Order Code IB93108
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Central Asia: Regional Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests
Updated January 24, 2006
Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
Russia’s Role
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
Democratization and Human Rights
Democracy Pledges
Security and Arms Control
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Trade and Investment
Energy Resources
Aid Overview
LEGISLATION


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Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
SUMMARY
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
U.S. aid focuses on economic reconstruction.
1991, the United States recognized the inde-
U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and
pendence of all the former Central Asian
natural gas development in Kazakhstan,
republics, supported their admission into
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Western organizations, and elicited Turkish
support to counter Iranian influence in the
Some observers call for different empha-
region. Congress was at the forefront in
ses or levels of U.S. involvement in Central
urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies
Asia. Some have called for strengthening
for aiding these and other Eurasian states of
conditions linking aid to progress in improv-
the former Soviet Union.
ing human rights or in making adequate prog-
ress in democratization and the creation of
Soon after the terrorist attacks on Amer-
free markets. Some have disputed the impor-
ica on September 11, 2001, all the Central
tance of energy resources to U.S. national
Asian states offered overflight and other
security. Others point to civil and ethnic
support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in
tensions in the region as possibly endangering
Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
U.S. lives and investments. Heightened con-
Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and pro-
gressional interest in Central Asia was re-
vided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan
flected in passage of “Silk Road” language in
endorsed coalition military action in Iraq and
late 1999 (P.L. 106-113) authorizing en-
Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops
hanced U.S. policy attention and aid to sup-
for rebuilding.
port conflict amelioration, humanitarian
needs, economic development, transport
After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy
(including energy pipelines) and communica-
emphasized bolstering the security of the
tions, border controls, democracy, and the
Central Asian states to help them combat
creation of civil societies in the South Cauca-
terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking.
sian and Central Asian states.
Other strategic interests include internal re-
forms (democratization, free markets, and
Foreign Operations Appropriations for
human rights) and energy development.
FY2006 was signed into law on November 14,
Administration policy also aims to integrate
2005 (H.R. 3057; P.L. 109-102). The confer-
these states into the international community
ees (H.Rept. 109-265) call for $25 million in
so that they follow responsible security and
Freedom Support Act aid to Kazakhstan, $25
other policies, and to discourage the growth of
million to Kyrgyzstan, $24 million to
xenophobic, fundamentalist, and anti-Western
Tajikistan, $5 million to Turkmenistan, and
orientations that threaten peace and stability.
$20 million to Uzbekistan. The law continues
prior year language conditioning aid to the
The Administration’s policy goals in
governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
Central Asia reflect the differing characteris-
on progress in democratization and respect for
tics of these states. U.S. interests in
human rights, and adds that the Uzbek govern-
Kazakhstan include the security and elimina-
ment should permit an international investiga-
tion of Soviet-era nuclear and biological
tion of the mid-2005 violence against civilians
weapons materials and facilities. In Tajikistan,
in Andijon.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On January 16, 2006, Uzbek officials announced that Uzbekistan was banning local
operations of the U.S.-based non-governmental organization Freedom House, which
advocates democratization and human rights worldwide. Among the reasons for the ban
were faulty registration documents and financial reports.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan; it borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples
of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language); and most
are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically
and culturally. By the late 19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent
khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been
imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of
the Soviet Union in December 1991, they gained independence. (See CRS Report 97-1058,
Kazakhstan; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan; CRS Report
97-1055, Turkmenistan; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan, all by Jim Nichol.)
Central Asia: Basic Facts
Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.; Tajikistan:
55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
Population: 56.9 million (2004 est., Commonwealth of Independent States Statistics Committee), somewhat
less than France; Kazakhstan: 15.1 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.1 m.; Tajikistan: 6.8 m.; Turkmenistan: 4.8 m.;
Uzbekistan: 25.1 m.
Gross Domestic Product: $76.1 billion in 2004; per capita GDP is about $1,337; poverty is rampant.
Kazakhstan: $40.7 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $2.2 b.; Tajikistan: $2.1 b.; Turkmenistan: $19.2 b.; Uzbekistan: $11.9 b.
(CIS and national statistics, current prices; Turkmenistan’s reported GDP is considered by many observers
to be inflated).
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, then-President George H.W.
