planning, but also in identifying issues for
action through the National Security Council and in developing a civilian response
capability.
The U.S. military is supportive of S/CRS’ creation and its mission. In his
prepared statement for testimony before the Armed Services committees in February
2005, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited the
creation of S/CRS as “an important step” in helping “post-conflict nations achieve
peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.” “In the future, provided this
office is given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts
and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping,
reconstruction and stability operations,” according to General Myers.26
Despite some Congressional reservations concerning funding for the office and
its activities, S/CRS has also received an endorsement from a task force headed by
two former Members. The June 2005 report of the Congressionally-mandated Task
Force on the United Nations, chaired by former Speaker of the House of
Representatives Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell,
recommended that the United States strengthen S/CRS and that Congress should
provide it with the necessary resources to coordinate with the United Nations.27
Current Activities28
S/CRS is currently comprised of 37 individuals from the State Department and
on detail from other U.S. government agencies. Since its establishment in July 2004,
the office has developed the concepts and mechanisms to carry out the bulk of its
mandate. Among areas in which it lists accomplishments are:
Monitoring and Planning for Potential Conflicts. To monitor potential
crises, S/CRS asked the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to provide it twice a
year with a list of weak states most susceptible to crisis, from which S/CRS chooses
one or more as test cases to prepare contingency plans for possible interventions.
S/CRS is also working with the USAID Office of Conflict Management and
25 (...continued)
International Republican Institute Dinner, Office of the White House, May 18, 2005.
26 Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, before the 109th Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 17, 2005, p. 31,
as posted on the Senate Armed Services Committee website.
27 American Interests and U.N. Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 2005, p. 25.
28 Information in this section was provided by various officials of S/CRS in periodic
interviews and consultations.

---

CRS-12
Mitigation, which is developing techniques for preparing highly-detailed assessments
of current and impending conflicts.
During 2005, S/CRS worked with the U.S. military’s Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) to develop a common civilian-military planning model for stabilization and
reconstruction operations. It also worked to develop specific strategic-level
contingency plans to set goals for addressing possible deteriorating situations in Haiti
and Sudan, and for a post-Fidel Castro Cuba. It is currently working on developing
concepts and personnel to carry out operational level planning.
Developing a Rapid-Response Capability. S/CRS is in the process of
creating integrated and coherent groups of crisis-response personnel. Its concepts for
such groups have been evolving over time. As of late 2005, S/CRS had begun with
the establishment of an Active Response Corps of 100 volunteers from the State
Department government who would be able to leave their jobs to deploy with
military forces at the beginning of an intervention in order to assume stabilization
responsibilities, freeing up military personnel for other tasks. Members of this group
will undertake their first large-scale exercise with the U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) in March 2006.
S/CRS has also begun work for two other groups of crisis-response personnel.
S/CRS is compiling a database of possible members for a 200 Standby-Corps of
federal, state, and local government personnel with solid experience in crisis
situations. On behalf of S/CRS, JFCOM commissioned a feasibility study for a
“Civilian Response Corps” from the Institute for Defense Analysis in an effort to
assess possible options for the development of a reserve of contractors, i.e., retired
government personnel, personnel from state and local governments, private for-profit
companies and non-profit NGOSs, to carry out rule of law and reconstruction
activities. The study is currently under review.
Developing Interagency Training Exercises. To address the need for
greater interagency, particularly civil-military, planning and coordination, S/CRS is
working with the military to develop, among other things, civilian-military training
exercises for stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS was a sponsor of a
civilian-military exercise by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
(CSRS) at the Naval Post-Graduate School and is working with SOUTHCOM to
develop the exercise for March 2006.
Other Activities. In three other areas necessary to carrying out Congress’
mandates, S/CRS has also taken a role. First, it has begun to develop ties with other
international participants to coordinate and enhance civilian capabilities for
stabilization and reconstruction activities. To better plan and carry out response
efforts, S/CRS is developing a system to collect, analyze, and transmit “lessons
learned.” S/CRS also is seeking to help State Department regional bureaus (which
have the lead on preventive activities) to develop concepts and proposals for
preventive action.

