Order Code RL31339
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-Saddam Governance
Updated January 13, 2006
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and
Post-Saddam Governance
Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq
remains violent and unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related
insurgency. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush
Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able
to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic
terrorists. The Administration believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will become
a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on
terrorism. However, mounting casualties and costs have intensified a debate within
the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S.
involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals.
The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important
successes, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose
an interim and then a full-term National Assembly, a referendum that adopted a
permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security
forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi
security units, the Administration has been working with the new Iraqi government
to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure; Sunnis were dominant during
the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant
Shiite Arabs and Kurds. The Administration believes that it has largely healed a rift
with some European countries over the decision to invade Iraq, and it points to
NATO and other nations’ contributions of training for Iraqi security forces and
government personnel.
Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in
Iraq is failing and that major new policy initiatives are required. Some believe that
U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop
commitment. Others believe that a U.S. move toward withdrawal might undercut
popular support for the insurgency and force compromise among Iraq’s factions.
Still others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counter-insurgent
combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents,
a plan the Administration says it is now moving toward under an approach termed
“clear, hold, and build.”
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth
Katzman; CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by Kenneth
Katzman and Alfred Prados; CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign
Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and
Christopher Blanchard; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in
Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.

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Contents
Major Anti-Saddam Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Iraqi National Congress (INC)/Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Iraq National Accord (INA)/Iyad al-Allawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Major Kurdish Organizations/KDP and PUK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Shiite Islamist Leaders and Organizations: Ayatollah Sistani,
SCIRI, Da’wa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Others . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Clinton Administration Strategy/Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Post-September 11: Regime Change Through Military Action . . . . . 10
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . 13
Iraq Governing Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Handover of Sovereignty and Run-up to Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Interim Constitution/Transition Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate . . . . . 15
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
January 30, 2005 Elections/New Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Drafting the Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
December 15, 2005, Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
International Donations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Sector Allocations for Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Political and Security Challenges, Responses, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The Insurgent Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
U.S. Responses to the Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
ISF Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
ISF Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Coalition-Building and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Troop Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Immediate Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Withdrawal Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Troop Drawdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Power-Sharing Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Negotiating With the Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

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Accelerating Economic Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Focus on Local Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
List of Tables
Table 1. Some Key Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 2. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and
Post-Saddam Governance
Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the (Sunni Muslim) Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958).1 Iraq had been a
province of the Ottoman empire until British forces defeated the Ottomans and took
control of what is now Iraq in 1918. Iraq’s first Hashemite king was Faysal bin
Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E
Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire
during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his
son, Ghazi (1933-1939). Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who ruled until
the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in
February 1963 by a Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath
Party has ruled in Syria, although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi
Baath regimes during Saddam’s rule.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Saddam’s regime became
particularly repressive of Iraq’s Shiites after the 1979 Islamic revolution in
neighboring Iran, which activated and emboldened Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements
that wanted to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Major Anti-Saddam Factions
The parties that dominate post-Saddam Iraq had been active against Saddam
Hussein for decades. Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991, of Operation Desert
Storm to reverse Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W.
1 See Eisenstadt, Michael, and Eric Mathewson, eds, U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq:
Lessons from the British Experience. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003.
Members of the Hashemite family rule neighboring Jordan.

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CRS-2
Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided
not to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein in the course of the 1991 war because
the United Nations had approved only the liberation of Kuwait, because the Arab
states in the coalition opposed an advance to Baghdad, and because it feared
becoming bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.2 Within days of the war’s
end (February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurdish factions in
northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support,
launched significant rebellions. The Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the
mostly Sunni Muslim Republican Guard forces had survived the war largely intact
and they suppressed the rebels. Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States for
standing aside during Saddam’s suppression of the uprisings. Iraq’s Kurds,
benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out
of much of northern Iraq and remained autonomous thereafter.
About two months after the failure of these uprisings, President George H.W.
Bush reportedly sent Congress an intelligence finding that the United States would
try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein. The Administration
apparently believed that a coup by elements within the regime could produce a
favorable government without fragmenting Iraq. After a reported July 1992 coup
failed, there was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the Kurdish, Shiite, and other
oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.3 The following sections
discuss these organizations and personalities, almost all of which are major features
of post-Saddam politics.
Iraqi National Congress (INC)/Ahmad Chalabi. In 1992, the two main
Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National
Congress (INC).” They adopted its platform of human rights, democracy, pluralism,
“federalism” (Kurdish autonomy), the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, and
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq.4 However, many
observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups have
authoritarian leaderships. The Kurds provided it with some armed force and a
presence on Iraqi territory. The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad
Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent banking family, to run the INC
on a daily basis. Chalabi, who is about 62 years old, was educated in the United
States (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician. His father was
president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the 1958 military
coup, and the family fled to Jordan. He taught math at the American University of
Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan. He later ran afoul
of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly
2 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million. Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times,
June 2, 1992.
4 The Iraqi National Congress and the International Community. Document provided by
INC representatives, Feb. 1993.

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CRS-3
with some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989.5 Chalabi maintains
that the Jordanian government was pressured by Iraq to turn against him.
The INC and Chalabi have been controversial in the United States since the INC
was formed. The State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly
believed the INC had little popularity inside Iraq. However, in the George W. Bush
Administration, numerous press reports indicated that the Defense Department and
office of Vice President Cheney believed the INC was well positioned to lead a post-
Saddam regime. Chalabi’s supporters maintain that it was largely his determination
that has now led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Several press reports say that,
after the start of the 2003 war, Defense Department officials sought to boost
Chalabi’s post-Saddam standing by flying him and about 700 INC fighters (“Free
Iraqi Forces”) into Iraq, first to the Nasiriya area in southern Iraq. After establishing
a headquarters in Baghdad, Chalabi tried to build support by directing U.S. forces to
possible hideouts of former regime members. The Free Iraqi Forces were disbanded
after the May 2003 U.S. decision to disarm independent militias. Then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Meyers said on May 20, 2004, that the INC
had provided information that had saved the lives of U.S. soldiers.
As an Iraqi governance structure was established, Chalabi was selected to the
Iraq Governing Council (IGC) and he was one of its nine rotating presidents
(president during September 2003). He headed the IGC’s committee on “de-
Baathification,” although his vigilance in purging former Baathists was slowed by
U.S. officials in early 2004. Since 2004, Chalabi has allied with Shiite Islamist
factions; he was number 10 on Ayatollah Sistani’s “United Iraqi Alliance” slate for
the January 30, 2005 elections. He is now one of three deputy prime ministers, with
a focus on economic and legal issues (trial of former regime members), and he is still
pressing aggressive de-Baathification. He made a high-profile visit to the United
States, including meetings with Vice President Cheney, during November 2005,
possibly as part of efforts to emerge as Prime Minister after December 15 elections.
Despite a poor showing in the December 15, 2005, National Assembly elections,
Chalabi was briefly appointed Oil Minister in late December 2005 when the minister
resigned due to the raising of gasoline price increases in Iraq, but the minister was
reinstated in January 2006.

Chalabi’s new prominence caps a comeback from a 2003-2004 fallout with
Washington, demonstrated when U.S.-backed Iraqi police raided INC headquarters
in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing documents that the INC had captured from
Iraqi ministries after Saddam’s fall. The raid reportedly was part of an investigation
of various allegations, including that Chalabi had provided intelligence to Iran.6 In
August 2004, an Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Chalabi’s arrest on counterfeiting
charges, and for his nephew Salem Chalabi’s arrest for the murder of an Iraqi finance
ministry official. (Salem had headed the tribunal trying Saddam Hussein and his
5 In Apr. 1992, he was convicted in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and
sentenced to 22 years in prison. The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors
a total of $400 million.
6 Risen, James, and David Johnston. “Chalabi Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code,”
New York Times, June 2, 2004.

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CRS-4
associates.) The case was subsequently dropped. (A table on U.S. appropriations for
the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).
Iraq National Accord (INA)/Iyad al-Allawi. The Iraq National Accord
(INA), founded after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by
Saudi Arabia but reportedly later earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).7 Consisting of defectors from Iraq’s Baath Party and security organs
who had ties to sitting officials in those organizations, the INA has been headed since
1990 by Dr. Iyad al-Allawi, who that year broke with another INA leader, Salah
Umar al-Tikriti. Allawi was a Baathist who purportedly helped Saddam Hussein
silence Iraqi dissidents in Europe in the mid-1970s.8 Allawi, who is about 60 years
old (born 1946 in Baghdad), fell out with Saddam in the mid-1970s, became a
neurologist and presided over the Iraqi Student Union in Europe. He survived an
alleged Saddam regime assassination attempt in London in 1978. He is a secular
Shiite Muslim, but many INA members are Sunnis. Allawi no longer considers
himself a Baath Party member, but he has not openly denounced the original tenets
of Baathism, a pan-Arab multi-ethnic movement founded in the 1940s by Lebanese
Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq.
In 1996, the fractiousness among anti-Saddam groups caused the Clinton
Administration to shift support to Iyad al-Allawi’s INA.9 An opportunity presented
itself when Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-Majid (organizer of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction efforts) defected to Jordan in August 1995, setting off
turmoil within Saddam’s regime. Jordan’s King Hussein subsequently allowed the
INA to operate from Jordan. However, the INA proved penetrated by Iraq’s
intelligence services and Baghdad arrested or executed over 100 INA activists in
June 1996. In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into northern
Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from the PUK. The
incursion enabled Baghdad to also rout remaining INC and INA operatives
throughout the north, executing two hundred oppositionists and arresting 2,000
others. The United States evacuated from northern Iraq and eventually resettled in
the United States 650 mostly INC activists.

In post-Saddam Iraq, Allawi was named to the IGC and to its rotating
presidency (president during October 2003). He was interim prime minister during
June 2004-January 2005, but his INA-led candidate slate (The Iraqis List) in the
January 30 elections garnered about 14% of the vote, giving his bloc 40 of the 275
seats. Neither he nor any other INA figure was given a cabinet or other senior
position in the new government. His Iraqis List in the December 15 election did
worse than expected, positioning it to gain only about 25 seats in the full-term
Assembly.
7 Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New
York Times, June 9, 2004.
8 Hersh, Seymour. “Annals of National Security: Plan B,” The New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
9 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed,” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.

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CRS-5
Major Kurdish Organizations/KDP and PUK.10 The Kurds, who are
mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are probably the most pro-U.S. of all major
groups. They have a historic fear of persecution by the Arab majority and want to,
at the very least, preserve the autonomy of the post-1991 Gulf war period. A major
question is whether the Kurds might seek outright independence alone or in concert
with Kurds in neighboring countries. The two main Kurdish factions are the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP), led by Masud Barzani. Their militias, the “peshmerga” are discussed later.
Some indications in late 2005 suggest that the two main parties might want to
go beyond autonomy to quasi or outright independence, particularly if factional strife
continues in Iraq. Some reports say that the Kurdish parties are positioning
themselves to secure the city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds covet as a source of oil, and
possibly part of the city of Mosul, with peshmerga. The Kurds also achieved
language in the new constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on whether
Kirkuk might formally join the Kurdish administered region.
For now, both major Kurdish factions are participating in Iraqi politics, the PUK
more so than the KDP. Talabani was IGC president in November 2003, and Barzani
led it in April 2004. The two factions offered a joint slate in the January 30 and
December 15 elections. Talabani became Iraq’s president after the January elections
and is now being nominated to continue in that post after the December election.
Masud Barzani has chosen instead to solidify his position in the Kurdish north, and,
on June 12, 2005, the 111-seat Kurdish regional assembly (also elected on January
30, 2005) named him “president of Kurdistan.” Yet, Barzani did participate
extensively in the final negotiations on the new Iraqi constitution. Barzani visited
Washington, D.C., in October 2005 and met with President Bush.
Shiite Islamist Leaders and Organizations: Ayatollah Sistani,
SCIRI, Da’wa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Others. Shiite Islamist
organizations have emerged as the strongest factions in post-Saddam politics. Shiite
Muslims constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented in every
Iraqi government. Several factions cooperated with the U.S. regime change efforts
of the 1990s, but others had no contact with the United States. In an event that many
Iraqi Shiites still refer to as an example of their potential to frustrate great power
influence, Shiite Muslims led a revolt against British occupation forces in 1920.
The undisputed Shiite religious leader in Iraq is Grand Ayatollah Sistani. He
maintained a low profile during Saddam Hussein’s regime and was not part of U.S.-
backed regime change efforts in the 1990s. As the “marja-e-taqlid” (source of
emulation) and, since 1992, as the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the
Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of seminaries), he is a major political
force in post-Saddam politics.11 Sistani also has a network of supporters and agents
10 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.
11 The three other senior Hawza clerics are Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim (uncle of
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim);
(continued...)