Bush sent the “FREEDOM Support Act” (FSA) to Congress, which was amended and signed
into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, congressional concerns led to passage of
the “Silk Road Strategy Act” authorizing language (P.L. 106-113) calling for enhanced
policy and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development,
transport and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies
in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
U.S. policymakers and others hold various views on the types and levels of U.S.
involvement in the region. Some argue that ties with “energy behemoth” Kazakhstan are
crucial to U.S. interests. At least until recently, others argued that Uzbekistan is the
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“linchpin” of the region (it is the most populous regional state and is centrally located,
shaping the range and scope of regional cooperation) and should receive the most U.S.
attention. In general, however, advocates of U.S. involvement support bolstering reforms
and stability in the region. Such advocates argue that political turmoil and the growth of
terrorist enclaves in Central Asia can produce spillover effects both in nearby states,
including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey, and worldwide. They also argue that the
United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly
acquiring Soviet-era technology for making weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They
maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that
Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the
strongest position as the sole superpower to influence democratization and respect for human
rights. They stress that such U.S. influence will help alleviate social tensions exploited by
Islamic extremist groups to gain adherents. Similarly, U.S. aid and investment is viewed as
strengthening the independence of the Central Asian states and forestalling Russian or
Chinese attempts to subjugate them.
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward
U.S. policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11, 2001, but aspects
of these views could gain more credence if Afghanistan becomes more stable. These
observers argued that the United States historically had few interests in this region and that
developments there remained largely marginal to U.S. interests. They discounted fears that
anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes
or otherwise harm U.S. interests. At least until the coup in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 (see
below, Democratization), these observers argued that the United States should not try to
foster democratization among cultures they claimed are historically attuned to
authoritarianism. Some observers reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism,
nonproliferation, regional cooperation, and trade outweigh concerns over democratization
and human rights, and urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive states. A few
observers point to instability in the region as a reason to eschew deeper U.S. involvement
such as military access that might place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan. Since the terrorist attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001, the Administration has stated that U.S. policy toward Central
Asia focuses on the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy development.
According to then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony in June
2002, the September 11 attacks led the Administration to realize that “it was critical to the
national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations with the five
Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism. After
September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance
to U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome
such operations. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern
Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan
as a base for terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which tried to reach
some accommodation with the Taliban) (see also below, Security).
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian
state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-March 2003 that endorsed
prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan joined later).
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Uzbekistan subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq, but Kazakhstan has deployed 27
military engineers to Iraq who are engaged in de-mining and water purification.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible
members of the international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid
and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey.
The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic regimes and terrorist groups
from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam, but display
hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some
trade and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting development
aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the long run, their
foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may more closely reflect the concerns
of other moderate Islamic states. (See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security:
Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests
, by Jim Nichol.)
Russia’s Role. During most of the 1990s, U.S. administrations generally viewed a
democratizing Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing
authoritarian tendencies in Russia since Vladimir Putin became its president in 2000, the
Bush Administration has emphasized that Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts in the region
broadly support U.S. interests. At the same time, the United States long has stressed to
Russia that it not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement.
Virtually all U.S. analysts agree that Russia’s actions should be monitored to ensure that the
independence of the Central Asian states is not threatened.
The long-term impact of the events of September 11, 2001, on the Central Asian states
may depend upon the durability and scope of U.S. and coalition presence in the region,
Russia’s countervailing policies, and the fate of Afghanistan. Prior to the September 2001
attacks, Putin had tried to strengthen Russia’s interests in the region while opposing the
growth of U.S. influence. Among Russia’s reasons for acquiescing to increased U.S. and
coalition presence in the region after the September 2001 attacks were its interests in
boosting some economic and other ties to the West and its hopes of regaining influence in
Afghanistan. More recently, Russia has appeared to step up efforts to counter U.S. influence.
Russian officials have emphasized interests in strategic security and economic ties with
Central Asia. Strategic concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and
the region’s role as a buffer to Islamic extremism. During the 1990s, Russia’s economic
decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its security presence, a trend that
President Putin has tried to retard or reverse. In 1999, Russian border guards were largely
phased out in Kyrgyzstan, the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness. However, Russia has
appeared determined to maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It long retained about
12,000 Federal Border Guards in Tajikistan, most of whom were Tajik conscripts, and 7,800
Russian troops of the 201st motorized rifle division (The Military Balance 2004-2005).
Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for years, as
Tajikistan endeavored to maximize rents and assert its sovereignty. In October 2004, the
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basing agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest military presence abroad, besides
its Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan demanded full control over border policing.
Russia announced on June 14, 2005, that it had handed over the last guard-house along the
Afghan-Tajik border to Tajik troops. Since then, more drugs are transiting the region,
according to some Russian critics of the handover.