---

CRS-13
Bush Administration FY2005 and FY2006 Funding
Requests and Congressional Action
FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations
As the S/CRS was created in mid-2004, well after the FY2005 budget request
was submitted, the Administration has requested substantial S/CRS funding as
FY2005 supplemental appropriations. The February 2005 supplemental
appropriations request asks for $17.2 million for S/CRS operations.
Of this amount, $9.4 million is for the initial stand-up costs of the office.
According to the request, this sum is intended to cover salaries of an initial staff of
45 and support costs (including information technology), and funding for planning,
studies, and services. It will also pay for the creation of a database of U.S.
government capabilities and of communications software that would allow U.S.
government agencies to share information among HQs personnel and those serving
abroad in remote locations. (The State Department’s FY2006 Congressional Budget
Justification cites S/CRS funding levels for FY2004 as $536,000, and for FY2005
and FY2006 as $737,000 each year.)
The other $7.8 million is requested for the initial development in FY2005 of a
rapid response cadre of State Department personnel and the design of a training
program and civil-military exercises. The FY2006 budget request (see below) asks
for funds to establish the cadre.
Congressional Action. The House Appropriations Committee reported the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (H.R. 1268) on March 11, 2005; its accompanying report,
H.Rept. 109-16 stated that the bill contained $3.0 million for S/CRS. No explanation
was given for not including the remaining funds requested by President Bush. Funds
were not added in subsequent House floor action.
As reported April 6, 2005, the Senate Appropriations Committee version of
H.R. 1268 (S.Rept. 109-052), contained $7.7 million, $1.7 million less than the $9.4
million requested for initial stand-up costs. S.Rept. 109-052 stated that the
Committee “expects [the] funding to support additional personnel requirements in
Washington and Sudan.” The report states that the Committee does not include the
$7.8 million requested for the active response unit, but that as “costs and programs
of these new activities are better identified, the Committee will consider any
proposed reprogramming of funds.” In floor action on H.R. 1268 on April 13, the
Senate approved by unanimous consent a Lugar-Biden amendment to provide the full
$17.2 million of the President’s request for S/CRS as emergency supplemental
appropriations.
Conferees provided the Senate Appropriations Committee’s $7.7 million. On
May 11, 2005, H.R. 1268 was signed into law (P.L. 109-13, the FY2005 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief Act).

---

CRS-14
FY2006 Annual Budget Request
The Bush Administration’s FY2006 budget request included $24.1 million for
the S/CRS operations, including the creation of 54 new positions in the S/CRS office
and the establishment of a 100-person “ready-response” cadre within the Department
of State. If approved by Congress, the “ready-response” units members would be
selected from the foreign and civil service and would be specially trained for post-
conflict response missions. Once trained, members would continue to serve in
positions in regional and function bureaus, but would be available for deployment as
“first responders” when an intervention occurs.
In addition, the Administration asked for the creation in FY2006 of a $100
million no-year contingency Conflict Response Fund that would be administered by
S/CRS and could be used “to prevent or respond to conflict or civil strife in foreign
countries or regions, or to enable transition from such strife.” This amount has been
requested several times previously in annual budget and supplemental appropriations
requests. As outlined in the President’s FY2006 budget request, the Secretary of
State could use the Conflict Response Fund “to prevent or respond to conflict or civil
strife in foreign countries or regions” or to facilitate the transition from such strife.
The Administration seeks legislative authority for an exceptional degree of flexibility
for the fund. Its proposed legislative language would not only exempt the application
of any restriction in law for the use of the Conflict Response Fund, but also would
permit the use of additional resources for countries receiving support from the Fund
without regard to restrictions elsewhere in legislation.
Appropriations Legislation
Appropriations for Science, the Department of State and Commerce
for FY2006 (P.L. 109-108, H.R. 2862). The House Appropriations Committee,
in its report accompanying the appropriations bill for Science, State, Justice,
Commerce, and related agencies (H.R. 2862, H.Rept. 109-118, June 10, 2005), noted
its recommendation to provide $7.7 million to the Department of State to fund 33
new positions in S/CRS. H.R. 2862 was passed in the House and received in the
Senate on June 16, 2005. The Senate version of H.R. 2862 does not include State
Department funding, and according to the Senate report accompanying the bill
(S.Rept. 109-88, June 23, 2005) would be included in a separate bill. The conference
version of this bill, H.Rept. 109-272, contains no earmark for S/CRS funding. As the
State Department appropriation is less than the Administration request, this leaves
the status of the 33 positions unclear.
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102,
H.R. 3057). On June 24, 2005, the House Appropriations Committee reported its
FY2006 foreign operations bill (H.R. 3057). As reported, the bill included a few
provisions related to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Most importantly,
the bill authorized the Secretary of State to transfer $100 million among State
Department accounts and to other federal agencies to carry out reconstruction and
stabilization assistance (Sec. 580). Under funding for USAID, the bill appropriated
$50 million (and allows for the transfer of an additional $15 million) to support the
transition to democracy and to long-term development of countries in crisis.