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CRS-6
(wakils) throughout Iraq and in countries where there are large Shiite communities.
Sistani is about 77 years old and suffers from heart problems that required treatment
in the United Kingdom in August 2004. Sistani was instrumental in putting together
the united slate of Shiite Islamist movements in the January 30 elections (“United
Iraqi Alliance,” UIA). The slate received about 48% of the vote and has 140 seats
in the new Assembly, just enough for a majority of the 275-seat body. He only
indirectly endorsed the UIA coalition for the December 15 election.
Sistani was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before relocating to Najaf at
the age of 21. His mentor, the former head of the Hawza, was Ayatollah Abol Qasem
Musavi-Khoi. Like Khoi, Sistani generally opposes a direct role for clerics in
government, but he believes in clerical supervision of political leaders, partly
explaining his involvement in major post-Saddam political decisions. He wants Iraq
to maintain its Islamic culture and not become Westernized, favoring modest dress
for women and curbs on sales of alcohol and Western music and entertainment.12
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI
is the best organized and most well funded Shiite Islamist political party. With the
Da’wa Party, it constitutes the core of the UIA election coalition. It is also the most
pro-Iranian: it was set up in Iran in 1982, mainly by ex-Da’wa Party members (see
below), to increase Iranian control over Shiite movements in Iraq and the Persian
Gulf states. SCIRI founders were in exile in Iran after a major crackdown in 1980
by Saddam, who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi Shiite Islamists of trying to overthrow
him. At its founding, SCIRI’s leader, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, was
designated by the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran to head an Islamic
republic of Iraq if Saddam were ousted. During Khomeini’s exile in Najaf (1964-
1978), Khomeini was hosted by Mohammad Baqr’s father, Grand Ayatollah Muhsin
al-Hakim, who was then head of the Hawza. Although it was a member of the INC
in the early 1990s, SCIRI refused to accept U.S. funds, although it did have contacts
with the United States during this period.
Mohammad Baqr was killed in a car bombing in August 2003 in Najaf, and
his younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric, is its
leader. Hakim served on the IGC (he was IGC president during December 2003) and
was number one on the UIA slate in January 2005 elections, but took no formal
position in government. One of his top aides, Bayan Jabr, is Interior Minister, who
runs the national police and who has been accused of packing police forces with
members of SCIRI’s militia, the “Badr Brigades,” which are discussed under
“Militias,” below. Because of the criticism, it has been widely reported in January
2006 that he will not likely be reappointed Interior Minister in the full-term
government soon to be assembled. SCIRI leaders say they do not seek to establish
an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but SCIRI reportedly receives substantial amounts
of financial and in-kind assistance from Iran. SCIRI also runs a television station.
11 (...continued)
Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, of Pakistani origin.
12 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].

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Da’wa Party/Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. The second major Shiite
Islamist party is the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party. Da’wa was founded in 1957 by a
revered Iraqi Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, an uncle of Moqtada
al-Sadr and a peer of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. Da’wa was the most active Shiite
opposition movement in the few years following Iran’s Islamic revolution in
February 1979; its activists conducted guerrilla attacks against the Baathist regime
and attempted assassinations of senior Iraqi leaders, including Tariq Aziz. Ayatollah
Baqr Al Sadr was hung by the Iraqi regime in 1980 for the unrest, and many other
Da’wa activists were killed or imprisoned. Most of the surviving members moved
into Iran; some subsequently joined SCIRI. Da’wa does not have an organized
militia, and it has a lower proportion of clerics and is less pro-Iranian than is
SCIRI.13
Ibrahim al-Jafari, now Prime Minister, is about 55 years old (born in 1950 in
Karbala). A Da’wa activist since 1966, he attended medical school in Mosul and
fled to Iran in 1980 to escape Saddam’s crackdown on the Da’wa. He later went to
live in London, possibly because he did not want to be seen as too closely linked to
Iran. During the 1990s, Da’wa did not join the U.S. effort to overthrow Saddam
Hussein. Jafari previously served on the IGC;14 he was the first of the nine rotating
IGC presidents (August 2003). He was deputy president in Allawi’s interim
government. He was number 7 on the UIA slate and, on April 7, he became prime
minister. He is a leading candidate to remain as prime minister in the full-term
government being negotiated now.
Although there is no public evidence that Jafari was involved in any terrorist
activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa allegedly committed a May 1985
attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on the
U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. Lebanese Hizballah was founded by Lebanese
clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and Khomeini, and there continue to be
personal and ideological linkages between Hizballah and Da’wa (as well as with
SCIRI). The Hizballah activists who held U.S. hostages in Lebanon during the
1980s often attempted to link release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa
prisoners held by Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s. Some Da’wa members in
Iraq are guided by Lebanon’s Shiite cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was
a student of Baqr Al Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction. A relative of Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr — the 31
year old Moqtada Al Sadr (born in 1974) — is emerging as a major figure in Iraq.
He is the lone surviving son of the revered Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (the
Ayatollah was killed, along with his other two sons, by regime security forces in
1999 after he began agitating against Saddam’s government). Unlike the Hakim
clan, the Sadr clan remained in Iraq during Saddam’s rule and developed charity
networks to help poor Shiites, particularly in the renamed “Sadr City” area of
Baghdad. It is these poor Shiites (Sadr City has a population of about 2 million) that
form Sadr’s core support base. He is viewed by Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, and Da’wa
13 There are breakaway factions of Da’wa, the most prominent of which calls itself Islamic
Da’wa of Iraq, but these factions are believed to be far smaller than Da’wa.
14 Salim was killed May 17, 2004, in a suicide bombing while serving as IGC president.

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CRS-8
as a young firebrand who lacks religious and political weight. This view first took
hold on April 10, 2003, when his supporters allegedly stabbed to death Abd al-Majid
Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi, shortly after Khoi’s U.S.-backed
arrival in Iraq.15 However, the more established Shiite factions — as well as Iranian
diplomats — are increasingly forging ties to him because of his large following.
By participating fully in the December 15, 2005, elections, Sadr has further
distanced himself from his more anti-U.S., anti-establishment activities in 2003 and
2004. During that time, he used Friday prayer sermons in Kufa (near Najaf) and
newspaper publications to agitate for a U.S. withdrawal, and he did not seek to join
the IGC or the interim government. He formed the “Mahdi Army” militia in 2003,
as discussed below under “Militias.” In the January 30, 2005, elections, Sadr started
moving into the political process by permitting a dozen of his supporters to join the
UIA slate, even though he publicly denounced those elections as a product of U.S.
occupation. Three other pro-Sadr politicians won seats under a separate “Nationalist
Elites and Cadres List.” Pro-Sadr candidates also won pluralities in several southern
Iraqi provincial council elections and hold 6 seats on Basra’s 41-seat provincial
council. It is reported that three ministers in the interim government, including
minister of transportation Salam al-Maliki, are Sadr supporters. Sadr placed 30 of
his allies formally on the UIA slate for the December elections, likely giving his
faction a significant bloc of seats in the full-term Assembly.
Other Shiite Organizations. A smaller Shiite Islamist organization, the
Islamic Amal (Action) Organization, is headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi
Modarassi, a relatively moderate Shiite cleric. Islamic Amal’s power base is in
Karbala, and, operating under the SCIRI umbrella, it conducted attacks there against
regime organs in the 1980s. Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s
regime in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamic Amal won two seats in the January 30
election. Another Shiite grouping, called Fadilah, is part of the UIA coalition.
Loyal to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, it is a splinter group of Moqtada al-Sadr’s
faction and is perceived as somewhat more hardline (anti-U.S. presence) than SCIRI
or Da’wa. It holds some seats on several provincial councils in the Shiite provinces.
Other Shiite parties are operating in southern Iraq. One such grouping is derived
from the fighters who challenged Saddam Hussein’s forces in the southern marsh
areas, around the town of Amara, north of Basra. It goes by the name Hizbollah-Iraq
and it is headed by guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the
IGC. Hizbollah-Iraq apparently plays a major role in policing Amara and environs.
Another pro-Iranian grouping, which wields a militia, is called Thar Allah
(Vengeance of God).
Clinton Administration Strategy/Iraq Liberation Act. From the time of
Iraq’s defeat of the INC and INA in northern Iraq in August 1996 until 1998, the
Clinton Administration had little contact with the groups discussed above, believing
them too weak to topple Saddam. During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N.
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections led to growing congressional calls
15 Khoi had headed the Khoi Foundation, based in London.

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CRS-9
to overthrow Saddam. A congressional push for a regime change policy began with
an FY1998 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 105-174) and continued subsequently
(see “Appendix”).
Congressional support for a more active U.S. overthrow effort was encapsulated
in another bill introduced in 1998: the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA, P.L. 105-338,
October 31, 1998). The ILA was viewed as an expression of congressional support
for the concept, advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts, of promoting an Iraqi
insurgency using U.S. air-power. In the debate over the decision to go to war, Bush
Administration officials have cited the ILA as evidence of a bi-partisan consensus
that Saddam Hussein needed to be removed. President Clinton signed the
legislation, despite doubts about opposition capabilities. The ILA:
! stated that it should be the policy of the United States to “support
efforts” to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-
November 1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime
change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Section 8
states that the act should not be construed as authorizing the use of
U.S. military force to achieve regime change.
! gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million worth of
defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting
funds, to opposition groups designated by the Administration.
! did not specifically provide for its termination after Saddam Hussein
is removed from power. Section 7 of the ILA provides for
continuing post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi parties and
movements with “democratic goals.”
The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998). On February 5,
1999, President Clinton issued a determination (P.D. 99-13) making the following
seven opposition groups eligible to receive U.S. military assistance: INC; INA;
SCIRI; KDP; PUK; the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);16 and the
Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM),17 a relatively small party advocating
16 Because of its role in the eventual formation of the radical Ansar al-Islam group, the IMIK
did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally taken off the ILA
eligibility list.
17 In concert with a May 1999 INC visit to Washington D.C, the Clinton Administration
announced a draw down of $5 million worth of training and “non-lethal” defense articles
under the ILA. During 1999-2000, about 150 oppositionists underwent civil administration
training at Hurlburt air base in Florida, including Defense Department-run civil affairs
training to administer a post-Saddam government. The Hurlburt trainees were not brought
into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward the
end of the major combat phase of the war.

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CRS-10
the return of Iraq’s monarchy. However, the Clinton Administration decided that the
opposition was not sufficiently capable to merit weapons or combat training.
Bush Administration Policy
Even though several senior Bush Administration officials had been strong
advocates of a regime change policy, many of the long-standing questions about the
difficulty of that strategy remained18 and the Bush Administration initially did not
alter its predecessor’s decision not to provide lethal aid. Some accounts say that the
Administration was planning, prior to September 11, to confront Iraq militarily, but
President Bush has denied this. During its first year, Administration policy focused
on strengthening containment of Iraq, which the Administration said had eroded
substantially in the few preceding years. The cornerstone of the policy was to
achieve U.N. Security Council adoption of a “smart sanctions” plan — relaxing
U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to Iraq of purely civilian equipment19 in
exchange for improved international enforcement of the U.N. ban on exports to Iraq
of militarily-useful goods. After about a year of negotiations, the major features of
the plan were adopted by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1409 (May 14, 2002).
Post-September 11: Regime Change Through Military Action. Bush
Administration Iraq policy changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. The shift to an active regime change effort followed President
Bush’s State of the Union message on January 29, 2002. In that speech, given as the
U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down, he
characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North Korea). Some
U.S. officials, particularly deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the
United States needed to respond to the September 11, 2001, attacks by “ending
states” that support terrorist groups, including Iraq. Vice President Cheney visited
the Middle East in March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the
possibility of confronting Iraq militarily, although the leaders visited reportedly
urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed confrontation
with Iraq. Some accounts, including the book Plan of Attack, by Bob Woodward
(published in April 2004) say that then Secretary of State Powell and others were
concerned about the potential consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the
difficulties of building a democracy after major hostilities ended. Other accounts
include reported memoranda (the “Downing Street Memo”) by British intelligence
officials, based on conversations with U.S. officials. That memo reportedly said that
by mid-2002 the Administration had already decided to go to war against Iraq and
that it sought to develop information about Iraq to support that judgment. President
Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this. (On December 20, 2001, the
House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N.
weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.)
18 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, Mar. 11, 2002.
19 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.