In a seeming shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January 2000,
then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept” that termed foreign
efforts to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia a security threat. In April 2000,
Russia called for the members of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces to
combat terrorism and hinted that such forces might launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan
terrorist bases. These hints elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint and consult the
U.N. Marking mutual concern, Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed at their June 2000
summit to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism. A May 2001 CST
summit approved the creation of a Central Asian rapid reaction force headquartered in
Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops in Tajikistan comprising most of the force. CIS members
in 2001 also approved setting up an Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) in Moscow, with a branch
in Kyrgyzstan, giving Russia influence over regional intelligence gathering. The ATC
sponsored an exercise in August 2005 at Kazakhstan’s Aktau seaport that focused on
combating threats to energy transport on the Caspian Sea.
Perhaps to counteract the increased U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan, Russia in September
2003 signed a 15-year military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the Kant
airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek. The nearly two dozen Russian aircraft and
several hundred troops at the base also serve as part of the Central Asian rapid reaction force.
The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s Manas airbase, which some observers
view as a clear sign of Putin’s drive to constrain U.S. regional influence. In July 2005,
Russia announced that it would double its 300-strong troop deployment, but reportedly the
base’s poor infrastructure has delayed this move. Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring
relations with many Western countries (see below), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied
Relations with Uzbekistan in November 2005 that contains provisions similar to those in the
CST that call for mutual defense consultations in the event of a threat to either party.
Some observers suggest that the gratitude of the Central Asian states toward the United
States — for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan —
has declined over time. Reasons may include perceptions that the United States has not
adequately addressed economic distress and drug trafficking. Also, Russia is pledging robust
security support to the states to get them to forget their pre-September 11, 2001,
dissatisfaction with its support. Russia’s efforts have benefitted too from growing concerns
among Central Asia’s authoritarian leaders that the United States advocates democratic
“revolutions” to replace them.
Russia’s economic interests in Central Asia are being reasserted as its economy
improves and may constitute its most effective lever of influence. Russia seeks to counter
Western business and gain substantial influence over energy resources through participation
in joint ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian territory. After an Energy
Cooperation Statement was signed at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia summit, it appeared that
Russia would accept a Western role in the Caspian region, including construction of the
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Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Subsequently, however, Russian officials tried
(unsuccessfully) to persuade Kazakhstan not to commit to use the BTC pipeline.
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Regional Tensions and Conflicts. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups,
convoluted borders, and emerging national identities pose challenges to stability in all the
Central Asian states. Emerging national identities compete with those of the clan, family,
region, and Islam. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to accurately reflect ethnic
distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks
make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In
Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen reside in
Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of
ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and
Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The central governments have struggled to gain control over
administrative subunits. Most observers agree that the term “Central Asia” currently denotes
a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations, although it is clear
that the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and sparsely-populated region will need more
integration in order to develop.
Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states, and such tensions
are potentially magnified by the formation of extra-regional cooperation groups such as the
CST Organization, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Each group reflects the diverging interests of Russia, the United States,
and China, although the fact that each group stresses anti-terrorism would seem to provide
motivation for cooperation. In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed
the “Shanghai treaty” with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of
mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile
former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the treaty to pressure the Central Asian states
to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s Xinjiang
province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the
group, re-named the SCO, and in 2003 the SCO Anti-Terrorism Center was established there.
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan. Tajikistan was among the Central Asian
republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up.
In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and
groups tried to take power. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and
Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in
20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of
whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the U.N. Security
Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December
1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and rebel leader Seyed Abdullo
Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were
largely met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. The United States has pledged to help
Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers point to events in the city of Andijon in Uzbekistan (see
below) as indicating that similar conflicts could engulf other Central Asian states where
major segments of the population are disenfranchised and poverty-stricken.
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The 1999 and 2000 Incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic
extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Jama Namanganiy, the
co-leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below), headed the largest
guerrilla group. They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an
Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek
and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999.
Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August
2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible
for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. According to the State Department, the
IMU did not invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because bin
Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance.
The 1999 and 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan. A series of explosions in Tashkent
in February 1999 were among early signs that the government was vulnerable to terrorism.
By various reports, the explosions killed 16 to 28 and wounded 100 to 351 people. The
aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and others deemed by some
observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh
(former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding
what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the IMU) and
the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving death sentences.
The suspects said in court that they received terrorist training in Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
Pakistan, and Russia and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev and Namanganiy. In 2000,
Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5
year prison sentence. Solikh denied membership in IMU, and he and Yuldashev denied
involvement in the bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of bombings and armed attacks were
launched in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of
Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed
responsibility for the violence. In subsequent trials, the alleged attackers were accused of
being members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic fundamentalist movement
ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of attempting to overthrow the
government. The first national trial of fifteen suspects (all of whom confessed their guilt)
ended in August 2004, with sentences of 11-16 years in prison. Some of the defendants
testified that they belonged to IJG and were trained by Arabs and others at camps in
Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that IMU member Najmiddin Jalolov (convicted
in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked him to Taliban head Mohammad
Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. Over 100 individuals
reportedly were convicted in various trials. On July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the
U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office in Tashkent. The
IMU and IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the bombings were aimed against Uzbek
and other “apostate” governments. A Kazakh security official in late 2004 announced the
apprehension of several IJG members. He alleged that the IJG had ties to Al Qaeda; had
other cells in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia; and was planning assassinations (see also
CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S.
