Order Code RS21695
Updated January 25, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Islamic Traditions of
Wahhabism and Salafiyya
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent investigations of these
attacks have called attention to Islamic puritanical movements known as Wahhabism
and Salafiyya. The Al Qaeda terrorist network and its leader, Osama bin Laden, have
advocated a message of violence that some suggest is an extremist interpretation of this
line of puritanical Islam. Other observers have accused Saudi Arabia, the center of
Wahhabism, of having disseminated a religion that promotes hatred and violence,
targeting the United States and its allies. Saudi officials strenuously deny these
allegations. This report1 provides a background on Wahhabi Islam and its association
to militant fundamentalist groups; it also summarizes recent charges against Wahhabism
and responses, including the findings of the final report of the 9/11 Commission and
bills relevant to this issue in the second session of the 109th Congress. It will be updated
periodically. Related CRS products include CRS Issue Brief IB93113, CRS Report
RL32499, CRS Report RS21432, CRS Report RS21529, CRS Report RS21654, and
CRS Report RL31718.
Background on Wahhabism
Definitions. “Wahhabism” generally refers to a movement that seeks to purify the
Islamic religion2 of any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh-century
teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. In the West, the term has been
used mostly to denote the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and which has spread
recently to various parts of the world. In most Muslim nations, however, believers who
adhere to this creed prefer to call themselves “Unitarians” (muwahiddun) or “Salafiyyun”
(sing. Salafi, noun Salafiyya). The latter term derives from the word salaf meaning to
“follow” or “precede,” a reference to the followers and companions of the Prophet. Some
1 This report was originally written by Febe Armanios. It has been updated by Christopher
Blanchard to include information relevant to the 109th Congress.
2 For more on the Islamic religion, see CRS Report RS21432, Islam: A Primer.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Muslims believe the Western usage of the term “Wahhabism” unfairly carries negative
and derogatory connotations. Although this paper explains differences in these terms, it
will refer to Wahhabism in association with a conservative Islamic creed centered in and
emanating from Saudi Arabia and to Salafiyya as a more general puritanical Islamic
movement that has developed independently in various places in the Islamic world.
History of Wahhabism.3 Wahhabism is a puritanical form of Sunni Islam and is
practiced in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, although it is much less rigidly enforced in the latter.
The word “Wahhabi” is derived from the name of a Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abd
al-Wahhab (1703-1791). Frustrated by the moral decline of his society, Abd al-Wahhab
denounced many popular beliefs and practices as idolatrous. Ultimately, he encouraged
a “return” to the pure and orthodox practice of the “fundamentals” of Islam, as embodied
in the Quran and in the life of the Prophet Muhammad. In the eighteenth century,
Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the modern-day Saudi dynasty, partnered with Abd al-
Wahhab to begin the process of unifying disparate tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. Since
the foundation of modern Saudi Arabia in 1932, there has been a close relationship
between the Saudi ruling family and the Wahhabi religious establishment.4
Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia Today. With the establishment of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism gained new ground and was used as the official basis for
determining laws and conduct in Saudi society. Wahhabism is the basis for practices such
as the segregation of the sexes, the prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, a
ban on women driving, and numerous other social restrictions. Wahhabism also has
shaped the Saudi educational structure, and Saudi schoolbooks generally denounce
teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs.5 The puritanical and iconoclastic
philosophies reflected in this sect historically have resulted in conflict with other Muslim
groups. Wahhabism opposes most popular religious practices such as saint veneration, the
celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, and practices associated with the mystical teachings
of Sufism. In September 2005, the State Department again designated Saudi Arabia as
a “Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act “for
particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” According to the State Department’s
2005 International Religious Freedom Report on Saudi Arabia, in spite of efforts by some
senior Saudi government officials to promote tolerance of other religions and steps to
remove some intolerant material from textbooks, members of the Shi’a Muslim minority
continue “to face political and economic discrimination,” and non-Muslim groups are not
granted freedom of worship, whether public or private.6 Harassment of citizens by
Wahhabist religious police reportedly increased during 2005.
3 For a comprehensive discussion of Sunni Islam and the schools of Islamic legal thought, see
CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites.