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CRS-11
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent. The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence, some of which has proven incorrect, is under renewed debate in late
2005. The Administration added that regime change would yield the further benefit
of liberating the Iraqi people from a brutal dictator and promoting democracy in the
Middle East.
! WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials asserted the
following about Iraq’s WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to rebuild its
WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N. weapons
inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of Iraq’s
WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons against its
own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying
that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD against
the United States; and (3) that Iraq could transfer its WMD to
terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in potentially catastrophic
attacks in the United States or elsewhere. Critics noted that, under
the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S.
troops in the 1991 Gulf war. The U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group,
whose work formally terminated in December 2004, determined that
Iraq did not possess active WMD programs, although it retained the
intention and capabilities to reconstitute them. (See
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/])
! Links to Al Qaeda. Iraq was a designated state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-82, and was again designated after the 1990 invasion of
Kuwait. Although they did not assert that Saddam Hussein’s regime
had a direct connection to the September 11 attacks or the October
2001 anthrax mailings, senior U.S. officials said there was evidence
of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-
Al Qaeda militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq.
The final report of the 9/11 Commission found no evidence of a
“collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq and Al Qaeda.20
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat. Although it is not
certain when the Administration decided on an invasion, from mid-2002 until the
beginning of 2003 the Administration was building a force in the region that gave
the President that option. In concert, the Administration tried to build up and
broaden the Iraqi opposition. On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that,
in early 2002, President Bush authorized stepped up covert activities by the CIA and
special operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein. In August 2002, the State
and Defense Departments jointly invited six opposition groups (INC, the INA, the
KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM) to Washington, D.C. At the same time, the
Administration expanded its ties to several groups, particularly those composed
primarily of ex-military officers. The Administration also began training about 5,000
20 9/11 Commission Report, p. 66.

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CRS-12
oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,21 although only about 70 completed training at
an air base (Taszar) in Hungary.22 They served mostly as translators during the war.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002 to enforce its 16 WMD-
related resolutions on Iraq. The Administration subsequently agreed to give Iraq a
“final opportunity” to comply with all applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions
by supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002), which
gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and
Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection. Iraq reluctantly accepted it.
UNMOVIC Director Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director Mohammad al-Baradei subsequently briefed the Security Council on WMD
inspections that resumed November 27, 2002. They criticized Iraq for failing to pro-
actively cooperate, but also noted progress and said that Iraq might not have retained
any WMD. The Bush Administration asserted that Iraq was not cooperating with
Resolution 1441 because it was not pro-actively revealing information to
UNMOVIC and the IAEA. (A “comprehensive” September 2004 report of the Iraq
Survey Group, known as the “Duelfer report,”23 found no WMD stockpiles or
production but said that there was evidence that the regime retained the intention to
reconstitute WMD programs in the future. The U.S.-led WMD search ended
December 2004.24 The UNMOVIC search remains technically active.25)
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion. It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if
he determines that doing so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N.
Security Council resolutions. It passed the House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and
the Senate the following day (77-23). It was signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely. The United States, along with Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria, maintained that Iraq had not fundamentally decided to disarm.
At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain, Spain, and
Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted that diplomatic options to disarm
Iraq had failed. The following evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and
21 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,”
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 2002.
22 Williams, Daniel. “U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles,” Washington Post, Dec. 18,
2002.
23 The full text of the Duelfer report is available at [http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
iraq/cia93004wmdrpt.html].
24 For analysis of the former regime’s WMD and other abuses, see CRS Report RL32379,
Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
25 For information on UNMOVIC’s ongoing activities, see [http://www.unmovic.org/].

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CRS-13
his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British force assembled (a substantial
proportion of which remained afloat or in supporting roles). Some Iraqi units and
irregulars (“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional
tactics. No WMD was used, although Iraq did fire some ballistic missiles into
Kuwait; it is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than
150 km). The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein
appeared publicly with supporters that day in the Adhamiya district of Baghdad.
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition
U.S. goals for Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein has changed somewhat.
U.S. goals initially were to create a stable, model democracy that is at peace with its
neighbors, free of WMD, and an ally of the United States. However, according to its
November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Administration goal now is to create
an Iraq that can provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical
Islamic terrorists. The Administration believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will
still become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the
global war on terrorism. However, there is growing debate over whether U.S. policy
can succeed in establishing a stable and democratic Iraq at an acceptable cost.26 The
political transition in post-Saddam Iraq has moved forward, but insurgent violence
is still widespread.
Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the
fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly
grounded in Administration concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major
anti-Saddam factions and not necessarily produce democracy. These concerns had
led the Administration to oppose a move by the U.S.-backed anti-Saddam groups to
declare a provisional government in advance of the invasion. The Administration
initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction, with a staff of U.S.
government personnel to serve as administrators in Iraq’s ministries. He headed the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the
Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order. Garner and
his staff deployed in April 2003. The Administration’s immediate post-war policy
did not make use of an extensive State Department initiative, called the “Future of
Iraq Project,” that spent at least a year before the war drawing up plans for
administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam. Some Iraqis who participated are now
in Iraqi government positions. The State Department project, which cost $5 million,
had 15 working groups on major issues.27
26 For text of President Bush’s June 28, 2005, speech on Iraq, see [http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].
27 Information on the project, including summaries of the findings of its 17 working groups,
can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/dutyiraq/].

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CRS-14
Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi regime. He and
then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (now Ambassador to Iraq) organized a
meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying ethnicities and
ideologies. A subsequent meeting of over 250 notables was held in Baghdad
(April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to
name an interim administration. However, senior U.S. officials reportedly disliked
Garner’s lax approach, including tolerating Iraqis naming themselves as local leaders.
In May 2003, the Administration named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace
Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which subsumed
ORHA. The CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003). Bremer suspended Garner’s political transition
process and decided instead to appoint a 25- to 30-member Iraqi advisory body that
would not have sovereignty.
Iraq Governing Council. On July 13, 2003, Bremer named the 25-member
Iraq Governing Council (IGC). Its major figures included the leaders of the major
anti-Saddam factions mentioned above, contributing to the perception of the IGC as
lacking in legitimacy. However, some emerging figures were on it, including Ghazi
al-Yawar, a Sunni elder (Shammar tribe) and president of a Saudi-based technology
firm. (He is now a deputy president.) In September 2003, the IGC selected a 25-
member “cabinet” to run individual ministries, with roughly the same factional and
ethnic balance of the IGC itself (a slight majority of Shiite Muslims). The IGC began
a process of “de-Baathification” — a purge from government of about 30,000
persons who held any of the four top ranks of the Baath Party — and it authorized a
war crimes tribunal for Saddam and his associates. That function is now performed
by a 323-member “Supreme Commission on De-Baathification.” The IGC dissolved
on June 1, 2004, when an interim government (of Iyad al-Allawi) was named.
The Handover of Sovereignty and Run-up to Elections
The Bush Administration initially made the end of U.S. occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections for a
new government, tasks expected to be completed by late 2005. However, Ayatollah
Sistani and others agitated for an early restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and for direct
elections for a new government. In response, in November 2003, the United States
announced it would return sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004, and that elections
for a permanent government would be held by the end of 2005.
Interim Constitution/Transition Roadmap. The CPA decisions on
transition roadmap were incorporated into an interim constitution, the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), which was drafted by a committee dominated by the
major anti-Saddam factions and signed on March 8, 2004.28 It provided for the
following:
28 The text of the TAL can be obtained from the CPA website [http://cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html].

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CRS-15
! Elections by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly, with election laws aimed to have “women constitute no
less than 25% of the members of the National Assembly.” A
permanent constitution would be drafted by August 15, 2005, and
put to a national referendum by October 15, 2005. National
elections for a permanent government, under the new constitution (if
it passed), would be held by December 15, 2005. The new
government would take office by December 31, 2005.
! Any three provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds
majority. If that happened, a new draft was to be developed and
voted on by October 15, 2006. In that case, the December 15, 2005,
elections would have been for another interim National Assembly.
! The Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government.” They were given powers to contradict or alter the
application of Iraqi law in their provinces, and their peshmerga
militia were allowed to operate.
! Islam was designated “a source,” but not the primary source, of law,
and no law could be passed that contradicts such rights as peaceful
assembly; free expression; equality of men and women before the
law; and the right to strike and demonstrate.
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover. The TAL did not
directly address the formation of the interim government that assumed sovereignty.
Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan for doing so; that plan involved
the selection of a national assembly through nationwide “caucuses,” not elections.
After considering other options, such as the holding of a traditional assembly, the
United States tapped U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to select that government;29
maneuvering by senior politicians led to their domination of it. The interim
government was named on June 1, 2004, and began work immediately; the IGC
dissolved. The formal handover of sovereignty occurred on June 28, 2004, two days
before the advertised June 30 date, partly to confound insurgents.
The interim government, whose powers were addressed in an addendum to the
TAL, had a largely ceremonial president (Ghazi al-Yawar) and two deputy presidents
(the Da’wa’s Jafari and the KDP’s Dr. Rowsch Shaways). Iyad al-Allawi was Prime
Minister, with executive power, and there was a deputy prime minister and 26
ministers. Six ministers were women, and the ethnicity mix was roughly the same
as in the IGC. The key defense and interior ministries were headed by Sunni Arabs.
U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate. The
Administration asserts that it has consistently sought international backing for its
post-war efforts, and it has supported an increase in the U.N. role since late 2003.
Resolution 1483 (May 6, 2003) recognized the CPA as an occupying authority;
29 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Envoy Urges U.N.-Chosen Iraqi Government,” Washington Post.
Apr. 15, 2004.

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CRS-16
provided for a U.N. special representative to Iraq; and it “call[ed] on” governments
to contribute forces for stabilization. Resolution 1500 (August 14, 2003) established
U.N. Assistance Mission - Iraq (UNAMI).30 The size of UNAMI in Iraq is rising to
a target level of about 300 people. In a further attempt to satisfy the requirements of
several major nations for greater U.N. backing of the coalition military presence, the
United States obtained agreement on Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003), formally
authorizing a “multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.] command.”
Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further. It
endorsed the handover of sovereignty, reaffirmed the responsibilities of the interim
government, and spelled out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq.
It also gave the United Nations a major role in helping the interim government
prepare for the January 30, 2005 elections and authorized a coalition component
force to protect U.N. personnel and facilities. Primarily because of Sistani’s
opposition to the TAL’s provision that would allow the Kurds a veto over a
permanent constitution, it did not explicitly endorse the TAL. Resolution 1546 also
stipulated that
! U.S. officials would no longer have final authority on non-security
issues. The interim government and the elected government could
have amended the TAL or revoked CPA decrees, but they did so on
only a few occasions.
! The coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the request of the
Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this
resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire when
a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and that the
mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so requests.”
The Security Council reviewed the mandate in advance of the June
8, 2005 deadline, and no alterations to it were made. However, on
November 11, 2005, in advance of the termination of the mandate,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1637 extending the
coalition military mandate to December 31, 2006, unless earlier
requested by the Iraqi government. There will also be a review of
the mandate on June 15, 2006.
! The relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is “coordination and
partnership,” as spelled out in an annexed exchange of letters
between the United States and Iraq. The Iraqi government does not
have a veto over coalition operations, and the coalition retains the
ability to take prisoners. Iraqi forces are “a principal partner in the
multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified [American]
command pursuant to the provisions of [Resolution 1511] and any
subsequent resolutions.”
30 On August 12, 2004, its mandate was renewed for one year and on August 11, 2005
(Resolution 1619), for another year.

