Order Code RL32686
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan:
Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Updated January 25, 2006
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Summary
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant factors
in Afghanistan’s fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years. In 2005,
Afghanistan remained the source of 87% of the world’s illicit opium, in spite of
ongoing efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and their international
partners to combat poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. U.N. officials estimate
that in-country illicit profits from the 2005 opium poppy crop were equivalent in
value to 50% of the country’s legitimate GDP, sustaining fears that Afghanistan’s
economic recovery continues to be underwritten by drug profits.
Across Afghanistan, regional militia commanders, criminal organizations, and
corrupt government officials have exploited opium production and drug trafficking
as reliable sources of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these
groups pose to the country’s fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its
embryonic democratic government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears to
provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue
to operate in and around Afghanistan, including remnants of the Taliban regime and
some Al Qaeda operatives. Although coalition forces may be less frequently relying
on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, many
observers have warned that drug related corruption among appointed and newly
elected Afghan officials may create new political obstacles to further progress.
The initial failure of U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts to disrupt
the Afghan opium trade or sever its links to warlordism and corruption after the fall
of the Taliban led some observers to warn that without redoubled multilateral action,
Afghanistan would succumb to a state of lawlessness and reemerge as a sanctuary for
terrorists. Following his election in late 2004, Afghan president Hamid Karzai
identified counternarcotics as the top priority for his administration and since has
stated his belief that “the fight against drugs is the fight for Afghanistan.” In 2005,
U.S. and Afghan officials implemented a new strategy to provide viable economic
alternatives to poppy cultivation and to disrupt corruption and narco-terrorist
linkages. According to a U.N. survey, these new initiatives contributed to a 21%
decrease in the amount of opium poppy cultivation across Afghanistan in the 2004-
2005 growing season. However, better weather and higher crop yields ensured that
overall opium output remained nearly static at 4,100 metric tons. Survey results and
official opinions suggest output may rise again in 2006.
In addition to describing the structure and development of the Afghan narcotics
trade, this report provides current statistical information, profiles the trade’s various
participants, explores alleged narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. and
international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers current
policy debates regarding the role of the U.S. military in counternarcotics operations,
opium poppy eradication, alternative livelihood development, and funding issues for
Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. For more
information on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. and CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan:
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.

---

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Afghanistan’s Opium Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Production Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Historical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Taliban Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-Taliban Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Farmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Land Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Traffickers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Narcotics and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Consumption Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Trafficking to the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Regional Security Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The International Policy Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Institutions and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Public Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Judicial Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Alternative Livelihood Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Defining the Role of the U.S. Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Redefining Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Aerial Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

---

Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Counternarcotics Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Cited Field Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
List of Figures
Figure 1. Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1986-2005 (hectares) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 2. Opium Production, 1980-2005 (metric tons) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation by Province, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 4. Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1. Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table 3. Alternative Livelihood Proposed Spending Targets by Province,
FY2005-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 4. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source,
FY2002-FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Table 5. Planned Use of FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-13 . . 39

---

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy
Introduction
In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan’s narcotics trade,
U.N. officials estimate that Afghanistan produced a massive opium poppy crop in
2005 that supplied 87% of the world’s illicit opium for the second year in a row.1
Afghan, U.S., and international officials have stated that opium poppy cultivation and
drug trafficking constitute serious strategic threats to the security and stability of
Afghanistan and jeopardize the success of post-9/11 counterterrorism and
reconstruction efforts there. In light of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that
the United States make a long-term commitment to the security and stability of
Afghanistan, counternarcotics policy has emerged as a focal point of recurring debate
in the Bush Administration and in Congress concerning the United States’ strategic
objectives in Afghanistan and the global war against terrorism.
Concerns include the role of U.S. military personnel in counternarcotics
activities and strategies for continuing the simultaneous pursuit of counterterrorism
and counternarcotics goals, which may be complicated by practical necessities and
emerging political realities. Coalition forces pursuing regional security and
counterterrorism objectives may rely on the cooperation of commanders, tribal
leaders, and local officials who may be involved in the narcotics trade. Similarly,
U.S. officials and many observers believe that the introduction of a democratic
system of government to Afghanistan has likely been accompanied by the election
and appointment of narcotics-associated individuals to positions of public office.
Efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of ending
a highly-profitable enterprise that has become deeply interwoven with the economic,
political, and social fabric of a war-torn country. Afghan, U.S., and international
authorities are engaged in a campaign to reverse an unprecedented upsurge of opium
poppy cultivation and heroin production: they have begun implementing a
multifaceted counternarcotics initiative that includes public awareness campaigns,
judicial reform measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, drug
interdiction operations, and more robust poppy eradication. The Bush
Administration and Congress continue to consider options for upgrading U.S. support
for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in order to meet the challenges posed by
the Afghan opium economy to the security of Afghanistan and the international
community. Questions regarding the likely effectiveness, resource requirements, and
implications of new counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan are likely to arise as
such options continue to be debated.
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/Government of Afghanistan
Counternarcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, Nov. 2004.

---

CRS-2
Afghanistan’s Opium Economy
Opium production has become an entrenched element of Afghanistan’s fragile
political and economic order over the last 25 years in spite of ongoing local, regional,
and international efforts to reverse its growth. At the time of Afghanistan’s pro-
Communist coup in 1978, narcotics experts estimated that Afghan farmers produced
300 metric tons (MT) of opium annually, enough to satisfy most local and regional
demand and to supply a handful of heroin production facilities whose products were
bound for Western Europe.2 Since the early 1980s, a trend of increasing opium
poppy cultivation and opium production has unfolded during successive periods of
insurgency, civil war, fundamentalist government, and recently, international
engagement (Figures 1 and 2). In 2004, Afghanistan produced a world record opium
poppy crop that yielded 4200 MT of illicit opium — an estimated 87% of the world’s
supply. A slightly smaller crop in 2005 produced a similar volume of opium, and
estimated 4,100 MT, due to improved weather and environmental conditions.
Narcotics experts describe Afghanistan’s opium economy as the backbone of
a multibillion dollar drug trade that stretches throughout Central and Southwest Asia
and supplies heroin to consumption markets in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and
the United States. Millions of Afghans remain involved with various aspects of the
opium trade, including farmers, laborers, traffickers, warlords, and government
officials. Some experts have warned that the consolidation of existing relationships
between these groups supports negative trends such as warlordism and corruption and
threatens to transform Afghanistan into a failed narco-state.
Current Production Statistics
According to the 2005 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Ministry of
Counternarcotics (MCN):
! Opium poppy cultivation took place in fewer Afghan provinces in
2005 than in 2004, with significant decreases occurring in some
provinces and significant increases occurring in others (see Figure
3). Afghan farmers cultivated opium poppy on 104,000 hectares of
land during the 2004-2005 growing season, a 21% decrease from the
131,000 hectares cultivated in 2004. The area under cultivation was
equal to 2.3% of Afghanistan’s arable land. U.S. government
estimates placed the area under cultivation at a similar level of
107,400 hectares.
! The 2005 opium poppy crop produced 4,100 MT of illicit opium, a
small decrease from the 4,200 MT produced in 2004. Although the
area of land dedicated to opium poppy cultivation decreased by 21%,
crop yields improved due to better weather and other environmental
2 See Jonathan C. Randal, “Afghanistan’s Promised War on Opium,” Washington Post, Nov.
2, 1978, and Stuart Auerbach, “New Heroin Connection: Afghanistan and Pakistan Supply
West With Opium,” Washington Post, Oct. 11, 1979.

---

CRS-3
factors. A range of accepted opium to heroin conversion rates
indicate that the 2005 opium yield of 4,100 MT could have produced
400 to 650 MT of refined heroin.3 U.S. government estimates
placed overall opium output lower at 3,375 MT.
! Approximately 309,000 Afghan families cultivated opium poppy in
2005, a number equal to roughly 2.0 million people or 8.7% of the
Afghan population. An estimated 500,000 laborers and an unknown
number of traffickers, warlords, and officials also participate.
! The estimated $2.7 billion value of Afghanistan’s 2005 illicit opium
harvest is equivalent to approximately 50% of the country’s licit
GDP. Many licit and emerging industries are financed or supported
by profits from narcotics trafficking.4
The 2005 UNODC report credits the public outreach efforts of President Karzai,
who has characterized opium as shameful and demanded that regional and local
officials take direct action to curb poppy cultivation and opium trafficking. The
report also indicates that farmers fear crop eradication and notes that the largest
declines in opium poppy cultivation occurred in provinces that received the largest
investments of alternative livelihood assistance. Other observers have pointed to the
steady increase in opium production volume that has occurred since late 2001 and
argued that excess opium supply had reduced raw opium price levels (Table 1) and
price incentives for farmers to cultivate poppy. Price levels have shown signs of
increase since late 2005 which may reinvigorate price incentives in some areas.
Experts have identified two factors that may affect Afghanistan’s future opium
output regardless of reported declines in cultivation. Intensified interdiction and
eradication efforts by Afghan authorities may fuel a renewed increase in opium prices
that could enrich traffickers who control large existing stocks of opium and
encourage farmers to resume cultivation in the future. In addition, drought and crop
disease problems that limited the output of the 2004 poppy crop may not affect the
output of future poppy crops. Smaller nationwide poppy crops may yield higher
opium outputs if weather and irrigation improve productivity in cultivated areas.
Note: The following figures display trends in poppy cultivation and opium
production in Afghanistan over the last 25 years. The sharp decline in cultivation and
production in the 2000-2001 growing season is related to the Taliban regime’s
decision to ban opium poppy cultivation. According to U.S. officials, opium
trafficking continued unabated during this period, and Taliban authorities and their
allies collected higher profits from the sale of opium and heroin stockpiles.5
3 UNODC/Afghan Gov., Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, Nov. 2004, pp. 105-7.
4 See Barnett Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Center for
International Cooperation, Oct. 7, 2004, and the World Bank Country Economic Report -
Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty, Sept. 9, 2004.
5 Author interviews with U.S., U.N., and coalition officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, Jan. 2005.

---

CRS-4
Figure 1. Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1986-2005 (hectares)
Source: Graphic from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005. One hectare is equal to 10,000 square meters. U.S. government
estimates placed 2005 opium cultivation at 107,400 hectares. The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under their control in 2001,
but allowed opium trafficking to continue and profited from the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks. Limited cultivation continued in areas
under Northern Alliance control.

---

CRS-5
Figure 2. Opium Production, 1980-2005 (metric tons)
Source: Graphic adapted from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Surveys 2004 and 2005. One metric ton is equal to 2,200 pounds. U.S.
government estimates placed 2005 opium production at ,3375 metric tons. The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under their
control in 2001 but allowed opium trafficking to continue and profited from the sale of regime-controlled opium stocks. Limited cultivation
continued in areas under Northern Alliance control.

---

CRS-6
Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation by Province, 2005
Source: Map from UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005.

