Order Code RS21391
Updated January 24, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:
How Soon an Arsenal?
Sharon A. Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
Summary
North Korea ended the eight-year freeze on its nuclear program in late 2002,
expelling international inspectors and restarting plutonium production facilities. Before
2002, the CIA estimated that North Korea might have enough plutonium (Pu) for 1 or
2 weapons. Since then, North Korea may have reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods
previously under seal at Yongbyon, yielding enough Pu for 6 or 8 weapons. In 2005,
North Korea announced it had nuclear weapons and was building more. North Korea
reportedly shut down the small reactor in April to extract plutonium. If so, it could have
two more weapons by April 2006. In July 2005, North Korea rejoined the Six-Party
Talks after a 13-month hiatus and agreed in September to abandon its nuclear weapons
program and return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, while resuming construction
of its two larger reactors. North Korea may continue to produce fissile material for
nuclear weapons as long as Six-Party Talks do not bring a resolution. This report will
be updated as needed.
Background
In the early1980s, U.S. satellites tracked a growing indigenous nuclear program in
North Korea. A small nuclear reactor at Yongbyon (5MWe), capable of producing about
6kg of plutonium per year, began operating in 1986.1 Later that year, U.S. satellites
detected high explosives testing and a new plant to separate plutonium. In addition,
construction of two larger reactors (50MWe at Yongbyon and 200MWe at Taechon)
added to the mounting evidence of a serious clandestine effort. Although North Korea
had joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, the safeguards inspections that
began only in 1992 raised questions about how much plutonium North Korea had
produced covertly that still have not been resolved. In 1994, North Korea pledged, under
the Agreed Framework with the United States, to freeze its plutonium programs and
1 5MWe is a power rating for the reactor, indicating that it produces 5 million watts of electricity
per day (very small). Reactors are also described in terms of million watts of heat (MW thermal).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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eventually dismantle them in return for several kinds of assistance.2 At that time, Western
intelligence agencies estimated that North Korea had separated enough plutonium for one
to two bombs; other sources claimed it was enough for 4-5 bombs.
Weapons Production Milestones
Acquiring fissile material — plutonium-239 or highly enriched uranium (HEU) —
is the key hurdle in nuclear weapons development.3 Producing these two materials is
technically challenging; in comparison, many experts believe weaponization to be
relatively easy.4 North Korea has industrial-scale uranium mining, and plants for milling,
refining, and converting uranium; it also has a fuel fabrication plant, a nuclear reactor, and
a reprocessing plant — in short, everything needed to produce Pu-239. In its nuclear
reactor, North Korea uses magnox fuel — natural uranium (>99%U-238) metal, wrapped
in magnesium-alloy cladding. About 8000 fuel rods constitute a fuel core for the reactor.
When irradiated in a reactor, natural uranium fuel absorbs a neutron and then decays
into plutonium (Pu-239). Fuel that remains in the reactor for a long time begins to
become contaminated by the isotope Pu-240, which can “poison” the functioning of a
nuclear weapon.5 Spent or irradiated fuel, which poses radiological hazards, must cool
after removal from the reactor. The cooling phase, estimated by some at five months, is
proportional to the fuel burn-up. Reprocessing to separate plutonium from waste products
and uranium is the next step. North Korea uses a PUREX separation process, like the
United States. After shearing off the fuel cladding, the fuel is dissolved in nitric acid.
Components (plutonium, uranium, waste) of the fuel are separated into different streams
using organic solvents. In small quantities, separation can be done in hot cells, but larger
quantities require significant shielding to prevent deadly exposure to radiation.6
Most experts agree that North Korea has mastered the engineering requirements of
plutonium production. Its 5MWe nuclear reactor operated from 1986 to 1994, restarting
in January 2003. North Korean officials claimed to have separated plutonium in hot cells
and tested the reprocessing plant in 1990, and to have reprocessed all 8000 fuel rods from
the 5MWe reactor between January and June 2003. The January 2004 unofficial U.S.
delegation reported that “All indications from the display in the control room are that the
reactor is operating smoothly now.... However, we have no way of assessing
independently how well the reactor has operated during the past year.”7 The same
delegation reported that the reprocessing “facility appeared in good repair,” in contrast to
2 See CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry Niksch.
3 Highly enriched uranium (HEU) has 20% or more U-235 isotope; weapons-grade uranium is
90% or more U-235.