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CRS-17
! An agreement on the status of foreign forces (Status of Forces
Agreement, SOFA) in Iraq would be deferred to an elected Iraqi
government. No such agreement has been signed, to date, and U.S.
forces operate in Iraq and use its facilities (such as Balad air base)
under temporary memoranda of understanding. However, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld told journalists on July 27, 2005, that U.S.
military lawyers are working with the Iraqis on a SOFA or other
arrangements that would cover U.S. operations in Iraq after a
permanent government takes over.
! There would be a 100-seat “Interim National Council” to serve as
an interim parliament. The body, selected during August 13-18,
2004,31 did not have legislative power but was able to veto
government decisions with a 2/3 majority. The council held some
televised “hearings,” including questioning ministers. Its work
ended after the National Assembly was elected in January 2005.
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq. The following were additional
consequences of the sovereignty handover, designed in part to lower the profile of
U.S. influence over post-handover Iraq.
! As of the June 28, 2004, handover of sovereignty, the state of
occupation ceased. Subsequently, a U.S. Ambassador (John
Negroponte) established U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first
time since January 1991. Negroponte’s philosophy was to generally
refrain from directly intervening in internal Iraqi debates. A U.S.
embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with about
1,100 U.S. personnel.32 Negroponte was succeeded in July 2005 by
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was previously Ambassador to
Afghanistan and who takes a more activist approach. (An FY2005
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provides $592 million of
$658 million requested to construct a new embassy in Baghdad and
to fund embassy operations.) In August 2005, Secretary of State
Rice named a new State Department-based chief coordinator for
Iraq; former deputy chief of mission in post-Saddam Baghdad,
James Jeffrey.
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB). Iraq also was given responsibility for close-out of
31 Tavernise, Sabrina. “In Climax To a Tumultuous 4-Day Debate, Iraq Chooses An
Assembly,” New York Times, Aug. 19, 2004.
32 See CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, by Susan B. Epstein.

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CRS-18
the “oil-for-food program.”33 Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2004)
ended that program as of November 21, 2003.
! Some CPA functions, such as the advising of local Iraqi
governments, local Iraqi governing councils, and U.S. military units,
were retained as part of an “Iraq Reconstruction and Management
Office (IRMO),” headed since June 2005 by Daniel Speckhard,
About 150 U.S. civilian personnel work out of four major centers
around Iraq (satellites of the U.S. Embassy) — Hilla, Basra, Kirkuk,
and Mosul, and 15-20 of them report to IRMO. A separate “Project
Contracting Office (PCO),” headed by Brig. Gen. William McCoy,
reports to the Defense Department; it funds infrastructure projects
such as roads, power plants, and school renovations.
! U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-
7, CJTF-7) became a multi-national headquarters “Multinational
Force-Iraq, MNF-I,” headed by four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey.
Lt. Gen. John Vines, due to leave Iraq in January 2006, has been
operational commander of U.S. forces as head of the “Multinational
Corps-Iraq.”
January 30, 2005 Elections/New Government. On January 30, 2005,
elections were held for a transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and
the Kurdish regional assembly. As noted above, the UIA won a slim majority (140)
of the 275 seats. Other seat allocations are contained in a table in CRS Report
RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman. The
new government took shape during March-May 2005, although U.S. officials said it
was not sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority.
! The Assembly convened on March 16 and chose Sunni
parliamentarian Hajim al-Hassani as speaker (March 29). He was
a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party, which boycotted the election,
but he ran on Ghazi al-Yawar’s slate. Shiite politician Hussein
Shahristani and Kurdish leader Arif Tayfour were chosen deputy
speakers.
! On April 6, in keeping with a UIA-Kurdish agreement, PUK leader
Talabani was selected President. His two deputies are SCIRI
official Adel Abdul Mahdi and Ghazi al-Yawar. They obtained the
required two-thirds Assembly vote. The three named Ibrahim al-
Jafari as Prime Minister; he was confirmed the next day.
! On April 28, with the one-month deadline for naming a cabinet
approaching, Jafari received near-unanimous Assembly approval for
a cabinet of 32 ministers and three deputy prime ministers.
However, five cabinet positions and a deputy prime ministership
33 For information on that program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program,
Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.

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CRS-19
were not initially filled, pending an agreement to appoint additional
Sunnis. Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch Shaways were named as
deputy prime ministers.
! On May 7, Jafari continued filling out the cabinet by appointing the
five remaining permanent ministers (2 of which were Sunnis) and
one (Sunni) deputy prime minister. One of the Sunnis was Defense
Minister, Sadoun al-Dulaymi, a former official in Saddam Hussein’s
security service who broke with the regime in 1984 and lived in
exile in Saudi Arabia. Another Sunni is Minister of Industry.
However, the other Sunni ministers hold slots they consider
relatively unimportant, such as the ministries of culture and of
women’s affairs. Of the 32 ministers, 16 are Shiites, 8 are Kurds, 6
are Sunnis, one is Christian, and one is Turkoman.. Six are women.
One deputy prime ministership was left vacant.
The new government has received some diplomatic support, even though most
of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination of the regime.
As of late 2005, there were 46 foreign missions in Iraq, including most European and
Arab countries. At a June 22, 2005, international conference on Iraq held in
Brussels, Jordan and Egypt pledged to appoint ambassadors to Baghdad. Perhaps in
an effort to derail that effort, on July 2, insurgents kidnaped and killed Egypt’s top
diplomat in Baghdad; he was to be appointed the ambassador there. Jordan
nonetheless did go forward with appointing an ambassador. On July 5, insurgents
attacked and wounded Bahrain’s top diplomat in Iraq. In late July, insurgents
captured and killed Algeria’s two highest ranking envoys in Iraq, prompting Algeria
to pull out. In November, two Moroccan embassy employees were killed and
Oman’s embassy was shot at. In September 2005, Kuwait pledged to re-establish
full diplomatic relations with the new government.
Drafting the Permanent Constitution. The drafting and adoption on
October 15, 2005, of the constitution is discussed further in CRS Report RS21968,
Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman. The major
provisions of the final draft adopted on October 15 are the following:
! Islam is “a main source of law,” but each sect and family has the
option of using civil or Islamic law (Sharia) in domestic situations.
Many Iraqi women fear that their male elders will decide on use of
Sharia courts, which might deprive them of substantial rights on
matters such as divorce and inheritances. The 25% electoral goal for
women is retained (as a permanent feature), and the concept of equal
rights for men and women is stated.
! The draft’s provision for a weak central government (“federalism”)
continues to provoke Sunni opposition. The draft, at the behest of
the Kurds and Shiites, whose regions have substantial oil reserves,
allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous
“regions” with their own regional governments, internal security
forces, and a large role in controlling revenues from any new energy

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CRS-20
discoveries. The Sunnis oppose this concept because their region
lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues.
The constitution was approved on October 15; Sunni opposition achieved a
two-thirds “no” vote in two provinces but not the three needed to defeat the
constitution. It takes effect after a new government is seated following the December
15 election. However, under a last-minute agreement before the October 15
referendum, the government to be elected is to name another constitutional
commission to propose amendments to the constitution within four months of the
seating of that government, to be approved by an Assembly majority and then voted
on in another referendum to be held two months later. U.S. officials hope the
amendments will satisfy Sunni concerns on the formation of regions and the powers
of regional governments. However, in a possible sign of difficulty, SCIRI leader
Hakim said on January 11, 2006, that he would not support major amendments to the
constitution.
December 15, 2005, Election. The December 15, 2005, election for a four-
year National Assembly and executive also is discussed further in CRS Report
RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman.
That vote was also mostly peaceful, and Sunnis voted in large numbers mostly for
Sunni slates. Iraqi officials say the certified results will be ready by mid-January
2006. Once the Assembly convenes, it will name a president (with a two-thirds
majority). The President will then name a Prime Minister, who in term names a
cabinet. The Prime Minister and cabinet need confirmation by a simple Assembly
majority. On the basis of preliminary results, the UIA appears to have won nearly a
majority of the 275 seats, but it and the Kurds might fall just short of the two-thirds
of seats needed to reconstitute their bilateral governing alliance. The two might have
to reach out to some Sunni or other blocs to form a government, and post-election
bargaining is said to be intense.
Democracy-Building and Local Governance. The United States and its
coalition partners have also been trying to build civil society and democracy at the
local level. U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the past 30 years,
with a free press and the ability to organize politically. According to a State
Department report to Congress in October 2005 detailing how the FY2004
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) is being spent (“2207 Report”), a total of
$945 million has been allocated for democracy building. An additional $56 million
is allocated for related “rule of law” programs, and another $159 million is allocated
to build and secure courts. About $360 million, largely for democracy and rule of
law activities, was requested in the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations
request. The conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) fully funds the Administration
request except for about $29 million in demining and related funds. It also funds a
Senate amendment (S.Amdt. 1299, Kennedy) providing $28 million each to the
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for
democracy promotion in Iraq. Both those organizations, as well as the U.S. Institute
of Peace and other groups, have been implementing U.S.-funded democracy-
building programs in Iraq.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of

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CRS-21
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), activities funded, aside from
assistance for the January 30 elections, include the following.
! Several projects attempting to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
! The “Community Action Program”: local reconstruction projects
such as school refurbishment that are voted on by village and town
representatives. About 225 such projects have been completed thus
far.
! Assistance to local governments on budgeting, finance, taxation,
record computerization, and 30,000 “civic dialogue activities.”
! An orientation manual for members of the National Assembly;
independent media promotion; and women’s democracy initiatives,
including candidate training, anti-violence programs, and political
participation.
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, and U.S. officials have sought to ensure that there are adequate resources
for governance and reconstruction. Since September 2004, the U.S. reconstruction
process has shifted resources to smaller scale projects that could be completed
quickly and employ Iraqis, such as sewer lines and city roads. IRMO director Daniel
Speckhard said on December 9 that Iraq’s economy is growing about 4% and that
about 30,000 new businesses were registered in Iraq over the past year. On the other
hand, U.S. officials acknowledge that the difficult security environment has slowed
reconstruction. Sanitation, health care, and education have improved statistically.34
Lines for gasoline often last many hours, and the government has said it will continue
to subsidize gas purchases, virtually ensuring demand growth. On the other hand,
U.S. officials largely confirmed press reports in January 2006 (Washington Post,
January 2, 2006) that the Administration will not propose additional Iraq
reconstruction funds in its budget request for 2007, relying instead on foreign
donations and Iraqi government revenues to continue reconstruction work.
The Oil Industry. As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding of the oil
industry has received substantial U.S. attention. Before the war, it was widely
asserted by Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only
to those of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction costs. The oil
industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led invasion (only about
nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of insurgents. Insurgents
have particularly focused their attacks on pipelines in northern Iraq; those lines feed
34 Vick, Karl. “Children Pay Cost of Iraq’s Chaos,” Washington Post, Nov. 21, 2004.

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CRS-22
the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that is loaded at Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
This has kept production and exports below expected levels, although high world oil
prices have more than compensated for the output shortfall. The United States
imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude oil from Iraq.
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries. Iraq’s interim government has contracted for a study of the extent of Iraq’s
oil reserves, and it has contracted with Royal Dutch/Shell to formulate a blueprint to
develop the gas sector. Poland reportedly is negotiating with Iraq for possible
investments in Iraq’s energy sector. In December 2005, it was reported that a
Norwegian company, DNO, has contracted with the Kurdish administrative region
to explore for oil near the northern city of Zakho, raising the concerns of Iraq’s Arabs
who view this as a move by the Kurds to control some Iraqi oil revenues.
Table 1. Some Key Indicators
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Oil
Exports
Oil
Oil
Revenue
Production
Production
Exports
(pre-
Revenue
Revenue
(as of
(1/06)
(pre-war)
(1/06)
war)
(2004)
(2005)
1/11/06)
1.81 million
$17
$23.5
$400
barrels per day
2.5 mbd
1.24 mbd
2.2 mbd
billion
billion
million
(mbd)
Electricity
Baghdad
Pre-War
(hrs. per day,
(MWh)
Current
1/06)
National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000
83,000
3.7
10
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
January 11, 2006. Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the
1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003). That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
International Donations. A World Bank estimate, released in October 2003,
said Iraq reconstruction would require about $56 billion during 2004-2007, including
$21 billion in U.S. pledges. At an October 2003 donors’ conference in Madrid,
donors pledged about $13.6 billion, including $8 billion from foreign governments
and $5.5 billion in loans from the World Bank and IMF. Of the funds pledged by
other foreign governments, about $3.5 billion has been disbursed. Included in that
figure is about $436 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, which were
disbursed in 2004 after Iraq cleared up $81 million in arrears to the Fund dating from
Saddam Hussein’s regime.