---

CRS-7
Table 1. Recent Opium Prices in Afghanistan
(regionally weighted fresh opium farmgatea price US$/kilogram)
1999
2000
2001b
2002
2003
2004
2005
Opium Price
$40
$28
$301
$350
$283
$92
$102
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004-5.
a. Farmgate price for fresh opium is the price paid to farmers for non-dried opium.
b. Dry opium prices skyrocketed to nearly $700/kg immediately following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and fell to $93/kg after U.S. airstrikes began.
Historical Development
During the more than two decades of occupation, foreign interference, and civil
war that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion, opium poppy cultivation and drug
trafficking served as central parts of Afghanistan’s war economy, providing revenue
to individuals and groups competing for power and an economic survival mechanism
to a growing segment of the impoverished population. In December 2001, Afghan
leaders participating in the Bonn conference that formed Afghanistan’s interim post-
Taliban government echoed pleas issued by their pro-Communist predecessors
decades earlier:6 They strongly urged that “the United Nations, the international
community, and regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority to
combat international terrorism, cultivation, and trafficking of illicit drugs and provide
Afghan farmers with financial, material and technical resources for alternative crop
production.”7 In spite of renewed efforts on the part of Afghan and international
authorities to combat opium poppy cultivation since the fall of the Taliban,
Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium.
Opium and Afghanistan’s War Economy. Following the Soviet invasion
of 1979 and during the civil war that ensued in the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal, opium poppy cultivation expanded in parallel with the gradual collapse
of state authority across Afghanistan. As the country’s formal economy succumbed
to violence and disorder, opium became one of the few available commodities
capable of both storing economic value and generating revenue for local
administration and military supplies. Some anti-Soviet mujahideen commanders
encouraged and taxed opium poppy cultivation and drug shipments, and, in some
instances, participated in the narcotics trade directly as a means of both economic
6 In 1978, pro-Communist Afghan officials reportedly requested “a lot of assistance from
abroad, especially economic help, to help replace farmers’ incomes derived from opium
poppy cultivation.” Randal, Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1978.
7 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions [The Bonn Agreement], Dec. 5, 2001.

---

CRS-8
survival and military financing.8 Elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) agency and Afghan rebel commanders to which the ISI channeled U.S. funding
and weaponry are also alleged to have participated in the Afghan narcotics trade
during the Soviet occupation and its aftermath, including in the production and
trafficking of refined heroin to U.S. and European markets.9 After the withdrawal of
Soviet troops and a drop in U.S. and Soviet funding, opium poppy cultivation, drug
trafficking, and other criminal activities increasingly provided local leaders and
military commanders with a means of supporting their operations and establishing
political influence in the areas they controlled.
Taliban Era. The centralization of authority under the Taliban movement
during the mid-to-late 1990s further fueled Afghan opium poppy cultivation and
narcotic production, as Taliban officials coopted their military opponents with
promises of permissive cultivation policies and mirrored the practices of their
warlord predecessors by collecting tax revenue and profits on the growing output.10
In 1999, Afghanistan produced a peak of over 4500 MT of raw opium, which led to
growing international pressure from states whose populations were consuming the
end products of a seemingly endless supply of Afghan drugs. In response, the
Taliban announced a ban on opium poppy cultivation in late 2000, but allowed the
opiate trade to continue, fueling speculation that the decision was designed to
contribute to their marginalized government’s campaign for international legitimacy.
Under the ban, opium poppy cultivation was reduced dramatically and overall opium
output fell to 185 MT, mainly because of continued cultivation and production in
areas under the control of Northern Alliance forces. Individual Northern Alliance
commanders also taxed opium production and transportation within their zones of
control and continued producing opium and trafficking heroin following the Taliban
prohibition.11 Although U.S. and international officials initially applauded the
Taliban policy shift, many experts now believe that the ban was designed to increase
the market price for and potential revenue from stocks of Afghan opium maintained
by the Taliban and its powerful trafficking allies within the country.12
8 See Arthur Bonner, “Afghan Rebel’s Victory Garden: Opium,” New York Times, June 18,
1986, and Mary Thornton, “Sales of Opium Reportedly Fund Afghan Rebels,” Washington
Post, Dec. 17, 1983.
9 See James Rupert and Steve Coll, “U.S. Declines to Probe Afghan Drug Trade: Rebels,
Pakistani Officers Implicated,” Washington Post, May 13, 1990; Jim Lobe, “Drugs: U.S.
Looks Other Way In Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Inter Press Service, May 18, 1990; John
F. Burns, “U.S. Cuts Off Arms to Afghan Faction,” New York Times, Nov. 19, 1989; Kathy
Evans, “Money is the Drug” The Guardian (UK), Nov. 11, 1989; and Lawrence Lifschultz,
“Bush, Drugs and Pakistan: Inside the Kingdom of Heroin,” The Nation, Nov. 14, 1988.
10 The Taliban government collected an agricultural tax (approximately 10%, paid in kind),
known as ushr, and a traditional Islamic tithe known as zakat (variable percentages). The
Taliban also taxed opium traders and transport syndicates involved in the transportation of
opiates. UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 92, 127-8.
11 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 92.
12 In December 2001, then Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs Rand Beers stated that the Taliban had not banned opium cultivation
“out of kindness, but because they wanted to regulate the market: They simply produced too
(continued...)

---

CRS-9
Post-Taliban Resurgence. Following 9/11, Afghan farmers anticipated the
fall of the Taliban government and resumed cultivating opium poppy as U.S.-led
military operations began in October 2001. International efforts to rebuild
Afghanistan’s devastated society began with the organization of an interim
administration at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, and Afghan leaders
committed their new government to combat the resurgence of opium poppy
cultivation and requested international counternarcotics assistance from the United
States, the United Kingdom and others.13 The United Kingdom was designated the
lead nation for international counternarcotics assistance and policy in Afghanistan.
On January 17, 2002, the Afghan Interim Administration issued a ban on opium
poppy cultivation that was enforced with a limited eradication campaign in April
2002. In spite of these efforts, the 2001-2002 opium poppy crop produced over 3400
MT of opium, reestablishing Afghanistan as the world’s leading producer of illicit
opium. Since 2002, further government bans and stronger interdiction and eradication
efforts failed to reverse an overall trend of increasing opium poppy cultivation and
opium output, although year-on-year reductions occurred in 2005.
Actors in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy
Farmers, laborers, landowners, and traffickers each play roles in Afghanistan’s
opium economy. Ongoing field research indicates that the motives and methods of
each group vary considerably based on their geographic location, their respective
economic circumstances, their relationships with ethnic groups and external parties,
and prevailing political conditions.14 Studies suggest that profit is not the universal
motivating factor fueling opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan: opium trade field
researcher David Mansfield argues that the “great diversity in the socio-economic
groups involved in opium poppy in Afghanistan and the assets at their disposal”
ensures that “there is great disparity in the revenues that they can accrue from its
cultivation.”15 Household debt and land access needs also motivate opium poppy
cultivation.
Farmers. Field studies have identified several structural barriers that limit the
profitability of opium poppy cultivation for the average Afghan farmer. Many
Afghan farming households cultivate opium poppy in order to improve their access
12 (...continued)
much opium.” Marc Kaufman, “Surge in Afghan Poppy Crop Is Forecast,” Washington Post,
Dec. 25, 2001. See Table 1 and UNODC, Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 57.
13 The Bonn Agreement, Dec. 5, 2001.
14 Analysis in this report relating to the motives and methods of Afghan farmers, land
owners, and traffickers is based on the findings of the UNODC’s “Strategic Studies” series
on Afghanistan’s opium economy and a series of commissioned development reports by
David Mansfield, the Aga Khan Foundation, Frank Kenefick and Larry Morgan, Adam Pain,
and others. UNODC Strategic Studies reports are available at [http://www.unodc.org/
pakistan/en/publications.html]. Complete citations are provided in Appendix A.
15 David Mansfield, “The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and
Reality,” International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and
Cooperation, Aug. 2001.

---

CRS-10
to land, water, agricultural supplies, and credit — inputs that remain in short supply
in many of the rural areas where opium poppy is grown. Experts have identified high
levels of household debt as a powerful structural determinant of the continuation of
opium poppy cultivation among some Afghan farmers. An opium-for-credit system,
known as salaam, allows farmers to secure loans to buy necessary supplies and
provisions if they agree in advance to sell future opium harvests at rates as low as
half their expected market value. Crop failures that occurred as a result of a severe
four-year nationwide drought (1998-2001) reportedly caused many farming
households to accumulate large amounts of debt in the form of salaam loans based
on future cultivation of opium poppy. In some cases, the introduction of strict poppy
cultivation bans and crop eradication policies by the Taliban in 2001 and the Afghan
Interim Authority in 2002 and 2003 increased the debt levels of many Afghan
farmers by destroying opium crops that served as collateral for salaam arrangements.
Although the Afghan government issued a decree banning opium-based loans
and credit in April 2002, the 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey reports that salaam
lending has continued. Increased debt has led some farmers to mortgage land and to
agree to cultivate opium poppy in the future through sharecropping arrangements.
Other landless farmers have reportedly been forced to accept the crop selection
choices of landowners who control their access to land and water and who favor
opium poppy over other traditional crops. According to experts, this combination of
drought-induced debt, predatory traditional lending systems, and the unintended side-
effects from government cultivation bans and eradication programs has fueled opium
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The 2005 UNODC/MCN opium survey warns that
in areas where farmers carry high salaam and other loan debt, significant decreases
in opium poppy cultivation and associated revenue may be “potentially problematic”
and could create “severe financial pressure on to farmers to resume opium production
[in 2006] in order not to default.”
Land Owners. Afghan land owners are better positioned to profit from opium
poppy cultivation because of the labor intensive nature of the opium production
process. Land owners who control vital opium cultivation inputs like land, water, and
fertilizers enjoy an economic advantage in the opium production cycle, which places
heavy demands on Afghanistan’s rural agricultural labor market during annual opium
poppy planting, maintenance, and harvesting seasons. Wealthy land owners secure
the services of skilled itinerant laborers to assist in the complex opium harvesting
process, which improves their crop yields and profits. Itinerant laborers, in turn,
contribute to the spread of opium cultivation expertise around Afghanistan.16
Although opium prices have fallen since reaching a peak of $350/kg in 2002, farmers
have experienced greater profit loss than land owners.17 Land owners also have
benefitted from consolidation of property related to rising debt levels among Afghan
farmers. Land valuation based on potential opium yields also benefits land owners.
Traffickers. International market prices for heroin and intermediate opiates
such as morphine ensure that individuals and groups engaged in the shipment and
16 See UNODC, “An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Poppy Cultivation to
New Districts in Afghanistan,” June 1998.
17 UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003,” p. 8.

---

CRS-11
distribution of refined opium products earn substantially higher profits than those
involved with cultivating and producing raw opium gum.18 Although opium refining
facilities that produce morphine base and heroin traditionally have been located in
tribal areas along the Afghan border with Pakistan, the growth and spread of opium
cultivation in recent years has led to a corresponding proliferation of opiate
processing facilities, particularly into northeastern Badakhshan province.19 The large
proportion of heroin in the composition of drugs seized in countries neighboring
Afghanistan reflects this proliferation and suggests that the profitability of opiate
trafficking for Afghan groups has increased significantly in recent years.
Although Afghan individuals and groups play a significant role in trafficking
opiates within Afghanistan and into surrounding countries, relatively few Afghans
have been identified as participants in the international narcotics trafficking
operations that bring finished opiate products such as heroin to Middle Eastern,
European, or North American consumer markets.20 Ethnic and tribal relationships
facilitate the opium trade within Afghanistan, while relationships between ethnic
Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, and Baluchi Afghans and their counterparts in Central Asia,
Pakistan, and Iran provide a basis for the organization and networking needed to
deliver Aghan opiates to regional markets and into the hands of international
trafficking organizations.21 Some observers argue that trafficking profits are a source
of economic and political instability and that interdiction and prosecution should
precede eradication efforts so that increased post-eradication opium prices do not
enrich trafficking groups further. Multilateral intelligence gathering and interdiction
operations have been initiated since 2001 and are described in further detail below.
Narcotics and Security
Experts and officials have identified three areas of concern about the potential
impact of the Afghan narcotics trade on the security of Afghanistan, the United
States, and the international community. Each is first summarized, and then more
fully developed below.
! Prospects for State Failure: Afghan, U.S., and international
officials have identified several correlations between the narcotics
trade and negative political and economic trends that undermine
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, establish the rule of law, and restore
a functioning and licit economy. These trends include corruption
and the existence of independent armed groups opposed to the
18 See UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 129-40, 165-8.
19 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” pp. 139, 158.
20 “The involvement of Afghan groups/individuals is basically limited to the opium
production, the trade of opium within Afghanistan, the transformation of some of the opium
into morphine and heroin, and to some extent, the trafficking of opiates to neighboring
countries.” UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 64.
21 See Tamara Makarenko, “Bumper Afghan Narcotics Crop Indicates Resilience of
Networks,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1, 2002.