Interests
, by Jim Nichol).
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden,
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resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The
“main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State
Department warned, and it linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-
2000. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, IMU forces assisting the Taliban and
Al Qaeda against coalition actions in Afghanistan suffered major losses, and Namanganiy
was probably killed. CIA Director Porter Goss testified to the Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 17, 2005, that IJG “has become a more virulent threat to U.S. interests
and local governments.” On May 25, 2005, the State Department designated IJG as a global
terrorist group, and on June 1, 2005, the U.N. Security Council added IJG to its terrorism list.
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan. Dozens or perhaps hundreds of
civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek troops fired on
demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to demand the
end of a trial of 23 prominent local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic
terrorist group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held
and released hundreds of inmates. There is a great deal of controversy about whether this
group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed mainly of the friends and families
of the accused. Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.
President Islam Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored
order by late on May 13. The United States and others in the international community have
called for an international inquiry, which the Uzbek government has rejected. On July 29,
439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted to Romania for
resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that they might
be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan (see also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Uzbekistan:
Context and Implications
, by Jim Nichol).
The first major trial of fifteen alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest began in
September 2005. According to testimony, the governments of the United States and
Kyrgyzstan helped finance and support the terrorist coup attempt to establish an Islamic
caliphate in the Fergana Valley, and international media colluded with local human rights
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this attempt. Many Uzbek
opposition party members and representatives of independent media and NGOs have been
arrested. Partly in response, Congress has amplified calls for conditioning aid to Uzbekistan
on its compliance with democratic and human rights principles (see below, Legislation).
Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term
development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. The United
States has worked with the ex-Communist Party officials who lead in the five states (even
in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the current presidents were once lower-level party
officials). Particularly since September 11, 2001, the United States has attempted to
harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in the region with its
interests in regional support for the Global War on Terrorism. In articles on May 1 and
December 31, 2005, the New York Times alleged that the Administration might be sending
suspected terrorists in its custody to Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed
“rendition.” The Administration states that it receives assurances that these suspects will not
be tortured.
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Possible scenarios of political development in Central Asia have ranged from continued
rule in most of the states by former Soviet elites to violent transitions to Islamic
fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. Relatively peaceful transitions to more or less
democratic and Western-oriented political systems have been considered less likely by many
observers. Some have suggested that such a scenario might be conceivable in Kyrgyzstan,
because of the slightly wider scope of civil liberties in that country compared to the rest of
Central Asia. All the Central Asian leaders have remained in power by orchestrating
extensions of their terms and by eliminating possible contenders. Besides the recent coup
in Kyrgyzstan (see below), there have been alleged coup attempts in Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and the leaders in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan face rising
popular protests. In December 2005, the NGO Freedom House gave Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan its lowest possible ratings on political rights and civil liberties, including them
among such countries as North Korea, Libya, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, and Myanmar.

Popular protests in Kyrgyzstan against a tainted legislative election and economic
distress resulted in President Akayev’s relatively peaceful overthrow on March 24, 2005.
Some observers hailed this coup as a third instance of a so-called “democratic revolution”
in Eurasia, like those in Georgia and Ukraine, and the first in Central Asia. (See also CRS
Report RL32864, Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and Implications, by Jim Nichol.)
Democracy Pledges. During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President
Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments
to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. During his December
2001 visit, Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in a joint statement with President Bush. In
March 2002, a U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan
to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During his
December 2002 U.S. visit, Tajikistan’s President Rakhmanov pledged to “expand
fundamental freedoms and human rights.”
Despite such democracy pledges, the states have made little progress in democratization
and respect for human rights, according to the State Department’s Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2004.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are generally viewed as the
most repressive, while Kazakhstan (and Kyrgyzstan under Akayev) increasingly limited what
free expression and other rights they permitted during the 1990s. Tajikistan experienced
many human rights abuses during its civil war, and the government appears in recent months
to be backtracking on respect for human rights. Non-favored faiths, missionaries, and pious
Muslims face religious rights abuses in all the states. Unfair elections increase political
alienation and violence aimed against the regimes. In its June 2005 Trafficking in Persons
Report
, the State Department placed Uzbekistan on a “Tier 2 Watch List,” for having
problems as a source country for human trafficking that they are making some progress in
addressing. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were taken off the watch list but were listed (as was
Kyrgyzstan) as “Tier 2” countries that have human trafficking problems they are addressing.