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CRS-23
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction. The U.S. military has attempted
to promote reconstruction to deprive the insurgency of popular support. A key tool
in this effort is the funding of small projects to promote trust among the population.
Called the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), the DOD funds are
controlled and disbursed by U.S. commanders at the tactical level. The total amount
of CERP funds for Iraq for FY2005 was $718 million, spent on 7,100 different
projects. Additional funds for this program are provided by the Iraqi government,
and the program employs about 25,000 Iraqis. A similar program began in October
2004, called the Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Projects
(CHHRP). About $86 million in FY2005 was allocated for this program. These
funds are for small projects, such as water and sewage repairs, mainly in restive
Sunni towns such as Ramadi and Samarra, but also in the Kurdish areas.

Sector Allocations for Reconstruction. Three
supplemental
appropriations include funds for Iraq reconstruction. An FY2003 supplemental, P.L.
108-11, appropriated about $2.5 billion for Iraq reconstruction. An FY2004
supplemental appropriations (P.L. 108-106) provided about $18.5 billion for Iraq
reconstruction (not including about $50 billion appropriated for U.S. military costs).
The two total $20.912 billion available for reconstruction. Of those funds, $17.768
billion has been obligated, and, of that, $12.6 billion has been disbursed as of
January 11, 2006. The October 2005 “2207 report” gives sector allocations:
! $5.018 billion: Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.247 billion: Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society
! $945 million for Democracy building;
! $4.31 billion: Electricity Sector;
! $1.723 billion: Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.146 billion: Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $509 million: Transportation and Communications;
! $334 million: Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $786 million: Health Care;
! $795 million: Private Sector Employment Development (includes
$352 million for debt relief for Iraq);
! $363 million: Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy, and
Governance (includes $99 million for education, and $25 million for
“human rights” programs and “civic programs)”; and
! $213 million: USAID administrative expenses.
As noted above, the conference report on the FY2006 foreign aid appropriation
fully funds the Administration request of about $380 million, including about $56
million for democracy building and $26 million for police training, although about
$29 million for de-mining costs is not included.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions. The Bush Administration has lifted most U.S.
sanctions on Iraq, beginning with Presidential Determinations issued under
authorities provided by P.L. 108-7 (appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11
(FY2003 supplemental):

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CRS-24
! On July 30, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order ending
the package of sanctions imposed on Iraq following the August 2,
1990 invasion of Kuwait. Those measures were in Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), banning U.S.
trade with and investment in Iraq and freezing Iraq’s assets in the
United States. The Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L.
101-513, signed November 5, 1990) reinforced those orders.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to have duty-free tariff treatment for entry into the United
States.
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72). Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of munitions list items (arms and related equipment
and services). Exports of dual use items (items that can have
military applications) are no longer subject to strict licensing
procedures.35 The July 30, 2004, order did not unfreeze any assets
in the United States of the former regime.
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removes Iraq from a named
list of countries for which the United States is required to withhold
a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to international
organizations for their programs in the named countries.
Debt Relief/WTO Membership. The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt built up during the regime of Saddam
Hussein. The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not including reparations
dating to the first Persian Gulf war. On November 21, 2004, the “Paris Club” of 19
industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes them.
However, with the exception of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf states that supported Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war have not to date firmly agreed to write-off Iraq’s
approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar). On December 17, 2004, the United States signed an
agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1 billion debt to the United States;
that debt consisted of principal and interest from about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi
agricultural credits from the 1980s.36 On December 13, 2004, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession talks with Iraq.
35 A May 7, 2003, executive order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act (P.L. 102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that
export technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.
36 For more information, see CRS Report RS21765, Iraq: Debt Relief, by Martin Weiss.

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CRS-25
Political and Security Challenges,
Responses, and Options
In a series of speeches in late 2005, President Bush has cited successful
elections and the growth of the Iraqi security forces to assert that U.S. policy will
produce a stable Iraq. Security challenges and U.S. responses are discussed below.
The Insurgent Challenge
The Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. and Iraqi forces has defied most
U.S. expectations in intensity and duration. Although hesitant to assess the size of
the insurgency, U.S. commanders say that insurgents probably number approximately
12,000-20,000. Some Iraqi (intelligence) officials have publicly advanced higher
estimates of about 40,000 active insurgents, helped by another 150,000 persons in
supporting roles. About 15,000 suspected insurgents are now in prison in Iraq.
Insurgent attacks numbered about 100 per day during most of 2005.
The insurgents, believed to be loosely coordinated at the city or province level,
have failed to derail the political transition.37 However, they have succeeded, to some
extent, in painting the Iraqi government as dependent on the United States for its
survival. Targets include not only U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security forces
but also Iraqi civilians working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors and aid
workers, oil export and gasoline distribution facilities, and water, power, and other
infrastructure facilities.
As discussed in the Administration’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq”
issued on November 30, 2005, many of the insurgents are motivated by opposition
to perceived U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite rulership. Others want to
bring the Baath Party back into power, although, according to many experts, some
might settle for a large Sunni role in governance with or without the Baath. Still
others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters, either foreign or Iraqi, that want to defeat the
United States and spread radical Islam throughout the region. Increasingly, the
violence is taking on a sectarian character, with bodies of groups of Sunni or Shiite
civilians often found bound and gagged, dumped in rivers or fields, apparent victims
of attack or retaliation. This has led some experts to assert that Iraq is already
experiencing a low level civil war. The following major Iraqi (not foreign) insurgent
factions are as follows.
! The Islamic Army of Iraq. An Iraqi group that conducts a wide
range of attacks and has captured several Western hostages.
! Muhammad’s Army. This faction is said to be led by radical Sunni
cleric Abdullah al-Janabi, who is from Fallujah.
! The Al Haq Army. Active in and around Ramadi.
! The 1920 Revolution Brigades. Has seized some foreign hostages.
37 For further information, see Baram, Amatzia. “Who Are the Insurgents?” U.S. Institute
of Peace, Special Report 134, Apr. 2005.

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CRS-26
The U.N. Security Council has adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency.
On August 4, 2005, it adopted Resolution 1618, condemning the “terrorist attacks
that have taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on Iraqi election workers,
constitution drafters, and foreign diplomats in Iraq.
Sunni Clerics and Political Relations with the Insurgency. Many Iraqi
insurgents appear to respect a network of Sunni Islamist clerics or politicians that
oppose the U.S. presence and have not participated in any governing structures.
These clerics belong to an organization called the Muslim Clerics Association
(MCA), which claims to represent 3,000 Sunni mosques countrywide. The MCA is
led by Harith al-Dhari, who heads the large Umm al-Qura mosque in Baghdad, and
Abd al-Salam al-Qubaysi, leader of the Abu Hanifa mosque in Baghdad. The MCA
has, on occasion, succeeded in persuading insurgent groups to release Western or
other hostages. It urged a boycott of the January 2005 elections and a “no” vote on
the constitution, although it did not urge a Sunni boycott of the December 15
election. In a sign of possible shifting of position, Dhari and Qubaysi attended the
November 2005 Conference on Iraq in Cairo with other Iraqi factions, although they
achieved inclusion in the final statement of that conference passages that said that
“resistance is legitimate” and that there should be a timetable for U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq.38 On the other hand, suggesting that the MCA is assisting insurgents, U.S.
forces raided the Umm al-Qura mosque in early January 2006 reportedly
investigating allegations that terrorist attacks were being planned there.
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi.39 A relatively small but important component
of the insurgency are non-Iraqi fighters. A study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies released in September 2005 said that about 3,500 foreign
fighters are in Iraq, which would represent just under 20% of the overall insurgency
if the U.S. military estimate of 20,000 total insurgents is correct. According to the
study, the foreign fighters come mostly from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt, with Saudis constituting only about 350 of the 3,000 estimated
foreign fighters. The Department of Defense said on October 20, 2005, that 312
foreign fighters had been captured in Iraq since April 2005.
A major portion of the foreign insurgent contingent is commanded by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, a 39-year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan during the 1980s alongside other Arab volunteers for the “jihad” against
the Soviet Union. Zarqawi came to Iraq in late 2001 after escaping the U.S. war
effort in Afghanistan along with several hundred Arab fighters. He made his way to
northern Iraq, after transiting Iran and Saddam-controlled Iraq, eventually taking
refuge with a Kurdish Islamist faction called Ansar al-Islam,40 near the town of
38 Text of final statement of the conference is online at [http://www.almendhar.com/english_
7873?news.aspx].
39 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?, by Kenneth Katzman.
40 Ansar al-Islam originated in 1998 as a radical splinter faction of a Kurdish Islamic group
called the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK). Based in Halabja, the IMIK
publicized the effects of Baghdad’s Mar. 1988 chemical attack on that city. Ansar is named
by the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).

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CRS-27
Khurmal.41 His group occasionally clashed with PUK fighters around Halabja. After
the Ansar enclave was destroyed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Zarqawi fled to the
Sunni Arab areas of Iraq and began using other organizational names, including the
Association of Unity and Jihad, which was named as an FTO on October 15, 2004.
Since then, as he has affiliated with bin Laden, he has changed his organization’s
name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in Mesopotamia” (Iraq’s name before its formation in the
1920s). It is named as an FTO, assuming that designation from the earlier Unity and
Jihad organizational title.42 Press reports said that U.S. forces almost caught him near
Ramadi in February 2005, and his aides posted web messages that he was seriously
wounded in a subsequent U.S. raid but then regained health.

Zarqawi’s faction has been the subject of substantial U.S. counter-efforts
because of its alleged perpetration of “terrorist” attacks — suicide and other attacks
against both combatant and civilian targets. Some of the attacks attributed to this
faction include the bombings in Baghdad of U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel
(August 19, 2003)43 and the August 2003 bombing that killed SCIRI leader
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim. The group, and related factions, have also kidnaped a
total of over 250 foreigner workers, and killed about 40 of those. There is some
speculation that Zarqawi’s faction, or a related group, might have committed the
August 19, 2005, failed rocket attack in the Jordanian port of Aqaba against two U.S.
warships docked there, as well as the November 10, 2005, Western-owned hotels in
Amman, Jordan. Increasingly, the group has been targeting Iraqi Shiite festivals and
ceremonies, most likely hoping to provoke civil conflict between Sunnis and Shiites;
in September 2005, Zarqawi declared war on Iraq’s Shiites, according to a website
attributed to his followers. However, this tactic reportedly has caused tensions and
occasional armed clashes with Iraqi insurgent factions that oppose attacks on purely
civilian targets. U.S. forces have sought to exploit these differences by attempting
to engage Iraqi insurgent factions and persuade them to cooperate with U.S. efforts
against the foreign fighters, reportedly with some success.44
An offshoot of Zarqawi’s group is called “Ansar al-Sunna,” or Partisans of the
Traditions [of the Prophet]. This group reportedly blends both foreign volunteers and
Iraqi insurgents. Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for the December 21, 2004,
attack on Camp Marez in Mosul that killed 22, including 14 U.S. soldiers, and has
been responsible for several subsequent attacks particularly in the Mosul area.
41 Chivers, C.J. “Repulsing Attack By Islamic Militants, Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities,”
New York Times, Dec. 6, 2002.
42 In early 2004, U.S. forces captured a letter purportedly written by Zarqawi asking bin
Laden’s support for Zarqawi’s insurgent activities in Iraq and an Islamist website broadcast
a message in October 2004, reportedly deemed authentic by U.S. agencies, that Zarqawi has
formally allied with Al Qaeda. There have also been recent press reports that bin Laden has
asked Zarqawi to plan operations outside Iraq. For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/
rls/31694.htm].
43 Among the dead in the latter bombing was the U.N. representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, and it prompted an evacuation of U.N. personnel from Iraq.
44 Filkins, Dexter and Sabrina Tavernise. U.S. Said to Meet With Insurgents, Exploiting
Rifts. New York Times, January 7, 2006.