---

CRS-15
Reported June 30, 2005, the Senate version of H.R. 3057 (S.Rept. 109-96) provides
the full Administration request for S/CRS of $24.1 million. For the Conflict
Response Fund, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $74 million,
almost three-quarters of the administration request of $100 million (Table 1), but
Senate floor action reduced the amount to $24 million.
The conference version of the bill (H.Rept. 109-265, P.L. 109-102; signed into
law on November 14, 2005) provided neither the House’s transfer authority nor the
Senate’s funding for the Conflict Response Fund. It also decreased USAID initial
transition assistance to $40 million. In their statement regarding the Conflict
Response Fund, the conferees requested the State Department to provide the
appropriations committees “with a comprehensive, disciplined and coherent strategy
detailing how the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization will
coordinate United States Government-wide efforts to respond to international post-
conflict contingencies” prior to the submission of the FY2007 budget request.
Authorization Legislation
Department of Defense FY2006 Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163, H.R.
1815/S. 1042). Section 1207 of the conference version of the Department of
Defense FY2006 Authorization Act (H.R. 1815, H.Rept 109-360, P.L. 109-163;
signed into law January 6, 2006) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide the
Secretary of State with up to $100 million in services, defense articles and funding
for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country per fiscal
year for FY2006 and FY2007. The assistance is subject to the provisions of Foreign
Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and any law making appropriations to
carry out such acts. The provision requires that the Secretary of Defense notify
armed services, foreign affairs, and appropriations committees of both chambers at
the time the authority is exercised. The original provision contained in a floor
amendment to the Senate version of the bill, S. 1042, offered by Senator James
Inhofe and adopted by the Senate on November 8, 2005, would have provided twice
that amount, i.e., $200 million per year. (The Section 1207 authority is in addition
to the Section 1209 authority to provide defense articles and defense services to the
military and other security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.)
The conferees explanatory statement reiterates the approving statement
regarding S/CRS and DOD’s support of and cooperation with S/CRS that was
originally expressed in the Senate Armed Services’ Committee report accompanying
the FY2006 DOD authorization bill (S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69, May 17, 2005). It also
repeats the Senate Committee’s urging that DOD continue and deepen its
coordination with the State Department “on planning for and participating in post-
conflict stability operations and reconstruction efforts.” In addition, the conferees
state that they view this provision “as a temporary authority to provide additional
resources, if needed, to the Department of State until S/CRS is fully stood up and
adequately resourced.” The conferees caution that they are not inclined to continue
appropriating DOD funds in order to enable the Department of State to “fulfill its
statutory authorities.”
Section 360 of the conference report directs the Secretary of Defense to report
to congressional defense committees by February 1, 2007, on joint field training and

---

CRS-16
experimentation conducted regarding stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
operations during FY2005-FY2006, including a description of the participation of
other departments and agencies and of allied and coalition partners.
Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for FY2006-FY2007 (S. 600). On
March 10, 2005, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported an authorization
bill (S. 600) for foreign relations and for the conduct of foreign affairs. This bill
authorizes $24 million to be appropriated for S/CRS for FY2006. Sections 701-711
incorporate a slightly modified version of the Lugar-Biden Stabilization and
Reconstruction bill of 2004 (S. 2127, 108th Congress) and the version of that bill
reintroduced on January 31, 2005 as S. 209. Senate floor action took place on April
5 and 6, 2005, but the bill was returned to the Senate calendar on April 26, 2005, and
no further action occurred. The House version, H.R. 2601, as introduced and sent to
the floor on June 9, 2005, contains no new S/CRS funding.
(On March 17, 2005, Representative David Dreier introduced H.R. 1361, the
International Security Enhancement Act of 2005. This bill is similar to S. 600 but
would provide S/CRS with additional authority for preventive action that is not
included in S. 600. If enacted, H.R. 1361 would allow the president, acting through
S/CRS, to authorize the deployment to a country likely to enter into conflict or civil
strife in addition to countries emerging from conflict.)
The S/CRS provisions of S. 600 would serve four functions. They would
! Create a statutory basis for S/CRS and its functions, and provide the
Senate with power over the appointment of the S/CRS head;
! Provide authority and funding for the creation of a Readiness
Response Corps of active duty government personnel and
contractors;
! Provide broad authority for conducting post-conflict response
operations, and
! Provide authority for the establishment of an emergency fund to
conduct such operations.
Make the Office of the Coordinator Permanent Law. The provisions
of Section 706 would codify the existence of S/CRS by amending Title 1 of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651 et. seq.), which, among
other functions, provides for the establishment of the higher level positions within
the Department of State. Section 706 states that the Coordinator should have the
rank and status of Ambassador-at-Large, and be appointed by the Secretary “by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate,” giving Congress power over the
appointment. (Although the advise and consent power is generally invoked for
positions of Assistant Secretary and higher, in an analogous entry in 1998, Congress
added the position of Coordinator for Counterterrorism through P.L. 105-277,
Section 2301. The Coordinator for Counterterrorism also holds the rank of
Ambassador-at-large and is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.)
Section 706 also would assign 10 specific functions to S/CRS, which could have the