4 While the physical principles of weaponization are well-known, producing a weapon with high
reliability, effectiveness and efficiency without testing holds significant challenges.
5 Plutonium that stays in a reactor for a long time (reactor-grade, with high “burn-up”) contains
about 20% Pu-240; weapons-grade plutonium contains less than 7% Pu-240.
6 Hot cells are heavily shielded rooms with remote handling equipment for working with
irradiated materials.
7 Siegfried Hecker, Jan. 21, 2004, testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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a 1992 IAEA assessment of the reprocessing plant as “extremely primitive.” In the end,
however, significant growth in North Korea’s arsenal depends on the completion of the
two larger reactors and progress in the reported uranium enrichment program.
There is virtually no information on North Korean nuclear weapons design. The
simplest, gun-type design requires no testing, but can only be made with HEU, not
plutonium. Implosion devices, which use sophisticated lenses of high explosives to
compress plutonium, are more likely to require testing. Some observers believe that
North Korean testing of high explosives with particular compression patterns in the 1980s
indicates the ability to manufacture an implosion device.8 In April 2005, media reported
that North Korea was readying a nuclear test site near Kilju, but the evidence did not seem
conclusive.9 A nuclear test by North Korea could provide more information on whether
it has a workable nuclear weapon and what kind of design it is — simple or more complex
(i.e., a boosted fission or composite pit design). It is unknown whether Pakistani scientist
A.Q. Khan provided North Korea with the same Chinese-origin nuclear weapon design
he provided to Libya.10 If so, North Korea might develop a reliable warhead for ballistic
missiles without testing. Such a warhead needs to be small, light and robust enough to
tolerate the extreme conditions encountered through a ballistic trajectory. DIA Director
Admiral Jacoby, in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 28,
2005, stated that North Korea had the capability to arm a missile with a nuclear device.
In January 2004, North Korean officials showed an unofficial U.S. delegation
alloyed “scrap” from a plutonium (Pu) casting operation. Alloying plutonium with other
materials is “common in plutonium metallurgy to retain the delta-phase of plutonium,
which makes it easier to cast and shape” (two steps in weapons production).11 Dr.
Siegfried Hecker, a delegation member, assessed that the stated density of the material
was consistent with plutonium alloyed with gallium or aluminum. If so, this could
indicate a certain sophistication in North Korea’s handling of Pu metal, but Hecker could
not confirm that the metal was indeed plutonium, that it was alloyed, or that it was from
the most recent reprocessing campaign, without conducting actual tests of the material.
Estimating Nuclear Material Production
Most estimates of nuclear weapon stockpiles are based on estimated fissile material
production. Factors in plutonium production include the average power level of the
reactor; days of operation; how much of the fuel is reprocessed and how quickly, and how
much plutonium is lost in production processes. According to North Korea, the 5MWe
reactor performed poorly early on, unevenly irradiating the rods. There is no data on the
reactor’s current performance or the reprocessing facility’s efficiency. North Korea told
the IAEA that during the 1990 “hot test,” it lost almost 30% of the plutonium in the waste
8 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, (MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 250.
9 First reported by the Wall Street Journal in the Seoul, on-line edition, Apr. 22, 2005. See also
“What Are Koreans Up To? U.S. Agencies Can’t Agree,” New York Times, May 12, 2005.
10 See also CRS Report RL32745, Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options.
11 Hecker, Jan. 21, 2004 testimony before SFRC.

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streams.12 A key consideration is whether or not the reprocessing plant can successfully
run continuously, since frequent shutdowns can lead to plutonium losses. According to
North Korean officials in January 2004, the plant throughput is 110 tons of spent fuel
annually, about twice the fuel load of the 5MWe reactor. A final factor in assessing how
many weapons North Korea can produce is whether North Korea’s technical
sophistication enables it to use more or less material than the international standards of
8kg of Pu and 25kg for HEU per weapon. North Korea’s abilities here are unknown.
