Order Code RL32759
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Al Qaeda: Statements
and Evolving Ideology
Updated January 26, 2006
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology
Summary
Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network have conducted a
sophisticated public relations and media campaign over the last ten years. Terrorism
analysts believe that these messages have been designed to elicit psychological
reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global audience as well
as to specific populations in the Islamic world, the United States, Europe, and Asia.
Some officials and analysts believe that Al Qaeda’s messages contain signals that
inform and instruct operatives to prepare for and carry out new attacks. Bin Laden
has referred to his public statements as important primary sources for parties seeking
to understand Al Qaeda’s ideology and political demands. Global counterterrorism
operations in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks appear to have
limited Bin Laden’s ability to provide command and control leadership to Al Qaeda
operatives and affiliated groups. Other Al Qaeda leaders continue to release
statements that sanction, encourage, and provide guidance for terrorist operations.
Iraq has become a focal point for Al Qaeda’s rhetoric, and statements continue to
underscore Al Qaeda leaders’ interest in Iraq and support for the ongoing insurgency.
Statements released by Osama Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri
since late 2004 have rekindled public debate in Europe and the United States
surrounding Al Qaeda’s ideology, motives, and future plans for attacks. Statements
released following the July 2005 Al Qaeda-linked suicide bombing attacks on the
London transit system have characterized those attacks and Al Qaeda’s ongoing
terrorist campaign as a response to British and American military operations in Iraq.
In January 2006, Bin Laden stated that Al Qaeda “does not object to a long-term
truce” with the United States “on the basis of fair conditions” but alluded to nearly
complete preparations to carry out attacks inside the United States.
The ideological content and highly political tone of the recent statements have
led some terrorism analysts to speculate that the messages may signal an on effort by
Al Qaeda figures to reaffirm their leadership roles and the role of the Al Qaeda
organization as the vanguard of an emerging, loosely organized international jihadist
movement. Others have argued that the presently limited operational capabilities of
Al Qaeda’s central leaders have inspired them to focus on ideological outreach
activities and efforts to influence public opinion in the United States and Europe.
Many observers believe that the group’s primary goal remains to inspire, plan, and
support terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies around the world, with
particular emphasis on targeting economic and energy infrastructure and fomenting
unrest in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf states, and countries neighboring Israel.
This report reviews Al Qaeda’s use of public statements from the mid-1990s to
the present and analyzes the evolving ideological and political content of those
statements. The report focuses primarily on statements made by Osama Bin Laden,
but also considers: statements made by his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri, remarks by
Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, and Al Qaeda military leader Sayf Al Adl. The report will
be updated periodically. For background on the Al Qaeda terrorist network, see CRS
Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Al Qaeda: Statements 1994-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Founding Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Declaration of Jihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
“Clash of Civilizations” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Al Qaeda Post-9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
“The Goals of the New York Strike” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Al Qaeda Statements in 2004-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Outreach and ‘Truce’ Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Iraq and Al Qaeda’s Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Strategic Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Tactical Differences? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Iraq and Al Qaeda’s Regional Ambitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Political Goals and Perspectives on Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Three Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Al Qaeda on Democracy and Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Strategic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Targeting Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Importance of Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Implications and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Al Qaeda’s Audiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Pragmatic Messianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Al Qaeda and the Jihadist International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Al Qaeda: Statements
and Evolving Ideology
Introduction
Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network have conducted a
sophisticated public relations and media campaign over the last ten years using a
series of faxed statements, audio recordings, video appearances, and Internet
postings.1 Terrorism analysts believe that these messages have been designed to elicit
psychological reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global
audience as well as to specific populations in the Islamic world, the United States,
Europe, and Asia. Bin Laden and his deputies have personally stated their belief in
the importance of harnessing the power of international and regional media for Al
Qaeda’s benefit, and Al Qaeda’s central leadership structure has featured a dedicated
media and communications committee tasked with issuing reports and statements in
support of the group’s operations.2 Some officials and analysts believe that Al
Qaeda’s messages contain signals that inform and instruct operatives to prepare for
and carry out new attacks.
Bin Laden has referred to his public statements as important primary sources for
parties seeking to understand Al Qaeda’s ideology and political demands.3 Through
his public statements over the last ten years, Bin Laden has portrayed himself both
as the leader of a consistent ideological movement and a strategic commander willing
to tailor his violent messages and acts to respond to specific political circumstances
and to influence specific audiences and events. Global counterterrorism operations
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks appear to have limited
Bin Laden’s ability to provide command and control leadership to Al Qaeda
operatives and affiliated groups. Bin Laden’s last confirmed message was released
in January 2006, in which he proposed a temporary truce with the United States in
exchange for a series of U.S. concessions. It is unlikely, however, that Bin Laden
could ensure a wholesale cessation of hostilities or that Al Qaeda supporters would
abandon the strategic priorities reflected in their statements that have sanctioned,
encouraged, and provided guidance for terrorist operations.
1 Unless indicated, translated citations are derived from “Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin
Statements 1994-January 2004,” Open Source Center (OSC) Report, GMP20040209000243,
Feb. 9, 2004.
2 Recent Al Qaeda messages have been produced by a dedicated studio, known as the Al
Sahab.Institute for Media Productions.
3 For example, in Bin Laden’s Oct. 2004 pre-U.S. presidential election message he referred
to specific pre-9/11 interviews with a variety of media outlets as previous indications of Al
Qaeda’s ideology and demands.