Among U.N. actions, the United States, Russia, and other countries in December 2003
approved a General Assembly resolution urging Turkmenistan to implement human rights
reforms as suggested by the OSCE and to permit prison visits. The U.N. Rapporteur on
Torture in March 2003 completed a draft report that concluded that police and prison
officials in Uzbekistan systematically employed torture and other coercive means to obtain
confessions and as punishment. In November 2005, a U.N. committee approved a draft
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resolution for consideration by the General Assembly to condemn the Uzbek government’s
violence against civilians in Andijon and subsequent apparently arbitrary arrests and to call
on it to permit an international investigation (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Russia voted against the resolution). The Uzbek representative termed the resolution a
“political” attack launched by some EU members of the United Nations.
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade FREEDOM
Support Act (FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State
determined and reported that Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting its
commitments to democratize and respect human rights. P.L. 108-7 also forbade assistance
to the government of Kazakhstan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that
it significantly had improved its human rights record during the preceding six months.
Unlike the case with Uzbekistan, the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive the
requirement on national security grounds. The Secretary reported in May 2003, that
Uzbekistan was making such progress, and in July 2003, that Kazakhstan was making
progress, eliciting some criticism of these findings from Congress. These conditions were
retained in Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (P.L. 108-
199), while clarifying that the prohibition covered assistance to the central government of
Uzbekistan and specifying that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a
“genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression
and media. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2005, including Foreign Operations (P.L.
108-447, Section 578) and Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102)
retained the conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
In mid-2004, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that, despite
some “encouraging progress” in respecting human rights, up to $18 million in military and
economic aid to Uzbekistan would be withheld because of “lack of progress on democratic
reform and restrictions put on U.S. assistance partners on the ground” (in contrast, progress
was reported regarding Kazakhstan). International Military Education and Training (IMET)
and FMF programs, which are conditioned on respect for human rights, were among those
affected. The State Department reprogrammed or used notwithstanding authority (after
consultation with Congress) to expend some of the funds, so that about $8.5 million was
ultimately withheld. During an August 2004 visit to Uzbekistan, Gen. Myers criticized the
cutoff of IMET and FMF programs as “shortsighted” and not “productive,” since it reduced
U.S. military influence (see also below, Weapons of Mass Destruction).
For FY2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reported to Congress on May 12,
2005, that Kazakhstan had failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but she
waived aid restrictions on national security grounds. The Secretary of State in FY2005 did
not determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making significant progress in
respecting human rights, so Section 578 aid restrictions remained in place.
Among recent elections, incumbent Kazakh President Nazarbayev won another term
with 91% of the vote in a five-man race on December 4, 2005. Many observers credited
economic growth in the country and some recent increases in wages and pensions as
bolstering his popularity. Observers from the OSCE, COE, and the European Parliament
assessed the election as progressive but still falling short of a free and fair race. Problems
included restrictions on campaigning and harassment of opposition candidates.
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Security and Arms Control
The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and IMU
terrorists in Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) increased the
security of Central Asia. The development of U.S. security ties with Central Asia pre-
September 11, 2001, facilitated the cooperation of the states in OEF. According to then-
Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military
relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior
to September 11th.” While denying that U.S. basing was permanent, Crouch averred that “for
the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue
to support actions to deter or defeat terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces
under civilian control. Kyrgyzstan, Crouch related, became a “critical regional partner” in
OEF, providing basing for U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in 2005, U.S. troops
reportedly number about 1,500). Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-
Khanabad (K2; just before the pullout, U.S. troops reportedly numbered less than 900), a
base for German units at Termez (in late 2004, German troops reportedly numbered over
300), and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at
Termez. Tajikistan permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for refueling and
hosted a French force (France reported 130 troops there in early 2005; they were pulled out
in November 2005). Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan provided overflight and other support.
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the March 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Declaration
on the Strategic Partnership included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States
affirmed that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s
security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The
two states pledged to intensify military cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed
Forces” of Uzbekistan.
Although U.S. security assistance was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid has
lessened somewhat since then as a percentage of all aid, particularly in FY2004-FY2005 after
some aid to Uzbekistan was cut (see below). Security and law enforcement aid was $187.55
million in FY2002 (31% of all such aid to Eurasia), $101.5 million (33%) in FY2003, and
$132.5 million (11.2%) in FY2004. Over the period from FY1992-FY2004, security and law
enforcement aid accounted for a little over one-fifth of all budgeted assistance to Central
Asia. Economic and humanitarian aid was more, accounting for over three-fifths of budgeted
assistance to Central Asia. Security and law enforcement aid included FMF, IMET, and
EDA programs and border security aid to combat trafficking in drugs, humans, and WMD.