---

CRS-12
Afghan government’s reform and counternarcotics agendas. Similar
drug-related trends threaten countries neighboring Afghanistan.
Political observers have warned that figures involved with the drug
trade have been elected or appointed to public office and may
oppose or undermine current and future counternarcotics initiatives.
! “Narco-Terrorism”: Afghan and U.S. officials believe that Taliban
insurgents and regional groups associated with Al Qaeda continue
to profit from Afghanistan’s burgeoning narcotics trade. Officials
also suspect that drug profits provide some Al Qaeda operatives with
financial and logistical support. U.S. officials believe that financial
and logistical relationships between narcotics traffickers, terrorists,
and criminal groups pose threats to the security of Afghanistan and
the wider international community.
! Consumption and Public Health: World health officials believe
that Afghan narcotics pose social and public health risks for
populations in Afghanistan, its neighbors, Russia, Western Europe,
and, to a limited extent, the United States. Increased use of Afghan
opiates has been closely associated with increased addiction and
HIV infection levels in heroin consumption markets.
Narcotics and Prospects for State Failure in Afghanistan
Afghan authorities and international observers have identified negative trends
associated with the narcotics trade as barriers to the reestablishment of security, the
rule of law, and a legitimate economy throughout Afghanistan — goals which U.S.
and Afghan authorities have characterized as essential for the country’s long term
stability. In a September 2004 report on Afghanistan’s economic development, the
World Bank described these related trends as “a vicious circle” (Figure 5) that
constitute “a grave danger” to the “entire state-building and reconstruction agenda.”22
Anti-Government Elements and Popular Violence. Authorities fear that
heavily armed trafficking groups and regional militia may join Afghan farmers in
violently resisting expanded drug interdiction and crop eradication efforts. Opium
production remains a source of revenue and patronage for some armed groups and
militia leaders seeking to maintain their power and influence over areas of the
country at the expense of the extension of national government authority.23
According to U.N. and Afghan officials, some armed groups impose informal taxes
and checkpoint fees of 10% to 40% on farmers, traffickers, and opiate processing
22 Testimony of Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, House International Relations Committee, Sept. 23, 2004.
23 See UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 69, and Report of the
Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International
Peace and Security, Aug. 12, 2004.

---

CRS-13
laboratories within their areas of control, receiving cash or payment in opium.24
Although much of the outright conflict between regional and factional militias that
motivated opium cultivation in the past has ended, long-established political and
commercial networks linking armed groups, landowning elites, transportation guilds,
and drug syndicates continue to constitute the foundation of the opium economy.
Figure 4. Narcotics and Security in Afghanistan
Source: World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing
Poverty, Country Economic Report No. 29551-AF September 9, 2004, p. 87.
Fears of widespread violence are based in large part on patterns of clashes
between Afghan farmers and counternarcotics authorities seeking to eradicate crops.
In April 2005, a large government eradication force clashed with approximately
2,000 villagers demonstrating against the destruction of opium crops in the southern
district of Maiwand, leading to the death of one security officer and the wounding of
several civilians. Afghan soldiers and police also were killed during 2005 by
attackers firing on government eradication forces in Uruzgan and Kandahar. These
clashes and attacks follow a pattern evident in previous years, in which eradication
teams employed by provincial authorities faced demonstrations, small arms fire, and
mined poppy fields.25 At the outset of the Afghan government’s first eradication
campaign in April 2002, for example, Pashtun farmers barricaded the major highway
24 UNODC/CND, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, p. 66.
25 The Afghan government’s Central Eradication Force reportedly was “rocketed by furious
villagers” during a 2004 eradication mission in Wardak province outside of Kabul. Reuters,
Pressure on Karzai as Afghan Drug Problem Worsens, Oct. 5, 2004.

---

CRS-14
linking Pakistan and Afghanistan, and clashes between opium farmers and Afghan
eradication teams killed 16 people.26
Corruption and Challenges to Afghan Democracy. According to the
State Department, national government officials are generally “believed to be free of
direct criminal connection to the drug trade,” although among provincial and district
level officials, “drug-related corruption is pervasive.”27 In December 2004, Afghan
counternarcotics official Mirwais Yasini indicated that “high government officials,
police commanders, governors are involved” in the drug trade.28 Government
authorities and security forces in Afghanistan have accused each other of
involvement in opium production and trafficking, and militia commanders have
clashed over opium production and profits in various regions of the country,
threatening the country’s stability and the lives of civilians.29 Although most of
Afghanistan’s prominent political figures have publicly condemned the country’s
opium economy, some political figures and their powerful supporters are alleged to
have links with the trade or hold responsibility for areas of Afghanistan where opium
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking take place. Commanders under the control of
former cabinet members and former presidential candidates are alleged to participate
in the opium trade.30
Some observers fear that as the Afghan government develops stronger
counternarcotics policies and capabilities, groups that are involved with the opium
trade will join others in seeking to corrupt or subvert Afghanistan’s democratic
process. Although no major attempts were made to disrupt the Afghan national
presidential or parliamentary elections, armed factions and local militia leaders
continue to exert political influence across Afghanistan.31 With regard to recent
parliamentary elections, some experts have argued that drug money may have
financed the campaigns of candidates, and at least one expert warned that “drug
lords” were candidates.32
26 See Agence France Presse, “Afghanistan Deploys 67 Million Dollars in War on Drugs,”
Apr. 11, 2002, and Anwar Iqbal, “War on Dug Begins in Afghanistan,” United Press
International, Apr. 10, 2002.
27 Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Mar. 2005.
28 Agence France Presse, “Curbing Rampant Afghan Opium Trade Will Take Karzai
Years,” Dec. 5, 2004.
29 See New York Times, “7 Are Killed in a Clash of Afghan Militias,” Feb. 9, 2004, and
FBIS IAP20040707000101 - Afghanistan Briefing, July 5-7, 2004.
30 See Victoria Burnett, “Outlook Uncertain: Can Afghanistan Take the Next Step to
Building a State?” Financial Times, Aug. 19, 2004; Carol Harrington, “Ruthless Dostum a
Rival for Karzai,” Toronto Star, Sept. 20, 2004; and Jurgen Dahlkamp, Susanne Koelbl, and
Georg Mascolo, (tr. Margot Bettauer Dembo), “Bundeswehr: Poppies, Rocks, Shards of
Trouble,” Der Spiegel [Germany], Nov. 10, 2003.
31 Human Rights Watch, “The Rule of the Gun.” Sept. 2004.
32 Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan,”
Boston Globe, Oct. 20, 2004.

---

CRS-15
Opium Profits and Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery. Reports
continue to indicate that profits from Afghanistan’s opium trade may be
overwhelming efforts to reestablish a functioning, licit economy. According to the
UNODC/MCN 2005 opium survey, the value of the 2005 opium harvest, an
estimated $2.7 billion, was equal to 50% of the country’s licit GDP from 2004. The
World Bank reports that the opium economy has produced significant increases in
rural wages and income and remains a significant source of credit for low income
rural households. Opium profits fuel consumption of domestic products and support
imports of high value goods such as automobiles and appliances from abroad. Funds
from the drug trade are also a major source of investment for infrastructure
development projects, including major projects in “building construction, trade, and
transport.”33 Analysts argue that efforts to combat narcotics must address
Afghanistan’s economic dependence on opium and replace drug profits with licit
capital and investment. In February 2005, the IMF warned that new counternarcotics
efforts, if successful, “could adversely affect GDP growth, the balance of payments,
and government revenue” by lowering drug income and weakening its support for
domestic consumption and taxed imports.34
Narcotics, Insurgency, and Terrorism
Afghan and U.S. officials believe that linkages between insurgents, terrorists,
and narcotics traffickers threaten the security of Afghanistan and the international
community. In addition to moving deadly opiates, sophisticated drug transportation
and money laundering networks may also facilitate the movement of wanted
individuals and terrorist funds and support illicit trafficking in persons and weapons.
Although some U.S. officials have made unequivocal statements about the existence
of narco-terrorist linkages, most officials address the issue in general terms and
indicate that intelligence agencies are continually developing more complete pictures
of these relationships. In late 2005 and early 2006, Afghan president Hamid Karzai
made several statements indicating that drug profits were providing financial support
to the ongoing Taliban insurgency, including funding suicide bombing operations
that killed Afghan civilians. According to U.S. officials, senior Al Qaeda leaders
considered and subsequently rejected the idea of becoming directly involved in
managing and profiting from aspects of Afghanistan’s narcotics trade. Ideological
considerations and fear of increased visibility and vulnerability to foreign intelligence
and law enforcement services reportedly were the predominant factors in their
decision.35 Al Qaeda operatives and the local tribal and criminal networks in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region that are suspected of supporting and sheltering
them are thought to have some involvement with the regional narcotics trade. Table
2 describes known linkages between groups involved in terrorism and the drug trade
as presented by State Department officials to Members of Congress in April 2004 and
February 2005.
33 World Bank, State Building..., p. 87.
34 International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 05/33 - Islamic State of
Afghanistan: 2004 Article IV Consultation and Second Review, Feb. 2005.
35 Author interviews with U.S. officials in Kabul, Afghanistan, Jan. 2005.

---

CRS-16
Table 2. Afghan Extremists’ Links to the Drug Trade
Afghan Extremists
Are they receiving money from the
Do traffickers provide them with logistical
Are they telling farmers to grow
trade?
support?
opium poppy?
Hizb-i Islami/
Almost Definitely: HIG commanders
Most Likely: HIG commanders involved in the
Probably: Afghan government
Gulbuddin (HIG)a
involved in trafficking have led attacks
drug trade may use those ties to facilitate
officials say the Taliban encourage
on Coalition forces, and U.S. troops
weapons smuggling and money laundering.
and in some instances force poppy
have raided labs linked to the HIG.
cultivation. Existing State
Department estimates suggest other
Taliban
Almost Definitely: U.N. and Afghan
Most Likely: Major drug barons who supported
groups interested in weakening the
Transitional Authority officials report
the Taliban when it was in power remain at
government in Kabul — like the HIG
the group earns money from trafficking
large, and may be moving people, equipment,
— may have followed suit.
and gets donations form drug lords.
and money on the group’s behalf.
Islamic Movement of
Probably: Uzbek officials have accused
Probably: Members with drug ties may turn to
Possibly: No reports, and these
Uzbekistan (IMU)
the group of involvement in the drug
traffickers for help crossing borders.
groups — as foreigners in
trade, and its remnants in Afghanistan
Afghanistan — may lack the moral
may turn to trafficking to raise funds.
and political authority needed to
influence farmers’ planting decisions.
Al Qaeda
Possibly: Only scattered reports, but
Probably: Traffickers stopped during December
fighters in Afghanistan may be engaged
2003 in the Arabian Sea were linked to Al
in low-level — but still lucrative —
Qaeda. Al Qaeda may hire criminals in South
drug deals.
Asia to transfer weapons, explosives, money,
and people through the region.
Source: Robert Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, April 1, 2004.
a. Hizb-i Islami’s leader — former anti-Soviet mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — is alleged to have been involved in the Afghan narcotics trade since the 1980s.