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Al Qaeda: Statements 1994-2001
Founding Principles. Osama Bin Laden’s experiences as a logistical
coordinator and financier for the Afghan and Arab resistance to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan during the 1980s are thought to have provided the backdrop for his
belief that Muslims could take effective military action inspired by select Islamic
principles. His exposure to the teachings of conservative Islamist scholars in Saudi
Arabia and his work with Arab militants in Afghanistan provided the theological and
ideological basis for his belief in the desirability of puritanical Salafist Islamic reform
in Muslim societies and the necessity of armed resistance in the face of perceived
aggression — a concept Al Qaeda has since associated with a communally-binding
Islamic principle known as “defensive jihad.”4 After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
1990, Bin Laden expressed these views in opposition to the introduction of foreign
military forces to Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden characterized the presence of U.S. and
other non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War as cause for
renewed commitment to defensive jihad and the promotion of violence against the
Saudi government and the United States.
Declaration of Jihad. In the early 1990s, Bin Laden emphasized his desire
to secure the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops from Saudi Arabia at all
costs. Bin Laden criticized the Saudi royal family publicly and alleged that their
invitation of foreign troops to the Arabian peninsula constituted an affront to the
sanctity of the birthplace of Islam and a betrayal of the global Islamic community.5
Finding his rhetoric and efforts rebuffed by Saudi leaders, Bin Laden was expelled
from Saudi Arabia and his ire increasingly focused on the United States. Following
a period of exile in Sudan and Afghanistan in which his radical views sharpened, Bin
Laden issued a declaration of jihad against the United States in 1996 that signaled his
emergence as an internationally recognizable figure and offered a full account of his
main critiques of an enemy he described as the “alliance of Jews, Christians, and
their agents.”6 Adopting the sensitive historical and religious imagery of Islamic
resistance to the European Crusades, Bin Laden condemned the U.S. military
presence in Saudi Arabia, criticized the international sanctions regime on Iraq, and
voiced his opposition to U.S. support for Israel.7 The declaration also cited
4 For more on Bin Laden and defensive jihad, see James Turner Johnson, “Jihad and Just
War,” First Things, June/July 2002, pp. 12-14. Bin Laden has identified Salafist thinkers
such as his former mentor Abdallah Azzam, Hamas founder Ahmed Yasin, World Trade
Center bombing conspirator Omar Abdel Rahman, Saudi dissident clerics Salman Al Awdah
and Safar Al Hawali, and 13th century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyah as prominent
ideological influences. For more on Salafism see CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic
Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya
, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
5 Robert Fisk, “Interview With Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin” Independent (London), July 10,
1996.
6 “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy
Mosques,” Al Islah (London), Sept. 2, 1996.
7 At the time, Bin Laden expressed no solidarity or sympathy for Saddam Hussein or his
regime, explaining — “We, as Muslims, do not like the Iraqi regime but we think that the
Iraqi people and their children are our brothers and we care about their future.” Fisk,
(continued...)

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“massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Fatani [as
transliterated], Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina” as
examples of a growing war on Islam for which the United States should be punished
(Bin Laden did not recognize the humanitarian aspects of U.S. efforts in Bosnia and
Somalia explicitly).8
“Clash of Civilizations”. Following his declaration of jihad on the United
States, Bin Laden released a series of statements that expanded the vision and scope
of his self-declared conflict with the United States and specified his political
prescriptions for the reformation of Islamic societies. Echoing U.S. academic
Samuel Huntington’s theory on the impending clash of civilizations,9 Bin Laden
repeated his characterization of a so-called “new crusade led by America against the
Islamic nations,” and emphasized his belief that an emerging conflict between Islam
and the West would be fought “between the Islamic world and the Americans and
their allies.”10 Bin Laden argued that the Islamic world should see itself as one
seamless community, or umma, and that Muslims were obliged to unite and defend
themselves. Turning his focus to the internal politics of the Islamic world, Bin Laden
urged Muslims to find a leader to unite them and establish a “pious caliphate” that
would be governed by Islamic law and follow Islamic principles of finance and social
conduct.11 Bin Laden repeatedly argued that Afghanistan had become a model
Islamic state under his Taliban hosts and used religious rhetoric to solicit support for
the Taliban and Al Qaeda.12
Although he possesses no traditional Islamic religious credentials or authority,
Bin Laden issued a fatwa, or religious edict, in 1998 that claimed that the United
States had made “a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims”13
through its policies in the Islamic world. The fatwa made use of the principle of
defensive jihad to argue that U.S. aggression made armed resistance and the targeting
of American civilians and military personnel incumbent upon all Muslims. The
statement also announced the formation of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad
against the Jews and Crusaders,” which consisted of a tacit alliance between Bin
Laden, his supporters, and a number of regional Islamic militant groups. Following
Al Qaeda’s bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) and the
7 (...continued)
“Interview With Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin” Independent (London), July 10, 1996. op. cit.
8 “Declaration of Jihad,” Al Islah (London), Sept. 2, 1996. op. cit.
9 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
Simon and Schuster, 1998.
10 “Correspondent Meets With Opposition Leader Bin Ladin,” Channel 4 (London) Feb. 20,
1997.
11 “Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Ladin,” (Islamabad, Pakistan), Mar. 18, 1997.
12 “Website Publishes Bin Ladin ‘Speech’” Internet Supporters of Shariah, June 22, 2000;
and “Al Jazirah Program on Bin Laden” Al Jazirah Television (Doha, Qatar), June 10, 1999.
13 “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans,” Al Quds Al Arabi (London), Feb. 23,
1998. The fatwa argued that defensive jihad was necessary “in order to liberate the al-Aqsa
Mosque [Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip [the U.S. and Israel].”