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Outside Support. Numerous accounts say that insurgent leaders are using
Syria as a base to funnel money and weapons to their fighters in Iraq.45 In September
2005, U.S. ambassador Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of allowing training camps
in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to gather and train before going into Iraq. These reports
have led to U.S. warnings to and imposition of additional U.S. sanctions against
Syria and to the U.S. Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of some suspected
financiers of the insurgency. Syria has tried to deflect the criticism by moves such
as the February 2005 turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi to Iraqi
authorities. Other assessments say the insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive
funding from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,46 where
a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.
On the other hand, in January 2006 senior U.S. commanders said they had been
receiving increased cooperation from Syria and Saudi Arabia to prevent insurgent
flows across those borders.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed in August 2005 that some explosives
from Iran had been intercepted in Iraq, although he did not assert that the shipment
was authorized by Iran’s government. Others believe that outside support is minimal
and that the insurgents have ample supplies of arms and explosives; according to the
Defense Department, about 250,000 tons of munitions remain around in Iraq in arms
depots not secured after the regime fell. For more information, see CRS Report
RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman.
U.S. Responses to the Insurgency
At times, such as after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, some
U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the insurgency would be defeated, only
to see the violence continue. As outlined in the “National Strategy for Victory in
Iraq,” the Administration continues to try to refine its stabilization strategy. As part
of that refinement, the Administration is increasingly focused on bringing Sunnis into
the political process.
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy. The Administration is now pursuing a
strategy called “clear, hold, and build.” The strategy intends to create and expand
stable enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces and U.S. civilian reconstruction experts
in areas cleared of insurgents. The strategy is intended to prevent re-infiltration by
insurgents as well as to build hope among the Sunni population for improved
conditions. In conjunction with the new U.S. strategy, the Administration is forming
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs, adapted from a concept used
in Afghanistan, will be composed of about 70 to 100 U.S. diplomats and military
personnel to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as the provincial councils
(elected in the January 2005 elections), representatives of the Iraqi provincial
governors, and local ministry representatives. Thus far, PRTs have been inaugurated
45 Blanford, Nicholas. “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
21, 2004.
46 Krane, Jim. “U.S. Officials: Iraq Insurgency Bigger.” Associated Press report published
in the Philadelphia Inquirer. July 9, 2004; Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker. “Estimates
By U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,” New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.

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in Nineveh and Babylon provinces. A total of 15 PRTs (nearly one per province) are
planned by July 2006. (The PRT concept is a follow-on to the Provincial
Reconstruction Development Committees set up during July - October 2005,
according to the October 2005 “2207 Report.”47 During April-July 2005, the United
States made available $241 million — $80 million in Commanders’ Emergency
Response Program, CERP, funds and $161 million in USAID-administered
Community Action Program and Local Governance Program funds — to lay the
groundwork for this initiative.)
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations. The U.S. stabilization
strategy requires continued combat operations against the insurgency. About
159,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq, with about another 50,000 troops in Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf region supporting OIF, and another 21,000 coalition partner forces in
Iraq from 26 other countries. In a January 4, 2006, speech, President Bush confirmed
reports that U.S. troop levels would be reduced in early 2006 to about 135,000,
slightly below the 138,000 pre-election “baseline” figure. Parts of two U.S. brigades
will not deploy.
A major focus of U.S. combat remains Anbar Province, which includes the
cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. About 40,000 U.S. troops are in Anbar alone. In
April 2004, after the city fell under insurgent control (it was run by a “mujahedin
shura,” or council of insurgents), U.S. commanders contemplated routing insurgents
from the city but, concerned about collateral damage and U.S. casualties, they agreed
to allow former Iraqi officers to patrol it. This solution quickly unraveled and, as
2004 progressed, about two dozen other Sunni-inhabited towns, including Baqubah,
Balad, Tikrit, Mosul, Ramadi, Samarra, and Tal Affar, as well as the small towns
south of Baghdad, fell under insurgent influence.
U.S. forces, joined by Iraqi forces, began operations in September 2004 to expel
insurgents. Most notable was “Operation Phantom Fury” on Fallujah (November
2004), involving 6,500 U.S. Marines and 2,000 Iraqi troops. Since then, over two
thirds of the city’s 250,000 have now returned, and some reconstruction has begun
there, using U.S. funds from a $246 million “post-battle reconstruction
initiative,”48drawn from funds appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-
106). However, some insurgents reportedly have re-infiltrated the city and U.S.
casualties continue in or near Fallujah.
Since May 2005, and particularly in the run-up to the December 15 elections,
U.S. (and Iraqi) forces have conducted operations (for example Operations Matador,
Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and Ram) to clear
contingents of foreign fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities along the
Euphrates River. A major focus has been to combat foreign fighters that entered Iraq
near the towns of Qaim, Husaybah, and Ubaydi, and had filtered down the Euphrates
valley to Ramadi, Hit and Haditha, or north into Tal Affar.
47 Quarterly report mandated by Section 2207 of P.L. 108-106, FY2004 Supplemental.
48 These funds are derived from the FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106), which provided
about $18.6 for Iraq reconstruction.

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Casualties. As of January 11, 2006, about 2,210 U.S. forces and about 200
coalition partner soldiers have died in OIF, as well as over 100 U.S. civilians
working on contract to U.S. institutions in Iraq. Of U.S. deaths, about 2,100 have
occurred since President Bush declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq
on May 1, 2003, and about 1,900 of the U.S. deaths were by hostile action. About
2,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces, which are analyzed below, have been
killed in action, to date. On December 12, 2005, President Bush cited press accounts
that about 30,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed to date.
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)49
A major pillar of U.S. policy is to equip and train Iraqi security forces (ISF) that
could secure Iraq by themselves. President Bush stated in his June 28, 2005 speech,
“Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand
down.”50 The conference report on the FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L.
109-13) required a Defense Department report to Congress on securing Iraq,
particularly the building of the ISF. The most recent such report, released October
2005, entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” generally reiterates U.S.
official statements of progress in Iraq and contains details of the training of the ISF.
The Department of Defense reports that, as of January 11, 2006, there are
223,700 total members of the ISF: 105,700 “operational” military forces under Iraq’s
Ministry of Defense and 118,000 police/lighter forces “trained and equipped” under
the Ministry of Interior. Those in units are organized into about 125 battalions. The
total force goal is 325,000 ISF by August 2007. However, police-related components
include possibly tens of thousands (according to the GAO on March 15, 2005) who
are absent-without-leave and might have deserted. The police generally live with
their families, rather than in barracks, and are therefore hard to account for.
The readiness of the ISF are subject to debate. In October 2005, U.S.
commanders clarified their assessments of readiness of these forces as follows (each
battalion has about 700 personnel):
! Battalions in Category One (fully independent): 1 (military only,
down from 3 reported at this level in June 2005);
! Battalions in Category Two (Iraqi unit capable of taking the lead in
operations): 45 (43 military and 2 police commando battalions);
! Battalions in Category Three: (Iraqi unit capable of fighting
alongside U.S./partner forces): 80 (54 military and 26 police
battalions); and
! Category Four: unit not yet formed.
49 For additional information, see CRS Report RS22093, Iraq’s New Security Forces: The
Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences, by Jeremy Sharp.
50 Speech by President Bush can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/
2005/06/print/20050628-7.html].

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According to this assessment, about 35,000 ISF (both military and police)
would be in the top two categories (in the lead or fully independent). U.S. officials
and reports praise their performance in each of the three election days in 2005. U.S.
commanders also cite as evidence of their growing confidence the September 2005
offensive in Tal Afar in which Iraqi units were in the lead, although some outside
accounts call that assessment into question. According to President Bush in his late
2005 speeches, U.S. forces have now turned over 40 of the 90 military bases used to
the ISF, and the ISF control 90 square miles of Baghdad. In August 2005, U.S.
commanders turned over full control of the city of Najaf to the ISF.
On the other hand, U.S. commanders and outside observers say that the ISF
continue to lack an effective command structure, independent initiative, or
commitment to the mission, and that it could fragment if U.S. troops draw down.51
U.S. commanders said in October 2005 that the ISF is still 18 months to two years
away from being able to operate independently. A report on the Iraqi police by the
offices of the Inspector General of the State and Defense Departments, released July
15, 2005, said that many recruits are only marginally literate, and some recruits are
actually insurgents trying to infiltrate the ISF (p.3).52 In one notable example, about
three quarters of the 4,000-person police force in Mosul collapsed in the face of an
insurgent uprising there in November 2004. As an indicator of continued difficulties,
in late December 2005, the U.S. military refused to turn over control of central
Baghdad to an ISF brigade (5th Brigade) because the Iraqi government was insisting
on a leader of that brigade that U.S. officers did not consider qualified.
Another major issue is ethnic balance; U.S. commanders have acknowledged
difficulty recruiting Sunni Arabs into the ISF and have said this is a deficiency they
are trying to correct. Most of the ISF are Shiites, with Kurdish units mainly deployed
in the north of Iraq. Almost all Iraqi units are of a single ethnicity, and there are few
integrated units. Many Sunnis see the ISF as mostly Shiite and Kurdish instruments
of repression. Partly in an attempt to address that perception, during 2004, the United
States and Iraq conducted some “emergency recruitment” of former Saddam military
units, mostly Sunni ex-Baathists. These units, one of which — a police commando
brigade — is led by Saddam-era air force intelligence officer Adnan Thabit, have
stiffened some security operations but have also provoked threats by UIA and
Kurdish leaders, who fear a future Ba’th coup. Sunnis have also been recruited to
rebuild police forces in Mosul and Fallujah, which virtually collapsed in 2004.
As a result of the deficiencies of the ISF, in 2005 the U.S. military, based on
recommendations by Gen. Gary Luck, shifted up to 10,000 U.S. forces in Iraq to
embedding with Iraqi units (ten-person teams per Iraqi battalion), a trend that U.S.
officials say will continue in 2006. The embedding concept will be expanded in the
police forces as well in 2006, with several hundred U.S. personnel attached to each
police commando brigade, up from about 40 per brigade at the end of 2005. The
police embeds will not only promote discipline and command abilities but help curb
abuses against Sunnis and other human rights abuses.
51 Fallows, James. Why Iraq Has No Army. Atlantic Monthly, December 2005.
52 Inspectors General. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense.
Interagency Assessment of Iraqi Police Training. July 15, 2005.

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ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy. Maj. Gen. David Petraeus first oversaw the training of the ISF as
head of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).53 On
September 8, 2005, he was replaced by Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey. The
Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this training and equipping
mission; according to the October 2005 “2207 report,” a total of $5.02 billion in
FY2004 funds has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for, and in
some cases provide pay for) the ISF. Of the funds available, $4.7 billion in total U.S.
funds has been obligated as of December 7, and $3.96 billion of that has been
disbursed. The FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an
additional $5.7 billion to equip and train the ISF, funds to be controlled by the
Department of Defense and provided to MNSTC-I. When spent, that would bring
total ISF funding to $11 billion. The funds have been allocated as noted below.
ISF Components. The following, based on Administration reports from May
2005, are the status of the major Iraqi security institutions.54
Ministry of Defense/Military Forces. The following forces are considered
military forces, under the control of the Ministry of Defense.
! Iraqi Army. The CPA formally disbanded the former Iraqi army
following Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad; the outcome of that move is
still being debated. There are about 104,400 Army personnel,
organized as nine infantry divisions and one mechanized division.
They comprise 80 battalions, or about 55,000 personnel, at the first
three levels of readiness (capable of operating alongside U.S. forces
or better). The remaining 55,000 are not in formed units yet.
Recruits are paid $60 per month and receive eight weeks of training.
Of FY2004 and FY2005 funds, $1.9 billion is allocated for Iraqi
Army facilities; $721 million is for equipment; and $654 million for
training and operations.
! The Iraqi Intervention Force, another military force, is divided into
four brigades (perhaps about 3,000 personnel, included in “Army”
total ) trained and equipped. Recruits receive thirteen weeks of basic
and urban operations training.
! Special Operations Forces. These forces, included in “Army” total,
consist of “Iraqi Counter Terrorist Forces” (ICTF) and a
“Commando Battalion.” The forces are given 12 weeks of training,
mostly by Jordanian officers in Jordan. The Defense Department
says that there are 1,300 of these forces as of October 2005.
53 For more information on this mission, see [http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/].
54 Most of the information in this section comes from State Department weekly summaries
on Iraq. Numbers of some ISF categories are openly reported, but some specific categories
are classified and can only be estimated from open sources.