To help counter burgeoning drug trafficking from Afghanistan, the emergency supplemental
for FY2005 (P.L. 109-13) provided $242 million for Central Asia and Afghanistan.
In addition to the aid reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense Department
provides coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan, including base rents and landing and
overflight fees (overall authority and funding have been provided in FY2002-FY2005
emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations and maintenance). According
to one report, the United States has paid $28 million in rent, landing, and takeoff fees at
Manas; $114 million for fuel, and $17 million to Kyrgyz contractors. In addition, the local
economy has benefitted from an estimated $4 million in expenditures by base personnel.
Uzbekistan received a payment of $15.7 million for use of K2 and associated services, and
the Defense Department in September 2005 announced an intention to pay another $23
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million, raising objections from some in Congress and elsewhere that the payment
“rewarded” Uzbekistan despite its lack of reform. On October 5, an amendment to Defense
Appropriations for FY2006 (H.R. 2863) was approved in the Senate to place a one-year hold
on the payment. Despite congressional concern, the Defense Department transferred the
payment in November 2005.
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military
engagement in Central Asia. It cooperates with the European Command (USEUCOM), on
the Caspian [Sea] Guard program, launched in 2003, to enhance and coordinate security
assistance provided by U.S. agencies to establish an “integrated airspace, maritime and
border control regime” for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. A related hydrocarbons initiative
provides maritime security, crisis response, and consequence management aid to help the
Caspian regional states protect their pipelines and other energy transport to the West. Russia
has appeared to counter U.S. maritime security aid by boosting the capabilities of its Caspian
Sea Flotilla and by urging the littoral states to coordinate their naval activities with Russia’s.
All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994
(Tajikistan joined in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP (or “PFP-
style”) exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in
exercises in Central Asia since 1997. A June 2004 NATO summit communique pledged
enhanced Alliance attention to the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
According to some reports, the Defense Department has been considering possibly
setting up long-term military facilities in Central Asia termed Cooperative Security Locations
(CSLs; they might contain pre-positioned equipment and be managed by private contractors,
and few if any U.S. military personnel may be present). The Overseas Basing Commission,
in its May 2005 Report, acknowledged that U.S. national security might be enhanced by
future CSLs in Central Asia but urged Congress to seek inter-agency answers to “what
constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area that would require long-term U.S. presence.”
Closure of Karshi-Khanabad. On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a declaration issued during a meeting of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO; see below, Regional Tensions) that called for coalition
members supporting operations in Afghanistan “to decide on the deadline for the use of the
temporary infrastructure and for their military contingents’ presence in those countries.” The
language seemed to target U.S. and coalition bases in Central Asia. Despite signing this
declaration, none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for the closing of U.S. and
other coalition bases. However, after the United States, the U.N., and others interceded so
that refugees who fled from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July
29 demanded that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005,
the United States officially ceased anti-terrorism operations (to support Afghanistan) at K2.
Uzbekistan reportedly also informed Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, and Sweden in mid-
November that their basing and overflight privileges would be suspended, after the European
Union denied travel visas to Uzbek officials who were implicated in violence in Andijon.
Germany was allowed to continue operations at a small base at Termez. During Secretary
Rice’s October 11, 2005, visit to Kyrgyzstan, President Bakiyev pledged that airbase
operations there could continue until stability was firmly established in Afghanistan.
Kyrgyzstan allegedly has requested $200 million per year for use of the base.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction. Major U.S. security interests have included
elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet
Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. The United States
has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear
technology and materials, including because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries.
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in
reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged “retaining” the
weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. In December 1993, the United
States and Kazakhstan signed a CTR umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure”
dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All bombers and
their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (except seven
bombers destroyed with U.S. aid in 1998). On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear
warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan
announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. The
United States reported that 147 silos had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty has been set up to facilitate verification and
compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the proliferation of WMD. S.Res. 122,
approved on May 25, 2005, commends Kazakhstan for eliminating its nuclear weapons.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines,
milling facilities, and nuclear waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, many of which reportedly remain inadequately protected against theft. Also,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities
during the Soviet era. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium
reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low
enriched uranium. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world’s only nuclear
desalinization facility. Shut down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium and
plutonium spent fuel in storage pools (three tons of which were weapons-grade). In 1997 and
1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau reactor. CTR aid
was used to facilitate the transport of eleven kilograms of uranium in fuel rods from
Uzbekistan to Russia in 2004. CTR and Energy Department funds have been used in
Kazakhstan to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to remove
some strains to the United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain scientists.
CTR funding was used to dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical weapons research facility.