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U.S.S. Cole in Yemen(2000), Bin Laden refused to take direct responsibility for the
attacks, but claimed that he approved of the strikes and shared the motivations of the
individuals who had carried them out. Bin Laden argued that the bombings should
be seen by Americans and the world as retribution for U.S. policy and compared
them to alleged “massacres” of Palestinians in historic cases familiar to many
Muslims and Arabs.14
Al Qaeda Post-9/11
Osama Bin Laden’s longstanding threats to strike the United States came to
fruition on September 11, 2001, and Bin Laden and others subsequently issued
several statements confirming Al Qaeda’s responsibility for the attacks on New York
and Washington. Following an established pattern, Bin Laden acknowledged his
support for the hijackers and repeated his claim that strikes on American targets
should be viewed by Muslims and Americans as a defensively motivated response
to perceived American aggression in the Islamic world. Statements attributed to Bin
Laden and Al Zawahiri since 2001 have promised further attacks and sought to
justify Al Qaeda’s targeting of American and British civilians by arguing that
Western societies are morally corrupt, recent democratic reform and human rights
initiatives are insincere or bankrupt, and American and British civilians should be
held accountable for the policies of their democratically elected governments in the
Middle East that Al Qaeda finds objectionable or unjust.15
“The Goals of the New York Strike”
Several Al Qaeda statements have addressed the motives for the 1998 Embassy
bombings and other terrorist operations, but relatively few statements have been
made regarding Al Qaeda’s strategic goals in planning and executing the September
11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington. A text attributed to Al Qaeda
military commander Sayf Al Adl released in May 2005 identifies three primary
objectives for the September 11 attacks.16 According to Al Adl, Al Qaeda’s “main
objective” in perpetrating the September 11 attacks was to carry out a damaging
strike against the United States in retaliation for its perceived aggression in the
Islamic world. Al Adl indicates that in the opinion of Al Qaeda’s leadership, this
14 Bin Laden specifically cited “Sabra, Shatila, Deir Yasin, Qana, Hebron and elsewhere.”
“Al Jazirah Program on Bin Laden” Al Jazirah Television (Doha, Qatar), June 10, 1999.
15 “It is a fundamental principle of any democracy that the people choose their leaders, and
as such, approve and are party to the actions of their elected leaders... By electing these
leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian
people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. This
is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active members in
all these crimes.” “Statement From Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, May God Protect Him, and
Al Qaeda Organization,” Al Qal’ah (Internet), Oct. 14, 2002.
16 Although portions of the text may reflect revised perspectives and the benefit of hindsight,
its key statements of intent correspond to elements of prior statements by Osama Bin Laden
and other Al Qaeda figures. “Detained Al-Qa’ida Leader Sayf al-Adl Chronicles
Al-Zarqawi’s Rise in Organization,” OSC Report - GMP2005060637100, May 21, 2005.

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primary objective was “partially achieved,” although “other strikes” would have had
a greater impact if they had been successful. However, Al Adl does not identify
specific planned attacks that may have been disrupted since September 2001.
Al Qaeda’s second objective, as identified by Al Adl, was to signal and support
the “emergence of a new virtuous leadership” dedicated to opposing “the
Zionist-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant coalition” that Al Qaeda blames for a litany of social
and political ills in the Islamic world. Analysts have associated this stated objective
with Al Qaeda leaders’ views of themselves as the vanguard of a broader global
Islamic movement and their desire to inspire political upheaval and change across the
Islamic world. The third and “ultimate objective,” according to Al Adl, “was to
prompt [the United States] to come out of its hole.” Al Adl claims that Al Qaeda
wanted to provoke the United States into attacking areas of the Islamic world
associated with the organization and its affiliates. In doing so, Al Adl claims, Al
Qaeda hoped to make it easier to attack elements of U.S. power and to build its
“credibility in front of [the Islamic] nation and the beleaguered people of the world.”
Reflecting on the subsequent U.S. response to the attacks, Bin Laden and others
have described the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as new “crusades” and
highlighted both the considerable economic impact of the 9/11 attacks and the
subsequent costs of the U.S. military response as indications of Al Qaeda’s
effectiveness. Al Adl and others have conceded that the attacks on New York and
Washington were not totally successful, while arguing that the September 11 attack
“was enough to prompt the Americans to carry out the anticipated response” —
namely direct military action within the Islamic world.17 Al Qaeda appears to have
been less successful in using the purportedly hoped for U.S. military response to
“help the [Islamic] nation to wake from its slumber,” as it claims to have planned.
Both Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri have criticized the population
and governments of the Islamic world for failing to answer their calls to arms and for
cooperating with the United States and its allies. These criticisms have been coupled
with renewed calls for armed “resistance” against the United States and its allies from
Al Zawahiri, Al Adl, Al Zarqawi, and others.
Al Qaeda Statements in 2004-2006
Outreach and ‘Truce’ Proposals. In 2004 and 2006, Bin Laden personally
addressed the governments and citizens of Europe and the United States directly in
an effort to discourage further support for their respective foreign policies in the
Islamic world. In April 2004, Bin Laden proposed a “truce” with Europeans if they
agreed to abandon their support for the United States and their military commitments
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The offer was resoundingly rejected by European leaders
and their citizens. In October 2004, on the eve of the U.S. presidential election, Bin
Laden made a similar statement in which he urged Americans to reevaluate their
policies toward the Islamic world and threatened to bleed and bankrupt the United
States. In late November 2004, Al Zawahiri stated Al Qaeda’s intention to continue
17 In his May 2005 statement, Sayf Al Adl argues, “What we had wished for actually
happened. It was crowned by the announcement of Bush Jr. of his crusade against Islam and
Muslims everywhere.” OSC Report - GMP2005060637100, May 21, 2005.