---

CRS-17
effect of clarifying its relationship to other executive departments and agencies.29
The codification would also prevent the dismantling of the office without the
legislative consent of Congress.
Provide Authority and Funding for a Readiness Response Corps.
The Corps is to consist of two parts — an active duty component and a reserve
component. The active duty component would be comprised of two groups with an
indeterminate total: the first group would contain up to 250 people who are
specifically recruited, hired and trained to serve in the active duty corps, and the
second would be comprised of as many others as the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the AID Administrator, would designate from the ranks of State
and USAID personnel. The reserve component, again of no definitive size, would
be comprised of two sets of volunteers, trained and available as needed, whose names
are placed on a reserve roster. The first group would be personnel from the State
Department (including foreign service nationals), USAID, other executive agencies,
and the legislative and judicial branches. A second group of at least 500 names
would be listed on the reserve roster; these could be retired Federal Government
employees, contractor personnel, nongovernmental organization personnel, and State
and local government personnel with the appropriate training and skills. No more
than 100 people at a time could be contracted under personal services contracts for
a stabilization and reconstruction operation, except that experts and consultants could
be employed for up to 60 days without regard to other requirements for employment
to assist in stabilization and reconstruction. Members of executive agencies,
uniformed services, and employees of State and local government could be employed
29 These functions are: (1) “Monitoring, in coordination with relevant bureaus within the
Department of State, political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for
mobilizing United States and international assistance for the stabilization and reconstruction
of countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife”; (2)
“Assessing the various types of stabilization and reconstruction crises that could occur and
cataloging and monitoring the non-military resources and capabilities of Executive agencies
that are available to address such crises”; (3) “Planning to address requirements, such as
demobilization, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information, that commonly
arise in stabilization and reconstruction crises”; (4) “Coordinating with relevant Executive
agencies (as that term is defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code) to develop
interagency contingency plans to mobilize and deploy civilian personnel to address the
various types of such crises”; (5) “Entering into appropriate arrangements with other
Executive agencies to carry out activities under this section and the Reconstruction and
Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2005”; (6) “Identifying personnel in State and
local governments and in the private sector who are available to participate in the Response
Readiness Corps or the Response Readiness Reserve ... or to otherwise participate in or
contribute to stabilization and reconstruction activities”; (7) “Ensuring that training of
civilian personnel to perform such stabilization and reconstruction activities is adequate and,
as appropriate, includes security training that involves exercises and simulations with the
Armed Forces, including the regional commands”; (8) “Sharing information and
coordinating plans for stabilization and reconstruction activities with the United Nations and
its specialized agencies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, nongovernmental
organizations, and other foreign national and international organizations”; (9) “Coordinating
plans and procedures for joint civilian-military operations with respect to stabilization and
reconstruction activities”; and (10) “Maintaining the capacity to field on short notice an
evaluation team to undertake on-site needs assessment.”