---

CRS-17
Taliban and Al Qaeda Financiers. Afghan individuals serve as middlemen
between the groups described in Table 2 and narcotics producers and traffickers.
Press reports and U.S. officials have identified two prominent figures involved in
Afghanistan’s drug trade that reportedly have financed Taliban insurgents and some
low-level Al Qaeda operatives:
! Haji Bashir Noorzai is a former confidant of ousted Taliban leader
Mullah Omar who served as a military commander during the
Taliban era and was reportedly a “major financial supporter of the
Taliban.”36 In June 2004, the Bush Administration added Haji
Bashir Noorzai to the U.S. government’s drug kingpin list. In April
2005, Noorzai was arrested by DEA officials and charged with
conspiracy to import heroin into the United States over a 15-year
period. The indictment charges that Noorzai and his organization
“provided demolitions, weaponry, and manpower to the Taliban” in
return for “protection for its opium crops, heroin laboratories,
drug-transportation routes, and members and associates.”37
! Haji Baz Mohammed is an alleged drug organization leader from
the eastern province of Nangarhar who was extradited to the United
States in October 2005 to face charges of importing Afghan heroin
into the United States. According to his indictment, Mohammed’s
organization was “closely aligned with the Taliban” and “provided
financial support to the Taliban and other associated Islamic-
extremist organizations in Afghanistan” in return for protection.38
! Haji Juma Khan has been identified as an alleged drug lord and Al
Qaeda financier. In August 2004, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Robert
Charles told Time Magazine that Haji Juma Khan is “obviously very
tightly tied to the Taliban.” Afghan Counter Narcotics Directorate
chief Mirwais Yasini added that “there are central linkages among
Khan, Mullah Omar and [Osama] Bin Laden.”39
U.S. forces reportedly detained and released both Haji Juma Khan and Haji
Bashir Noorzai in late 2001 and early 2002. Press accounts state that Noorzai
voluntarily provided intelligence about his Taliban and Al Qaeda colleagues during
36 Liz Sly, “Opium Cash Fuels Terror, Experts Say,” Chicago Tribune, Feb. 9, 2004; John
Fullerton, “Live and Let Live for Afghan Warlords, Drug Barons,” Reuters, Feb. 5, 2002.
37 See U.S. v. Bashir Noorzai, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S1 05 Cr.
19, Apr. 25, 2005.
38 See U.S. v. Baz Mohammed, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S14 03
Cr. 486 [DC], Oct. 25, 2005.
39 Tim McGirk, “Terrorism’s Harvest,” Time Magazine [Asia], Aug. 2, 2004.

---

CRS-18
questioning at Kandahar’s airport prior to his release.40 DEA officials reportedly
were unable to question him at the time.41 Noorzai’s forces later surrendered a large
number of weapons to coalition and Afghan authorities and provided security for
Qandahar province governor Gul Agha Sherzai.42 Juma Khan remains at large, and
Department of Defense officials indicate that U.S. military forces are not directly
pursuing major figures in the Afghan opium trade, although U.S., Afghan, and
coalition authorities continue to monitor and collect intelligence on their activities
and support Afghan authorities and their operations.43
Consumption Markets
Afghan opium presents significant public health and internal security challenges
to downstream markets where refined heroin and other opiates are consumed,
including the United States. Russia and Europe have been the main consumption
markets for Afghan opiates since the early 1990s, and estimates place Afghan opium
as the source of over 90% of the heroin that enters the United Kingdom and Western
Europe annually. Russian and European leaders have expressed concern over the
growth of Afghanistan’s opium trade as both a national security threat as well as a
threat to public health and safety.
Trafficking to the United States. Heroin originating in southwest Asia
(Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) “was the predominant form of heroin
available in the United States” from 1980 to 1987,44 and the DEA’s Heroin Signature
Program has indicated that southwest Asia-derived heroin currently constitutes up to
10% of the heroin available in the United States.45 Since the 1980s, several figures
involved in the Afghan drug trade have been convicted of trafficking illegal drugs,
including heroin, into the United States.46 Afghan and Pakistani nationals have been
indicted and convicted on heroin trafficking and money laundering charges in U.S.
courts as recently as April 2005. In addition to the cases of Haji Bashir Noorzai and
40 Haji Bashir reportedly described his time with U.S. forces in the following terms: “I spent
my days and nights comfortably... I was like a guest, not a prisoner.” CBS Evening News,
“Newly Arrived US Army Soldiers Find it Difficult to Adjust...,” Feb. 7, 2002.
41 Steve Inskeep, “Afghanistan’s Opium Trade,” National Public Radio, Apr. 26, 2002.
42 See Mark Corcoran, “America’s Blind Eye,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
Foreign Correspondent, Apr. 10, 2002.
43 Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.
44 Drug Enforcement Agency, “The Availability of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United
States,” May 1996.
45 Drug Enforcement Agency, “Heroin Signature Program: 2002,” Mar. 2004.
46 In 1985, the DEA developed evidence against a wealthy Afghan national alleged to have
been “involved in supplying Afghan rebels with weapons in exchange for heroin and
hashish, portions of which were eventually distributed in Western Europe and the United
States.” See Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control - Annual Report 1985, Dec.
19, 1986, p. 58; See U.S. v. Roeffen, et al. [U.S. District Court of New Jersey (Trenton),
86-00013-01] and U.S. v. Wali [860 F.2d 588 (3d Cir.1988)].

---

CRS-19
Haji Baz Mohammed noted above, the following other recent cases involve links to
the Taliban and Al Qaeda:
! In the mid-1990s, several Pakistani nationals were extradited to the
United States and convicted of heroin and hashish trafficking,
including Haji Ayub Afridi, a former member of Pakistan’s
Parliament and alleged drug baron.47
! Since 2001, DEA and FBI investigators have prosecuted several
Afghan and Pakistani nationals in connection with heroin trafficking
and money laundering charges, including members of Pakistan’s
Afridi clan.48 Officials have indicated that some of the individuals
involved in these recent cases may have relationships with Taliban
insurgents and members of Al Qaeda.49
! Al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers have been captured
trafficking large quantities of heroin and hashish and attempting to
trade drugs for Stinger missiles.50
Russia. Afghan opiates have been a concern for Russian leaders since the
1980s, when Afghan drug dealers targeted Soviet troops and many Russian soldiers
returned from service in Afghanistan addicted to heroin.51 More recently, the Russian
government has expressed deep concern about “narco-terrorist” linkages that are
alleged to exist between Chechen rebel groups, their Islamist extremist allies, and
Caucasian criminal groups that traffic and distribute heroin in Russia. Since 1993,
HIV infection and heroin addiction rates have skyrocketed in Russia, and these trends
have been linked to the influx and growing use of Afghan opiates. These concerns
make the Afghan narcotics trade an issue of priority interest to Russian decision
makers, and motivate attention and initiative on the part of Russian security services
47 Marcus W. Brauchli, “Pakistan’s Wild Frontier Breeds Trouble — Drugs, Terrorism
Could Overflow Into Other Regions,” Wall Street Journal, June 3,1993; Kathy Gannon,
“Pakistan Extradites Suspected Drug Dealers to U.S.,” Associated Press, Oct. 16, 1993;
Jeanne King, “U.S. Denies Bail to Alleged Pakistani Drug Baron,” Reuters, Dec. 21, 1995;
and Ron Synovitz, “U.S. Indicts 11 In Connection With Drug Ring,” RFE/RL, Sep. 17, 2003.
48 U.S. v. Afridi, et. al., [U.S. District Court of Maryland, (Baltimore), AW-03-0211].
49 Testimony of DEA Administrator Karen Tandy before the House International Relations
Committee, Feb. 12, 2004.
50 James W. Crawley, “U.S. Warships Pinching Persian Gulf Drug Trade,” San Diego
Union-Tribune, February 9, 2004, and Tony Perry, “2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for Al
Qaeda Ally,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 4, 2004.
51 Defense Department officials report that steps are taken to educate U.S. troops serving in
Afghanistan about the dangers of narcotics use and to monitor and prevent drug use.
Testimony of Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director of Strategic Plans (J-5), Before the House
International Relations Committee, Sept. 23, 2004.

---

CRS-20
in the region. The head of Russia’s counternarcotics service has announced plans to
open a counternarcotics field office in Kabul.52
Western Europe. In Europe, press outlets and public officials in several
countries have devoted significant attention to Afghanistan’s opium trade since the
1990s. In the United Kingdom, where British officials estimate that 90-95% of the
heroin that enters the country annually is derived from Afghan opium, the public
places a high priority on combating the Afghan opiate trade. In October 2001, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair cited the Taliban regime’s tolerance for opium cultivation
and heroin production as one justification for the United Kingdom’s involvement in
the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. Some British citizens and officials
have criticized the Blair Administration’s counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and
argued that more should be done to stem the flow of Afghan opiates in the future.53
The United Kingdom currently serves as the lead nation for international
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, and British government officials assist
Afghan counternarcotics authorities in intelligence gathering and targeting operations
for interdiction and eradication. British defense officials have announced plans to
send up to 4,000 British troops to the key opium-producing province of Helmand
province in southern Afghanistan, where their mission reportedly will include efforts
to support security operations and target narcotic traffickers.
Regional Security Implications
Afghanistan’s opiate trade presents a range of policy challenges for
Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly for the Central Asian republics of the former
Soviet Union. As a security issue, regional governments face the challenge of
securing their borders and populations against the inflow of Afghan narcotics and
infiltration by armed trafficking and terrorist groups. Regional terrorist organizations
and international criminal syndicates that move Afghan opiates throughout the region
have been linked to insecurity, corruption, and violence in several countries.54 As a
public health issue, Afghan narcotics have contributed to a dramatic upsurge in opiate
use and addiction rates in countries neighboring Afghanistan, a factor that also has
been linked to dramatic increases in HIV infection rates in many of Afghanistan’s
neighbors. According to the UNODC, by 2001, “Afghan opiates represented: almost
100% of the illicit opiates consumed in... Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the Russian
Federation.”55 With the exception of Turkey, intravenous use of Afghan opiates is
52 Agence France Presse, “Russia plans anti-drug centre in Kabul,” Mar. 29, 2005.
53 House of Commons (UK) - Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report, July 21, 2004.
54 For more information see Tamara Makarenko, “Crime, Terror and the Central Asian Drug
Trade,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 3 (Summer 2002), and Integrated Regional
Information Networks (IRIN) Report, “Central Asia: Regional Impact of the Afghan Heroin
Trade ,” U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Aug. 2004.
Available at [http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/opium/regOvr.asp].
55 UNODC, “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” p. 33, 35.

---

CRS-21
the dominant driver of growing HIV infection rates in each of these countries.56
These destabilizing factors could provide a powerful pretext for increased attention
to and possible intervention in Afghan affairs on the part of regional powers such as
Iran and Pakistan.
Central Asia.57 The emergence of the so-called “Northern Route” of opiate
trafficking through Central Asia and the Caucasus in the mid-1990s transformed the
region’s previously small and relatively self-contained opiate market into the center
of global opium and heroin trafficking. Ineffective border control, civil war, and
corruption facilitated this trend, and opiate trafficking and use in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan now pose significant security and public
health threats to those countries. U.S. officials have implicated the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan in the regional drug trade, as well as well-organized and heavily armed
criminal syndicates that threaten U.S. interests.
Tajikistan has emerged as the primary transit point for Afghan opiates entering
Central Asia and being trafficked beyond. From 1998 to 2003, Tajikistan’s Drug
Control Agency seized 30 MT of drugs and narcotics, including 16 MT of heroin.
U.N. authorities estimate that the European street value of the 5,600 kg of heroin
seized by Tajik authorities in 2003 was over $3 billion.58 The 201st Russian Army
Division stationed troops along the Afghan-Tajik border to disrupt the activities of
criminals, narcotics traffickers, and terrorist groups from 1993 through late 2004.
Tajik and Russian authorities have begun replacing these Russian military forces with
Tajik border security guards and are scheduled to complete the process by the end of
2006.59 Some observers have expressed concern that the relatively poor training and
inexperience of the Tajik forces may result in an increase in the flow of opium and
heroin into Central Asia and onward to Russia and Europe. Others fear that Tajik
security forces may prove more vulnerable to corruption than their Russian
counterparts.60 In January 2005, Russian press sources reported that Russian border
guards seized 2.5 MT of heroin on the Tajik-Afghan border in 2004. A Russian-led
56 For more information, see the World Health Organization’s Epidemiological Fact Sheets
on HIV/AIDS at [http://www.who.int/GlobalAtlas/PDFFactory/HIV/index.asp], and Julie
Stachowiak and Chris Beyrer, HIV Follows Heroin Trafficking Routes,” Open Society
Institute - Central Eurasia Project, Available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/health.security/
presentations/hiv_trafficking.shtml].
57 For more on Central Asian security and public health, including information on narcotics
trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism see CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s
Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, and CRS Report RL30970, Health in
Russia and Other Soviet Successor States: Context and Issues for Congress, both by Jim
Nichol.
58 IRIN Report, “Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide,” OCHA, Sept. 13, 2004. Available
at [http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/opium/regTaj.asp].
59 Agence France Presse, “Tajiks to Take Over Patrolling Half of Tajik-Afghan Border
From Russians,” Oct. 1, 2004.
60 See Rukhshona Najmiddinova, “Tajikistan Arrests Anti-Drug Agency Head,” Associated
Press, Aug. 6, 2004.