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its jihad against the United States indefinitely until its leaders deem “U.S. policy
toward Muslims” to be non-aggressive. These sentiments were echoed in tapes
issued by Al Zawahiri in 2005, in which he cited Bin Laden’s truce offer and
characterized Al Qaeda’s message to Americans and their allies as “crystal clear.”18
In January 2006 Bin Laden stated that Al Qaeda “does not object to a long-term
truce” with the United States “on the basis of fair conditions,” but it is unlikely that
he could guarantee a total cessation of hostilities or that other Al Qaeda figures
would abandon strategic priorities that include long-term confrontation with the
United States and its allies. 19
Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders have cast further doubt on the validity of
their truce proposals by simultaneously calling for further attacks on U.S. and
European targets and praising terrorist attacks that have targeted and killed civilians.
In December 2004, Osama Bin Laden released audio tapes calling for continued
attacks on U.S. forces and interests and revealing his perspectives on events in Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories. The first tape, released on December
16, 2004, received media attention for its praise of an Al Qaeda-affiliated group’s
attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in early December 2004.20 The
remainder of the tape was devoted to delivering a litany of religiously based
criticisms of the Saudi royal family for its support for the United States and its
insufficient commitment to the implementation of Islamic law and moral principles.
Bin Laden appealed directly to “the silent ulema” (religious scholars) and business
and community leaders in Saudi Arabia to withdraw their support for the ruling Al
Saud family. In the second tape, released on December 27, 2004, Bin Laden
underscored Al Qaeda’s interest in Iraq and support for the ongoing insurgency. Bin
Laden’s January 2006 message implied that Al Qaeda operatives had infiltrated the
United States and were preparing to strike.
Iraq and Al Qaeda’s Ideology
Strategic Perspectives. In December 2004, Bin Laden identified the
conflict in Iraq as “a golden and unique opportunity” for jihadists to engage and
defeat the United States, and he characterized the insurgency in Iraq as the central
battle in a “Third World War, which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the
18 “The lion of Islam mujahid Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin... offered you a truce until you leave
the land of Islam... Has Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin not informed you that you will not dream
of security until we live it in reality in Palestine and before all infidel armies leave the land
of Muhammad, may peace be upon him? You however shed rivers of blood in our land so
we exploded volcanoes of anger in your land... Our message to you is crystal clear: Your
salvation will only come in your withdrawal from our land, in stopping the robbing of our
oil and resources, and in stopping your support for the corrupt and corrupting leaders.”
Ayman Al Zawahiri, “Message on Desecration of Holy Koran and the Infidel Democracy,”
Aug. 4, 2005, OSC Report - GMP20050927550001.
19 “Bin Ladin Threatens New Operations, Offers ‘Long-Term Truce,’” OSC Report -
GMP20060119544004, January 19, 2006.
20 “Bin Ladin Contests Legality of Saudi Rulers, Praises Attack on US Consulate,” OSC
Report - GMP20041216000222, Dec. 16, 2004.

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Islamic nation.”21 Describing Baghdad as “the capital of the caliphate,” Bin Laden
asserted that “jihad in Palestine and Iraq today is a duty for the people of the two
countries” and other Muslims. On a strategic level, Bin Laden has employed well-
known Quranic injunctions against failing to contribute to “the cause of God” to
appeal to Muslims to support Al Qaeda and its jihadist affiliates in Iraq politically,
financially, and militarily.22 He has also personally welcomed and endorsed
Jordanian-born terrorist leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi as an Al Qaeda affiliate and
the leader of Al Qaeda operations in Iraq.23 In January 2006, Bin Laden stated that
“Iraq has become a point of attraction and recruitment of qualified resources.”
Subsequent statements attributed to Abu Musab Al Zarqawi and Ayman Al
Zawahiri have underscored the importance of the conflict in Iraq to the jihadist cause
from Al Qaeda’s perspective. In May 2005, Al Zarqawi reaffirmed his allegiance to
Osama Bin Laden and reflected on the success of insurgent operations in Iraq as a
symbol of Al Qaeda’s success.24 Ayman Al Zawahiri reiterated the interest of Al
Qaeda’s leadership in the Iraqi insurgency and the country’s political developments
in many of his messages during 2005. Both men vehemently denounced the
successful constitutional and electoral processes that have laid the groundwork for
the formation of the new Iraqi government: Al Zawahiri has repeatedly argued that
the democratic reforms initiated by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan are
incomplete and insincere, while Al Zarqawi has adopted more sectarian rhetoric in
seeking to dissuade Iraq’s Sunni community from participating in the country’s
democratic processes and to condemn Iraq’s Shi’a political organizations and
communities on religious grounds.
Tactical Differences? On a tactical level, statements from leading Al Qaeda
figures have demonstrated a degree of differentiation in their preferred methods for
opposing coalition forces in Iraq and the new Iraqi government. Bin Laden has
identified “martyrdom operations,” or suicide attacks, as “the most important
21 Bin Laden described the stakes of the confrontation between coalition and jihadist forces
in Iraq in the following terms: “The whole world is watching this war and the two
adversaries; the Islamic nation, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the
other. It is either victory and glory or misery and humiliation. The nation today has a very
rare opportunity to come out of the subservience and enslavement to the West and to smash
the chains with which the Crusaders have fettered it.” OSC Report - FEA20041227000762,
Dec. 27, 2004.