4 Contemporary Saudi Wahhabism combines the teachings of its founder Abd al-Wahhab and
other religious and cultural traditions. Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Manning the Barricades: Islam
according to Saudi Arabia’s School Texts,” The Middle East Journal 57, no. 2 (2003):230-248.
5 Michaela Prokop, “Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education,” Int. Affairs, 79, no. 1, pp. 77-89.
6 Approximately two million Shiites are citizens of Saudi Arabia. Report available online at
[http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51609.htm].

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Political and Religious Factors
What Is Salafiyya? As noted above, among adherents in general, preference is
given to the term “Salafiyya” over “Wahhabism.” These terms have distinct historical
roots, but they have been used interchangeably in recent years, especially in the West.
Wahhabism is considered by some Muslims as the Saudi form of Salafiyya. Unlike the
eighteenth-century Saudi roots of Wahhabism, however, modern Salafi beliefs grew from
a reform-oriented movement of the early twentieth century, which developed in various
parts of the Islamic world and progressively grew more conservative. In line with other
puritanical Islamic teachings, Salafis generally believe that the Quran and the Prophet’s
practices (hadith) are the ultimate religious authority in Islam, rather than the subsequent
commentaries produced by Islamic scholars that interpret these sources.7 Salafis also
generally maintain that they are “the only [Muslim] group that will be saved on Judgment
Day.”8 Salafiyya is not a unified movement, and there exists no single Salafi “sect.”
However, Salafi interpretations of Islam appeal to a large number of Muslims worldwide
— in Africa, Asia, North America, and throughout the Middle East.
The Use of Violence. According to a number of scholars, the use of violent jihad9
is not inherently associated with puritanical Islamic beliefs. Among certain puritanical
Muslims — be they self-described Salafis or Wahhabis — advocacy of jihad is a
relatively recent phenomenon and is highly disputed within these groups. Some scholars
date the ascendancy of militancy among Salafis to the 1980s war of resistance against the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The war against the Soviets gained wide support
throughout the Muslim world and mobilized thousands of volunteer fighters. Radical
beliefs spread rapidly through select groups of mosques and madrasas (Islamic religious
schools),10 located on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which were created to support the
Afghan resistance and funded primarily by Saudi Arabia. Similar U.S. and European
funding provided to Pakistan to aid the Afghan mujahideen also may have been diverted
to fund the construction and maintenance of madrasas. Following the war, Jihadist Salafis
with ties to the Afghan resistance denounced leaders of countries such as Saudi Arabia
and Egypt as “apostates” and as vehicles for facilitating Western imperialism. The
Afghan Taliban group also emerged from this network of institutions. Jihadist Salafi
groups such as Al Qaeda continue to advocate the overthrow of the Saudi government and
other regimes and the establishment of states that will sustain puritanical Islamic doctrine
enforced under a strict application of shari’a or Islamic law.
Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda Terrorist Network. The Al Qaeda
terrorist network arose in the early 1990s, directly out of the radical Salafi Jihadist
7 Ahmad Dallal, “Appropriating the Past: Twentieth-Century Reconstruction of Pre-Modern
Islamic Thought,” Islamic Law and Society 7, no. 1 (Leiden, 2000): 347.
8 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle East
Policy
8, no. 4 (2001): 20.
9 Jihad literally means “striving” or “struggle.” It has also been used to refer to a “holy war,”
although this term does not appear in the Quran. A “greater jihad” implies the spiritual struggle
that each Muslim must wage within himself or herself in order to become a better individual. The
“lesser jihad” is the one in which a Muslim spreads his/her faith through persuasion and social
justice, but it has also been commonly used to refer to war against an aggressor.