---

CRS-22
Collective Security Treaty Organization interdiction effort known as Channel-2005
seized close to 9 MT of drugs in 2005, including over 200 kg of heroin.61
Pakistan. According to the 2005 State Department International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), “Pakistan remains a substantial trafficking country
for heroin, morphine, and hashish from Afghanistan,” and Pakistani narcotics
traffickers “play a very prominent role in all aspects of the drug trade” in regions of
Afghanistan that border Pakistan. Trafficking groups routinely use western areas of
Afghanistan and Pakistan as staging areas for the movement of opiates into and
through Iran. Efforts to control the narcotics trade in Pakistan have historically been
complicated by the government’s limited ability to assert authority over autonomous
tribal zones, although recent cooperative border security efforts with the United
States have increased the presence of government authorities in these regions. The
Pakistani government’s efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production since 2001 have been moderately successful; however, drug usage
remains relatively high among some elements of Pakistani society. In March 2003,
former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain told a House International
Relations Committee panel that the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
agency in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 had been “substantial.”62 The 2003 State
Department INCSR stated that U.S. officials have “no evidence” that any senior
government officials were involved with the narcotics trade or drug money
laundering, although the report also stated that narcotics remained a source of
“persistent corruption” among lower level officials.
Iran. Narcotics trafficking and use continue to present serious security and
public health risks to Iran, which the State Department has called “a major transit
route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan.” According to the 2003 State
Department INCSR, over 3200 Iranian security personnel have been killed in clashes
with heavily-armed narcotics trafficking groups over the last twenty years, and 67%
of HIV infections in Iran are related to intravenous drug use by the country’s more
than 1 million estimated addicts. Iran’s interdiction efforts along its eastern borders
with Afghanistan and Pakistan are widely credited with forcing opiate traffickers to
establish and maintain the “Northern Route” through Central Asia. According to the
State Department, Iranian officials seized 181 MT of opiates in the first six months
of 2004.
The 2005 INCSR states that the Iranian government “has demonstrated
sustained national political will and taken strong measures against illicit narcotics,
including cooperation with the international community.” Although the absence of
bilateral diplomatic relations prevents the United States from directly supporting
61 Moscow Interfax, “Russia Says Around 9 Tonnes of Afghan Drugs Seized in International
Operation,” Nov. 13, 2005. FBIS Document CEP20051113029009.
62 Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain, “Transcript: Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific of the House International Relations Committee,” Federal News Service, Mar.
20, 2003. See also, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 120-2, and
Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 197-8.
See also Rubin, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and
the Middle East and Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mar. 7, 1990.

---

CRS-23
counternarcotics initiatives in Iran, the INSCR indicates that United States and Iran
“have worked together productively” in the UN’s multilateral “Six Plus Two” group.
Shared interest in interdiction has led the United Kingdom to support the Iranian
government’s counternarcotics efforts since 1999 by providing millions of dollars in
grants for security equipment purchases, including bullet-proof vests for Iran’s border
patrol guards.63
63 Jason Barnes, “The Desert Village that Feeds UK’s Heroin Habit,” The Observer (UK),
Dec. 12, 1999.

---

CRS-24
The International Policy Response
The Bonn Agreement that established the Afghan Interim Authority committed
Afghanistan’s new government to cooperation with the international community “in
the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime.”64 After taking office in early
2002, Hamid Karzai’s transitional administration took a series of steps to combat the
growth of the Afghan narcotics trade, including issuing a formal ban on opium
cultivation, outlining a national counternarcotics strategy, and establishing
institutions and forces tasked with eradicating poppy crops and interdicting drug
traffic. Karzai’s government places a high priority on creating alternative livelihoods
and sources of income for opium growing farmers. Many countries have contributed
funding, equipment, forces, and training to various counternarcotics programs in
Afghanistan, including crop eradication and judicial reform. The United States and
others work closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors in an effort to contain the flow of
narcotics and strengthen interdiction efforts.
The United Kingdom serves as the lead coalition nation for international
counternarcotics policy and assistance in Afghanistan. Under British leadership,
basic eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood development measures
began in the spring of 2002. The State Department’s International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) Bureau administers U.S. counternarcotics and law enforcement
assistance programs in Afghanistan and coordinates with the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
the Government of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). To date, U.S. forces in Afghanistan
have engaged in some counternarcotics activities based on limited rules of
engagement, although military officials indicate that the role of the U.S. military in
counternarcotics has expanded in 2005 to include police training and interdiction
mission support. British military units carry out interdiction missions in cooperation
with Afghan authorities that target drug production laboratories and trafficking
infrastructure. The United States also provides counternarcotics assistance to other
countries in the region.
The Bush Administration has begun a “five pillar” inter-agency initiative to
reinvigorate U.S. support for the implementation of Afghanistan’s national
counternarcotics strategy. The initiative has been accompanied by a substantial
increase in spending on counternarcotics programs, with particular emphasis on
alternative livelihood development and greater U.S. support for crop eradication
efforts. Training of and equipment for Afghan counternarcotics forces and
prosecution teams also have figured prominently in the new strategy. Most observers
and officials expect that a long-term, sustained international effort will be necessary
to reduce the threat posed by the opium trade to the security and stability of
Afghanistan and the international community.
64 The Bonn Agreement, Dec. 5, 2001.

---

CRS-25
Afghan Counternarcotics Policies, Programs, and Forces
Bans, Prohibitions, and Policy Statements. Among the first acts of the
newly established Afghan Interim Authority created by the Bonn Agreement was the
issuance of a decree that banned the opium poppy cultivation, heroin production,
opiate trafficking, and drug use on January 17, 2002. On April 3, 2002, Afghan
authorities released a second decree that described the scope and goals of an
eradication program designed to destroy a portion of the opium poppy crop that had
been planted during late 2001. In order to prevent further cultivation during the
autumn 2002 planting season, the government issued a third, more specific decree in
September 2002 that spelled out plans for the enforcement of bans on opium
cultivation, production, trafficking, and abuse.
Religious and political leaders have also spoken out adamantly against
involvement in the drug trade. Islamic leaders from Afghanistan’s General Council
of Ulema issued a fatwa or religious ruling in August 2004 that declared poppy
cultivation to be contrary to Islamic sharia law.65 Following his election in October
2004, President Hamid Karzai has made a number of public statements characterizing
involvement in opium cultivation and trafficking as shameful and stating that
provincial and district leaders would be held accountable by the central government
for failure to combat drug activity in areas under their control.
Afghan authorities developed a national counternarcotics strategy in 2003 in
consultation with experts and officials from the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the UNODC.66 The strategy declares the Afghan government’s commitment to
reducing opium poppy cultivation by 70% by 2008 and to completely eliminating
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking by 2013. The strategy identifies five key
tactical goals to support its broader commitments: “the provision of alternative
livelihoods for Afghan poppy farmers, the extension of drug law enforcement
throughout Afghanistan, the implementation of drug control legislation, the
establishment of effective institutions, and the introduction of prevention and
treatment programs for addicts.” In 2005, the Afghan government released an
implementation plan for the strategy that outlines specific initiatives planned in each
of the five policy areas, as well as for regional cooperation, eradication, and public
information campaigns.67 Afghanistan’s new counternarcotics law clarifies
administrative authorities for counternarcotics policy and establishes clear procedures
for investigating and prosecuting major drug offenses.
Institutions and Forces. In October 2002, then-Interim President Hamid
Karzai announced that the Afghan National Security Council would take
responsibility for counternarcotics policy and would oversee the creation and
65 Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy, Associated Press, Aug. 3,
2004.
66 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, National Drug Control Strategy, May 18, 2003.
Available at [http://www.cnd.gov.af/ndcs.html].
67 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation
Plan, Feb. 16, 2005. Available at [http://www.cnd.gov.af/imp_plan.htm].

---

CRS-26
activities of a new Counternarcotics Directorate (CND). The CND subsequently
established functional units to analyze data and coordinate action in five areas:
judicial reform, law enforcement, alternative livelihood development, demand
reduction, and public awareness. Following its establishment in late 2002, the CND
worked with other Afghan ministries, local leaders, and international authorities to
develop counternarcotics policies and coordinate the creation of counternarcotics
institutions and the training of effective personnel. The CND was transformed into
a new Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) in December 2004. Habibullah Qaderi
currently serves as Afghanistan’s Minister for Counternarcotics.
Counternarcotics enforcement activities have been directed from within the
Ministry of Interior since 2002. General Mohammed Daud was named Deputy
Ministry of Interior for Counternarcotics in December 2004. General Daud and his
staff work closely with U.S. and British officials in implementing the Afghan
government’s expanded counternarcotics enforcement plan. The Ministry of Interior
directs the activities of the following Afghan counternarcotics and law enforcement
entities.
! Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A). The CNP-A
consists of investigative and enforcement divisions whose officers
work closely with U.S. and British counternarcotics authorities.
CNP-A officers continue to receive U.S. training to support their
ability to plan and execute counternarcotics activities independently.
! National Interdiction Unit (NIU). The NIU was established as an
element of CNP-A in October 2004 and continues to conduct
significant raids across Afghanistan. Approximately 200 NIU
officers have received U.S. training and now operate in cooperation
with DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST teams, for more
see below).68
! Central Eradication Planning Cell (CPEC). The CPEC is a U.K.-
supported targeting and intelligence center that uses sophisticated
technology and surveying to target poppy crops and monitor the
success of eradication operations. The CPEC provides target data
for the Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF).
! Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF). The U.S.-supported
CPEF conducts ground-based eradication of poppy crops throughout
Afghanistan based on targeting data provided by the Central
Eradication Planning Cell (CPEC). The force is made up of
approximately 1,000 trained eradicators and is supported by security
personnel. Plans called for 3,000 CPEF officers to be trained by the
end of 2005; however, Afghan and U.S. officials have expressed a
68 Statement of James E. Stahlman, Assistant Operations Officer, U.S. Central Command,
Committee on House Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources, May 10, 2005.