22 Bin Laden: “The one who stays behind and fails to join the Mujahidin when Jihad
becomes an individual duty commits a cardinal sin... The most pressing duty after faith is
repelling the aggressor enemy. This means that the nation should devote its resources, sons,
and money to fight the infidels and drive them out of its lands.” OSC Report -
FEA20041227000762, Dec. 27, 2004. See also the Quran - Al Tawbah, 9:42-72.
23 “Website Posts Full Version of New Audiotape Attributed to Bin Ladin,” OSC Report -
FEA20041227000762, Dec. 27, 2004. Bin Laden’s endorsement read, “It should be known
that Mujahid brother Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi is the Amir of the Tanzim al-Qa’idah fi Bilad
al-Rafidayn [Al-Qa’ida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers]. The brothers in the
group there should heed his orders and obey him in all that which is good.”
24 “Al-Zarqawi Addresses Letter to Bin Ladin on Al-Qa’im Battle, ‘Plan,’” OSC Report -
GMP20050530549008, May 30, 2005.

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operations” for disrupting the activities of the United States and its allies.25
Politically, he has encouraged Islamist insurgents in Iraq to work with “Socialist”
groups (Baathists) and compared cooperation between Islamists and Baathists to
Arab and Persian collaboration against the Byzantine empire in the 7th and 8th
centuries.26 Bin Laden has also encouraged Muslim Iraqis and non-Iraqis of all
ethnic and linguistic backgrounds to cooperate in opposing the Iraqi Government and
coalition forces in Iraq. He has applied similar disregard for ethnic, linguistic, and
ideological differences in issuing condemnations of so-called collaborators;
identifying Arabs cooperating with Iraqi and coalition authorities as equally guilty
parties.27
While Al Zawahiri and Al Zarqawi have been similarly indiscriminate in their
calls for anti-U.S. cooperation, differences appear to have emerged in their
perspectives on the targeting of Muslims who collaborate with coalition troops or
initiatives and the desirability of pursuing an agenda of violent opposition to Iraq’s
Shi’a-led government on sectarian grounds. These differences became public in
October 2005 after the publication of an intercepted letter reportedly written by Al
Zawahiri to Al Zarqawi in which Al Zawahiri offered advice to Al Zarqawi on his
campaign in Iraq. Specifically, Al Zawahiri questioned the wisdom of pursuing a
campaign against Shi’a Iraqis on a sectarian basis when sectarian violence may
reduce overall public support among the region’s Sunni Muslim population for Al
Qaeda’s objectives.28
Iraq and Al Qaeda’s Regional Ambitions. Abu Musab Al Zarqawi and
Al Qaeda military leader Sayf Al Adl have referred to the current situation in Iraq as
an opportunity for the global jihadist movement to take advantage of insecurity in the
heart of the Arab world and to spread into neighboring areas. Al Adl has speculated
that the ongoing violence in Iraq may spread into Syria and Lebanon, which could
give “the Islamic action a vast area of action and maneuvering” and help it to attract
“tremendous human and financial resources.” The expansion of violence in the
Middle East could also bring the jihadist movement close to “the border of occupied
Palestine” and into direct confrontation with Israel, according to Al Adl, which, in
25 Bin Laden urged followers to “...become diligent in carrying out martyrdom operations...
These are the most important operations.” OSC Report - FEA20041227000762, Dec. 27,
2004.
26 Bin Laden sanctioned cooperation with Baathists “despite our belief in the infidelity of
socialists.” “Usama Bin Ladin’s Message to Iraq,” Al Jazirah Television, Feb. 11, 2003.
27 “The Iraqi who is waging Jihad against the infidel Americans or Allawi’s renegade
government is our brother and companion, even if he was of Persian, Kurdish, or Tukomen
origin. The Iraqi who joins this renegade government to fight against the Mujahidin, who
resists occupation, is considered a renegade and one of the infidels, even if he were an Arab
from Rabi’ah or Mudar tribes.” OSC Report - FEA20041227000762, Dec. 27, 2004.
28 Judging by statements made in the letter, Al Zawahiri largely shares Al Zarqawi’s disdain
for Shi’a Muslims generally and Iraq’s Shi’a political groups in particular. He questions the
timing of Al Zarqawi’s anti-Shi’a operations because in his opinion, a majority of the Sunni
community Al Qaeda is trying to mobilize on a region-wide basis do not feel as strongly or
as negatively about Shi’ism or the Shi’a community in Iraq. The letter is available in Arabic
and English on the Director of National Intelligence website at [http://www.dni.gov/].

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his opinion, would further legitimize the jihadist cause and its supporters. Al
Zarqawi’s group has claimed responsibility for two 2005 terrorist attacks in Jordan
as well as a rocket attack launched against Israel from Lebanon in December 2005.
Political Goals and Perspectives on Reform
The Three Foundations. Al Qaeda’s strategic analysis and the operations
of its affiliates continue to be supported by centrally planned ideological outreach
activities. In a January 30, 2005 audiotape, for example, Ayman Al Zawahiri
identified “three foundations” of Al Qaeda’s political ideology and applied them to
events in Iraq and elsewhere.29 The three principles were repeated in a June 2005
video message from Al Zawahiri. Al Zawahiri, who is regarded as Al Qaeda’s chief
ideologue, described Al Qaeda’s core principles in sharp contrast to secular and
religious reform ideologies voiced by other Muslims as well as recent U.S. support
for democracy. This may signal an attempt by Al Qaeda’s leadership to renew and
clearly define its goals as a basis for attracting new recruits and inspiring new
affiliates. The “three foundations,” as outlined by Al Zawahiri are as follows:
! “The Quran-Based Authority to Govern.” According to Al
Zawahiri, Al Qaeda supports the creation of an Islamic state
governed solely by sharia law. Secular government or “man-made”
law is considered unacceptable and deemed contrary to Islamic faith.