What Does North Korea Have Now?
Secretary of State Powell stated in December 2002 that “We now believe they [North
Koreans] have a couple of nuclear weapons and have had them for years.”13 On February
10, 2005, North Korea announced that it had manufactured “nukes” for self-defense and
that it would bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal.14 In June 2005, Vice Foreign Minister
Kim Gye Gwan told ABC News that “We have enough nuclear bombs to defend against
a U.S. attack. As for specifically how many we have, that is a secret.” Kim also said
North Korea was building more bombs and when asked about delivery systems, said “our
scientists have the knowledge, comparable to other scientists around the world.”15 Some
observers interpreted this to mean that North Korea can mate nuclear warheads to
missiles. Some Members of Congress interpreted CIA Director Porter Goss’s statements
in March 2005 on a “range” of nuclear weapon estimates to confirm that North Korea’s
arsenal has multiplied.16 In December 2005, angered by U.S. criticism of its human rights
record and financial sanctions, the North Korean foreign ministry stated that it would
“increase [its] self-reliant national defense capacity, including nuclear deterrent.”17
Has North Korea reprocessed the existing spent fuel?. On July 13, 2003,
North Korean officials told U.S. officials in New York that they had completed
reprocessing the 8000 fuel rods on June 30.18 On January 8, 2004, North Korean officials
told the unofficial U.S. delegation that the reprocessing campaign began in mid-January
2003 and ended at the end of June 2003. In all, they reportedly reprocessed 50 tons of
spent fuel in less than six months, which tracks with earlier estimates that North Korea
could reprocess about 11 tons/month, roughly enough plutonium for 1 bomb per month.
The unofficial U.S. delegation visiting in January 2004 concluded that the spent fuel
pond no longer held the 8000 fuel rods and surmised that those fuel rods could have been
moved to a different storage location, but not without significant health and safety risks.
12 David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, editors, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, ISIS
Report, ISIS Press, 2000, p. 88.
13 Transcript of Dec. 29, 2002 Meet the Press.
14 “North Korea Says It Has Nuclear Weapons and Rejects Talks,” New York Times, Feb. 10,
2005.
15 “N. Korea Building Bombs, Its Envoy Says,” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2005.
16 Carl Levin and Hillary Clinton, “North Korea’s Rising Urgency,” Washington Post, July 5,
2005.
17 “N. Korea: Nuclear Program to Expand,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 20, 2005.
18 “North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel For Atom Bombs,” New York Times, July 15, 2003.

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The delegation was not allowed to visit the Dry Storage Building, where the fuel rods
likely would have been stored before reprocessing. If the 8000 fuel rods from the 5MWe
reactor have been reprocessed, they would yield, according to one estimate, between 25
and 30kg of plutonium, enough for 5 or 6 weapons.
The exact amount of plutonium that might have been reprocessed is not known. The
January 2004 U.S. visitors to the plant were not allowed to visit waste facilities, and
North Korean officials did not reveal any operating difficulties with the plant, stating that
the reprocessing campaign was conducted continuously (4 six-hour shifts). U.S. efforts
to detect Krypton-85 (a by-product of reprocessing) reportedly suggested that some
reprocessing had taken place, but were largely inconclusive.
Adding to the Arsenal
Make New Plutonium in 5MWe Reactor. On February 6, 2003, North Korean
officials announced that the 5MWe reactor was operating, and commercial satellite
photography confirmed activity in March. In January 2004, North Korean officials told
the unofficial U.S. delegation that the reactor was now operating smoothly at 100% of its
rated power. The U.S. visitors noted that the display in the reactor control room and
steam plumes from the cooling towers confirmed operation, but that there was no way of
knowing how it had operated over the last year. In April 2005, the reactor was shut down,
and on May 11, 2005, North Korean officials stated they harvested fuel rods for
weapons.19
A common estimate is that the reactor generates 6kg of Pu per year, roughly 1 bomb
per year, but the reactor would likely be operated for several years before fuel is
withdrawn. Assuming a six-month cooling period for plutonium, North Korea would
have been ready to reprocess about 12 kg of Pu by October 2005 and could convert it into
metal by April 2006, adding potentially another two nuclear weapons to the stockpile.