---

CRS-27
preference for locally led and administered eradication efforts for
2006, after the CPEF failed to meet its targets for 2005.69
! Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF). The elite ASNF, or
“Force 333,” has received special training from the British military
and carries out interdiction missions against high value targets and
in remote areas. The U.S. military provides some intelligence and
airlift support for the ASNF. According to the Ministry of
Counternarcotics, the ASNF has destroyed over 150 MT of opium,
45 MT of precursor chemicals, and 191 drug laboratories.
! Border Police, National Police, and Highway Police.
Approximately 27,000 Afghan police have graduated from U.S.-
sponsored training facilities, and elements of all three forces have
received training, equipment, and communications support from
British, German, and U.S. authorities to improve their
counternarcotics enforcement capabilities. U.S. and German
authorities planned to train 50,000 border and national police by
December 2005.
U.S. Policy Initiatives: The “Five-Pillar” Plan
In spite of limited efforts on the part of Afghan, U.S., and international
authorities, the land area used for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and
Afghanistan’s corresponding opiate output increased annually from late 2001 through
2004. Although public awareness of government opium poppy cultivation bans and
laws outlawing participation in the narcotics trade is widespread, until recently,
counternarcotics enforcement activities have been hindered by the Afghan
government’s tactical inability to carry out nationwide, effective eradication and
interdiction campaigns as well as a lack of adequate legal infrastructure to support
drug-related prosecutions. International development agencies have made positive,
but limited, efforts to address structural economic issues associated with rural
livelihoods and drug production, such as household debt and the destruction of local
agricultural market infrastructure. These efforts were not centrally coordinated or
linked directly to counternarcotics goals and initiatives until late 2004.
Substantial growth in opium poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking led U.S.
officials, in consultation with their Afghan and coalition partners, to develop a more
comprehensive, complementary plan to support the implementation of the Afghan
national counternarcotics strategy. The evolving policy initiative developed by U.S.
agencies consists of five key elements, or pillars, that mirror Afghan initiatives and
call for increased interagency and international cooperation.70 The five pillars of the
U.S. initiative are public information, judicial reform, alternative livelihood
development, interdiction, and eradication. New initiatives in these areas are
69 Agence France Presse, “Afghanistan Launches Poppy Eradication Force,” Feb. 2, 2005.
70 David Shelby, “United States to Help Afghanistan Attack Narcotics Industry,”
Washington File, U.S. Department of State, Nov. 17, 2004.

---

CRS-28
building upon a range of preexisting policy initiatives being implemented by U.S.,
Afghan, and coalition authorities.
Public Information. Afghan and U.S. authorities have initiated public
information campaigns to reach out to ordinary Afghans and raise public awareness
about the threat of narcotics and the danger of participation in the illegal drug trade.71
The efforts build on the Afghan government’s public awareness strategy, which
enlists local community and religious leaders to support the government’s
counternarcotics policies and encourages them to speak out in their communities
against drug use and involvement the opium trade. As noted above, Islamic leaders
from Afghanistan’s General Council of Ulema have supported this effort by publicly
condemning poppy cultivation and involvement in the drug trade.72
The U.S. campaigns supplement existing public information efforts designed to
reduce demand for illegal drugs within Afghan society and spread awareness of the
Afghan government’s opium poppy cultivation bans and drug laws. The
UNODC/MCN 2005 Opium Survey found that farmers across Afghanistan were well
aware of the government’s ban on opium poppy cultivation and that many farmers
who declined to cultivate opium poppy did so because they feared eradication or
incarceration. An earlier survey also reported that farmers in provinces where opium
poppy cultivation was found to have increased believed that the government could
not or would not enforce the ban.
Judicial Reform. Department of State (INL office) and Department of Justice
personnel are undertaking judicial reform efforts to further enable Afghan authorities
to enforce counternarcotics laws and prosecute prominent individuals involved in
narcotics trafficking. A Counternarcotics Vertical Prosecution Task Force (CNVPTF)
is under development and will feature integrated teams of Afghan judges,
prosecutors, and enforcement officials that are being specially trained to handle
complex, high-profile cases. Some U.S. federal prosecutors are participating in
CNVPTF training activities in Afghanistan. In 2005, an Afghan team of ten
investigators, seven prosecutors, and three judges began serving under the
jurisdiction of the Kabul criminal court and are currently processing cases against
narcotics suspects and detainees. The U.S. Department of Defense is supporting
construction activities for a maximum-security wing at the Pol-i-Charki prison near
Kabul to hold narcotics offenders prosecuted by the Task Force. Afghan and
coalition officials are currently working to identify targets for prosecution, although,
according to U.S. officials, political concerns and security considerations will play
a role in the targeting of individuals.
The April 2005 arrest of Haji Bashir Noorzai by U.S. officials and the
extradition of Haji Baz Mohammed raised concern about the readiness and ability of
Afghan authorities to investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate drug suspects
independently. According to an Afghan Interior Ministry official, “Afghan police
had no role in [Noorzai’s] arrest,” and Afghan authorities were constrained because
71 Ibid.
72 “Afghan Religious Scholars Urge End To Opium Economy,” Associated Press, Aug. 3,
2004.

---

CRS-29
of “a lack of concrete evidence against him.”73 Discussion of a limited amnesty
program for prominent narcotics traffickers surfaced in January 2005 but is
reportedly no longer under consideration.74 With U.S. and coalition support, the
government of Afghanistan drafted and issued a new counternarcotics law in
December 2005 that clarifies administrative authorities for counternarcotics policy
and establishes clear procedures for investigating and prosecuting major drug
offenses.
Alternative Livelihood Development.75 In order to provide viable
economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation and drug production, U.S. officials
have developed a three-phased plan that directly links development initiatives to
overall counternarcotics efforts through a comprehensive program targeted to opium
producing areas. The first phase of the alternative livelihoods plan accelerated
existing agricultural development initiatives, including improvements to agricultural
market infrastructure, farmer education programs, and micro-credit lending systems
to support rural families. The new efforts build on existing USAID programs to
develop integrated systems of crop processing facilities, storage areas, roads, and
markets, and to restore wheat and other cereal crop production levels. Work began
on phase one projects in early 2005 and will continue through 2006.
The second phase of the plan consists of a one-year “immediate needs”/ “cash-
for-work” program that is sponsoring labor intensive work projects to provide non-
opium incomes to rural laborers and to rehabilitate agricultural infrastructure. The
program began in December 2004 and has been renewed for 2006. USAID personnel
design “immediate needs” projects in consultation with local councils and tribal
leaders in districts where crop eradication has been planned or where farmers have
agreed to cease poppy cultivation.76 According to USAID, in main opium producing
provinces, USAID-sponsored alternative livelihood cash-for-work programs
generated 4.5 million work days in 2005 and paid $15.7 million in salaries to 194,000
people who otherwise may have engaged in or supported opium poppy cultivation.
Over 6,00 km of irrigation canals, drainage ditches, nd traditional water
transportation systems were repaired and cleaned in a number of provinces,
improving irrigation and supporting high value agriculture on an estimated 290,000
hectares of land.77
The third, “comprehensive development” phase of the plan began in six key
poppy-producing provinces during 2005 and is scheduled to be implemented through
73 Interior Ministry spokesman Lutfullah Mashal. Agence France Presse, “Afghan Drugs
Kingpin Seized by US was Untouchable in Afghanistan: Experts,” Apr. 27, 2005.
74 Author interview with U.S. officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, Jan. 2005 and Washington,
D.C., May 2005.
75 Sources: Author interviews with USAID officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, January 2005; and
USAID Alternative Livelihoods Conference, Washington, D.C., May 2005.
76 USAID has established a “Good Performer’s Fund” to reward districts that end cultivation
with high visibility infrastructure development projects.
77 USAID, Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 3, Apr. 1-15, 2005; author consultation
with USAID Afghanistan Desk Office, Jan. 2006.

---

CRS-30
2009. Current and planned projects include long-term infrastructure development for
urban and rural areas, credit and financial services expansion, agricultural
diversification, and private investment support. The Afghan government requested
that USAID expand alternative livelihood programs into the provinces of Ghor, Dai
Kundi, Konar, Farah, and Uruzgan, and USAID personnel have consulted with
contractors and security officials and initiated preliminary projects in some of those
provinces.
Table 3. Alternative Livelihood Proposed Spending Targets
by Province, FY2005-2007
($ millions)
2004 Province Share
Immediate
Comprehensive
Province
of Nationwide Poppy
Needs
Development
Cultivated Area
Nangarhar and Laghman
$18
$110
21.1%
Helmand and Kandahar
$19
$120
34.2%
Badakhshan and Takhar
$1.5
$60
8.6%
Source: USAID, Alternative Livelihoods Update: Issue 2, March 16 — 31, 2005.
Accountability standards have been built into the USAID alternative livelihood
programs, including seed and fertilizer distributions and cash-for-work programs.
Seed and fertilizer recipients, including government officials, are required to agree
in writing not to grow poppy in exchange for program support. Cash-for-work
program participants must make similar commitments, and program staff monitor
participant activities outside of the program to ensure compliance. According to
USAID, all alternative livelihood program assistance is 100% conditional on the
reduction of poppy cultivation within one year of the receipt of assistance.78 For
example, alternative livelihood assistance was denied to the border district of Achin
in eastern Nangarhar province during 2005 because its inhabitants refused to halt
poppy cultivation. Some villages in Achin that subsequently agreed to abandon
poppy farming during the current season are scheduled to receive alternative
livelihood assistance on a conditional basis in 2006.
Interdiction. Reflecting on the absence of effective counternarcotics
institutions and authorities in post-Taliban Afghanistan, international authorities led
by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) established a series
of cooperative interdiction initiatives in countries neighboring Afghanistan beginning
in early 2002. The primary U.S.-led effort, known as “Operation Containment,” is
designed to “implement a joint strategy to deprive drug trafficking organizations of
their market access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs,
78 Author consultation with USAID Afghanistan Desk Office, Jan. 2006.

---

CRS-31
precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency.”79 Operation Containment
has continued since early 2002 and currently involves “nineteen countries from
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Europe and Russia.”80 According to the DEA, Operation
Containment activities were responsible for the seizure of “2.4 metric tons of heroin,
985 kilograms of morphine base, three metric tons of opium gum, 152.9 metric tons
of cannabis, and 195 arrests” in the first quarter of 2005.81 A similar multinational
DEA-led effort named Operation Topaz has focused on interdicting acetic anhydride
— a primary heroin production precursor chemical — to Afghanistan.
In addition to ongoing international narcotics and precursor interdiction
initiatives under Operation Containment and Operation Topaz, U.S. officials are
providing increased support to Afghan government interdiction efforts through
intelligence cooperation, training programs, equipment transfers, and joint
operations. The DEA has expanded its presence in Afghanistan since January 2003,
although in the past DEA officials have cited restrictions on the capabilities and
freedom of movement of their staff in Afghanistan due to a general lack of security
outside of Kabul. DEA Foreign Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) have been
deployed to Afghanistan “to provide guidance and conduct bilateral investigations
that will identify, target, and disrupt illicit drug trafficking organizations.” The FAST
teams receive Defense Department support and are currently conducting operations
and providing mentoring to newly-trained Afghan recruits. DEA received new
FY2006 funding to expand its operational presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia,
including support for FAST teams, Operation Containment activities, and new field
officers.
Current U.S. Department of Defense directives state that U.S. military forces in
Afghanistan do not and will not directly target drug production facilities or pursue
drug traffickers as a distinct component of ongoing U.S. counternarcotics
initiatives.82 Current rules of engagement allow U.S. forces to seize and destroy
drugs and drug infrastructure discovered during the course of routine military
operations carried out in pursuit of conventional counterterrorism and stability
missions.83 U.S. forces continue to provide limited intelligence and air support to
Afghan and British forces during interdiction missions, including the destruction of
heroin laboratories and opiate storage warehouses. U.S. initiatives that supply
Afghan police with tents, boots, communication equipment, mobility support,
infrastructure improvements, and training are expected to continue. Defense
Department and military personnel plan to focus future efforts on further improving
Afghanistan’s border security and providing greater intelligence support to Afghan
79 DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy, House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Feb. 26, 2004.
80 Ibid.
81 Statement of Michael Braun, Chief of Operations - Drug Enforcement Agency, Before the
House Committee on International Relations, Mar. 17, 2005.
82 Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.
83 Testimony of Thomas W. O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Before House International Relations Committee,
Feb. 12, 2004; and Defense Department response to CRS inquiry, Nov. 12, 2004.