! “The Liberation of the Homelands.” Al Zawahiri argued that
reforms and free elections will not be possible for Muslims without
first establishing “the freedom of the Muslim lands and their
liberation from every aggressor.” He also emphasized the
importance of establishing control over the Middle East’s energy
resources and described the Muslim world as “impotent and exposed
to the Israeli nuclear arsenal.”
! “The Liberation of the Human Being.” Al Zawahiri articulated a
vision of a contractual social relationship between Muslims and their
rulers that would permit people to choose and criticize their leaders
but also demand that Muslims resist and overthrow rulers who
violate Islamic laws and principles. He criticized hereditary
government and identified a need “to specify the power of the sharia
based judiciary, and insure that no one can dispose of the people’s
rights, except in accordance with this judiciary.”
Al Qaeda on Democracy and Reform. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al
Zawahiri, and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi have applied these and other similar principles
to current issues of democracy, reform, and conflict in Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Afghanistan, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories. In both of his December 2004
statements, for example, Bin Laden clearly stated his view that democracies,
constitutional governments, and insufficiently Islamic monarchies are equally
29 “Al-Zawahiri Denounces US, Argues for Reign of Islamic Law and Caliphate, Jihad
Against Crusaders and Jews,” OSC Report - GMP20050131000021, Jan. 31, 2005.

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unacceptable forms of governance for Islamic societies because they empower human
rulers and man-made legal systems rather than “the law of God.”30 Al Zarqawi
expanded on these sentiments in a January 2005 statement that characterized
democracy as a rival “religion” to Islam and criticized adherence to democratic
principles such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion as un-Islamic and
tantamount to apostasy punishable by death.31 Al Zarqawi has condemned the Iraqi
Islamic Party and other Iraqi Sunni groups for participating in the 2005 constitutional
referenda and parliamentary elections. He has also frequently characterized the Iraqi
government as illegitimate and collaborationist, echoing to his January 2005 post-
election statement that his followers in Iraq “shall not accept the rule of anyone but
that of God and His Prophet [Mohammed].”32
Bin Laden’s December 2004 statements urged Muslims to oppose the creation
of democratic governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories; to
resist non-Islamic reform movements in other Islamic societies; and to overturn
existing regimes deemed insufficiently-Islamic by Al Qaeda such as the Saudi
monarchy.33 Al Zawahiri repeated Bin Laden’s assertions throughout 2005 and
added specific criticism of U.S. detention centers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Abu
Ghraib, Iraq and characterized them as examples of U.S. reform plans for the Islamic
world. Al Zawahiri also dismissed Afghan, Egyptian, and Iraqi elections as
incomplete and argued that the United States and its allies would not have supported
the elections if the results may have yielded Islamist governments that could oppose
U.S. policies in the region. Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, and Al Zarqawi have based their
calls for revolutionary change in Islamic societies on a stated belief in a model of
governance where Muslim citizens would empowered to choose and depose their
leaders according to Islamic principles and traditions of consultation, or shura.34 Bin
30 For example, Bin Laden has linked his opposition to insufficiently Islamic governance in
Saudi Arabia to his view that under the Saudi monarchy, “absolute obedience and
supremacy are given to the king and his laws, and not to God’s religion.” OSC Report -
GMP20041216000222, Dec. 16, 2004.
31 According to Bin Laden, Muslims have a right to participate in the selection of their rulers
only under certain “conditions,” namely the absence of occupying foreign powers and the
presence of candidates willing to rule solely according to Islamic law. OSC Report -
FEA20041227000762, Dec. 27, 2004.
32 “Al Zarqawi on US Casualties in Iraq, Elections, Israel,” OSC Report -
GMP20060109519001, Jan. 9, 2006; and “Al-Zarqawi’s Group Issues Post-Election
Statement, Claims Attacks Against US Embassy, Mosul Targets,” OSC Report -
FEA20050201001026, Feb. 1, 2005.
33 Bin Laden’s critiques of Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the Palestinian
Authority reflect these sentiments: “The constitution (TAL), which was imposed by U.S.
occupier Bremer, is a man-made and pagan constitution, which insisted that Islam should
not be the sole source of legislation... Palestine is under occupation and its constitution is
man-made and pagan, and Islam has nothing to do with it.” OSC Report -
FEA20041227000762, Dec. 27, 2004.
34 “If the ruler renounces the law of God, the governed, on God’s orders, must cease to obey
him... Rights cannot be restored from a regime when the ruler becomes renegade or refuses
to follow religion except by force.” OSC Report - GMP20041216000222, Dec. 16, 2004.

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Laden specifically argued that, “all Muslims should embark on reforms” but similarly
cautioned that “reforms should be achieved in accordance with the religious laws.”
Strategic Framework
Al Qaeda military commander Sayf Al Adl concluded his May 2005 text with
advice for Abu Musab Al Zarqawi and other affiliates that includes a detailed
strategic framework for the jihadist movement.35 While Al Adl’s statement is one
among many jihadist strategic documents that have surfaced in recent years, it is
noteworthy because it was issued by an individual thought to be a key member of Al
Qaeda’s scattered leadership and offered a uniquely detailed outline. Elements of
similar strategic thinking appeared in statements issued by Ayman Al Zawahiri and
Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in late 2005. A summary follows:
! Jihadist action must have a clear “thought or idea that outlines its
means and objectives.” Al Adl recommended that Al Zarqawi and
others declare that their strategic “objective is to reintroduce the
Islamic way of life by means of establishing the state of Islam that
will solve the entire problems of the nation.” This objective should
be supported ideologically by “a circle of judicious men and
scholars” and propagated by “a special da’wah (Islamic outreach)
authority.” The goal is to better enable the jihadist movement to
employ “the [Islamic] nation’s potentials, including human and
financial resources” by attracting more supporters.