CTR aid also was used to eliminate active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an
island in the Aral Sea. Both these projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps
keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research.
The FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 1306) provided
for the president to waive prohibitions on CTR aid (as contained in Sec.1203 of P.L. 103-
160) to a state of the former Soviet Union if he certified that the waiver was necessary for
national security and submitted a report outlining why the waiver was necessary and how he
planned to promote future compliance with the restrictions on CTR aid. The waiver
authority, exercisable each fiscal year, expired at the end of FY2005. (The six restrictions
in P.L. 103-160 include a call for CTR recipients to observe internationally recognized
human rights.) On December 30, 2003 (for FY2004), and on December 14, 2004 (for
FY2005), President explained that Uzbekistan’s human rights problems necessitated a
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waiver. Defense Authorizations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) provide an indefinite waiver
authority, exercisable annually (see below, Legislation).
Trade and Investment
The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms directly
serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and
sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has
greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan.
U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian
states, but bilateral investment treaties are in force only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Permanent normal trade relations with Kyrgyzstan were established by law in June 2000, so
that “Jackson-Vanik” trade provisions no longer apply that call for presidential reports and
waivers concerning freedom of emigration.
The emergence of Central Asia as a “new silk road” of trade and commerce is
challenged by corruption, inadequate roads, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and the
uncertain respect for contracts. All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that
could yield export earnings, but these challenges scare off major foreign investment (except
for some investment in the energy sector) to revamp, develop, or market the resources. The
Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports but need added foreign
investment for production and transport. Uzbekistan’s state-controlled cotton and gold
production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It also has moderate
energy reserves. Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, is a major
wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the world’s largest
aluminum processing plants and is a major cotton grower.
Energy Resources. U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central
Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the
West, supporting U.S. private investment, promoting Western energy security through
diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that
transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give it undue influence over the region.
Security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also has been a recent interest.
President Bush’s May 2001 National Energy Policy report suggests that greater oil
production in the Caspian region could not only benefit regional economies, but also help
mitigate possible world supply disruptions. It recommends U.S. support for building the
BTC pipeline and an Azerbaijan-Turkey gas pipeline, coaxing Kazakhstan to use the oil
pipeline, and otherwise encouraging the regional states to provide a stable and inviting
business climate for energy development.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Caspian region is emerging as
a significant source of oil and gas for world markets. Kazakhstan possesses the Caspian
region’s largest proven oil reserves at 9-29 billion barrels, according to DOE, and also
possesses 65 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are
about 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd). Some U.S. energy firms and other private foreign
investors have become discouraged in recent months by harsher government terms, taxes,
and fines. Turkmenistan possesses about 101tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE,
among the largest in the world. In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth
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largest natural gas producer (See also CRS Report RS21190, Caspian Oil and Gas:
Production and Prospects
, by Bernard A. Gelb).
The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing export pipelines. Russian
shareholders have a controlling interest in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which in 2001
completed a 930-mile pipeline that initially carried 560,000 bpd of oil from Kazakhstan to
Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. In December 1997, Turkmenistan opened the first
pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage
to Iran. Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with Putin in 2003 on supplying Russia about 200
billion cubic feet of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production), rising to 2.8 tcf in 2009, perhaps
then tying up a large part of Turkmenistan’s production. Turkmenistan halted gas shipments
to Russia at the beginning of 2005 in an attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-
cash rather than partial barter payments. In early 2006, it appeared that Turkmenistan was
again requesting higher gas prices from Russia. In October 2005, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
agreed in principle to ship some Kazakh oil through the BTC pipeline, giving Kazakhstan
an export route not transiting Russia. The first Kazakh oil export pipeline not transiting
Russia was completed at the end of 2005, from Atyrau on Kazakhstan’s Caspian seacoast to
the Xinjiang region of China, with a capacity of 200,000 bpd.
Aid Overview
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided much
more aid each year to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia than to any Central Asian state
(most such aid was funded from the FSA account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but
some derived from other program and agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid budgeted
to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2004 amounted to $3.4 billion, about 13% of the
amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the lesser priority given to these states
prior to 9/11. Budgeted spending for FY2002 for Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly
boosted in absolute amounts ($584 million) and as a share of total aid to Eurasia (about one-
quarter of such aid). Although subsequent aid amounts appear less in absolute amounts, they
appear to loom larger as percentages of the total FSA and other Function 150 aid to Eurasia.
Appearing to reflect concern about human rights, lessening interest in the region, and
a push to reduce spending, Congress approved $99 million in FSA aid for the states of
Central Asia for FY2006, $17.5 million below the presidential request (P.L. 109-102).