10 See CRS Report RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background.

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tradition. As analysts have noted, the ideology of Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden,
is intended to polarize the Islamic world into two clearly delineated factions: between the
umma (Islamic community) and those regimes which are closely allied with the United
States and the West.11 Attacks inside Saudi Arabia, in particular, have aimed to
undermine the Saudi ruling family, to expose its allegedly “misguided” or insufficient
dedication to Wahhabi Islam, and to jeopardize its protectorship of Mecca and Medina,
Islam’s holiest cities. Since the 1990s, Al Qaeda has called for a war against the United
States, alleging that “U.S. crimes against Islam” were part of a “Zionist-Crusader” plot
intended to annihilate Muslims.12 Many Islamic scholars, including some Wahhabi
leaders, have condemned the September 11 attacks against civilians as having no roots
in the Islamic religion and view Bin Laden as a hijacker and a usurper of their religion.13
Bush Administration officials have echoed this sentiment, noting that the United States
has “an interest in the voices of the moderates, the people who do not want their religion
stolen away from them by extremists like Osama bin Laden.”14
Although the majority of Salafi adherents do not advocate the violence enshrined in
Bin Laden’s message, this ideology has attracted a number of followers throughout the
Muslim world. Analysts note that some receptive groups are drawn to the anti-Western
political messages preached by Bin Laden and his organization, despite the fact that these
groups may hold different religious beliefs. Some experts have cautioned against
“homogenizing” these groups and organizations into a monolithic entity.
“Reformist” Salafi Trends. Some Salafis and Wahhabis believe that violence
should be a last resort and, if used, should be the final stage in a long process of personal
transformation, purification, and self-discipline in which each Muslim should engage and
which ultimately will lead to the establishment of a pure Islamic state. These “reformists”
oppose violence on the basis of the Prophet Muhammad’s own practices; however, their
rejection of violence is not absolute and is debated in the face of defending perceived
threats against the Islamic religion.
Recent Allegations against Wahhabism and Responses
There have been two major allegations against Wahhabism and against the Saudi
Arabian government, which is viewed as its principal proponent:
“Wahhabism Spreads Terrorism”? It is widely acknowledged that the Saudi
government, as well as wealthy Saudi individuals, have supported the spread of the
Wahhabist form of Islam in several Muslim countries and in the West. Some have argued
that this proselyting has promoted terrorism and has spawned Islamic militancy
11 Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2002): 23.
12 John Kaltner and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al Qaeda’s
Justification for September 11,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2(2003): 85. For more on Al Qaeda’s
ideology, see CRS Report RL32759, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology.
13 Nora Boustany, “Bin Laden Now a Target in Arab Media; Criticism Emerges as Scholars
Emphasize Distance from ‘Distortion of Religion’,” Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2001. See also
Tamara Albertini, “The Seductiveness of Certainty: The Destruction of Islam’s Intellectual
Legacy by the Fundamentalists,” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4(2003): 456.
14 “Defense Undersecretary Feith Holds News Briefing,” Heritage Foundation, Nov. 24, 2003.

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throughout the world.15 Saudi funding of mosques, madrasas, and charities, some of
which have been linked to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, has raised concern that
Wahhabi Islam has been used by militants who tailor this ideology to suit their political
goals and who rely on Saudi donations to support their aspirations. Some maintain that
the spread of Wahhabism was used to placate radical religious groups that threatened the
Saudi regime.16 Others maintain that Islam, like other religions, “possesses holy texts that
can be invoked to support [peace or violence], depending on the circumstances.”17
“Wahhabism Spreads Intolerance”? Some reports suggest that teachings
within Saudi domestic schools may foster intolerance of other religions and cultures. A
2002 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) indicates that
“some Saudi textbooks taught Islamic tolerance while others viciously condemned Jews
and Christians...[and] use rhetoric that was little more than hate literature.”18 Others also
have argued that the global spread of Wahhabist teachings threatens the existence of more
moderate Islamic beliefs and practices in other parts of the world, including the United
States.19 A 2005 report from Freedom House’s Center for Religious Freedom cites
examples of what its authors calls “hate ideology” taken from a number of Saudi
government publications that have been distributed in U.S. mosques and Islamic centers.20
Saudi Arabia’s Response to These Allegations. The Saudi Arabian
government has strenuously denied the above allegations. With regard to charges of
terrorism, senior Saudi Arabian government and religious officials have issued statements
insisting there is no association between the Islamic religion and terrorism.21 In response
to allegations of teaching intolerance, the Saudi government has embarked in recent
months on a campaign of educational reforms, although the outcome of these reforms
remains to be seen. Many Saudi leaders have asserted that their religion is tolerant and
peaceful, and they have denied allegations that their government exports religious or
cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education.