! The strategic objectives of the jihadist movement should be rooted
in and motivated by what Al Adl refers to as “the clear banner of
Islam — the banner of ‘there is no deity but God and Muhammad is
the messenger of God.’” This fundamental statement of Islamic
faith is meant to signify the ultimate priority of the principle of
tawhid, or the unity and authority of God and religion, in Al Qaeda’s
ideological framework.
! Detailed strategic and operational plans must be developed with
short-term and long-term components. Al Adl links the failures of
other “contemporary Islamic movements” to the fact that their
“actions were mostly random.” According to Al Adl, “mujahidin
should have short-term plans aimed at achieving interim goals and
long-term plans aimed at accomplishing the greater objective, which
is the establishment of a state.” Throughout his statement, Al Adl
alludes to the existence of a broad plan developed by Al Qaeda’s
leaders, but he declines to describe it in detail.
Targeting Israel. Variations in the intensity and prominence of Al Qaeda
leaders’ anti-Israeli rhetoric have fueled suggestions that Al Qaeda’s commitment to
the Palestinian cause waxes and wanes depending on the network’s need for support
35 “Detained Al-Qa’ida Leader Sayf al-Adl Chronicles Al-Zarqawi’s Rise in Organization,”
OSC Report - GMP2005060637100, May 21, 2005.

CRS-12
— becoming more pronounced during periods when Al Qaeda’s actions have
alienated supporters or recently as part of a more outright ideological appeal. Bin
Laden has addressed these charges personally and argued that support for the
Palestinians and all Muslims is and will remain essential to Al Qaeda’s cause, which
is the mobilization of the entire Muslim world in resistance to perceived U.S.
aggression.36 Other Al Qaeda figures have alluded to the desirability of attacks on
and eventual conflict with Israel. In January 2006, Al Zarqawi claimed responsibility
for a rocket attack on northern Israel, which he claimed was personally ordered by
Osama Bin Laden. He described the attack as “the beginning of a blessed action to
strike the Zionist enemy at the heart of its existence.”37
The Importance of Oil. Al Qaeda leaders’ statements reveal sophisticated
consideration of the economic and military vulnerabilities of the United States and
its allies, particularly with regard to the role of Middle Eastern oil as “the basis of
industry” in the global economy.38 Statements by Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri urging
attacks on oil infrastructure and military supply lines could indicate a shift in Al
Qaeda’s strategic and tactical planning in favor of a more protracted attritional
conflict characterized by disruptive attacks on economic and critical energy
production infrastructure. For example, in an interview reportedly conducted on or
around the fourth anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Ayman Al
Zawahiri urged “mujahidin to concentrate their campaigns on the Muslims’ stolen
oil” and to “not allow the thieves ruling [Muslim] countries to control this oil.”39 Bin
Laden has called for Muslim societies to become more self-sufficient economically
and has urged Arab governments to preserve oil as “a great and important economic
power for the coming Islamic state.” Bin Laden also has described economic
boycotts as “extremely effective”40 weapons.
36 “Interview Held with Usama Bin Ladin,” Jihad Online News, Jan. 21, 2003.
37 “Al Zarqawi on US Casualties in Iraq, Elections, Israel,” OSC Report - GMP200601
09519001, Jan. 9, 2006.
38 “One of the most important reasons that made our enemies control our land is the pilfering
of our oil... Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations
accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf for this is their fate.” OSC Report -
GMP20041216000222, Dec. 16, 2004.
39 “Al Qa’ida’s Al Zawahiri Predicts Failure of US ‘Crusade’ Against Muslim States,” OSC
Report - GMP20051207507001, Dec. 7, 2005.
40 “Declaration of Jihad” Al Islah (London), Sept. 2, 1996. op. cit.

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Implications and Conclusion
Statements from Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Abu Musab Al
Zarqawi, and Sayf Al Adl display the uncompromising commitment of Al Qaeda’s
leaders and affiliates to a consistent ideological agenda focused on two sequential
goals: the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from Islamic societies and,
ultimately, the creation of an Islamic state ruled by sharia law. The political
prescriptions outlined in the statements are rooted in the Islamic principle known as
tawhid, or the principle of the absolute unity of God, and an identification of Islam
as an all-encompassing religious, political, and social system.41 According to this
perspective, Islamic faith, adherence to Islamic law, and implementation of
conservative Islamic social and political principles are synonymous. Throughout
their recent statements, Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, and Al Zarqawi characterized as
“infidels” those who do not share these beliefs, those who oppose the creation of an
Islamic state on the terms they describe, and those supporting existing governments
and coalition activities in the Islamic world.
Al Qaeda’s Audiences
Al Qaeda’s diverse statements contain calculated variations in tone and content
that address or appeal to various target audiences. In his early statements, for
example, Osama Bin Laden adopted a pseudo-nationalist tone in directly addressing
the population of Saudi Arabia and outlining ways that specific groups in Saudi
society could support Al Qaeda. In his 2004 and 2006 statements addressed to the
U.S. and European public, Bin Laden blended threats of violence with attempts to
portray himself as a statesmanlike figure more palatable to Western audiences and
appealing to moderate Muslims. Bin Laden’s earlier statements also addressed the
American public in several instances that he since has characterized as attempts to
explain his motives and outline steps the United States should have taken in order to
avoid Al Qaeda attacks.