---

CRS-32
law enforcement officials through joint military/DEA/Afghan “intelligence fusion
centers” located at U.S. facilities in Kabul and the Afghan Ministry of Interior.84
British forces currently contribute to a central targeting operation that identifies
opiate warehouses and processing facilities for destruction. British Customs and
Excise authorities also work with Afghan officials through mobile heroin detection
units in Kabul. British military forces reportedly will operate under more permissive
rules of engagement that will allow them to carry out “opportunistic strikes” against
narcotics infrastructure and to support Afghan eradication teams with a “rapid-
reaction force.” British defense officials have announced plans to send up to 4,000
British troops to the key opium-producing province of Helmand province in southern
Afghanistan, where their mission reportedly will include efforts to support security
operations and target narcotic traffickers. 85
Eradication. Critics have cited growth in opium poppy cultivation figures as
evidence that manual eradication campaigns have failed to serve as a credible
deterrent for Afghan farmers. Plans developed by the Department of State, in
consultation with Afghan authorities, called for early and more robust opium poppy
eradication measures for the 2004-2005 growing season to provide a strong deterrent
to future cultivation. The Afghan Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) carried
out limited operations with support from U.K. intelligence officers, U.S. advisors,
and international contractors in early 2005. Field reports indicated that CPEF
personnel met violent resistance from farmers in some instances and largely failed
to meet their eradication targets for the 2004-2005 season.86
The centrally organized and executed eradication plan marked a departure from
previous eradication campaign strategies, which largely relied upon governors and
local authorities to target and destroy crops. Most governors pledged to support
President Karzai’s eradication initiatives in 2005, and U.S. officials report that areas
where governors and local leaders embraced and enforced the central government’s
eradication demands saw significant reductions in poppy cultivation. During the
current season, “poppy elimination programs” (PEPs) are being established in select
Afghan provinces. The PEPs are led by small U.S. interagency and international
teams that will direct and monitor locally led and administered counternarcotics
activities, including eradication. U.S. officials have stressed the importance of early
season, locally executed eradication in order to minimize violent farmer resistance
and give Afghan farmers time to plant licit replacement cash crops.
84 Statement of Lennard J. Wolfson, Assistant Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office
of National Drug Control Policy, Committee on House Government Reform Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, May 10, 2005.
85 Philip Webster, “4,000 Troops to be Sent to Troubled Afghan Province,” The Times
(London), Jan. 25, 2006.
86 Author conversation with DEA official, Washington, D.C., May 2005.

---

CRS-33
Issues for Congress
Experts and government officials have warned that narcotics trafficking may
jeopardize the success of international efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.
U.S. officials believe that efforts to reverse the related trends of opium cultivation,
drug trafficking, corruption, and insecurity must expand if broader strategic
objectives are to be achieved. A broad interagency initiative to assist Afghan
authorities in combating the narcotics trade has been developed, but the effectiveness
of new U.S. efforts will not be apparent until later this year. Primary issues of
interest to the Congress include program funding, the role of the U.S. military, and
the scope and nature of eradication and development assistance initiatives. The 108th
Congress addressed the issue of counternarcotics in Afghanistan in intelligence
reform proposals, and the first session of the 109th Congress considered new
counternarcotics policy proposals in relation to FY2006 appropriation and
authorization requests.
Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle
As noted above, narcotics trafficking and political instability remain intimately
linked across Afghanistan. U.S. officials have identified narcotics trafficking as a
primary barrier to the establishment of security and consider insecurity to be a
primary barrier to successful counternarcotics operations. Critics of existing
counternarcotics efforts have argued that Afghan authorities and their international
partners remain reluctant to directly confront prominent individuals and groups
involved in the opium trade because of their fear that confrontation will lead to
internal security disruptions or armed conflict with drug-related groups. Afghan
authorities have expressed their belief that “the beneficiaries of the drugs trade will
resist attempts to destroy it,” and have argued that “the political risk of internal
instability caused by counternarcotics measures” must be balanced “with the
requirement to project central authority nationally” for counternarcotics purposes.87
Conflict and regional security disruptions have accompanied recent efforts to expand
crop eradication programs and previous efforts to implement central government
counternarcotics policies.
U.S. officials have identified rural security and national rule of law as
prerequisites for effective counternarcotics policy implementation, while
simultaneously identifying narcotics as a primary threat to security and stability.88
Although an increasing number of Afghan police, security forces, and
counternarcotics authorities are being trained by U.S. and coalition officials, the size
and capability of Afghan forces may limit their power to effectively challenge
entrenched drug trafficking groups and regional militia in the short term. Specifically,
87 National Drug Control Strategy, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, May 18, 2003.
88 “Poppy cultivation is likely to continue until responsible governmental authority is
established throughout the country and until rural poverty levels can be reduced via
provision of alternative livelihoods and increased rural incomes... Drug processing and
trafficking can be expected to continue until security is established and drug law
enforcement capabilities can be increased. “ State Department, INCSR, Mar. 2005.

---

CRS-34
questions remain as to whether Afghan security and counternarcotics forces alone
will be able to establish the security conditions necessary for the more robust
eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood programs planned by U.S. and
Afghan officials. From a political perspective, U.S. officials expect that
parliamentary and provincial elections will contribute to the political legitimacy of
government counternarcotics initiatives; however, the creation of sufficient political
and military stability for effective counternarcotics operations is likely to remain a
significant challenge. The death of several local contractor employees working on
USAID alternative livelihood projects in May 2005 brought renewed urgency to these
concerns.
Balancing Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics
In pursuing counterterrorism objectives, Afghan and coalition authorities also
must consider difficult political choices when confronting corrupt officials, militia
leaders, and narcotics traffickers. Regional and local militia commanders with
alleged links to the opium trade played significant roles in coalition efforts to
undermine the Taliban regime and capture Al Qaeda operatives, particularly in
southeastern Afghanistan. Since late 2001, some of these figures have been
incorporated into government and security structures, including positions of
responsibility for enforcing counternarcotics policies.89 According to Afghanistan
scholar Barnett Rubin, “the empowerment and enrichment of the warlords who allied
with the United States in the anti-Taliban efforts, and whose weapons and authority
now enabled them to tax and protect opium traffickers,” have provided the opium
trade “with powerful new protectors.”90
Pragmatic decisions taken since 2001 to prioritize counterterrorism operations
and current plans to enforce counternarcotics policies more strictly may conflict with
each other, forcing Afghan and coalition authorities to address seemingly difficult
contradictions. “Tactical” coalition allies in militia and other irregular forces with
ties to the drug trade may inhibit the ability of the central government to extend its
authority and enforce its counternarcotics policies. These issues may weigh strongly
in decision concerning the feasibility and prospects for success of continuing
counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations. One senior Defense Department
official has argued that U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan must recognize
89 See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “U.S. Turns to Drug Baron to Rally Support,” Asia Times,
Dec. 4, 2001; Charles Clover and Peronet Despeignes, “Murder Undermines Karzai
Government,” Financial Times, July 8, 2002; Susan B. Glasser, “U.S. Backing Helps
Warlord Solidify Power,” Washington Post, Feb. 18, 2002; Ron Moreau and Sami
Yousafzai, with Donatella Lorch, “Flowers of Destruction,” Newsweek, July 14, 2003;
Andrew North, “Warlord Tells Police Chief to Go,” BBC News, July 12, 2004; Steven
Graham, “Group: Warlords to Hinder Afghan Election,” Associated Press, Sept. 28, 2004;
and Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan,”
Boston Globe, Oct. 20, 2004.
90 Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Oct. 7, 2004.

---

CRS-35
“the impact the drug trade has on our other policy objectives, while complementing
(and not competing with) our other efforts in furtherance of those objectives.”91
Defining the Role of the U.S. Military
Some observers have argued that U.S. and coalition military forces should play
an active, direct role in targeting the leaders and infrastructure of the opiate trade.
Although U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials have indicated that “the
DoD counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan is a key element of our campaign
against terrorism,”92 military officials reportedly have resisted the establishment of
a direct counternarcotics enforcement role for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Critics
claim that a direct enforcement role for U.S. or coalition forces may alienate them
from the Afghan population, jeopardize ongoing counterterrorism missions that
require Afghan intelligence support, and divert already stretched military resources
from direct counter-insurgent and counterterrorism operations. According to the
Defense Department, U.S. military forces are authorized to seize narcotics and related
supplies encountered during the course of normal stability and counterterrorism
operations.
Current U.S. policy calls for an expanded role for U.S. military forces in
training, equipping, and providing intelligence and airlift support for Afghan
counternarcotics teams but stops short of elevating narcotics targets to a direct
priority for U.S. combat teams.
Defense Department officials agreed in March
2005 to provide limited airlift assistance (four operations per month) to U.S. and
Afghan interdiction teams using U.S. Blackhawk and Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters.
Successful interdiction operations in remote areas have been carried out on this basis
since mid-March 2005, and further helicopter leasing and pilot training arrangements
have been made.
The conference report (H.Rept. 109-360) on the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) did not include a provision included in the
Senate version of the bill (S. 1042, Section 1033) that would have allowed the
Defense Department to provide a range of technical and operational support to
Afghan counternarcotics authorities based on an element of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101- 510, Section 1004). The Senate
version would have authorized “the use of U.S. bases of operation or training
facilities to facilitate the conduct of counterdrug activities in Afghanistan” in
response to the Defense Department’s request “to provide assistance in all aspects of
counterdrug activities in Afghanistan, including detection, interdiction, and related
91 Testimony of Mary-Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics before the House Committee on International Relations, Mar. 17, 2005.
92 “U.S. CENTCOM views narcotrafficking as a significant obstacle to the political and
economic reconstruction of Afghanistan... Local terrorist and criminal leaders have a vested
interest in using the profits from narcotics to oppose the central government and undermine
the security and stability of Afghanistan.” Major Gen. John Sattler, USMC, Dir. of
Operations-US CENTCOM before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Apr. 21, 2004.

---

CRS-36
criminal justice activities.”93 This would have included transportation of personnel
and supplies, maintenance and repair of equipment, the establishment and operation
of bases and training facilities, and training for Afghan law enforcement personnel.
Redefining Eradication
Proponents of swift, widespread eradication argued that destroying a large
portion of the 2004-2005 opium poppy crop was necessary in order to establish a
credible deterrent before opium production in Afghanistan reaches an irreversible
level. Critics of widespread, near-term eradication argued that eradication in the
absence of existing alternative livelihood options for Afghan farmers would
contribute to the likelihood that farmers would continue to cultivate opium poppy in
the future by deepening opium based debt and driving up opium prices.94 U.S. and
Afghan authorities maintain that the Central Poppy Eradication Force and governor-
led eradication programs were effective in deterring and reducing some opium poppy
cultivation in 2005. However, given recurrent clashes between eradication forces and
farmers, some observers and officials have expressed concern about the safety and
effectiveness of current ground-based eradication efforts. During the 2006 season,
“poppy elimination program” teams will be in place in key opium poppy growing
provinces to monitor and direct early season, locally-executed eradication activities.
This strategy is designed to minimize violent farmer resistance to central government
forces and give farming families time to plant replacement cash crops.
Aerial Eradication. Policy makers are likely to engage in further debate
concerning the option of aerial poppy eradication and its possible risks and rewards.
Afghan and U.S. authorities discussed the introduction of aerial eradication to
Afghanistan in late 2004, but decided against initiating a program in early 2005 due
to financial, logistical, and political considerations. Afghan President Hamid Karzai
has expressed his categorical opposition to the use of aerial eradication, citing public
health and environmental safety concerns.95 Proponents of aerial eradication argue
that the large amount of rural land under poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and poor
road infrastructure makes ground-based eradication inefficient and subjects
eradication teams to unnecessary security threats. Critics of aerial eradication argue
that the mixed-crop cultivation patterns common throughout Afghanistan will expose
legitimate food crops to damage and warn that aerial spraying may produce
widespread, possibly violent resistance by villagers with vivid memories of centrally
directed Soviet military campaigns to destroy food crops and agricultural
infrastructure. The Senate report on the FY2005 supplemental appropriations bill
93 S.Rept. 109-69.
94 Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy expects that farmers with a “legacy of debt”
will find that their “situation will be exacerbated by eradication efforts.” A September 2004
British government report argues that “if not targeted properly, eradication can have the
reverse effect and encourage farmers to cultivate more poppy to pay off increased debts.”
Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (UK) to the
Seventh Report from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Sep. 2004.
95 Office of the Spokesperson to the President — Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan,
“About the Commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to the Fight Against Narcotics
and Concerns About the Aerial Spraying of Poppy Fields.”