Complete Other Reactors. The reactors at Yongbyon (50MWe) and Taechon
(200MWe) are likely several years from completion. U.S. visitors in January 2004 saw
heavy corrosion and cracks in concrete building structures at Yongbyon, reporting that the
reactor building “looks in a terrible state of repair.”20 The CIA estimates that the two
reactors could generate about 275kg of plutonium per year.21 In August 2005, another
unofficial U.S. delegation to Pyongyang was told by North Korean officials that they
planned to finish building the 50MWe reactor within two years. A September 2005
commercial satellite image showed preparations for construction.22
Produce Highly Enriched Uranium for Weapons. A 2002 unclassified CIA
working paper on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment estimated that
19 “North Koreans Claim to Extract Fuel for Nuclear Weapons,” New York Times, May 12, 2005.
20 Hecker Jan. 21, 2004 testimony before SRFC.
21 CIA unclassified point paper distributed to Congressional staff on Nov. 19, 2002.
22 “North Korea Rushes to Finish Reactor,” Washington Post, November 9, 2005. Siegfried
Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Stanford University professor
John Lewis were part of the unofficial U.S. delegation.

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North Korea “is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium
for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational — which could be as
soon as mid-decade.”23 Such a plant would need to produce more than 50kg of HEU per
year, requiring cascades of thousands of centrifuges. The paper noted that in 2001, North
Korea “began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities.” The CIA has not
released any other unclassified statements on North Korea’s enrichment capabilities since
2002. Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan probably offered the same P-2-design centrifuges to North
Korea as he did to Libya and Iran, but since the United States has not pressed for access
to Khan, this is impossible to verify.
Centrifuge enrichment of uranium poses significant technical challenges.
Nonetheless, such a program may offer a few advantages to North Korea: such plants are
difficult to locate and target, making them less vulnerable to military strikes than reactors
or reprocessing plants. HEU also could give the North Koreans the option of producing
either simpler weapons (gun-assembly type) or more sophisticated weapons (using
composite pits or boosted fission techniques). Also, an HEU program could be politically
useful as a bargaining chip in negotiations.
How to Verify North Korean Claims?
Information about North Korea’s nuclear weapons production has depended largely
on remote monitoring and defector information, with mixed results. Satellite images
correctly indicated the start-up of the 5MWe reactor, but gave no detailed information
about its operations. Satellites also detected trucks at Yongbyon in late January 2003, but
could not confirm the movement of spent fuel to the reprocessing plant;24 imagery
reportedly detected activity at the reprocessing plant in April 2003, but could not confirm
large-scale reprocessing;25 and, satellite imagery could not peer into an empty spent fuel
pond, which was shown to U.S. visitors in January 2004. Even U.S. scientists visiting
Pyongyang in January 2004 could not confirm North Korean claims of having reprocessed
the spent fuel or that the material shown was in fact plutonium. Verification of those
claims would require greater access to the material and North Korean cooperation. This
is particularly true in the case of uranium enrichment; U.S. intelligence officials have said
they do not know where the uranium program is. According to one senior Administration
official, the North Koreans have “got to give it up. That’s how the Libyans did it.”26
Other verification tasks, like confirming the existence of North Korean warheads and their
dismantlement, could pose similar challenges. There are precedents for bilateral (U.S. and
Soviet; Argentine and Brazilian) as well as international verification (IAEA verification
of South African nuclear disarmament and Iraqi nuclear disarmament in 1991) of
disarmament. However, details of verification will have to wait until the first hurdle is
cleared — agreeing on the timing of dismantlement in relation to provision of assistance
to North Korea.
23 CIA unclassified point paper.
24 “Reactor Restarted, North Korea Says,” Washington Post, Feb. 6, 2003.
25 “US Suspects North Korea Moved Ahead on Weapons,” New York Times, May 6, 2003.
26 “U.S. Offers North Korea Evidence That Nuclear Secrets Came From Pakistani’s Network,”
New York Times, July 29, 2005.

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