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! In the fall of 2005, MNSTC-I formed four “Strategic Infrastructure
Battalions” (about 3,000 personnel) to protect oil pipelines,
electricity infrastructure, and other facilities.
! Air Force. It currently has about its goal of 500, manning four
squadrons. Because the Saddam-era air force was destroyed in the
various wars with the United States, the new Air Force only flies
nine helicopters, three C-130s, and 14 propeller observation aircraft.
The UAE has said it would supply the Iraqi Air Force with some
additional unspecified combat aircraft, and Jordan is considering
providing 12 UH-1 helicopters. About $28 million in FY2004 funds
was allocated for Iraqi Air Force airfields (of those funds for the
Iraqi Army, above). Pilots undergo up to six months of training.
! Navy. This service has 800 operational personnel, roughly its target
size. It has a “Patrol Boat Squadron” and a “Coastal Defense
Regiment.” It is equipped with five patrol boats, with six more to be
delivered, 24 Fast Aluminum Boats to patrol Iraq’s waterways (out
to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf) to
prevent smuggling and infiltration. In March 2005, it took control
of its own naval base at Umm Qasr and, as of July 2005, U.S. Navy
personnel have turned over responsibility for Iraq’s Basrah port and
Khor Al Amaya oil terminals. The Royal Australian Navy is
training some of the Iraqi navy personnel.
! Military Training.55 U.S. training takes place at Taji, north of
Baghdad; Kirkush, near the Iranian border; and Numaniya, southeast
of Baghdad. All 26 NATO countries are participating in the NATO
Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I),56 which open a new headquarters in
September 2005 at Rustamiya, near Baghdad. As of September
2005, 151 NATO trainers are in Iraq, according to NATO officials
in Baghdad, with the goal of 300 trainers eventually. About 1,000
Iraqi officers are to be trained there each year. Additional Iraqi
officers are being trained (under NTM-I) at NATO facilities in
Norway, Germany, and Italy. Other countries performing training
under bilateral agreements are Jordan (1,500 Iraqi officers trained
at Zarqa Military College), Egypt (146 officers), and Poland. A
number of other countries, such as Spain, Turkey, France (police),
Malaysia, and Morocco, have offered military training, but the offers
were not responded to by Iraq.
55 For information on foreign contributions to the training of the ISF, see CRS Report
RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and
Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard.
56 France, Belgium, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, and Germany had previously declined to
send troops to Iraq to participate in the NTM-I, although some of these countries were
providing bilateral training outside Iraq.

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! Equipment. Iraqi military forces are poorly equipped because much
of Iraq’s arsenal was destroyed in OIF. The new military is being
supplied with U.S. and other donated equipment and some repaired
Iraqi equipment. NATO countries from the former East bloc are
donating tanks and other mostly Russian-made equipment
compatible with the Soviet-era equipment used by the former
regime. In November 2005, 77 T-72 tanks donated by Poland
arrived in Iraq, giving the new army its first modern battle tanks.
! On November 21, 2003, the Bush Administration issued a
determination repealing a U.S. ban on arms exports to Iraq so that
the United States can supply weapons to the ISF; authority to repeal
this ban was granted in an FY2003 emergency supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 108-11), subject to a determination that sales to
Iraq are “in the national interest.” On July 21, 2004, the
Administration determined that Iraq would be treated as a friendly
nation in evaluating U.S. arms sales to Iraqi security forces and that
such sales would be made in accordance with the Foreign Assistance
Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
Ministry of Interior/Police Forces. The following are police forces under
the Ministry of Interior, which is advised by the Civilian Police Assistance Training
Team (CPATT). However, many of these police forces are being trained to perform
counter-insurgency missions rather than traditional policing.
! Iraqi Police Service (IPS). There are 77,500 IPS personnel, divided
primarily into provincial police departments, trained and equipped
thus far. This number includes the 1,300 person Highway Patrol.
The goal of the police force is 135,000 by February 2007. New
police receive eight weeks of training, are paid $60 per month, and
must pass a background check ensuring they do not have a record of
human rights violations or criminal activity. They are recruited
locally, making them susceptible to intimidation by insurgents in
restive areas. Of FY2004 and FY2005 funds, $1.808 billion has
been allocated for police training.
! Other Police Forces. There are a number of other “police” forces,
focused on counter-insurgency missions and organized into
battalions. They are (1) the Bureau of Dignitary Protection,
designed to protect Iraqi leaders, with about 500 personnel; (2) the
Special Police Commandos, counter-insurgency units with about
10,000 personnel. It receives four weeks of training; (3) the
Emergency Response Unit (ERU), a 300-person hostage rescue
force; the Mechanized Police, which has about 1,200 personnel; and
Public Order Police, with a total of about 7,000 personnel.
! Border Enforcement. This force is also included in the MOI forces.
Intended to prevent cross-border infiltration, it has about 17,000
personnel. It now controls 258 border forts (built or under
construction) all along Iraq’s frontiers to keep out insurgent fighters.

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It also has a Riverine Police component to secure water crossings
(Shatt al-Arab, dividing Iran and Iraq). Members of these forces
receive four weeks of training. Of FY2004 and FY2005 funds,
$437 million is allocated for this force.
! Police Training and Funding. Police training is taking place mostly
in Jordan (Jordan International Police Training Center, JIPTC); Iraq
(Baghdad Police College and seven regional academies; and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE). The countries contributing police
instructors in these locations include United States, Canada, Britain,
Australia, Sweden, Poland, UAE, Denmark, Austria, Finland, the
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore,
and Belgium. Also, Egypt trained 258 officers in Egypt in August
2004. Several countries, such as France and Belgium, as well as
most of the countries discussed above under “military training,”
have offered to train Iraqi police forces.57
! Facilities Protection Service. This is a force that consists of the
approximately 75,000 security guards that protect installations such
as oil pumping stations, electricity substations, and government
buildings. This force is not counted in U.S. totals for Iraq’s forces
because it is not controlled by either the Ministry of Interior or
Ministry of Defense. Of FY2004 and FY2005 funds, $53 million
has been allocated for this service.
Irregular and Militia Forces. As noted earlier, many of the major political
factions maintain militia forces separate from the ISF. Some militia members have
joined the ISF but retain loyalties to the parties or figures that sponsored them rather
than to the ISF command structure. The most prominent are the Kurds’ Peshmerga,
SCIRI’s Badr Organization, and Sadr’s Mahdi Army. The State Department report
on human rights in Iraq, released on February 28, 2005, notes numerous human rights
abuses of the interim government, mostly by the largely Shiite police, but attributes
the abuses to the interim government’s drive to secure the country.58 As noted above,
U.S. officers say that they will be focusing on professionalizing the Iraqi police
forces in 2006 that have been most widely cited as riddled with militia loyalists.
! Kurdish Peshmerga. Together, the KDP and PUK may have as
many as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of whom are now
operating as unofficial security organs in northern Iraqi cities. Some
are integrated into the ISF and deploy in such cities as Mosul and
Baghdad. Kurdish ISF units reportedly were a major component of
the ISF forces that fought alongside U.S. forces in offensives at Tal
Affar in September 2005. Peshmerga units have sometimes fought
each other; in May 1994, the KDP and the PUK clashed with each
other over territory, customs revenues, and control over the Kurdish
regional government in Irbil.
57 France has offered to train Iraqi police forces in Qatar.
58 U.S. State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Iraq. Feb. 28, 2005.

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! Badr Brigades. The militia of SCIRI numbers about 20,000 and is
led by Hadi al-Amiri (a member of the National Assembly). The
Badr Brigades were formed, trained, and equipped by Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard, politically aligned with Iran’s hardliners,
during the Iran-Iraq war, during which Badr guerrillas conducted
forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials.
Most Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners
of war held in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed SCIRI as
an Iranian puppet, and Badr operations in southern Iraq during the
1980s and 1990s did not spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi
regime. The Badr Organization registered as a separate political
entity, in addition to its SCIRI parent, for the January 30 election and
the December 15 election.
! Badr militiamen play unofficial policing roles in Basra, Najaf, and
elsewhere in southern Iraq, and many Badr members also reputedly
are in the ISF, particularly the police, which is led by the SCIRI-
dominated Interior Ministry. A related militia, called the “Wolf
Brigade” is a Badr offshoot that is formally part of the police. It is
also led by a SCIRI activist. Many Sunnis have accused Badr
fighters both in and outside the ISF of operating as “death squads,”
arresting or conducting retaliatory attacks on Sunnis. Those charges
gained strength on November 16, 2005, with the discovery by U.S.
forces of a secret Ministry of Interior detention facility. The facility,
allegedly run by Badr militiamen, housed 170 Sunni Arab detainees
who allegedly were tortured. At least two other such facilities, run
by the Wolf Brigade, were uncovered in December 2005. In another
example, on August 9, 2005, Badr fighters reportedly helped SCIRI
member Hussein al-Tahaan forcibly replace Ali al-Tamimi as mayor
of Baghdad.
! Mahdi Army. This militia was formed by Moqtada al-Sadr in mid-
2003; its size is unknown, but it is re-gaining strength since U.S.
military operations put down the militia’s uprisings in April 2004
and August 2004 in southern Iraq and Sadr City of Baghdad. In each
case, fighting was ended with compromises under which Mahdi
forces stopped fighting (and in some cases traded in some of their
weapons for money) in exchange for lenient treatment or releases of
prisoners, amnesty for Sadr himself, and reconstruction aid. The
Mahdi Army has since ended active anti-U.S. combat and Sadr City
has been relatively peaceful, but Mahdi fighters, reportedly with the
tacit approval of U.S. forces, continue to patrol that district and parts
of other Shiite cities, particularly Basra. Mahdi (and Badr)
assertiveness in Basra has partly accounted for a sharp deterioration
of relations since July 2005 between Iraqi officials in Basra and the
British forces based there. About nine British soldiers have died in
attacks in that area since then, and in October 2005, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair publicly blamed Iran for arming Iraqi groups,
particularly the Mahdi Army, responsible for the soldiers’ deaths.
In one dispute, British forces forcibly rescued British special forces

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soldiers taken into official custody in Basra. Mahdi and Badr forces
have occasionally clashed as well, most recently in October 2005.
Coalition-Building and Maintenance59
Some Members believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient
efforts to enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that
the U.S. mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military
personnel contributions. As of January 11, 2006, 26 coalition partner forces are
contributing 21,000 forces, but that total is expected to fall. Poland and Britain lead
multinational divisions in central and southern Iraq, respectively. The UK-led force
(UK forces alone number about 8,000) is based in Basra; the Poland-led force (Polish
forces number 1,700) is based in Hilla.
The coalition in Iraq has been shrinking since Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of
its 1,300 troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004 Madrid
bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had
supported the war effort. However, Spain has said it might train Iraqi security forces
at a center outside Madrid. Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
followed Spain’s withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in
July 2004 after one of its citizens was taken hostage and threatened with beheading.
On the other hand, many nations are replacing their contingents with trainers for the
ISF or financial contributions or other assistance to Iraq. Among recent changes:
! Hungary completed a pullout of its 300 forces in December 2004.
! Italy announced on March 15, 2005, that it would begin withdrawing
its force of 3,200 in September 2005; the announcement came after
the U.S. wounding of an Italian journalist who was leaving Iraq after
being released by insurgents. However, after discussions with U.S.
officials, Italy delayed its departure into an unspecified time frame
in 2006.
! Thailand, New Zealand, and Norway withdrew in early 2005, and
Norway’s 20 personnel were withdrawn in October 2005.
! In March 2005, Poland drew down to 1,700 from its prior force level
of 2,400. In February 2006, it will reduce further to about 900, but
the presence of those has been extended to the end of 2006.
Previously, Poland was planning to completely withdraw, but a new
government elected in November 2005 modified that position.
59 For additional information on international contributions to Iraq peacekeeping and
reconstruction, see CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to
Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher
Blanchard.