---

CRS-37
(H.R. 1268) specifies that “none of the funds recommended by the Committee may
be available for aerial eradication programs within Afghanistan absent a formal
request by the President of Afghanistan seeking such support.”
Reports of unauthorized aerial spraying in eastern Nangarhar province in mid-
November 2004 angered Afghan officials and led to an investigation by the Afghan
Ministries of Agriculture and Health of claims that crops had been sprayed with
herbicides by unidentified aircraft. The government investigation reportedly revealed
that unidentified chemicals were present in soil samples, that non-narcotic crops had
been destroyed, and that an increase in related illnesses in local villages had occurred.
Afghan officials cited U.S. control of Afghan airspace in their subsequent demands
for an explanation. U.S. and British officials have denied involvement in the spraying
and assured Afghan authorities that they support President Karzai’s position.96 In
early December 2004, then-U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad
suggested that “some drug-associated people” may have sprayed the crops “in order
to create the sort of distrust and problem between Afghanistan and some of its
allies.”97 Observers noted that the vocal negative reaction of the Afghan population
and government to an alleged isolated spraying incident illustrates the type of popular
opposition that may accompany any future aerial eradication program.
Afghan government officials would have to approve any future aerial spraying
operations undertaken by U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan. Any future aerial
eradication in Afghanistan also would require specific funding and the introduction
of airframes and military support aircraft that exceed current U.S. capabilities in the
region. Aerial eradication programs, if employed in the future, could feature the use
of chemical herbicide such as the glyphosate compound currently approved for use
in Colombia. The use of mycoherbicides, or fungal herbicides, also has been
discussed. Opium poppy-specific mycoherbicide has been developed with U.N.,
U.K., and U.S. support at the Institute of Genetics and Experimental Biology, a
former Soviet biological warfare facility in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.98 Mycoherbicide
tests continue, including efforts by USDA’s Agricultural Research Service , although
USDA officials and others have expressed various concerns about the use of
mycoherbicides for counternarcotics purposes.99
96 See David Brunnstrom, “Afghans Committed to Drug War But Against Spraying,”
Reuters, Nov. 19, 2004; and Stephen Graham, “Afghan Government Concerned at Spraying
of Opium Crops by Mystery Aircraft,” Associated Press, Nov. 30, 2004.
97 Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Poppy Farmers Say Mystery Spraying Killed Crops,” New York
Times, Dec. 5, 2004, and Reuters, “U.S. Says Drug Lords May Have Sprayed Afghan
Opium,” Dec. 2, 2004.
98 See Nicholas Rufford, “Secret Bio-weapon Can Wipe Out Afghan Heroin,” Sunday Times
(London), May 26, 2002; Antony Barnett, “UK in Secret Biological War on Drugs,”
Observer (London), Sept. 17, 2000; Juanita Darling, “Fungi May Be the Newest Recruits
in War on Drugs Colombia,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 30, 2000.
99 According to a USDA official, “The Department of Agriculture, as an agency, is opposed
to the idea [of using mycoherbicides in Afghanistan]: The science is far from complete;
There are real environmental and possible human health negative implications; There are
very real image problems... the use of any agent like this would be portrayed as biological
(continued...)

---

CRS-38
Pending Legislation and Counternarcotics Funding
Several intelligence reform proposals in the 108th Congress sought to address
the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation on expanding the U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan’s security and stability, including U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Section
7104 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108 —
458) states the sense of Congress that “the President should make the substantial
reduction of illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a priority in the
Global War on Terrorism” and calls on the Administration to provide a secure
environment for counternarcotics personnel and to specifically target narcotics
operations that support terrorist organizations. The act also required the submission
of a joint Defense and State Department report within 120 days of enactment that
described current progress toward the reduction of poppy cultivation and heroin
production in Afghanistan and provided detail on the extent to which drug profits
support terrorist groups and anti-government elements in and around Afghanistan.
In the 109th Congress, H.R. 1437, the “Afghan Poppy Eradication and Prosperity
Act of 2005,” would authorize $1 billion to support a two-year USAID-led cash-for-
work and poppy eradication pilot program in Afghanistan. Under the program,
Afghan laborers would receive $10 per day of work. As noted above, cash-for-work
programs are currently being administered by USAID and British authorities in
Afghanistan. The bill would require an annual report from USAID on progress
toward poppy eradication and alternative livelihood creation. The bill has been
referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
Counternarcotics Funding. Funding for U.S. counternarcotics operations
in Afghanistan consists of program administration costs and financial and material
assistance to Afghan counternarcotics authorities. Table 4 displays the funding
appropriated for U.S. counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan and related regional
programs from FY2002 through FY2006. Table 5 describes the Administration’s
planned use for the counternarcotics funding included in the FY2005 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-13), which provided $758.15 million of the $773.15 million
in supplemental FY2005 counternarcotics funding originally requested by the
Administration. Under the terms of P.L. 109-13, the Comptroller General must
conduct an audit of the use of all Economic Support Fund and International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement funds for bilateral counternarcotics and alternative
livelihood programs in Afghanistan obligated and expended during FY2005. The
General Accounting Office is currently conducting this audit. Requests for further
funding for Department of Defense counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan will
likely be made as part of future supplemental funding requests.
99 (...continued)
warfare.” USDA response to CRS inquiry, Oct. 19, 2004.

---

CRS-39
Table 4. U.S. Counternarcotics Funding for Afghanistan by Source, FY2002-FY2006
($ million)
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
Appropriated
P.L.
Appropriated
P.L.
Appropriated
P.L.
P.L.
Appropriated
P.L.
Appropriated
Funds
107-206
Funds
108-11
Funds
108-106
107-38
Funds
109-13
Funds
Department of State
$3.00a
$60.00
$3.00a
$25.00 -
$170.00b
$50.00c
$89.28
$260.00
$235.00
Department of Defense
-
-
-
-
-
$73.00
-
$15.40
$242.00
-
Drug Enforcement Agencyd
($0.58)
-
($2.92)
-
-
($3.96)
-
($7.67)
$7.65
$17.60e
USAIDf -
$9.99
$14.29
-
$53.55
-
-
$95.69
$248.50
$90.50g
Annual Total
$73.57
$45.21
$350.51
$966.19
$343.10
Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development - Budget Justifications to the Congress, Department of State - Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign
Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense - Defense Budget Materials, Office of Management and Budget, and Legislative Information System.
a $3 million funding for Southwest Asia Initiative counternarcotics programs in Pakistan partially designed to restrict the flow of Afghan opiates.
b Of the $170 million in supplemental funds, $110 million was channeled toward police training and judicial reform programs.
c Reprogrammed funds appropriated as part of $40 billion Emergency Response Fund established in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.
d On May 8, 2002, Congress approved a reprogramming of 17 positions and $15,125,000 in Violent Crime Reduction Program prior year funds to support the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s ‘Operation Containment,’ which targets heroin trafficking in Southwest Asia. The figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect annual expenditure of the reprogrammed
obligated funds. (DEA response to CRS request, October 2004.)
e FY2006 funds include $7.72 million for Operation Containment, $4.3 million to support Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) teams, and $5.58 million for DEA offices in Kabul
and Dushanbe, Tajikistan. New funds were not appropriated for the creation of a DEA office in Dubai, United Arab Emirates authorized in House Report 109-272.
f USAID figures for FY2002-FY2005 reflect funds applied to USAID’s “Agriculture” and “Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods” programs (Program #306-001).
g USAID will shift activities currently funded through its”Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods” program to a “Thriving Economy Led by the Private Sector” program (Program
#306-YYY). Relevant funds include $90.5 million to “Develop and Expand Alternative Development.”

---

CRS-40
Table 5. Planned Use of FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-13
($ million)
Agency
Amount
Proposed Purpose
Funds for training, equipment, intelligence, infrastructure, and information operations related to the campaign
against narcotics trafficking and narcotics-related terrorist activities in Afghanistan and the Central Asia area.
Department of Defense
Of this amount, $70 million restored funding to other DoD counternarcotics activities from which funds were
(Drug Interdiction and
$242
used to finance counter-drug assistance to Afghanistan. P.L. 109-13 limited the provision of assistance to $34
Counter-Drug Activities)
million for the Afghan government and allows for the delivery of individual and crew-served weapons for
counter-drug security forces. (Note: The Administration’s original request was for $257 million.)
Funds to continue the expanded counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan begun in FY2005. Of the total amount
Department of State
requested, $95 million replenished funding advanced to start expanded crop eradication, establishment of a
(International Narcotics Control
$260
National Interdiction Unit, prosecution of drug traffickers, and public information programs. The remaining
and Law Enforcement Account)
$165 million supported the Department of State’s contribution to expanded efforts in eradication ($89 million),
interdiction ($51 million), law enforcement ($22 million), and public information ($3 million).
Funds to support alternative livelihoods programs. A portion ($138.5 million) of the amount replenished
United States Agency for
reconstruction and development aid accounts that had been drawn on previously to create alternative livelihood
International Development
$248.5
programs in late 2004 and early 2005. The balance ($110 million) is being used to expand alternative livelihood
(Economic Support Fund)
programs beyond pilot provinces.
Funds to support and equip DEA’s Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) and to provide operational
Drug Enforcement Agency
$7.65
support for a 100-member Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU).
Total FY2005
$758.15
Supplemental Appropriation
Source: P.L. 109-13 and Office of Management and Budget, Estimate #1: Emergency Supplemental — Ongoing Military Operations in the War on Terror;
Reconstruction Activities in Afghanistan; Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction; and Other Purposes, February 14, 2005.

---

CRS-41
Appendix A
Cited Field Surveys
Jonathan Goodhand, “From Holy War to Opium War: A Case Study of the Opium
Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan,” Peacebuilding and Complex
Emergencies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 5, University of Manchester,
1999.
Frank Kenefick, and Larry Morgan, “Opium in Afghanistan: People and Poppies —
The Good Evil,” Chemonics International Inc. for USAID, February 5, 2004.
Aga Kahn Foundation, “Badakhshan Province: Suggestions for an Area
Development Based Counter-narcotics Strategy,” April 2004.
David Mansfield, “Coping Strategies, Accumulated Wealth and Shifting Markets:
The Story of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Badakhshan 2000-2003,” Agha Khan
Development Network, January 2004.
David Mansfield, “Alternative Development in Afghanistan: The Failure of Quid Pro
Quo,” International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in
Drug Control and Development Cooperation, January 2002.
Adam Pain, “The Impact of the Opium Poppy Economy on Household Livelihoods:
Evidence from the Wakhan Corridor and Khustak Valley in Badakhshan,” Aga
Kahn Development Network, Badakhshan Programme, January 2004.
UNODC, “An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Cultivation to New
Districts in Afghanistan,” Strategic Study #1, June 1998.
UNODC, “The Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Coping Strategies
of Opium Traders,” Strategic Study #2, October 1998.
UNODC, “The Role of Opium as an Informal Credit,” Preliminary Strategic Study
#3, January 1999.
UNODC, “Access to Labour: The Role of Opium in the Livelihood Strategies of
Itinerant Harvesters Working in Helmand Province, Afghanistan,” Strategic
Study #4, June 1999.
UNODC, “The Role of Women in Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,”
Strategic Study #6, June 2000.

---