Over time, the cornerstone of Al Qaeda leaders’ religious and political rhetoric
has remained consistent: Muslims should view themselves as a single nation and
unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression on the basis of obligatory defensive jihad.
Non-Islamic government is unacceptable, and Muslims should join Al Qaeda and
other sympathetic groups and movements in opposing those seeking to establish
secular democratic governments or maintain existing governments deemed to be
insufficiently Islamic. Bin Laden has often coupled his “Islamic-unity” rhetoric with
litanies of anti-Semitic statements, condemnations of Israel, and allegations of U.S.
complicity in the suffering of Muslims worldwide. In many pre-9/11 statements, Bin
Laden broadened his rhetorical outreach to appeal to non-Arab Muslims, especially
those concerned with or engaged in conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and the
Philippines. Following September 11, 2001, Bin Laden has appealed directly to
national groups on the front lines of robust counter-terrorism operations, particularly
the populations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories.
41 According to Bin Laden, “Islam is one unit that can not be divided... a way of life revealed
by God for men to abide by all of its aspects in all their affairs.” OSC Report -
FEA2004122700076, Dec. 27, 2004.

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Pragmatic Messianism
Although Bin Laden’s ideological rhetoric has remained relatively consistent,
he and other Al Qaeda leaders have placed varying levels of emphasis on specific
strategic objectives and tactics in their statements over the years. In statements
addressed to U.S. and European audiences, Bin Laden and others have outlined
specific political demands that support an image of Al Qaeda as a pliable, pragmatic
political actor. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda’s operational record seems to indicate that
its leaders’ commitment to specific national causes and limited political objectives
are rhetorical tools designed to elicit support for their broader ideological agenda of
confrontation with the West and puritanical reform in the Islamic world. For
example, Bin Laden’s rhetorical treatment of the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi
Arabia during the 1990s is largely inconsistent with Al Qaeda’s ongoing terrorist
operations there following the almost complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces
from Saudi Arabia in September 2003.42 Although only a small number of U.S.
military personnel remain in Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda affiliates have continued a
violent campaign to topple the Saudi government and have targeted non-U.S.
civilians in numerous terrorist attacks.
In messages to regional audiences, Bin Laden and his deputies have
characterized U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as new
provocations and “crusades” that justify ongoing attacks. In his December 2004
statements, Bin Laden referred to the confrontation between the U.S., its allies, and
jihadist movements as “a war of destiny between infidelity and Islam” and a “Third
World War,” seemingly leaving little doubt about the scope or flexibility of Al
Qaeda’s strategic ambitions, grievances, and demands. From a strategic perspective,
statements from Ayman Al Zawahiri and others advocate for a phased struggle, in
which the first goal is the expulsion of U.S. military forces and proximate goals
include the overthrow of “corrupt” regional leaders, the creation of a sharia-ruled
Islamic state, military confrontation with Israel, and conflict with Shi’a Muslims.
Al Qaeda and the Jihadist International
Overall, Al Qaeda leaders have displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt the
strategic and tactical content of their statements to changing circumstances while
retaining a messianic commitment to their broader ideological agenda. Although Bin
Laden’s self-professed goal is to “move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation”43
until it reaches a revolutionary “ignition point,”44 Al Qaeda leaders’ statements and
Al Qaeda’s attacks largely have failed to effectively mobilize widespread Muslim
support for their agenda thus far. Since late 2001, however, public opinion polling
42 In his September 1996 declaration of jihad against the United States, Bin Laden described
the presence of U.S. troops in the Arabian peninsula as “one of the worst catastrophes to
befall Muslims since the death of the Prophet [Mohammed].” In an earlier interview,
however, he indicated that the “the withdrawal of American troops” would serve as the
“solution” to the crisis between the United States and the Islamic world.
43 “Usama Bin Ladin’s Message to Iraq,” Al-Jazirah Television, Feb. 11, 2003. Op. cit.
44 “Bin Ladin Interviewed on Jihad Against U.S.,” Al Quds Al Arabi, Nov. 27, 1996.

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and media monitoring in the Middle East and broader Islamic world indicate that
dissatisfaction with the United States and its foreign policy has grown significantly
within many Muslim societies.
In light of this trend, Al Qaeda leaders’ shift toward more explicitly political and
ideological rhetoric seems to signal a direct attempt to broaden the movement’s
appeal, solicit greater financial and material support, and possibly inspire new and
more systematically devastating attacks. Some experts have argued however, that the
uncompromising, anti-democratic tone of some public statements by Bin Laden, Al
Zawahiri, and Al Zarqawi may alienate Muslims who oppose theocracy or who
support secular or representative government.
Experience suggests that Al Qaeda’s leaders believe that regular attempts to
characterize Al Qaeda’s actions as defensive and religiously sanctioned will increase
tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program. The identification of
limited political objectives and the implication that their fulfilment will resolve
broader grievances may generate broader appeal than the group’s underlying
ideological agenda. Osama Bin Laden’s truce proposals addressed to citizens of the
United States and its European allies illustrate this trend, but the proposals’ validity
has been questioned due to ongoing attacks and continuing threats.
Overall, Al Qaeda leaders’ statements from the mid-1990s through the present
indicate that they continue to see themselves and their followers as the vanguard of
an international Islamic movement primarily committed to ending U.S. “interference”
in the affairs of Islamic countries and supportive of efforts to recast Islamic societies
according to narrow interpretations of Islam and Islamic law. Public statements
addressed to regional and international populations will likely continue to play a
prominent role in Al Qaeda’s efforts to achieve its goals.