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! In March 2005, the Netherlands withdrew its 1,350 troops, although
some remain. Some U.K. forces have taken over the Netherlands
force’s duty to help protect Japan’s forces in Samawa.
! Ukraine, which lost eight of its soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent
attack, withdrew 150 personnel from their base 25 miles south of
Baghdad in March 2005. Ukraine says it will complete its
withdrawal in early 2006, but it adds that it might give equipment to
the Iraqi military.
! In February 2004, Portugal withdrew its 127 paramilitary officers.
! Bulgaria completed the pullout of its 400-member unit after the
December 15 Iraqi elections. Bulgaria has said it would continue to
contribute to NTM-I and would increase its civilian reconstruction
contingent in Iraq.
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and its cabinet voted on November 21 to withdraw one-third of its
remaining 3,300 forces in late 2005, but to keep the remainder in
until the end of 2006.
! Japan decided in mid-December 2005 to extend the deployment of
its 600-person military reconstruction contingent in Samawah until
the end of 2006.
! Some countries have increased forces to compensate for
withdrawals. Singapore deployed 180 troops in November 2004
after a hiatus of several months. Azerbaijan also has increase forces.
! In February 2005, El Salvador agreed to send a replacement
contingent of 380 soldiers to replace those who are rotating out.
! In February 2005, Australia added 450 troops, bringing its
contribution to over 900.
! In March 2005, Georgia sent an additional 550 troops to Iraq to help
guard the United Nations facilities, bringing its total Iraq deployment
to 850. In March 2005, Albania increased its force by 50, giving it
about 120 troops in Iraq.
NATO/EU/Other Offers of Civilian Training. As noted above, all NATO
countries have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to
contribute funds or equipment. Several NATO countries and others are offering to
train not only Iraqi security but also civilian personnel. In addition to the security
training offers discussed above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help
train Iraqi police, administrators, and judges outside Iraq. At the June 22, 2005
Brussels conference discussed above, the EU pledged a $130 million package to help
Iraq write its permanent constitution and reform government ministries; Norway
offered energy sector cooperation, and Turkey offered to conduct seminars on

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CRS-39
democracy for Iraqis. Japan has made a similar offer on constitutional drafting, and
Malaysia has offered to train Iraqi civil servants. The FY2005 supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $99 million to set up a regional counter-
terrorism center in Jordan to train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
In July 2004, Secretary of State Powell said the United States would consider
a Saudi proposal for a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to perform
peacekeeping in Iraq, reportedly under separate command. However, the idea
floundered because of opposition from potential contributing countries.
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy”
Some Members say that major new initiatives need to be considered to ensure
success of the U.S. mission in Iraq, and debates emerged over several congressional
resolutions proposing an “exit strategy” in November 2005. At the same time, the
Administration is reducing the U.S commitment somewhat with a minor troop
drawdown and by refraining from asking for additional U.S. reconstruction funds for
Iraq beyond what has been appropriated already. The Administration has also
adjusted U.S. goals in Iraq, now asserting that the United States is needed only until
Iraqi forces can combat the insurgency themselves, rather than until the insurgency
is ended. Some of the ideas widely circulated among Members and other policy
experts are discussed below.
Troop Increase. Some, including Senator John McCain, have said that the
United States should increase its troops in Iraq in an effort to prevent insurgents
from re-infiltrating areas cleared by U.S. operations. Some experts believe the extra
troops needed for such an effort might number about 100,000.60 The Administration
asserts that U.S. commanders feel that planned force levels are sufficient to complete
the mission, and that U.S. commanders are able to request additional forces, if
needed, and have not done so. Some experts believe that troop level increases
would aggravate Sunni Arabs already resentful of the U.S. intervention in Iraq and
that even many more U.S. troops would not necessarily produce stability. Others
believe that increasing U.S. force levels would further the impression that the Iraqi
government depends on the United States for its survival and that the United States
is deepening its commitment without a clear exit strategy.
Immediate Withdrawal. Some Members argue that the United States should
begin to withdraw virtually immediately. Supporters of this position tend to argue
that the decision to invade Iraq and change its regime was a mistake in light of the
failure thus far to locate WMD, that a continued large U.S. presence in Iraq is
inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S.
casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Those who take this position
include Representatives Lynne Woolsey, Maxine Waters, and Barbara Lee, who
together with about 47 other Members, initiated an “Out of Iraq Caucus.” In
November 2005, a prominent defense-oriented Member, Representative John
Murtha, publicly articulated a similar position, calling for an “immediate” pullout
60 Bersia, John. “The Courage Needed to Win the War,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 9,
2005.

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(over six months) and the maintenance of an “over the horizon” presence available
to help the Iraqis. A resolution introduced by Murtha (H.J.Res. 73) calls for a U.S.
withdrawal “at the earliest practicable date,” and the maintenance of an “over the
horizon” U.S. presence to help the ISF. As re-written by Representative Duncan
Hunter, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, a related resolution
failed 403-3 on November 18, 2005. Other bills, such as H.R. 3142 and H.Con.Res.
197, state that it [should be] U.S. policy not to maintain a permanent or long-term
presence in Iraq.
Withdrawal Timetable. Another alternative is the setting of a timetable for
a U.S. withdrawal. This has been exemplified by H.J.Res. 55, introduced by five
House Members from both parties, including Representative Walter Jones, which
calls on the Administration to begin a withdrawal by October 2006. In November
2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view that the United States needs to force internal
compromise in Iraq by threatening to withdraw, introduced an amendment to S. 1042
(defense authorization bill) to compel the Administration to work on a timetable for
withdrawal (during 2006). On November 10, 2005, Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee John Warner reworked the Levin proposal into an amendment
that stopped short of setting a timetable for withdrawal but requires an
Administration report on a “schedule for meeting conditions” that could permit a
U.S. withdrawal. That measure, which also states in its preamble that “2006 should
be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty,” achieved bi-partisan
support, passing 79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications by House
conferees, in the conference report on the bill (H.R. 1815, H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-
163). Senator Russ Feingold expressed a view similar to that of Senator Levin in
August 2005 when Senator Feingold called for a withdrawal of U.S. forces by the
end of 2006. His resolution (S.Res. 171) calls for the Administration to report to
Congress on the time frame needed for the United States to complete its mission.
Troop Drawdown. Responding to the November 2005 congressional action,
President Bush and U.S. commanders remained adamant in their stated opposition
to the setting of any timetable for troop pullouts, let alone an immediate pullout.
They maintained that the Iraqi government would collapse upon an immediate
pullout, representing a victory for such terrorist figures as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
However, as noted above, the President has announced a small drawdown in early
2006 (to about 135,000), and senior U.S. military officials have said there are plans
for a substantial drawdown (40,000 - 50,000 of the total contingent) later in 2006 if
there is continued political progress and the insurgency does not escalate. On the
other hand, assessing the state of the insurgency, it might be difficult to withdraw that
large a proportion of the U.S. force without producing major insurgent advances.
Some Members appear to favor the idea of a troop drawdown. In December
2005, Senator John Kerry said the United States should reduce its forces by “at least”
100,000 by the end of 2006. Senator Joseph Biden, ranking Democrat on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, has said publicly that a drawdown is likely in early
2006. Senator Hillary Clinton wrote to constituents in late November 2005 that the

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CRS-41
United States might begin withdrawing troops after the December 15 elections, if
those elections are successful.61
Power-Sharing Formulas. Both the Administration strategy for Iraq and its
critics have identified the need to bring more Sunni Arabs into the political process
to undercut support for the insurgency. As noted above, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad
has been reaching out to Sunni groups, and has persuaded some to participate openly
in the political process. Three major Sunni groups formed a slate in the December
15 elections, and campaigning was vigorous even in formerly restive towns. Some
believe that a key to progress in this effort will be U.S. ability to persuade the Shiites
and Kurds to agree to major amendments to the constitution during the four month
amendment process that begins after the December 15 election. Another unknown
is what package of incentives would persuade most Sunnis to end support for the
insurgency and fully support the government. Many experts believe that the Sunnis
will only settle for a share of power that is perhaps slightly less than that wielded by
the majority Shiites, even though the Shiites greatly outnumber Sunni Arabs in Iraq.
Negotiating With the Insurgents. In addition to exploring power sharing
arrangements with moderate Sunni leaders, the Administration appears to have
adopted a recommendation by early critics of U.S. policy to negotiate with some
Sunni figures representing the insurgency and with low-level insurgent fighters.
These include members of the MCA, and the two main MCA leaders did attend the
conference on Iraq in Cairo in November 2005. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
earlier confirmed to journalists (June 2005) that such discussions had been taking
place and some of these talks reportedly are intended to help U.S. forces defeat
Zarqawi’s foreign insurgent faction. However, these talks do not appear to have
resulted in major insurgent factions laying down their arms, to date, and some believe
the United States might need to talk directly to insurgent leaders. According to this
view, insurgent commanders want not only an increased role for Sunnis in
government but also, at the very least, a withdrawal of mostly Sunni or Kurdish ISF
forces from Sunni-inhabited areas, as well as U.S. withdrawal. For now, the
Administration has ruled out talks with actual insurgent commanders that have
conducted violent attacks, according to General Casey on December 13, 2005
(Chicago Tribune, “Iraqi Insurgents Reach Out to U.S.”). Some U.S. officials appear
to believe that talking directly with insurgents would increase insurgent leverage and
embolden them to continue violent attacks.
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction. Some believe that the key to
calming Iraq is to accelerate economic reconstruction. According to this view,
accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment,
improving public services, and creating confidence in the government. This idea
appears to have been incorporated into the President’s “National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq” document and the formation of the PRTs, as discussed above. Others doubt
that economic improvement alone will produce major political results. According
to this view, the divisions among Iraq’s major factions are fundamental and resistant
to amelioration by an improved economy. In addition, the U.S. refraining from
61 Healy, Patrick. Senator Clinton Calls for Withdrawal From Iraq to Begin in 2006. New
York Times, November 30, 2005.

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CRS-42
requesting additional reconstruction funds might indicate that the Administration has
not found this idea persuasive.
Focus on Local Security. Another idea advanced by experts, and which
appears to form the core of the Administration’s “clear, hold, and build” approach
in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, is for the United States to shift its focus
from broad counter-insurgency combat operations to local efforts to improve the
sense of security of average Iraqis, which would deny the insurgents popular
support.62 At least one version of this idea, advanced by Andrew Krepinevich in the
September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,63 says that the United States
should devote substantial resources to providing security and reconstruction in
selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that would attract support and be
expanded to other areas and eventually throughout Iraq.

62 Pollack, Kenneth. “Five Ways to Win Back Iraq,” New York Times op-ed. July 1, 2005.
63 Krepinevich, Andrew. “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2005.

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CRS-43
Table 2. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
(Amounts in millions of U.S. $)
Unspecified
War
opposition
INC
crimes
Broadcasting
activities
Total
FY1998
—
2.0
5.0 (RFE/RL
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
for “Radio Free
Iraq)
FY1999
3.0
3.0
—
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY2000
—
2.0
—
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid in Iraq)
(INC radio)
FY2002
—
—
—
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
FY2003
3.1
—
—
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
Total,
18.1
9.0
11.0
49.9
88.0
FY1998-FY2003
(about 14.5
million of this
went to INC
FY2004 (request)
—
—
—
0
0
Notes: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003. Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London. The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs. Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used. In August 2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds. The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq. The figures above do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources. Much of the “war
crimes” funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks. During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs. See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation, Apr. 2004.

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Figure 1. Map of Iraq
Caspian
Sea
T u r k e y
Zakhu
Dahuk
Tall 'Afar
Al Mawsil (Mosul)
Irbil
As Sulaymaniyah
Chamchamal
Kirkuk
Khurma
S y r i a
Halabjah
Tuz Khurmatu
Tikrit
Anah
Qarah Tappah
I r a n
Balad
Al Khalis
Ba'Qubah
Mandali
Hit
Al Jadidah
Ar Ramadi
Al Fallujah
Al A`Zamiyah
Al Habbaniyah
Baghdad
Ar Rutbah
Al Mahmudiyah
I r a q
Sal Man Pak
Jordan
Karbala'
An Nu'Maniyah
Al Kut
Al Hillah
Kut Al Hayy
Al Kufah Ad Diwaniyah
Al Amarah
An Najaf
Qawam Al Hamzah
Ar Rifa
Al Majarr Al Kabir
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Suq Ash Shuyukh
Al Basrah
Az Zubayr
Persian
Kuwait
Gulf
S a u d i A r a b i a
Al-Kuwait
0
100 Miles
0
100 KM
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 7/21/04)

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