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial
institutions that aid Central Asia. Policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it should be
used for, who should receive it, and whether it is effective.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia
(in millions of dollars)
Cumulative Funds
Central Asian
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
Budgeted FY1992-
Country
Budgeteda
Estimatea
Requestc
FY2004a
Kazakhstan
1,125.5
41.9
37.8
36.974
Kyrgyzstan
749.0
43.5
36.4
35.738
Tajikistan
612.6
34.1
43.6
37.124
Turkmenistan
237.34
8.4
9.3
8.086
Uzbekistan
645.96
38.4
48.7
37.393
Total
3,439.75 b
166.3
175.8
155.315
Percent
13
26
26
26
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia; State
Department, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia: FY2003 Annual Report,
January 2004.
a. FSA and Agency funds. Excludes some classified coalition support funding.
b. Central Asian Regional funds are included in the total.
c. FSA and other Function 150 funds, not including Defense or Energy Department funds; in FY2004 and
thereafter, funding for exchanges is excluded.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-265)
agreed to in the House on November 4, 2005, and in the Senate on November 10, 2005.
Signed into law November 14, 2005. Conference report called for $25 million in Freedom
Support Act aid to Kazakhstan, $25 million to Kyrgyzstan, $24 million to Tajikistan, $5
million to Turkmenistan, and $20 million to Uzbekistan. It continued prior year language
conditioning aid to the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on progress in
democratization and respect for human rights and added a condition that the Uzbek
government should permit an international investigation of violence against civilians in
Andijon. It conditioned aid to Kyrgyzstan on a report by the Secretary of State on whether
the Kyrgyz government is forcibly returning Uzbeks who have fled violence and political
persecution. The conferees recommended no Foreign Military Financing aid for Uzbekistan.
P.L. 109-148, H.R. 2863
Defense Appropriations for FY2006. Introduced June 10, 2005. Passed House June 20,
2005. On October 5, an amendment to the Senate version was approved to place a one-year
hold on a Defense Department-proposed payment for use of the Karshi-Khanabad airbase in
Uzbekistan (the provision was removed in conference). H.R. 2863 passed Senate October
7, 2005. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-359) agreed to in House on December 19, 2005,
and in the Senate on December 21, 2005. Signed into law on December 30, 2005.
P.L. 109-163, H.R. 1815/S. 1042
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006. H.R. 1815 introduced April 26, 2005.
Passed House May 25, 2005. S. 1042 introduced and reported May 17, 2005. H.R. 1815
passed the Senate with an amendment substituting the language of S. 1042, on November 15,
2005. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-360) agreed to in House on December 19, 2005, and
in the Senate on December 21, 2005. Signed into law on January 6, 2006. Sec. 1303
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indefinitely extends presidential authority to annually waive conditions on Comprehensive
Threat Reduction assistance.
H.Res. 545 (Ros-Lehtinen)/S.Res. 295 (Lugar)
A resolution expressing the sense of the Congress on the arrest of Sanjar Umarov in
Uzbekistan. H.Res. 545 introduced on November 10, 2005. Passed House on December 18,
2005. S.Res. 295 introduced on November 2, 2005. Passed Senate on November 2, 2005.
H.Con.Res. 187 (Ros-Lehtinen)
Expressing the Sense of Congress Concerning Uzbekistan. Introduced June 22, 2005.
Calls for Uzbekistan to permit an international inquiry into the May 2005 violence there and
to carry out democratic and human rights reforms.
H.R. 3545 (William Delahunt)
Uzbekistan Freedom Promotion Act of 2005. Introduced July 28, 2005. Amends the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to limit foreign assistance to the government of Uzbekistan,
unless the President certifies each fiscal year that it is upholding democratic and human
rights. The bill restricts arms exports and visas for Uzbek officials involved in human rights
abuses and permits freezing their assets. It calls for expedited U.S. admission of Uzbek
pro-democracy advocates fearing prosecution and a report to Congress on moving U.S.
military operations out of Uzbekistan.
H.R. 3189 (Christopher Smith)
Central Asia Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2005. Introduced June 30, 2005.
Authorizes $188 million for FY2006 and each subsequent fiscal year to encourage
democratization and respect for human rights in Central Asia. Similarly authorizes $15
million for expanding broadcasting to the region. Conditions aid to the governments based
on their progress on reforms.
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Ast ana
MON.
Aral
Sea
Alma Ata
Bishkek
Caspian
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZST AN
Sea
Am
Tashkent
AZER.
u Da
Baku
ry
TURKMENISTAN
a
Dushanbe
Ashgabat
TAJIK.
0
500 Miles
Tehran
Kabul
Islamabad
0
500 KM
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Parallel scale at 40û
N 0û
E
PAKISTAN
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (08/02 M. Chin)
CRS-16