---

CRS-18
on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis to assist with the work. Within three
years of enactment of this provision into law, at least 10 percent of State Department
and USAID employees in the United States would have to be either (1) members of,
(2) trained to undertake the activities of, or (3) identified for potential deployment in
support of the Response Readiness Corps.
Provide Broad Authority for Conducting Post-Conflict Response
Operations. Section 705 would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (FAA) by providing broad authority for the President to furnish assistance
through U.S. civilian agencies or non-Federal employees for the stabilization and
reconstruction of a country or region in or in transition from conflict or civil strife.
The assistance could be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law except
the provision of FAA Section 614(a)(3), which requires the President to consult with
and provide a written policy justification to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
(now International Relations), the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the
Appropriations committee of each chamber. Section 705 would also waive the
percentage and dollar limitations on U.S. government drawdowns of commodities
and services for unforeseen emergencies contained in FAA Section 552(c)(2) and on
the transfer between accounts contained in FAA Section 610 and on the use of funds
and foreign services authorized under the FAA Arms Export Control Act, as well as
sales authorized under the latter, as provided for by FAA Section 614.
Provide Authority for the Establishment of an Emergency Fund.
Section 705 would also authorize the establishment of a $100 million fund, as well
as its automatic replenishment each fiscal year, for stabilization and reconstruction
activities. Funds could be spent without regard to any provision of law except FAA
Section 614(a)(3). (The 108th Congress turned down five Administration requests for
the creation of a $100 million emergency crisis response fund, as now proposed in
S. 209 and S. 600. Conferees on the FY2005 consolidated appropriations bill, P.L.
108-447/H.R. 4818 deleted a Senate provision for $20 million in a no-year money,
State Department Crisis Response Fund. Congress has long resisted the provision
of “blank check” pots of money as an abdication of constitutional appropriation and
oversight powers. Nevertheless, Congress has provided for such a mechanism in the
case of the automatically replenishable Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
or ERMA emergency relief account.)
Sense of Congress Provisions on Further Governmental
Reorganization. Among the seven Sense of Congress statements contained in the
proposed legislation, two concern the reorganization of the U.S. government to better
plan for and conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations. One states that the
President should establish a new National Security Council directorate to oversee the
development of interagency contingency plans and procedures for such operations.
The other states that the president should establish a standing committee, to be
chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to ensure the
appropriate coordination of stabilization and reconstruction policy development and
implementation. Members of the committee would include the heads of the State
Department, USAID, and the departments of Labor, Commerce, Justice, the
Treasury, Agriculture, and Defense, and other agencies as appropriate.

---

CRS-19
Expand Permitted Police Training. U.S. assistance to train foreign police
forces is substantially circumscribed by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended (codified as Section 2420 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code).
Section 660 prohibits U.S. assistance to train foreign police with certain exceptions.
In 1974, Congress enacted the prohibition, with limited exemptions for certain
assistance by the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in reaction to reports of U.S. police trainers acquiescing or
participating in human rights abuses abroad. Five further exemptions were added
beginning in 1985 - one of them, added in 2000, permits police training “with respect
to assistance provided to reconstitute civilian police authority and capability in the
post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure” and to provide professional
training in international recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-
corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy. S. 600
proposes three new exemptions which would facilitate training for post-conflict
needs: assistance to combat corruption through good governance programs (FAA
Section 133), to combat trafficking in persons, and for “constabularies or comparable
law enforcement authorities in support of developing capabilities for and deployment
to peace operations.”
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2006 and FY2007 (H.R.
2601). H.R. 2601, which would authorize FY2006 and FY2007 State Department
funding, contained no authorization for FY2006 for S/CRS when reported on by the
House International Relations Committee on July 13, 2005. In floor action on July
19, the House approved an amendment sponsored by Representative Dreier which
would authorize the establishment of an Active Response Corps to carry out
stabilization and reconstruction activities in foreign countries or regions that are in,
are in transition from, or are likely to enter into conflict or civil strife. No specific
funding was authorized for the Corps. The bill was received in the Senate on July
22, 2005, but as of the end of the first session of the 109th Congress, the Senate had
not acted on it.

---

CRS-20
Table 1. FY2006 Civilian Capabilities Funding
Legislation
S/CRS
S&R Corps
Conflict Response Fund
Appropriations
House:
None
None
P.L. 109-108, H.R. 2862
$7.7 million
Appropriations for Science, the
Conference: No earmark.
Department of State and Commerce
for FY2006
Appropriations
House: None
None
House: Secretary of State may transfer up to $100 million
P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057
among State Department accounts and to other federal agencies
to carry out reconstruction and stabilization assistance.
Senate:
Foreign Operations Appropriations
$24 million
Senate: Appropriates $24 million in new funds for the fund.
Act for FY2006
Conference: None
Conference: Does not provide funding or transfer authority.
Authorization
None
None
Senate: Authority to transfer to the Secretary of State up to
P.L. 109-163, H.R. 1815
$200 million in services, defense articles, and funding for
reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance.
Department of Defense FY2006

Authorization Act
Conference: Authority up to $100 million for above purposes.

NOTE: Although this provision is not labeled “Conflict
Response Fund,” it addresses the same needs.
Authorization/S. 600
Senate: $24.1 million
None
Senate: $100 million
Foreign Affairs Authorization Act
for FY2006 and FY2007
Authorization/H.R. 2601
None
House: Authorized
None
establishment of an
Foreign Relations Authorization Act
Active Response
for FY2006 and FY2007
Corps. No funding
authorized.

---