Current U.S. Policy and Legislation
In light of allegations against Wahhabism, some critics have called for a reevaluation
of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, although others maintain
that U.S. economic and security interests require continued and close ties with the Saudis.
15 See Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing, “Update on
the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing,” June 15, 2004, p. 20.
16 Dave Montgomery, “Radical Re-Education,” The Fort-Worth Star-Telegram, Dec. 3, 2003.
17 Peter David, “In the Name of Islam,” The Economist, Sept. 13, 2003.
18 Saudi Arabia: Opposition, Islamic Extremism, and Terrorism, Report by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Nov. 27, 2002, p. 18.
19 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearing: “Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic
Threat?” Nov. 18, 2003, [http://www.uscirf.gov/hearings/18Nov03/saudi.php3].
20 Freedom House, “Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Fill American Mosques,” Jan. 2005.
21 “Saudi Arabia’s Highest Religious Authority Warns Against the Dangers of Extremism,” Aug.
21, 2003. Available at [http://saudiembassy.net/ReportLink/Report_Extremism_Oct03.pdf].

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The Bush administration has praised Saudi counter-terrorism cooperation, and President
Bush has praised Islam and denounced groups that have “hijacked a great religion.”22
9/11 Commission. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”) claims that “Islamist terrorism”
finds inspiration in “a long tradition of extreme intolerance” that flows “through the
founders of Wahhabism,” the Muslim Brotherhood, and prominent Salafi thinkers. The
report further details the education and activities of some 9/11 hijackers in the Al Qassim
province of Saudi Arabia, which the report describes as “the very heart of the strict
Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia.” According to the Commission, some Saudi
“Wahhabi- funded organizations,” such as the now-defunct Al Haramain Islamic
Foundation, “have been exploited by extremists to further their goal of violent jihad
against non-Muslims.”23 Due in part to these findings, the Commission recommended a
frank discussion of the relationship between the United States and its “problematic ally,”
Saudi Arabia.
Issues for Congress. Wahhabism has been a focus of congressional hearings,
which have examined the relationship between this religious belief and terrorist financing,
as well as its alleged ties to the spread of intolerance. Several bills in the 108th Congress
criticized Saudi-funded religious institutions and alleged that they provide ideological
support for anti-Western terrorism. Section 7105(b) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004) expressed the sense
of Congress that “there should be a more robust dialogue between the people and
Government of the United States and the people and Government of Saudi Arabia.”
Section 7120(b) of the act required the President to submit to Congress within 180 days
a strategy for collaboration with Saudi Arabia. The strategy paper was to include
proposals for promoting tolerance and diversity in Saudi Arabia and for diminishing
support for extremist groups from Saudi sources.
In the 109th Congress, Section 233 of the proposed Targeting Terrorists More
Effectively Act of 2005 (S. 12) states the sense of Congress that Saudi Arabia must
“undertake a number of political and economic reforms,” in order to more effectively
combat terrorism, including “providing more political rights to its citizens, increasing the
rights of women,” and “engaging in comprehensive educational reform.” The bill would
require the President to submit a report, classified as necessary, within 90 days of
enactment that describes the long-term strategy of the United States to engage with Saudi
Arabia to facilitate political, economic, and social reforms and to effectively prevent the
financing of terrorism. The bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. H.Con.Res. 275 cites Wahhabist influence over Saudi Arabian religious
education in expressing “extreme disappointment with the slow pace of education reform”
in Saudi Arabia. The bill was passed by the House in December 2005. The Saudi Arabia
Accountability Act of 2005 (S. 1171 and H.R. 2037) calls on the government of Saudi
Arabia to end its support for organizations that allegedly support terrorism, including
religious charities and schools. Both bills have been referred to committees of
jurisdiction.
22 “Remarks by President George W. Bush on U.S. Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan,” Oct. 11,
2002, White House website: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html].
23 For more on Al Haramain and allegations on Saudi support for terrorism, see CRS Report
RL32499, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues.